The Principles of Psychology
{"WorkMasterId":7513,"WpPageId":288898,"ParentWpPageId":193821,"Slug":"principles-of-psychology","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/principles-of-psychology/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/principles-of-psychology/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":2149398,"CleanHtmlLength":2093700,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"The Principles of Psychology","Deck":"James presents consciousness, habit, attention, emotion, will, self, perception, and psychology as an empirical science.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/william-james-01-alice-boughton-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"William James by Alice M. Boughton","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"William James","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","Copies":["1842 CE – 1910 CE","New York City, New York","American philosopher and psychologist whose pragmatism, radical empiricism, stream-of-consciousness psychology, pluralism, and philosophy of religion reshaped modern philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1890 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1890 CE for the two-volume first edition.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"The Principles of Psychology","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-mind"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-science"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #57628 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["James presents consciousness, habit, attention, emotion, will, self, perception, and psychology as an empirical science."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Principles of Psychology","KeyConcepts":"stream of consciousness; habit; attention; will; emotion; self; psychology","Methodology":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported.","Structure":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."},"Arguments":["James presents consciousness, habit, attention, emotion, will, self, perception, and psychology as an empirical science."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as James\u0027s major psychology and philosophy-of-mind work via SEP, Britannica, Commons title-page evidence, catalog records, and scholarship.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as James\u0027s major psychology and philosophy-of-mind work via SEP, Britannica, Commons title-page evidence, catalog records, and scholarship."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #57628\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57628\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["James presents consciousness, habit, attention, emotion, will, self, perception, and psychology as an empirical science."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Principles of Psychology"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"stream of consciousness; habit; attention; will; emotion; self; psychology"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["James presents consciousness, habit, attention, emotion, will, self, perception, and psychology as an empirical science."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, phenomenology of experience, philosophy of religion, pluralism, moral psychology, process thought, analytic pragmatism, and modern discussions of consciousness."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as James\u0027s major psychology and philosophy-of-mind work via SEP, Britannica, Commons title-page evidence, catalog records, and scholarship.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as James\u0027s major psychology and philosophy-of-mind work via SEP, Britannica, Commons title-page evidence, catalog records, and scholarship."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57628\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #57628\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 500px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"titlepage\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-cover.jpg\" style=\"width: 500px\" id=\"img_images_cover.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chapl\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch1\u003eTHE PRINCIPLES\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\nOF\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\nPSYCHOLOGY\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eBY\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eWILLIAM JAMES\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003ePROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIN TWO VOLUMES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVOL. I\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003eNEW YORK\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e1918\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\" style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\r\nTO\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMY DEAR FRIEND\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFRANÇOIS PILLON.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAS A TOKEN OF AFFECTION,\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF WHAT I OWE\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTO THE\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_v\"\u003e[Pg v]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ca id=\"PREFACE\"\u003ePREFACE.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe treatise which follows has in the main grown up in\r\nconnection with the author\u0027s class-room instruction in\r\nPsychology, although it is true that some of the chapters\r\nare more \u0027metaphysical,\u0027 and others fuller of detail, than\r\nis suitable for students who are going over the subject for\r\nthe first time. The consequence of this is that, in spite of\r\nthe exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and\r\npain, and moral and æsthetic feelings and judgments, the\r\nwork has grown to a length which no one can regret more\r\nthan the writer himself. The man must indeed be sanguine\r\nwho, in this crowded age, can hope to have many readers\r\nfor fourteen hundred continuous pages from his pen. But\r\n\u003ci\u003ewer Vieles bringt wird Manchem etwas bringen\u003c/i\u003e; and, by judiciously\r\nskipping according to their several needs, I am sure\r\nthat many sorts of readers, even those who are just beginning\r\nthe study of the subject, will find my book of use.\r\nSince the beginners are most in need of guidance, I suggest\r\nfor their behoof that they omit altogether on a first\r\nreading chapters 6, 7, 8, 10 (from page 330 to page 371),\r\n12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, and 28. The better to awaken the\r\nneophyte\u0027s interest, it is possible that the wise order would\r\nbe to pass directly from chapter 4 to chapters 23, 24, 25,\r\nand 26, and thence to return to the first volume again.\r\nChapter 20, on Space-perception, is a terrible thing, which,\r\nunless written with all that detail, could not be fairly\r\ntreated at all. An abridgment of it, called \u0027The Spatial\r\nQuale,\u0027 which appeared in the Journal of Speculative\r\nPhilosophy, vol. xiii, p. 64, may be found by some persons\r\na useful substitute for the entire chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have kept close to the point of view of natural science\r\nthroughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_vi\"\u003e[Pg vi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndata uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements\r\nbetween which its own \u0027laws\u0027 obtain, and from\r\nwhich its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the\r\nscience of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1)\r\n\u003ci\u003ethoughts and feelings\u003c/i\u003e, and (2) \u003ci\u003ea physical world\u003c/i\u003e in time and\r\nspace with which they coexist and which (3) \u003ci\u003ethey know\u003c/i\u003e. Of\r\ncourse these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion\r\nof them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics\r\nand falls outside the province of this book. This\r\nbook, assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are\r\nvehicles of knowledge, thereupon contends that psychology\r\nwhen she has ascertained the empirical correlation of the\r\nvarious sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions\r\nof the brain, can go no farther—can go no farther, that is,\r\nas a natural science. If she goes farther she becomes\r\nmetaphysical. All attempts to \u003ci\u003eexplain\u003c/i\u003e our phenomenally\r\ngiven thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities\r\n(whether the latter be named \u0027Soul,\u0027 \u0027Transcendental\r\nEgo,\u0027 \u0027Ideas,\u0027 or \u0027Elementary Units of Consciousness\u0027) are\r\nmetaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the\r\nassociationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this\r\nstrictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature\r\nof it for which I feel tempted to claim originality. Of\r\ncourse this point of view is anything but ultimate. Men\r\nmust keep thinking; and the data assumed by psychology,\r\njust like those assumed by physics and the other natural\r\nsciences, must some time be overhauled. The effort to\r\noverhaul them clearly and thoroughly is metaphysics;\r\nbut metaphysics can only perform her task well when distinctly\r\nconscious of its great extent. Metaphysics fragmentary,\r\nirresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that\r\nshe is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects\r\nherself into a natural science. And it seems to me\r\nthat the theories both of a spiritual agent and of associated\r\n\u0027ideas\u0027 are, as they figure in the psychology-books, just such\r\nmetaphysics as this. Even if their results be true, it\r\nwould be as well to keep them, \u003ci\u003eas thus presented\u003c/i\u003e, out of\r\npsychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of\r\nphysics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_vii\"\u003e[Pg vii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with\r\nbrain-states as the ultimate laws for our science. The\r\nreader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book.\r\nIt is mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into\r\nqueries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of\r\nher task can hope successfully to deal with. That will\r\nperhaps be centuries hence; and meanwhile the best mark\r\nof health that a science can show is this unfinished-seeming\r\nfront.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe completion of the book has been so slow that\r\nseveral chapters have been published successively in Mind,\r\nthe Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the Popular Science\r\nMonthly, and Scribner\u0027s Magazine. Acknowledgment is\r\nmade in the proper places.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe bibliography, I regret to say, is quite unsystematic.\r\nI have habitually given my authority for special\r\nexperimental facts; but beyond that I have aimed mainly\r\nto cite books that would probably be actually used by\r\nthe ordinary American college-student in his collateral\r\nreading. The bibliography in W. Volkmann von Volkmar\u0027s\r\nLehrbuch der Psychologie (1875) is so complete, up to its\r\ndate, that there is no need of an inferior duplicate. And\r\nfor more recent references, Sully\u0027s Outlines, Dewey\u0027s Psychology,\r\nand Baldwin\u0027s Handbook of Psychology may be\r\nadvantageously used.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to\r\nsingle out particular creditors; yet I cannot resist the\r\ntemptation at the end of my first literary venture to record\r\nmy gratitude for the inspiration I have got from the writings\r\nof J. S. Mill, Lotze, Renouvier, Hodgson, and Wundt,\r\nand from the intellectual companionship (to name only five\r\nnames) of Chauncey Wright and Charles Peirce in old\r\ntimes, and more recently of Stanley Hall, James Putnam,\r\nand Josiah Royce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHarvard University\u003c/span\u003e, August 1890.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_viii\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e[Pg ix]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ca id=\"CONTENTS\"\u003eCONTENTS.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#PSYCHOLOGY\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Scope of Psychology\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMental Manifestations depend on Cerebral Conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nPursuit of ends and choice are the marks of Mind\u0027s presence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_II\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Functions of the Brain\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReflex, semi-reflex, and voluntary acts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e. The Frog\u0027s nerve-centres,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e. General notion of the hemispheres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e. Their\r\nEducation—the Meynert scheme, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e. The phrenological contrasted\r\nwith the physiological conception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e. The localization\r\nof function in the hemispheres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e. The motor zone, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e. Motor\r\nAphasia, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e. The sight-centre, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e. Mental blindness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e. The\r\nhearing-centre, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e. Sensory Aphasia, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e. Centres for smell and\r\ntaste, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e. The touch-centre, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e. Man\u0027s Consciousness limited to\r\nthe hemispheres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e. The restitution of function, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e. Final\r\ncorrection of the Meynert scheme, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e. Conclusions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_III\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOn Some General Conditions of Brain-activity\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe summation of Stimuli, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e. Reaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e. Cerebral\r\nblood-supply, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e. Cerebral Thermometry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e. Phosphorus and\r\nThought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IV136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHabit\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDue to plasticity of neural matter, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e. Produces ease of\r\naction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e. Diminishes attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_115\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e. Concatenated performances,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_116\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e. Ethical implications and pedagogic maxims, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Automaton-theory\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe theory described, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e. Reasons for it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e. Reasons\r\nagainst it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_x\"\u003e[Pg x]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Mind-stuff Theory\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvolutionary Psychology demands a Mind-dust, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e. Some\r\nalleged proofs that it exists, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e. Refutation of these proofs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nSelf-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e. Can\r\nstates of mind be unconscious? \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e. Refutation of alleged proofs\r\nof unconscious thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e. Difficulty of stating the connection\r\nbetween mind and brain, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e. \u0027The Soul\u0027 is logically the least\r\nobjectionable hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e. Conclusion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Methods and Snares of Psychology\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychology is a natural Science, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e. Introspection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nExperiment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e. Sources of error, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e. The \u0027Psychologist\u0027s\r\nfallacy,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Relations of Minds to other Things\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTime relations: lapses of Consciousness—Locke \u003ci\u003ev\u003c/i\u003e. Descartes,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_200\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e. The \u0027unconsciousness\u0027 of hysterics not genuine, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nMinds may split into dissociated parts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e. Space-relations:\r\nthe Seat of the Soul, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e. Cognitive relations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e. The Psychologist\u0027s\r\npoint of view, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e. Two kinds of knowledge, acquaintance\r\nand knowledge about, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Stream of Thought\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsciousness tends to the personal form, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e. It is in constant\r\nchange, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e. It is sensibly continuous, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e. \u0027Substantive\u0027\r\nand \u0027transitive\u0027 parts of Consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e. Feelings of relation,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_245\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e. Feelings of tendency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_249\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e. The \u0027fringe\u0027 of the\r\nobject, \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e. The feeling of rational sequence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e. Thought\r\npossible in any kind of mental material, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e. Thought and language,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_267\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e267\u003c/a\u003e. Consciousness is cognitive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e. The word Object,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e. Every cognition is due to one integral pulse of thought\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e. Diagrams of Thought\u0027s stream, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e. Thought is always\r\nselective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Consciousness of Self\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Empirical Self or Me, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e. Its constituents, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e. The\r\nmaterial self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e. The Social Self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e. The Spiritual Self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nDifficulty of apprehending Thought as a purely spiritual activity,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e[Pg xi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_299\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e. Emotions of Self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_305\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e305\u003c/a\u003e. Rivalry and conflict of one\u0027s different\r\nselves, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e. Their hierarchy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_313\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e313\u003c/a\u003e. What Self we love in \u0027Self-love,\u0027\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_317\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e. The Pure Ego, \u003ca href=\"#Page_329\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e. The verifiable ground of the\r\nsense of personal identity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_332\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e332\u003c/a\u003e. The passing Thought is the only\r\nThinker which Psychology requires, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e. Theories of Self-consciousness:\r\n1) The theory of the Soul, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e. 2) The Associationist\r\ntheory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e. 3) The Transcendentalist theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e. The mutations\r\nof the Self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e. Insane delusions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e. Alternating selves,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_379\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e379\u003c/a\u003e. Mediumships or possessions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e. Summary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_400\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e400\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAttention\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIts neglect by English psychologists, \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e. Description of it,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_404\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e404\u003c/a\u003e. To how many things can we attend at once? \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e. Wundt\u0027s\r\nexperiments on displacement of date of impressions simultaneously\r\nattended to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_410\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e410\u003c/a\u003e. Personal equation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_413\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e413\u003c/a\u003e. The varieties of\r\nattention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_416\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e416\u003c/a\u003e. Passive attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e418\u003c/a\u003e. Voluntary attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_420\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e420\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nAttention\u0027s effects on sensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_425\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e425\u003c/a\u003e;—on discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_426\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e426\u003c/a\u003e;—on\r\nrecollection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e;—on reaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e. The neural process\r\nin attention: 1) Accommodation of sense-organ, \u003ca href=\"#Page_434\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e434\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n2) Preperception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_438\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e438\u003c/a\u003e. Is voluntary attention a resultant or a\r\nforce? \u003ca href=\"#Page_447\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e447\u003c/a\u003e. The effort to attend can be conceived as a\r\nresultant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_450\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e450\u003c/a\u003e. Conclusion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_453\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e453\u003c/a\u003e. Acquired Inattention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_455\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConception\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e459\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sense of sameness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e459\u003c/a\u003e. Conception defined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_461\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e. Conceptions\r\nare unchangeable, \u003ca href=\"#Page_464\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e. Abstract ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e468\u003c/a\u003e. Universals,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_473\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e473\u003c/a\u003e. The conception \u0027of the same\u0027 is not the \u0027same state\u0027 of\r\nmind, \u003ca href=\"#Page_480\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e480\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiscrimination and Comparison\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_483\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e483\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke on discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_483\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e483\u003c/a\u003e. Martineau \u003ci\u003editto\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_484\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e484\u003c/a\u003e. Simultaneous\r\nsensations originally fuse into one object, \u003ca href=\"#Page_488\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e488\u003c/a\u003e. The\r\nprinciple of mediate comparison, \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e. Not all differences are\r\ndifferences of composition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_490\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e490\u003c/a\u003e. The conditions of discrimination,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_494\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e494\u003c/a\u003e. The sensation of difference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_495\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e495\u003c/a\u003e. The transcendentalist\r\ntheory of the perception of differences uncalled for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_498\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e498\u003c/a\u003e. The\r\nprocess of analysis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_502\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e502\u003c/a\u003e. The process of abstraction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_505\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e505\u003c/a\u003e. The\r\nimprovement of discrimination by practice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e508\u003c/a\u003e. Its two causes,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_510\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e510\u003c/a\u003e. Practical interests limit our discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e. Reaction-time\r\nafter discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_523\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e523\u003c/a\u003e. The perception of likeness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e528\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nThe magnitude of differences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e. The measurement of discriminative \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xii\"\u003e[Pg xii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsensibility: Weber\u0027s law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_533\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e533\u003c/a\u003e. Fechner\u0027s interpretation\r\nof this as the psycho-physic law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e537\u003c/a\u003e. Criticism thereof, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e545\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIV463\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XIV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAssociation\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_550\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e550\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem of the connection of our thoughts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_550\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e550\u003c/a\u003e. It\r\ndepends on mechanical conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e553\u003c/a\u003e. Association is of objects\r\nthought of, not of \u0027ideas,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#Page_554\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e554\u003c/a\u003e. The rapidity of association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e557\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nThe \u0027law of contiguity,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e561\u003c/a\u003e. The elementary law of association,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_566\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e566\u003c/a\u003e. Impartial redintegration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_569\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e569\u003c/a\u003e. Ordinary or mixed association,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_571\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e571\u003c/a\u003e. The law of interest, \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e. Association by similarity,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_578\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e. Elementary expression of the difference between the three\r\nkinds of association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_581\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e581\u003c/a\u003e. Association in voluntary thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_583\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e583\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nSimilarity no elementary law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_590\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e590\u003c/a\u003e. History of the doctrine of\r\nassociation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XV512\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Perception of Time\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_605\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e605\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sensible present, \u003ca href=\"#Page_606\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e606\u003c/a\u003e. Its duration is the primitive time-perception,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_608\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e608\u003c/a\u003e. Accuracy of our estimate of short durations,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_611\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e611\u003c/a\u003e. We have no sense for empty time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_619\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e619\u003c/a\u003e. Variations of our\r\ntime-estimate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_624\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e624\u003c/a\u003e. The feeling of past time is a present feeling,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_627\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e627\u003c/a\u003e. Its cerebral process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_632\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e632\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XVI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMemory\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_643\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e643\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrimary memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_643\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e643\u003c/a\u003e. Analysis of the phenomenon of memory,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_648\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e648\u003c/a\u003e. Retention and reproduction are both caused by paths\r\nof association in the brain, \u003ca href=\"#Page_653\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e653\u003c/a\u003e. The conditions of goodness in\r\nmemory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_659\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e659\u003c/a\u003e. Native retentiveness is unchangeable, \u003ca href=\"#Page_663\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e663\u003c/a\u003e. All improvement\r\nof memory consists in better \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_667\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e667\u003c/a\u003e. Other conditions\r\nof good memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_669\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e669\u003c/a\u003e. Recognition, or the sense of familiarity,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_673\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e673\u003c/a\u003e. Exact measurements of memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_676\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e676\u003c/a\u003e. Forgetting,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_679\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e679\u003c/a\u003e. Pathological cases, \u003ca href=\"#Page_681\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e681\u003c/a\u003e. Professor Ladd criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_687\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e687\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp style=\"font-size: 0.8em;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#INDEX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eINDEX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[Pg 1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e \u003ca id=\"PSYCHOLOGY\"\u003ePSYCHOLOGY.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its\r\nphenomena and of their conditions. The phenomena are\r\nsuch things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings,\r\ndecisions, and the like; and, superficially considered,\r\ntheir variety and complexity is such as to leave a chaotic\r\nimpression on the observer. The most natural and consequently\r\nthe earliest way of unifying the material was,\r\nfirst, to classify it as well as might be, and, secondly, to\r\naffiliate the diverse mental modes thus found, upon a\r\nsimple entity, the personal Soul, of which they are taken\r\nto be so many facultative manifestations. Now, for instance,\r\nthe Soul manifests its faculty of Memory, now of\r\nReasoning, now of Volition, or again its Imagination or its\r\nAppetite. This is the orthodox \u0027spiritualistic\u0027 theory of\r\nscholasticism and of common-sense. Another and a less\r\nobvious way of unifying the chaos is to seek common elements\r\nin the divers mental facts rather than a common\r\nagent behind them, and to explain them constructively by\r\nthe various forms of arrangement of these elements, as one\r\nexplains houses by stones and bricks. The \u0027associationist\u0027\r\nschools of Herbart in Germany, and of Hume the\r\nMills and Bain in Britain have thus constructed a \u003ci\u003epsychology\r\nwithout a soul\u003c/i\u003e by taking discrete \u0027ideas,\u0027 faint or vivid,\r\nand showing how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and forms\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[Pg 2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof succession, such things as reminiscences, perceptions,\r\nemotions, volitions, passions, theories, and all the other\r\nfurnishings of an individual\u0027s mind may be engendered.\r\nThe very Self or \u003ci\u003eego\u003c/i\u003e of the individual comes in this\r\nway to be viewed no longer as the pre-existing source of\r\nthe representations, but rather as their last and most complicated\r\nfruit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if we strive rigorously to simplify the phenomena\r\nin either of these ways, we soon become aware of inadequacies\r\nin our method. Any particular cognition, for example,\r\nor recollection, is accounted for on the soul-theory\r\nby being referred to the spiritual faculties of Cognition\r\nor of Memory. These faculties themselves are thought\r\nof as absolute properties of the soul; that is, to take\r\nthe case of memory, no reason is given why we should\r\nremember a fact as it happened, except that so to remember\r\nit constitutes the essence of our Recollective\r\nPower. We may, as spiritualists, try to explain our memory\u0027s\r\nfailures and blunders by secondary causes. But\r\nits \u003ci\u003esuccesses\u003c/i\u003e can invoke no factors save the existence of\r\ncertain objective things to be remembered on the one\r\nhand, and of our faculty of memory on the other. When,\r\nfor instance, I recall my graduation-day, and drag all its\r\nincidents and emotions up from death\u0027s dateless night, no\r\nmechanical cause can explain this process, nor can any\r\nanalysis reduce it to lower terms or make its nature seem\r\nother than an ultimate \u003ci\u003edatum\u003c/i\u003e, which, whether we rebel or\r\nnot at its mysteriousness, must simply be taken for granted\r\nif we are to psychologize at all. However the associationist\r\nmay represent the present ideas as thronging and arranging\r\nthemselves, still, the spiritualist insists, he has in the end to\r\nadmit that \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e, be it brain, be it \u0027ideas,\u0027 be it \u0027association,\u0027\r\n\u003ci\u003eknows\u003c/i\u003e past time \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e past, and fills it out with this\r\nor that event. And when the spiritualist calls memory an\r\n\u0027irreducible faculty,\u0027 he says no more than this admission\r\nof the associationist already grants.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd yet the admission is far from being a satisfactory\r\nsimplification of the concrete facts. For why should this\r\nabsolute god-given Faculty retain so much better the events\r\nof yesterday than those of last year, and, best of all, those\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[Pg 3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof an hour ago? Why, again, in old age should its grasp\r\nof childhood\u0027s events seem firmest? Why should illness\r\nand exhaustion enfeeble it? Why should repeating an experience\r\nstrengthen our recollection of it? Why should\r\ndrugs, fevers, asphyxia, and excitement resuscitate things\r\nlong since forgotten? If we content ourselves with merely\r\naffirming that the faculty of memory is so peculiarly constituted\r\nby nature as to exhibit just these oddities, we seem\r\nlittle the better for having invoked it, for our explanation\r\nbecomes as complicated as that of the crude facts with which\r\nwe started. Moreover there is something grotesque and\r\nirrational in the supposition that the soul is equipped with\r\nelementary powers of such an ingeniously intricate sort.\r\nWhy \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e our memory cling more easily to the near than\r\nthe remote? Why should it lose its grasp of proper sooner\r\nthan of abstract names? Such peculiarities seem quite fantastic;\r\nand might, for aught we can see \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, be the\r\nprecise opposites of what they are. Evidently, then, \u003ci\u003ethe\r\nfaculty does not exist absolutely, but works under conditions\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand \u003ci\u003ethe quest of the conditions\u003c/i\u003e becomes the psychologist\u0027s\r\nmost interesting task.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHowever firmly he may hold to the soul and her remembering\r\nfaculty, he must acknowledge that she never\r\nexerts the latter without a \u003ci\u003ecue\u003c/i\u003e, and that something must always\r\nprecede and \u003ci\u003eremind\u003c/i\u003e us of whatever we are to recollect.\r\n\"An \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e,\" says the associationist, \"an idea associated with\r\nthe remembered thing; and this explains also why things\r\nrepeatedly met with are more easily recollected, for their associates\r\non the various occasions furnish so many distinct\r\navenues of recall.\" But this does not explain the effects of\r\nfever, exhaustion, hypnotism, old age, and the like. And\r\nin general, the pure associationist\u0027s account of our mental\r\nlife is almost as bewildering as that of the pure spiritualist.\r\nThis multitude of ideas, existing absolutely, yet clinging\r\ntogether, and weaving an endless carpet of themselves, like\r\ndominoes in ceaseless change, or the bits of glass in a\r\nkaleidoscope,—whence do they get their fantastic laws of\r\nclinging, and why do they cling in just the shapes they do?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor this the associationist must introduce the order of\r\nexperience in the outer world. The dance of the ideas is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[Pg 4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na copy, somewhat mutilated and altered, of the order of\r\nphenomena. But the slightest reflection shows that phenomena\r\nhave absolutely no power to influence our ideas\r\nuntil they have first impressed our senses and our brain.\r\nThe bare existence of a past fact is no ground for our remembering\r\nit. Unless we have seen it, or somehow \u003ci\u003eundergone\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit, we shall never know of its having been. The expediences\r\nof the body are thus one of the conditions of the\r\nfaculty of memory being what it is. And a very small\r\namount of reflection on facts shows that one part of the\r\nbody, namely, the brain, is the part whose experiences are\r\ndirectly concerned. If the nervous communication be cut\r\noff between the brain and other parts, the experiences of\r\nthose other parts are non-existent for the mind. The eye\r\nis blind, the ear deaf, the hand insensible and motionless.\r\nAnd conversely, if the brain be injured, consciousness is\r\nabolished or altered, even although every other organ in\r\nthe body be ready to play its normal part. A blow on the\r\nhead, a sudden subtraction of blood, the pressure of an\r\napoplectic hemorrhage, may have the first effect; whilst a\r\nvery few ounces of alcohol or grains of opium or hasheesh,\r\nor a whiff of chloroform or nitrous oxide gas, are sure to\r\nhave the second. The delirium of fever, the altered self\r\nof insanity, are all due to foreign matters circulating\r\nthrough the brain, or to pathological changes in that\r\norgan\u0027s substance. The fact that the brain is the one\r\nimmediate bodily condition of the mental operations is\r\nindeed so universally admitted nowadays that I need\r\nspend no more time in illustrating it, but will simply\r\npostulate it and pass on. The whole remainder of the\r\nbook will be more or less of a proof that the postulate was\r\ncorrect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBodily experiences, therefore, and more particularly\r\nbrain-experiences, must take a place amongst those conditions\r\nof the mental life of which Psychology need take\r\naccount. \u003ci\u003eThe spiritualist and the associationist must both\r\nbe \u0027cerebralists\u0027\u003c/i\u003e, to the extent at least of admitting that\r\ncertain peculiarities in the way of working of their own\r\nfavorite principles are explicable only by the fact that the\r\nbrain laws are a codeterminant of the result.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[Pg 5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOur first conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of\r\nbrain-physiology must be presupposed or included in\r\nPsychology.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_1_1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn still another way the psychologist is forced to be\r\nsomething of a nerve-physiologist. Mental phenomena are\r\nnot only conditioned \u003ci\u003ea parte ante\u003c/i\u003e by bodily processes; but\r\nthey lead to them \u003ci\u003ea parte post\u003c/i\u003e. That they lead to \u003ci\u003eacts\u003c/i\u003e is of\r\ncourse the most familiar of truths, but I do not merely mean\r\nacts in the sense of voluntary and deliberate muscular\r\nperformances. Mental states occasion also changes in the\r\ncalibre of blood-vessels, or alteration in the heart-beats, or\r\nprocesses more subtle still, in glands and viscera. If these\r\nare taken into account, as well as acts which follow at some\r\n\u003ci\u003eremote period\u003c/i\u003e because the mental state was once there, it will\r\nbe safe to lay down the general law that \u003ci\u003eno mental modification\r\never occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily\r\nchange\u003c/i\u003e. The ideas and feelings, \u003ci\u003ee.g\u003c/i\u003e., which these present\r\nprinted characters excite in the reader\u0027s mind not only\r\noccasion movements of his eyes and nascent movements of\r\narticulation in him, but will some day make him speak, or\r\ntake sides in a discussion, or give advice, or choose a book\r\nto read, differently from what would have been the case had\r\nthey never impressed his retina. Our psychology must therefore\r\ntake account not only of the conditions antecedent to\r\nmental states, but of their resultant consequences as well.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut actions originally prompted by conscious intelligence\r\nmay grow so automatic by dint of habit as to be\r\napparently unconsciously performed. Standing, walking,\r\nbuttoning and unbuttoning, piano-playing, talking, even\r\nsaying one\u0027s prayers, may be done when the mind is absorbed\r\nin other things. The performances of animal\r\n\u003ci\u003einstinct\u003c/i\u003e seem semi-automatic, and the \u003ci\u003ereflex acts\u003c/i\u003e of self-preservation\r\ncertainly are so. Yet they resemble intelligent\r\nacts in bringing about the \u003ci\u003esame ends\u003c/i\u003e at which the animals\u0027\r\nconsciousness, on other occasions, deliberately aims.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[Pg 6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nShall the study of such machine-like yet purposive acts as\r\nthese be included in Psychology?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe boundary-line of the mental is certainly vague. It\r\nis better not to be pedantic, but to let the science be as\r\nvague as its subject, and include such phenomena as these\r\nif by so doing we can throw any light on the main business\r\nin hand. It will ere long be seen, I trust, that we can;\r\nand that we gain much more by a broad than by a narrow\r\nconception of our subject. At a certain stage in the development\r\nof every science a degree of vagueness is what\r\nbest consists with fertility. On the whole, few recent formulas\r\nhave done more real service of a rough sort in psychology\r\nthan the Spencerian one that the essence of mental\r\nlife and of bodily life are one, namely, \u0027the adjustment of\r\ninner to outer relations.\u0027 Such a formula is vagueness\r\nincarnate; but because it takes into account the fact that\r\nminds inhabit environments which act on them and on\r\nwhich they in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind\r\nin the midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely\r\nmore fertile than the old-fashioned \u0027rational psychology,\u0027\r\nwhich treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient\r\nunto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and\r\nproperties. I shall therefore feel free to make any sallies\r\ninto zoology or into pure nerve-physiology which may\r\nseem instructive for our purposes, but otherwise shall leave\r\nthose sciences to the physiologists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCan we state more distinctly still the manner in which\r\nthe mental life seems to intervene between impressions\r\nmade from without upon the body, and reactions of the\r\nbody upon the outer world again? Let us look at a few\r\nfacts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf some iron filings be sprinkled on a table and a magnet\r\nbrought near them, they will fly through the air for a\r\ncertain distance and stick to its surface. A savage seeing\r\nthe phenomenon explains it as the result of an attraction\r\nor love between the magnet and the filings. But\r\nlet a card cover the poles of the magnet, and the filings\r\nwill press forever against its surface without its ever occurring\r\nto them to pass around its sides and thus come into\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[Pg 7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore direct contact with the object of their love. Blow\r\nbubbles through a tube into the bottom of a pail of water,\r\nthey will rise to the surface and mingle with the air. Their\r\naction may again be poetically interpreted as due to a\r\nlonging to recombine with the mother-atmosphere above\r\nthe surface. But if you invert a jar full of water over the\r\npail, they will rise and remain lodged beneath its bottom,\r\nshut in from the outer air, although a slight deflection\r\nfrom their course at the outset, or a re-descent towards the\r\nrim of the jar when they found their upward course impeded,\r\nwould easily have set them free.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf now we pass from such actions as these to those of\r\nliving things, we notice a striking difference. Romeo wants\r\nJuliet as the filings want the magnet; and if no obstacles\r\nintervene he moves towards her by as straight a line as\r\nthey. But Romeo and Juliet, if a wall be built between\r\nthem, do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against\r\nits opposite sides like the magnet and the filings with the\r\ncard. Romeo soon finds a circuitous way, by scaling the\r\nwall or otherwise, of touching Juliet\u0027s lips directly. With\r\nthe filings the path is fixed; whether it reaches the end\r\ndepends on accidents. With the lover it is the end which\r\nis fixed, the path may be modified indefinitely.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose a living frog in the position in which we placed\r\nour bubbles of air, namely, at the bottom of a jar of water.\r\nThe want of breath will soon make him also long to rejoin\r\nthe mother-atmosphere, and he will take the shortest path\r\nto his end by swimming straight upwards. But if a jar\r\nfull of water be inverted over him, he will not, like the\r\nbubbles, perpetually press his nose against its unyielding\r\nroof, but will restlessly explore the neighborhood until\r\nby re-descending again he has discovered a path round its\r\nbrim to the goal of his desires. Again the fixed end, the\r\nvarying means!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch contrasts between living and inanimate performances\r\nend by leading men to deny that in the physical\r\nworld final purposes exist at all. Loves and desires are\r\nto-day no longer imputed to particles of iron or of air.\r\nNo one supposes now that the end of any activity which\r\nthey may display is an ideal purpose presiding over the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[Pg 8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nactivity from its outset and soliciting or drawing it into\r\nbeing by a sort of \u003ci\u003evis a fronte\u003c/i\u003e. The end, on the contrary, is\r\ndeemed a mere passive result, pushed into being \u003ci\u003ea tergo\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nhaving had, so to speak, no voice in its own production.\r\nAlter the pre-existing conditions, and with inorganic materials\r\nyou bring forth each time a different apparent end.\r\nBut with intelligent agents, altering the conditions changes\r\nthe activity displayed, but not the end reached; for here\r\nthe idea of the yet unrealized end co-operates with the conditions\r\nto determine what the activities shall be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for\r\ntheir attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence\r\nof mentality\u003c/i\u003e in a phenomenon. We all use this test to discriminate\r\nbetween an intelligent and a mechanical performance.\r\nWe impute no mentality to sticks and stones,\r\nbecause they never seem to move for \u003ci\u003ethe sake of\u003c/i\u003e anything,\r\nbut always when pushed, and then indifferently and with no\r\nsign of choice. So we unhesitatingly call them senseless.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJust so we form our decision upon the deepest of all\r\nphilosophic problems: Is the Kosmos an expression of\r\nintelligence rational in its inward nature, or a brute\r\nexternal fact pure and simple? If we find ourselves, in contemplating\r\nit, unable to banish the impression that it is a\r\nrealm of final purposes, that it exists for the sake of something,\r\nwe place intelligence at the heart of it and have a\r\nreligion. If, on the contrary, in surveying its irremediable\r\nflux, we can think of the present only as so much mere\r\nmechanical sprouting from the past, occurring with no\r\nreference to the future, we are atheists and materialists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the lengthy discussions which psychologists have\r\ncarried on about the amount of intelligence displayed by\r\nlower mammals, or the amount of consciousness involved in\r\nthe functions of the nerve-centres of reptiles, the same test\r\nhas always been applied: Is the character of the actions\r\nsuch that we must believe them to be performed \u003ci\u003efor the sake\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof their result? The result in question, as we shall hereafter\r\nabundantly see, is as a rule a useful one,—the animal\r\nis, on the whole, safer under the circumstances for bringing\r\nit forth. So far the action has a teleological character;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[Pg 9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut such mere outward teleology as this might still be the\r\nblind result of \u003ci\u003evis a tergo\u003c/i\u003e. The growth and movements of\r\nplants, the processes of development, digestion, secretion,\r\netc., in animals, supply innumerable instances of performances\r\nuseful to the individual which may nevertheless\r\nbe, and by most of us are supposed to be, produced by\r\nautomatic mechanism. The physiologist does not confidently\r\nassert conscious intelligence in the frog\u0027s spinal\r\ncord until he has shown that the useful result which the\r\nnervous machinery brings forth under a given irritation\r\n\u003ci\u003eremains the same when the machinery is altered\u003c/i\u003e. If, to take\r\nthe stock instance, the right knee of a headless frog be irritated\r\nwith acid, the right foot will wipe it off. When, however,\r\nthis foot is amputated, the animal will often raise the\r\n\u003ci\u003eleft\u003c/i\u003e foot to the spot and wipe the offending material away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePflüger and Lewes reason from such facts in the following\r\nway: If the first reaction were the result of mere machinery,\r\nthey say; if that irritated portion of the skin discharged\r\nthe right leg as a trigger discharges its own barrel of a shot-gun;\r\nthen amputating the right foot would indeed frustrate\r\nthe wiping, but would not make the \u003ci\u003eleft\u003c/i\u003e leg move. It would\r\nsimply result in the right stump moving through the empty\r\nair (which is in fact the phenomenon sometimes observed).\r\nThe right trigger makes no effort to discharge the left barrel\r\nif the right one be unloaded; nor does an electrical machine\r\never get restless because it can only emit sparks,\r\nand not hem pillow-cases like a sewing-machine.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, on the contrary, the right leg originally moved for the\r\n\u003ci\u003epurpose\u003c/i\u003e of wiping the acid, then nothing is more natural\r\nthan that, when the easiest means of effecting that purpose\r\nprove fruitless, other means should be tried. Every failure\r\nmust keep the animal in a state of disappointment which\r\nwill lead to all sorts of new trials and devices; and tranquillity\r\nwill not ensue till one of these, by a happy stroke,\r\nachieves the wished-for end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a similar way Goltz ascribes intelligence to the\r\nfrog\u0027s optic lobes and cerebellum. We alluded above to the\r\nmanner in which a sound frog imprisoned in water will discover\r\nan outlet to the atmosphere. Goltz found that frogs\r\ndeprived of their cerebral hemispheres would often exhibit\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[Pg 10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na like ingenuity. Such a frog, after rising from the bottom\r\nand finding his farther upward progress checked by the\r\nglass bell which has been inverted over him, will not persist\r\nin butting his nose against the obstacle until dead of\r\nsuffocation, but will often re-descend and emerge from under\r\nits rim as if, not a definite mechanical propulsion upwards,\r\nbut rather a conscious desire to reach the air by hook or\r\ncrook were the main-spring of his activity. Goltz concluded\r\nfrom this that the hemispheres are not the sole seal\r\nof intellect in frogs. He made the same inference from\r\nobserving that a brainless frog will turn over from his back\r\nto his belly when one of his legs is sewed up, although the\r\nmovements required are then very different from those\r\nexcited under normal circumstances by the same annoying\r\nposition. They seem determined, consequently, not merely\r\nby the antecedent irritant, but by the final end,—though the\r\nirritant of course is what makes the end desired.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother brilliant German author, Liebmann,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_2_2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e argues\r\nagainst the brain\u0027s mechanism accounting for mental action,\r\nby very similar considerations. A machine as such, he\r\nsays, will bring forth right results when it is in good order,\r\nand wrong results if out of repair. But both kinds of result\r\nflow with equally fatal necessity from their conditions. We\r\ncannot suppose the clock-work whose structure fatally\r\ndetermines it to a certain rate of speed, noticing that this\r\nspeed is too slow or too fast and vainly trying to correct it.\r\nIts conscience, if it have any, should be as good as that of\r\nthe best chronometer, for both alike obey equally well the\r\nsame eternal mechanical laws—laws from behind. But if\r\nthe \u003ci\u003ebrain\u003c/i\u003e be out of order and the man says \"Twice four are\r\ntwo,\" instead of \"Twice four are eight,\" or else \"I must go\r\nto the coal to buy the wharf,\" instead of \"I must go to the\r\nwharf to buy the coal,\" instantly there arises a consciousness\r\nof error. The wrong performance, though it obey the\r\nsame mechanical law as the right, is nevertheless condemned,—condemned\r\nas contradicting the inner law—the\r\nlaw from in front, the purpose or ideal for which the brain\r\n\u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e act, whether it do so or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[Pg 11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe need not discuss here whether these writers in drawing\r\ntheir conclusion have done justice to all the premises I\r\ninvolved in the cases they treat of. We quote their arguments\r\nonly to show how they appeal to the principle that\r\n\u003ci\u003eno actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of\r\nmeans, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI shall then adopt this as the criterion by which to circumscribe\r\nthe subject-matter of this work so far as action\r\nenters into it. Many nervous performances will therefore\r\nbe unmentioned, as being purely physiological. Nor will the\r\nanatomy of the nervous system and organs of sense be\r\ndescribed anew. The reader will find in H. N. Martin\u0027s\r\n\u0027Human Body,\u0027 in G. T. Ladd\u0027s \u0027Physiological Psychology,\u0027\r\nand in all the other standard Anatomies and Physiologies,\r\na mass of information which we must regard as preliminary\r\nand take for granted in the present work.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_3_3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e Of\r\nthe functions of the cerebral hemispheres, however, since\r\nthey directly subserve consciousness, it will be well to\r\ngive some little account.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e Geo. T. Ladd: Elements of Physiological Psychology (1887), pt.\r\niii, chap. iii, §§ 9, 12.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, p. 489.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nothing is easier than to familiarize one\u0027s self with the mammalian\r\nbrain. Get a sheep\u0027s head, a small saw, chisel, scalpel and forceps (all\r\nthree can best be had from a surgical-instrument maker), and unravel its\r\nparts either by the aid of a human dissecting book, such as Holden\u0027s \u0027Manual\r\nof Anatomy,\u0027 or by the specific directions \u003ci\u003ead hoc\u003c/i\u003e given in such books as\r\nFoster and Langley\u0027s \u0027Practical Physiology\u0027 (Macmillan) or Morrell\u0027s\r\n\u0027Comparative Anatomy and Dissection of Mammalia\u0027 (Longmans).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[Pg 12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_II\"\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf I begin chopping the foot of a tree, its branches are\r\nunmoved by my act, and its leaves murmur as peacefully as\r\never in the wind. If, on the contrary, I do violence to the\r\nfoot of a fellow-man, the rest of his body instantly responds\r\nto the aggression by movements of alarm or defence. The\r\nreason of this difference is that the man has a nervous system\r\nwhilst the tree has none; and the function of the nervous\r\nsystem is to bring each part into harmonious co-operation\r\nwith every other. The afferent nerves, when excited by\r\nsome physical irritant, be this as gross in its mode of operation\r\nas a chopping axe or as subtle as the waves of light,\r\nconveys the excitement to the nervous centres. The commotion\r\nset up in the centres does not stop there, but discharges\r\nitself, if at all strong, through the efferent nerves\r\ninto muscles and glands, exciting movements of the limbs\r\nand viscera, or acts of secretion, which vary with the animal,\r\nand with the irritant applied. These acts of response have\r\nusually the common character of being of service. They\r\nward off the noxious stimulus and support the beneficial\r\none; whilst if, in itself indifferent, the stimulus be a sign of\r\nsome distant circumstance of practical importance, the\r\nanimal\u0027s acts are addressed to this circumstance so as to\r\navoid its perils or secure its benefits, as the case may be.\r\nTo take a common example, if I hear the conductor calling\r\n\u0027All aboard!\u0027 as I enter the depot, my heart first stops,\r\nthen palpitates, and my legs respond to the air-waves\r\nfalling on my tympanum by quickening their movements.\r\nIf I stumble as I run, the sensation of falling provokes a\r\nmovement of the hands towards the direction of the fall,\r\nthe effect of which is to shield the body from too sudden a\r\nshock. If a cinder enter my eye, its lids close forcibly\r\nand a copious flow of tears tends to wash it out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[Pg 13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese three responses to a sensational stimulus differ,\r\nhowever, in many respects. The closure of the eye and the\r\nlachrymation are quite involuntary, and so is the disturbance\r\nof the heart. Such involuntary responses we know as\r\n\u0027reflex\u0027 acts. The motion of the arms to break the shock\r\nof falling may also be called reflex, since it occurs too\r\nquickly to be deliberately intended. Whether it be instinctive\r\nor whether it result from the pedestrian education of\r\nchildhood may be doubtful; it is, at any rate, less automatic\r\nthan the previous acts, for a man might by conscious effort\r\nlearn to perform it more skilfully, or even to suppress it altogether.\r\nActions of this kind, into which instinct and volition\r\nenter upon equal terms, have been called \u0027semi-reflex.\u0027 The\r\nact of running towards the train, on the other hand, has no\r\ninstinctive element about it. It is purely the result of education,\r\nand is preceded by a consciousness of the purpose to\r\nbe attained and a distinct mandate of the will. It is a \u0027voluntary\r\nact.\u0027 Thus the animal\u0027s reflex and voluntary performances\r\nshade into each other gradually, being connected\r\nby acts which may often occur automatically, but may also\r\nbe modified by conscious intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn outside observer, unable to perceive the accompanying\r\nconsciousness, might be wholly at a loss to discriminate\r\nbetween the automatic acts and those which volition escorted.\r\nBut if the criterion of mind\u0027s existence be the\r\nchoice of the proper means for the attainment of a supposed\r\nend, all the acts seem to be inspired by intelligence, for\r\n\u003ci\u003eappropriateness\u003c/i\u003e characterizes them all alike. This fact, now,\r\nhas led to two quite opposite theories about the relation to\r\nconsciousness of the nervous functions. Some authors,\r\nfinding that the higher voluntary ones seem to require the\r\nguidance of feeling, conclude that over the lowest reflexes\r\nsome such feeling also presides, though it may be a feeling\r\nof which \u003ci\u003ewe\u003c/i\u003e remain unconscious. Others, finding that reflex\r\nand semi-automatic acts may, notwithstanding their appropriateness,\r\ntake place with an unconsciousness apparently\r\ncomplete, fly to the opposite extreme and maintain that the\r\nappropriateness even of voluntary actions owes nothing to\r\nthe fact that consciousness attends them. They are, according\r\nto these writers, results of physiological mechanism pure\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[Pg 14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand simple. In a near chapter we shall return to this\r\ncontroversy again. Let us now look a little more closely\r\nat the brain and at the ways in which its states may be supposed\r\nto condition those of the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE FROG\u0027S NERVE-CENTRES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBoth the minute anatomy and the detailed physiology\r\nof the brain are achievements of the present generation, or\r\nrather we may say (beginning with Meynert) of the past\r\ntwenty years. Many points are still obscure and subject\r\nto controversy; but a general way of conceiving the organ\r\nhas been reached on all hands which in its main feature\r\nseems not unlikely to stand, and which even gives a most\r\nplausible scheme of the way in which cerebral and mental\r\noperations go hand in hand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 120px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-014-0001.jpg\" style=\"width: 120px\" id=\"img_images_jame_014_0001.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 1.—\u003ci\u003eC H\u003c/i\u003e, cerebral\r\nHemispheres; \u003ci\u003eO Th\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nOptic Thalami; \u003ci\u003eO L\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nOptic Lobes; \u003ci\u003eCb\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nCerebellum; \u003ci\u003eM O\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nMedulla Oblongata;\r\n\u003ci\u003eS C\u003c/i\u003e, Spinal cord.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe best way to enter the subject will be to take a lower\r\ncreature, like a frog, and study by the vivisectional method\r\nthe functions of his different nerve-centres. The frog\u0027s\r\nnerve-centres are figured in the accompanying\r\ndiagram, which needs no further explanation.\r\nI will first proceed to state\r\nwhat happens when various amounts of\r\nthe anterior parts are removed, in different\r\nfrogs, in the way in which an ordinary\r\nstudent removes them; that is, with no extreme\r\nprecautions as to the purity of the\r\noperation. We shall in this way reach a\r\nvery simple conception of the functions of\r\nthe various centres, involving the strongest\r\npossible contrast between the cerebral\r\nhemispheres and the lower lobes. This\r\nsharp conception will have didactic advantages,\r\nfor it is often very instructive\r\nto start with too simple a formula and\r\ncorrect it later on. Our first formula, as we shall later\r\nsee, will have to be softened down somewhat by the results\r\nof more careful experimentation both on frogs and birds,\r\nand by those of the most recent observations on dogs,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[Pg 15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmonkeys, and man. But it will put us, from the outset, in\r\nclear possession of some fundamental notions and distinctions\r\nwhich we could otherwise not gain so well, and none\r\nof which the later more completed view will overturn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, then, we reduce the frog\u0027s nervous system to the\r\nspinal cord alone, by making a section behind the base of\r\nthe skull, between the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata,\r\nthereby cutting off the brain from all connection with\r\nthe rest of the body, the frog will still continue to live, but\r\nwith a very peculiarly modified activity. It ceases to breathe\r\nor swallow; it lies flat on its belly, and does not, like a\r\nnormal frog, sit up on its fore paws, though its hind legs are\r\nkept, as usual, folded against its body and immediately resume\r\nthis position if drawn out. If thrown on its back, it\r\nlies there quietly, without turning over like a normal frog.\r\nLocomotion and voice seem entirely abolished. If we suspend\r\nit by the nose, and irritate different portions of its\r\nskin by acid, it performs a set of remarkable \u0027defensive\u0027\r\nmovements calculated to wipe away the irritant. Thus, if\r\nthe breast be touched, both fore paws will rub it vigorously;\r\nif we touch the outer side of the elbow, the hind foot of the\r\nsame side will rise directly to the spot and wipe it. The\r\nback of the foot will rub the knee if that be attacked, whilst\r\nif the foot be cut away, the stump will make ineffectual\r\nmovements, and then, in many frogs, a pause will come, as\r\nif for deliberation, succeeded by a rapid passage of the\r\nopposite unmutilated foot to the acidulated spot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most striking character of all these movements,\r\nafter their teleological appropriateness, is their precision.\r\nThey vary, in sensitive frogs and with a proper amount of\r\nirritation, so little as almost to resemble in their machine-like\r\nregularity the performances of a jumping-jack, whose\r\nlegs must twitch whenever you pull the string. The spinal\r\ncord of the frog thus contains arrangements of cells and\r\nfibres fitted to convert skin irritations into movements of\r\ndefence. We may call it the \u003ci\u003ecentre for defensive movements\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin this animal. We may indeed go farther than this, and\r\nby cutting the spinal cord in various places find that its\r\nseparate segments are independent mechanisms, for appropriate\r\nactivities of the head and of the arms and legs respectively.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[Pg 16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe segment governing the arms is especially\r\nactive, in male frogs, in the breeding season; and these members\r\nalone with the breast and back appertaining to them,\r\neverything else being cut away, will then actively grasp a\r\nfinger placed between them and remain hanging to it for a\r\nconsiderable time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe spinal cord in other animals has analogous powers.\r\nEven in man it makes movements of defence. Paraplegics\r\ndraw up their legs when tickled; and Robin, on tickling\r\nthe breast of a criminal an hour after decapitation, saw the\r\narm and hand move towards the spot. Of the lower functions\r\nof the mammalian cord, studied so ably by Goltz and\r\nothers, this is not the place to speak.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, in a second animal, the cut be made just behind the\r\noptic lobes so that the cerebellum and medulla oblongata\r\nremain attached to the cord, then swallowing, breathing,\r\ncrawling, and a rather enfeebled jumping and swimming\r\nare added to the movements previously observed.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_4_4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e There\r\nare other reflexes too. The animal, thrown on his back,\r\nimmediately turns over to his belly. Placed in a shallow\r\nbowl, which is floated on water and made to rotate, he responds\r\nto the rotation by first turning his head and then\r\nwaltzing around with his entire body, in the opposite direction\r\nto the whirling of the bowl. If his support be tilted so\r\nthat his head points downwards, he points it up; he points\r\nit down if it be pointed upwards, to the right if it be\r\npointed to the left, etc. But his reactions do not go\r\nfarther than these movements of the head. He will not,\r\nlike frogs whose thalami are preserved, climb up a board\r\nif the latter be tilted, but will slide off it to the ground.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the cut be made on another frog between the thalami\r\nand the optic lobes, the locomotion both on land\r\nand water becomes quite normal, and, in addition to the\r\nreflexes already shown by the lower centres, he croaks\r\nregularly whenever he is pinched under the arms. He\r\ncompensates rotations, etc., by movements of the head, and\r\nturns over from his back; but still drops off his tilted\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[Pg 17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nboard. As his optic nerves are destroyed by the usual\r\noperation, it is impossible to say whether he will avoid\r\nobstacles placed in his path.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen, finally, a frog\u0027s cerebral hemispheres alone are cut\r\noff by a section between them and the thalami which preserves\r\nthe latter, an unpractised observer would not at first\r\nsuspect anything abnormal about the animal. Not only is\r\nhe capable, on proper instigation, of all the acts already\r\ndescribed, but he guides himself by sight, so that if an\r\nobstacle be set up between him and the light, and he be\r\nforced to move forward, he either jumps over it or swerves\r\nto one side. He manifests sexual passion at the proper\r\nseason, and, unlike an altogether brainless frog, which embraces\r\nanything placed between his arms, postpones this\r\nreflex act until a female of his own species is provided.\r\nThus far, as aforesaid, a person unfamiliar with frogs\r\nmight not suspect a mutilation; but even such a person\r\nwould soon remark the almost entire absence of spontaneous\r\nmotion—that is, motion unprovoked by any \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e incitation\r\nof sense. The continued movements of swimming,\r\nperformed by the creature in the water, seem to be the\r\nfatal result of the contact of that fluid with its skin. They\r\ncease when a stick, for example, touches his hands. This\r\nis a sensible irritant towards which the feet are automatically\r\ndrawn by reflex action, and on which the animal remains\r\nsitting. He manifests no hunger, and will suffer a\r\nfly to crawl over his nose unsnapped at. Fear, too, seems\r\nto have deserted him. In a word, he is an extremely complex\r\nmachine whose actions, so far as they go, tend to\r\nself-preservation; but still a \u003ci\u003emachine\u003c/i\u003e, in this sense—that it\r\nseems to contain no incalculable element. By applying\r\nthe right sensory stimulus to him we are almost as certain\r\nof getting a fixed response as an organist is of hearing a\r\ncertain tone when he pulls out a certain stop.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut now if to the lower centres we add the cerebral\r\nhemispheres, or if, in other words, we make an intact animal\r\nthe subject of our observations, all this is changed. In\r\naddition to the previous responses to present incitements\r\nof sense, our frog now goes through long and complex acts\r\nof locomotion \u003ci\u003espontaneously\u003c/i\u003e, or as if moved by what in ourselves\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[Pg 18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe should call an idea. His reactions to outward\r\nstimuli vary their form, too. Instead of making simple\r\ndefensive movements with his hind legs like a headless\r\nfrog if touched, or of giving one or two leaps and then sitting\r\nstill like a hemisphereless one, he makes persistent\r\nand varied efforts at escape, as if, not the mere contact of\r\nthe physiologist\u0027s hand, but the notion of danger suggested\r\nby it were now his spur. Led by the feeling of hunger,\r\ntoo, he goes in search of insects, fish, or smaller frogs, and\r\nvaries his procedure with each species of victim. The\r\nphysiologist cannot by manipulating him elicit croaking,\r\ncrawling up a board, swimming or stopping, at will. His\r\nconduct has become incalculable. We can no longer foretell\r\nit exactly. Effort to escape is his dominant reaction, but\r\nhe \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e do anything else, even swell up and become perfectly\r\npassive in our hands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch are the phenomena commonly observed, and such\r\nthe impressions which one naturally receives. Certain\r\ngeneral conclusions follow irresistibly. First of all the\r\nfollowing:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe acts of all the centres involve the use of the same\r\nmuscles.\u003c/i\u003e When a headless frog\u0027s hind leg wipes the acid, he\r\ncalls into play all the leg-muscles which a frog with his\r\nfull medulla oblongata and cerebellum uses when he turns\r\nfrom his back to his belly. Their contractions are, however,\r\n\u003ci\u003ecombined\u003c/i\u003e differently in the two cases, so that the results\r\nvary widely. We must consequently conclude that\r\nspecific arrangements of cells and fibres exist in the\r\ncord for wiping, in the medulla for turning over, etc.\r\nSimilarly they exist in the thalami for jumping over\r\nseen obstacles and for balancing the moved body; in the\r\noptic lobes for creeping backwards, or what not. But in\r\nthe hemispheres, since the presence of these organs \u003ci\u003ebrings\r\nno new elementary form of movement\u003c/i\u003e with it, but only \u003ci\u003edetermines\r\ndifferently the occasions\u003c/i\u003e on which the movements shall\r\noccur, making the usual stimuli less fatal and machine-like;\r\nwe need suppose no such machinery \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e co-ordinative\r\nof muscular contractions to exist. We may rather assume,\r\nwhen the mandate for a wiping-movement is sent forth by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[Pg 19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe hemispheres, that a current goes straight to the wiping-arrangement\r\nin the spinal cord, exciting this arrangement\r\nas a whole. Similarly, if an intact frog wishes to jump\r\nover a stone which he sees, all he need do is to excite from\r\nthe hemispheres the jumping-centre in the thalami or\r\nwherever it may be, and the latter will provide for the details\r\nof the execution. It is like a general ordering a\r\ncolonel to make a certain movement, but not telling him\r\nhow it shall be done.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_5_5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe same muscle, then, is repeatedly represented at different\r\nheights;\u003c/i\u003e and at each it enters into a different combination\r\nwith other muscles to co-operate in some special form of\r\nconcerted movement. \u003ci\u003eAt each height the movement is discharged\r\nby some particular form of sensorial stimulus.\u003c/i\u003e Thus\r\nin the cord, the skin alone occasions movements; in the\r\nupper part of the optic lobes, the eyes are added; in the\r\nthalami, the semi-circular canals would seem to play a part;\r\nwhilst the stimuli which discharge the hemispheres would\r\nseem not so much to be elementary sorts of sensation, as\r\ngroups of sensations forming determinate \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethings.\r\nPrey\u003c/i\u003e is not pursued nor are \u003ci\u003eenemies\u003c/i\u003e shunned by ordinary\r\nhemisphereless frogs. Those reactions upon complex circumstances\r\nwhich we call instinctive rather than reflex, are\r\nalready in this animal dependent on the brain\u0027s highest\r\nlobes, and still more is this the case with animals higher\r\nin the zoological scale.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe results are just the same if, instead of a frog, we\r\ntake a pigeon, and cut out his hemispheres as they are ordinarily\r\ncut out for a lecture-room demonstration. There is\r\nnot a movement natural to him which this brainless bird\r\ncannot perform if expressly excited thereto; only the inner\r\npromptings seem deficient, and when left to himself he\r\nspends most of his time crouched on the ground with his\r\nhead sunk between his shoulders as if asleep.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[Pg 20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eGENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll these facts lead us, when we think about them, to\r\nsome such explanatory conception as this: \u003ci\u003eThe lower centres\r\nact from present sensational stimuli alone; the hemispheres act\r\nfrom perceptions and considerations,\u003c/i\u003e the sensations which they\r\nmay receive serving only as suggesters of these. But what\r\nare perceptions but sensations grouped together? and what\r\nare considerations but expectations, in the fancy, of sensations\r\nwhich will be felt one way or another according as\r\naction takes this course or that? If I step aside on seeing\r\na rattlesnake, from considering how dangerous an animal\r\nhe is, the mental materials which constitute my prudential\r\nreflection are images more or less vivid of the movement\r\nof his head, of a sudden pain in my leg, of a state of terror,\r\na swelling of the limb, a chill, delirium, unconsciousness,\r\netc., etc., and the ruin of my hopes. But all these images\r\nare constructed out of my past experiences. They are \u003ci\u003ereproductions\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof what I have felt or witnessed. They are, in\r\nshort, \u003ci\u003eremote\u003c/i\u003e sensations; and the \u003ci\u003edifference between the hemisphereless\r\nanimal and the whole one\u003c/i\u003e may be concisely expressed\r\nby saying that the \u003ci\u003eone obeys absent, the other only\r\npresent, objects.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe hemispheres would then seem to be \u003ci\u003ethe seat of memory\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nVestiges of past experience must in some way be\r\nstored up in them, and must, when aroused by present\r\nstimuli, first appear as representations of distant goods\r\nand evils; and then must discharge into the appropriate\r\nmotor channels for warding off the evil and securing the\r\nbenefits of the good. If we liken the nervous currents to\r\nelectric currents, we can compare the nervous system, \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbelow the hemispheres to a direct circuit from sense-organ\r\nto muscle along the line \u003ci\u003eS … C … M\u003c/i\u003e of Fig. 2.\r\nThe hemisphere, \u003ci\u003eH\u003c/i\u003e, adds the long circuit or loop-line\r\nthrough which the current may pass when for any reason\r\nthe direct line is not used.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-021-0002.jpg\" style=\"width: 125px\" id=\"img_images_jame_021_0002.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 2.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, a tired wayfarer on a hot day throws himself on\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[Pg 21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe damp earth beneath a maple-tree. The sensations of\r\ndelicious rest and coolness pouring\r\nthemselves through the direct\r\nline would naturally discharge into\r\nthe muscles of complete extension:\r\nhe would abandon himself\r\nto the dangerous repose. But the\r\nloop-line being open, part of the\r\ncurrent is drafted along it, and\r\nawakens rheumatic or catarrhal\r\nreminiscences, which prevail over\r\nthe instigations of sense, and make\r\nthe man arise and pursue his way to where he may enjoy his\r\nrest more safely. Presently we shall examine the manner\r\nin which the hemispheric loop-line may be supposed to\r\nserve as a reservoir for such reminiscences as these. Meanwhile\r\nI will ask the reader to notice some corollaries of its\r\nbeing such a reservoir.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, no animal without it can deliberate, pause, postpone,\r\nnicely weigh one motive against another, or compare.\r\nPrudence, in a word, is for such a creature an impossible\r\nvirtue. Accordingly we see that nature removes those functions\r\nin the exercise of which prudence is a virtue from the\r\nlower centres and hands them over to the cerebrum. Wherever\r\na creature has to deal with complex features of the environment,\r\nprudence is a virtue. The higher animals have so\r\nto deal; and the more complex the features, the higher we\r\ncall the animals. The fewer of his acts, then, can \u003ci\u003esuch\u003c/i\u003e an\r\nanimal perform without the help of the organs in question.\r\nIn the frog many acts devolve wholly on the lower centres;\r\nin the bird fewer; in the rodent fewer still; in the dog very\r\nfew indeed; and in apes and men hardly any at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe advantages of this are obvious. Take the prehension\r\nof food as an example and suppose it to be a reflex\r\nperformance of the lower centres. The animal will be condemned\r\nfatally and irresistibly to snap at it whenever\r\npresented, no matter what the circumstances may be;\r\nhe can no more disobey this prompting than water can\r\nrefuse to boil when a fire is kindled under the pot. His\r\nlife will again and again pay the forfeit of his gluttony.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[Pg 22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nExposure to retaliation, to other enemies, to traps, to\r\npoisons, to the dangers of repletion, must be regular\r\nparts of his existence. His lack of all thought by which to\r\nweigh the danger against the attractiveness of the bait, and\r\nof all volition to remain hungry a little while longer,\r\nis the direct measure of his lowness in the mental scale.\r\nAnd those fishes which, like our cunners and sculpins,\r\nare no sooner thrown back from the hook into the water,\r\nthan they automatically seize the hook again, would soon\r\nexpiate the degradation of their intelligence by the extinction\r\nof their type, did not their exaggerated fecundity atone\r\nfor their imprudence. Appetite and the acts it prompts\r\nhave consequently become in all higher vertebrates functions\r\nof the cerebrum. They disappear when the physiologist\u0027s\r\nknife has left the subordinate centres alone in place.\r\nThe brainless pigeon will starve though left on a corn-heap.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake again the sexual function. In birds this devolves\r\nexclusively upon the hemispheres. When these are shorn\r\naway the pigeon pays no attention to the billings and cooings\r\nof its mate. And Goltz found that a bitch in heat\r\nwould excite no emotion in male dogs who had suffered\r\nlarge loss of cerebral tissue. Those who have read Darwin\u0027s\r\n\u0027Descent of Man\u0027 know what immense importance in\r\nthe amelioration of the breed in birds this author ascribes\r\nto the mere fact of sexual selection. The sexual act is not\r\nperformed until every condition of circumstance and sentiment\r\nis fulfilled, until time, place, and partner all are fit.\r\nBut in frogs and toads this passion devolves on the lower\r\ncentres. They show consequently a machine-like obedience\r\nto the present incitement of sense, and an almost\r\ntotal exclusion of the power of choice. Copulation occurs\r\n\u003ci\u003eper fas aut nefas\u003c/i\u003e, occasionally between males, often with\r\ndead females, in puddles exposed on the highway, and\r\nthe male may be cut in two without letting go his hold.\r\nEvery spring an immense sacrifice of batrachian life takes\r\nplace from these causes alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo one need be told how dependent all human social\r\nelevation is upon the prevalence of chastity. Hardly any\r\nfactor measures more than this the difference between civilisation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[Pg 23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand barbarism. Physiologically interpreted, chastity\r\nmeans nothing more than the fact that present solicitations\r\nof sense are overpowered by suggestions of æsthetic and\r\nmoral fitness which the circumstances awaken in the\r\ncerebrum; and that upon the inhibitory or permissive influence\r\nof these alone action directly depends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWithin the psychic life due to the cerebrum itself the\r\nsame general distinction obtains, between considerations of\r\nthe more immediate and considerations of the more remote.\r\nIn all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by\r\nreference to the most distant ends has been held to possess\r\nthe highest intelligence. The tramp who lives from hour\r\nto hour; the bohemian whose engagements are from day\r\nto day; the bachelor who builds but for a single life;\r\nthe father who acts for another generation; the patriot\r\nwho thinks of a whole community and many generations;\r\nand finally, the philosopher and saint whose cares are for\r\nhumanity and for eternity,—these range themselves in an\r\nunbroken hierarchy, wherein each successive grade results\r\nfrom an increased manifestation of the special form of\r\naction by which the cerebral centres are distinguished\r\nfrom all below them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \u0027loop-line\u0027 along which the memories and ideas\r\nof the distant are supposed to lie, the action, so far as it is\r\na physical process, must be interpreted after the type of the\r\naction in the lower centres. If regarded here as a reflex\r\nprocess, it must be reflex there as well. The current in\r\nboth places runs out into the muscles only after it has first\r\nrun in; but whilst the path by which it runs out is determined\r\nin the lower centres by reflections few and fixed\r\namongst the cell-arrangements, in the hemispheres the\r\nreflections are many and instable. This, it will be seen, is\r\nonly a difference of degree and not of kind, and does not\r\nchange the reflex type. The conception of \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e action as\r\nconforming to this type is the fundamental conception of\r\nmodern nerve-physiology. So much for our general preliminary\r\nconception of the nerve-centres! Let us define it\r\nmore distinctly before we see how well physiological observation\r\nwill bear it out in detail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[Pg 24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE EDUCATION OF THE HEMISPHERES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNerve-currents run in through sense-organs, and whilst\r\nprovoking reflex acts in the lower centres, they arouse ideas\r\nin the hemispheres, which either permit the reflexes in\r\nquestion, check them, or substitute others for them. All\r\nideas being in the last resort reminiscences, the question to\r\nanswer is: \u003ci\u003eHow can processes become organized in the hemispheres\r\nwhich correspond to reminiscences in the mind?\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_6_6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing is easier than to conceive a \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e way in\r\nwhich this might be done, provided four assumptions be\r\ngranted. These assumptions (which after all are inevitable\r\nin any event) are:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) The same cerebral process which, when aroused\r\nfrom without by a sense-organ, gives the perception of an\r\nobject, will give an \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of the same object when aroused\r\nby other cerebral processes from within.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) If processes 1, 2, 3, 4 have once been aroused together\r\nor in immediate succession, any subsequent arousal\r\nof any one of them (whether from without or within) will\r\ntend to arouse the others in the original order. [This is the\r\nso-called law of association.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) Every sensorial excitement propagated to a lower\r\ncentre tends to spread upwards and arouse an idea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4) Every idea tends ultimately either to produce a\r\nmovement or to check one which otherwise would be produced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 120px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-025-0003.jpg\" style=\"width: 120px\" id=\"img_images_jame_025_0003.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 3.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose now (these assumptions being granted) that we\r\nhave a baby before us who sees a candle-flame for the first\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[Pg 25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntime, and, by virtue of a reflex tendency common in babies\r\nof a certain age, extends his\r\nhand to grasp it, so that his\r\nfingers get burned. So far we\r\nhave two reflex currents in\r\nplay: first, from the eye to the\r\nextension movement, along the\r\nline 1—1—1—1 of Fig. 3; and\r\nsecond, from the finger to the\r\nmovement of drawing back the\r\nhand, along the line 2—2—2—2.\r\nIf this were the baby\u0027s whole\r\nnervous system, and if the reflexes\r\nwere once for all organic,\r\nwe should have no alteration in his behavior, no matter\r\nhow often the experience recurred. The retinal image of\r\nthe flame would always make the arm shoot forward, the\r\nburning of the finger would always send it back. But we\r\nknow that \u0027the burnt child dreads the fire,\u0027 and that one\r\nexperience usually protects the fingers forever. The point\r\nis to see how the hemispheres may bring this result to pass.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 120px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-025-0004.jpg\" style=\"width: 120px\" id=\"img_images_jame_025_0004.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 4.—The dotted lines stand for afferent\r\npaths, the broken lines for paths\r\nbetween the centres; the entire lines\r\nfor efferent paths.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe must complicate our diagram (see Fig. 4). Let\r\nthe current 1—1, from the eye, discharge upward as well as\r\ndownward when it reaches the lower centre for vision, and\r\narouse the perceptional process \u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e in the hemispheres; let\r\nthe feeling of the arm\u0027s extension\r\nalso send up a current\r\nwhich leaves a trace of itself,\r\n\u003ci\u003em\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e; let the burnt finger leave\r\nan analogous trace, \u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e; and\r\nlet the movement of retraction\r\nleave \u003ci\u003em\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. These four\r\nprocesses will now, by virtue\r\nof assumption 2), be associated\r\ntogether by the path\r\n\u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e—m\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e—s\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e—m\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, running from\r\nthe first to the last, so that if\r\nanything touches off \u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, ideas\r\nof the extension, of the burnt\r\nfinger, and of the retraction will pass in rapid succession\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[Pg 26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough the mind. The effect on the child\u0027s conduct when\r\nthe candle-flame is next presented is easy to imagine. Of\r\ncourse the sight of it arouses the grasping reflex; but it\r\narouses simultaneously the idea thereof, together with that\r\nof the consequent pain, and of the final retraction of the\r\nhand; and if these cerebral processes prevail in strength\r\nover the immediate sensation in the centres below, the last\r\nidea will be the cue by which the final action is discharged.\r\nThe grasping will be arrested in mid-career, the hand\r\ndrawn back, and the child\u0027s fingers saved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all this we assume that the hemispheres do not\r\n\u003ci\u003enatively\u003c/i\u003e couple any particular sense-impression with any\r\nspecial motor discharge. They only register, and preserve\r\ntraces of, such couplings as are already organized in the\r\nreflex centres below. But this brings it inevitably about\r\nthat, when a chain of experiences has been already registered\r\nand the first link is impressed once again from without,\r\nthe last link will often be awakened in \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e long before it\r\ncan exist in \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e. And if this last link were previously\r\ncoupled with a motion, that motion may now come from the\r\nmere ideal suggestion without waiting for the actual impression\r\nto arise. Thus an animal with hemispheres acts in \u003ci\u003eanticipation\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof future things; or, to use our previous formula, he\r\nacts from considerations of distant good and ill. If we give\r\nthe name of \u003ci\u003epartners\u003c/i\u003e to the original couplings of impressions\r\nwith motions in a reflex way, then we may say that the function\r\nof the hemispheres is simply to bring about \u003ci\u003eexchanges\r\namong the partners\u003c/i\u003e. Movement \u003ci\u003em\u003csup\u003en\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, which natively is sensation\r\n\u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003en\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s partner, becomes through the hemispheres the\r\npartner of sensation \u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e, s\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003es\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. It is like the great commutating\r\nswitch-board at a central telephone station. No\r\nnew elementary process is involved; no impression nor any\r\nmotion peculiar to the hemispheres; but any number of\r\ncombinations impossible to the lower machinery taken\r\nalone, and an endless consequent increase in the possibilities\r\nof behavior on the creature\u0027s part.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll this, as a mere scheme,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_7_7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e is so clear and so concordant\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[Pg 27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith the general look of the facts as almost to impose itself\r\non our belief; but it is anything but clear in detail. The\r\nbrain-physiology of late years has with great effort sought\r\nto work out the paths by which these couplings of sensations\r\nwith movements take place, both in the hemispheres\r\nand in the centres below.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo we must next test our scheme by the facts discovered\r\nm this direction. We shall conclude, I think, after taking\r\nthem all into account, that the scheme probably makes\r\nthe lower centres too machine-like and the hemispheres\r\nnot quite machine-like enough, and must consequently be\r\nsoftened down a little. So much I may say in advance.\r\nMeanwhile, before plunging into the details which await us,\r\nit will somewhat clear our ideas if we contrast the modern\r\nway of looking at the matter with the \u003ci\u003ephrenological\u003c/i\u003e conception\r\nwhich but lately preceded it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a certain sense Gall was the first to seek to explain\r\nin detail how the brain could subserve our mental operations.\r\nHis way of proceeding was only too simple. He took\r\nthe faculty-psychology as his ultimatum on the mental side,\r\nand he made no farther psychological analysis. Wherever\r\nhe found an individual with some strongly-marked trait\r\nof character he examined his head; and if he found the\r\nlatter prominent in a certain region, he said without more\r\nado that that region was the \u0027organ\u0027 of the trait or\r\nfaculty in question. The traits were of very diverse constitution,\r\nsome being simple sensibilities like \u0027weight\u0027\r\nor \u0027color;\u0027 some being instinctive tendencies like \u0027alimentiveness\u0027\r\nor \u0027amativeness;\u0027 and others, again, being complex\r\nresultants like \u0027conscientiousness,\u0027 \u0027individuality.\u0027\r\nPhrenology fell promptly into disrepute among scientific\r\nmen because observation seemed to show that large faculties\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[Pg 28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand large \u0027bumps\u0027 might fail to coexist; because the\r\nscheme of Gall was so vast as hardly to admit of accurate\r\ndetermination at all—who of us can say even of his own\r\nbrothers whether their perceptions of \u003ci\u003eweight\u003c/i\u003e and of \u003ci\u003etime\u003c/i\u003e are\r\nwell developed or not?—because the followers of Gall and\r\nSpurzheim were unable to reform these errors in any appreciable\r\ndegree; and, finally, because the whole analysis of\r\nfaculties was vague and erroneous from a psychologic point\r\nof view. Popular professors of the lore have nevertheless\r\ncontinued to command the admiration of popular audiences;\r\nand there seems no doubt that Phrenology, however little\r\nit satisfy our scientific curiosity about the functions of different\r\nportions of the brain, may still be, in the hands of\r\nintelligent practitioners, a useful help in the art of reading\r\ncharacter. A hooked nose and a firm jaw are usually signs\r\nof practical energy; soft, delicate hands are signs of refined\r\nsensibility. Even so may a prominent eye be a sign of\r\npower over language, and a bull-neck a sign of sensuality.\r\nBut the brain behind the eye and neck need no more be\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eorgan\u003c/i\u003e of the signified faculty than the jaw is the\r\norgan of the will or the hand the organ of refinement.\r\nThese correlations between mind and body are, however, so\r\nfrequent that the \u0027characters\u0027 given by phrenologists are\r\noften remarkable for knowingness and insight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhrenology hardly does more than restate the problem.\r\nTo answer the question, \"Why do I like children?\" by\r\nsaying, \"Because you have a large organ of philoprogenitiveness,\"\r\nbut renames the phenomenon to be explained.\r\nWhat \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e my philoprogenitiveness? Of what mental elements\r\ndoes it consist? And how \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e a part of the brain\r\nbe its organ? A science of the mind must reduce such\r\ncomplex manifestations as \u0027philoprogenitiveness\u0027 to their\r\n\u003ci\u003eelements\u003c/i\u003e. A science of the brain must point out the functions\r\nof \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e elements. A science of the relations of mind\r\nand brain must show how the elementary ingredients of the\r\nformer correspond to the elementary functions of the latter.\r\nBut phrenology, except by occasional coincidence, takes no\r\naccount of elements at all. Its \u0027faculties,\u0027 as a rule, are\r\nfully equipped persons in a particular mental attitude.\r\nTake, for example, the \u0027faculty\u0027 of language. It involves\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[Pg 29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin reality a host of distinct powers. We must first have\r\nimages of concrete things and ideas of abstract qualities\r\nand relations; we must next have the memory of words\r\nand then the capacity so to associate each idea or image\r\nwith a particular word that, when the word is heard, the\r\nidea shall forthwith enter our mind. We must conversely,\r\nas soon as the idea arises in our mind, associate with it a\r\nmental image of the word, and by means of this image we\r\nmust innervate our articulatory apparatus so as to reproduce\r\nthe word as physical sound. To read or to write a\r\nlanguage other elements still must be introduced. But it\r\nis plain that the faculty of spoken language alone is so\r\ncomplicated as to call into play almost all the elementary\r\npowers which the mind possesses, memory, imagination,\r\nassociation, judgment, and volition. A portion of the brain\r\ncompetent to be the adequate seat of such a faculty would\r\nneeds be an entire brain in miniature,—just as the faculty\r\nitself is really a specification of the entire man, a sort of\r\nhomunculus.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet just such homunculi are for the most part the\r\nphrenological organs. As Lange says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We have a parliament of little men together, each one of whom,\r\nas happens also in a real parliament, possesses but a single idea\r\nwhich he ceaselessly strives to make prevail\"—benevolence, firmness,\r\nhope, and the rest. \"Instead of one soul, phrenology gives us forty,\r\neach alone as enigmatic as the full aggregate psychic life can be. Instead\r\nof dividing the latter into effective elements, she divides it into\r\npersonal beings of peculiar character…. \u0027Herr Pastor, sure there\r\nbe a horse inside,\u0027 called out the peasants to X after their spiritual\r\nshepherd had spent hours in explaining to them the construction of the\r\nlocomotive. With a horse inside truly everything becomes clear, even\r\nthough it be a queer enough sort of horse—the horse itself calls for no\r\nexplanation! Phrenology takes a start to get beyond the point of view\r\nof the ghost-like soul entity, but she ends by populating the whole skull\r\nwith ghosts of the same order.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_8_8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eModern Science conceives of the matter in a very different\r\nway. \u003ci\u003eBrain and mind alike consist of simple elements,\r\nsensory and motor\u003c/i\u003e. \"All nervous centres,\" says Dr. Hughlings\r\nJackson,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_9_9\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e \"from the lowest to the very highest (the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[Pg 30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsubstrata of consciousness), are made up of nothing else\r\nthan nervous arrangements, representing impressions and\r\nmovements…. I do not see of what other materials\r\nthe brain \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be made.\" Meynert represents the matter\r\nsimilarly when he calls the cortex of the hemispheres the\r\nsurface of projection for every muscle and every sensitive\r\npoint of the body. The muscles and the sensitive points\r\nare \u003ci\u003erepresented\u003c/i\u003e each by a cortical point, and the brain is\r\nnothing but the sum of all these cortical points, to which,\r\non the mental side, as many \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e correspond. \u003ci\u003eIdeas of\r\nsensation, ideas of motion\u003c/i\u003e are, on the other hand, \u003ci\u003ethe elementary\r\nfactors out of which the mind is built up by the\r\nassociationists in psychology\u003c/i\u003e. There is a complete parallelism\r\nbetween the two analyses, the same diagram of little\r\ndots, circles, or triangles joined by lines symbolizes equally\r\nwell the cerebral and mental processes: the dots stand for\r\ncells or ideas, the lines for fibres or associations. We shall\r\nhave later to criticise this analysis so far as it relates to\r\nthe mind; but there is no doubt that it is a most convenient,\r\nand has been a most useful, hypothesis, formulating the\r\nfacts in an extremely natural way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, then, we grant that motor and sensory ideas variously\r\nassociated are the materials of the mind, all we need do to get\r\na complete diagram of the mind\u0027s and the brain\u0027s relations\r\nshould be to ascertain which sensory idea corresponds to\r\nwhich sensational surface of projection, and which motor\r\nidea to which muscular surface of projection. The associations\r\nwould then correspond to the fibrous connections between\r\nthe various surfaces. This distinct \u003ci\u003ecerebral localization\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the various elementary sorts of idea has been treated as\r\na \u0027postulate\u0027 by many physiologists (e.g. Munk); and the\r\nmost stirring controversy in nerve-physiology which the\r\npresent generation has seen has been the \u003ci\u003elocalization-question\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE\r\nHEMISPHERES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUp to 1870, the opinion which prevailed was that which\r\nthe experiments of Flourens on pigeons\u0027 brains had made\r\nplausible, namely, that the different functions of the hemispheres\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[Pg 31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwere not locally separated, but carried on each by\r\nthe aid of the whole organ. Hitzig in 1870 showed, however,\r\nthat in a dog\u0027s brain highly specialized movements\r\ncould be produced by electric irritation of determinate\r\nregions of the cortex; and Ferrier and Munk, half a dozen\r\nyears later, seemed to prove, either by irritations or excisions\r\nor both, that there were equally determinate regions\r\nconnected with the senses of sight, touch, hearing, and\r\nsmell. Munk\u0027s special sensorial localizations, however,\r\ndisagreed with Ferrier\u0027s; and Goltz, from his extirpation-experiments,\r\ncame to a conclusion adverse to strict localization\r\nof any kind. The controversy is not yet over. I\r\nwill not pretend to say anything more of it historically, but\r\ngive a brief account of the condition in which matters at\r\npresent stand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe one thing which is \u003ci\u003eperfectly\u003c/i\u003e well established is this,\r\nthat the \u0027central\u0027 convolutions, on either side of the fissure of\r\nRolando, and (at least in the monkey) the calloso-marginal\r\nconvolution (which is continuous with them on the mesial\r\nsurface where one hemisphere is applied against the other),\r\nform the region by which all the motor incitations which\r\nleave the cortex pass out, on their way to those executive\r\ncentres in the region of the pons, medulla, and spinal cord\r\nfrom which the muscular contractions are discharged in\r\nthe last resort. The existence of this so-called \u0027motor\r\nzone\u0027 is established by the lines of evidence successively\r\ngiven below:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) \u003ci\u003eCortical Irritations.\u003c/i\u003e Electrical currents of small\r\nintensity applied to the surface of the said convolutions in\r\ndogs, monkeys, and other animals, produce well-defined\r\nmovements in face, fore-limb, hind-limb, tail, or trunk,\r\naccording as one point or another of the surface is irritated.\r\nThese movements affect almost invariably the side opposite\r\nto the brain irritations: If the left hemisphere be excited, the\r\nmovement is of the right leg, side of face, etc. All the objections\r\nat first raised against the validity of these experiments\r\nhave been overcome. The movements are certainly not due\r\nto irritations of the base of the brain by the downward spread\r\nof the current, for: \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) mechanical irritations will produce\r\nthem, though less easily than electrical; \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) shifting the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[Pg 32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nelectrodes to a point close by on the surface changes the\r\nmovement in ways quite inexplicable by changed physical\r\nconduction of the current; \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) if the cortical \u0027centre\u0027 for a\r\ncertain movement be cut under with a sharp knife but left\r\n\u003ci\u003ein situ\u003c/i\u003e, although the electric conductivity is physically\r\nunaltered by the operation, the physiological conductivity\r\nis gone and currents of the same strength no longer produce\r\nthe movements which they did; \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) the time-interval\r\nbetween the application of the electric stimulus to the cortex\r\nand the resultant movement is what it would be if the\r\ncortex acted physiologically and not merely physically in\r\ntransmitting the irritation. It is namely a well-known fact\r\nthat when a nerve-current has to pass through the spinal\r\ncord to excite a muscle by reflex action, the time is longer\r\nthan if it passes directly down the motor nerve: the cells\r\nof the cord take a certain time to discharge. Similarly,\r\nwhen a stimulus is applied directly to the cortex the muscle\r\ncontracts two or three hundredths of a second later than it\r\ndoes when the place on the cortex is cut away and the electrodes\r\nare applied to the white fibres below.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_10_10\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) \u003ci\u003eCortical Ablations.\u003c/i\u003e When the cortical spot which is\r\nfound to produce a movement of the fore-leg, in a dog,\r\nis excised (see spot 5 in Fig. 5), the leg in question becomes\r\npeculiarly affected. At first it seems paralyzed. Soon, however,\r\nit is used with the other legs, but badly. The animal\r\ndoes not bear his weight on it, allows it to rest on its dorsal\r\nsurface, stands with it crossing the other leg, does not remove\r\nit if it hangs over the edge of a table, can no longer \u0027give the\r\npaw\u0027 at word of command if able to do so before the operation,\r\ndoes not use it for scratching the ground, or holding a\r\nbone as formerly, lets it slip out when running on a smooth\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[Pg 33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsurface or when shaking himself, etc., etc. Sensibility of\r\nall kinds seems diminished as well as motility, but of this I\r\nshall speak later on. Moreover the dog tends in voluntary\r\nmovements to swerve towards the side of the brain-lesion instead\r\nof going straight forward. All these symptoms gradually\r\ndecrease, so that even with a very severe brain-lesion\r\nthe dog may be outwardly indistinguishable from a well dog\r\nafter eight or ten weeks. Still, a slight chloroformization\r\nwill reproduce the disturbances, even then. There is a certain\r\nappearance of ataxic in-coordination in the movements—the\r\ndog lifts his fore-feet high and brings them down with\r\nmore strength than usual, and yet the trouble is not ordinary\r\nlack of co-ordination. Neither is there paralysis.\r\nThe strength of whatever movements are made is as great\r\nas ever—dogs with extensive destruction of the motor zone\r\ncan jump as high and bite as hard as ever they did, but\r\nthey seem \u003ci\u003eless easily moved\u003c/i\u003e to do \u003ci\u003eanything\u003c/i\u003e with the affected\r\nparts. Dr. Loeb, who has studied the motor disturbances\r\nof dogs more carefully than any one, conceives of them \u003ci\u003een\r\nmasse\u003c/i\u003e as effects of an increased inertia in all the processes\r\nof innervation towards the side opposed to the lesion. All\r\nsuch movements require an unwonted effort for their execution;\r\nand when only the normally usual effort is made\r\nthey fall behind in effectiveness.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_11_11\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-033-0005.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_033_0005.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 5.—Left Hemisphere of Dog\u0027s Brain, after Ferrier. \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, the fissure of Sylvius. \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe crucial sulcus. \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e, the olfactory bulb. \u003ci\u003eI, II, III, IV,\u003c/i\u003e indicate the first, second,\r\nthird, and fourth external convolutions respectively. (1), (4), and (5) are on the\r\n\u003ci\u003esigmoid\u003c/i\u003e gyrus.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[Pg 34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-034-0006.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_034_0006.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 6.—Left Hemisphere of Monkey\u0027s Brain. Outer Surface.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven when the entire motor zone of a dog is removed,\r\nthere is no permanent paralysis of any part, but only this\r\ncurious sort of relative inertia when the two sides of the\r\nbody are compared; and this itself becomes hardly noticeable\r\nafter a number of weeks have elapsed. Prof. Goltz\r\nhas described a dog whose entire left hemisphere was destroyed,\r\nand who retained only a slight motor inertia on the\r\nright half of the body. In particular he could use his right\r\npaw for holding a bone whilst gnawing it, or for reaching\r\nafter a piece of meat. Had he been taught to give his paw\r\nBefore the operations, it would have been curious to see\r\nwhether that faculty also came back. His tactile sensibility\r\nwas permanently diminished on the right side.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_12_12\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e In\r\n\u003ci\u003emonkeys\u003c/i\u003e a genuine paralysis follows upon ablations of the\r\ncortex in the motor region. This paralysis affects parts of\r\nthe body which vary with the brain-parts removed. The\r\nmonkey\u0027s opposite arm or leg hangs flaccid, or at most takes a\r\nsmall part in associated movements. When the entire region\r\nis removed there is a genuine and permanent hemiplegia\r\nin which the arm is more affected than the leg; and this is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[Pg 35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfollowed months later by contracture of the muscles, as in\r\nman after inveterate hemiplegia.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_13_13\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e According to Schaefer\r\nand Horsley, the trunk-muscles also become paralyzed after\r\ndestruction of the \u003ci\u003emarginal\u003c/i\u003e convolution on \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e sides (see\r\nFig. 7). These differences between dogs and monkeys show\r\nthe danger of drawing general conclusions from experiments\r\ndone on any one sort of animal. I subjoin the figures given\r\nby the last-named authors of the motor regions in the\r\nmonkey\u0027s brain.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_14_14\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-035-0007.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_035_0007.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 7.—Left Hemisphere of Monkey\u0027s Brain. Mesial Surface.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn man\u003c/i\u003e we are necessarily reduced to the observation\r\n\u003ci\u003epost-mortem\u003c/i\u003e of cortical ablations produced by accident or\r\ndisease (tumor, hemorrhage, softening, etc.). What results\r\nduring life from such conditions is either localized spasm,\r\nor palsy of certain muscles of the opposite side. The cortical\r\nregions which invariably produce these results are\r\nhomologous with those which we have just been studying\r\nin the dog, cat, ape, etc. Figs. 8 and 9 show the result of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[Pg 36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n169 cases carefully studied by Exner. The parts shaded\r\nare regions where lesions produced \u003ci\u003eno\u003c/i\u003e motor disturbance.\r\nThose left white were, on the contrary, never injured without\r\nmotor disturbances of some sort. Where the injury to\r\nthe cortical substance is profound in man, the paralysis is\r\npermanent and is succeeded by muscular rigidity in the\r\nparalyzed parts, just as it may be in the monkey.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-036-0008.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_036_0008.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 8.—Right Hemisphere of Human Brain. Lateral Surface.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-036-0009.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_036_0009.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 9.—Right Hemisphere of Human Brain. Mesial Surface.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[Pg 37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) \u003ci\u003eDescending degenerations\u003c/i\u003e show the intimate connection\r\nof the rolandic regions of the cortex with the motor\r\ntracts of the cord. When, either in man or in the lower animals,\r\nthese regions are destroyed, a peculiar degenerative\r\nchange known as secondary sclerosis is found to extend\r\ndownwards through the white fibrous substance of the\r\nbrain in a perfectly definite manner, affecting certain distinct\r\nstrands which pass through the inner capsule, crura,\r\nand pons, into the anterior pyramids of the medulla oblongata,\r\nand from thence (partly crossing to the other side)\r\ndownwards into the anterior (direct) and lateral (crossed)\r\ncolumns of the spinal cord.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) \u003ci\u003eAnatomical proof\u003c/i\u003e of the continuity of the rolandic\r\nregions with these motor columns of the cord is also clearly\r\ngiven. Flechsig\u0027s \u0027Pyramidenbahn\u0027 forms an uninterrupted\r\nstrand (distinctly traceable in human embryos,\r\nbefore its fibres have acquired their white \u0027medullary\r\nsheath\u0027) passing upwards from the pyramids of the medulla,\r\nand traversing the internal capsule and corona radiata\r\nto the convolutions in question (Fig. 10). None of the\r\ninferior gray matter of the brain seems to have any connection\r\nwith this important fibrous strand. It passes directly\r\nfrom the cortex to the motor arrangements in the cord, depending\r\nfor its proper nutrition (as the facts of degeneration\r\nshow) on the influence of the cortical cells, just as motor\r\nnerves depend for their nutrition on that of the cells of the\r\nspinal cord. Electrical stimulation of this motor strand in\r\nany accessible part of its course has been shown in dogs to\r\nproduce movements analogous to those which excitement\r\nof the cortical surface calls forth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 375px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-038-0010.jpg\" style=\"width: 375px\" id=\"img_images_jame_038_0010.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 10.—Schematic Transverse Section of Brain showing Motor Strand.—After\r\nEdinger.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the most instructive proofs of motor localization\r\nin the cortex is that furnished by the disease now called\r\naphemia, or \u003ci\u003emotor Aphasia\u003c/i\u003e. Motor aphasia is neither loss\r\nof voice nor paralysis of the tongue or lips. The patient\u0027s\r\nvoice is as strong as ever, and all the innervations of his\r\nhypoglossal and facial nerves, except those necessary for\r\nspeaking, may go on perfectly well. He can laugh and cry,\r\nand even sing; but he either is unable to utter any words at\r\nall; or a few meaningless stock phrases form his only speech;\r\nor else he speaks incoherently and confusedly, mispronouncing,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[Pg 38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmisplacing, and misusing his words in various degrees.\r\nSometimes his speech is a mere broth of unintelligible syllables.\r\nIn cases of pure motor aphasia the patient recognizes\r\nhis mistakes and suffers acutely from them. Now\r\nwhenever a patient dies in such a condition as this, and\r\nan examination of his brain is permitted, it is found that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[Pg 39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe lowest frontal gyrus (see Fig. 11) is the seat of injury.\r\nBroca first noticed this fact in 1861, and since then the\r\ngyrus has gone by the name of Broca\u0027s convolution. The\r\ninjury in right-handed people is found on the left hemisphere,\r\nand in left-handed people on the right hemisphere.\r\nMost people, in fact, are left-brained, that is, all their\r\ndelicate and specialized movements are handed over to\r\nthe charge of the left hemisphere. The ordinary right-handedness\r\nfor such movements is only a consequence of\r\nthat fact, a consequence which shows outwardly on account\r\nof that extensive decussation of the fibres whereby most of\r\nthose from the left hemisphere pass to the right half of the\r\nbody only. But the left-brainedness might exist in equal\r\nmeasure and not show outwardly. This would happen\r\nwherever organs on \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e sides of the body could be governed\r\nby the left hemisphere; and just such a case seems\r\noffered by the vocal organs, in that highly delicate and\r\nspecial motor service which we call speech. Either hemisphere\r\n\u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e innervate them bilaterally, just as either seems\r\nable to innervate bilaterally the muscles of the trunk, ribs,\r\nand diaphragm. Of the special movements of speech, however,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[Pg 40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit would appear (from the facts of aphasia) that the\r\nleft hemisphere in most persons habitually takes exclusive\r\ncharge. With that hemisphere thrown out of gear, speech is\r\nundone; even though the opposite hemisphere still be there\r\nfor the performance of less specialized acts, such as the\r\nvarious movements required in eating.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-039-0011.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_039_0011.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 11.—Schematic Profile of Left Hemisphere, with the parts shaded whose\r\ndestruction causes motor (\u0027Broca\u0027) and sensory (\u0027Wernicke\u0027) Aphasia.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be noticed that Broca\u0027s region is homologous\r\nwith the parts ascertained to produce movements of the\r\nlips, tongue, and larynx when excited by electric currents\r\nin apes (cf. Fig. 6). The evidence is therefore as complete\r\nas it well can be that the motor incitations to these\r\norgans leave the brain by the lower frontal region.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVictims of motor aphasia generally have other disorders.\r\nOne which interests us in this connection has been called\r\n\u003ci\u003eagraphia\u003c/i\u003e: they have lost the power to \u003ci\u003ewrite\u003c/i\u003e. They can\r\nread writing and understand it; but either cannot use the\r\npen at all or make egregious mistakes with it. The seat\r\nof the lesion here is less well determined, owing to an insufficient\r\nnumber of good cases to conclude from.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_15_15\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e There\r\nis no doubt, however, that it is (in right-handed people) on\r\nthe left side, and little doubt that it consists of elements\r\nof the hand-and-arm region specialized for that service,\r\nThe symptom may exist when there is little or no disability\r\nin the hand for other uses. If it does not get well, the\r\npatient usually educates his right hemisphere, i.e. learns\r\nto write with his left hand. In other cases of which we\r\nshall say more a few pages later on, the patient can write\r\nboth spontaneously and at dictation, but cannot \u003ci\u003eread\u003c/i\u003e even\r\nwhat he has himself written! All these phenomena are\r\nnow quite clearly explained by separate brain-centres for\r\nthe various feelings and movements and tracts for associating\r\nthese together. But their minute discussion belongs to\r\nmedicine rather than to general psychology, and I can only\r\nuse them here to illustrate the principles of motor localization.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_16_16\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nUnder the heads of sight and hearing I shall\r\nhave a little more to say.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[Pg 41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe different lines of proof which I have taken up\r\nestablish conclusively the proposition that \u003ci\u003eall the motor\r\nimpulses which leave the cortex pass out\u003c/i\u003e, in healthy animals,\r\n\u003ci\u003efrom the convolutions about the fissure of Rolando\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen, however, it comes to defining precisely what is\r\ninvolved in a motor impulse leaving the cortex, things grow\r\nmore obscure. Does the impulse start independently from\r\nthe convolutions in question, or does it start elsewhere and\r\nmerely flow through? And to what particular phase of\r\npsychic activity does the activity of these centres correspond?\r\nOpinions and authorities here divide; but it will\r\nbe better, before entering into these deeper aspects of the\r\nproblem, to cast a glance at the facts which have been\r\nmade out concerning the relations of the cortex to sight,\r\nhearing, and smell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eSight.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFerrier was the first in the field here. He found, when\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eangular\u003c/i\u003e convolution (that lying between the \u0027intra\r\nparietal\u0027 and \u0027external occipital\u0027 fissures, and bending\r\nround the top of the fissure of Sylvius, in Fig. 6) was excited\r\nin the monkey, that movements of the eyes and head\r\nas if for vision occurred; and that when it was extirpated,\r\nwhat he supposed to be total and permanent blindness\r\nof the opposite eye followed. Munk almost immediately\r\ndeclared total and permanent blindness to follow from destruction\r\nof the \u003ci\u003eoccipital lobe\u003c/i\u003e in monkeys as well as dogs, and\r\nsaid that the angular gyrus had nothing to do with sight,\r\nbut was only the centre for tactile sensibility of the eyeball.\r\nHunk\u0027s absolute tone about his observations and his theoretic\r\narrogance have led to his ruin as an authority. But he\r\ndid two things of permanent value. He was the first to\r\ndistinguish in these vivisections between sensorial and\r\n\u003ci\u003epsychic\u003c/i\u003e blindness, and to describe the phenomenon of \u003ci\u003erestitution\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the visual function after its first impairment by\r\nan operation; and the first to notice the \u003ci\u003ehemiopic\u003c/i\u003e character\r\nof the visual disturbances which result when only one\r\nhemisphere is injured. Sensorial blindness is absolute\r\ninsensibility to light; psychic blindness is inability to recognize\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of the optical impressions, as when we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[Pg 42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsee a page of Chinese print but it suggests nothing to us.\r\nA hemiopic disturbance of vision is one in which neither\r\nretina is affected in its totality, but in which, for example,\r\nthe left portion of \u003ci\u003eeach\u003c/i\u003e retina is blind, so that the animal\r\nsees nothing situated in space towards its right. Later\r\nobservations have corroborated this hemiopic character of\r\nall the disturbances of sight from injury to a single hemisphere\r\nin the higher animals; and the question whether\r\nan animal\u0027s apparent blindness is sensorial or only psychic\r\nhas, since Munk\u0027s first publications, been the most urgent\r\none to answer, in all observations relative to the function of\r\nsight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGoltz almost simultaneously with Ferrier and Munk\r\nreported experiments which led him to deny that the\r\nvisual function was essentially bound up with any one\r\nlocalized portion of the hemispheres. Other divergent\r\nresults soon came in from many quarters, so that, without\r\ngoing into the history of the matter any more, I may report\r\nthe existing state of the case as follows:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_17_17\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003efishes, frogs\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003elizards\u003c/i\u003e vision persists when the\r\nhemispheres are entirely removed. This is admitted for\r\nfrogs and fishes even by Munk, who denies it for birds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll of Munk\u0027s \u003ci\u003ebirds\u003c/i\u003e seemed totally blind (blind sensorially)\r\nafter removal of the hemispheres by his operation.\r\nThe following of a candle by the head and winking at a\r\nthreatened blow, which are ordinarily held to prove the\r\nretention of crude optical sensations by the lower centres\r\nin supposed hemisphereless pigeons, are by Munk ascribed\r\nto vestiges of the visual sphere of the cortex left behind\r\nby the imperfection of the operation. But Schrader, who\r\noperated after Munk and with every apparent guarantee of\r\ncompleteness, found that all his pigeons saw after two\r\nor three weeks had elapsed, and the inhibitions resulting\r\nfrom the wound had passed away. They invariably avoided\r\neven the slightest obstacles, flew very regularly towards\r\ncertain perches, etc., differing \u003ci\u003etoto cœlo\u003c/i\u003e in these respects\r\nwith certain simply \u003ci\u003eblinded\u003c/i\u003e pigeons who were kept with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[Pg 43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem for comparison. They did not pick up food strewn\r\non the ground, however. Schrader found that they would\r\ndo this if even a small part of the frontal region of the\r\nhemispheres was left, and ascribes their non-self-feeding\r\nwhen deprived of their occipital cerebrum not to a visual,\r\nbut to a motor, defect, a sort of alimentary aphasia.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_18_18\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn presence of such discord as that between Munk and\r\nhis opponents one must carefully note how differently significant\r\nis \u003ci\u003eloss\u003c/i\u003e, from \u003ci\u003epreservation\u003c/i\u003e, of a function after an operation\r\non the brain. The \u003ci\u003eloss\u003c/i\u003e of the function does not necessarily\r\nshow that it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e dependent on the part cut out; but its\r\n\u003ci\u003epreservation\u003c/i\u003e does show that it is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e dependent: and this is\r\ntrue though the loss should be observed ninety-nine times\r\nand the preservation only once in a hundred similar excisions.\r\nThat birds and mammals \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be blinded by cortical ablation\r\nis undoubted; the only question is, \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e they be so?\r\nOnly then can the cortex be certainly called the \u0027seat of\r\nsight.\u0027 The blindness may always be due to one of those\r\nremote effects of the wound on distant parts, inhibitions,\r\nextensions of inflammation,—interferences, in a word,—upon\r\nwhich Brown-Séquard and Goltz have rightly insisted,\r\nand the importance of which becomes more manifest every\r\nday. Such effects are transient; whereas the \u003ci\u003esymptoms of\r\ndeprivation\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eAusfallserscheinungen\u003c/i\u003e, as Goltz calls them) which\r\ncome from the actual loss of the cut-out region must from\r\nthe nature of the case be permanent. Blindness in the\r\npigeons, \u003ci\u003eso far as it passes away\u003c/i\u003e, cannot possibly be charged\r\nto their seat of vision being lost, but only to some influence\r\nwhich temporarily depresses the activity of that seat.\r\nThe same is true \u003ci\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/i\u003e of all the other effects of\r\noperations, and as we pass to mammals we shall see still\r\nmore the importance of the remark.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn rabbits\u003c/i\u003e loss of the entire cortex seems compatible\r\nwith the preservation of enough sight to guide the poor\r\nanimals\u0027 movements, and enable them to avoid obstacles.\r\nChristiani\u0027s observations and discussions seem conclusively\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[Pg 44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto have established this, although Munk found that all \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nanimals were made totally blind.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_19_19\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn dogs\u003c/i\u003e also Munk found absolute stone-blindness after\r\nablation of the occipital lobes. He went farther and\r\nmapped out determinate portions of the cortex thereupon,\r\nwhich he considered correlated with definite segments of the\r\ntwo retinæ, so that destruction of given portions of the cortex\r\nproduces blindness of the retinal centre, top, bottom,\r\nor right or left side, of the same or opposite eye. There\r\nseems little doubt that this definite correlation is mythological.\r\nOther observers, Hitzig, Goltz, Luciani, Loeb, Exner,\r\netc., find, whatever part of the cortex may be ablated on\r\none side, that there usually results a \u003ci\u003ehemiopic\u003c/i\u003e disturbance\r\nof \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e eyes, slight and transient when the anterior lobes\r\nare the parts attacked, grave when an occipital lobe is the\r\nseat of injury, and lasting in proportion to the latter\u0027s\r\nextent. According to Loeb, the defect is a dimness of vision\r\n(\u0027hemiamblyopia\u0027) in which (however severe) the centres\r\nremain the best seeing portions of the retina, just as they\r\nare in normal dogs. The lateral or temporal part of each\r\nretina seems to be in exclusive connection with the cortex\r\nof its own side. The centre and nasal part of each seems,\r\non the contrary, to be connected with the cortex of the\r\nopposite hemispheres. Loeb, who takes broader views\r\nthan any one, conceives the hemiamblyopia as he conceives\r\nthe motor disturbances, namely, as the expression\r\nof an increased inertia in the whole optical machinery, of\r\nwhich the result is to make the animal respond with greater\r\neffort to impressions coming from the half of space opposed\r\nto the side of the lesion. If a dog has right hemiamblyopia,\r\nsay, and two pieces of meat are hung before him at once,\r\nhe invariably turns first to the one on his left. But if the\r\nlesion be a slight one, \u003ci\u003eshaking\u003c/i\u003e slightly the piece of meat\r\non his right (this makes of it a stronger stimulus) makes him\r\nseize upon it first. If only one piece of meat be offered, he\r\ntakes it, on whichever side it be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"Engravings\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-045-0012-13.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_045_0012_13.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFigs.\u003c/span\u003e 12 and 13.\r\nThe Dog\u0027s visual centre according to Munk, the entire striated region, \u003ci\u003eA, A\u003c/i\u003e, being the\r\nexclusive seat of vision, and the dark central circle, \u003ci\u003eA\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, being correlated with the\r\nretinal centre of the opposite eye.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen both occipital lobes are extensively destroyed\r\ntotal blindness may result. Munk maps out his \u0027Sehsphäre\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[Pg 45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndefinitely, and says that blindness \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e result\r\nwhen the entire shaded part, marked \u003ci\u003eA, A,\u003c/i\u003e in Figs. 12\r\nand 13, is involved in the lesion. Discrepant reports\r\nof other observations he explains as due to incomplete\r\nablation. Luciani, Goltz, and Lannegrace, however, contend\r\nthat they have made complete bilateral extirpations\r\nof Munk\u0027s Sehsphäre more than once, and found a sort\r\nof crude indiscriminating sight of objects to return in a\r\nfew weeks.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_20_20\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e The question whether a dog is blind or not\r\nis harder to solve than would at first appear; for simply\r\nblinded dogs, in places to which they are accustomed, show\r\nlittle of their loss and avoid all obstacles; whilst dogs\r\nwhose occipital lobes are gone may run against things frequently\r\nand yet see notwithstanding. The best proof that\r\nthey may see is that which Goltz\u0027s dogs furnished: they\r\ncarefully avoided, as it seemed, strips of sunshine or paper\r\non the floor, as if they were solid obstacles. This no really\r\nblind dog would do. Luciani tested his dogs when hungry\r\n(a condition which sharpens their attention) by strewing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[Pg 46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npieces of meat and pieces of cork before them. If they\r\nwent straight at them, they \u003ci\u003esaw\u003c/i\u003e; and if they chose the meat\r\nand left the cork, they \u003ci\u003esaw discriminatingly\u003c/i\u003e. The quarrel\r\nis very acrimonious; indeed the subject of localization of\r\nfunctions in the brain seems to have a peculiar effect on the\r\ntemper of those who cultivate it experimentally. The\r\namount of preserved vision which Goltz and Luciani report\r\nseems hardly to be worth considering, on the one hand;\r\nand on the other, Munk admits in his penultimate paper\r\nthat out of 85 dogs he only \u0027succeeded\u0027 4 times in his operation\r\nof producing complete blindness by complete extirpation\r\nof his \u0027Sehsphäre.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_21_21\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e The safe conclusion for \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e is that\r\nLuciani\u0027s diagram, Fig. 14, represents something like the\r\ntruth. The occipital lobes are far more important for\r\nvision than any other part of the cortex, so that their complete\r\ndestruction makes the animal almost blind. As for\r\nthe crude sensibility to light which \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e then remain, nothing\r\nexact is known either about its nature or its seat.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-046-0014.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_046_0014.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 14.—Distribution of the Visual Function in the Cortex, according to Luciani.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn the monkey\u003c/i\u003e, doctors also disagree. The truth seems,\r\nhowever, to be that the \u003ci\u003eoccipital lobes\u003c/i\u003e in this animal also are\r\nthe part connected most intimately with the visual function.\r\nThe function would seem to go on when very small portions\r\nof them are left, for Ferrier found no \u0027appreciable impairment\u0027\r\nof it after almost complete destruction of them on both\r\nsides. On the other hand, he found complete and permanent\r\nblindness to ensue when they and the \u003ci\u003eangular gyri\u003c/i\u003e in\r\naddition were destroyed on both sides. Munk, as well as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[Pg 47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBrown and Schaefer, found no disturbance of sight from\r\ndestroying the \u003ci\u003eangular gyri\u003c/i\u003e alone, although Ferrier found\r\nblindness to ensue. This blindness was probably due to\r\ninhibitions exerted \u003ci\u003ein distans\u003c/i\u003e, or to cutting of the white\r\noptical fibres passing under the angular gyri on their way\r\nto the occipital lobes. Brown and Schaefer got complete\r\nand permanent blindness in one monkey from total destruction\r\nof both occipital lobes. Luciani and Seppili, performing\r\nthis operation on two monkeys, found that the animals\r\nwere only mentally, not sensorially, blind. After some\r\nweeks they saw their food, but could not distinguish by\r\nsight between figs and pieces of cork. Luciani and Seppili\r\nseem, however, not to have extirpated the entire lobes.\r\nWhen one lobe only is injured the affection of sight is\r\nhemiopic in monkeys: in this all observers agree. On\r\nthe whole, then, Munk\u0027s original location of vision in the\r\noccipital lobes is confirmed by the later evidence.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_22_22\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn man\u003c/i\u003e we have more exact results, since we are not\r\ndriven to interpret the vision from the outward conduct.\r\nOn the other hand, however, we cannot vivisect, but must\r\nwait for pathological lesions to turn up. The pathologists\r\nwho have discussed these (the literature is tedious \u003ci\u003ead libitum\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nconclude that the occipital lobes are the indispensable\r\npart for vision in man. Hemiopic disturbance in both eyes\r\ncomes from lesion of either one of them, and total blindness,\r\nsensorial as well as psychic, from destruction of both.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHemiopia may also result from lesion in other parts,\r\nespecially the neighboring angular and supra-marginal gyri,\r\nand it may accompany extensive injury in the motor region\r\nof the cortex. In these cases it seems probable that it is\r\ndue to an \u003ci\u003eactio in distans\u003c/i\u003e, probably to the interruption of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[Pg 48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfibres proceeding from the occipital lobe. There seem to\r\nbe a few cases on record where there was injury to the\r\noccipital lobes without visual defect. Ferrier has collected\r\nas many as possible to prove his localization in the angular\r\ngyrus.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_23_23\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e A strict application of logical principles would make\r\none of these cases outweigh one hundred contrary ones. And\r\nyet, remembering how imperfect observations may be, and\r\nhow individual brains may vary, it would certainly be rash for\r\ntheir sake to throw away the enormous amount of positive\r\nevidence for the occipital lobes. Individual variability is\r\nalways a \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e explanation of an anomalous case. There\r\nis no more prominent anatomical fact than that of the \u0027decussation\r\nof the pyramids,\u0027 nor any more usual pathological\r\nfact than its consequence, that left-handed hemorrhages\r\ninto the motor region produce right-handed paralyses.\r\nAnd yet the decussation is variable in amount, and seems\r\nsometimes to be absent altogether.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_24_24\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e If, in such a case as\r\nthis last, the left brain were to become the seat of apoplexy,\r\nthe left and not the right half of the body would be the\r\none to suffer paralysis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eschema\u003c/i\u003e below [Fig. 15], copied from Dr.\r\nSeguin, expresses, on the whole, the probable truth about the\r\nregions concerned in vision. Not the entire occipital lobes,\r\nbut the so-called cunei, and the first convolutions, are the\r\ncortical parts most intimately concerned. Nothnagel agrees\r\nwith Seguin in this limitation of the essential tracts.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_25_25\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-049-0015.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_049_0015.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 15.—Scheme of the mechanism of vision, after Seguin. The \u003ci\u003ecuneus\u003c/i\u003e convolution\r\n(\u003ci\u003eCu\u003c/i\u003e) of the right occipital lobe is supposed to be injured, and all the parts which\r\nlead to it are darkly shaded to show that they fail to exert their function. \u003ci\u003eF. O.\u003c/i\u003e are\r\nthe intra-hemispheric optical fibres. \u003ci\u003eP. O. C.\u003c/i\u003e is the region of the lower optic centres\r\n(corpora geniculata and quadrigemina). \u003ci\u003eT. O. D.\u003c/i\u003e is the right optic tract; \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nchiasma; \u003ci\u003eF. L. D.\u003c/i\u003e are the fibres going to the lateral or temporal half \u003ci\u003eT\u003c/i\u003e of the right\r\nretina; and \u003ci\u003eF. C. S.\u003c/i\u003e are those going to the central or nasal half of the left retina.\r\n\u003ci\u003eO. D.\u003c/i\u003e is the right, and \u003ci\u003eO. S.\u003c/i\u003e the left eyeball. The rightward half of each is therefore\r\nblind: in other words, the right nasal field, \u003ci\u003eR. N. F.\u003c/i\u003e, and the left temporal field\r\n\u003ci\u003eL. T. F.\u003c/i\u003e, have become invisible to the subject with the lesion at \u003ci\u003eCu\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA most interesting effect of cortical disorder is \u003ci\u003emental\r\nblindness\u003c/i\u003e. This consists not so much in insensibility to\r\noptical impressions, as in \u003ci\u003einability to understand them\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nPsychologically it is interpretable as \u003ci\u003eloss of associations\u003c/i\u003e between\r\noptical sensations and what they signify; and any\r\ninterruption of the paths between the optic centres and the\r\ncentres for other ideas ought to bring it about. Thus,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[Pg 49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprinted letters of the alphabet, or words, signify certain\r\nsounds and certain articulatory movements. If the connection\r\nbetween the articulating or auditory centres, on the\r\none hand, and the visual centres on the other, be ruptured\r\nwe ought \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e to expect that the sight of words would\r\nfail to awaken the idea of their sound, or the movement for\r\npronouncing them. We ought, in short, to have \u003ci\u003ealexia\u003c/i\u003e, or\r\ninability to read: and this is just what we do have in many\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[Pg 50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncases of extensive injury about the fronto-temporal regions,\r\nas a complication of \u003ci\u003eaphasic\u003c/i\u003e disease. Nothnagel suggests\r\nthat whilst the \u003ci\u003ecuneus\u003c/i\u003e is the seat of optical \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nother parts of the occipital lobe may be the field of optical\r\n\u003ci\u003ememories and ideas\u003c/i\u003e, from the loss of which mental blindness\r\nshould ensue. In fact, all the medical authors speak\r\nof mental blindness as if it must consist in the loss of visual\r\nimages from the memory. It seems to me, however, that\r\nthis is a psychological misapprehension. A man whose\r\npower of visual imagination has decayed (no unusual phenomenon\r\nin its lighter grades) is not mentally blind in\r\nthe least, for he recognizes perfectly all that he sees. On\r\nthe other hand, he \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be mentally blind, with his optical\r\nimagination well preserved; as in the interesting case published\r\nby Wilbrand in 1887.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_26_26\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e In the still more interesting\r\ncase of mental blindness recently published by Lissauer,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_27_27\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthough the patient made the most ludicrous mistakes, calling\r\nfor instance a clothes-brush a pair of spectacles, an umbrella\r\na plant with flowers, an apple a portrait of a lady, etc.\r\netc., he seemed, according to the reporter, to have his mental\r\nimages fairly well preserved. It is in fact the momentary\r\nloss of our \u003ci\u003enon\u003c/i\u003e-optical images which makes us mentally\r\nblind, just as it is that of our \u003ci\u003enon\u003c/i\u003e-auditory images which\r\nmakes us mentally deaf. I am mentally deaf if, \u003ci\u003ehearing\u003c/i\u003e a\r\nbell, I can\u0027t recall how it \u003ci\u003elooks\u003c/i\u003e; and mentally blind if, \u003ci\u003eseeing\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit, I can\u0027t recall its \u003ci\u003esound or its name\u003c/i\u003e. As a matter of\r\nfact, I should have to be not merely mentally blind, but\r\nstone-blind, if all my visual images were lost. For although\r\nI am blind to the right half of the field of view if my\r\nleft occipital region is injured, and to the left half if my\r\nright region is injured, such hemianopsia does not deprive\r\nme of visual \u003ci\u003eimages\u003c/i\u003e, experience seeming to show that\r\nthe unaffected hemisphere is always sufficient for production\r\nof these. To abolish them entirely I should have\r\nto be deprived of both occipital lobes, and that would deprive\r\nme not only of my inward images of sight, but of my\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[Pg 51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsight altogether.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_28_28\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e Recent pathological annals seem to offer\r\na few such cases.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_29_29\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e Meanwhile there are a number of cases\r\nof mental blindness, especially for written language, coupled\r\nwith hemianopsia, usually of the rightward field of view.\r\nThese are all explicable by the breaking down, through\r\ndisease, of the \u003ci\u003econnecting tracts\u003c/i\u003e between the occipital lobes\r\nand other parts of the brain, especially those which go to\r\nthe centres for speech in the frontal and temporal regions of\r\nthe left hemisphere. They are to be classed among disturbances\r\nof \u003ci\u003econduction\u003c/i\u003e or of \u003ci\u003eassociation\u003c/i\u003e; and nowhere can I find\r\nany fact which should force us to believe that optical images\r\nneed\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_30_30\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e be lost in mental blindness, or that the cerebral\r\ncentres for such images are locally distinct from those for\r\ndirect sensations from the eyes.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_31_31\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere an object fails to be recognized by sight, it often\r\nhappens that the patient will recognize and name it as soon\r\nas he touches it with his hand. This shows in an interesting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[Pg 52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nway how numerous the associative paths are which all\r\nend by running out of the brain through the channel of\r\nspeech. The hand-path is open, though the eye-path be\r\nclosed. When mental blindness is most complete, neither\r\nsight, touch, nor sound avails to steer the patient, and a sort\r\nof dementia which has been called \u003ci\u003easymbolia\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eapraxia\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nthe result. The commonest articles are not understood.\r\nThe patient will put his breeches on one shoulder and his\r\nhat upon the other, will bite into the soap and lay his shoes\r\non the table, or take his food into his hand and throw it\r\ndown again, not knowing what to do with it, etc. Such disorder\r\ncan only come from extensive brain-injury.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_32_32\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003emethod of degeneration\u003c/i\u003e corroborates the other evidence\r\nlocalizing the tracts of vision. In young animals one\r\ngets secondary degeneration of the occipital regions from\r\ndestroying an eyeball, and, \u003ci\u003evice versâ\u003c/i\u003e, degeneration of the\r\noptic nerves from destroying the occipital regions. The\r\ncorpora geniculata, thalami, and subcortical fibres leading\r\nto the occipital lobes are also found atrophied in these\r\ncases. The phenomena are not uniform, but are indisputable;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_33_33\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nso that, taking all lines of evidence together, the\r\nspecial connection of vision with the occipital lobes is perfectly\r\nmade out. It should be added, that the occipital\r\nlobes have frequently been found shrunken in cases of inveterate\r\nblindness in man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eHearing.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHearing is hardly as definitely localized as sight. \u003ci\u003eIn the\r\ndog\u003c/i\u003e, Luciani\u0027s diagram will show the regions which directly or\r\nindirectly affect it for the worse when injured. As with sight,\r\none-sided lesions produce symptoms on both sides. The\r\nmixture of black dots and gray dots in the diagram is meant\r\nto represent this mixture of \u0027crossed\u0027 and \u0027uncrossed\u0027 connections,\r\nthough of course no topographical exactitude is\r\naimed at. Of all the region, the temporal lobe is the most\r\nimportant part; yet permanent absolute deafness did not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[Pg 53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresult in a dog of Luciani\u0027s, even from bilateral destruction\r\nof both temporal lobes in their entirety.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_34_34\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-053-0016.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_053_0016.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 16.—Luciani\u0027s Hearing Region.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn the monkey\u003c/i\u003e, Ferrier and Yeo once found permanent\r\ndeafness to follow destruction of the upper temporal convolution\r\n(the one just below the fissure of Sylvius in Fig.\r\n6) on both sides. Brown and Schaefer found, on the contrary,\r\nthat in several monkeys this operation failed to noticeably\r\naffect the hearing. In one animal, indeed, both entire\r\ntemporal lobes were destroyed. After a week or two of\r\ndepression of the mental faculties this beast recovered and\r\nbecame one of the brightest monkeys possible, domineering\r\nover all his mates, and admitted by all who saw him to\r\nhave all his senses, including hearing, \u0027perfectly acute.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_35_35\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTerrible recriminations have, as usual, ensued between the\r\ninvestigators, Ferrier denying that Brown and Schaefer\u0027s\r\nablations were complete,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_36_36\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e Schaefer that Ferrier\u0027s monkey\r\nwas really deaf.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_37_37\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e In this unsatisfactory condition the subject\r\nmust be left, although there seems no reason to doubt\r\nthat Brown and Schaefer\u0027s observation is the more important\r\nof the two.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn man\u003c/i\u003e the temporal lobe is unquestionably the seat of\r\nthe hearing function, and the superior convolution adjacent\r\nto the sylvian fissure is its most important part. The phenomena\r\nof aphasia show this. We studied motor aphasia a\r\nfew pages back; we must now consider \u003ci\u003esensory aphasia\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[Pg 54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOur knowledge of this disease has had three stages: we\r\nmay talk of the period of Broca, the period of Wernicke,\r\nand the period of Charcot. What Broca\u0027s discovery was we\r\nhave seen. Wernicke was the first to discriminate those\r\ncases in which the patient can \u003ci\u003enot even understand\u003c/i\u003e speech\r\nfrom those in which he can understand, only not talk; and\r\nto ascribe the former condition to lesion of the temporal\r\nlobe.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_38_38\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e The condition in question is \u003ci\u003eword-deafness\u003c/i\u003e, and the\r\ndisease is \u003ci\u003eauditory aphasia\u003c/i\u003e. The latest statistical survey of\r\nthe subject is that by Dr. Allen Starr.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_39_39\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e In the seven cases\r\nof \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e word-deafness which he has collected, cases in which\r\nthe patient could read, talk, and write, but not understand\r\nwhat was said to him, the lesion was limited to the first and\r\nsecond temporal convolutions in their posterior two thirds.\r\nThe lesion (in right-handed, i.e. left-brained, persons) is\r\nalways on the left side, like the lesion in motor aphasia.\r\nCrude hearing would not be abolished, even were the left\r\ncentre for it utterly destroyed; the right centre would still\r\nprovide for that. But the \u003ci\u003elinguistic use\u003c/i\u003e of hearing appears\r\nbound up with the integrity of the left centre more or less\r\nexclusively. Here it must be that words heard enter into\r\nassociation with the things which they represent, on the one\r\nhand, and with the movements necessary for pronouncing\r\nthem, on the other. In a large majority of Dr. Starr\u0027s fifty\r\ncases, the power either to name objects or to talk coherently\r\nwas impaired. This shows that in most of us (as Wernicke\r\nsaid) speech must go on from auditory cues; that is, it\r\nmust be that our ideas do not innervate our motor centres\r\ndirectly, but only after first arousing the mental sound of\r\nthe words. This is the immediate stimulus to articulation;\r\nand where the possibility of this is abolished by the destruction\r\nof its usual channel in the left temporal lobe, the\r\narticulation must suffer. In the few cases in which the\r\nchannel is abolished with no bad effect on speech we must\r\nsuppose an idiosyncrasy. The patient must innervate his\r\nspeech-organs either from the corresponding portion of the\r\nother hemisphere or directly from the centres of ideation,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[Pg 55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthose, namely, of vision, touch, etc., without leaning on the\r\nauditory region. It is the minuter analysis of the facts in\r\nthe light of such individual differences as these which constitutes\r\nCharcot\u0027s contribution towards clearing up the\r\nsubject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery nameable thing, act, or relation has numerous\r\nproperties, qualities, or aspects. In our minds the properties\r\nof each thing, together with its name, form an associated\r\ngroup. If different parts of the brain are severally concerned\r\nwith the several properties, and a farther part with\r\nthe hearing, and still another with the uttering, of the name,\r\nthere must inevitably be brought about (through the law of\r\nassociation which we shall later study) such a dynamic connection\r\namongst all these brain-parts that the activity of any one\r\nof them will be likely to awaken the activity of all the rest.\r\nWhen we are talking as we think, the \u003ci\u003eultimate\u003c/i\u003e process is that\r\nof utterance. If the brain-part for \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e be injured, speech\r\nis impossible or disorderly, even though all the other brain-parts\r\nbe intact: and this is just the condition of things\r\nwhich, on \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 37\u003c/a\u003e, we found to be brought about by\r\nlimited lesion of the left inferior frontal convolution. But\r\nback of that last act various orders of succession are\r\npossible in the associations of a talking man\u0027s ideas. The\r\nmore usual order seems to be from the tactile, visual, or\r\nother properties of the things thought-about to the sound\r\nof their names, and then to the latter\u0027s utterance. But if in\r\na certain individual the thought of the \u003ci\u003elook\u003c/i\u003e of an object or\r\nof the \u003ci\u003elook\u003c/i\u003e of its printed name be the process which\r\nhabitually precedes articulation, then the loss of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ehearing\u003c/i\u003e centre will \u003ci\u003epro tanto\u003c/i\u003e not affect that individual\u0027s\r\nspeech. He will be mentally deaf, i.e. his \u003ci\u003eunderstanding\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nspeech will suffer, but he will not be aphasic. In this way\r\nit is possible to explain the seven cases of \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e word-deafness\r\nwhich figure in Dr. Starr\u0027s table.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf this order of association be ingrained and habitual in\r\nthat individual, injury to his \u003ci\u003evisual\u003c/i\u003e centres will make him\r\nnot only word-blind, but aphasic as well. His speech will\r\nbecome confused in consequence of an occipital lesion.\r\nNaunyn, consequently, plotting out on a diagram of the\r\nhemisphere the 71 irreproachably reported cases of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[Pg 56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\naphasia which he was able to collect, finds that the lesions\r\nconcentrate themselves in three places: first, on Broca\u0027s\r\ncentre; second, on Wernicke\u0027s; third, on the supra-marginal\r\nand angular gyri under which those fibres pass which connect\r\nthe visual centres with the rest of the brain\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_40_40\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e (see Fig.\r\n17). With this result Dr. Starr\u0027s analysis of purely sensory\r\ncases agrees.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-056-0017.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_056_0017.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 17.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a later chapter we shall again return to these differences\r\nin the effectiveness of the sensory spheres in different\r\nindividuals. Meanwhile few things show more beautifully\r\nthan the history of our knowledge of aphasia how the\r\nsagacity and patience of many banded workers are in time\r\ncertain to analyze the darkest confusion into an orderly\r\ndisplay.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_41_41\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e There is no \u0027centre of Speech\u0027 in the brain any\r\nmore than there is a faculty of Speech in the mind. The\r\nentire brain, more or less, is at work in a man who uses\r\nlanguage. The subjoined diagram, from Boss, shows the\r\nfour parts most critically concerned, and, in the light of our\r\ntext, needs no farther explanation (see Fig. 18).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 350px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-057-0018.jpg\" style=\"width: 350px\" id=\"img_images_jame_057_0018.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 18.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[Pg 57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eSmell.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEverything conspires to point to the median descending\r\npart of the temporal lobes as being the organs of smell.\r\nEven Ferrier and Munk agree on the hippocampal gyrus,\r\nthough Ferrier restricts olfaction, as Munk does not, to the\r\nlobule or uncinate process of the convolution, reserving the\r\nrest of it for touch. Anatomy and pathology also point to\r\nthe hippocampal gyrus; but as the matter is less interesting\r\nfrom the point of view of human psychology than were\r\nsight and hearing, I will say no more, but simply add\r\nLuciani and Seppili\u0027s diagram of the dog\u0027s smell-centre.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_42_42\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e Of\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[Pg 58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eTaste\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ewe know little that is definite. What little there is points\r\nto the lower temporal regions again. Consult Ferrier as\r\nbelow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-058-0019.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_058_0019.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 19.—Luciani\u0027s Olfactory Region in the Dog.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eTouch.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInteresting problems arise with regard to the seat of\r\ntactile and muscular sensibility. Hitzig, whose experiments\r\non \u003ci\u003edogs\u0027 brains\u003c/i\u003e fifteen years ago opened the entire subject\r\nwhich we are discussing, ascribed the disorders of motility\r\nobserved after ablations of the motor region to a loss of\r\nwhat he called muscular consciousness. The animals do\r\nnot notice eccentric positions of their limbs, will stand with\r\ntheir legs crossed, with the affected paw resting on its back\r\nor hanging over a table\u0027s edge, etc.; and do not resist our\r\nbending and stretching of it as they resist with the unaffected\r\npaw. Goltz, Munk, Schiff, Herzen, and others\r\npromptly ascertained an equal defect of cutaneous sensibility\r\nto pain, touch, and cold. The paw is not withdrawn\r\nwhen pinched, remains standing in cold water, etc. Ferrier\r\nmeanwhile denied that there was any true anæsthesia\r\nproduced by ablations in the motor zone, and explains\r\nthe appearance of it as an effect of the sluggish motor\r\nresponses of the affected side.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_43_43\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e Munk\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_44_44\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e and Schiff\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_45_45\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e, on the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[Pg 59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontrary, conceive of the \u0027motor zone\u0027 as essentially sensory,\r\nand in different ways explain the motor disorders as\r\nsecondary results of the anæsthesia which is always there,\r\nMunk calls the motor zone the Fühlsphäre of the animal\u0027s\r\nlimbs, etc., and makes it coördinate with the Sehsphäre,\r\nthe Hörsphäre, etc., the entire cortex being, according to\r\nhim, nothing but a projection-surface for sensations, with\r\nno exclusively or essentially motor part. Such a view\r\nwould be important if true, through its bearings on the\r\npsychology of volition. What is the truth? As regards\r\nthe fact of cutaneous anæsthesia from motor-zone ablations,\r\nall other observers are against Ferrier, so that he is probably\r\nwrong in denying it. On the other hand, Munk and\r\nSchiff are wrong in making the motor symptoms \u003ci\u003edepend\u003c/i\u003e on\r\nthe anæsthesia, for in certain rare cases they have been\r\nobserved to exist not only without insensibility, but with\r\nactual hyperæsthesia of the parts.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_46_46\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e The motor and\r\nsensory symptoms seem, therefore, to be independent\r\nvariables.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn monkeys\u003c/i\u003e the latest experiments are those of Horsley\r\nand Schaefer,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_47_47\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e whose results Ferrier accepts. They find\r\nthat excision of the hippocampal convolution produces transient\r\ninsensibility of the opposite side of the body, and that\r\npermanent insensibility is produced by destruction of its\r\ncontinuation upwards above the corpus callosum, the so-called\r\n\u003ci\u003egyrus fornicatus\u003c/i\u003e (the part just below the \u0027calloso-marginal\r\nfissure\u0027 in Fig. 7). The insensibility is at its maximum\r\nwhen the entire tract comprising both convolutions is\r\ndestroyed. Ferrier says that the sensibility of monkeys is\r\n\u0027entirely unaffected\u0027 by ablations of the motor zone,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_48_48\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nHorsley and Schaefer consider it by no means necessarily\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[Pg 60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabolished.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_49_49\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e Luciani found it diminished in his three experiments\r\non apes.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_50_50\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-060-0020.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_060_0020.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 20.—Luciani\u0027s Tactile Region in the Dog.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn man\u003c/i\u003e we have the fact that one-sided paralysis from\r\ndisease of the opposite motor zone may or may not be\r\naccompanied with anæsthesia of the parts. Luciani, who\r\nbelieves that the motor zone is also sensory, tries to minimize\r\nthe value of this evidence by pointing to the insufficiency\r\nwith which patients are examined. He himself believes that\r\nin dogs the tactile sphere extends backwards and forwards\r\nof the directly excitable region, into the frontal and parietal\r\nlobes (see Fig. 20). Nothnagel considers that pathological\r\nevidence points in the same direction;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_51_51\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e and Dr. Mills, carefully\r\nreviewing the evidence, adds the gyri fornicatus and\r\nhippocampi to the cutaneo-muscular region in man.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_52_52\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e If one\r\ncompare Luciani\u0027s diagrams together (Figs. 14, 16, 19, 20)\r\none will see that the entire parietal region of the dog\u0027s skull\r\nis common to the four senses of sight, hearing, smell, and\r\ntouch, including muscular feeling. The corresponding region\r\nin the human brain (upper parietal and supra-marginal\r\ngyri—see Fig. 17) seems to be a somewhat similar\r\nplace of conflux. Optical aphasias and motor and tactile\r\ndisturbances all result from its injury, especially when that is\r\non the left side.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_53_53\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e The lower we go in the animal scale the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[Pg 61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nless differentiated the functions of the several brain-parts\r\nseem to be.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_54_54\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e It may be that the region in question still\r\nrepresents in ourselves something like this primitive condition,\r\nand that the surrounding parts, in adapting themselves\r\nmore and more to specialized and narrow functions, have\r\nleft it as a sort of \u003ci\u003ecarrefour\u003c/i\u003e through which they send currents\r\nand converse. That it should be connected with\r\nmusculo-cutaneous feeling is, however, no reason why the\r\nmotor zone proper should not be so connected too. And\r\nthe cases of paralysis from the motor zone with no accompanying\r\nanæsthesia may be explicable without denying all\r\nsensory function to that region. For, as my colleague Dr.\r\nJames Putnam informs me, sensibility is always harder to\r\nkill than motility, even where we know for a certainty that\r\nthe lesion affects tracts that are both sensory and motor.\r\nPersons whose hand is paralyzed in its movements from\r\ncompression of arm-nerves during sleep, still feel with their\r\nfingers; and they may still feel in their feet when their legs\r\nare paralyzed by bruising of the spinal cord. In a similar\r\nway, the motor cortex might be sensitive as well as\r\nmotor, and yet by this greater subtlety (or whatever the\r\npeculiarity may be) in the sensory currents, the sensibility\r\nmight survive an amount of injury there by which the\r\nmotility was destroyed. Nothnagel considers that there are\r\ngrounds for supposing the \u003ci\u003emuscular\u003c/i\u003e sense to be exclusively\r\nconnected with the parietal lobe and not with the motor\r\nzone. \"Disease of this lobe gives pure ataxy without palsy,\r\nand of the motor zone pure palsy without loss of muscular\r\nsense.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_55_55\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e He fails, however, to convince more competent\r\ncritics than the present writer,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_56_56\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e so I conclude with them\r\nthat as yet we have no decisive grounds for locating muscular\r\nand cutaneous feeling apart. Much still remains to be\r\nlearned about the relations between musculo-cutaneous\r\nsensibility and the cortex, but one thing is certain: that\r\nneither the occipital, the forward frontal, nor the temporal\r\nlobes seem to have anything essential to do with it in man.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[Pg 62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt is knit up with the performances of the \u003ci\u003emotor zone and\r\nof the convolutions backwards and midwards of them\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nreader must remember this conclusion when we come to\r\nthe chapter on the Will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI must add a word about the connection of aphasia\r\nwith the tactile sense. On \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 40\u003c/a\u003e I spoke of those cases\r\nin which the patient can write but not read his own writing.\r\nHe cannot read by his eyes; but he can read by the\r\nfeeling in his fingers, if he retrace the letters in the air.\r\nIt is convenient for such a patient to have a pen in hand\r\nwhilst reading in this way, in order to make the usual feeling\r\nof writing more complete.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_57_57\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e In such a case we must\r\nsuppose that the path between the optical and the graphic\r\ncentres remains open, whilst that between the optical and\r\nthe auditory and articulatory centres is closed. Only thus\r\ncan we understand how the look of the writing should fail\r\nto suggest the sound of the words to the patient\u0027s mind,\r\nwhilst it still suggests the proper movements of graphic\r\nimitation. These movements in their turn must of course\r\nbe felt, and the feeling of them must be associated with\r\nthe centres for hearing and pronouncing the words. The\r\ninjury in cases like this where very special combinations\r\nfail, whilst others go on as usual, must always be supposed\r\nto be of the nature of increased resistance to the passage\r\nof certain currents of association. If any of the \u003ci\u003eelements\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nmental function were destroyed the incapacity would\r\nnecessarily be much more formidable. A patient who can\r\nboth read and write with his fingers most likely uses an\r\nidentical \u0027graphic\u0027 centre, at once sensory and motor, for\r\nboth operations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-064-0021.jpg\" style=\"width: 125px\" id=\"img_images_jame_064_0021.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003eDog\u0027s motor centres, right\r\nhemisphere, according to Paneth.—The\r\npoints of the motor region\r\nare correlated as follows with\r\nmuscles: the \u003ci\u003eloops\u003c/i\u003e with the \u003ci\u003eorbicularis\r\npalpebrarum\u003c/i\u003e; the \u003ci\u003eplain\r\ncrosses\u003c/i\u003e with the \u003ci\u003eflexor\u003c/i\u003e, the \u003ci\u003ecrosses\r\ninscribed in circles\u003c/i\u003e with the \u003ci\u003eextensor,\r\ndigitorum communis\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe fore-paw; the \u003ci\u003eplain circles\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith the \u003ci\u003eabductor pollicis\r\nlongus\u003c/i\u003e; the \u003ci\u003edouble crosses\u003c/i\u003e with\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eextensor communis\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nhind-limb.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have now given, as far as the nature of this book will\r\nallow, a complete account of the present state of the localization-question.\r\nIn its main outlines it stands firm, though\r\nmuch has still to be discovered. The anterior frontal lobes,\r\nfor example, so far as is yet known, have no definite functions.\r\nGoltz finds that dogs bereft of them both are incessantly in\r\nmotion, and excitable by every small stimulus. They are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[Pg 63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nirascible and amative in an extraordinary degree, and their\r\nsides grow bare with perpetual reflex scratching; but they\r\nshow no \u003ci\u003elocal\u003c/i\u003e troubles of either motion or sensibility. In\r\nmonkeys not even this lack of inhibitory ability is shown,\r\nand neither stimulation nor excision of the prefrontal lobes\r\nproduces any symptoms whatever. One monkey of Horsley\r\nand Schaefer\u0027s was as tame, and did certain tricks as well,\r\nafter as before the operation.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_58_58\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e It is probable that we have\r\nabout reached the limits of what can be learned about brain-functions\r\nfrom vivisecting inferior animals, and that we\r\nmust hereafter look more exclusively to human pathology\r\nfor light. The existence of separate speech and writing\r\ncentres in the left hemisphere in man; the fact that palsy\r\nfrom cortical injury is so much more complete and enduring\r\nin man and the monkey than in dogs; and the farther\r\nfact that it seems more difficult to get complete sensorial\r\nblindness from cortical ablations in the lower animals than\r\nin man, all show that functions get more specially localized\r\nas evolution goes on. In birds localization seems\r\nhardly to exist, and in rodents it is much less conspicuous\r\nthan in carnivora. Even for man, however, Munk\u0027s way of\r\nmapping out the cortex into absolute areas within which\r\nonly one movement or sensation is represented is surely\r\nfalse. The truth seems to be rather that, although there is\r\na correspondence of certain regions of the brain to certain\r\nregions of the body, yet the several \u003ci\u003eparts\u003c/i\u003e within each bodily\r\nregion are represented throughout the \u003ci\u003ewhole\u003c/i\u003e of the corresponding\r\nbrain-region like pepper and salt sprinkled from\r\nthe same caster. This, however, does not prevent each\r\n\u0027part\u0027 from having its \u003ci\u003efocus\u003c/i\u003e at one spot within the brain-region.\r\nThe various brain-regions merge into each other\r\nin the same mixed way. As Mr. Horsley says: \"There are\r\nborder centres, and the area of representation of the face\r\nmerges into that for the representation of the upper limb.\r\nIf there was a focal lesion at that point, you would have\r\nthe movements of these two parts starting together.\"\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[Pg 64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_59_59\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe accompanying figure from Paneth shows just how the\r\nmatter stands in the dog.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_60_60\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI am speaking now of localizations\r\nbreadthwise over the brain-surface.\r\nIt is conceivable that\r\nthere might be also localizations\r\ndepthwise through the cortex. The\r\nmore superficial cells are smaller,\r\nthe deepest layer of them is large;\r\nand it has been suggested that the\r\nsuperficial cells are sensorial, the\r\ndeeper ones motor;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_61_61\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e or that the\r\nsuperficial ones in the motor region\r\nare correlated with the extremities\r\nof the organs to be moved (fingers,\r\netc.), the deeper ones with the more\r\ncentral segments (wrist, elbow,\r\netc.).\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_62_62\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e It need hardly be said that\r\nall such theories are as yet but\r\nguesses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe thus see that the postulate\r\nof Meynert and Jackson which we\r\nstarted with on \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 30\u003c/a\u003e is on the whole\r\nmost satisfactorily corroborated\r\nby subsequent objective research.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe highest centres do probably\r\ncontain nothing but arrangements\r\nfor representing impressions and\r\nmovements, and other arrangements\r\nfor coupling the activity Of these\r\narrangements together.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_63_63\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e Currents\r\npouring in from the sense-organs\r\nfirst excite some arrangements,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[Pg 65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich in turn excite others, until at last a motor discharge\r\ndownwards of some sort occurs. When this is once\r\nclearly grasped there remains little ground for keeping\r\nup that old controversy about the motor zone, as to\r\nwhether it is in reality motor or sensitive. The whole\r\ncortex, inasmuch as currents run through it, is both. All\r\nthe currents probably have feelings going with them, and\r\nsooner or later bring movements about. In one aspect, then,\r\nevery centre is afferent, in another efferent, even the motor\r\ncells of the spinal cord having these two aspects inseparably\r\nconjoined. Marique,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_64_64\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e and Exner and Paneth\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_65_65\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e have\r\nshown that by cutting \u003ci\u003eround\u003c/i\u003e a \u0027motor\u0027 centre and so separating\r\nit from the influence of the rest of the cortex, the\r\nsame disorders are produced as by cutting it out, so that\r\nreally it is only the mouth of the funnel, as it were,\r\nthrough which the stream of innervation, starting from elsewhere,\r\npours;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_66_66\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e consciousness accompanying the stream,\r\nand being mainly of things seen if the stream is strongest\r\noccipitally, of things heard if it is strongest temporally,\r\nof things felt, etc., if the stream occupies most intensely the\r\n\u0027motor zone.\u0027 It seems to me that some broad and vague\r\nformulation like this is as much as we can safely venture on\r\nin the present state of science; and in subsequent chapters\r\nI expect to give confirmatory reasons for my view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eMAN\u0027S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBut is the consciousness which accompanies the activity of\r\nthe cortex the only consciousness that man has?\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eare his lower\r\ncentres conscious as well?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is a difficult question to decide, how difficult one\r\nonly learns when one discovers that the cortex-consciousness\r\nitself of certain objects can be seemingly annihilated\r\nin any good hypnotic subject by a bare wave of his operator\u0027s\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[Pg 66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhand, and yet be proved by circumstantial evidence to\r\nexist all the while in a split-off condition, quite as \u0027ejective\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_67_67\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the rest of the subject\u0027s mind as that mind is to the mind\r\nof the bystanders.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_68_68\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e The lower centres themselves may\r\nconceivably all the while have a split-off consciousness of\r\ntheir own, similarly ejective to the cortex-consciousness;\r\nbut whether they have it or not can never be known from\r\nmerely introspective evidence. Meanwhile the fact that\r\noccipital destruction in man may cause a blindness which\r\nis apparently absolute (no feeling remaining either of light\r\nor dark over one half of the field of view), would lead us to\r\nsuppose that if our lower optical centres, the corpora\r\nquadrigemina, and thalami, do have any consciousness, it\r\nis at all events a consciousness which does not mix with\r\nthat which accompanies the cortical activities, and which\r\nhas nothing to do with our personal Self. In lower\r\nanimals this may not be so much the case. The traces of\r\nsight found (supra, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 46\u003c/a\u003e) in dogs and monkeys whose occipital\r\nlobes were entirely destroyed, may possibly have been\r\ndue to the fact that the lower centres of these animals saw,\r\nand that what they saw was not ejective but objective to\r\nthe remaining cortex, i.e. it formed part of one and the\r\nsame inner world with the things which that cortex perceived.\r\nIt may be, however, that the phenomena were due\r\nto the fact that in these animals the cortical \u0027centres\u0027 for\r\nvision reach outside of the occipital zone, and that destruction\r\nof the latter fails to remove them as completely as in\r\nman. This, as we know, is the opinion of the experimenters\r\nthemselves. For practical purposes, nevertheless, and\r\nlimiting the meaning of the word consciousness to the personal\r\nself of the individual, we can pretty confidently answer\r\nthe question prefixed to this paragraph by saying that \u003ci\u003ethe\r\ncortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_69_69\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e If there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[Pg 67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe any consciousness pertaining to the lower centres, it is\r\na consciousness of which the self knows nothing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother problem, not so metaphysical, remains. The\r\nmost general and striking fact connected with cortical injury\r\nis that of the \u003ci\u003erestoration of function\u003c/i\u003e. Functions lost at\r\nfirst are after a few days or weeks restored. \u003ci\u003eHow are we\r\nto understand this restitution?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo theories are in the field:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) Restitution is due to the vicarious action either of the\r\nrest of the cortex or of centres lower down, acquiring functions\r\nwhich until then they had not performed;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) It is due to the remaining centres (whether cortical or\r\n\u0027lower\u0027) resuming functions which they had always had,\r\nbut of which the wound had temporarily inhibited the\r\nexercise. This is the view of which Goltz and Brown-Séquard\r\nare the most distinguished defenders.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInhibition is a \u003ci\u003evera causa\u003c/i\u003e, of that there can be no doubt.\r\nThe pneumogastric nerve inhibits the heart, the splanchnic\r\ninhibits the intestinal movements, and the superior\r\nlaryngeal those of inspiration. The nerve-irritations which\r\nmay inhibit the contraction of arterioles are innumerable,\r\nand reflex actions are often repressed by the simultaneous\r\nexcitement of other sensory nerves. For all such facts the\r\nreader must consult the treatises on physiology. What\r\nconcerns us here is the inhibition exerted by different parts\r\nof the nerve-centres, when irritated, on the activity of distant\r\nparts. The flaccidity of a frog from \u0027shock,\u0027 for a\r\nminute or so after his medulla oblongata is cut, is an inhibition\r\nfrom the seat of injury which quickly passes away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is known as \u0027surgical shock \u0027(unconsciousness,\r\npallor, dilatation of splanchnic blood-vessels, and general\r\nsyncope and collapse) in the human subject is an inhibition\r\nwhich lasts a longer time. Goltz, Freusberg, and others,\r\ncutting the spinal cord in dogs, proved that there were\r\nfunctions inhibited still longer by the wound, but which re-established\r\nthemselves ultimately if the animal was kept\r\nalive. The lumbar region of the cord was thus found to\r\ncontain independent vaso-motor centres, centres for erection,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[Pg 68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor control of the sphincters, etc., which could be\r\nexcited to activity by tactile stimuli and as readily reinhibited\r\nby others simultaneously applied.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_70_70\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e We may therefore\r\nplausibly suppose that the rapid reappearance of motility,\r\nvision, etc., after their first disappearance in consequence\r\nof a cortical mutilation, is due to the passing off of\r\ninhibitions exerted by the irritated surface of the wound.\r\nThe only question is whether \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e restorations of function\r\nmust be explained in this one simple way, or whether some\r\npart of them may not be owing to the formation of entirely\r\nnew paths in the remaining centres, by which they become\r\n\u0027educated\u0027 to duties which they did not originally possess.\r\nIn favor of an indefinite extension of the inhibition theory\r\nfacts may be cited such as the following: In dogs whose disturbances\r\ndue to cortical lesion have disappeared, they may\r\nin consequence of some inner or outer accident reappear in all\r\ntheir intensity for 24 hours or so and then disappear again.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_71_71\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn a dog made half blind by an operation, and then shut\r\nup in the dark, vision comes back just as quickly as in\r\nother similar dogs whose sight is exercised systematically\r\nevery day.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_72_72\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e A dog which has learned to beg before the\r\noperation recommences this practice quite \u003ci\u003espontaneously\u003c/i\u003e\r\na week after a double-sided ablation of the motor zone.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_73_73\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOccasionally, in a pigeon (or even, it is said, in a dog)\r\nwe see the disturbances less marked immediately after\r\nthe operation than they are half an hour later.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_74_74\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e This\r\nwould be impossible were they due to the subtraction of the\r\norgans which normally carried them on. Moreover the\r\nentire drift of recent physiological and pathological speculation\r\nis towards enthroning inhibition as an ever-present\r\nand indispensable condition of orderly activity. We shall\r\nsee how great is its importance, in the chapter on the Will.\r\nMr. Charles Mercier considers that no muscular contraction,\r\nonce begun, would ever stop without it, short of exhaustion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[Pg 69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the system;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_75_75\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e and Brown-Séquard has for years been\r\naccumulating examples to show how far its influence extends.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_76_76\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nUnder these circumstances it seems as if error\r\nmight more probably lie in curtailing its sphere too much\r\nthan in stretching it too far as an explanation of the\r\nphenomena following cortical lesion.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_77_77\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, if we admit \u003ci\u003eno\u003c/i\u003e re-education of centres,\r\nwe not only fly in the face of an \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e probability,\r\nbut we find ourselves compelled by facts to suppose an\r\nalmost incredible number of functions natively lodged in the\r\ncentres below the \u003ci\u003ethalami\u003c/i\u003e or even in those below the \u003ci\u003ecorpora\r\nquadrigemina\u003c/i\u003e. I will consider the \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e objection after\r\nfirst taking a look at the facts which I have in mind. They\r\nconfront us the moment we ask ourselves just \u003ci\u003ewhich are the\r\nparts which perform the functions abolished by an operation\r\nafter sufficient time has elapsed for restoration to occur?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first observers thought that they must be the \u003ci\u003ecorresponding\r\nparts of the opposite or intact hemisphere\u003c/i\u003e. But as\r\nlong ago as 1875 Carville and Duret tested this by cutting\r\nout the fore-leg-centre on one side, in a dog, and then, after\r\nwaiting till restitution had occurred, cutting it out on the\r\nopposite side as well. Goltz and others have done the\r\nsame thing.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_78_78\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e If the opposite side were really the seat of the\r\nrestored function, the original palsy should have appeared\r\nagain and been permanent. But it did not appear at all;\r\nthere appeared only a palsy of the hitherto unaffected side.\r\nThe next supposition is that \u003ci\u003ethe parts surrounding the cut-out\r\nregion\u003c/i\u003e learn vicariously to perform its duties. But here,\r\nagain, experiment seems to upset the hypothesis, so far as\r\nthe motor zone goes at least; for we may wait till motility\r\nhas returned in the affected limb, and then both irritate the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[Pg 70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncortex surrounding the wound without exciting the limb\r\nto movement, and ablate it, without bringing back the\r\nvanished palsy.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_79_79\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e It would accordingly seem that \u003ci\u003ethe cerebral\r\ncentres below the cortex\u003c/i\u003e must be the seat of the regained\r\nactivities. But Goltz destroyed a dog\u0027s entire left hemisphere,\r\ntogether with the \u003ci\u003ecorpus striatum\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003ethalamus\u003c/i\u003e\r\non that side, and kept him alive until a surprisingly small\r\namount of motor and tactile disturbance remained.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_80_80\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e These\r\ncentres cannot here have accounted for the restitution. He\r\nhas even, as it would appear,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_81_81\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e ablated both the hemispheres\r\nof a dog, and kept him alive 51 days, able to walk and stand.\r\nThe corpora striata and thalami in this dog were also practically\r\ngone. In view of such results we seem driven, with\r\nM. François-Franck,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_82_82\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e to fall back on the \u003ci\u003eganglia lower still\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nor even on the \u003ci\u003espinal cord\u003c/i\u003e as the \u0027vicarious\u0027 organ of which\r\nwe are in quest. If the abeyance of function between the\r\noperation and the restoration was due \u003ci\u003eexclusively\u003c/i\u003e to inhibition,\r\nthen we must suppose these lowest centres to be in\r\nreality extremely accomplished organs. They must always\r\nhave done what we now find them doing after function is\r\nrestored, even when the hemispheres were intact. Of\r\ncourse this is conceivably the case; yet it does not seem\r\nvery plausible. And the \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e considerations which a\r\nmoment since I said I should urge, make it less plausible\r\nstill.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor, in the first place, the brain is essentially a place of\r\ncurrents, which run in organized paths. Loss of function\r\ncan only mean one of two things, either that a current can\r\nno longer run in, or that if it runs in, it can no longer run\r\nout, by its old path. Either of these inabilities may come\r\nfrom a local ablation; and \u0027restitution\u0027 can then only mean\r\nthat, in spite of a temporary block, an inrunning current has\r\nat last become enabled to flow out by its old path again—e.g.,\r\nthe sound of \u0027give your paw\u0027 discharges after some\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[Pg 71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nweeks into the same canine muscles into which it used to\r\ndischarge before the operation. As far as the cortex itself\r\ngoes, since one of the purposes for which it actually exists\r\nis the production of new paths,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_83_83\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e the only question before\r\nus is: Is the formation of \u003ci\u003ethese particular \u0027vicarious\u0027 paths\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntoo much to expect of its plastic powers? It would certainly\r\nbe too much to expect that a hemisphere should\r\nreceive currents from optic fibres whose \u003ci\u003earriving-place\u003c/i\u003e within\r\nit is destroyed, or that it should discharge into fibres of\r\nthe pyramidal strand if their \u003ci\u003eplace of exit\u003c/i\u003e is broken down.\r\nSuch lesions as these must be irreparable \u003ci\u003ewithin that\r\nhemisphere\u003c/i\u003e. Yet even then, through the other hemisphere,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003ecorpus callosum\u003c/i\u003e, and the bilateral connections in the\r\nspinal cord, one can imagine some road by which the old\r\nmuscles might eventually be innervated by the same incoming\r\ncurrents which innervated them before the block.\r\nAnd for all minor interruptions, not involving the arriving-place\r\nof the \u0027cortico-petal\u0027 or the place of exit of the \u0027cortico-fugal\u0027\r\nfibres, roundabout paths of some sort through the\r\naffected hemisphere itself must exist, for every point of it\r\nis, remotely at least, in potential communication with every\r\nother point. The normal paths are only paths of least\r\nresistance. If they get blocked or cut, paths formerly more\r\nresistant become the least resistant paths under the changed\r\nconditions. It must never be forgotten that a current that\r\nruns in has got to run out \u003ci\u003esomewhere\u003c/i\u003e; and if it only once\r\nsucceeds by accident in striking into its old place of exit\r\nagain, the thrill of satisfaction which the consciousness\r\nconnected with the whole residual brain then receives will\r\nreinforce and fix the paths of that moment and make them\r\nmore likely to be struck into again. The resultant feeling\r\nthat the old habitual act is at last successfully back again,\r\nbecomes itself a new stimulus which stamps all the existing\r\ncurrents in. It is matter of experience that such feelings\r\nof successful achievement do tend to fix in our memory\r\nwhatever processes have led to them; and we shall have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[Pg 72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na good deal more to say upon the subject when we come to\r\nthe Chapter on the Will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy conclusion then is this: that some of the restitution\r\nof function (especially where the cortical lesion is not too\r\ngreat) is probably due to genuinely vicarious function on\r\nthe part of the centres that remain; whilst some of it\r\nis due to the passing off of inhibitions. In other words,\r\nboth the vicarious theory and the inhibition theory are\r\ntrue in their measure. But as for determining that measure,\r\nor saying which centres are vicarious, and to what extent\r\nthey can learn new tricks, that is impossible at present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eFINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd now, after learning all these facts, what are we to\r\nthink of the child and the candle-flame, and of that scheme\r\nwhich provisionally imposed itself on our acceptance after\r\nsurveying the actions of the frog? (\u003ci\u003eCf\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 25-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ci\u003esupra\u003c/i\u003e.) It\r\nwill be remembered that we then considered the lower centres\r\n\u003ci\u003een masse\u003c/i\u003e as machines for responding to present sense-impressions\r\nexclusively, and the hemispheres as equally\r\nexclusive organs of action from inward considerations or\r\nideas; and that, following Meynert, we supposed the hemispheres\r\nto have no native tendencies to determinate activity,\r\nbut to be merely superadded organs for breaking up the\r\nvarious reflexes performed by the lower centres, and combining\r\ntheir motor and sensory elements in novel ways. It\r\nwill also be remembered that I prophesied that we should\r\nbe obliged to soften down the sharpness of this distinction\r\nafter we had completed our survey of the farther facts.\r\nThe time has now come for that correction to be made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWider and completer observations show us both that the\r\nlower centres are more spontaneous, and that the hemispheres\r\nare more automatic, than the Meynert scheme\r\nallows. Schrader\u0027s observations in Goltz\u0027s Laboratory on\r\nhemisphereless frogs\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_84_84\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e and pigeons\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_85_85\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e give an idea quite\r\ndifferent from the picture of these creatures which is\r\nclassically current. Steiner\u0027s\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_86_86\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e observations on frogs\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[Pg 73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalready went a good way in the same direction, showing,\r\nfor example, that locomotion is a well-developed function\r\nof the medulla oblongata. But Schrader, by great care\r\nin the operation, and by keeping the frogs a long time alive,\r\nfound that at least in some of them the spinal cord would\r\nproduce movements of locomotion when the frog was\r\nsmartly roused by a poke, and that swimming and croaking\r\ncould sometimes be performed when nothing above the\r\nmedulla oblongata remained.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_87_87\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e Schrader\u0027s hemisphereless\r\nfrogs moved spontaneously, ate flies, buried themselves\r\nin the ground, and in short did many things which before\r\nhis observations were supposed to be impossible unless the\r\nhemispheres remained. Steiner\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_88_88\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e and Vulpian have remarked\r\nan even greater vivacity in fishes deprived of their\r\nhemispheres. Vulpian says of his brainless carps\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_89_89\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e that\r\nthree days after the operation one of them darted at food\r\nand at a knot tied on the end of a string, holding the latter so\r\ntight between his jaws that his head was drawn out of\r\nwater. Later, \"they see morsels of white of egg; the\r\nmoment these sink through the water in front of them,\r\nthey follow and seize them, sometimes after they are on the\r\nbottom, sometimes before they have reached it. In capturing\r\nand swallowing this food they execute just the same\r\nmovements as the intact carps which are in the same aquarium.\r\nThe only difference is that they seem to see them at\r\nless distance, seek them with less impetuosity and less perseverance\r\nin all the points of the bottom of the aquarium,\r\nbut they struggle (so to speak) sometimes with the sound\r\ncarps to grasp the morsels. It is certain that they do not\r\nconfound these bits of white of egg with other white bodies,\r\nsmall pebbles for example, which are at the bottom of the\r\nwater. The same carp which, three days after operation,\r\nseized the knot on a piece of string, no longer snaps at it\r\nnow, but if one brings it near her, she draws away from it\r\nby swimming backwards before it comes into contact with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[Pg 74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nher mouth.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_90_90\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e Already on \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 9-10\u003c/a\u003e, as the reader may remember,\r\nwe instanced those adaptations of conduct to new\r\nconditions, on the part of the frog\u0027s spinal cord and thalami,\r\nwhich led Pflüger and Lewes on the one hand and Goltz on\r\nthe other to locate in these organs an intelligence akin to\r\nthat of which the hemispheres are the seat.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen it comes to birds deprived of their hemispheres,\r\nthe evidence that some of their acts have conscious purpose\r\nbehind them is quite as persuasive. In pigeons Schrader\r\nfound that the state of somnolence lasted only three or four\r\ndays, after which time the birds began indefatigably to\r\nwalk about the room. They climbed out of boxes in which\r\nthey were put, jumped over or flew up upon obstacles, and\r\ntheir sight was so perfect that neither in walking nor flying\r\ndid they ever strike any object in the room. They had\r\nalso definite ends or purposes, flying straight for more\r\nconvenient perching places when made uncomfortable by\r\nmovements imparted to those on which they stood; and of\r\nseveral possible perches they always chose the most convenient.\r\n\"If we give the dove the choice of a horizontal\r\nbar (\u003ci\u003eReck\u003c/i\u003e) or an equally distant table to fly to, she always\r\ngives decided preference to the table. Indeed she chooses\r\nthe table even if it is several meters farther off than the bar\r\nor the chair.\" Placed on the back of a chair, she flies first\r\nto the seat and then to the floor, and in general \"will forsake\r\na high position, although it give her sufficiently firm\r\nsupport, and in order to reach the ground will make use of\r\nthe environing objects as intermediate goals of flight, showing\r\na perfectly correct judgment of their distance. Although\r\nable to fly directly to the ground, she prefers to make the\r\njourney in successive stages…. Once on the ground, she\r\nhardly ever rises spontaneously into the air.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_91_91\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYoung rabbits deprived of their hemispheres will stand,\r\nrun, start at noises, avoid obstacles in their path, and give\r\nresponsive cries of suffering when hurt. Rats will do the\r\nsame, and throw themselves moreover into an attitude of\r\ndefence. Dogs never survive such an operation if performed\r\nat once. But Goltz\u0027s latest dog, mentioned on \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[Pg 75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 70\u003c/a\u003e, which is said to have been kept alive for fifty-one days\r\nafter both hemispheres had been removed by a series of\r\nablations and the corpora striata and thalami had softened\r\naway, shows how much the mid-brain centres and the cord\r\ncan do even in the canine species. Taken together, the\r\nnumber of reactions shown to exist in the lower centres by\r\nthese observations make out a pretty good case for the Meynert\r\nscheme, as applied to these lower animals. That\r\nscheme demands hemispheres which shall be mere supplements\r\nor organs of repetition, and in the light of these\r\nobservations they obviously are so to a great extent. But\r\nthe Meynert scheme also demands that the reactions of the\r\nlower centres shall all be \u003ci\u003enative\u003c/i\u003e, and we are not absolutely\r\nsure that some of those which we have been considering\r\nmay not have been acquired after the injury; and it furthermore\r\ndemands that they should be machine-like, whereas\r\nthe expression of some of them makes us doubt whether\r\nthey may not be guided by an intelligence of low degree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven in the lower animals, then, there is reason to soften\r\ndown that opposition between the hemispheres and the\r\nlower centres which the scheme demands. The hemispheres\r\nmay, it is true, only supplement the lower centres,\r\nbut the latter resemble the former in nature and have\r\nsome small amount at least of \u0027spontaneity\u0027 and choice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut when we come to monkeys and man the scheme\r\nwell-nigh breaks down altogether; for we find that the\r\nhemispheres do not simply repeat voluntarily actions which\r\nthe lower centres perform as machines. There are many\r\nfunctions which the lower centres cannot by themselves\r\nperform at all. When the motor cortex is injured in a man\r\nor a monkey genuine paralysis ensues, which in man is\r\nincurable, and almost or quite equally so in the ape. Dr.\r\nSeguin knew a man with hemi-blindness, from cortical\r\ninjury, which had persisted unaltered for twenty-three\r\nyears. \u0027Traumatic inhibition\u0027 cannot possibly account\r\nfor this. The blindness must have been an \u0027Ausfallserscheinung,\u0027\r\ndue to the loss of vision\u0027s essential organ. It\r\nwould seem, then, that in these higher creatures the lower\r\ncentres must be less adequate than they are farther down\r\nin the zoological scale; and that even for certain elementary\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[Pg 76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncombinations of movement and impression the co-operation\r\nof the hemispheres is necessary from the start. Even in\r\nbirds and dogs the power of \u003ci\u003eeating properly\u003c/i\u003e is lost when\r\nthe frontal lobes are cut off.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_92_92\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe plain truth is that neither in man nor beast are the\r\nhemispheres the virgin organs which our scheme called\r\nthem. So far from being unorganized at birth, they must\r\nhave native tendencies to reaction of a determinate sort.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_93_93\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThese are the tendencies which we know as \u003ci\u003eemotions\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003einstincts\u003c/i\u003e, and which we must study with some detail in later\r\nchapters of this book. Both instincts and emotions are reactions\r\nupon special sorts of objects of \u003ci\u003eperception\u003c/i\u003e; they depend\r\non the hemispheres; and they are in the first instance\r\nreflex, that is, they take place the first time the exciting object\r\nis met, are accompanied by no forethought or deliberation,\r\nand are irresistible. But they are modifiable to a\r\ncertain extent by experience, and on later occasions of\r\nmeeting the exciting object, the instincts especially have\r\nless of the blind impulsive character which they had at\r\nfirst. All this will be explained at some length in Chapter\r\nXXIV. Meanwhile we can say that the multiplicity of emotional\r\nand instinctive reactions in man, together with his\r\nextensive associative power, permit of extensive recouplings\r\nof the original sensory and motor partners. The \u003ci\u003econsequences\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof one instinctive reaction often prove to be the\r\ninciters of an opposite reaction, and being \u003ci\u003esuggested\u003c/i\u003e on later\r\noccasions by the original object, may then suppress the\r\nfirst reaction altogether, just as in the case of the child and\r\nthe flame. For this education the hemispheres do not need\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[Pg 77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto be \u003ci\u003etabulæ rasæ\u003c/i\u003e at first, as the Meynert scheme would\r\nhave them; and so far from their being educated by the\r\nlower centres exclusively, they educate themselves.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_94_94\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already noticed the absence of reactions from\r\nfear and hunger in the ordinary brainless frog. Schrader\r\ngives a striking account of the instinctless condition of his\r\nbrainless pigeons, active as they were in the way of locomotion\r\nand voice. \"The hemisphereless animal moves in a\r\nworld of bodies which … are all of equal value for him….\r\nHe is, to use Goltz\u0027s apt expression, \u003ci\u003eimpersonal\u003c/i\u003e…. Every\r\nobject is for him only a space-occupying mass, he turns out\r\nof his path for an ordinary pigeon no otherwise than for a\r\nstone. He may try to climb over both. All authors agree\r\nthat they never found any difference, whether it was an inanimate\r\nbody, a cat, a dog, or a bird of prey which came in\r\ntheir pigeon\u0027s way. The creature knows neither friends\r\nnor enemies, in the thickest company it lives like a hermit.\r\nThe languishing cooing of the male awakens no more impression\r\nthan the rattling of the peas, or the call-whistle\r\nwhich in the days before the injury used to make the birds\r\nhasten to be fed. Quite as little as the earlier observers\r\nhave I seen hemisphereless she-birds answer the courting\r\nof the male. A hemisphereless male will coo all day long\r\nand show distinct signs of sexual excitement, but his activity\r\nis without any object, it is entirely indifferent to him\r\nwhether the she-bird be there or not. If one is placed near\r\nhim, he leaves her unnoticed…. As the male pays no attention\r\nto the female, so she pays none to her young. The\r\nbrood may follow the mother ceaselessly calling for food,\r\nbut they might as well ask it from a stone…. The hemisphereless\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[Pg 78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsphereless pigeon is in the highest degree tame, and fears\r\nman as little as cat or bird of prey.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_95_95\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePutting together now all the facts and reflections which\r\nwe have been through, it seems to me that \u003ci\u003ewe can no longer\r\nhold strictly to the Meynert scheme\u003c/i\u003e. If anywhere, it will\r\napply to the lowest animals; but in them especially the\r\nlower centres seem to have a degree of spontaneity and\r\nchoice. On the whole, I think that we are driven to substitute\r\nfor it some such general conception as the following,\r\nwhich allows for zoological differences as we know them,\r\nand is vague and elastic enough to receive any number of\r\nfuture discoveries of detail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCONCLUSION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll the centres, in all animals, whilst they are in one\r\naspect mechanisms, probably are, or at least once were,\r\norgans of consciousness in another, although the consciousness\r\nis doubtless much more developed in the hemispheres\r\nthan it is anywhere else. The consciousness must everywhere\r\n\u003ci\u003eprefer\u003c/i\u003e some of the sensations which it gets to others;\r\nand if it can remember these in their absence, however\r\ndimly, they must be its \u003ci\u003eends\u003c/i\u003e of desire. If, moreover, it can\r\nidentify in memory any motor discharges which may have\r\nled to such ends, and associate the latter with them, then\r\nthese motor discharges themselves may in turn become\r\ndesired as \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e. This is the development of \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e; and its\r\nrealization must of course be proportional to the possible\r\ncomplication of the consciousness. Even the spinal cord\r\nmay possibly have some little power of will in this sense,\r\nand of effort towards modified behavior in consequence of\r\nnew experiences of sensibility.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[Pg 79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_96_96\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll nervous centres have then in the first instance one\r\nessential function, that of \u0027intelligent\u0027 action. They feel,\r\nprefer one thing to another, and have \u0027ends.\u0027 Like all\r\nother organs, however, they \u003ci\u003eevolve\u003c/i\u003e from ancestor to descendant,\r\nand their evolution takes two directions, the lower\r\ncentres passing downwards into more unhesitating automatism,\r\nand the higher ones upwards into larger intellectuality.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_97_97\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThus it may happen that those functions which\r\ncan safely grow uniform and fatal become least accompanied\r\nby mind, and that their organ, the spinal cord, becomes a\r\nmore and more soulless machine; whilst on the contrary\r\nthose functions which it benefits the animal to have adapted\r\nto delicate environing variations pass more and more to the\r\nhemispheres, whose anatomical structure and attendant\r\nconsciousness grow more and more elaborate as zoological\r\nevolution proceeds. In this way it might come about that\r\nin man and the monkeys the basal ganglia should do fewer\r\nthings by themselves than they can do in dogs, fewer in dogs\r\nthan in rabbits, fewer in rabbits than in hawks,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_98_98\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e fewer in\r\nhawks than in pigeons, fewer in pigeons than in frogs, fewer\r\nin frogs than in fishes, and that the hemispheres should\r\ncorrespondingly do more. This passage of functions forward\r\nto the ever-enlarging hemispheres would be itself one\r\nof the evolutive changes, to be explained like the development\r\nof the hemispheres themselves, either by fortunate\r\nvariation or by inherited effects of use. The reflexes, on\r\nthis view, upon which the education of our human hemispheres\r\ndepends, would not be due to the basal ganglia\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[Pg 80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalone. They would be tendencies in the hemispheres themselves,\r\nmodifiable by education, unlike the reflexes of the\r\nmedulla oblongata, pons, optic lobes and spinal cord. Such\r\ncerebral reflexes, if they exist, form a basis quite as good\r\nas that which the Meynert scheme offers, for the acquisition\r\nof memories and associations which may later result in all\r\nsorts of \u0027changes of partners\u0027 in the psychic world. The\r\ndiagram of the baby and the candle (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 25\u003c/a\u003e) can be\r\nre-edited, if need be, as an entirely cortical transaction.\r\nThe original tendency to touch will be a cortical instinct;\r\nthe burn will leave an image in another part of the cortex,\r\nwhich, being recalled by association, will inhibit the touching\r\ntendency the next time the candle is perceived, and\r\nexcite the tendency to withdraw—so that the retinal picture\r\nwill, upon that next time, be coupled with the original\r\nmotor partner of the pain. We thus get whatever psychological\r\ntruth the Meynert scheme possesses without entangling\r\nourselves on a dubious anatomy and physiology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome such shadowy view of the evolution of the centres,\r\nof the relation of consciousness to them, and of the hemispheres\r\nto the other lobes, is, it seems to me, that in which\r\nit is safest to indulge. If it has no other advantage, it at\r\nany rate makes us realize how enormous are the gaps in our\r\nknowledge, the moment we try to cover the facts by any\r\none formula of a general kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It should be said that this particular cut commonly proves fatal. The\r\ntext refers to the rare cases which survive.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I confine myself to the frog for simplicity\u0027s sake. In higher animals,\r\nespecially the ape and man, it would seem as if not only determinate combinations\r\nof muscles, but limited groups or even single muscles could be\r\ninnervated from the hemispheres.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I hope that the reader will take no umbrage at my so mixing the\r\nphysical and mental, and talking of reflex acts and hemispheres and reminiscences\r\nin the same breath, as if they were homogeneous quantities and\r\nfactors of one causal chain. I have done so deliberately; for although I\r\nadmit that from the radically physical point of view it is easy to conceive\r\nof the chain of events amongst the cells and fibres as complete in itself,\r\nand that whilst so conceiving it one need make no mention of \u0027ideas,\u0027\r\nI yet suspect that point of view of being an unreal abstraction. Reflexes\r\nin centres may take place even where accompanying feelings or ideas guide\r\nthem. In another chapter I shall try to show reasons for not abandoning\r\nthis common-sense position; meanwhile language lends itself so much\r\nmore easily to the mixed way of describing, that I will continue to employ\r\nthe latter. The more radical-minded reader can always read \u0027ideational\r\nprocess\u0027 for \u0027idea.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I shall call it hereafter for shortness \u0027the Meynert scheme;\u0027 for the\r\nchild-and-flame example, as well as the whole general notion that the hemispheres\r\nare a supernumerary surface for the projection and association of\r\nsensations and movements natively coupled in the centres below, is due to\r\nTh. Meynert, the Austrian anatomist. For a popular account of his views,\r\nsee his pamphlet \u0027Zur Mechanik des Gehirnbaues,\u0027 Vienna, 1874. His\r\nmost recent development of them is embodied in his \u0027Psychiatry,\u0027 a\r\nclinical treatise on diseases of the forebrain, translated by B. Sachs, New\r\nYork, 1885.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Geschichte des Materialismus, 2d ed., ii, p. 345.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e West Riding Asylum Reports, 1876, p. 267.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For a thorough discussion of the various objections, see Ferrier\u0027s\r\n\u0027Functions of the Brain,\u0027 2d ed., pp. 227-234, and François-Franck\u0027s\r\n\u0027Leçons sur les Fonctions Motrices du Cerveau\u0027 (1887), Leçon 31. The most\r\nminutely accurate experiments on irritation of cortical points are those\r\nof Paneth, in Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol 37, p. 528.—Recently the skull has been\r\nfearlessly opened by surgeons, and operations upon the human brain performed,\r\nsometimes with the happiest results. In some of these operations\r\nthe cortex has been electrically excited for the purpose of more exactly\r\nlocalizing the spot, and the movements first observed in dogs and monkeys\r\nhave then been verified in men.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Loeb: Beiträge zur Physiologie des Grosshirns; Pflüger\u0027s Archiv,\r\nxxxix, 293. I simplify the author\u0027s statement.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Goltz: Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, xlii, 419.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Hemiplegia\u0027 means one-sided palsy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophical Transactions, vol. 179, pp. 6, 10 (1888). In a later paper\r\n(\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 205) Messrs. Beevor and Horsley go into the localization still more\r\nminutely, showing spots from which single muscles or single digits can be\r\nmade to contract.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nothnagel und Naunyn; Die Localization in den Gehirnkrankheiten\r\n(Wiesbaden, 1887), p. 34.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e An accessible account of the history of our knowledge of motor\r\naphasia is in W. A. Hammond\u0027s \u0027Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous\r\nSystem,\u0027 chapter vii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The history up to 1885 may be found in A. Christiani: Zur Physiologie\r\ndes Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 44, p. 176. Munk (Berlin Academy Sitzsungberichte,\r\n1889, xxxi) returns to the charge, denying the extirpations of\r\nSchrader to be complete: \"Microscopic portions of the \u003ci\u003eSehsphäre\u003c/i\u003e must\r\nremain.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A. Christiani; Zur Physiol. d. Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885), chaps. ii, iii, iv,\r\nH. Munk: Berlin Akad. Stzgsb. 1884, xxiv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Luciani und Seppili: Die Functions-Localization auf der Grosshirnrinde\r\n(Deutsch von Fraenkel), Leipzig, 1886, Dogs M, N, and S. Goltz in\r\nPflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 34, pp. 490-6; vol. 42, p. 454. Cf. also Munk: Berlin\r\nAkad. Stzgsb. 1886, vii, viii, pp. 113-121, and Loeb: Pflüger\u0027s Archiv,\r\nvol. 39, p. 337.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte, 1886, vii, viii, p. 124.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e H. Munk: Functionen der Grosshirnrinde (Berlin, 1881), pp. 36-40.\r\nFerrier: Functions, etc., 2d ed., chap, ix, pt. i. Brown and Schaefer,\r\nPhilos. Transactions, vol. 179, p. 321. Luciani u. Seppili, op. cit. pp.\r\n131-138. Lannegrace found traces of sight with both occipital lobes destroyed,\r\nand in one monkey even when angular gyri and occipital lobes\r\nwere destroyed altogether. His paper is in the Archives de Médecine\r\nExpérimentale for January and March, 1889. I only know it from the\r\nabstract in the Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, pp. 108-420. The reporter\r\ndoubts the evidence of vision in the monkey. It appears to have consisted\r\nin avoiding obstacles and in emotional disturbance in the presence of men.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Localization of Cerebral Disease (1878), pp. 117-8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For cases see Flechsig: Die Leitungsbahnen in Gehirn u. Rückenmark\r\n(Leipzig, 1876), pp. 112, 272; Exner\u0027s Untersuchungen, etc., p. 83; Ferrier\u0027s\r\nLocalization, etc., p. 11; François-Franck\u0027s Cerveau Moteur, p. 63, note.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E. C. Seguin: Hemianopsia of Cerebral Origin, in Journal of Nervous\r\nand Mental Disease, vol. xiii, p. 30. Nothnagel und Naunyn: Ueber die\r\nLocalization der Gehirnkrankheiten (Wiesbaden, 1887), p. 16.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Die Seelenblindheit, etc., p. 51 ff. The mental blindness was in\r\nthis woman\u0027s case moderate in degree.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. 21, p. 222.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nothnagel (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 22) says: \"\u003ci\u003eDies trifft aber nicht zu\u003c/i\u003e.\" He gives,\r\nhowever, no case in support of his opinion that double-sided cortical lesion\r\nmay make one stone-blind and yet not destroy one\u0027s visual images; so that\r\nI do not know whether it is an observation of fact or an \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e assumption.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In a case published by C. S. Freund: Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. xx, the\r\noccipital lobes were injured, but their cortex was not destroyed, on both\r\nsides. There was still vision. Cf. \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 291-5\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_30_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I say \u0027need,\u0027 for I do not of course deny the \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e coexistence of the\r\ntwo symptoms. Many a brain-lesion might block optical associations and at\r\nthe same time impair optical imagination, without entirely stopping vision.\r\nSuch a case seems to have been the remarkable one from Charcot which I\r\nshall give rather fully in the chapter on Imagination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_31_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Freund (in the article cited above \u0027Ueber optische Aphasie und\r\nSeelenblindheit\u0027) and Bruns (\u0027Ein Fall von Alexie,\u0027 etc., in the Neurologisches\r\nCentralblatt for 1888, pp. 581, 509) explain their cases by broken-down\r\nconduction. Wilbrand, whose painstaking monograph on mental\r\nblindness was referred to a moment ago, gives none but \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e reasons for\r\nhis belief that the optical \u0027Erinnerungsfeld\u0027 must be locally distinct from\r\nthe Wahrnehmungsfeld (cf. \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e). The \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e reasons are really the\r\nother way. Mauthner (\u0027Gehirn u. Auge\u0027 (1881), p. 487 ff.) tries to show\r\nthat the \u0027mental blindness\u0027 of Munk\u0027s dogs and apes after occipital mutilation\r\nwas not such, but real dimness of sight. The best case of mental\r\nblindness yet reported is that by Lissauer, as above. The reader will also\r\ndo well to read Bernard: De l\u0027Aphasie (1885) chap. v; Ballet: Le Langage\r\nIntérieur (1886), chap. viii; and Jas. Boss\u0027s little book on Aphasia (1887), p. 74.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_32_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For a case see Wernicke\u0027s Lehrb. d. Gehirnkrankheiten, vol. ii, p.\r\n554 (1881).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_33_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[33]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The latest account of them is the paper \u0027Über die optischen Centren\r\nu. Bahnen\u0027 by von Monakow in the Archiv für Psychiatrie, vol. xx, p. 714.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_34_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[34]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Die Functions-Localization, etc., Dog X; see also p. 161.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_35_35\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[35]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 312.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_36_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[36]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Brain, vol. xi, p. 10.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_37_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[37]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 147.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_38_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[38]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Der aphasische Symptomencomplex (1874). See in Fig. 11 the convolution\r\nmarked \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWernicke\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_39_39\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[39]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027The Pathology of Sensory Aphasia,\u0027 \u0027Brain,\u0027 July, 1889.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_40_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[40]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nothnagel und Naunyn; \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e plates.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_41_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[41]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ballet\u0027s and Bernard\u0027s works cited on \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 51\u003c/a\u003e are the most accessible\r\ndocuments of Charcot\u0027s school. Bastian\u0027s book on the Brain as an Organ\r\nof Mind (last three chapters) is also good.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_42_42\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[42]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For details, see Ferrier\u0027s \u0027Functions,\u0027 chap. ix, pt. iii, and Chas.\r\nK. Mills: Transactions of Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons,\r\n1888, vol. i, p. 278.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_43_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[43]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Functions of the Brain, chap. x, § 14.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_44_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[44]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ueber die Functionen d. Grosshirnrinde (1881), p. 50.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_45_45\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[45]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lezioni di Fisiologia sperimentale sul sistema nervoso encefalico\r\n(l. 73), p. 527 ff. Also \u0027Brain,\u0027 vol. ix, p. 298.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_46_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[46]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bechterew (Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 35, p. 137) found \u003ci\u003eno\u003c/i\u003e anæsthesia in\r\na cat with motor symptoms from ablation of sigmoid gyrus. Luciani got\r\nhyperæsthesia coexistent with cortical motor defect in a dog, by simultaneously\r\nhemisecting the spinal cord (Luciani u. Seppili, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 234).\r\nGoltz frequently found hyperæsthesia of the whole body to accompany\r\nmotor defect after ablation of both frontal lobes, and he once found it\r\nafter ablating the motor zone (Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 34, p. 471).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_47_47\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[47]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philos. Transactions, vol. 179, p. 20 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_48_48\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[48]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Functions, p. 375.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_49_49\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[49]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 15-17.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_50_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[50]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Luciani u. Seppili, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 275-288.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_51_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[51]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_52_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[52]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Trans. of Congress, etc., p. 272.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_53_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[53]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Exner\u0027s Unters. üb. Localization, plate xxv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_54_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[54]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Ferrier\u0027s Functions, etc., chap. iv, and chap. x, §§ 6 to 9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_55_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[55]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 17.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_56_56\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[56]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g. Starr, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 272; Leyden, Beiträge zur Lehre v. d. Localization\r\nim Gehirn (1888), p. 72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_57_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[57]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bernard, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 84.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_58_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[58]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_59_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[59]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Trans. of Congress of Am. Phys. and Surg. 1888, vol. i, p. 343.\r\nBeevor and Horsley\u0027s paper on electric stimulation of the monkey\u0027s brain\r\nis the most beautiful work yet done for precision. See Phil. Trans., vol.\r\n179, p. 205, especially the plates.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_60_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[60]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 37, p. 523 (1885).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_61_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[61]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e By Luys in his generally preposterous book \u0027The Brain\u0027; also by\r\nHorsley.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_62_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[62]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e C. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind, p. 124.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_63_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[63]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The frontal lobes as yet remain a puzzle. Wundt tries to explain\r\nthem as an organ of \u0027apperception\u0027 (Grundzüge d. Physiologischen\r\nPsychologie, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 233 ff.), but I confess myself unable to apprehend\r\nclearly the Wundtian philosophy so far as this word enters into it, so\r\nmust be contented with this bare reference.—Until quite recently it was\r\ncommon to talk of an \u0027ideational centre\u0027 as of something distinct from the\r\naggregate of other centres. Fortunately this custom is already on the\r\nwane.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_64_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[64]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Rech. Exp. sur le Fonctionnement des Centres Psycho-moteurs (Brussels,\r\n1885).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_65_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[65]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 44, p. 544.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_66_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[66]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I ought to add, however, that François-Franck (Fonctions Motrices,\r\np. 370) got, in two dogs and a cat, a different result from this sort of \u0027circumvallation.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_67_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[67]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For this word, see T. K. Clifford\u0027s Lectures and Essays (1879), vol. ii,\r\np. 72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_68_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[68]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See below, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter VIII\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_69_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[69]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Ferrier\u0027s Functions, pp. 120, 147, 414. See also Vulpian: Leçons\r\nsur la Physiol. du Syst. Nerveux, p. 548; Luciani u. Seppili, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e pp.\r\n404-5; H. Maudsley: Physiology of Mind (1876), pp. 138 ff., 197 ff., and\r\n241 ff. In G. H. Lewes\u0027s Physical Basis of Mind, Problem IV: \u0027The Reflex\r\nTheory,\u0027 a very full history of the question is given.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_70_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[70]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Goltz: Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 8, p. 460; Freusberg: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e vol. 10, p. 174.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_71_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[71]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Goltz: Verrichtungen des Grosshirns, p. 78.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_72_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[72]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Loeb: Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 89, p. 276.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_73_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[73]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 289.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_74_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[74]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Schrader: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e vol. 44, p. 218.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_75_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[75]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), chaps. iii, vi; also in\r\nBrain, vol. xi, p. 361.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_76_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[76]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Brown-Séquard has given a resume of his opinions in the Archives\r\nde Physiologie for Oct. 1889, 5me. Série, vol. i, p 751.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_77_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[77]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Goltz first applied the inhibition theory to the brain in his \u0027Verrichtungen\r\ndes Grosshirns,\u0027 p. 39 ff. On the general philosophy of Inhibition\r\nthe reader may consult Brunton\u0027s \u0027Pharmakology and Therapeutics,\u0027\r\np. 154 ff., and also \u0027Nature,\u0027 vol. 27, p. 419 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_78_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[78]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g. Herzen, Herman u. Schwalbe\u0027s Jahres-bericht for 1886, Physiol.\r\nAbth. p. 38. (Experiments on new-born puppies.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_79_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[79]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e François-Franck: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 382. Results are somewhat contradictory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_80_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[80]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 42, p. 419.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_81_81\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[81]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, p. 372.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_82_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[82]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 387. See pp. 378 to 388 for a discussion of the whole\r\nquestion. Compare also Wundt\u0027s Physiol. Psych., 3d ed., i, 225 ff., and\r\nLuciani u. Seppili, pp. 243, 293.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_83_83\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[83]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Chapters on Habit, Association, Memory, and Perception will\r\nchange our present preliminary conjecture that that is one of its essential\r\nuses, into an unshakable conviction.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_84_84\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[84]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 41, p. 75 (1887).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_85_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[85]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e vol. 44, p. 175 (1889).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_86_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[86]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Untersuchungen über die Physiologie des Froschhirns. 1885.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_87_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[87]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 80, 82-3. Schrader also found a \u003ci\u003ebiting-reflex\u003c/i\u003e developed\r\nwhen the medulla oblongata is cut through just behind the cerebellum.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_88_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[88]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte for 1886.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_89_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[89]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Comptes Rendus, vol. 102, p. 90.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_90_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[90]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Comptes Rendus de l\u0027Acad. d. Sciences, vol. 102, p. 1530.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_91_91\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[91]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 210.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_92_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[92]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Goltz: Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 42, p. 447; Schrader: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e vol. 44, p.\r\n219 ff. It is possible that this symptom may be an effect of traumatic\r\ninhibition, however.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_93_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[93]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A few years ago one of the strongest arguments for the theory that\r\nthe hemispheres are purely supernumerary was Soltmann\u0027s often-quoted\r\nobservation that in new-born puppies the motor zone of the cortex is not\r\nexcitable by electricity and only becomes so in the course of a fortnight,\r\npresumably after the experiences of the lower centres have educated it to\r\nmotor duties. Paneth\u0027s later observations, however, seem to show that\r\nSoltmann may have been misled through overnarcotizing his victims\r\n(Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 37, p. 202). In the Neurologisches Centralblatt\r\nfor 1889, p. 513, Bechterew returns to the subject on Soltmann\u0027s side without,\r\nhowever, noticing Paneth\u0027s work.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_94_94\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[94]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Münsterberg (Die Willenshandlung, 1888, p. 134) challenges Meynert\u0027s\r\nscheme \u003ci\u003ein toto\u003c/i\u003e, saying that whilst we have in our personal experience\r\nplenty of examples of acts which were at first voluntary becoming secondarily\r\nautomatic and reflex, we have no conscious record of a single originally\r\nreflex act growing voluntary.—As far as conscious record is concerned,\r\nwe could not possibly have it even if the Meynert scheme were wholly true,\r\nfor the education of the hemispheres which that scheme postulates must\r\nin the nature of things antedate recollection. But it seems to me that\r\nMünsterberg\u0027s rejection of the scheme may possibly be correct as regards\r\nreflexes from the \u003ci\u003elower centres\u003c/i\u003e. Everywhere in this department of psychogenesis\r\nwe are made to feel how ignorant we really are.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_95_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[95]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vol. 44, p. 230-1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_96_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[96]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Naturally, as Schiff long ago pointed out (Lehrb. d. Muskel-u. Nervenphysiologie,\r\n1859, p. 213 ff.), the \u0027Rückenmarksseele,\u0027 if it now exist,\r\ncan have no higher sense-consciousness, for its incoming currents are\r\nsolely from the skin. But it may, in its dim way, both feel, prefer, and\r\ndesire. See, for the view favorable to the text: G. H. Lewes, The Physiology\r\nof Common Life (1860), chap. ix. Goltz (Nervencentren des Frosches\r\n1869, pp. 102-130) thinks that the frog\u0027s cord has no adaptative power. This\r\nmay be the case in such experiments as his, because the beheaded frog\u0027s\r\nshort span of life does not give it time to learn the new tricks asked for.\r\nBut Rosenthal (Biologisches Centralblatt, vol. iv, p. 247) and Mendelssohn\r\n(Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte, 1885, p. 107) in their investigations on the\r\nsimple reflexes of the frog\u0027s cord, show that there is some adaptation to new\r\nconditions, inasmuch as when usual paths of conduction are interrupted by\r\na cut, new paths are taken. According to Rosenthal, these grow more\r\npervious (i.e. require a smaller stimulus) in proportion as they are more\r\noften traversed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_97_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[97]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Whether this evolution takes place through the inheritance of habits\r\nacquired, or through the preservation of lucky variations, is an alternative\r\nwhich we need not discuss here. We shall consider it in the last chapter\r\nin the book. For our present purpose the \u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of the evolution\r\nmakes no difference, provided it be admitted to occur.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_98_98\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[98]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Schrader\u0027s Observations, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[Pg 81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_III\"\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe elementary properties of nerve-tissue on which\r\nthe brain-functions depend are far from being satisfactorily\r\nmade out. The scheme that suggests itself in the first\r\ninstance to the mind, because it is so obvious, is certainly\r\nfalse: I mean the notion that each cell stands for an idea\r\nor part of an idea, and that the ideas are associated or\r\n\u0027bound into bundles\u0027 (to use a phrase of Locke\u0027s) by the\r\nfibres. If we make a symbolic diagram on a blackboard,\r\nof the laws of association between ideas, we are inevitably\r\nled to draw circles, or closed figures of some kind, and to\r\nconnect them by lines. When we hear that the nerve-centres\r\ncontain cells which send off fibres, we say that Nature\r\nhas realized our diagram for us, and that the mechanical\r\nsubstratum of thought is plain. In \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e way, it is true, our\r\ndiagram must be realized in the brain; but surely in no\r\nsuch visible and palpable way as we at first suppose.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_99_99\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e An\r\nenormous number of the cellular bodies in the hemispheres\r\nare fibreless. Where fibres are sent off they soon divide into\r\nuntraceable ramifications; and nowhere do we see a simple\r\ncoarse anatomical connection, like a line on the blackboard,\r\nbetween two cells. Too much anatomy has been\r\nfound to order for theoretic purposes, even by the anatomists;\r\nand the popular-science notions of cells and fibres\r\nare almost wholly wide of the truth. Let us therefore relegate\r\nthe subject of the \u003ci\u003eintimate\u003c/i\u003e workings of the brain to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[Pg 82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe physiology of the future, save in respect to a few points\r\nof which a word must now be said. And first of\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE SUMMATION OF STIMULI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ein the same nerve-tract. This is a property extremely important\r\nfor the understanding of a great many phenomena\r\nof the neural, and consequently of the mental, life; and it\r\nbehooves us to gain a clear conception of what it means before\r\nwe proceed any farther.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe law is this, that \u003ci\u003ea stimulus which would be inadequate by\r\nitself to excite a nerve-centre to effective discharge may, by acting\r\nwith one or more other stimuli (equally ineffectual by themselves\r\nalone) bring the discharge about\u003c/i\u003e. The natural way to consider\r\nthis is as a summation of tensions which at last overcome\r\na resistance. The first of them produce a \u0027latent\r\nexcitement\u0027 or a \u0027heightened irritability\u0027—the phrase is\r\nimmaterial so far as practical consequences go; the last is\r\nthe straw which breaks the camel\u0027s back. Where the\r\nneural process is one that has consciousness for its accompaniment,\r\nthe final explosion would in all cases seem to\r\ninvolve a vivid state of feeling of a more or less substantive\r\nkind. But there is no ground for supposing that the tensions\r\nwhilst yet submaximal or outwardly ineffective, may\r\nnot also have a share in determining the total consciousness\r\npresent in the individual at the time. In later\r\nchapters we shall see abundant reason to suppose that they\r\ndo have such a share, and that without their contribution\r\nthe fringe of relations which is at every moment a vital ingredient\r\nof the mind\u0027s object, would not come to consciousness\r\nat all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subject belongs too much to physiology for the\r\nevidence to be cited in detail in these pages. I will throw\r\ninto a note a few references for such readers as may be interested\r\nin following it out,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_100_100\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e and simply say that the direct\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[Pg 83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nelectrical irritation of the cortical centres sufficiently proves\r\nthe point. For it was found by the earliest experimenters\r\nhere that whereas it takes an exceedingly strong current\r\nto produce any movement when a single induction-shock\r\nis used, a rapid succession of induction-shocks (\u0027faradization\u0027)\r\nwill produce movements when the current is comparatively\r\nweak. A single quotation from an excellent\r\ninvestigation will exhibit this law under further aspects:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If we continue to stimulate the cortex at short intervals with the\r\nstrength of current which produces the minimal muscular contraction\r\n[of the dog\u0027s digital extensor muscle], the amount of contraction\r\ngradually increases till it reaches the maximum. Each earlier stimulation\r\nleaves thus an effect behind it, which increases the efficacy of the\r\nfollowing one. In this summation of the stimuli…. the following\r\npoints may be noted: 1) Single stimuli entirely inefficacious when\r\nalone may become efficacious by sufficiently rapid reiteration. If the\r\ncurrent used is very much less than that which provokes the first beginning\r\nof contraction, a very large number of successive shocks may be\r\nneeded before the movement appears—20, 50, once 106 shocks were\r\nneeded. 2) The summation takes place easily in proportion to the\r\nshortness of the interval between the stimuli. A current too weak to\r\ngive effective summation when its shocks are 3 seconds apart will be\r\ncapable of so doing when the interval is shortened to 1 second. 3)\r\nNot only electrical irritation leaves a modification which goes to swell\r\nthe following stimulus, but every sort of irritant which can produce a\r\ncontraction does so. If in any way a reflex contraction of the muscle\r\nexperimented on has been produced, or if it is contracted spontaneously\r\nby the animal (as not unfrequently happens \u0027by sympathy,\u0027 during a\r\ndeep inspiration), it is found that an electrical stimulus, until then\r\ninoperative, operates energetically if immediately applied.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_101_101\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFurthermore:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In a certain stage of the morphia-narcosis an ineffectively weak\r\nshock will become powerfully effective, if, immediately before its application\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[Pg 84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the motor centre, the skin of certain parts of the body is\r\nexposed to gentle tactile stimulation…. If, having ascertained the\r\nsubminimal strength of current and convinced one\u0027s self repeatedly of its\r\ninefficacy, we draw our hand a single time lightly over the skin of the\r\npaw whose cortical centre is the object of stimulation, we find the current\r\nat once strongly effective. The increase of irritability lasts some\r\nseconds before it disappears. Sometimes the effect of a single light\r\nstroking of the paw is only sufficient to make the previously ineffectual\r\ncurrent produce a very weak contraction. Repeating the tactile stimulation\r\nwill then, as a rule, increase the contraction\u0027s extent.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_102_102\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe constantly use the summation of stimuli in our\r\npractical appeals. If a car-horse balks, the final way of\r\nstarting him is by applying a number of customary incitements\r\nat once. If the driver uses reins and voice, if one\r\nbystander pulls at his head, another lashes his hind\r\nquarters, and the conductor rings the bell, and the dismounted\r\npassengers shove the car, all at the same moment,\r\nhis obstinacy generally yields, and he goes on his way rejoicing.\r\nIf we are striving to remember a lost name or fact,\r\nwe think of as many \u0027cues\u0027 as possible, so that by their\r\njoint action they may recall what no one of them can recall\r\nalone. The sight of a dead prey will often not stimulate a\r\nbeast to pursuit, but if the sight of movement be added to\r\nthat of form, pursuit occurs. \"Brücke noted that his brainless\r\nhen, which made no attempt to peck at the grain under\r\nher very eyes, began pecking if the grain were thrown on\r\nthe ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_103_103\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"Dr. Allen Thomson hatched out some chickens on a carpet,\r\nwhere he kept them for several days. They showed no inclination\r\nto scrape,… but when Dr. Thomson sprinkled\r\na little gravel on the carpet,… the chickens immediately\r\nbegan their scraping movements.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_104_104\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e A strange person, and\r\ndarkness, are both of them stimuli to fear and mistrust in\r\ndogs (and for the matter of that, in men). Neither circumstance\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[Pg 85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalone may awaken outward manifestations, but together,\r\ni.e. when the strange man is met in the dark, the dog\r\nwill be excited to violent defiance.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_105_105\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e Street-hawkers well\r\nknow the efficacy of summation, for they arrange themselves\r\nin a line upon the sidewalk, and the passer often buys from\r\nthe last one of them, through the effect of the reiterated solicitation,\r\nwhat he refused to buy from the first in the row.\r\nAphasia shows many examples of summation. A patient\r\nwho cannot name an object simply shown him, will name it\r\nif he touches as well as sees it, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInstances of summation might be multiplied indefinitely,\r\nbut it is hardly worth while to forestall subsequent chapters.\r\nThose on Instinct, the Stream of Thought, Attention, Discrimination,\r\nAssociation, Memory, Æsthetics, and Will, will\r\ncontain numerous exemplifications of the reach of the principle\r\nin the purely psychological field.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eREACTION-TIME.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the lines of experimental investigation most\r\ndiligently followed of late years is that of the ascertainment\r\nof the \u003ci\u003etime occupied by nervous events\u003c/i\u003e. Helmholtz led\r\noff by discovering the rapidity of the current in the sciatic\r\nnerve of the frog. But the methods he used were soon\r\napplied to the sensory nerves and the centres, and the\r\nresults caused much popular scientific admiration when\r\ndescribed as measurements of the \u0027velocity of thought.\u0027\r\nThe phrase \u0027quick as thought\u0027 had from time immemorial\r\nsignified all that was wonderful and elusive of determination\r\nin the line of speed; and the way in which Science\r\nlaid her doomful hand upon this mystery reminded people\r\nof the day when Franklin first \u0027\u003ci\u003eeripuit cœlo fulmen\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 foreshadowing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[Pg 86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe reign of a newer and colder race of gods.\r\nWe shall take up the various operations measured, each in\r\nthe chapter to which it more naturally pertains. I may\r\nsay, however, immediately, that the phrase \u0027velocity of\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is misleading, for it is by no means clear in any\r\nof the cases what particular act of thought occurs during\r\nthe time which is measured. \u0027Velocity of nerve-action\u0027 is\r\nliable to the same criticism, for in most cases we do not know\r\nwhat particular nerve-processes occur. What the times\r\nin question really represent is the total duration of certain\r\n\u003ci\u003ereactions upon stimuli\u003c/i\u003e. Certain of the conditions of the reaction\r\nare prepared beforehand; they consist in the assumption\r\nof those motor and sensory tensions which we name\r\nthe expectant state. Just what happens during the actual\r\ntime occupied by the reaction (in other words, just what\r\nis added to the pre-existent tensions to produce the actual\r\ndischarge) is not made out at present, either from the\r\nneural or from the mental point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe method is essentially the same in all these investigations.\r\nA signal of some sort is communicated to the subject,\r\nand at the same instant records itself on a time-registering\r\napparatus. The subject then makes a muscular movement\r\nof some sort, which is the \u0027reaction,\u0027 and which also\r\nrecords itself automatically. The time found to have elapsed\r\nbetween the two records is the total time of that observation.\r\nThe time-registering instruments are of various types.\r\nOne type is that of the revolving drum covered with smoked\r\npaper, on which one electric pen traces a line which the\r\nsignal breaks and the \u0027reaction\u0027 draws again; whilst another\r\nelectric pen (connected with a pendulum or a rod of metal\r\nvibrating at a known rate) traces alongside of the former\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[Pg 87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nline a \u0027time-line\u0027 of which each undulation or link stands\r\nfor a certain fraction of a second, and against which the\r\nbreak in the reaction-line can be measured. Compare\r\nFig. 21, where the line is broken by the signal at the first\r\narrow, and continued again by the reaction at the second.\r\nLudwig\u0027s Kymograph, Marey\u0027s Chronograph are good examples\r\nof this type of instrument.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\" Engraving\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-086-0021.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_086_0021.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 21.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother type of instrument is represented by the stopwatch,\r\nof which the most perfect form is Hipp\u0027s Chronoscope.\r\nThe hand on the dial measures intervals as short\r\nas 1/1000 of a second. The signal (by an appropriate electric\r\nconnection) starts it; the reaction stops it; and by reading\r\noff its initial and terminal positions we have immediately\r\nand with no farther trouble the time we seek. A still\r\nsimpler instrument, though one not very satisfactory in its\r\nworking, is the \u0027psychodometer\u0027 of Exner \u0026amp; Obersteiner,\r\nof which I picture a modification devised by my colleague\r\nProfessor H. P. Bowditch, which works very well.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption0\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-087-0022.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_087_0022.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 22.—Bowditch\u0027s Reaction-timer. \u003ci\u003eF\u003c/i\u003e, tuning-fork carrying a little plate which\r\nholds the paper on which the electric pen \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e makes the tracing, and sliding in\r\ngrooves on the base-board. \u003ci\u003eP\u003c/i\u003e, a plug which spreads the prongs of the fork apart\r\nwhen it is pushed forward to its extreme limit, and releases them when it is drawn\r\nback to a certain point. The fork then vibrates, and, its backward movement continuing,\r\nan undulating line is drawn on the smoked paper by the pen. At \u003ci\u003eT\u003c/i\u003e is a\r\ntongue fixed to the carriage of the fork, and at \u003ci\u003eK\u003c/i\u003e an electric key which the tongue\r\nopens and with which the electric pen is connected. At the instant of opening, the\r\npen changes its place and the undulating line is drawn at a different level on the\r\npaper. The opening can be made to serve as a signal to the reacter in a variety\r\nof ways, and his reaction can be made to close the pen again, when the line returns\r\nto its first level. The reaction time = the number of undulations traced at\r\nthe second level.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe manner in which the signal and reaction are connected\r\nwith the chronographic apparatus varies indefinitely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[Pg 88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin different experiments. Every new problem requires\r\nsome new electric or mechanical disposition of apparatus.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_106_106\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe least complicated time-measurement is that known\r\nas \u003ci\u003esimple reaction-time\u003c/i\u003e, in which there is but one possible\r\nsignal and one possible movement, and both are known in\r\nadvance. The movement is generally the closing of an electric\r\nkey with the hand. The foot, the jaw, the lips, even\r\nthe eyelid, have been in turn made organs of reaction, and\r\nthe apparatus has been modified accordingly.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_107_107\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e The time\r\nusually elapsing between stimulus and movement lies between\r\none and three tenths of a second, varying according\r\nto circumstances which will be mentioned anon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subject of experiment, whenever the reactions are\r\nshort and regular, is in a state of extreme tension, and feels,\r\nwhen the signal comes, as if \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e started the reaction, by a\r\nsort of fatality, and as if no psychic process of perception\r\nor volition had a chance to intervene. The whole succession\r\nis so rapid that perception seems to be retrospective, and\r\nthe time-order of events to be read off in memory rather\r\nthan known at the moment. This at least is my own personal\r\nexperience in the matter, and with it I find others to\r\nagree. The question is, What happens inside of us, either\r\nin brain or mind? and to answer that we must analyze just\r\nwhat processes the reaction involves. It is evident that\r\nsome time is lost in each of the following stages:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The stimulus excites the peripheral sense-organ\r\nadequately for a current to pass into the sensory nerve;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The sensory nerve is traversed;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The transformation (or reflection) of the sensory into\r\na motor current occurs in the centres;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. The spinal cord and motor nerve are traversed;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e5. The motor current excites the muscle to the contracting\r\npoint.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[Pg 89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTime is also lost, of course, outside the muscle, in the\r\njoints, skin, etc., and between the parts of the apparatus;\r\nand when the stimulus which serves as signal is applied to\r\nthe skin of the trunk or limbs, time is lost in the sensorial\r\nconduction through the spinal cord.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe stage marked 3 is the only one that interests us\r\nhere. The other stages answer to purely physiological\r\nprocesses, but stage 3 is psycho-physical; that is, it is a\r\nhigher-central process, and has probably some sort of consciousness\r\naccompanying it. What sort?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt has little difficulty in deciding that it is consciousness\r\nof a quite elaborate kind. He distinguishes\r\nbetween two stages in the conscious reception of an impression,\r\ncalling one \u003ci\u003eperception\u003c/i\u003e, and the other \u003ci\u003eapperception\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand likening the one to the mere entrance of an object into\r\nthe periphery of the field of vision, and the other to its\r\ncoming to occupy the focus or point of view. \u003ci\u003eInattentive\r\nawareness\u003c/i\u003e of an object, and \u003ci\u003eattention\u003c/i\u003e to it, are, it seems to\r\nme, equivalents for perception and apperception, as Wundt\r\nuses the words. To these two forms of awareness of the\r\nimpression Wundt adds the conscious volition to react,\r\ngives to the trio the name of \u0027psycho-physical\u0027 processes,\r\nand assumes that they actually follow upon each other in\r\nthe succession in which they have been named.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_108_108\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e So at\r\nleast I understand him. The simplest way to determine\r\nthe time taken up by this psycho-physical stage No. 3\r\nwould be to determine separately the duration of the several\r\npurely physical processes, 1, 2, 4, and 5, and to subtract\r\nthem from the total reaction-time. Such attempts\r\nhave been made.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_109_109\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e But the data for calculation are too\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[Pg 90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninaccurate for use, and, as Wundt himself admits,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_110_110\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e the precise\r\nduration of stage 3 must at present be left enveloped\r\nwith that of the other processes, in the total reaction-time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy own belief is that no such succession of conscious\r\nfeelings as Wundt describes takes place during stage 3.\r\nIt is a process of central excitement and discharge, with\r\nwhich doubtless some feeling coexists, but \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e feeling we\r\ncannot tell, because it is so fugitive and so immediately\r\neclipsed by the more substantive and enduring memory of\r\nthe impression as it came in, and of the executed movement\r\nof response. Feeling of the impression, attention to\r\nit, thought of the reaction, volition to react, \u003ci\u003ewould\u003c/i\u003e, undoubtedly,\r\nall be links of the process \u003ci\u003eunder other conditions\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_111_111\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nwould lead to the same reaction—after an indefinitely longer\r\ntime. But these other conditions are not those of the\r\nexperiments we are discussing; and it is mythological psychology\r\n(of which we shall see many later examples) to conclude\r\nthat because two mental processes lead to the same\r\nresult they must be similar in their inward subjective constitution.\r\nThe feeling of stage 3 is certainly no articulate\r\nperception. It can be nothing but the mere sense of a\r\nreflex discharge. \u003ci\u003eThe reaction whose time is measured is\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nin short, \u003ci\u003ea reflex action pure and simple, and not a psychic\r\nact\u003c/i\u003e. A foregoing psychic condition is, it is true, a prerequisite\r\nfor this reflex action. The preparation of the\r\nattention and volition; the expectation of the signal and\r\nthe readiness of the hand to move, the instant it shall come;\r\nthe nervous tension in which the subject waits, are all conditions\r\nof the formation in him for the time being of a new\r\npath or arc of reflex discharge. The tract from the sense-organ\r\nwhich receives the stimulus, into the motor centre\r\nwhich discharges the reaction, is already tingling with premonitory\r\ninnervation, is raised to such a pitch of heightened\r\nirritability by the expectant attention, that the signal is\r\ninstantaneously sufficient to cause the overflow.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_112_112\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e No other\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[Pg 91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntract of the nervous system is, at the moment, in this hair-trigger\r\ncondition. The consequence is that one sometimes\r\nresponds to a \u003ci\u003ewrong\u003c/i\u003e signal, especially if it be an impression\r\nof the same \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e with the signal we expect.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_113_113\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e But if by\r\nchance we are tired, or the signal is unexpectedly weak,\r\nand we do not react instantly, but only after an express\r\nperception that the signal has come, and an express volition,\r\nthe time becomes quite disproportionately long (a\r\nsecond or more, according to Exner\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_114_114\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e), and we feel that the\r\nprocess is in nature altogether different.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact, the reaction-time experiments are a case to\r\nwhich we can immediately apply what we have just learned\r\nabout the summation of stimuli. \u0027Expectant attention\u0027 is\r\nbut the subjective name for what objectively is a partial\r\nstimulation of a certain pathway, the pathway from the\r\n\u0027centre\u0027 for the signal to that for the discharge. In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter\r\nXI\u003c/a\u003e we shall see that all attention involves excitement from\r\nwithin of the tract concerned in feeling the objects to which\r\nattention is given. The tract here is the excito-motor arc\r\nabout to be traversed. The signal is but the spark from\r\nwithout which touches off a train already laid. The performance,\r\nunder these conditions, exactly resembles any\r\nreflex action. The only difference is that whilst, in the\r\nordinarily so-called reflex acts, the reflex arc is a permanent\r\nresult of organic growth, it is here a transient result of\r\nprevious cerebral conditions.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[Pg 92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_115_115\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI am happy to say that since the preceding paragraphs\r\n(and the notes thereto appertaining) were written, Wundt\r\nhas himself become converted to the view which I defend.\r\nHe now admits that in the shortest reactions \"there is\r\nneither apperception nor will, but that they are merely\r\n\u003ci\u003ebrain-reflexes due to practice\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_116_116\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e The means of his conversion\r\nare certain experiments performed in his laboratory\r\nby Herr L. Lange,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_117_117\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e who was led to distinguish between\r\ntwo ways of setting the attention in reacting on a signal,\r\nand who found that they gave very different time-results.\r\nIn the \u0027\u003ci\u003eextreme sensorial\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 way, as Lange calls it, of reacting,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[Pg 93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none keeps one\u0027s mind as intent as possible upon the expected\r\nsignal, and \u0027purposely avoids\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_118_118\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e thinking of the movement\r\nto be executed; in the \u0027\u003ci\u003eextreme muscular\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 way one\r\n\u0027does not think at all\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_119_119\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e of the signal, but stands as ready as\r\npossible for the movement. The muscular reactions are\r\nmuch shorter than the sensorial ones, the average difference\r\nbeing in the neighborhood of a tenth of a second.\r\nWundt accordingly calls them \u0027shortened reactions\u0027 and,\r\nwith Lange, admits them to be mere reflexes; whilst the\r\nsensorial reactions he calls \u0027complete,\u0027 and holds to his\r\noriginal conception as far as they are concerned. The\r\nfacts, however, do not seem to me to warrant even this\r\namount of fidelity to the original Wundtian position.\r\nWhen we begin to react in the \u0027extreme sensorial\u0027 way,\r\nLange says that we get times so very long that they must\r\nbe rejected from the count as non-typical. \"Only after\r\nthe reacter has succeeded by repeated and conscientious\r\npractice in bringing about an extremely precise co-ordination\r\nof his voluntary impulse with his sense-impression\r\ndo we get times which can be regarded as typical sensorial\r\nreaction-times.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_120_120\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e Now it seems to me that these excessive\r\nand \u0027untypical\u0027 times are probably the real \u0027complete times,\u0027\r\nthe only ones in which distinct processes of actual perception\r\nand volition occur (see above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 88-9\u003c/a\u003e). The typical\r\nsensorial time which is attained by practice is probably\r\nanother sort of reflex, less perfect than the reflexes prepared\r\nby straining one\u0027s attention towards the movement.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_121_121\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe times are much more variable in the sensorial way\r\nthan in the muscular. The several muscular reactions\r\ndiffer little from each other. Only in them does the phenomenon\r\noccur of reacting on a false signal, or of reacting\r\nbefore the signal. Times intermediate between these two\r\ntypes occur according as the attention fails to turn itself\r\nexclusively to one of the extremes. It is obvious that Herr\r\nLange\u0027s distinction between the two types of reaction is a\r\nhighly important one, and that the \u0027extreme muscular\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[Pg 94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmethod,\u0027 giving both the shortest times and the most constant\r\nones, ought to be aimed at in all comparative investigations.\r\nHerr Lange\u0027s own muscular time averaged\r\n0\u0027\u0027.123; his sensorial time, 0\u0027\u0027.230.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese reaction-time experiments are then in no sense\r\nmeasurements of the swiftness of \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e. Only when we\r\ncomplicate them is there a chance for anything like an\r\nintellectual operation to occur. They may be complicated\r\nin various ways. The reaction may be withheld until the\r\nsignal has consciously awakened a distinct idea (Wundt\u0027s\r\ndiscrimination-time, association-time) and then performed.\r\nOr there may be a variety of possible signals, each with\r\na different reaction assigned to it, and the reacter may\r\nbe uncertain which one he is about to receive. The\r\nreaction would then hardly seem to occur without a preliminary\r\nrecognition and choice. We shall see, however,\r\nin the appropriate chapters, that the discrimination and\r\nchoice involved in such a reaction are widely different from\r\nthe intellectual operations of which we are ordinarily conscious\r\nunder those names. Meanwhile the simple reaction-time\r\nremains as the starting point of all these superinduced\r\ncomplications. It is the fundamental physiological constant\r\nin all time-measurements. As such, its own variations\r\nhave an interest, and must be briefly passed in review.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_122_122\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reaction-time varies with the \u003ci\u003eindividual\u003c/i\u003e and his \u003ci\u003eage\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAn individual may have it particularly long in respect of\r\nsignals of one sense (Buccola, p. 147), but not of others.\r\nOld and uncultivated people have it long (nearly a second,\r\nin an old pauper observed by Exner, Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vii,\r\n612-4). Children have it long (half a second, Herzen in\r\nBuccola, p. 152).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePractice\u003c/i\u003e shortens it to a quantity which is for each individual\r\na minimum beyond which no farther reduction can\r\nbe made. The aforesaid old pauper\u0027s time was, after\r\nmuch practice, reduced to 0.1866 sec. (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 626).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[Pg 95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFatigue\u003c/i\u003e lengthens it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eConcentration of attention\u003c/i\u003e shortens it. Details will be\r\ngiven in the chapter on Attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003enature of the signal\u003c/i\u003e makes it vary.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_123_123\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e Wundt writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I found that the reaction-time for impressions on the skin with\r\nelectric stimulus is less than for true touch-sensations, as the following\r\naverages show:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eAverage. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eAverage Variation\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSound\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.167 sec. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.0221 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eLight\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.222 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.0219 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eElectric skin-sensation \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.201 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.0115 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eTouch-sensations\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.213 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.0134 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I here bring together the averages which have been obtained by\r\nsome other observers:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eHirsch. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eHankel. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eExner.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSound\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.149\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.1505\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.1360\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eLight\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.200\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.2246\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.1506\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSkin-sensation \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.182\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.1546\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.1337\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_124_124\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThermic\u003c/i\u003e reactions have been lately measured by A.\r\nGoldscheider and by Vintschgau (1887), who find them\r\nslower than reactions from touch. That from heat especially\r\nis very slow, more so than from cold, the differences\r\n(according to Goldscheider) depending on the nerve-terminations\r\nin the skin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eGustatory\u003c/i\u003e reactions were measured by Vintschgau. They\r\ndiffered according to the substances used, running up to\r\nhalf a second as a maximum when identification took place.\r\nThe mere perception of the presence of the substance on\r\nthe tongue varied from 0\u0027\u0027.159 to 0\u0027\u0027.219 (Pflüger\u0027s Archiv,\r\nxiv, 529).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eOlfactory\u003c/i\u003e reactions have been studied by Vintschgau,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[Pg 96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBuccola, and Beaunis. They are slow, averaging about\r\nhalf a second (cf. Beaunis, Recherches exp. sur l\u0027Activité\r\nCérébrale, 1884, p. 49 ff.).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be observed that \u003ci\u003esound\u003c/i\u003e is more promptly reacted\r\non than either \u003ci\u003esight\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003etouch. Taste\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esmell\u003c/i\u003e are slower\r\nthan either. One individual, who reacted to touch upon\r\nthe tip of the tongue in 0\u0027\u0027.125, took 0\u0027\u0027.993 to react upon\r\nthe taste of quinine applied to the same spot. In another,\r\nupon the base of the tongue, the reaction to touch being\r\n0\u0027\u0027.141, that to sugar was 0\u0027\u0027.552 (Vintschgau, quoted by\r\nBuccola, p. 103). Buccola found the reaction to odors to\r\nvary from 0\u0027\u0027.334 to 0\u0027\u0027.681, according to the perfume used\r\nand the individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eintensity of the signal\u003c/i\u003e makes a difference. The intenser\r\nthe stimulus the shorter the time. Herzen (Grundlinien\r\neiner allgem. Psychophysiologie, p. 101) compared\r\nthe reaction from a \u003ci\u003ecorn\u003c/i\u003e on the toe with that from the skin\r\nof the hand of the same subject. The two places were\r\nstimulated simultaneously, and the subject tried to react\r\nsimultaneously with both hand and foot, but the foot always\r\nwent quickest. When the sound skin of the foot was\r\ntouched instead of the corn, it was the hand which always\r\nreacted first. Wundt tries to show that when the signal is\r\nmade barely perceptible, the time is probably the same in\r\nall the senses, namely, about 0.332\u0027\u0027 (Physiol. Psych., 2d\r\ned., ii, 224).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the signal is of touch, the place to which it is\r\napplied makes a difference in the resultant reaction-time.\r\nG. S. Hall and V. Kries found (Archiv f. Anat. u. Physiol.,\r\n1879) that when the finger-tip was the place the reaction\r\nwas shorter than when the middle of the upper arm was\r\nused, in spite of the greater length of nerve-trunk to be\r\ntraversed in the latter case. This discovery invalidates the\r\nmeasurements of the rapidity of transmission of the current\r\nin human nerves, for they are all based on the method of\r\ncomparing reaction-times from places near the root and\r\nnear the extremity of a limb. The same observers found\r\nthat signals seen by the periphery of the retina gave longer\r\ntimes than the same signals seen by direct vision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eseason\u003c/i\u003e makes a difference, the time being some hundredths\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[Pg 97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof a second shorter on cold winter days (Vintschgau\r\n\u003ci\u003eapud\u003c/i\u003e Exner, Hermann\u0027s Hdbh., p. 270).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIntoxicants\u003c/i\u003e alter the time. \u003ci\u003eCoffee\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003etea\u003c/i\u003e appear to\r\nshorten it. Small doses of \u003ci\u003ewine\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ealcohol\u003c/i\u003e first shorten and\r\nthen lengthen it; but the shortening stage tends to disappear\r\nif a large dose be given immediately. This, at least,\r\nis the report of two German observers. Dr. J. W. Warren,\r\nwhose observations are more thorough than any previous\r\nones, could find no very decided effects from ordinary doses\r\n(Journal of Physiology, viii, 311). \u003ci\u003eMorphia\u003c/i\u003e lengthens the\r\ntime. \u003ci\u003eAmyl-nitrite\u003c/i\u003e lengthens it, but after the inhalation it\r\nmay fall to less than the normal. Ether and chloroform\r\nlengthen it (for authorities, etc., see Buccola, p. 189).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain \u003ci\u003ediseased states\u003c/i\u003e naturally lengthen the time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003ehypnotic trance\u003c/i\u003e has no constant effect, sometimes\r\nshortening and sometimes lengthening it (Hall, Mind, viii,\r\n170; James, Proc. Am. Soc. for Psych. Research, 246).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe time taken to \u003ci\u003einhibit\u003c/i\u003e a movement (e.g. to cease contraction\r\nof jaw-muscles) seems to be about the same as to\r\nproduce one (Gad, Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1887, 468;\r\nOrchansky, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e1889, 1885).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn immense amount of work has been done on reaction-time,\r\nof which I have cited but a small part. It is a sort\r\nof work which appeals particularly to patient and exact\r\nminds, and they have not failed to profit by the opportunity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCEREBRAL BLOOD-SUPPLY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next point to occupy our attention is the \u003ci\u003echanges of\r\ncirculation which accompany cerebral activity\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-098-0023.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_098_0023.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 23.—Sphymographic pulse-tracing. \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, during intellectual repose; \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, during intellectual\r\nactivity. (Mosso.)\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll parts of the cortex, when electrically excited, produce\r\nalterations both of respiration and circulation. The blood-pressure\r\nrises, as a rule, all over the body, no matter where\r\nthe cortical irritation is applied, though the motor zone is\r\nthe most sensitive region for the purpose. Elsewhere the\r\ncurrent must be strong enough for an epileptic attack to be\r\nproduced.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_125_125\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e Slowing and quickening of the heart are also\r\nobserved, and are independent of the vaso-constrictive\r\nphenomenon. Mosso, using his ingenious \u0027plethysmograph\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[Pg 98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas an indicator, discovered that the blood-supply to\r\nthe arms diminished during intellectual activity, and found\r\nfurthermore that the arterial tension (as shown by the\r\nsphygmograph) was increased in these members (see\r\nFig. 23). So slight an emotion as that produced by the\r\nentrance of Professor Ludwig into the laboratory was instantly\r\nfollowed by a shrinkage of the arms.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_126_126\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e The brain\r\nitself is an excessively vascular organ, a sponge full of\r\nblood, in fact; and another of Mosso\u0027s inventions showed\r\nthat when less blood went to the arms, more went to the\r\nhead. The subject to be observed lay on a delicately balanced\r\ntable which could tip downward either at the head\r\nor at the foot if the weight of either end were increased.\r\nThe moment emotional or intellectual activity began in the\r\nsubject, down went the balance at the head-end, in consequence\r\nof the redistribution of blood in his system. But\r\nthe best proof of the immediate afflux of blood to the brain\r\nduring mental activity is due to Mosso\u0027s observations on\r\nthree persons whose brain had been laid bare by lesion of\r\nthe skull. By means of apparatus described in his book,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_127_127\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthis physiologist was enabled to let the brain-pulse record\r\nitself directly by a tracing. The intra-cranial blood-pressure\r\nrose immediately whenever the subject was spoken to, or\r\nwhen he began to think actively, as in solving a problem in\r\nmental arithmetic. Mosso gives in his work a large number\r\nof reproductions of tracings which show the instantaneity\r\nof the change of blood-supply, whenever the mental\r\nactivity was quickened by any cause whatever, intellectual\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[Pg 99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor emotional. He relates of his female subject that one\r\nday whilst tracing her brain-pulse he observed a sudden\r\nrise with no apparent outer or inner cause. She however\r\nconfessed to him afterwards that at that moment she had\r\ncaught sight of a \u003ci\u003eskull\u003c/i\u003e on top of a piece of furniture in the\r\nroom, and that this had given her a slight emotion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fluctuations of the blood supply to the brain were\r\nindependent of respiratory changes,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_128_128\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e and followed the\r\nquickening of mental activity almost immediately. We\r\nmust suppose a very delicate adjustment whereby the circulation\r\nfollows the needs of the cerebral activity. Blood\r\nvery likely may rush to each region of the cortex according\r\nas it is most active, but of this we know nothing. I need\r\nhardly say that the activity of the nervous matter is the\r\nprimary phenomenon, and the afflux of blood its secondary\r\nconsequence. Many popular writers talk as if it were\r\nthe other way about, and as if mental activity were due to\r\nthe afflux of blood. But, as Professor H. N. Martin has\r\nwell said, \"that belief has no physiological foundation\r\nwhatever; it is even directly opposed to all that we know of\r\ncell life.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_129_129\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e A chronic pathological congestion may, it is true,\r\nhave secondary consequences, but the primary congestions\r\nwhich we have been considering \u003ci\u003efollow\u003c/i\u003e the activity of the\r\nbrain-cells by an adaptive reflex vaso-motor mechanism\r\ndoubtless as elaborate as that which harmonizes blood-supply\r\nwith cell-action in any muscle or gland.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf the changes in the cerebral circulation during sleep\r\nI will speak in the chapter which treats of that subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCEREBRAL THERMOMETRY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBrain-activity seems accompanied by a local disengagement\r\nof heat.\u003c/i\u003e The earliest careful work in this direction was by\r\nDr. J. S. Lombard in 1867. Dr. Lombard\u0027s latest results include\r\nthe records of over 60,000 observations.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_130_130\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e He noted the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[Pg 100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchanges in delicate thermometers and electric piles placed\r\nagainst the scalp in human beings, and found that any intellectual\r\neffort, such as computing, composing, reciting poetry\r\nsilently or aloud, and especially that emotional excitement\r\nsuch as an anger fit, caused a general rise of temperature,\r\nwhich rarely exceeded a degree Fahrenheit. The rise was\r\nin most cases more marked in the middle region of the head\r\nthan elsewhere. Strange to say, it was greater in reciting\r\npoetry silently than in reciting it aloud. Dr. Lombard\u0027s\r\nexplanation is that \"in internal recitation an additional\r\nportion of energy, which in recitation aloud was converted\r\ninto nervous and muscular force, now appears as\r\nheat.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_131_131\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e I should suggest rather, if we must have a theory,\r\nthat the surplus of heat in recitation to one\u0027s self is due to\r\ninhibitory processes which are absent when we recite aloud.\r\nIn the chapter on the Will we shall see that the \u003ci\u003esimple\u003c/i\u003e central\r\nprocess is to \u003ci\u003espeak\u003c/i\u003e when we think; to think silently\r\ninvolves a check in addition. In 1870 the indefatigable\r\nSchiff took up the subject, experimenting on live dogs and\r\nchickens, plunging thermo-electric needles into the substance\r\nof their brain, to eliminate possible errors from\r\nvascular changes in the skin when the thermometers were\r\nplaced upon the scalp. After habituation was established,\r\nhe tested the animals with various sensations, tactile, optic,\r\nolfactory, and auditory. He found very regularly an immediate\r\ndeflection of the galvanometer, indicating an abrupt\r\nalteration of the intra-cerebral temperature. When, for instance,\r\nhe presented an empty roll of paper to the nose of\r\nhis dog as it lay motionless, there was a small deflection,\r\nbut when a piece of meat was in the paper the deflection\r\nwas much greater. Schiff concluded from these and other\r\nexperiments that sensorial activity heats the brain-tissue,\r\nbut he did not try to localize the increment of heat beyond\r\nfinding that it was in both hemispheres, whatever might be\r\nthe sensation applied.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_132_132\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e Dr. R. W. Amidon in 1880 made\r\na farther step forward, in localizing the heat produced by\r\nvoluntary muscular contractions. Applying a number of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[Pg 101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndelicate surface-thermometers simultaneously against the\r\nscalp, he found that when different muscles of the body\r\nwere made to contract vigorously for ten minutes or more,\r\ndifferent regions of the scalp rose in temperature, that the\r\nregions were well focalized, and that the rise of temperature\r\nwas often considerably over a Fahrenheit degree. As a result\r\nof his investigations he gives a diagram in which numbered\r\nregions represent the centres of highest temperature\r\nfor the various special movements which were investigated.\r\nTo a large extent they correspond to the centres for the\r\nsame movements assigned by Ferrier and others on other\r\ngrounds; only they cover more of the skull.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_133_133\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003ePhosphorus and Thought.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eChemical action must of course accompany brain-activity.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nBut little definite is known of its exact nature. Cholesterin\r\nand creatin are both excrementitious products, and are\r\nboth found in the brain. The subject belongs to chemistry\r\nrather than to psychology, and I only mention it here for\r\nthe sake of saying a word about a wide-spread popular\r\nerror about brain-activity and phosphorus. \u0027\u003ci\u003eOhne\r\nPhosphor, kein Gedanke\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 was a noted war-cry of the\r\n\u0027materialists\u0027 during the excitement on that subject which\r\nfilled Germany in the \u002760s. The brain, like every other\r\norgan of the body, contains phosphorus, and a score of\r\nother chemicals besides. Why the phosphorus should be\r\npicked out as its essence, no one knows. It would be\r\nequally true to say \u0027Ohne Wasser kein Gedanke,\u0027 or \u0027Ohne\r\nKochsalz kein Gedanke\u0027; for thought would stop as quickly\r\nif the brain should dry up or lose its NaCl as if it lost its\r\nphosphorus. In America the phosphorus-delusion has\r\ntwined itself round a saying quoted (rightly or wrongly)\r\nfrom Professor L. Agassiz, to the effect that fishermen are\r\nmore intelligent than farmers because they eat so much fish,\r\nwhich contains so much phosphorus. All the facts may be\r\ndoubted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only straight way to ascertain the importance of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[Pg 102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nphosphorus to thought would be to find whether more is\r\nexcreted by the brain during mental activity than during\r\nrest. Unfortunately we cannot do this directly, but can\r\nonly gauge the amount of PO\u003csub\u003e5\u003c/sub\u003e in the urine, which represents\r\nother organs as well as the brain, and this procedure,\r\nas Dr. Edes says, is like measuring the rise of water at the\r\nmouth of the Mississippi to tell where there has been a\r\nthunder-storm in Minnesota.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_134_134\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e It has been adopted, however,\r\nby a variety of observers, some of whom found the\r\nphosphates in the urine diminished, whilst others found\r\nthem increased, by intellectual work. On the whole, it is\r\nimpossible to trace any constant relation. In maniacal\r\nexcitement less phosphorus than usual seems to be excreted.\r\nMore is excreted during sleep. There are differences between\r\nthe alkaline and earthy phosphates into which I will\r\nnot enter, as my only aim is to show that the popular way\r\nof looking at the matter has no exact foundation.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_135_135\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nfact that phosphorus-preparations may do good in nervous\r\nexhaustion proves nothing as to the part played by phosphorus\r\nin mental activity. Like iron, arsenic, and other\r\nremedies it is a stimulant or tonic, of whose intimate workings\r\nin the system we know absolutely nothing, and which\r\nmoreover does good in an extremely small number of the\r\ncases in which it is prescribed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phosphorus-philosophers have often compared\r\nthought to a secretion. \"The brain secretes thought, as the\r\nkidneys secrete urine, or as the liver secretes bile,\" are\r\nphrases which one sometimes hears. The lame analogy\r\nneed hardly be pointed out. The materials which the brain\r\n\u003ci\u003epours into the blood\u003c/i\u003e (cholesterin, creatin, xanthin, or whatever\r\nthey may be) are the analogues of the urine and the\r\nbile, being in fact real material excreta. As far as these\r\nmatters go, the brain is a ductless gland. But we know of\r\nnothing connected with liver-and kidney-activity which can\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[Pg 103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe in the remotest degree compared with the stream of\r\nthought that accompanies the brain\u0027s material secretions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere remains another feature of general brain-physiology,\r\nand indeed for psychological purposes the most\r\nimportant feature of all. I refer to the aptitude of the brain\r\nfor acquiring \u003ci\u003ehabits\u003c/i\u003e. But I will treat of that in a chapter\r\nby itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_99_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[99]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I shall myself in later places indulge in much of this schematization.\r\nThe reader will understand once for all that it is symbolic; and that the\r\nuse of it is hardly more than to show what a deep congruity there is between\r\nmental processes and mechanical processes of \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e kind, not necessarily of\r\nthe exact kind portrayed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_100_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[100]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Valentin: Archiv f. d. gesammt. Physiol., 1873, p. 458. Stirling:\r\nLeipzig Acad. Berichte, 1875, p. 372 (Journal of Physiol., 1875). J.\r\nWard: Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1880, p. 72. H. Sewall: Johns\r\nHopkins Studies, 1880, p. 30. Kronecker u. Nicolaides: Archiv f.\r\n(Anat. u.) Physiol., 1880, p. 437. Exner: Archiv f. die ges. Physiol., Bd.\r\n28, p. 487 (1882). Eckhard: in Hermann\u0027s Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. I, Thl.\r\nii, p. 31. François-Franck: Leçons sur les Fonctions motrices du Cerveau,\r\np. 51 ff., 339.—For the process of summation in \u003ci\u003enerves\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003emuscles\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ncf. Hermann: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e Thl. i, p. 109, and vol. i, p. 40. Also Wundt:\r\nPhysiol. Psych., i, 243 ff.; Richet: Travaux du Laboratoire de Marey, 1877,\r\np. 97; L\u0027Homme et l\u0027Intelligence, pp. 24 ff., 468; Revue Philosophique,\r\nt. xxi, p. 564. Kronecker u. Hall: Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1879;\r\nSchönlein: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e1882, p. 357. Sertoli (Hofmann and Schwalbe\u0027s Jahres-bericht),\r\n1882, p. 25. De Watteville: Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1883,\r\nNo. 7. Grünhagen: Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 34, p. 301 (1884).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_101_101\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[101]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bubnoff und Heidenhain: Ueber Erregungs- und Hemmungsvorgänge\r\ninnerhalb der motorischen Hirncentren. Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd.\r\n26, p. 156 (1881).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_102_102\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[102]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 176 (1881). Exner thinks (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nBd. 28, p. 497 (1882)) that the summation here occurs in the spinal cord.\r\nIt makes no difference where this particular summation occurs, so far as\r\nthe general philosophy of summation goes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_103_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[103]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e G H. Lewes: Physical Basis of Mind, p. 479, where many similar\r\nexamples are given, 487-9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_104_104\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[104]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Romanes: Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 168.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_105_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[105]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See a similar instance in Mach: Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen,\r\np. 36, a sparrow being the animal. My young children are afraid\r\nof their own pug-dog, if he enters their room after they are in bed and the\r\nlights are out. Compare this statement also: \"The first question to a\r\npeasant seldom proves more than a flapper to rouse the torpid adjustments\r\nof his ears. The invariable answer of a Scottish peasant is, \u0027What\u0027s your\r\nwull?\u0027—that of the English, a vacant stare. A second and even a third\r\nquestion may be required to elicit an answer.\" (R. Fowler; Some Observations\r\non the Mental State of the Blind, and Deaf, and Dumb (Salisbury,\r\n1843), p. 14.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_106_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[106]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The reader will find a great deal about chronographic apparatus in\r\nJ. Marey: La Méthode Graphique, pt. ii, chap. ii. One can make pretty\r\nfair measurements with no other instrument than a watch, by making a\r\nlarge number of reactions, each serving as a signal for the following one,\r\nand dividing the total time they take by their number. Dr. O. W. Holmes\r\nfirst suggested this method, which has been ingeniously elaborated and\r\napplied by Professor Jastrow. See \u0027Science\u0027 for September 10, 1886.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_107_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[107]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for a few modifications, Cattell, Mind, xi, 220 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_108_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[108]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 221-2. Cf. also the first edition, 728-9. I must\r\nconfess to finding all Wundt\u0027s utterances about \u0027apperception\u0027 both vacillating\r\nand obscure. I see no use whatever for the word, as he employs it,\r\nin Psychology. Attention, perception, conception, volition, are its ample\r\nequivalents. Why we should need a single word to denote all these things\r\nby turns, Wundt fails to make clear. Consult, however, his pupil Staude\u0027s\r\narticle, \u0027Ueber den Begriff der Apperception,\u0027 etc., in Wundt\u0027s periodical\r\nPhilosophische Studien, i, 149, which may be supposed official. For a\r\nminute criticism of Wundt\u0027s \u0027apperception,\u0027 see Marty: Vierteljahrschrift\r\nf. wiss. Philos., x, 346.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_109_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[109]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e By Exner, for example, Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vii, 628 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_110_110\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[110]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 222. Cf. also Richet, Rev. Philos., vi, 395-6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_111_111\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[111]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For instance, if, on the previous day, one had resolved to act on a\r\nsignal when it should come, and it now came whilst we were engaged in\r\nother things, and reminded us of the resolve.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_112_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[112]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"I need hardly mention that success in these experiments depends in\r\na high degree on our concentration of attention. If inattentive, one gets\r\nvery discrepant figures…. This concentration of the attention is in the\r\nhighest degree exhausting. After some experiments in which I was concerned\r\nto get results as uniform as possible, I was covered with perspiration\r\nand excessively fatigued although I had sat quietly in my chair all the\r\nwhile.\" (Exner, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e vii, 618.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_113_113\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[113]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Wundt, Physiol. Psych., ii, 226\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_114_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[114]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vii, 616.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_115_115\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[115]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In short, what M. Delbœuf calls an \u0027\u003ci\u003eorgane adventice\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 The reaction-time,\r\nmoreover, is quite compatible with the reaction itself being of a reflex\r\norder. Some reflexes (sneezing, e.g.) are very slow. The only time-measurement\r\nof a reflex act in the human subject with which I am\r\nacquainted is Exner\u0027s measurement of winking (in Pflüger\u0027s Archiv f.\r\nd. gesammt. Physiol., Bd. viii, p. 526, 1874). He found that when the\r\nstimulus was a flash of light it took the wink 0.2168 sec. to occur. A strong\r\nelectric shock to the cornea shortened the time to 0.0578 sec. The ordinary\r\n\u0027reaction-time\u0027 is midway between these values. Exner \u0027reduces\u0027 his times\r\nby eliminating the physiological process of conduction. His \u0027reduced\r\nminimum winking-time\u0027 is then 0.0471 (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e 531), whilst his reduced reaction-time\r\nis 0.0828 (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e vii, 637). These figures have really no scientific\r\nvalue beyond that of showing, according to Exner\u0027s own belief (vii, 531),\r\nthat reaction-time and reflex-time measure processes of essentially the same\r\norder. His description, moreover, of the process is an excellent description\r\nof a reflex act. \"Every one,\" says he, \"who makes reaction-time experiments\r\nfor the first time is surprised to find how little he is master of his own\r\nmovements, so soon as it becomes a question of executing them with a\r\nmaximum of speed. Not only does their energy lie, as it were, outside the\r\nfield of choice, but even the time in which the movement occurs depends\r\nonly partly upon ourselves. We jerk our arm, and we can afterwards tell\r\nwith astonishing precision whether we have jerked it quicker or slower than\r\nanother time, although we have no power to jerk it exactly at the wished-for\r\nmoment.\"—Wundt himself admits that when we await a strong signal with\r\ntense preparation there is no consciousness of any duality of \u0027apperception\u0027\r\nand motor response; the two are continuous (Physiol. Psych., ii,\r\n226).—Mr. Cattell\u0027s view is identical with the one I defend. \"I think,\"\r\nhe says, \"that if the processes of perception and willing are present at all\r\nthey are very rudimentary…. The subject, by a voluntary effort [before\r\nthe signal comes], puts the lines of communication between the centre for\"\r\nthe stimulus \"and the centre for the co-ordination of motions … in a state\r\nof unstable equilibrium. When, therefore, a nervous impulse reaches the\"\r\nformer centre, \"it causes brain-changes in two directions; an impulse moves\r\nalong to the cortex and calls forth there a perception corresponding to the\r\nstimulus, while at the same time an impulse follows a line of small resistance\r\nto the centre for the co-ordination of motions, and the proper nervous\r\nimpulse, already prepared and waiting for the signal, is sent from the\r\ncentre to the muscle of the hand. When the reaction has often been\r\nmade the entire cerebral process becomes automatic, the impulse of itself\r\ntakes the well-travelled way to the motor centre, and releases the motor\r\nimpulse.\" (Mind, xi, 232-3.)—Finally, Prof. Lipps has, in his elaborate\r\nway (Grundtatsachen, 179-188), made mince-meat of the view that stage 3\r\ninvolves either conscious perception or conscious will.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_116_116\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[116]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., 3d edition (1887), vol. ii, p. 266.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_117_117\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[117]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, vol. iv, p. 479 (1888).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_118_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[118]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 488.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_119_119\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[119]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 487.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_120_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[120]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 489.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_121_121\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[121]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lange has an interesting hypothesis as to the brain-process concerned\r\nin the latter, for which I can only refer to his essay.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_122_122\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[122]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The reader who wishes to know more about the matter will find a\r\nmost faithful compilation of all that has been done, together with much\r\noriginal matter, in G. Buccola\u0027s \u0027Legge del Tempo,\u0027 etc. See also chapter\r\nxvi of Wundt\u0027s Physiol. Psychology; Exner in Hermann\u0027s Hdbch.,\r\nBd. 2, Thl. ii, pp. 252-280; also Ribot\u0027s Contemp. Germ. Psych.\r\nchap. viii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_123_123\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[123]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The nature of the movement also seems to make it vary. Mr. B. I.\r\nGilman and I reacted to the same signal by simply raising our hand, and\r\nagain by carrying our hand towards our back. The moment registered was\r\nalways that at which the hand broke an electric contact in \u003ci\u003estarting\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nmove. But it started one or two hundredths of a second later when the\r\nmore extensive movement was the one to be made. Orchansky, on the\r\nother hand, experimenting on contractions of the masseter muscle, found\r\n(Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1889, p. 187) that the greater the amplitude\r\nof contraction intended, the shorter grew the time of reaction. He\r\nexplains this by the fact that a more ample contraction makes a greater\r\n\u003ci\u003eappeal to the attention\u003c/i\u003e, and that this shortens the times.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_124_124\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[124]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 223.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_125_125\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[125]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e François-Franck, Fonctions Motrices, Leçon xxii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_126_126\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[126]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e La Paura (1884), p. 117.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_127_127\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[127]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ueber den Kreislauf des Blutes im menschlichen Gehirn (1881),\r\nchap. ii. The Introduction gives the history of our previous knowledge\r\nof the subject.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_128_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[128]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In this conclusion M. Gley (Archives de Physiologie, 1881, p. 742)\r\nagrees with Professor Mosso. Gley found his pulse rise 1-3 beats, his\r\ncarotid dilate, and his radial artery contract during hard mental work.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_129_129\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[129]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Address before Med. and Chirurg. Society of Maryland, 1879.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_130_130\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[130]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See his book; \"Experimental Researches on the Regional Temperature\r\nof the Head\" (London, 1879).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_131_131\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[131]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 195.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_132_132\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[132]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The most convenient account of Schiff\u0027s experiments is by Prof.\r\nHierzen, in the Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 36.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_133_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[133]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A New Study of Cerebral Cortical Localization (N. Y., Putnam,\r\n1880), pp. 48-53.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_134_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[134]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Archives of Medicine, vol. x, No. 1 (1883).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_135_135\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[135]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Without multiplying references, I will simply cite Mendel (Archiv f.\r\nPsychiatrie, vol. iii, 1871), Mairet (Archives de Neurologie, vol. ix, 1885),\r\nand Beaunis (Rech. Expérimentales sur l\u0027Activité Cérébrale, 1887). Richet\r\ngives a partial bibliography in the Revue Scientifique, vol. 38, p. 788 (1886).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[Pg 104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_IV136\"\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_136_136\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eHABIT.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we look at living creatures from an outward point\r\nof view, one of the first things that strike us is that they\r\nare bundles of habits. In wild animals, the usual round of\r\ndaily behavior seems a necessity implanted at birth; in\r\nanimals domesticated, and especially in man, it seems, to a\r\ngreat extent, to be the result of education. The habits to\r\nwhich there is an innate tendency are called instincts; some\r\nof those due to education would by most persons be called\r\nacts of reason. It thus appears that habit covers a very\r\nlarge part of life, and that one engaged in studying the\r\nobjective manifestations of mind is bound at the very outset\r\nto define clearly just what its limits are.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moment one tries to define what habit is, one is led\r\nto the fundamental properties of matter. The laws of\r\nNature are nothing but the immutable habits which the\r\ndifferent elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions\r\nand reactions upon each other. In the organic world, however,\r\nthe habits are more variable than this. Even instincts\r\nvary from one individual to another of a kind; and are\r\nmodified in the same individual, as we shall later see, to\r\nsuit the exigencies of the case. The habits of an elementary\r\nparticle of matter cannot change (on the principles of\r\nthe atomistic philosophy), because the particle is itself an\r\nunchangeable thing; but those of a compound mass of\r\nmatter can change, because they are in the last instance due\r\nto the structure of the compound, and either outward forces\r\nor inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that\r\nstructure into something different from what it was. That\r\nis, they can do so if the body be plastic enough to maintain\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[Pg 105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits integrity, and be not disrupted when its structure yields.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe change of structure here spoken of need not involve\r\nthe outward shape; it may be invisible and molecular, as\r\nwhen a bar of iron becomes magnetic or crystalline through\r\nthe action of certain outward causes, or India-rubber\r\nbecomes friable, or plaster \u0027sets.\u0027 All these changes are\r\nrather slow; the material in question opposes a certain\r\nresistance to the modifying cause, which it takes time to\r\novercome, but the gradual yielding whereof often saves the\r\nmaterial from being disintegrated altogether. When the\r\nstructure has yielded, the same inertia becomes a condition\r\nof its comparative permanence in the new form, and of the\r\nnew habits the body then manifests. \u003ci\u003ePlasticity\u003c/i\u003e, then, in\r\nthe wide sense of the word, means the possession of a structure\r\nweak enough to yield to an influence, but strong\r\nenough not to yield all at once. Each relatively stable\r\nphase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by\r\nwhat we may call a new set of habits. Organic matter,\r\nespecially nervous tissue, seems endowed with a very extraordinary\r\ndegree of plasticity of this sort; so that we\r\nmay without hesitation lay down as our first proposition\r\nthe following, that \u003ci\u003ethe phenomena of habit in living beings are\r\ndue to the plasticity\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_137_137\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e of the organic materials of which their\r\nbodies are composed\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the philosophy of habit is thus, in the first instance,\r\na chapter in physics rather than in physiology or psychology.\r\nThat it is at bottom a physical principle is admitted\r\nby all good recent writers on the subject. They call attention\r\nto analogues of acquired habits exhibited by dead matter.\r\nThus, M. Léon Dumont, whose essay on habit is perhaps\r\nthe most philosophical account yet published, writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Every one knows how a garment, after having been worn a certain\r\ntime, clings to the shape of the body better than when it was new;\r\nthere has been a change in the tissue, and this change is a new habit of\r\ncohesion. A lock works better after being used some time; at the outset\r\nmore force was required to overcome certain roughnesses in the\r\nmechanism. The overcoming of their resistance is a phenomenon of\r\nhabituation. It costs less trouble to fold a paper when it has been\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[Pg 106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfolded already. This saving of trouble is due to the essential nature of\r\nhabit, which brings it about that, to reproduce the effect, a less amount\r\nof the outward cause is required. The sounds of a violin improve by\r\nuse in the hands of an able artist, because the fibres of the wood at last\r\ncontract habits of vibration conformed to harmonic relations. This is\r\nwhat gives such inestimable value to instruments that have belonged to\r\ngreat masters. Water, in flowing, hollows out for itself a channel, which\r\ngrows broader and deeper; and, after having ceased to flow, it resumes,\r\nwhen it flows again, the path traced by itself before. Just so, the impressions\r\nof outer objects fashion for themselves in the nervous system\r\nmore and more appropriate paths, and these vital phenomena recur\r\nunder similar excitements from without, when they have been interrupted\r\na certain time.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_138_138\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot in the nervous system alone. A scar anywhere is\r\na \u003ci\u003elocus minoris resistentiæ\u003c/i\u003e, more liable to be abraded,\r\ninflamed, to suffer pain and cold, than are the neighboring\r\nparts. A sprained ankle, a dislocated arm, are in danger\r\nof being sprained or dislocated again; joints that have once\r\nbeen attacked by rheumatism or gout, mucous membranes\r\nthat have been the seat of catarrh, are with each fresh recurrence\r\nmore prone to a relapse, until often the morbid\r\nstate chronically substitutes itself for the sound one. And\r\nif we ascend to the nervous system, we find how many so-called\r\nfunctional diseases seem to keep themselves going\r\nsimply because they happen to have once begun; and how\r\nthe forcible cutting short by medicine of a few attacks is\r\noften sufficient to enable the physiological forces to get possession\r\nof the field again, and to bring the organs back to\r\nfunctions of health. Epilepsies, neuralgias, convulsive affections\r\nof various sorts, insomnias, are so many cases in point.\r\nAnd, to take what are more obviously habits, the success\r\nwith which a \u0027weaning\u0027 treatment can often be applied to\r\nthe victims of unhealthy indulgence of passion, or of\r\nmere complaining or irascible disposition, shows us how\r\nmuch the morbid manifestations themselves were due to the\r\nmere inertia of the nervous organs, when once launched on\r\na false career.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCan we now form a notion of what the inward physical\r\nchanges may be like, in organs whose habits have thus\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[Pg 107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstruck into new paths? In other words, can we say just\r\nwhat mechanical facts the expression \u0027change of habit\u0027\r\ncovers when it is applied to a nervous system? Certainly\r\nwe cannot in anything like a minute or definite way. But\r\nour usual scientific custom of interpreting hidden molecular\r\nevents after the analogy of visible massive ones enables us to\r\nframe easily an abstract and general scheme of processes\r\nwhich the physical changes in question \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be like. And\r\nwhen once the possibility of \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e kind of mechanical interpretation\r\nis established, Mechanical Science, in her present\r\nmood, will not hesitate to set her brand of ownership upon\r\nthe matter, feeling sure that it is only a question of time\r\nwhen the exact mechanical explanation of the case shall be\r\nfound out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf habits are due to the plasticity of materials to outward\r\nagents, we can immediately see to what outward\r\ninfluences, if to any, the brain-matter is plastic. Not to\r\nmechanical pressures, not to thermal changes, not to any\r\nof the forces to which all the other organs of our body are\r\nexposed; for nature has carefully shut up our brain and\r\nspinal cord in bony boxes, where no influences of this sort\r\ncan get at them. She has floated them in fluid so that\r\nonly the severest shocks can give them a concussion, and\r\nblanketed and wrapped them about in an altogether exceptional\r\nway. The only impressions that can be made upon\r\nthem are through the blood, on the one hand, and through\r\nthe sensory nerve-roots, on the other; and it is to the infinitely\r\nattenuated currents that pour in through these latter\r\nchannels that the hemispherical cortex shows itself to be so\r\npeculiarly susceptible. The currents, once in, must find a\r\nway out. In getting out they leave their traces in the paths\r\nwhich they take. The only thing they \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e do, in short, is\r\nto deepen old paths or to make new ones; and the whole\r\nplasticity of the brain sums itself up in two words when\r\nwe call it an organ in which currents pouring in from the\r\nsense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do\r\nnot easily disappear. For, of course, a simple habit, like\r\nevery other nervous event—the habit of snuffling, for\r\nexample, or of putting one\u0027s hands into one\u0027s pockets, or of\r\nbiting one\u0027s nails—is, mechanically, nothing but a reflex\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[Pg 108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndischarge; and its anatomical substratum must be a path\r\nin the system. The most complex habits, as we shall\r\npresently see more fully, are, from the same point of view,\r\nnothing but \u003ci\u003econcatenated\u003c/i\u003e discharges in the nerve-centres,\r\ndue to the presence there of systems of reflex paths, so\r\norganized as to wake each other up successively—the impression\r\nproduced by one muscular contraction serving as\r\na stimulus to provoke the next, until a final impression\r\ninhibits the process and closes the chain. The only difficult\r\nmechanical problem is to explain the formation \u003ci\u003ede novo\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof a simple reflex or path in a pre-existing nervous system.\r\nHere, as in so many other cases, it is only the \u003ci\u003epremier pas\r\nqui coûte\u003c/i\u003e. For the entire nervous system \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e nothing but a\r\nsystem of paths between a sensory \u003ci\u003eterminus a quo\u003c/i\u003e and a muscular,\r\nglandular, or other \u003ci\u003eterminus ad quem\u003c/i\u003e. A path once\r\ntraversed by a nerve-current might be expected to follow\r\nthe law of most of the paths we know, and to be scooped\r\nout and made more permeable than before;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_139_139\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e and this ought\r\nto be repeated with each new passage of the current.\r\nWhatever obstructions may have kept it at first from being\r\na path should then, little by little, and more and more, be\r\nswept out of the way, until at last it might become a natural\r\ndrainage-channel. This is what happens where either\r\nsolids or liquids pass over a path; there seems no reason\r\nwhy it should not happen where the thing that passes is a\r\nmere wave of rearrangement in matter that does not displace\r\nitself, but merely changes chemically or turns itself\r\nround in place, or vibrates across the line. The most\r\nplausible views of the nerve-current make it out to be the\r\npassage of some such wave of rearrangement as this. If\r\nonly a part of the matter of the path were to \u0027rearrange\u0027\r\nitself, the neighboring parts remaining inert, it is easy to\r\nsee how their inertness might oppose a friction which it\r\nwould take many waves of rearrangement to break down\r\nand overcome. If we call the path itself the \u0027organ,\u0027 and\r\nthe wave of rearrangement the \u0027function,\u0027 then it is obviously\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[Pg 109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na case for repeating the celebrated French formula\r\nof \u0027\u003ci\u003eLa fonction fait l\u0027organe.\u003c/i\u003e\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo nothing is easier than to imagine how, when a current\r\nonce has traversed a path, it should traverse it more\r\nreadily still a second time. But what made it ever traverse\r\nit the first time?\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_140_140\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e In answering this question we can only\r\nfall back on our general conception of a nervous system as\r\na mass of matter whose parts, constantly kept in states of\r\ndifferent tension, are as constantly tending to equalize their\r\nstates. The equalization between any two points occurs\r\nthrough whatever path may at the moment be most pervious.\r\nBut, as a given point of the system may belong,\r\nactually or potentially, to many different paths, and, as the\r\nplay of nutrition is subject to accidental changes, \u003ci\u003eblocks\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmay from time to time occur, and make currents shoot\r\nthrough unwonted lines. Such an unwonted line would be\r\na new-created path, which if traversed repeatedly, would\r\nbecome the beginning of a new reflex arc. All this is vague\r\nto the last degree, and amounts to little more than saying\r\nthat a new path may be formed by the sort of \u003ci\u003echances\u003c/i\u003e that\r\nin nervous material are likely to occur. But, vague as it\r\nis, it is really the last word of our wisdom in the matter.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_141_141\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be noticed that the growth of structural modification\r\nin living matter may be more rapid than in any\r\nlifeless mass, because the incessant nutritive renovation of\r\nwhich the living matter is the seat tends often to corroborate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[Pg 110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand fix the impressed modification, rather than to counteract\r\nit by renewing the original constitution of the tissue\r\nthat has been impressed. Thus, we notice after exercising\r\nour muscles or our brain in a new way, that we can do so\r\nno longer at that time; but after a day or two of rest, when\r\nwe resume the discipline, our increase in skill not seldom\r\nsurprises us. I have often noticed this in learning a tune;\r\nand it has led a German author to say that we learn to swim\r\nduring the winter and to skate during the summer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Carpenter writes:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_142_142\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is a matter of universal experience that every kind of training\r\nfor special aptitudes is both far more effective, and leaves a more permanent\r\nimpress, when exerted on the \u003ci\u003egrowing\u003c/i\u003e organism than when\r\nbrought to bear on the adult. The effect of such training is shown in\r\nthe tendency of the organ to \u0027grow to\u0027 the mode in which it is habitually\r\nexercised; as is evidenced by the increased size and power of particular\r\nsets of muscles, and the extraordinary flexibility of joints, which are\r\nacquired by such as have been early exercised in gymnastic performances….\r\nThere is no part of the organism of man in which the\r\n\u003ci\u003ereconstructive activity\u003c/i\u003e is so great, during the whole period of life, as it\r\nis in the ganglionic substance of the brain. This is indicated by the\r\nenormous supply of blood which it receives…. It is, moreover, a\r\nfact of great significance that the nerve-substance is specially distinguished\r\nby its \u003ci\u003ereparative\u003c/i\u003e power. For while injuries of other tissues\r\n(such as the muscular) which are distinguished by the \u003ci\u003especiality\u003c/i\u003e of their\r\nstructure and endowments, are repaired by substance of a lower or less\r\nspecialized type, those of nerve-substance are repaired by a complete\r\nreproduction of the normal tissue; as is evidenced in the sensibility of\r\nthe newly forming skin which is closing over an open wound, or in the\r\nrecovery of the sensibility of a piece of \u0027transplanted\u0027 skin, which has\r\nfor a time been rendered insensible by the complete interruption of the\r\ncontinuity of its nerves. The most remarkable example of this reproduction,\r\nhowever, is afforded by the results of M. Brown-Séquard\u0027s\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_143_143\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexperiments upon the gradual restoration of the functional activity of\r\nthe spinal cord after its complete division; which takes place in a way\r\nthat indicates rather a \u003ci\u003ereproduction\u003c/i\u003e of the whole, or the lower part of\r\nthe cord and of the nerves proceeding from it, than a mere \u003ci\u003ereunion\u003c/i\u003e of\r\ndivided surfaces. This reproduction is but a special manifestation of\r\nthe reconstructive change which is \u003ci\u003ealways\u003c/i\u003e taking place in the nervous\r\nsystem; it being not less obvious to the eye of reason that the \u0027waste\u0027\r\noccasioned by its functional activity must be constantly repaired by the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[Pg 111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nproduction of new tissue, than it is to the eye of sense that such reparation\r\nsupplies an actual \u003ci\u003eloss\u003c/i\u003e of substance by disease or injury.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now, in this constant and active reconstruction of the nervous\r\nsystem, we recognize a most marked conformity to the general plan\r\nmanifested in the nutrition of the organism as a whole. For, in the\r\nfirst place, it is obvious that there is a tendency to the production of a\r\n\u003ci\u003edeterminate type\u003c/i\u003e of structure; which type is often not merely that of\r\nthe species, but some special modification of it which characterized one\r\nor both of the progenitors. But this type is peculiarly liable to modification\r\nduring the early period of life; in which the functional activity\r\nof the nervous system (and particularly of the brain) is extraordinarily\r\ngreat, and the reconstructive process proportionally active. And this\r\nmodifiability expresses itself in the formation of the mechanism by\r\nwhich those \u003ci\u003esecondarily automatic\u003c/i\u003e modes of movement come to be\r\nestablished, which, in man, take the place of those that are \u003ci\u003econgenital\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin most of the animals beneath him; and those modes of sense-perception\r\ncome to be \u003ci\u003eacquired\u003c/i\u003e, which are elsewhere clearly \u003ci\u003einstinctive\u003c/i\u003e. For\r\nthere can be no reasonable doubt that, in both cases, a nervous\r\nmechanism is \u003ci\u003edeveloped\u003c/i\u003e in the course of this self-education, corresponding\r\nwith that which the lower animals inherit from their parents. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eplan\u003c/i\u003e of that \u003ci\u003erebuilding\u003c/i\u003e process, which is necessary to maintain the\r\nintegrity of the organism generally, and which goes on with peculiar\r\nactivity in this portion of it, is thus being incessantly modified; and in\r\nthis manner all that portion of it which ministers to the \u003ci\u003eexternal\u003c/i\u003e life of\r\nsense and motion that is shared by man with the animal kingdom at\r\nlarge, becomes at adult age the expression of the habits which the\r\nindividual has acquired during the period of growth and development.\r\nOf these habits, some are common to the race generally, while others\r\nare peculiar to the individual; those of the former kind (such as walking\r\nerect) being universally acquired, save where physical inability\r\nprevents; while for the latter a special training is needed, which is\r\nusually the more effective the earlier it is begun—as is remarkably\r\nseen in the case of such feats of dexterity as require a conjoint education\r\nof the perceptive and of the motor powers. And when thus\r\ndeveloped during the period of growth, so as to have become a part of\r\nthe constitution of the adult, the acquired mechanism is thenceforth\r\nmaintained in the ordinary course of the nutritive operations, so as to\r\nbe ready for use when called upon, even after long inaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"What is so clearly true of the nervous apparatus of animal life can\r\nscarcely be otherwise than true of that which ministers to the automatic\r\nactivity of the mind. For, as already shown, the study of psychology\r\nhas evolved no more certain result than that there are uniformities of\r\nmental action which are so entirely conformable to those of bodily action\r\nas to indicate their intimate relation to a \u0027mechanism of thought and\r\nfeeling,\u0027 acting under the like conditions with that of sense and motion.\r\nThe psychical principles of \u003ci\u003eassociation\u003c/i\u003e, indeed, and the physiological\r\nprinciples of \u003ci\u003enutrition\u003c/i\u003e, simply express—the former in terms of mind,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[Pg 112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe latter in terms of brain—the universally admitted fact that any\r\nsequence of mental action which has been frequently repeated tends to\r\nperpetuate itself; so that we find ourselves automatically prompted to\r\n\u003ci\u003ethink, feel,\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e what we have been before accustomed to think, feel,\r\nor do, under like circumstances, without any consciously formed \u003ci\u003epurpose\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nor anticipation of results. For there is no reason to regard the\r\ncerebrum as an exception to the general principle that, while each part\r\nof the organism tends to \u003ci\u003eform itself\u003c/i\u003e in accordance with the mode in\r\nwhich it is habitually exercised, this tendency will be especially strong\r\nin the nervous apparatus, in virtue of that \u003ci\u003eincessant regeneration\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nis the very condition of its functional activity. It scarcely, indeed,\r\nadmits of doubt that every state of ideational consciousness which is\r\neither \u003ci\u003every strong\u003c/i\u003e or is \u003ci\u003ehabitually repeated\u003c/i\u003e leaves an organic impression\r\non the cerebrum; in virtue of which that same state may be reproduced\r\nat any future time, in respondence to a suggestion fitted to\r\nexcite it…. The \u0027strength of early association\u0027 is a fact so\r\nuniversally recognized that the expression of it has become proverbial;\r\nand this precisely accords with the physiological principle that, during\r\nthe period of growth and development, the formative activity of the\r\nbrain will be most amenable to directing influences. It is in this way\r\nthat what is early \u0027learned by heart\u0027 becomes branded in (as it were)\r\nupon the cerebrum; so that its \u0027traces\u0027 are never lost, even though\r\nthe conscious memory of it may have completely faded out. For, when\r\nthe organic modification has been once \u003ci\u003efixed\u003c/i\u003e in the growing brain, it\r\nbecomes a part of the normal fabric, and is regularly \u003ci\u003emaintained\u003c/i\u003e by\r\nnutritive substitution; so that it may endure to the end of life, like the\r\nscar of a wound.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Carpenter\u0027s phrase that \u003ci\u003eour nervous system grows to\r\nthe modes in which it has been exercised\u003c/i\u003e expresses the philosophy\r\nof habit in a nutshell. We may now trace some of\r\nthe practical applications of the principle to human life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first result of it is that \u003ci\u003ehabit simplifies the movements\r\nrequired to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate\r\nand diminishes fatigue\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The beginner at the piano not only moves his finger up and down\r\nin order to depress the key, he moves the whole hand, the forearm and\r\neven the entire body, especially moving its least rigid part, the head,\r\nas if he would press down the key with that organ too. Often a contraction\r\nof the abdominal muscles occurs as well. Principally, however,\r\nthe impulse is determined to the motion of the hand and of the single\r\nfinger. This is, in the first place, because the movement of the finger\r\nis the movement \u003ci\u003ethought of\u003c/i\u003e and, in the second place, because its movement\r\nand that of the key are the movements we try to \u003ci\u003eperceive\u003c/i\u003e, along\r\nwith the results of the latter on the ear. The more often the process\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[Pg 113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis repeated, the more easily the movement follows, on account of the\r\nincrease in permeability of the nerves engaged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But the more easily the movement occurs, the slighter is the\r\nstimulus required to set it up; and the slighter the stimulus is, the\r\nmore its effect is confined to the fingers alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Thus, an impulse which originally spread its effects over the whole\r\nbody, or at least over many of its movable parts, is gradually determined\r\nto a single definite organ, in which it effects the contraction of\r\na few limited muscles. In this change the thoughts and perceptions\r\nwhich start the impulse acquire more and more intimate causal relations\r\nwith a particular group of motor nerves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To recur to a simile, at least partially apt, imagine the nervous\r\nsystem to represent a drainage-system, inclining, on the whole, toward\r\ncertain muscles, but with the escape thither somewhat clogged. Then\r\nstreams of water will, on the whole, tend most to fill the drains that\r\ngo towards these muscles and to wash out the escape. In case of a\r\nsudden \u0027flushing,\u0027 however, the whole system of channels will fill itself,\r\nand the water overflow everywhere before it escapes. But a moderate\r\nquantity of water invading the system will flow through the proper\r\nescape alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Just so with the piano-player. As soon as his impulse, which has\r\ngradually learned to confine itself to single muscles, grows extreme,\r\nit overflows into larger muscular regions. He usually plays with his\r\nfingers, his body being at rest. But no sooner does he get excited than\r\nhis whole body becomes \u0027animated,\u0027 and he moves his head and trunk,\r\nin particular, as if these also were organs with which he meant to\r\nbelabor the keys.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_144_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_144_144\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMan is born with a tendency to do more things than he\r\nhas ready-made arrangements for in his nerve-centres.\r\nMost of the performances of other animals are automatic.\r\nBut in him the number of them is so enormous, that most\r\nof them must be the fruit of painful study. If practice did\r\nnot make perfect, nor habit economize the expense of nervous\r\nand muscular energy, he would therefore be in a sorry\r\nplight. As Dr. Maudsley says:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_145_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_145_145\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the\r\ncareful direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment\r\non each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might\r\nbe confined to one or two deeds—that no progress could take place in\r\ndevelopment. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and undressing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[Pg 114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhimself; the attitude of his body would absorb all his attention\r\nand energy; the washing of his hands or the fastening of a button\r\nwould be as difficult to him on each occasion as to the child on its first\r\ntrial; and he would, furthermore, be completely exhausted by his exertions.\r\nThink of the pains necessary to teach a child to stand, of the\r\nmany efforts which it must make, and of the ease with which it at\r\nlast stands, unconscious of any effort. For while secondarily automatic\r\nacts are accomplished with comparatively little weariness—in\r\nthis regard approaching the organic movements, or the original reflex\r\nmovements—the conscious effort of the will soon produces exhaustion.\r\nA spinal cord without … memory would simply be an idiotic\r\nspinal cord…. It is impossible for an individual to realize how\r\nmuch he owes to its automatic agency until disease has impaired its\r\nfunctions.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next result is that \u003ci\u003ehabit diminishes the conscious attention\r\nwith which our acts are performed\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne may state this abstractly thus: If an act require for\r\nits execution a chain, \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G,\u003c/i\u003e etc., of successive\r\nnervous events, then in the first performances of the action\r\nthe conscious will must choose each of these events from a\r\nnumber of wrong alternatives that tend to present themselves;\r\nbut habit soon brings it about that each event calls\r\nup its own appropriate successor without any alternative\r\noffering itself, and without any reference to the conscious\r\nwill, until at last the whole chain, \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G,\u003c/i\u003e rattles\r\nitself off as soon as \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e occurs, just as if \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and the rest of\r\nthe chain were fused into a continuous stream. When we\r\nare learning to walk, to ride, to swim, skate, fence, write,\r\nplay, or sing, we interrupt ourselves at every step by unnecessary\r\nmovements and false notes. When we are proficients,\r\non the contrary, the results not only follow with\r\nthe very minimum of muscular action requisite to bring them\r\nforth, they also follow from a single instantaneous \u0027cue.\u0027\r\nThe marksman sees the bird, and, before he knows it, he\r\nhas aimed and shot. A gleam in his adversary\u0027s eye, a\r\nmomentary pressure from his rapier, and the fencer finds\r\nthat he has instantly made the right parry and return. A\r\nglance at the musical hieroglyphics, and the pianist\u0027s fingers\r\nhave rippled through a cataract of notes. And not only\r\nis it the right thing at the right time that we thus involuntarily\r\ndo, but the wrong thing also, if it be an habitual\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[Pg 115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthing. Who is there that has never wound up his watch on\r\ntaking off his waistcoat in the daytime, or taken his latch-key\r\nout on arriving at the door-step of a friend? Very\r\nabsent-minded persons in going to their bedroom to dress\r\nfor dinner have been known to take off one garment after\r\nanother and finally to get into bed, merely because that was\r\nthe habitual issue of the first few movements when performed\r\nat a later hour. The writer well remembers how,\r\non revisiting Paris after ten years\u0027 absence, and, finding\r\nhimself in the street in which for one winter he had attended\r\nschool, he lost himself in a brown study, from which he was\r\nawakened by finding himself upon the stairs which led to\r\nthe apartment in a house many streets away in which he\r\nhad lived during that earlier time, and to which his steps\r\nfrom the school had then habitually led. We all of us have\r\na definite routine manner of performing certain daily offices\r\nconnected with the toilet, with the opening and shutting of\r\nfamiliar cupboards, and the like. Our lower centres know\r\nthe order of these movements, and show their knowledge\r\nby their \u0027surprise\u0027 if the objects are altered so as to oblige\r\nthe movement to be made in a different way. But our\r\nhigher thought-centres know hardly anything about the\r\nmatter. Few men can tell off-hand which sock, shoe, or\r\ntrousers-leg they put on first. They must first mentally\r\nrehearse the act; and even that is often insufficient—the\r\nact must be \u003ci\u003eperformed\u003c/i\u003e. So of the questions, Which\r\nvalve of my double door opens first? Which way does my\r\ndoor swing? etc. I cannot \u003ci\u003etell\u003c/i\u003e the answer; yet my \u003ci\u003ehand\u003c/i\u003e\r\nnever makes a mistake. No one can \u003ci\u003edescribe\u003c/i\u003e the order in\r\nwhich he brushes his hair or teeth; yet it is likely that the\r\norder is a pretty fixed one in all of us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese results may be expressed as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn action grown habitual, what instigates each new\r\nmuscular contraction to take place in its appointed order\r\nis not a thought or a perception, but the \u003ci\u003esensation occasioned\r\nby the muscular contraction just finished\u003c/i\u003e. A strictly\r\nvoluntary act has to be guided by idea, perception, and\r\nvolition, throughout its whole course. In an habitual action,\r\nmere sensation is a sufficient guide, and the upper\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[Pg 116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nregions of brain and mind are set comparatively free. A\r\ndiagram will make the matter clear:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-116-0024.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_116_0024.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 24.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G\u003c/i\u003e represent an habitual chain of\r\nmuscular contractions, and let \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e, f\u003c/i\u003e stand for the\r\nrespective sensations which these contractions excite in us\r\nwhen they are successively performed. Such sensations\r\nwill usually be of the muscles, skin, or joints of the parts\r\nmoved, but they may also be effects of the movement upon\r\nthe eye or the ear. Through them, and through them\r\nalone, we are made aware whether the contraction has or\r\nhas not occurred. When the series, \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G,\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nbeing learned, each of these sensations becomes the object\r\nof a separate perception by the mind. By it we test each\r\nmovement, to see if it be right before advancing to the next.\r\nWe hesitate, compare, choose, revoke, reject, etc., by intellectual\r\nmeans; and the order by which the next movement\r\nis discharged is an express order from the ideational centres\r\nafter this deliberation has been gone through.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn habitual action, on the contrary, the only impulse\r\nwhich the centres of idea or perception need send down is\r\nthe initial impulse, the command to \u003ci\u003estart\u003c/i\u003e. This is represented\r\nin the diagram by \u003ci\u003eV\u003c/i\u003e; it may be a thought of the\r\nfirst movement or of the last result, or a mere perception\r\nof some of the habitual conditions of the chain, the presence,\r\ne.g., of the keyboard near the hand. In the present case,\r\nno sooner has the conscious thought or volition instigated\r\nmovement \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, than \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, through the sensation \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e of its own\r\noccurrence, awakens \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e reflexly; \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e then excites \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e through\r\n\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, and so on till the chain is ended, when the intellect generally\r\ntakes cognizance of the final result. The process, in\r\nfact, resembles the passage of a wave of \u0027peristaltic\u0027 motion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[Pg 117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndown the bowels. The intellectual perception at the end\r\nis indicated in the diagram by the effect of \u003ci\u003eG\u003c/i\u003e being represented,\r\nat \u003ci\u003eG\u0027\u003c/i\u003e, in the ideational centres above the merely\r\nsensational line. The sensational impressions, \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e, f,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nare all supposed to have their seat below the ideational\r\nlines. That our ideational centres, if involved at all by \u003ci\u003ea,\r\nb, c, d, e, f,\u003c/i\u003e are involved in a minimal degree, is shown by\r\nthe fact that the attention may be wholly absorbed elsewhere.\r\nWe may say our prayers, or repeat the alphabet,\r\nwith our attention far away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A musical performer will play a piece which has become familiar\r\nby repetition while carrying on an animated conversation, or while continuously\r\nengrossed by some train of deeply interesting thought; the\r\naccustomed sequence of movements being directly prompted by the\r\n\u003ci\u003esight\u003c/i\u003e of the notes, or by the remembered succession of the \u003ci\u003esounds\u003c/i\u003e (if\r\nthe piece is played from memory), aided in both cases by the guiding\r\nsensations derived from the muscles themselves. But, further, a higher\r\ndegree of the same \u0027training\u0027 (acting on an organism specially fitted to\r\nprofit by it) enables an accomplished pianist to play a difficult piece of\r\nmusic at sight; the movements of the hands and fingers following so\r\nimmediately upon the sight of the notes that it seems impossible to\r\nbelieve that any but the very shortest and most direct track can be the\r\nchannel of the nervous communication through which they are called\r\nforth. The following curious example of the same class of \u003ci\u003eacquired\r\naptitudes\u003c/i\u003e, which differ from instincts only in being prompted to action\r\nby the will, is furnished by Robert Houdin:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u0027With a view of cultivating the rapidity of visual and tactile perception,\r\nand the precision of respondent movements, which are necessary\r\nfor success in every kind of prestidigitation, Houdin early practised\r\nthe art of juggling with balls in the air; and having, after a month\u0027s\r\npractice, become thorough master of the art of keeping up \u003ci\u003efour\u003c/i\u003e balls at\r\nonce, he placed a book before him, and, while the balls were in the air,\r\naccustomed himself to read without hesitation. \u0027This,\u0027 he says, \u0027will\r\nprobably seem to my readers very extraordinary; but I shall surprise\r\nthem still more when I say that I have just amused myself with repeating\r\nthis curious experiment. Though thirty years have elapsed since\r\nthe time I was writing, and though I have scarcely once touched the\r\nballs during that period, I can still manage to read with ease while\r\nkeeping \u003ci\u003ethree\u003c/i\u003e balls up.\u0027\"(Autobiography, p. 26.)\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_146_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_146_146\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have called \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e, f,\u003c/i\u003e the antecedents of the successive\r\nmuscular attractions, by the name of sensations.\r\nSome authors seem to deny that they are even this. If not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[Pg 118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neven this, they can only be centripetal nerve-currents, not\r\nsufficient to arouse feeling, but sufficient to arouse motor\r\nresponse.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_147_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_147_147\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e It may be at once admitted that they are not\r\ndistinct \u003ci\u003evolitions\u003c/i\u003e. The will, if any will be present, limits\r\nitself to a \u003ci\u003epermission\u003c/i\u003e that they exert their motor effects.\r\nDr. Carpenter writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There may still be metaphysicians who maintain that actions\r\nwhich were originally prompted by the will with a distinct intention,\r\nand which are still entirely under its control, can never cease to be\r\nvolitional; and that either an infinitesimally small amount of will is\r\nrequired to sustain them when they have been once set going, or that\r\nthe will is in a sort of pendulum-like oscillation between the two actions—the\r\nmaintenance of the train of \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e, and the maintenance of the\r\ntrain of \u003ci\u003emovement\u003c/i\u003e. But if only an infinitesimally small amount of will\r\nis necessary to sustain them, is not this tantamount to saying that they\r\ngo on by a force of their own? And does not the experience of the\r\n\u003ci\u003eperfect continuity\u003c/i\u003e of our train of thought during the performance of\r\nmovements that have become habitual, entirely negative the hypothesis\r\nof oscillation? Besides, if such an oscillation existed, there must be\r\n\u003ci\u003eintervals\u003c/i\u003e in which each action goes on \u003ci\u003eof itself\u003c/i\u003e; so that its essentially\r\nautomatic character is virtually admitted. The physiological explanation,\r\nthat the mechanism of locomotion, as of other habitual movements,\r\n\u003ci\u003egrows to\u003c/i\u003e the mode in which it is early exercised, and that it then\r\nworks automatically under the general control and direction of the will,\r\ncan scarcely be put down by any assumption of an hypothetical necessity,\r\nwhich rests only on the basis of ignorance of one side of our composite\r\nnature.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_148_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_148_148\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if not distinct acts of will, these immediate antecedents\r\nof each movement of the chain are at any rate\r\naccompanied by consciousness of some kind. They are\r\n\u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e to which we are \u003ci\u003eusually inattentive\u003c/i\u003e, but which immediately\r\ncall our attention if they go \u003ci\u003ewrong\u003c/i\u003e. Schneider\u0027s\r\naccount of these sensations deserves to be quoted. In the\r\nact of walking, he says, even when our attention is entirely\r\noff,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"we are continuously aware of certain muscular feelings; and we\r\nhave, moreover, a feeling of certain impulses to keep our equilibrium\r\nand to set down one leg after another. It is doubtful whether we could\r\npreserve equilibrium if no sensation of our body\u0027s attitude were there,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[Pg 119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand doubtful whether we should advance our leg if we had no sensation\r\nof its movement as executed, and not even a minimal feeling of impulse\r\nto set it down. Knitting appears altogether mechanical, and the knitter\r\nkeeps up her knitting even while she reads or is engaged in lively talk.\r\nBut if we ask her how this be possible, she will hardly reply that the\r\nknitting goes on of itself. She will rather say that she has a feeling of\r\nit, that she feels in her hands that she knits and how she must knit, and\r\nthat therefore the movements of knitting are called forth and regulated\r\nby the sensations associated therewithal, even when the attention is\r\ncalled away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"So of every one who practises, apparently automatically, a long-familiar\r\nhandicraft. The smith turning his tongs as he smites the iron,\r\nthe carpenter wielding his plane, the lace-maker with her bobbin, the\r\nweaver at his loom, all will answer the same question in the same way\r\nby saying that they have a feeling of the proper management of the\r\nimplement in their hands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In these cases, the feelings which are conditions of the appropriate\r\nacts are very faint. But none the less are they necessary. Imagine\r\nyour hands not feeling; your movements could then only be provoked\r\nby ideas, and if your ideas were then diverted away, the movements\r\nought to come to a standstill, which is a consequence that seldom\r\noccurs.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_149_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_149_149\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"An idea makes you take, for example, a violin into your left hand.\r\nBut it is not necessary that your idea remain fixed on the contraction\r\nof the muscles of the left hand and fingers in order that the\r\nviolin may continue to be held fast and not let fall. The sensations\r\nthemselves which the holding of the instrument awakens in the hand,\r\nsince they are associated with the motor impulse of grasping, are sufficient\r\nto cause this impulse, which then lasts as long as the feeling\r\nitself lasts, or until the impulse is inhibited by the idea of some antagonistic\r\nmotion.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd the same may be said of the manner in which the right\r\nhand holds the bow:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It sometimes happens, in beginning these simultaneous combinations,\r\nthat one movement or impulse will cease if the consciousness\r\nturn particularly toward another, because at the outset the guiding\r\nsensations must \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e be strongly \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e. The bow will perhaps slip from\r\nthe fingers, because some of the muscles have relaxed. But the\r\nslipping is a cause of new sensations starting up in the hand, so that\r\nthe attention is in a moment brought back to the grasping of the bow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The following experiment shows this well: When one begins to\r\nplay on the violin, to keep him from raising his right elbow in playing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[Pg 120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na book is placed under his right armpit, which he is ordered to hold\r\nfast by keeping the upper arm tight against his body. The muscular\r\nfeelings, and feelings of contact connected with the book, provoke an\r\nimpulse to press it tight. But often it happens that the beginner,\r\nwhose attention gets absorbed in the production of the notes, lets drop\r\nthe book. Later, however, this never happens; the faintest sensations\r\nof contact suffice to awaken the impulse to keep it in its place, and the\r\nattention may be wholly absorbed by the notes and the fingering with\r\nthe left hand. \u003ci\u003eThe simultaneous combination of movements is thus\r\nin the first instance conditioned by the facility with which in us, alongside\r\nof intellectual processes, processes of inattentive feeling may still\r\ngo on.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_150_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_150_150\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us by a very natural transition to the \u003ci\u003eethical\r\nimplications of the law of habit\u003c/i\u003e. They are numerous and\r\nmomentous. Dr. Carpenter, from whose \u0027Mental Physiology\u0027\r\nwe have quoted, has so prominently enforced the\r\nprinciple that our organs grow to the way in which they\r\nhave been exercised, and dwelt upon its consequences, that\r\nhis book almost deserves to be called a work of edification,\r\non this account alone. We need make no apology, then,\r\nfor tracing a few of these consequences ourselves:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Habit a second nature! Habit is ten times nature,\"\r\nthe Duke of Wellington is said to have exclaimed; and the\r\ndegree to which this is true no one can probably appreciate\r\nas well as one who is a veteran soldier himself. The daily\r\ndrill and the years of discipline end by fashioning a man\r\ncompletely over again, as to most of the possibilities of his\r\nconduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There is a story, which is credible enough, though it may not\r\nbe true, of a practical joker, who, seeing a discharged veteran\r\ncarrying home his dinner, suddenly called out, \u0027Attention!\u0027 whereupon\r\nthe man instantly brought his hands down, and lost his mutton\r\nand potatoes in the gutter. The drill had been thorough, and its\r\neffects had become embodied in the man\u0027s nervous structure.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_151_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_151_151\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRiderless cavalry-horses, at many a battle, have been\r\nseen to come together and go through their customary\r\nevolutions at the sound of the bugle-call. Most trained\r\ndomestic animals, dogs and oxen, and omnibus- and car-horses,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[Pg 121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nseem to be machines almost pure and simple, undoubtingly,\r\nunhesitatingly doing from minute to minute the\r\nduties they have been taught, and giving no sign that the\r\npossibility of an alternative ever suggests itself to their\r\nmind. Men grown old in prison have asked to be readmitted\r\nafter being once set free. In a railroad accident to\r\na travelling menagerie in the United States some time in\r\n1881, a tiger, whose cage had broken open, is said to have\r\nemerged, but presently crept back again, as if too much\r\nbewildered by his new responsibilities, so that he was without\r\ndifficulty secured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most\r\nprecious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all\r\nwithin the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of\r\nfortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone\r\nprevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from\r\nbeing deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It\r\nkeeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the\r\nwinter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the\r\ncountryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through\r\nall the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the\r\nnatives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all\r\nto fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture\r\nor our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that\r\ndisagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted,\r\nand it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social\r\nstrata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you\r\nsee the professional mannerism settling down on the young\r\ncommercial traveller, on the young doctor, on the young\r\nminister, on the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little\r\nlines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks\r\nof thought, the prejudices, the ways of the \u0027shop,\u0027 in a\r\nword, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape\r\nthan his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of\r\nfolds. On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It\r\nis well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty,\r\nthe character has set like plaster, and will never soften\r\nagain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the period between twenty and thirty is the critical\r\none in the formation of intellectual and professional habits,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[Pg 122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe period below twenty is more important still for the fixing\r\nof \u003ci\u003epersonal\u003c/i\u003e habits, properly so called, such as vocalization\r\nand pronunciation, gesture, motion, and address.\r\nHardly ever is a language learned after twenty spoken\r\nwithout a foreign accent; hardly ever can a youth transferred\r\nto the society of his betters unlearn the nasality and\r\nother vices of speech bred in him by the associations of\r\nhis growing years. Hardly ever, indeed, no matter how\r\nmuch money there be in his pocket, can he even learn to\r\n\u003ci\u003edress\u003c/i\u003e like a gentleman-born. The merchants offer their\r\nwares as eagerly to him as to the veriest \u0027swell,\u0027 but he\r\nsimply \u003ci\u003ecannot\u003c/i\u003e buy the right things. An invisible law, as\r\nstrong as gravitation, keeps him within his orbit, arrayed\r\nthis year as he was the last; and how his better-bred\r\nacquaintances contrive to get the things they wear will be\r\nfor him a mystery till his dying day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe great thing, then, in all education, is to \u003ci\u003emake our\r\nnervous system our ally instead of our enemy\u003c/i\u003e. It is to fund\r\nand capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the\r\ninterest of the fund. \u003ci\u003eFor this we must make automatic and\r\nhabitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand guard against the growing into ways that are likely to\r\nbe disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the\r\nplague. The more of the details of our daily life we can\r\nhand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more\r\nour higher powers of mind will be set free for their own\r\nproper work. There is no more miserable human being\r\nthan one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and\r\nfor whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every\r\ncup, the time of rising and going to bed every day, and\r\nthe beginning of every bit of work, are subjects of express\r\nvolitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man\r\ngoes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought\r\nto be so ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his\r\nconsciousness at all. If there be such daily duties not yet\r\ningrained in any one of my readers, let him begin this very\r\nhour to set the matter right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Professor Bain\u0027s chapter on \u0027The Moral Habits\u0027\r\nthere are some admirable practical remarks laid down.\r\nTwo great maxims emerge from his treatment. The first\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[Pg 123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off\r\nof an old one, we must take care to \u003ci\u003elaunch ourselves with as\r\nstrong and decided an initiative as possible\u003c/i\u003e. Accumulate all\r\nthe possible circumstances which shall re-enforce the right\r\nmotives; put yourself assiduously in conditions that encourage\r\nthe new way; make engagements incompatible\r\nwith the old; take a public pledge, if the case allows; in\r\nshort, envelop your resolution with every aid you know.\r\nThis will give your new beginning such a momentum that\r\nthe temptation to break down will not occur as soon as it\r\notherwise might; and every day during which a breakdown\r\nis postponed adds to the chances of its not occurring at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second maxim is: \u003ci\u003eNever suffer an exception to occur\r\ntill the new habit is securely rooted in your life\u003c/i\u003e. Each lapse\r\nis like the letting fall of a ball of string which one is carefully\r\nwinding up; a single slip undoes more than a great\r\nmany turns will wind again. \u003ci\u003eContinuity\u003c/i\u003e of training is the\r\ngreat means of making the nervous system act infallibly\r\nright. As Professor Bain says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The peculiarity of the moral habits, contradistinguishing them\r\nfrom the intellectual acquisitions, is the presence of two hostile powers,\r\none to be gradually raised into the ascendant over the other. It is\r\nnecessary, above all things, in such a situation, never to lose a battle.\r\nEvery gain on the wrong side undoes the effect of many conquests on\r\nthe right. The essential precaution, therefore, is so to regulate the\r\ntwo opposing powers that the one may have a series of uninterrupted\r\nsuccesses, until repetition has fortified it to such a degree as to enable\r\nit to cope with the opposition, under any circumstances. This is the\r\ntheoretically best career of mental progress.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe need of securing success at the \u003ci\u003eoutset\u003c/i\u003e is imperative.\r\nFailure at first is apt to dampen the energy of all future\r\nattempts, whereas past experience of success nerves one to\r\nfuture vigor. Goethe says to a man who consulted him\r\nabout an enterprise but mistrusted his own powers: \"Ach!\r\nyou need only blow on your hands!\" And the remark\r\nillustrates the effect on Goethe\u0027s spirits of his own habitually\r\nsuccessful career. Prof. Baumann, from whom I borrow\r\nthe anecdote,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_152_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_152_152\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e says that the collapse of barbarian\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[Pg 124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnations when Europeans come among them is due to their\r\ndespair of ever succeeding as the new-comers do in the\r\nlarger tasks of life. Old ways are broken and new ones\r\nnot formed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question of \u0027tapering-off,\u0027 in abandoning such\r\nhabits as drink and opium-indulgence, comes in here, and\r\nis a question about which experts differ within certain\r\nlimits, and in regard to what may be best for an individual\r\ncase. In the main, however, all expert opinion would\r\nagree that abrupt acquisition of the new habit is the best\r\nway, \u003ci\u003eif there be a real possibility of carrying it out\u003c/i\u003e. We\r\nmust be careful not to give the will so stiff a task as to insure\r\nits defeat at the very outset; but, \u003ci\u003eprovided one can\r\nstand it\u003c/i\u003e, a sharp period of suffering, and then a free time,\r\nis the best thing to aim at, whether in giving up a habit\r\nlike that of opium, or in simply changing one\u0027s hours of\r\nrising or of work. It is surprising how soon a desire will\r\ndie of inanition if it be \u003ci\u003enever\u003c/i\u003e fed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"One must first learn, unmoved, looking neither to the right nor\r\nleft, to walk firmly on the straight and narrow path, before one can\r\nbegin \u0027to make one\u0027s self over again.\u0027 He who every day makes a\r\nfresh resolve is like one who, arriving at the edge of the ditch he is to\r\nleap, forever stops and returns for a fresh run. Without \u003ci\u003eunbroken\u003c/i\u003e\r\nadvance there is no such thing as \u003ci\u003eaccumulation\u003c/i\u003e of the ethical forces\r\npossible, and to make this possible, and to exercise us and habituate us\r\nin it, is the sovereign blessing of regular \u003ci\u003ework\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_153_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_153_153\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA third maxim may be added to the preceding pair:\r\n\u003ci\u003eSeize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution\r\nyou make, and on every emotional prompting you may\r\nexperience in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain.\u003c/i\u003e It\r\nis not in the moment of their forming, but in the moment\r\nof their producing \u003ci\u003emotor effects\u003c/i\u003e, that resolves and aspirations\r\ncommunicate the new \u0027set\u0027 to the brain. As the\r\nauthor last quoted remarks:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The actual presence of the practical opportunity alone furnishes the\r\nfulcrum upon which the lever can rest, by means of which the moral\r\nwill may multiply its strength, and raise itself aloft. He who has no\r\nsolid ground to press against will never get beyond the stage of empty\r\ngesture-making.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[Pg 125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo matter how full a reservoir of \u003ci\u003emaxims\u003c/i\u003e one may possess,\r\nand no matter how good one\u0027s \u003ci\u003esentiments\u003c/i\u003e may be, if one\r\nhave not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to\r\n\u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e, one\u0027s character may remain entirely unaffected for the\r\nbetter. With mere good intentions, hell is proverbially\r\npaved. And this is an obvious consequence of the principles\r\nwe have laid down. A \u0027character,\u0027 as J. S. Mill says,\r\n\u0027is a completely fashioned will\u0027; and a will, in the sense in\r\nwhich he means it, is an aggregate of tendencies to act in a\r\nfirm and prompt and definite way upon all the principal\r\nemergencies of life. A tendency to act only becomes effectively\r\ningrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted\r\nfrequency with which the actions actually occur, and the\r\nbrain \u0027grows\u0027 to their use. Every time a resolve or a fine\r\nglow of feeling evaporates without bearing practical fruit is\r\nworse than a chance lost; it works so as positively to\r\nhinder future resolutions and emotions from taking the\r\nnormal path of discharge. There is no more contemptible\r\ntype of human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist\r\nand dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering\r\nsea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly\r\nconcrete deed. Rousseau, inflaming all the mothers of\r\nFrance, by his eloquence, to follow Nature and nurse their\r\nbabies themselves, while he sends his own children to the\r\nfoundling hospital, is the classical example of what I mean.\r\nBut every one of us in his measure, whenever, after glowing\r\nfor an abstractly formulated Good, he practically\r\nignores some actual case, among the squalid \u0027other particulars\u0027\r\nof which that same Good lurks disguised, treads\r\nstraight on Rousseau\u0027s path. All Goods are disguised by\r\nthe vulgarity of their concomitants, in this work-a-day\r\nworld; but woe to him who can only recognize them when\r\nhe thinks them in their pure and abstract form! The habit\r\nof excessive novel-reading and theatre-going will produce\r\ntrue monsters in this line. The weeping of a Russian lady\r\nover the fictitious personages in the play, while her coachman\r\nis freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort of\r\nthing that everywhere happens on a less glaring scale.\r\nEven the habit of excessive indulgence in music, for those\r\nwho are neither performers themselves nor musically gifted\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[Pg 126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nenough to take it in a purely intellectual way, has probably\r\na relaxing effect upon the character. One becomes filled\r\nwith emotions which habitually pass without prompting to\r\nany deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept\r\nup. The remedy would be, never to suffer one\u0027s self to\r\nhave an emotion at a concert, without expressing it afterward\r\nin \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e active way.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_154_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_154_154\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e Let the expression be the least\r\nthing in the world—speaking genially to one\u0027s aunt, or\r\ngiving up one\u0027s seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic\r\noffers—but let it not fail to take place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese latter cases make us aware that it is not simply\r\n\u003ci\u003eparticular lines\u003c/i\u003e of discharge, but also \u003ci\u003egeneral forms\u003c/i\u003e of discharge,\r\nthat seem to be grooved out by habit in the brain.\r\nJust as, if we let our emotions evaporate, they get into a\r\nway of evaporating; so there is reason to suppose that if\r\nwe often flinch from making an effort, before we know it the\r\neffort-making capacity will be gone; and that, if we suffer\r\nthe wandering of our attention, presently it will wander all\r\nthe time. Attention and effort are, as we shall see later,\r\nbut two names for the same psychic fact. To what brain-processes\r\nthey correspond we do not know. The strongest\r\nreason for believing that they do depend on brain-processes\r\nat all, and are not pure acts of the spirit, is just this fact,\r\nthat they seem in some degree subject to the law of habit,\r\nwhich is a material law. As a final practical maxim, relative\r\nto these habits of the will, we may, then, offer something\r\nlike this: \u003ci\u003eKeep the faculty of effort alive in you by a\r\nlittle gratuitous exercise every day\u003c/i\u003e. That is, be systematically\r\nascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do\r\nevery day or two something for no other reason than that\r\nyou would rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire\r\nneed draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained\r\nto stand the test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance\r\nwhich a man pays on his house and goods. The tax\r\ndoes him no good at the time, and possibly may never bring\r\nhim a return. But if the fire \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e come, his having paid it\r\nwill be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[Pg 127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndaily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention,\r\nenergetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things.\r\nHe will stand like a tower when everything rocks around\r\nhim, and when his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like\r\nchaff in the blast.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe physiological study of mental conditions is thus the\r\nmost powerful ally of hortatory ethics. The hell to be\r\nendured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than\r\nthe hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually\r\nfashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could the\r\nyoung but realize how soon they will become mere walking\r\nbundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct\r\nwhile in the plastic state. We are spinning our own\r\nfates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest\r\nstroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar.\r\nThe drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson\u0027s play, excuses\r\nhimself for every fresh dereliction by saying, \u0027I won\u0027t count\r\nthis time!\u0027 Well! he may not count it, and a kind Heaven\r\nmay not count it; but it is being counted none the less.\r\nDown among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are\r\ncounting it, registering and storing it up to be used against\r\nhim when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do\r\nis, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. Of course, this\r\nhas its good side as well as its bad one. As we become\r\npermanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we\r\nbecome saints in the moral, and authorities and experts in\r\nthe practical and scientific spheres, by so many separate\r\nacts and hours of work. Let no youth have any anxiety\r\nabout the upshot of his education, whatever the line of it may\r\nbe. If he keep faithfully busy each hour of the working-day,\r\nhe may safely leave the final result to itself. He can\r\nwith perfect certainty count on waking up some fine morning,\r\nto find himself one of the competent ones of his generation,\r\nin whatever pursuit he may have singled out.\r\nSilently, between all the details of his business, the \u003ci\u003epower of\r\njudging\u003c/i\u003e in all that class of matter will have built itself up\r\nwithin him as a possession that will never pass away.\r\nYoung people should know this truth in advance. The\r\nignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement\r\nand faint-heartedness in youths embarking on arduous\r\ncareers than all other causes put together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_136_136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[136]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This chapter has already appeared in the Popular Science Monthly\r\nfor February 1887.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_137_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[137]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the sense above explained, which applies to inner structure as well\r\nas to outer form.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_138_138\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[138]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Revue Philosophique, i, 324.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_139_139\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[139]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Some paths, to be sure, are banked up by bodies moving through\r\nthem under too great pressure, and made impervious. These special cases\r\nwe disregard.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_140_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[140]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We cannot say \u003ci\u003ethe will\u003c/i\u003e, for, though many, perhaps most, human\r\nhabits were once voluntary actions, no action, as we shall see in a later\r\nchapter, can be \u003ci\u003eprimarily\u003c/i\u003e such. While an habitual action may once have\r\nbeen voluntary, the voluntary action must before that, at least once, have\r\nbeen impulsive or reflex. It is this very first occurrence of all that we\r\nconsider in the text.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_141_141\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[141]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Those who desire a more definite formulation may consult J. Fiske\u0027s\r\n\u0027Cosmic Philosophy,\u0027 vol. ii, pp. 142-146 and Spencer\u0027s \u0027Principles of\r\nBiology,\u0027 sections 302 and 303, and the part entitled \u0027Physical Synthesis\u0027\r\nof his \u0027Principles of Psychology.\u0027 Mr. Spencer there tries, not only to\r\nshow how new actions may arise in nervous systems and form new reflex\r\narcs therein, but even how nervous tissue may actually be born by the passage\r\nof new waves of isometric transformation through an originally indifferent\r\nmass. I cannot help thinking that Mr. Spencer\u0027s data, under a great\r\nshow of precision, conceal vagueness and improbability, and even self-contradiction.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_142_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[142]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Mental Physiology\u0027 (1874) pp. 339-345.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_143_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[143]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See, later, Masius in Van Benedens\u0027 and Van Bambeke\u0027s \u0027Archives\r\nde Biologie,\u0027 vol. i (Liège, 1880).—W. J.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_144_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_144_144\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[144]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e G. H. Schneider: \u0027Der menschliche Wille\u0027 (1882), pp. 417-419 (freely\r\ntranslated). For the drain-simile, see also Spencer\u0027s \u0027Psychology,\u0027 part\r\nv, chap. viii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_145_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_145_145\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[145]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiology of Mind, p. 155.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_146_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_146_146\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[146]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Carpenter\u0027s \u0027Mental Physiology\u0027 (1874), pp. 217, 218.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_147_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_147_147\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[147]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Von Hartmann devotes a chapter of his \u0027Philosophy of the Unconscious\u0027\r\n(English translation, vol. i, p. 72) to proving that they must be\r\nboth \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eunconscious\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_148_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_148_148\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[148]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Mental Physiology,\u0027 p. 20.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_149_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_149_149\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[149]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Der menschliche Wille,\u0027 pp. 447, 448.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_150_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_150_150\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[150]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Der menschliche Wille,\u0027 p. 439. The last sentence is rather freely\r\ntranslated—the sense is unaltered.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_151_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_151_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[151]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Huxley\u0027s \u0027Elementary Lessons in Physiology,\u0027 lesson xii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_152_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_152_152\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[152]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See the admirable passage about success at the outset, in his Handbuch\r\nder Moral (1878), pp. 38-43.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_153_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_153_153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[153]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Bahnsen: \u0027Beiträge zu Charakterologie\u0027 (1867), vol i, p. 209.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_154_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_154_154\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[154]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See for remarks on this subject a readable article by Miss V. Scudder\r\non \u0027Musical Devotees and Morals,\u0027 in the Andover Review for January.\r\n1887.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[Pg 128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_V\"\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE AUTOMATON-THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn describing the functions of the hemispheres a short\r\nway back, we used language derived from both the bodily\r\nand the mental life, saying now that the animal made indeterminate\r\nand unforeseeable reactions, and anon that he\r\nwas swayed by considerations of future good and evil;\r\ntreating his hemispheres sometimes as the seat of memory\r\nand ideas in the psychic sense, and sometimes talking\r\nof them as simply a complicated addition to his\r\nreflex machinery. This sort of vacillation in the point of\r\nview is a fatal incident of all ordinary talk about these\r\nquestions; but I must now settle my scores with those\r\nreaders to whom I already dropped a word in passing (see\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eFootnote 6\u003c/a\u003e) and who have probably been dissatisfied\r\nwith my conduct ever since.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose we restrict our view to facts of one and the same\r\nplane, and let that be the bodily plane: cannot all the outward\r\nphenomena of intelligence still be exhaustively described?\r\nThose mental images, those \u0027considerations,\u0027\r\nwhereof we spoke,—presumably they do not arise without\r\nneural processes arising simultaneously with them, and\r\npresumably each consideration corresponds to a process \u003ci\u003esui\r\ngeneris\u003c/i\u003e, and unlike all the rest. In other words, however\r\nnumerous and delicately differentiated the train of ideas\r\nmay be, the train of brain-events that runs alongside of it\r\nmust in both respects be exactly its match, and we must\r\npostulate a neural machinery that offers a living counterpart\r\nfor every shading, however fine, of the history of its owner\u0027s\r\nmind. Whatever degree of complication the latter may\r\nreach, the complication of the machinery must be quite as\r\nextreme, otherwise we should have to admit that there\r\nmay be mental events to which no brain-events correspond.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[Pg 129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut such an admission as this the physiologist is reluctant\r\nto make. It would violate all his beliefs. \u0027No psychosis\r\nwithout neurosis,\u0027 is one form which the principle of continuity\r\ntakes in his mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this principle forces the physiologist to make still\r\nanother step. If neural action is as complicated as mind;\r\nand if in the sympathetic system and lower spinal cord we\r\nsee what, so far as we know, is unconscious neural action\r\nexecuting deeds that to all outward intent may be called\r\nintelligent; what is there to hinder us from supposing that\r\neven where we know consciousness to be there, the still\r\nmore complicated neural action which we believe to be its\r\ninseparable companion is alone and of itself the real agent\r\nof whatever intelligent deeds may appear? \"As actions of\r\na certain degree of complexity are brought about by mere\r\nmechanism, why may not actions of a still greater degree of\r\ncomplexity be the result of a more refined mechanism?\"\r\nThe conception of reflex action is surely one of the best\r\nconquests of physiological theory; why not be radical with\r\nit? Why not say that just as the spinal cord is a machine\r\nwith few reflexes, so the hemispheres are a machine with\r\nmany, and that that is all the difference? The principle of\r\ncontinuity would press us to accept this view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut what on this view could be the function of the consciousness\r\nitself? \u003ci\u003eMechanical\u003c/i\u003e function it would have none.\r\nThe sense-organs would awaken the brain-cells; these\r\nwould awaken each other in rational and orderly sequence,\r\nuntil the time for action came; and then the last brain-vibration\r\nwould discharge downward into the motor tracts.\r\nBut this would be a quite autonomous chain of occurrences,\r\nand whatever mind went with it would be there\r\nonly as an \u0027epiphenomenon,\u0027 an inert spectator, a sort of\r\n\u0027foam, aura, or melody\u0027 as Mr. Hodgson says, whose opposition\r\nor whose furtherance would be alike powerless over\r\nthe occurrences themselves. When talking, some time ago,\r\nwe ought not, accordingly, \u003ci\u003eas physiologists\u003c/i\u003e, to have said anything\r\nabout \u0027considerations\u0027 as guiding the animal. We\r\nought to have said \u0027paths left in the hemispherical cortex\r\nby former currents,\u0027 and nothing more.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow so simple and attractive is this conception from the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[Pg 130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsistently physiological point of view, that it is quite\r\nwonderful to see how late it was stumbled on in philosophy,\r\nand how few people, even when it has been explained to\r\nthem, fully and easily realize its import. Much of the\r\npolemic writing against it is by men who have as yet failed\r\nto take it into their imaginations. Since this has been the\r\ncase, it seems worth while to devote a few more words to\r\nmaking it plausible, before criticising it ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo Descartes belongs the credit of having first been bold\r\nenough to conceive of a completely self-sufficing nervous\r\nmechanism which should be able to perform complicated\r\nand apparently intelligent acts. By a singularly arbitrary\r\nrestriction, however, Descartes stopped short at man, and\r\nwhile contending that in beasts the nervous machinery was\r\nall, he held that the higher acts of man were the result\r\nof the agency of his rational soul. The opinion that\r\nbeasts have no consciousness at all was of course too paradoxical\r\nto maintain itself long as anything more than a\r\ncurious item in the history of philosophy. And with its\r\nabandonment the very notion that the nervous system \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmight work the work of intelligence, which was an integral,\r\nthough detachable part of the whole theory, seemed also to\r\nslip out of men\u0027s conception, until, in this century, the\r\nelaboration of the doctrine of reflex action made it possible\r\nand natural that it should again arise. But it was not till\r\n1870, I believe, that Mr. Hodgson made the decisive step,\r\nby saying that feelings, no matter how intensely they may\r\nbe present, can have no causal efficacy whatever, and comparing\r\nthem to the colors laid on the surface of a mosaic, of\r\nwhich the events in the nervous system are represented by\r\nthe stones.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_155_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_155_155\"\u003e[155]\u003c/a\u003e Obviously the stones are held in place by each\r\nother and not by the several colors which they support.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAbout the same time Mr. Spalding, and a little later\r\nMessrs. Huxley and Clifford, gave great publicity to an\r\nidentical doctrine, though in their case it was backed by\r\nless refined metaphysical considerations.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[Pg 131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_156_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_156_156\"\u003e[156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA few sentences from Huxley and Clifford may be subjoined\r\nto make the matter entirely clear. Professor Huxley\r\nsays:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the\r\nmechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working,\r\nand to be as completely without any power of modifying that working\r\nas the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine\r\nis without influence on its machinery. Their volition, if they have any,\r\nis an emotion \u003ci\u003eindicative\u003c/i\u003e of physical changes, not a \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e of such changes….\r\nThe soul stands related to the body as the bell of a clock to the works,\r\nand consciousness answers to the sound which the bell gives out when\r\nit is struck…. Thus far I have strictly confined myself to the\r\nautomatism of brutes…. It is quite true that, to the best of my\r\njudgment, the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally\r\ngood of men; and, therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as\r\nin them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance.\r\nIt seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that\r\nany state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the\r\nmatter of the organism. If these positions are well based, it follows\r\nthat our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of\r\nthe changes which take place automatically in the organism; and that,\r\nto take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the\r\ncause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which\r\nis the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Clifford writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"All the evidence that we have goes to show that the physical world\r\ngets along entirely by itself, according to practically universal rules….\r\nThe train of physical facts between the stimulus sent into the eye,\r\nor to any one of our senses, and the exertion which follows it, and the\r\ntrain of physical facts which goes on in the brain, even when there is\r\nno stimulus and no exertion,—these are perfectly complete physical\r\ntrams, and every step is fully accounted for by mechanical conditions….\r\nThe two things are on utterly different platforms—the physical\r\nfacts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves.\r\nThere is a parallelism between them, but there is no interference\r\nof one with the other. Again, if anybody says that the will\r\ninfluences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. Such\r\nan assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. The only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[Pg 132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthing which influences matter is the position of surrounding matter or\r\nthe motion of surrounding matter…. The assertion that another\r\nman\u0027s volition, a feeling in his consciousness that I cannot perceive, is\r\npart of the train of physical facts which I may perceive,—this is neither\r\ntrue nor untrue, but nonsense; it is a combination of words whose corresponding\r\nideas will not go together…. Sometimes one series is\r\nknown better, and sometimes the other; so that in telling a story we\r\nspeak sometimes of mental and sometimes of material facts. A feeling\r\nof chill made a man run; strictly speaking, the nervous disturbance\r\nwhich coexisted with that feeling of chill made him run, if we want to\r\ntalk about material facts; or the feeling of chill produced the form of\r\nsub-consciousness which coexists with the motion of legs, if we want\r\nto talk about mental facts…. When, therefore, we ask: \u0027What is the\r\nphysical link between the ingoing message from chilled skin and the\r\noutgoing message which moves the leg? \u0027and the answer is, \u0027A man\u0027s\r\nwill,\u0027 we have as much right to be amused as if we had asked our friend\r\nwith the picture what pigment was used in painting the cannon in the\r\nforeground, and received the answer, \u0027Wrought iron.\u0027 It will be found\r\nexcellent practice in the mental operations required by this doctrine to\r\nimagine a train, the fore part of which is an engine and three carriages\r\nlinked with iron couplings, and the hind part three other carriages\r\nlinked with iron couplings; the bond between the two parts being\r\nmade up out of the sentiments of amity subsisting between the stoker\r\nand the guard.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo comprehend completely the consequences of the\r\ndogma so confidently enunciated, one should unflinchingly\r\napply it to the most complicated examples. The movements\r\nof our tongues and pens, the flashings of our eyes in\r\nconversation, are of course events of a material order, and as\r\nsuch their causal antecedents must be exclusively material.\r\nIf we knew thoroughly the nervous system of Shakespeare,\r\nand as thoroughly all his environing conditions, we\r\nshould be able to show why at a certain period of his life\r\nhis hand came to trace on certain sheets of paper those\r\ncrabbed little black marks which we for shortness\u0027\r\nsake call the manuscript of Hamlet. We should understand\r\nthe rationale of every erasure and alteration therein,\r\nand we should understand all this without in the slightest\r\ndegree acknowledging the existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare\u0027s\r\nmind. The words and sentences would be taken,\r\nnot as signs of anything beyond themselves, but as little\r\noutward facts, pure and simple. In like manner we might\r\nexhaustively write the biography of those two hundred\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[Pg 133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npounds, more or less, of warmish albuminoid matter called\r\nMartin Luther, without ever implying that it felt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, on the other hand, nothing in all this could prevent\r\nus from giving an equally complete account of either\r\nLuther\u0027s or Shakespeare\u0027s spiritual history, an account in\r\nwhich every gleam of thought and emotion should find its\r\nplace. The mind-history would run alongside of the body-history\r\nof each man, and each point in the one would correspond\r\nto, but not react upon, a point in the other. So\r\nthe melody floats from the harp-string, but neither checks\r\nnor quickens its vibrations; so the shadow runs alongside\r\nthe pedestrian, but in no way influences his steps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother inference, apparently more paradoxical still,\r\nneeds to be made, though, as far as I am aware, Dr. Hodgson\r\nis the only writer who has explicitly drawn it. That\r\ninference is that feelings, not causing nerve-actions, cannot\r\neven cause each other. To ordinary common sense, felt\r\npain is, as such, not only the cause of outward tears and\r\ncries, but also the cause of such inward events as sorrow,\r\ncompunction, desire, or inventive thought. So the consciousness\r\nof good news is the direct producer of the feeling\r\nof joy, the awareness of premises that of the belief in\r\nconclusions. But according to the automaton-theory, each\r\nof the feelings mentioned is only the correlate of some nerve-movement\r\nwhose \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e lay wholly in a previous nerve-movement.\r\nThe first nerve-movement called up the second;\r\nwhatever feeling was attached to the second consequently\r\nfound itself following upon the feeling that was attached\r\nto the first. If, for example, good news was the consciousness\r\ncorrelated with the first movement, then joy turned\r\nout to be the correlate in consciousness of the second.\r\nBut all the while the items of the nerve series were the\r\nonly ones in causal continuity; the items of the conscious\r\nseries, however inwardly rational their sequence, were\r\nsimply juxtaposed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eREASONS FOR THE THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0027conscious automaton-theory,\u0027 as this conception is\r\ngenerally called, is thus a radical and simple conception of\r\nthe manner in which certain facts may possibly occur. But\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[Pg 134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbetween conception and belief, proof ought to lie. And\r\nwhen we ask, \u0027What proves that all this is more than a\r\nmere conception of the possible?\u0027 it is not easy to get a\r\nsufficient reply. If we start from the frog\u0027s spinal cord\r\nand reason by continuity, saying, as that acts so intelligently,\r\n\u003ci\u003ethough unconscious\u003c/i\u003e, so the higher centres, \u003ci\u003ethough\r\nconscious\u003c/i\u003e, may have the intelligence they show quite as\r\nmechanically based; we are immediately met by the exact\r\ncounter-argument from continuity, an argument actually\r\nurged by such writers as Pflüger and Lewes, which starts\r\nfrom the acts of the hemispheres, and says: \"As \u003ci\u003ethese\u003c/i\u003e owe\r\n\u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e intelligence to the consciousness which we know to\r\nbe there, so the intelligence of the spinal cord\u0027s acts must\r\nreally be due to the invisible presence of a consciousness\r\nlower in degree.\" All arguments from continuity work in\r\ntwo ways: you can either level up or level down by their\r\nmeans. And it is clear that such arguments as these can\r\neat each other up to all eternity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere remains a sort of philosophic faith, bred like\r\nmost faiths from an æsthetic demand. Mental and physical\r\nevents are, on all hands, admitted to present the strongest\r\ncontrast in the entire field of being. The chasm which\r\nyawns between them is less easily bridged over by the\r\nmind than any interval we know. Why, then, not call it an\r\nabsolute chasm, and say not only that the two worlds\r\nare different, but that they are independent? This gives\r\nus the comfort of all simple and absolute formulas, and it\r\nmakes each chain homogeneous to our consideration.\r\nWhen talking of nervous tremors and bodily actions, we\r\nmay feel secure against intrusion from an irrelevant mental\r\nworld. When, on the other hand, we speak of feelings, we\r\nmay with equal consistency use terms always of one denomination,\r\nand never be annoyed by what Aristotle calls\r\n\u0027slipping into another kind.\u0027 The desire on the part of men\r\neducated in laboratories not to have their physical reasonings\r\nmixed up with such incommensurable factors as feelings\r\nis certainly very strong. I have heard a most intelligent\r\nbiologist say: \"It is high time for scientific men to protest\r\nagainst the recognition of any such thing as consciousness\r\nin a scientific investigation.\" In a word, feeling constitutes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[Pg 135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe \u0027unscientific\u0027 half of existence, and any one who enjoys\r\ncalling himself a \u0027scientist\u0027 will be too happy to purchase\r\nan untrammelled homogeneity of terms in the studies of his\r\npredilection, at the slight cost of admitting a dualism\r\nwhich, in the same breath that it allows to mind an independent\r\nstatus of being, banishes it to a limbo of causal\r\ninertness, from whence no intrusion or interruption on its\r\npart need ever be feared.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOver and above this great postulate that matters must\r\nbe kept simple, there is, it must be confessed, still another\r\nhighly abstract reason for denying causal efficacity to our\r\nfeelings. We can form no positive image of the \u003ci\u003emodus\r\noperandi\u003c/i\u003e of a volition or other thought affecting the cerebral\r\nmolecules.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Let us try to imagine an idea, say of food, producing a movement,\r\nsay of carrying food to the mouth…. What is the method of its\r\naction? Does it assist the decomposition of the molecules of the gray\r\nmatter, or does it retard the process, or does it alter the direction in\r\nwhich the shocks are distributed? Let us imagine the molecules of the\r\ngray matter combined in such a way that they will fall into simpler\r\ncombinations on the impact of an incident force. Now suppose the incident\r\nforce, in the shape of a shock from some other centre, to impinge\r\nupon these molecules. By hypothesis it will decompose them, and they\r\nwill fall into the simpler combination. How is the idea of food to prevent\r\nthis decomposition? Manifestly it can do so only by increasing;\r\nthe force which binds the molecules together. Good! Try to imagine\r\nthe idea of a beefsteak binding two molecules together. It is impossible.\r\nEqually impossible is it to imagine a similar idea loosening the\r\nattractive force between two molecules.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_157_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_157_157\"\u003e[157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis passage from an exceedingly clever writer expresses\r\nadmirably the difficulty to which I allude. Combined with\r\na strong sense of the \u0027chasm\u0027 between the two worlds, and\r\nwith a lively faith in reflex machinery, the sense of this\r\ndifficulty can hardly fail to make one turn consciousness\r\nout of the door as a superfluity so far as one\u0027s explanations\r\ngo. One may bow her out politely, allow her to remain as\r\nan \u0027epiphenomenon\u0027 (invaluable word!), but one insists that\r\nmatter shall hold all the power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Having thoroughly recognized the fathomless abyss that separates\r\nmind from matter, and having so blended the very notion into his very\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[Pg 136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnature that there is no chance of his ever forgetting it or failing to\r\nsaturate with it all his meditations, the student of psychology has next\r\nto appreciate the association between these two orders of phenomena….\r\nThey are associated in a manner so intimate that some of the\r\ngreatest thinkers consider them different aspects of the same process….\r\nWhen the rearrangement of molecules takes place in the higher\r\nregions of the brain, a change of consciousness simultaneously occurs….\r\nThe change of consciousness never takes place without the change\r\nin the brain; the change in the brain never … without the change\r\nin consciousness. But \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e the two occur together, or what the link is\r\nwhich connects them, we do not know, and most authorities believe\r\nthat we never shall and never can know. Having firmly and tenaciously\r\ngrasped these two notions, of the absolute separateness of mind\r\nand matter, and of the invariable concomitance of a mental change\r\nwith a bodily change, the student will enter on the study of psychology\r\nwith half his difficulties surmounted.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_158_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_158_158\"\u003e[158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHalf his difficulties ignored, I should prefer to say. For\r\nthis \u0027concomitance\u0027 in the midst of \u0027absolute separateness\u0027\r\nis an utterly irrational notion. It is to my mind quite inconceivable\r\nthat consciousness should have \u003ci\u003enothing to do\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith a business which it so faithfully attends. And the\r\nquestion, \u0027What has it to do?\u0027 is one which psychology\r\nhas no right to \u0027surmount,\u0027 for it is her plain duty to consider\r\nit. The fact is that the whole question of interaction\r\nand influence between things is a metaphysical question,\r\nand cannot be discussed at all by those who are unwilling\r\nto go into matters thoroughly. It is truly enough hard to\r\nimagine the \u0027idea of a beefsteak binding two molecules\r\ntogether;\u0027 but since Hume\u0027s time it has been equally hard\r\nto imagine \u003ci\u003eanything\u003c/i\u003e binding them together. The whole\r\nnotion of \u0027binding\u0027 is a mystery, the first step towards the\r\nsolution of which is to clear scholastic rubbish out of the\r\nway. Popular science talks of \u0027forces,\u0027 \u0027attractions\u0027 or\r\n\u0027affinities\u0027 as binding the molecules; but clear science,\r\nthough she may use such words to abbreviate discourse, has\r\nno use for the conceptions, and is satisfied when she can\r\nexpress in simple \u0027laws\u0027 the bare space-relations of the\r\nmolecules as functions of each other and of time. To the\r\nmore curiously inquiring mind, however, this simplified\r\nexpression of the bare facts is not enough; there must\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[Pg 137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe a \u0027reason\u0027 for them, and something must \u0027determine\u0027\r\nthe laws. And when one seriously sits down to consider\r\nwhat sort of a thing one \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e when one asks\r\nfor a \u0027reason,\u0027 one is led so far afield, so far away from\r\npopular science and its scholasticism, as to see that even\r\nsuch a fact as the existence or non-existence in the universe\r\nof \u0027the idea of a beefsteak\u0027 may not be wholly indifferent\r\nto other facts in the same universe, and in particular may\r\nhave something to do with determining the distance at\r\nwhich two molecules in that universe shall lie apart. If\r\nthis is so, then common-sense, though the intimate nature\r\nof causality and of the connection of things in the universe\r\nlies beyond her pitifully bounded horizon, has the root and\r\ngist of the truth in her hands when she obstinately holds\r\nto it that feelings and ideas are causes. However inadequate\r\nour ideas of causal efficacy may be, we are less wide\r\nof the mark when we say that our ideas and feelings have\r\nit, than the Automatists are when they say they haven\u0027t it.\r\nAs in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical\r\ncriticism all causes are obscure. But one has no\r\nright to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject\r\nonly, as the automatists do, and to say that \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e causation\r\nis unintelligible, whilst in the same breath one dogmatizes\r\nabout \u003ci\u003ematerial\u003c/i\u003e causation as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had\r\nnever been born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One\r\nmust be impartially \u003ci\u003enaif\u003c/i\u003e or impartially critical. If the\r\nlatter, the reconstruction must be thorough-going or \u0027metaphysical,\u0027\r\nand will probably preserve the common-sense\r\nview that ideas are forces, in some translated form. But\r\nPsychology is a mere natural science, accepting certain\r\nterms uncritically as her data, and stopping short of\r\nmetaphysical reconstruction. Like physics, she must be\r\n\u003ci\u003enaive\u003c/i\u003e; and if she finds that in her very peculiar field of\r\nstudy ideas \u003ci\u003eseem\u003c/i\u003e to be causes, she had better continue to\r\ntalk of them as such. She gains absolutely nothing by a\r\nbreach with common-sense in this matter, and she loses,\r\nto say the least, all naturalness of speech. If feelings are\r\ncauses, of course their effects must be furtherances and\r\ncheckings of internal cerebral motions, of which in themselves\r\nwe are entirely without knowledge. It is probable\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[Pg 138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat for years to come we shall have to infer what happens\r\nin the brain either from our feelings or from motor effects\r\nwhich we observe. The organ will be for us a sort of vat\r\nin which feelings and motions somehow go on stewing\r\ntogether, and in which innumerable things happen of which\r\nwe catch but the statistical result. Why, under these circumstances,\r\nwe should be asked to forswear the language\r\nof our childhood I cannot well imagine, especially as it is\r\nperfectly compatible with the language of physiology. The\r\nfeelings can produce nothing absolutely new, they can only\r\nreinforce and inhibit reflex currents which already exist,\r\nand the original organization of these by physiological\r\nforces must always be the ground-work of the psychological\r\nscheme.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy conclusion is that to urge the automaton-theory\r\nupon us, as it is now urged, on purely \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003equasi-\u003c/i\u003emetaphysical\r\ngrounds, is an \u003ci\u003eunwarrantable impertinence in\r\nthe present state of psychology\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eREASONS AGAINST THE THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there are much more positive reasons than this why\r\nwe ought to continue to talk in psychology as if consciousness\r\nhad causal efficacy. The \u003ci\u003eparticulars of the distribution\r\nof consciousness\u003c/i\u003e, so far as we know them, \u003ci\u003epoint to its\r\nbeing efficacious\u003c/i\u003e. Let us trace some of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is very generally admitted, though the point would\r\nbe hard to prove, that consciousness grows the more complex\r\nand intense the higher we rise in the animal kingdom.\r\nThat of a man must exceed that of an oyster. From this\r\npoint of view it seems an organ, superadded to the other\r\norgans which maintain the animal in the struggle for existence;\r\nand the presumption of course is that it helps him\r\nin some way in the struggle, just as they do. But it\r\ncannot help him without being in some way efficacious and\r\ninfluencing the course of his bodily history. If now it\r\ncould be shown in what way consciousness \u003ci\u003emight\u003c/i\u003e help him,\r\nand if, moreover, the defects of his other organs (where\r\nconsciousness is most developed) are such as to make them\r\nneed just the kind of help that consciousness would bring\r\nprovided it \u003ci\u003ewere\u003c/i\u003e efficacious; why, then the plausible inference\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[Pg 139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould be that it came just \u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e of its efficacy—in\r\nother words, its efficacy would be inductively proved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the study of the phenomena of consciousness which\r\nwe shall make throughout the rest of this book will show\r\nus that consciousness is at all times primarily \u003ci\u003ea selecting\r\nagency\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_159_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_159_159\"\u003e[159]\u003c/a\u003e Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense,\r\nor in the highest of intellection, we find it always doing\r\none thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so\r\npresented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that\r\nand suppressing as far as possible all the rest. The item\r\nemphasized is always in close connection with some \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e\r\nfelt by consciousness to be paramount at the time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut what are now the defects of the nervous system in\r\nthose animals whose consciousness seems most highly\r\ndeveloped? Chief among them must be \u003ci\u003einstability\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\ncerebral hemispheres are the characteristically \u0027high\u0027\r\nnerve-centres, and we saw how indeterminate and unforeseeable\r\ntheir performances were in comparison with those\r\nof the basal ganglia and the cord. But this very vagueness\r\nconstitutes their advantage. They allow their possessor\r\nto adapt his conduct to the minutest alterations in\r\nthe environing circumstances, any one of which may be\r\nfor him a sign, suggesting distant motives more powerful\r\nthan any present solicitations of sense. It seems as if certain\r\nmechanical conclusions should be drawn from this\r\nstate of things. An organ, swayed by slight impressions is\r\nan organ whose natural state is one of unstable equilibrium.\r\nWe may imagine the various lines of discharge in the cerebrum\r\nto be almost on a par in point of permeability—what\r\ndischarge a given small impression will produce may be\r\ncalled \u003ci\u003eaccidental\u003c/i\u003e, in the sense in which we say it is a matter\r\nof accident whether a rain-drop falling on a mountain\r\nridge descend the eastern or the western slope. It\r\nis in this sense that we may call it a matter of accident\r\nwhether a child be a boy or a girl. The ovum is so unstable\r\na body that certain causes too minute for our apprehension\r\nmay at a certain moment tip it one way or the\r\nother. The natural law of an organ constituted after this\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[Pg 140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfashion can be nothing but a law of caprice. I do not see\r\nhow one could reasonably expect from it any certain pursuance\r\nof useful lines of reaction, such as the few and fatally\r\ndetermined performances of the lower centres constitute\r\nwithin their narrow sphere. The dilemma in regard to the\r\nnervous system seems, in short, to be of the following kind.\r\nWe may construct one which will react infallibly and certainly,\r\nbut it will then be capable of reacting to very few\r\nchanges in the environment—it will fail to be adapted to all\r\nthe rest. We may, on the other hand, construct a nervous\r\nsystem potentially adapted to respond to an infinite variety\r\nof minute features in the situation; but its fallibility will\r\nthen be as great as its elaboration. We can never be sure\r\nthat its equilibrium will be upset in the appropriate direction.\r\nIn short, a high brain may do many things, and may\r\ndo each of them at a very slight hint. But its hair-trigger\r\norganization makes of it a happy-go-lucky, hit-or-miss\r\naffair. It is as likely to do the crazy as the sane thing at\r\nany given moment. A low brain does few things, and in\r\ndoing them perfectly forfeits all other use. The performances\r\nof a high brain are like dice thrown forever on a\r\ntable. Unless they be loaded, what chance is there that\r\nthe highest number will turn up oftener than the lowest?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll this is said of the brain as a physical machine pure\r\nand simple. \u003ci\u003eCan consciousness increase its efficiency by\r\nloading its dice?\u003c/i\u003e Such is the problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLoading its dice would mean bringing a more or less\r\nconstant pressure to bear in favor of \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e of its performances\r\nwhich make for the most permanent interests cf the\r\nbrain\u0027s owner; it would mean a constant inhibition of the\r\ntendencies to stray aside.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, just such pressure and such inhibition are what\r\nconsciousness \u003ci\u003eseems\u003c/i\u003e to be exerting all the while. And the\r\ninterests in whose favor it seems to exert them are \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e interests\r\nand its alone, interests which it \u003ci\u003ecreates\u003c/i\u003e, and which,\r\nbut for it, would have no status in the realm of being whatever.\r\nWe talk, it is true, when we are darwinizing, as if\r\nthe mere \u003ci\u003ebody\u003c/i\u003e that owns the brain had interests; we speak\r\nabout the utilities of its various organs and how they help\r\nor hinder the body\u0027s survival; and we treat the survival as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[Pg 141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nif it were an absolute end, existing as such in the physical\r\nworld, a sort of actual \u003ci\u003eshould-be\u003c/i\u003e, presiding over the animal\r\nand judging his reactions, quite apart from the presence of\r\nany commenting intelligence outside. We forget that in\r\nthe absence of some such superadded commenting intelligence\r\n(whether it be that of the animal itself, or only ours\r\nor Mr. Darwin\u0027s), the reactions cannot be properly talked\r\nof as \u0027useful\u0027 or \u0027hurtful\u0027 at all. Considered merely\r\nphysically, all that can be said of them is that \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e they occur\r\nin a certain way survival will as a matter of fact prove to be\r\ntheir incidental consequence. The organs themselves, and\r\nall the rest of the physical world, will, however, all the time\r\nbe quite indifferent to this consequence, and would quite as\r\ncheerfully, the circumstances changed, compass the animal\u0027s\r\ndestruction. In a word, survival can enter into a purely\r\nphysiological discussion only as an \u003ci\u003ehypothesis made by an\r\nonlooker\u003c/i\u003e, about the future. But the moment you bring a\r\nconsciousness into the midst, survival ceases to be a mere\r\nhypothesis. No longer is it, \"\u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e survival is to occur, then\r\nso and so must brain and other organs work.\" It has now\r\nbecome an imperative decree: \"Survival \u003ci\u003eshall\u003c/i\u003e occur, and\r\ntherefore organs \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e so work!\" \u003ci\u003eReal\u003c/i\u003e ends appear for the\r\nfirst time now upon the world\u0027s stage. The conception of\r\nconsciousness as a purely cognitive form of being, which\r\nis the pet way of regarding it in many idealistic schools,\r\nmodern as well as ancient, is thoroughly anti-psychological,\r\nas the remainder of this book will show. Every actually\r\nexisting consciousness seems to itself at any rate to\r\nbe a \u003ci\u003efighter for ends\u003c/i\u003e, of which many, but for its presence,\r\nwould not be ends at all. Its powers of cognition are\r\nmainly subservient to these ends, discerning which facts\r\nfurther them and which do not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow let consciousness only be what it seems to itself,\r\nand it will help an instable brain to compass its proper\r\nends. The movements of the brain \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e yield the means\r\nof attaining these ends mechanically, but only out of a lot of\r\nother ends, if so they may be called, which are not the\r\nproper ones of the animal, but often quite opposed. The\r\nbrain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties.\r\nBut the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[Pg 142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknowing also well which possibilities lead thereto and\r\nwhich away, will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce\r\nthe favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or\r\nindifferent ones. The nerve-currents, coursing through the\r\ncells and fibres, must in this case be supposed strengthened\r\nby the fact of their awaking one consciousness and dampened\r\nby awaking another. \u003ci\u003eHow\u003c/i\u003e such reaction of the consciousness\r\nupon the currents may occur must remain at\r\npresent unsolved: it is enough for my purpose to have\r\nshown that it may not uselessly exist, and that the matter\r\nis less simple than the brain-automatists hold.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll the facts of the natural history of consciousness lend\r\ncolor to this view. Consciousness, for example, is only\r\nintense when nerve-processes are hesitant. In rapid,\r\nautomatic, habitual action it sinks to a minimum. Nothing\r\ncould be more fitting than this, if consciousness have the\r\nteleological function we suppose; nothing more meaningless,\r\nif not. Habitual actions are certain, and being in no\r\ndanger of going astray from their end, need no extraneous\r\nhelp. In hesitant action, there seem many alternative possibilities\r\nof final nervous discharge. The feeling awakened\r\nby the nascent excitement of each alternative nerve-tract\r\nseems by its attractive or repulsive quality to determine\r\nwhether the excitement shall abort or shall become complete.\r\nWhere indecision is great, as before a dangerous\r\nleap, consciousness is agonizingly intense. Feeling, from\r\nthis point of view, may be likened to a cross-section of the\r\nchain of nervous discharge, ascertaining the links already\r\nlaid down, and groping among the fresh ends presented\r\nto it for the one which seems best to fit the case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phenomena of \u0027vicarious function\u0027 which we studied\r\nin \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_II\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter II\u003c/a\u003e seem to form another bit of circumstantial\r\nevidence. A machine in working order acts fatally in\r\none way. Our consciousness calls this the right way.\r\nTake out a valve, throw a wheel out of gear or bend a\r\npivot, and it becomes a different machine, acting just as\r\nfatally in another way which we call the wrong way. But\r\nthe machine itself knows nothing of wrong or right: matter\r\nhas no ideals to pursue. A locomotive will carry its train\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[Pg 143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough an open drawbridge as cheerfully as to any other\r\ndestination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA brain with part of it scooped out is virtually a new\r\nmachine, and during the first days after the operation\r\nfunctions in a thoroughly abnormal manner. As a matter\r\nof fact, however, its performances become from day to day\r\nmore normal, until at last a practised eye may be needed\r\nto suspect anything wrong. Some of the restoration is undoubtedly\r\ndue to \u0027inhibitions\u0027 passing away. But if the\r\nconsciousness which goes with the rest of the brain, be there\r\nnot only in order to take cognizance of each functional\r\nerror, but also to exert an efficient pressure to check it if it\r\nbe a sin of commission, and to lend a strengthening hand\r\nif it be a weakness or sin of omission,—nothing seems\r\nmore natural than that the remaining parts, assisted in\r\nthis way, should by virtue of the principle of habit grow\r\nback to the old teleological modes of exercise for which\r\nthey were at first incapacitated. Nothing, on the contrary,\r\nseems at first sight more unnatural than that they should\r\nvicariously take up the duties of a part now lost without\r\nthose \u003ci\u003eduties as such\u003c/i\u003e exerting any persuasive or coercive\r\nforce. At the end of Chapter XXVI I shall return to this\r\nagain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is yet another set of facts which seem explicable\r\non the supposition that consciousness has causal efficacy.\r\n\u003ci\u003eIt is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally associated\r\nwith beneficial, pains with detrimental, experiences.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nAll the fundamental vital processes illustrate this law.\r\nStarvation, suffocation, privation of food, drink and sleep,\r\nwork when exhausted, burns, wounds, inflammation, the\r\neffects of poison, are as disagreeable as filling the hungry\r\nstomach, enjoying rest and sleep after fatigue, exercise after\r\nrest, and a sound skin and unbroken bones at all times, are\r\npleasant. Mr. Spencer and others have suggested that\r\nthese coincidences are due, not to any pre-established\r\nharmony, but to the mere action of natural selection which\r\nwould certainly kill off in the long-run any breed of creatures\r\nto whom the fundamentally noxious experience seemed\r\nenjoyable. An animal that should take pleasure in a feeling\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[Pg 144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof suffocation would, if that pleasure were efficacious\r\nenough to make him immerse his head in water, enjoy a\r\nlongevity of four or five minutes. But if pleasures and\r\npains have no efficacy, one does not see (without some\r\nsuch \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e rational harmony as would be scouted by the\r\n\u0027scientific\u0027 champions of the automaton-theory) why the\r\nmost noxious acts, such as burning, might not give thrills\r\nof delight, and the most necessary ones, such as breathing,\r\ncause agony. The exceptions to the law are, it is true,\r\nnumerous, but relate to experiences that are either not vital\r\nor not universal. Drunkenness, for instance, which though\r\nnoxious, is to many persons delightful, is a very exceptional\r\nexperience. But, as the excellent physiologist Pick remarks,\r\nif all rivers and springs ran alcohol instead of water,\r\neither all men would now be born to hate it or our nerves\r\nwould have been selected so as to drink it with impunity.\r\nThe only considerable attempt, in fact, that has been made\r\nto explain the \u003ci\u003edistribution\u003c/i\u003e of our feelings is that of Mr. Grant\r\nAllen in his suggestive little work \u003ci\u003ePhysiological Æsthetics\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand his reasoning is based exclusively on that causal efficacy\r\nof pleasures and pains which the \u0027double-aspect\u0027 partisans\r\nso strenuously deny.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, then, from every point of view the circumstantial\r\nevidence against that theory is strong. \u003ci\u003eA priori\u003c/i\u003e analysis\r\nof both brain-action and conscious action shows us that if\r\nthe latter were efficacious it would, by its selective emphasis,\r\nmake amends for the indeterminateness of the former; whilst\r\nthe study \u003ci\u003ea posteriori\u003c/i\u003e of the \u003ci\u003edistribution\u003c/i\u003e of consciousness\r\nshows it to be exactly such as we might expect in an organ\r\nadded for the sake of steering a nervous system grown too\r\ncomplex to regulate itself. The conclusion that it is useful\r\nis, after all this, quite justifiable. But, if it is useful,\r\nit must be so through its causal efficaciousness, and the\r\nautomaton-theory must succumb to the theory of common-sense.\r\nI, at any rate (pending metaphysical reconstructions\r\nnot yet successfully achieved), shall have no hesitation\r\nin using the language of common-sense throughout this\r\nbook.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_155_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_155_155\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[155]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 416 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_156_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_156_156\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[156]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The present writer recalls how in 1869, when still a medical student,\r\nhe began to write an essay showing how almost every one who speculated\r\nabout brain-processes illicitly interpolated into his account of them links\r\nderived from the entirely heterogeneous universe of Feeling. Spencer,\r\nHodgson (in his Time and Space), Maudsley, Lockhart Clarke, Bain, Dr. S.\r\nCarpenter, and other authors were cited as having been guilty of the confusion.\r\nThe writing was soon stopped because he perceived that the view\r\nwhich he was upholding against these authors was a pure conception, with\r\nno proofs to be adduced of its reality. Later it seemed to him that whatever\r\n\u003ci\u003eproofs\u003c/i\u003e existed really told in favor of their view.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_157_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_157_157\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[157]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Chas. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), p. 9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_158_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_158_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[158]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_159_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_159_159\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[159]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See in particular the end of \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[Pg 145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_VI\"\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE MIND-STUFF THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader who found himself swamped with too much\r\nmetaphysics in the last chapter will have a still worse\r\ntime of it in this one, which is exclusively metaphysical.\r\nMetaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate\r\neffort to think clearly. The fundamental conceptions of\r\npsychology are practically very clear to us, but theoretically\r\nthey are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest\r\nassumptions in this science without realizing, until\r\nchallenged, what internal difficulties they involve. When\r\nthese assumptions have once established themselves (as\r\nthey have a way of doing in our very descriptions of the\r\nphenomenal facts) it is almost impossible to get rid of them\r\nafterwards or to make any one see that they are not essential\r\nfeatures of the subject. The only way to prevent this\r\ndisaster is to scrutinize them beforehand and make them\r\ngive an articulate account of themselves before letting them\r\npass. One of the obscurest of the assumptions of which\r\nI speak is \u003ci\u003ethe assumption that our mental states are composite\r\nin structure, made up of smaller states conjoined\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThis hypothesis has outward advantages which make it\r\nalmost irresistibly attractive to the intellect, and yet it is\r\ninwardly quite unintelligible. Of its unintelligibility, however,\r\nhalf the writers on psychology seem unaware. As\r\nour own aim is \u003ci\u003eto understand\u003c/i\u003e if possible, I make no apology\r\nfor singling out this particular notion for very explicit\r\ntreatment before taking up the descriptive part of our work.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe theory of \u0027mind-stuff\u0027 is the theory that our mental\r\nstates are compounds\u003c/i\u003e, expressed in its most radical form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[Pg 146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eEVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY DEMANDS A MIND-DUST.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a general theory of evolution the inorganic comes\r\nfirst, then the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life,\r\nthen forms of life that possess mentality, and finally those\r\nlike ourselves that possess it in a high degree. As long as\r\nwe keep to the consideration of purely outward facts, even\r\nthe most complicated facts of biology, our task as evolutionists\r\nis comparatively easy. We are dealing all the time with\r\nmatter and its aggregations and separations; and although\r\nour treatment must perforce be hypothetical, this does not\r\nprevent it from being \u003ci\u003econtinuous\u003c/i\u003e. The point which as evolutionists\r\nwe are bound to hold fast to is that all the new\r\nforms of being that make their appearance are really nothing\r\nmore than results of the redistribution of the original\r\nand unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which,\r\nchaotically dispersed, made the nebula, now, jammed and\r\ntemporarily caught in peculiar positions, form our brains;\r\nand the \u0027evolution\u0027 of the brains, if understood, would be\r\nsimply the account of how the atoms came to be so caught\r\nand jammed. In this story no new \u003ci\u003enatures\u003c/i\u003e, no factors not\r\npresent at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new\r\nnature seems to slip in, something whereof the potency was\r\n\u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e given in the mere outward atoms of the original chaos.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe enemies of evolution have been quick to pounce\r\nupon this undeniable discontinuity in the data of the world\r\nand many of them, from the failure of evolutionary explanations\r\nat this point, have inferred their general incapacity\r\nall along the line. Every one admits the entire incommensurability\r\nof feeling as such with material motion as\r\nsuch. \"A motion became a feeling!\"—no phrase that our\r\nlips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning.\r\nAccordingly, even the vaguest of evolutionary enthusiasts,\r\nwhen deliberately comparing material with mental facts,\r\nhave been as forward as any one else to emphasize the\r\n\u0027chasm\u0027 between the inner and the outer worlds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Can the oscillations of a molecule,\" says Mr. Spencer, \"be represented\r\nside by side with a nervous shock [he means a mental shock],\r\nand the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[Pg 147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of\r\nmotion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into\r\njuxtaposition.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_160_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_160_160\"\u003e[160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Suppose it to have become quite clear that a shock in consciousness\r\nand a molecular motion are the subjective and objective faces of\r\nthe same thing; we continue utterly incapable of uniting the two, so as\r\nto conceive that reality of which they are the opposite faces.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_161_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_161_161\"\u003e[161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, incapable of perceiving in them any common\r\ncharacter. So Tyndall, in that lucky paragraph\r\nwhich has been quoted so often that every one knows it by\r\nheart:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding\r\nfacts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought\r\nand a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we\r\ndo not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of\r\nthe organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning,\r\nfrom one to the other.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_162_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_162_162\"\u003e[162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr in this other passage:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We can trace the development of a nervous system and correlate\r\nwith it the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with\r\nundoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar\r\nin a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection\r\nbetween them…. There is no fusion possible between the two classes\r\nof facts—no motor energy in the intellect of man to carry it without\r\nlogical rupture from the one to the other.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_163_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_163_163\"\u003e[163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNone the less easily, however, when the evolutionary\r\nafflatus is upon them, do the very same writers leap over\r\nthe breach whose flagrancy they are the foremost to announce,\r\nand talk as if mind grew out of body in a continuous\r\nway. Mr. Spencer, looking back on his review of\r\nmental evolution, tells us how \"in tracing up the increase\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[Pg 148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe found ourselves passing \u003ci\u003ewithout break\u003c/i\u003e from the phenomena\r\nof bodily life to the phenomena of mental life.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_164_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_164_164\"\u003e[164]\u003c/a\u003e And Mr.\r\nTyndall, in the same Belfast Address from which we just\r\nquoted, delivers his other famous passage:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Abandoning all disguise, the confession that I feel bound to make\r\nbefore you is that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of\r\nthe experimental evidence, and discern in that matter which we, in our\r\nignorance and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator,\r\nhave hitherto covered with opprobrium the promise and potency of\r\nevery form and quality of life.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_165_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_165_165\"\u003e[165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e—mental life included, as a matter of course.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo strong a postulate is continuity! Now this book will\r\ntend to show that mental postulates are on the whole to be\r\nrespected. The demand for continuity has, over large tracts\r\nof science, proved itself to possess true prophetic power.\r\nWe ought therefore ourselves sincerely to try every possible\r\nmode of conceiving the dawn of consciousness so that it\r\nmay \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e appear equivalent to the irruption into the universe\r\nof a new nature, non-existent until then.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMerely to call the consciousness \u0027nascent\u0027 will not\r\nserve our turn.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_166_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_166_166\"\u003e[166]\u003c/a\u003e It is true that the word signifies not yet\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[Pg 149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003equite\u003c/i\u003e born, and so seems to form a sort of bridge between\r\nexistence and nonentity. But that is a verbal quibble.\r\nThe fact is that discontinuity comes in if a new nature\r\ncomes in at all. The \u003ci\u003equantity\u003c/i\u003e of the latter is quite immaterial.\r\nThe girl in \u0027Midshipman Easy\u0027 could not excuse the\r\nillegitimacy of her child by saying, \u0027it was a little small\r\none.\u0027 And Consciousness, however little, is an illegitimate\r\nbirth in any philosophy that starts without it, and yet\r\nprofesses to explain all facts by continuous evolution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIf evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape\r\nmust have been present at the very origin of things.\u003c/i\u003e Accordingly\r\nwe find that the more clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers\r\nare beginning to posit it there. Each atom of the\r\nnebula, they suppose, must have had an aboriginal atom\r\nof consciousness linked with it; and, just as the material\r\natoms have formed bodies and brains by massing themselves\r\ntogether, so the mental atoms, by an analogous\r\nprocess of aggregation, have fused into those larger consciousnesses\r\nwhich we know in ourselves and suppose to\r\nexist in our fellow-animals. Some such doctrine of\r\n\u003ci\u003eatomistic hylozoism\u003c/i\u003e as this is an indispensable part of a\r\nthorough-going philosophy of evolution. According to it\r\nthere must be an infinite number of degrees of consciousness,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[Pg 150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfollowing the degrees of complication and aggregation\r\nof the primordial mind-dust. To prove the separate\r\nexistence of these degrees of consciousness by indirect evidence,\r\nsince direct intuition of them is not to be had, becomes\r\ntherefore the first duty of psychological evolutionism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSOME ALLEGED PROOFS THAT MIND-DUST EXISTS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome of this duty we find already performed by a number\r\nof philosophers who, though not interested at all in\r\nevolution, have nevertheless on independent grounds convinced\r\nthemselves of the existence of a vast amount of\r\nsub-conscious mental life. The criticism of this general\r\nopinion and its grounds will have to be postponed for a\r\nwhile. At present let us merely deal with the arguments\r\nassumed to prove aggregation of bits of mind-stuff into\r\ndistinctly sensible feelings. They are clear and admit of a\r\nclear reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe German physiologist A. Fick, in 1862, was, so far\r\nas I know, the first to use them. He made experiments on\r\nthe discrimination of the feelings of warmth and of touch,\r\nwhen only a very small portion of the skin was excited\r\nthrough a hole in a card, the surrounding parts being protected\r\nby the card. He found that under these circumstances\r\nmistakes were frequently made by the patient,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_167_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_167_167\"\u003e[167]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand concluded that this must be because the number of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[Pg 151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsensations from the elementary nerve-tips affected was too\r\nsmall to sum itself distinctly into either of the qualities of\r\nfeeling in question. He tried to show how a different\r\nmanner of the summation might give rise in one case to the\r\nheat and in another to the touch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A feeling of temperature,\" he says, \"arises when the intensities\r\nof the units of feeling are evenly gradated, so that between two\r\nelements \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e no other unit can spatially intervene whose intensity\r\nis not also \u003ci\u003ebetween\u003c/i\u003e that of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e. A feeling of contact perhaps arises\r\nwhen this condition is not fulfilled. Both kinds of feeling, however, are\r\ncomposed of the same units.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is obviously far clearer to interpret such a gradation\r\nof intensities as a brain-fact than as a mind-fact. If\r\nin the brain a tract were first excited in one of the ways\r\nsuggested by Prof. Fick, and then again in the other, it\r\nmight very well happen, for aught we can say to the contrary,\r\nthat the psychic accompaniment in the one case would\r\nbe heat, and in the other pain. The pain and the heat would,\r\nhowever, not be composed of psychic units, but would each\r\nbe the direct result of one total brain-process. So long as\r\nthis latter interpretation remains open, Fick cannot be held\r\nto have proved psychic summation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLater, both Spencer and Taine, independently of each\r\nother, took up the same line of thought. Mr. Spencer\u0027s\r\nreasoning is worth quoting \u003ci\u003ein extenso\u003c/i\u003e. He writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Although the individual sensations and emotions, real or ideal, of\r\nwhich consciousness is built up, appear to be severally simple, homogeneous,\r\nunanalyzable, or of inscrutable natures, yet they are not so.\r\nThere is at least one kind of feeling which, as ordinarily experienced,\r\nseems elementary, that is demonstrably not elementary. And after resolving\r\nit into its proximate components, we can scarcely help suspecting\r\nthat other apparently-elementary feelings are also compound, and\r\nmay have proximate components like those which we can in this one\r\ninstance identify.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Musical sound is the name we give to this seemingly simple feeling\r\nwhich is clearly resolvable into simpler feelings. Well-known experiments\r\nprove that when equal blows or taps are made one after another\r\nat a rate not exceeding some sixteen per second, the effect of each is\r\nperceived as a separate noise; but when the rapidity with which the\r\nblows follow one another exceeds this, the noises are no longer identified\r\nin separate states of consciousness, and there arises in place of them a\r\ncontinuous state of consciousness, called a tone. In further increasing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[Pg 152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe rapidity of the blows, the tone undergoes the change of quality distinguished\r\nas rise in pitch; and it continues to rise in pitch as the blows\r\ncontinue to increase in rapidity, until it reaches an acuteness beyond\r\nwhich it is no longer appreciable as a tone. So that out of units of feeling\r\nof the same kind, many feelings distinguishable from one another\r\nin quality result, according as the units are more or less integrated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This is not all. The inquiries of Professor Helmholtz have shown\r\nthat when, along with one series of these rapidly-recurring noises, there\r\nis generated another series in which the noises are more rapid though\r\nnot so loud, the effect is a change in that quality known as its \u003ci\u003etimbre\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAs various musical instruments show us, tones which are alike in pitch\r\nand strength are distinguishable by their harshness or sweetness, their\r\nringing or their liquid characters; and all their specific peculiarities are\r\nproved to arise from the combination of one, two, three, or more, supplementary\r\nseries of recurrent noises with the chief series of recurrent\r\nnoises. So that while the unlikenesses of feeling known as differences\r\nof pitch in tones are due to differences of integration among the recurrent\r\nnoises of one series, the unlikenesses of feeling known as differences\r\nof \u003ci\u003etimbre\u003c/i\u003e, are due to the simultaneous integration with this series\r\nof other series having other degrees of integration. And thus an\r\nenormous number of qualitatively-contrasted kinds of consciousness\r\nthat seem severally elementary prove to be composed of one simple\r\nkind of consciousness, combined and recombined with itself in multitudinous\r\nways.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Can we stop short here? If the different sensations known as\r\nsounds are built out of a common unit, is it not to be rationally inferred\r\nthat so likewise are the different sensations known as tastes, and the\r\ndifferent sensations known as odors, and the different sensations known\r\nas colors? Nay, shall we not regard it as probable that there is a unit\r\ncommon to all these strongly-contrasted classes of sensations? If the\r\nunlikenesses among the sensations of each class may be due to unlikenesses\r\namong the modes of aggregation of a unit of consciousness common\r\nto them all; so too may the much greater unlikenesses between\r\nthe sensations of each class and those of other classes. There may be a\r\nsingle primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of\r\nconsciousness may be produced by the compounding of this element\r\nwith itself and the recompounding of its compounds with one another\r\nin higher and higher degrees: so producing increased multiplicity,\r\nvariety, and complexity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Have we any clue to this primordial element? I think we have.\r\nThat simple mental impression which proves to be the unit of composition\r\nof the sensation of musical tone, is allied to certain other simple\r\nmental impressions differently originated. The subjective effect produced\r\nby a crack or noise that has no appreciable duration is little\r\nelse than a nervous shock. Though we distinguish such a nervous\r\nshock as belonging to what we call sounds, yet it does not differ very\r\nmuch from nervous shocks of other kinds. An electric discharge sent\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[Pg 153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough the body causes a feeling akin to that which a sudden loud report\r\ncauses. A strong unexpected impression made through the eyes,\r\nas by a flash of lightning, similarly gives rise to a start or shock; and\r\nthough the feeling so named seems, like the electric shock, to have the\r\nbody at large for its seat, and may therefore be regarded as the correlative\r\nrather of the efferent than of the afferent disturbance, yet on remembering\r\nthe mental change that results from the instantaneous\r\ntransit of an object across the field of vision, I think it may be perceived\r\nthat the feeling accompanying the efferent disturbance is itself reduced\r\nvery nearly to the same form. The state of consciousness so generated\r\nis, in fact, comparable in quality to the initial state of consciousness\r\ncaused by a blow (distinguishing it from the pain or other feeling that\r\ncommences the instant after); which state of consciousness caused by a\r\nblow may be taken as the primitive and typical form of the nervous\r\nshock. The fact that sudden brief disturbances thus set up by different\r\nstimuli through different sets of nerves cause feelings scarcely\r\ndistinguishable in quality will not appear strange when we recollect that\r\ndistinguishableness of feeling implies appreciable duration; and that\r\nwhen the duration is greatly abridged, nothing more is known than that\r\nsome mental change has occurred and ceased. To have a sensation of\r\nredness, to know a tone as acute or grave, to be conscious of a taste as\r\nsweet, implies in each case a considerable continuity of state. If the\r\nstate does not last long enough to admit of its being contemplated, it\r\ncannot be classed as of this or that kind; and becomes a momentary\r\nmodification very similar to momentary modifications otherwise caused.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is possible, then—may we not even say probable?—that something\r\nof the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the\r\nultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the unlikenesses among\r\nour feelings result from unlike modes of integration of this ultimate\r\nunit. I say of the same order, because there are discernible differences\r\namong nervous shocks that are differently caused; and the primitive\r\nnervous shock probably differs somewhat from each of them. And I\r\nsay of the same order, for the further reason that while we may\r\nascribe to them a general likeness in nature, we must suppose a great\r\nunlikeness in degree. The nervous shocks recognized as such are violent—must\r\nbe violent before they can be perceived amid the procession\r\nof multitudinous vivid feelings suddenly interrupted by them.\r\nBut the rapidly-recurring nervous shocks of which the different forms\r\nof feeling consist, we must assume to be of comparatively moderate, or\r\neven of very slight intensity. Were our various sensations and emotions\r\ncomposed of rapidly-recurring shocks as strong as those ordinarily\r\ncalled shocks, they would be unbearable; indeed life would cease at\r\nonce. We must think of them rather as successive faint pulses of subjective\r\nchange, each having the same quality as the strong pulse of\r\nsubjective change distinguished as a nervous shock.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_168_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_168_168\"\u003e[168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[Pg 154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eINSUFFICIENCY OF THESE PROOFS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-154-0025.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_154_0025.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 25.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConvincing as this argument of Mr. Spencer\u0027s may\r\nappear on a first reading, it is singular how weak it really\r\nis.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_169_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_169_169\"\u003e[169]\u003c/a\u003e We do, it is true, when we study the connection between\r\na musical note and its outward cause, find the note\r\nsimple and continuous while the cause is multiple and discrete.\r\nSomewhere, then, there \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e a transformation, reduction,\r\nor fusion. The question is, Where?—in the nerve-world\r\nor in the mind-world? Really we have no experimental\r\nproof by which to decide; and if decide we must,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[Pg 155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanalogy and \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e probability can alone guide us. Mr.\r\nSpencer assumes that the fusion must come to pass in the\r\nmental world, and that the physical processes get through\r\nair and ear, auditory nerve and medulla, lower brain and\r\nhemispheres, without their number being reduced. Figure\r\n25 will make the point clear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet the line \u003ci\u003ea—b\u003c/i\u003e represent the threshold of consciousness:\r\nthen everything drawn below that line will symbolize\r\na physical process, everything above it will mean a fact\r\nof mind. Let the crosses stand for the physical blows, the\r\ncircles for the events in successively higher orders of nerve-cells,\r\nand the horizontal marks for the facts of feeling.\r\nSpencer\u0027s argument implies that each order of cells transmits\r\njust as many impulses as it receives to the cells above\r\nit; so that if the blows come at the rate of 20,000 in a second\r\nthe cortical cells discharge at the same rate, and one unit\r\nof feeling corresponds to each one of the 20,000 discharges.\r\nThen, and only then, does \u0027integration\u0027 occur, by the\r\n20,000 units of feeling \u0027compounding with themselves\u0027 into\r\nthe \u0027continuous state of consciousness\u0027 represented by the\r\nshort line at the top of the figure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow such an interpretation as this flies in the face of\r\nphysical analogy, no less than of logical intelligibility.\r\nConsider physical analogy first,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA pendulum may be deflected by a single blow, and swing\r\nback. Will it swing back the more often the more we multiply\r\nthe blows? No; for if they rain upon the pendulum too\r\nfast, it will not swing at all but remain deflected in a sensibly\r\nstationary state. In other words, increasing the cause\r\nnumerically need not equally increase numerically the\r\neffect. Blow through a tube: you get a certain musical\r\nnote; and increasing the blowing increases for a certain time\r\nthe loudness of the note. Will this be true indefinitely?\r\nNo; for when a certain force is reached, the note, instead of\r\ngrowing louder, suddenly disappears and is replaced by its\r\nhigher octave. Turn on the gas slightly and light it: you\r\nget a tiny flame. Turn on more gas, and the breadth of the\r\nflame increases. Will this relation increase indefinitely?\r\nNo, again; for at a certain moment up shoots the flame\r\ninto a ragged streamer and begins to hiss. Send slowly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[Pg 156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough the nerve of a frog\u0027s gastrocnemius muscle a succession\r\nof galvanic shocks: you get a succession of twitches.\r\nIncreasing the number of shocks does not increase the\r\ntwitching; on the contrary, it stops it, and we have the\r\nmuscle in the apparently stationary state of contraction\r\ncalled tetanus. This last fact is the true analogue of what\r\nmust happen between the nerve-cell and the sensory fibre.\r\nIt is certain that cells are more inert than fibres, and that\r\nrapid vibrations in the latter can only arouse relatively\r\nsimple processes or states in the former. The higher\r\ncells may have even a slower rate of explosion than the\r\nlower, and so the twenty thousand supposed blows of the\r\nouter air may be \u0027integrated\u0027 in the cortex into a very\r\nsmall number of cell-discharges in a second. This other\r\ndiagram will serve to contrast this supposition with\r\nSpencer\u0027s.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 130px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-156-0026.jpg\" style=\"width: 130px\" id=\"img_images_jame_156_0026.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 26.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Fig. 26 all \u0027integration\u0027 occurs below the\r\nthreshold of consciousness. The frequency of cell-events\r\nbecomes more and more reduced as we approach the cells\r\nto which feeling is most directly attached, until at last we\r\ncome to a condition of things symbolized by the larger\r\nellipse, which may be taken to stand for some rather\r\nmassive and slow process of tension and discharge in the\r\ncortical centres, to which, \u003ci\u003eas a whole\u003c/i\u003e, the feeling of musical\r\ntone symbolized by the line at the top of the diagram\r\n\u003ci\u003esimply and totally\u003c/i\u003e corresponds. It is as if a long file\r\nof men were to start one after\r\nthe other to reach a distant point.\r\nThe road at first is good and\r\nthey keep their original distance\r\napart. Presently it is intersected\r\nby bogs each worse than the last,\r\nso that the front men get so retarded\r\nthat the hinder ones catch\r\nup with them before the journey\r\nis done, and all arrive together\r\nat the goal.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_170_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_170_170\"\u003e[170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[Pg 157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn this supposition there \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e no unperceived units of\r\nmind-stuff preceding and composing the full consciousness.\r\nThe latter is itself an immediate psychic fact and bears\r\nan immediate relation to the neural state which is its unconditional\r\naccompaniment. Did each neural shock give\r\nrise to its own psychic shock, and the psychic shocks then\r\ncombine, it would be impossible to understand why severing\r\none part of the central nervous system from another\r\nshould break up the integrity of the consciousness. The\r\ncut has nothing to do with the psychic world. The atoms\r\nof mind-stuff ought to float off from the nerve-matter on\r\neither side of it, and come together over it and fuse, just\r\nas well as if it had not been made. We know, however,\r\nthat they do not; that severance of the paths of conduction\r\nbetween a man\u0027s left auditory centre or optical centre and\r\nthe rest of his cortex will sever all communication between\r\nthe words which he hears or sees written and the rest of\r\nhis ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, if feelings can mix into a \u003ci\u003etertium quid\u003c/i\u003e, why\r\ndo we not take a feeling of greenness and a feeling of redness,\r\nand make a feeling of yellowness out of them? Why\r\nhas optics neglected the open road to truth, and wasted\r\ncenturies in disputing about theories of color-composition\r\nwhich two minutes of introspection would have settled\r\nforever\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_171_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_171_171\"\u003e[171]\u003c/a\u003e We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may\r\nmix the objects we feel, and from \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e mixture get new\r\nfeelings. We cannot even (as we shall later see) have two\r\nfeelings in our mind at once. At most we can compare\r\ntogether \u003ci\u003eobjects previously presented\u003c/i\u003e to us in distinct feelings;\r\nbut then we find each object stubbornly maintaining\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[Pg 158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits separate identity before consciousness, whatever the\r\nverdict of the comparison may be.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_172_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_172_172\"\u003e[172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSELF-COMPOUNDING OF MENTAL FACTS IS INADMISSIBLE.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there is a still more fatal objection to the theory of\r\nmental units \u0027compounding with themselves\u0027 or \u0027integrating.\u0027\r\nIt is logically unintelligible; it leaves out the essential\r\nfeature of all the \u0027combinations\u0027 we actually know.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAll the \u0027combinations\u0027 which we actually know are\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eeffects,\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ewrought by the units said to be \u0027combined,\u0027\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eupon some entity\r\nother than themselves\u003c/span\u003e. Without this feature of a medium\r\nor vehicle, the notion of combination has no sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A multitude of contractile units, by joint action, and by being all\r\nconnected, for instance, with a single tendon, will pull at the same, and\r\nwill bring about a dynamical effect which is undoubtedly the resultant\r\nof their combined individual energies…. On the whole, tendons are\r\nto muscular fibres, and bones are to tendons, combining recipients of\r\nmechanical energies. A medium of composition is indispensable to the\r\nsummation of energies. To realize the complete dependence of mechanical\r\nresultants on a combining substratum, one may fancy for a moment\r\nall the individually contracting muscular elements severed from their\r\nattachments. They might then still be capable of contracting with the\r\nsame energy as before, yet no co-operative result would be accomplished.\r\nThe medium of dynamical combination would be wanting. The multiple\r\nenergies, singly exerted on no common recipient, would lose\r\nthemselves on entirely isolated and disconnected efforts.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_173_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_173_173\"\u003e[173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, no possible number of entities (call them\r\nas you like, whether forces, material particles, or mental\r\nelements) can sum \u003ci\u003ethemselves\u003c/i\u003e together. Each remains, in\r\nthe sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only\r\n\u003ci\u003efor a bystander\u003c/i\u003e who happens to overlook the units and to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[Pg 159]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\napprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape\r\nof some other \u003ci\u003eeffect\u003c/i\u003e on an entity external to the sum itself.\r\nLet it not be objected that H\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e and O combine of themselves\r\ninto \u0027water,\u0027 and thenceforward exhibit new properties.\r\nThey do not. The \u0027water\u0027 is just the old atoms in the\r\nnew position, H-O-H; the \u0027new properties\u0027 are just their\r\ncombined \u003ci\u003eeffects\u003c/i\u003e, when in this position, upon external media,\r\nsuch as our sense-organs and the various reagents on which\r\nwater may exert its properties and be known.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Aggregations are organized wholes only when they behave as such\r\nin the presence of other things. A statue is an aggregation of particles\r\nof marble, but as such it has no unity. For the spectator it is\r\none; in itself it is an aggregate; just as, to the consciousness of an ant\r\ncrawling over it, it may again appear a mere aggregate. No summing\r\nup of parts can make an unity of a mass of discrete constituents, unless\r\nthis unity exist for some other subject, not for the mass itself.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_174_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_174_174\"\u003e[174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJust so, in the parallelogram of forces, the \u0027forces\u0027\r\nthemselves do not combine into the diagonal resultant; a\r\n\u003ci\u003ebody\u003c/i\u003e is needed on which they may impinge, to exhibit their\r\nresultant effect. No more do musical sounds combine \u003ci\u003eper\r\nse\u003c/i\u003e into concords or discords. Concord and discord are\r\nnames for their combined effects on that external medium,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eear\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[Pg 160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the elemental units are supposed to be feelings,\r\nthe case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them,\r\nshuffle them and pack them as close together as you can\r\n(whatever that may mean); still each remains the same feeling\r\nit always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant\r\nof what the other feelings are and mean. There would\r\nbe a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or\r\nseries of such feelings were set up, a consciousness \u003ci\u003ebelonging\r\nto the group as such\u003c/i\u003e should emerge. And this 101st feeling\r\nwould be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings\r\nmight, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its \u003ci\u003ecreation\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhen they came together; but they would have no substantial\r\nidentity with it, nor it with them, and one could\r\nnever deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible\r\nsense) say that they \u003ci\u003eevolved\u003c/i\u003e it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men\r\nand tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or\r\njam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as\r\nintently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness\r\nof the whole sentence.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_175_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_175_175\"\u003e[175]\u003c/a\u003e We talk of the \u0027spirit of the age,\u0027\r\nand the \u0027sentiment of the people,\u0027 and in various ways we\r\nhypostatize \u0027public opinion.\u0027 But we know this to be symbolic\r\nspeech, and never dream that the spirit, opinion,\r\nsentiment, etc., constitute a consciousness other than, and\r\nadditional to, that of the several individuals whom the\r\nwords \u0027age,\u0027 \u0027people,\u0027 or \u0027public\u0027 denote. The private\r\nminds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind.\r\nThis has always been the invincible contention of the\r\nspiritualists against the associationists in Psychology,—a\r\ncontention which we shall take up at greater length in\r\n\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter X\u003c/a\u003e. The associationists say the mind is constituted\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[Pg 161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby a multiplicity of distinct \u0027ideas\u0027 \u003ci\u003eassociated\u003c/i\u003e into a unity.\r\nThere is, they say, an idea of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, and also an idea of \u003ci\u003eb.\r\nTherefore,\u003c/i\u003e they say, there is an idea of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, or of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntogether. Which is like saying that the mathematical\r\nsquare of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e plus that of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the square of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e,\r\na palpable untruth. Idea of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + idea of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e identical\r\nwith idea of (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e). It is one, they are two; in it, what\r\nknows \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e also knows \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e; in them, what knows \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e is expressly\r\nposited as not knowing \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e; etc. In short, the two separate\r\nideas can never by any logic be made to figure as one and\r\nthe same thing as the \u0027associated\u0027 idea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is what the spiritualists keep saying; and since we\r\ndo, as a matter of fact, have the \u0027compounded\u0027 idea, and do\r\nknow \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e together, they adopt a farther hypothesis to\r\nexplain that fact. The separate ideas exist, they say, but\r\n\u003ci\u003eaffect\u003c/i\u003e a third entity, the soul. \u003ci\u003eThis\u003c/i\u003e has the \u0027compounded\u0027\r\nidea, if you please so to call it; and the compounded idea\r\nis an altogether new psychic fact to which the separate ideas\r\nstand in the relation, not of constituents, but of occasions\r\nof production.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis argument of the spiritualists against the associationists\r\nhas never been answered by the latter. It holds good\r\nagainst any talk about self-compounding amongst feelings,\r\nagainst any \u0027blending,\u0027 or \u0027complication,\u0027 or \u0027mental\r\nchemistry,\u0027 or \u0027psychic synthesis,\u0027 which supposes a resultant\r\nconsciousness to float off from the constituents \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nin the absence of a supernumerary principle of consciousness\r\nwhich they may affect. The mind-stuff theory, in\r\nshort, is unintelligible. Atoms of feeling cannot compose\r\nhigher feelings, any more than atoms of matter can compose\r\nphysical things! The \u0027things,\u0027 for a clear-headed atomistic\r\nevolutionist, are not. Nothing is but the everlasting\r\natoms. When grouped in a certain way, \u003ci\u003ewe\u003c/i\u003e name them\r\nthis \u0027thing\u0027 or that; but the thing we name has no existence\r\nout of our mind. So of the states of mind which are\r\nsupposed to be compound because they know many different\r\nthings together. Since indubitably such states do exist,\r\nthey must exist as single new facts, effects, possibly, as\r\nthe spiritualists say, on the Soul (we will not decide that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[Pg 162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npoint here), but at any rate independent and integral, and\r\nnot compounded of psychic atoms.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_176_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_176_176\"\u003e[176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCAN STATES OF MIND BE UNCONSCIOUS?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe passion for unity and smoothness is in some minds\r\nso insatiate that, in spite of the logical clearness of these\r\nreasonings and conclusions, many will fail to be influenced\r\nby them. They establish a sort of disjointedness in things\r\nwhich in certain quarters will appear intolerable. They\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[Pg 163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsweep away all chance of \u0027passing without break\u0027 either\r\nfrom the material to the mental, or from the lower to the\r\nhigher mental; and they thrust us back into a pluralism of\r\nconsciousnesses—each arising discontinuously in the midst\r\nof two disconnected worlds, material and mental—which is\r\neven worse than the old notion of the separate creation of\r\neach particular soul. But the malcontents will hardly try\r\nto refute our reasonings by direct attack. It is more probable\r\nthat, turning their back upon them altogether, they\r\nwill devote themselves to sapping and mining the region\r\nroundabout until it is a bog of logical liquefaction, into the\r\nmidst of which all definite conclusions of any sort may be\r\ntrusted ere long to sink and disappear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur reasonings have assumed that the \u0027integration\u0027 of\r\na thousand psychic units must be either just the units over\r\nagain, simply rebaptized, or else something real, but then\r\nother than and additional to those units; that if a certain\r\nexisting fact is that of a thousand feelings, it cannot at the\r\nsame time be that of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e feeling; for the essence of feeling\r\nis to be felt, and as a psychic existent \u003ci\u003efeels\u003c/i\u003e, so it must \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIf the one feeling feels like no one of the thousand, in what\r\nsense can it be said to \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e the thousand? These assumptions\r\nare what the monists will seek to undermine. The Hegelizers\r\namongst them will take high ground at once, and say\r\nthat the glory and beauty of the psychic life is that in it all\r\ncontradictions find their reconciliation; and that it is just\r\nbecause the facts we are considering \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e facts of the self\r\nthat they are both one and many at the same time. With\r\nthis intellectual temper I confess that I cannot contend.\r\nAs in striking at some unresisting gossamer with a club,\r\none but overreaches one\u0027s self, and the thing one aims at\r\ngets no harm. So I leave this school to its devices.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other monists are of less deliquescent frame, and\r\ntry to break down distinctness among mental states by\r\n\u003ci\u003emaking a distinction\u003c/i\u003e. This sounds paradoxical, but it is\r\nonly ingenious. The distinction is that \u003ci\u003ebetween the unconscious\r\nand the conscious being of the mental state\u003c/i\u003e. It is the\r\nsovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology,\r\nand of turning what might become a science into a tumbling-ground\r\nfor whimsies. It has numerous champions,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[Pg 164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand elaborate reasons to give for itself. We must therefore\r\naccord it due consideration. In discussing the question:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eDO UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES EXIST?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eit will be best to give the list of so-called proofs as briefly\r\nas possible, and to follow each by its objection, as in scholastic\r\nbooks.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_177_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_177_177\"\u003e[177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFirst Proof\u003c/i\u003e. The \u003ci\u003eminimum visibile\u003c/i\u003e, the \u003ci\u003eminimum audibile\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nare objects composed of parts. How can the whole affect\r\nthe sense unless each part does? And yet each part does\r\nso without being separately sensible. Leibnitz calls the\r\ntotal consciousness an \u0027\u003ci\u003eaperception\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 the supposed insensible\r\nconsciousness by the name of \u0027\u003ci\u003epetites perceptions\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To judge of the latter,\" he says, \"I am accustomed to use the example\r\nof the roaring of the sea with which one is assailed when near the\r\nshore. To hear this noise as one does, one must hear the parts which\r\ncompose its totality, that is, the noise of each wave,… although this\r\nnoise would not be noticed if its wave were alone. One must be affected\r\na little by the movement of one wave, one must have some perception\r\nof each several noise, however small it be. Otherwise one would not\r\nhear that of 100,000 waves, for of 100,000 zeros one can never make a\r\nquantity.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_178_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_178_178\"\u003e[178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply\u003c/i\u003e. This is an excellent example of the so-called\r\n\u0027fallacy of division,\u0027 or predicating what is true only of a\r\ncollection, of each member of the collection distributively.\r\nIt no more follows that if a thousand things together cause\r\nsensation, one thing alone must cause it, than it follows\r\nthat if one pound weight moves a balance, then one ounce\r\nweight must move it too, in less degree. One ounce\r\nweight does not move it \u003ci\u003eat all\u003c/i\u003e; its movement \u003ci\u003ebegins\u003c/i\u003e with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[Pg 165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe pound. At most we can say that each ounce affects\r\nit in \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e way which helps the advent of that movement.\r\nAnd so each infra-sensible stimulus to a nerve\r\nno doubt affects the nerve and helps the birth of sensation\r\nwhen the other stimuli come. But this affection is\r\na nerve-affection, and there is not the slightest ground for\r\nsupposing it to be a \u0027perception\u0027 unconscious of itself.\r\n\"A certain \u003ci\u003equantity\u003c/i\u003e of the cause may be a necessary condition\r\nto the production of \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e of the effect,\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_179_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_179_179\"\u003e[179]\u003c/a\u003e when the\r\nlatter is a mental state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSecond Proof.\u003c/i\u003e In all acquired dexterities and habits,\r\nsecondarily automatic performances as they are called, we\r\ndo what \u003ci\u003eoriginally\u003c/i\u003e required a chain of deliberately conscious\r\nperceptions and volitions. As the actions still keep\r\ntheir intelligent character, intelligence must still preside\r\nover their execution. But since our consciousness seems\r\nall the while elsewhere engaged, such intelligence must\r\nconsist of unconscious perceptions, inferences, and volitions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e There is more than one alternative explanation\r\nin accordance with larger bodies of fact. One is that the\r\nperceptions and volitions in habitual actions may be performed\r\nconsciously, only so quickly and inattentively that\r\nno \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e of them remains. Another is that the consciousness\r\nof these actions exists, but is \u003ci\u003esplit-off\u003c/i\u003e from the rest of\r\nthe consciousness of the hemispheres. We shall find in\r\n\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter X\u003c/a\u003e numerous proofs of the reality of this split-off\r\ncondition of portions of consciousness. Since in man the\r\nhemispheres indubitably co-operate in these secondarily\r\nautomatic acts, it will not do to say either that they occur\r\nwithout consciousness or that their consciousness is that of\r\nthe lower centres, which we know nothing about. But\r\neither lack of memory or split-off cortical consciousness\r\nwill certainly account for all of the facts.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_180_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_180_180\"\u003e[180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThird Proof.\u003c/i\u003e Thinking of A, we presently find ourselves\r\nthinking of C. Now B is the natural logical link\r\nbetween A and C, but we have no consciousness of having\r\nthought of B. It must have been in our mind \u0027\u003ci\u003eun\u003c/i\u003econsciously,\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[Pg 166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand in that state affected the sequence of our\r\nideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e Here again we have a choice between more\r\nplausible explanations. Either B was consciously there,\r\nbut the next instant forgotten, or its \u003ci\u003ebrain-tract\u003c/i\u003e alone was\r\nadequate to do the whole work of coupling A with C, without\r\nthe idea B being aroused at all, whether consciously\r\nor \u0027unconsciously.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFourth Proof.\u003c/i\u003e Problems unsolved when we go to bed\r\nare found solved in the morning when we wake. Somnambulists\r\ndo rational things. We awaken punctually at an\r\nhour predetermined overnight, etc. Unconscious thinking,\r\nvolition, time-registration, etc., must have presided over\r\nthese acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e Consciousness forgotten, as in the hypnotic\r\ntrance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFifth Proof.\u003c/i\u003e Some patients will often, in an attack\r\nof epileptiform unconsciousness, go through complicated\r\nprocesses, such as eating a dinner in a restaurant and paying\r\nfor it, or making a violent homicidal attack. In trance,\r\nartificial or pathological, long and complex performances,\r\ninvolving the use of the reasoning powers, are executed, of\r\nwhich the patient is wholly unaware on coming to.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e Rapid and complete oblivescence is certainly\r\nthe explanation here. The analogue again is hypnotism.\r\nTell the subject of an hypnotic trance, during his trance,\r\nthat he \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e remember, and he may remember everything\r\nperfectly when he awakes, though without your telling him\r\nno memory would have remained. The extremely rapid\r\noblivescence of common \u003ci\u003edreams\u003c/i\u003e is a familiar fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSixth Proof.\u003c/i\u003e In a musical concord the vibrations of the\r\nseveral notes are in relatively simple ratios. The mind\r\nmust unconsciously count the vibrations, and be pleased by\r\nthe simplicity which it finds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e The brain-process produced by the simple ratios\r\nmay be as directly agreeable as the conscious process of\r\ncomparing them would be. No counting, either conscious\r\nor \u0027unconscious,\u0027 is required.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSeventh Proof.\u003c/i\u003e Every hour we make theoretic judgments\r\nand emotional reactions, and exhibit practical tendencies,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[Pg 167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor which we can give no explicit logical justification, but\r\nwhich are good inferences from certain premises. We\r\nknow more than we can say. Our conclusions run ahead\r\nof our power to analyze their grounds. A child, ignorant\r\nof the axiom that two things equal to the same are equal to\r\neach other, applies it nevertheless in his concrete judgments\r\nunerringly. A boor will use the \u003ci\u003edictum de omni et nullo\u003c/i\u003e who\r\nis unable to understand it in abstract terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We seldom consciously think how our house is painted, what the\r\nshade of it is, what the pattern of our furniture is, or whether the door\r\nopens to the right or left, or out or in. But how quickly should we\r\nnotice a change in any of these things! Think of the door you have\r\nmost often opened, and tell, if you can, whether it opens to the right or\r\nleft, out or in. Yet when you open the door you never put the hand\r\non the wrong side to find the latch, nor try to push it when it opens\r\nwith a pull…. What is the precise characteristic in your friend\u0027s step\r\nthat enables you to recognize it when he is coming? Did you ever consciously\r\nthink the idea, \u0027if I run into a solid piece of matter I shall get\r\nhurt, or be hindered in my progress\u0027? and do you avoid running into\r\nobstacles because you ever distinctly conceived, or consciously acquired\r\nand thought, that idea?\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_181_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_181_181\"\u003e[181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost of our knowledge is at all times potential. We act\r\nin accordance with the whole drift of what we have learned,\r\nbut few items rise into consciousness at the time. Many\r\nof them, however, we may recall at will. All this co-operation\r\nof unrealized principles and facts, of potential\r\nknowledge, with our actual thought is quite inexplicable\r\nunless we suppose the perpetual existence of an immense\r\nmass of \u003ci\u003eideas in an unconscious state\u003c/i\u003e, all of them exerting a\r\nsteady pressure and influence upon our conscious thinking,\r\nand many of them in such continuity with it as ever and\r\nanon to become conscious themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e No such mass of ideas is supposable. But there\r\nare all kinds of short-cuts in the brain; and processes not\r\naroused strongly enough to give any \u0027idea\u0027 distinct enough\r\nto be a premise, may, nevertheless, help to determine just\r\nthat resultant process of whose psychic accompaniment the\r\nsaid idea \u003ci\u003ewould\u003c/i\u003e be a premise, if the idea existed at all. A\r\ncertain overtone may be a feature of my friend\u0027s voice, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[Pg 168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay conspire with the other tones thereof to arouse in my\r\nbrain the process which suggests to my consciousness his\r\nname. And yet I may be ignorant of the overtone \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand unable, even when he speaks, to tell whether it be there\r\nor no. It leads me to the idea of the name; but it produces\r\nin me no such cerebral process as that to which the\r\n\u003ci\u003eidea of the overtone\u003c/i\u003e would correspond. And similarly of our\r\nlearning. Each subject we learn leaves behind it a modification\r\nof the brain, which makes it impossible for the latter\r\nto react upon things just as it did before; and the result of\r\nthe difference may be a tendency to act, though with no idea,\r\nmuch as we should \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e we were consciously thinking about\r\nthe subject. The becoming conscious of the latter at will\r\nis equally readily explained as a result of the brain-modification.\r\nThis, as Wundt phrases it, is a \u0027predisposition\u0027 to\r\nbring forth the conscious idea of the original subject, a predisposition\r\nwhich other stimuli and brain-processes may\r\nconvert into an actual result. But such a predisposition is\r\nno \u0027unconscious idea;\u0027 it is only a particular collocation of\r\nthe molecules in certain tracts of the brain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eEighth Proof.\u003c/i\u003e Instincts, as pursuits of ends by appropriate\r\nmeans, are manifestations of intelligence; but as the\r\nends are not foreseen, the intelligence must be unconscious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e Chapter XXIV will show that all the phenomena\r\nof instinct are explicable as actions of the nervous system,\r\nmechanically discharged by stimuli to the senses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eNinth Proof.\u003c/i\u003e In sense-perception we have results in\r\nabundance, which can only be explained as conclusions\r\ndrawn by a process of unconscious inference from data\r\ngiven to sense. A small human image on the retina is\r\nreferred, not to a pygmy, but to a distant man of normal\r\nsize. A certain gray patch is inferred to be a white object\r\nseen in a dim light. Often the inference leads us astray:\r\ne.g., pale gray against pale green looks red, because we\r\ntake a wrong premise to argue from. We think a green\r\nfilm is spread over everything; and knowing that under\r\nsuch a film a red thing would look gray, we wrongly infer\r\nfrom the gray appearance that a red thing must be there.\r\nOur study of space-perception in Chapter XVIII will give\r\nabundant additional examples both of the truthful and illusory\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[Pg 169]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npercepts which have been explained to result from\r\nunconscious logic operations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReply.\u003c/i\u003e That chapter will also in many cases refute\r\nthis explanation. Color-and light-contrast are certainly\r\npurely sensational affairs, in which inference plays no part.\r\nThis has been satisfactorily proved by Hering,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_182_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_182_182\"\u003e[182]\u003c/a\u003e and shall\r\nbe treated of again in Chapter XVII. Our rapid judgments\r\nof size, shape, distance, and the like, are best explained\r\nas processes of simple cerebral association. Certain\r\nsense-impressions directly stimulate brain-tracts, of\r\nwhose activity ready-made conscious percepts are the\r\nimmediate psychic counterparts. They do this by a mechanism\r\neither connate or acquired by habit. It is to be\r\nremarked that Wundt and Helmholtz, who in their earlier\r\nwritings did more than any one to give vogue to the notion\r\nthat unconscious inference is a vital factor in sense-perception,\r\nhave seen fit on later occasions to modify their views\r\nand to admit that results \u003ci\u003elike\u003c/i\u003e those of reasoning may accrue\r\nwithout any actual reasoning process unconsciously taking\r\nplace.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_183_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_183_183\"\u003e[183]\u003c/a\u003e Maybe the excessive and riotous applications made\r\nby Hartmann of their principle have led them to this\r\nchange. It would be natural to feel towards him as the\r\nsailor in the story felt towards the horse who got his foot\r\ninto the stirrup,—\"If you\u0027re going to get on, I must get off.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHartmann fairly boxes the compass of the universe with\r\nthe principle of unconscious thought. For him there is no\r\nnamable thing that does not exemplify it. But his logic\r\nis so lax and his failure to consider the most obvious alternatives\r\nso complete that it would, on the whole, be a\r\nwaste of time to look at his arguments in detail. The same\r\nis true of Schopenhauer, in whom the mythology reaches\r\nits climax. The visual perception, for example, of an\r\nobject in space results, according to him, from the intellect\r\nperforming the following operations, all unconscious. First,\r\nit apprehends the inverted retinal image and turns it right\r\nside up, constructing \u003ci\u003eflat space\u003c/i\u003e as a preliminary operation;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[Pg 170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthen it computes from the angle of convergence of the eyeballs\r\nthat the two retinal images must be the projection of\r\nbut a single \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e; thirdly, it constructs the third dimension\r\nand sees this object \u003ci\u003esolid\u003c/i\u003e; fourthly, it assigns its \u003ci\u003edistance\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand fifthly, in each and all of these operations it gets\r\nthe objective character of what it \u0027constructs\u0027 by unconsciously\r\ninferring it as the only possible \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e of some sensation\r\nwhich it unconsciously feels.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_184_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_184_184\"\u003e[184]\u003c/a\u003e Comment on this\r\nseems hardly called for. It is, as I said, pure mythology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNone of these facts, then, appealed to so confidently in\r\nproof of the existence of ideas in an unconscious state,\r\nprove anything of the sort. They prove either that conscious\r\nideas were present which the next instant were\r\nforgotten; or they prove that certain results, \u003ci\u003esimilar\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nresults of reasoning, may be wrought out by rapid brain-processes\r\nto which no ideation seems attached. But there\r\nis one more argument to be alleged, less obviously insufficient\r\nthan those which we have reviewed, and demanding\r\na new sort of reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTenth Proof.\u003c/i\u003e There is a great class of experiences in\r\nour mental life which may be described as discoveries that\r\na subjective condition which we have been having is really\r\nsomething different from what we had supposed. We suddenly\r\nfind ourselves bored by a thing which we thought we\r\nwere enjoying well enough; or in love with a person whom\r\nwe imagined we only liked. Or else we deliberately analyze\r\nour motives, and find that at bottom they contain\r\njealousies and cupidities which we little suspected to be\r\nthere. Our feelings towards people are perfect wells of\r\nmotivation, unconscious of itself, which introspection brings\r\nto light. And our sensations likewise: we constantly discover\r\nnew elements in sensations which we have been in\r\nthe habit of receiving all our days, elements, too, which\r\nhave been there from the first, since otherwise we should\r\nhave been unable to distinguish the sensations containing\r\nthem from others nearly allied. The elements must exist,\r\nfor we use them to discriminate by; but they must exist in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[Pg 171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan unconscious state, since we so completely fail to single\r\nthem out.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_185_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_185_185\"\u003e[185]\u003c/a\u003e The books of the analytic school of psychology\r\nabound in examples of the kind. Who knows the\r\ncountless associations that mingle with his each and every\r\nthought? Who can pick apart all the nameless feelings\r\nthat stream in at every moment from his various internal\r\norgans, muscles, heart, glands, lungs, etc., and compose in\r\ntheir totality his sense of bodily life? Who is aware of the\r\npart played by feelings of innervation and suggestions of\r\npossible muscular exertion in all his judgments of distance,\r\nshape, and size? Consider, too, the difference between a\r\nsensation which we simply \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e and one which we \u003ci\u003eattend to\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAttention gives results that seem like fresh creations; and\r\nyet the feelings and elements of feeling which it reveals\r\nmust have been already there—in an unconscious state.\r\nWe all know \u003ci\u003epractically\u003c/i\u003e the difference between the so-called\r\nsonant and the so-called surd consonants, between D, B, Z,\r\nG, V, and T, P, S, K, F, respectively. But comparatively few\r\npersons know the difference \u003ci\u003etheoretically\u003c/i\u003e, until their attention\r\nhas been called to what it is, when they perceive it\r\nreadily enough. The sonants are nothing but the surds\r\nplus a certain element, which is alike in all, superadded.\r\nThat element is the laryngeal sound with which they are\r\nuttered, surds having no such accompaniment. When we\r\nhear the sonant letter, both its component elements must\r\nreally be in our mind; but we remain unconscious of what\r\nthey really are, and mistake the letter for a simple quality\r\nof sound until an effort of attention teaches us its two components.\r\nThere exist a host of sensations which most men\r\npass through life and never attend to, and consequently\r\nhave only in an unconscious way. The feelings of opening\r\nand closing the glottis, of making tense the tympanic membrane,\r\nof accommodating for near vision, of intercepting the\r\npassage from the nostrils to the throat, are instances of\r\nwhat I mean. Every one gets these feelings many times an\r\nhour; but few readers, probably, are conscious of exactly\r\nwhat sensations are meant by the names I have just used.\r\nAll these facts, and an enormous number more, seem to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[Pg 172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprove conclusively that, in addition to the fully conscious\r\nway in which an idea may exist in the mind, there is also\r\nan unconscious way; that it is unquestionably the same\r\nidentical idea which exists in these two ways; and that\r\ntherefore any arguments against the mind-stuff theory,\r\nbased on the notion that \u003ci\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e in our mental life is \u003ci\u003esentiri\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand that an idea must consciously be felt as what it is, fall\r\nto the ground.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eObjection.\u003c/i\u003e These reasonings are one tissue of confusion.\r\nTwo states of mind which refer to the same external reality,\r\nor two states of mind the later one of which refers to the\r\nearlier, are described as the same state of mind, or \u0027idea,\u0027\r\npublished as it were in two editions; and then whatever\r\nqualities of the second edition are found openly lacking in\r\nthe first are explained as having really been there, only in\r\nan \u0027unconscious\u0027 way. It would be difficult to believe that\r\nintelligent men could be guilty of so patent a fallacy, were\r\nnot the history of psychology there to give the proof. The\r\npsychological stock-in-trade of some authors is the belief\r\nthat two thoughts about one thing are virtually the same\r\nthought, and that this same thought may in subsequent\r\nreflections become more and more \u003ci\u003econscious\u003c/i\u003e of what it really\r\n\u003ci\u003ewas\u003c/i\u003e all along from the first. But once make the distinction\r\nbetween simply \u003ci\u003ehaving an idea\u003c/i\u003e at the moment of its presence\r\nand subsequently knowing all sorts of things \u003ci\u003eabout it\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nmake moreover that between a state of mind itself, taken\r\nas a subjective fact, on the one hand, and the objective\r\nthing it knows, on the other, and one has no difficulty in\r\nescaping from the labyrinth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake the latter distinction first: Immediately all the\r\narguments based on sensations and the new features in\r\nthem which attention brings to light fall to the ground.\r\nThe sensations of the B and the V when we attend to these\r\nsounds and analyze out the laryngeal contribution which\r\nmakes them differ from P and F respectively, are \u003ci\u003edifferent\r\nsensations\u003c/i\u003e from those of the B and the V taken in a simple\r\nway. They stand, it is true, for the \u003ci\u003esame letters\u003c/i\u003e, and thus\r\nmean the \u003ci\u003esame outer realities\u003c/i\u003e; but they are different mental\r\naffections, and certainly depend on widely different processes\r\nof cerebral activity. It is unbelievable that two mental\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[Pg 173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstates so different as the passive reception of a sound as a\r\nwhole, and the analysis of that whole into distinct ingredients\r\nby voluntary attention, should be due to processes\r\nat all similar. And the subjective difference does not consist\r\nin that the first-named state \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the second in an \u0027unconscious\u0027\r\nform. It is an absolute psychic difference, even\r\ngreater than that between the states to which two different\r\nsurds will give rise. The same is true of the other sensations\r\nchosen as examples. The man who learns for the\r\nfirst time how the closure of his glottis feels, experiences in\r\nthis discovery an absolutely new psychic modification, the\r\nlike of which he never had before. He had another feeling\r\nbefore, a feeling incessantly renewed, and of which the same\r\nglottis was the organic starting point; but that was not the\r\nlater feeling in an \u0027unconscious\u0027 state; it was a feeling \u003ci\u003esui\r\ngeneris\u003c/i\u003e altogether, although it took cognizance of the same\r\nbodily part, the glottis. We shall see, hereafter, that the\r\nsame reality can be cognized by an endless number of\r\npsychic states, which may differ \u003ci\u003etoto cœlo\u003c/i\u003e among themselves,\r\nwithout ceasing on that account to refer to the reality in\r\nquestion. Each of them is a conscious fact: none of them\r\nhas any mode of being whatever except a certain way of\r\nbeing felt at the moment of being present. It is simply\r\nunintelligible and fantastical to say, because they point to\r\nthe same outer reality, that they must therefore be so many\r\neditions of the same \u0027idea,\u0027 now in a conscious and now in\r\nan \u0027unconscious\u0027 phase. There is only one \u0027phase\u0027 in\r\nwhich an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condition.\r\nIf it is not in that condition, then it is not at all.\r\nSomething else is, in its place. The something else may be\r\na merely physical brain-process, or it may be another conscious\r\nidea. Either of these things may perform much the\r\nsame \u003ci\u003efunction\u003c/i\u003e as the first idea, refer to the same object,\r\nand roughly stand in the same relations to the upshot of\r\nour thought. But that is no reason why we should throw\r\naway the logical principle of identity in psychology, and\r\nsay that, however it may fare in the outer world, the mind\r\nat any rate is a place in which a thing can be all kinds of\r\nother things without ceasing to be itself as well.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow take the other cases alleged, and the other distinction,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[Pg 174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat namely between \u003ci\u003ehaving\u003c/i\u003e a mental state and knowing\r\nall \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it. The truth is here even simpler to unravel.\r\nWhen I decide that I have, without knowing it, been for\r\nseveral weeks in love, I am simply giving a name to a state\r\nwhich previously \u003ci\u003eI have not named\u003c/i\u003e, but which was fully conscious;\r\nwhich had no residual mode of being except the\r\nmanner in which it was conscious; and which, though it was\r\na feeling towards the same person for whom I now have a\r\nmuch more inflamed feeling, and though it continuously led\r\ninto the latter, and is similar enough to be called by the\r\nsame name, is yet in no sense identical with the latter, and\r\nleast of all in an \u0027unconscious\u0027 way. Again, the feelings from\r\nour viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the feelings of\r\ninnervation (if such there be), and those of muscular exertion\r\nwhich, in our spatial judgments, are supposed unconsciously\r\nto determine what we shall perceive, are just exactly\r\nwhat we feel them, perfectly determinate conscious states,\r\nnot vague editions of other conscious states. They may be\r\nfaint and weak; they may be very vague cognizers of the\r\nsame realities which other conscious states cognize and name\r\nexactly; they may be unconscious of much in the reality\r\nwhich the other states are conscious of. But that does not\r\nmake them \u003ci\u003ein themselves\u003c/i\u003e a whit dim or vague or unconscious.\r\nThey \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e eternally as they feel when they exist,\r\nand can, neither actually nor potentially, be identified with\r\nanything else than their own faint selves. A faint feeling\r\nmay be looked back upon and classified and understood in\r\nits relations to what went before or after it in the stream of\r\nthought. But it, on the one hand, and the later state of\r\nmind which knows all these things about it, on the other,\r\nare surely not two conditions, one conscious and the other\r\n\u0027unconscious,\u0027 of the same identical psychic fact. It is the\r\ndestiny of thought that, on the whole, our early ideas are\r\nsuperseded by later ones, giving fuller accounts of the same\r\nrealities. But none the less do the earlier and the later\r\nideas preserve their own several substantive identities as so\r\nmany several successive states of mind. To believe the contrary\r\nwould make any definite science of psychology impossible.\r\nThe only identity to be found among our successive\r\nideas is their similarity of cognitive or representative\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[Pg 175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfunction as dealing with the same objects. Identity of\r\n\u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e, there is none; and I believe that throughout the rest\r\nof this volume the reader will reap the advantages of the\r\nsimpler way of formulating the facts which is here begun.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_186_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_186_186\"\u003e[186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo we seem not only to have ascertained the unintelligibility\r\nof the notion that a mental fact can be two things\r\nat once, and that what seems like one feeling, of blueness\r\nfor example, or of hatred, may really and \u0027unconsciously\u0027\r\nbe ten thousand elementary feelings which do not resemble\r\nblueness or hatred at all, but we find that we can\r\nexpress all the observed facts in other ways. The mind-stuff\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[Pg 176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheory, however, though scotched, is, we may be sure,\r\nnot killed. If we ascribe consciousness to unicellular\r\nanimalcules, then single cells can have it, and analogy\r\nshould make us ascribe it to the several cells of the brain,\r\neach individually taken. And what a convenience would it\r\nnot be for the psychologist if, by the adding together of various\r\ndoses of this separate-cell-consciousness, he could treat\r\nthought as a kind of stuff or material, to be measured out\r\nin great or small amount, increased and subtracted from,\r\nand baled about at will! He feels an imperious craving\r\nto be allowed to \u003ci\u003econstruct\u003c/i\u003e synthetically the successive\r\nmental states which he describes. The mind-stuff theory\r\nso easily admits of the construction being made, that it\r\nseems certain that \u0027man\u0027s unconquerable mind\u0027 will devote\r\nmuch future pertinacity and ingenuity to setting it on its\r\nlegs again and getting it into some sort of plausible working-order.\r\nI will therefore conclude the chapter with some\r\nconsideration of the remaining difficulties which beset the\r\nmatter as it at present stands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eDIFFICULTY OF STATING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MIND\r\nAND BRAIN.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be remembered that in our criticism of the theory\r\nof the integration of successive conscious units into a feeling\r\nof musical pitch, we decided that whatever integration\r\nthere was was that of the air-pulses into a simpler and simpler\r\nsort of physical effect, as the propagations of material\r\nchange got higher and higher in the nervous system. At\r\nlast, we said (\u003ca href=\"#Page_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 23\u003c/a\u003e), there results some simple and massive\r\nprocess in the auditory centres of the hemispherical cortex,\r\nto which, \u003ci\u003eas a whole\u003c/i\u003e, the feeling of musical pitch directly\r\ncorresponds. Already, in discussing the localization of\r\nfunctions in the brain, I had said (\u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 158-9\u003c/a\u003e) that consciousness\r\naccompanies the stream of innervation through that\r\norgan and varies in quality with the character of the currents,\r\nbeing mainly of things seen if the occipital lobes are\r\nmuch involved, of things heard if the action is focalized in\r\nthe temporal lobes, etc., etc.; and I had added that a vague\r\nformula like this was as much as one could safely venture\r\non in the actual state of physiology. The facts of mental\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[Pg 177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndeafness and blindness, of auditory and optical aphasia,\r\nshow us that the whole brain must act together if certain\r\nthoughts are to occur. The consciousness, which is itself\r\nan integral thing not made of parts, \u0027corresponds\u0027 to the\r\nentire activity of the brain, whatever that may be, at the\r\nmoment. This is a way of expressing the relation of mind\r\nand brain from which I shall not depart during the remainder\r\nof the book, because it expresses the bare\r\nphenomenal fact with no hypothesis, and is exposed to no\r\nsuch logical objections as we have found to cling to the\r\ntheory of ideas in combination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNevertheless, this formula which is so unobjectionable\r\nif taken vaguely, positivistically, or scientifically, as a\r\nmere empirical law of concomitance between our thoughts\r\nand our brain, tumbles to pieces entirely if we assume\r\nto represent anything more intimate or ultimate by it.\r\nThe ultimate of ultimate problems, of course, in the\r\nstudy of the relations of thought and brain, is to understand\r\nwhy and how such disparate things are connected\r\nat all. But before that problem is solved (if it ever is\r\nsolved) there is a less ultimate problem which must first\r\nbe settled. Before the connection of thought and brain\r\ncan be explained, it must at least be \u003ci\u003estated\u003c/i\u003e in an elementary\r\nform; and there are great difficulties about so stating it.\r\nTo state it in elementary form one must reduce it to its\r\nlowest terms and know which mental fact and which cerebral\r\nfact are, so to speak, in immediate juxtaposition. We must\r\nfind the minimal mental fact whose being reposes directly\r\non a brain-fact; and we must similarly find the minimal\r\nbrain-event which will have a mental counterpart at all.\r\nBetween the mental and the physical minima thus found\r\nthere will be an immediate relation, the expression of\r\nwhich, if we had it, would be the elementary psycho-physic\r\nlaw.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur own formula escapes the unintelligibility of psychic\r\natoms by \u003ci\u003etaking the entire thought\u003c/i\u003e (even of a complex\r\nobject) \u003ci\u003eas the minimum with which it deals on the mental\r\nside\u003c/i\u003e. But in taking the entire brain-process as its minimal\r\nfact on the material side it confronts other difficulties\r\nalmost as bad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[Pg 178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, it ignores analogies on which certain\r\ncritics will insist, those, namely, between the composition\r\nof the total brain-process and that of the \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nthought. The total brain-process is composed of parts,\r\nof simultaneous processes in the seeing, the hearing, the\r\nfeeling, and other centres. The object thought of is also\r\ncomposed of parts, some of which are seen, others heard,\r\nothers perceived by touch and muscular manipulation.\r\n\"How then,\" these critics will say, \"should the thought\r\nnot itself be composed of parts, each the counterpart\r\nof a part of the object and of a part of the brain-process?\"\r\nSo natural is this way of looking at the matter\r\nthat it has given rise to what is on the whole the most\r\nflourishing of all psychological systems—that of the Lockian\r\nschool of associated ideas—of which school the mind-stuff\r\ntheory is nothing but the last and subtlest offshoot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second difficulty is deeper still. \u003ci\u003eThe \u0027entire brain-process\u0027\r\nis not a physical fact at all.\u003c/i\u003e It is the appearance to\r\nan onlooking mind of a multitude of physical facts. \u0027Entire\r\nbrain\u0027 is nothing but our name for the way in which a\r\nmillion of molecules arranged in certain positions may\r\naffect our sense. On the principles of the corpuscular or\r\nmechanical philosophy, the only realities are the separate\r\nmolecules, or at most the cells. Their aggregation into\r\na \u0027brain\u0027 is a fiction of popular speech. Such a fiction\r\ncannot serve as the objectively real counterpart to any\r\npsychic state whatever. Only a genuinely physical fact can\r\nso serve. But the molecular fact is the only genuine physical\r\nfact—whereupon we seem, if we are to have an elementary\r\npsycho-physic law at all, thrust right back upon something\r\nlike the mind-stuff theory, for the molecular fact,\r\nbeing an element of the \u0027brain,\u0027 would seem naturally to\r\ncorrespond, not to the total thoughts, but to elements in\r\nthe thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat shall we do? Many would find relief at this\r\npoint in celebrating the mystery of the Unknowable and the\r\n\u0027awe\u0027 which we should feel at having such a principle to\r\ntake final charge of our perplexities. Others would rejoice\r\nthat the finite and separatist view of things with which we\r\nstarted had at last developed its contradictions, and was\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[Pg 179]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabout to lead us dialectically upwards to some \u0027higher\r\nsynthesis\u0027 in which inconsistencies cease from troubling\r\nand logic is at rest. It may be a constitutional infirmity,\r\nbut I can take no comfort in such devices for making a\r\nluxury of intellectual defeat. They are but spiritual\r\nchloroform. Better live on the ragged edge, better gnaw\r\nthe file forever!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE MATERIAL-MONAD THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most rational thing to do is to suspect that there\r\nmay be a third possibility, an alternative supposition which\r\nwe have not considered. Now there \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e an alternative supposition—a\r\nsupposition moreover which has been frequently\r\nmade in the history of philosophy, and which is\r\nfreer from logical objections than either of the views we\r\nhave ourselves discussed. It may be called the \u003ci\u003etheory of\r\npolyzoism or multiple monadism\u003c/i\u003e; and it conceives the matter\r\nthus:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery brain-cell has its own individual consciousness,\r\nwhich no other cell knows anything about, all individual\r\nconsciousnesses being \u0027ejective\u0027 to each other. There is,\r\nhowever, among the cells one central or pontifical one to\r\nwhich \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e consciousness is attached. But the events of all the\r\nother cells physically influence this arch-cell; and through\r\nproducing their joint effects on it, these other cells may be\r\nsaid to \u0027combine.\u0027 The arch-cell is, in fact, one of those\r\n\u0027external media\u0027 without which we saw that no fusion or\r\nintegration of a number of things can occur. The physical\r\nmodifications of the arch-cell thus form a sequence of\r\nresults in the production whereof every other cell has a\r\nshare, so that, as one might say, every other cell is represented\r\ntherein. And similarly, the conscious correlates to\r\nthese physical modifications form a sequence of thoughts\r\nor feelings, each one of which is, as to its substantive\r\nbeing, an integral and uncompounded psychic thing, but\r\neach one of which may (in the exercise of its \u003ci\u003ecognitive\u003c/i\u003e\r\nfunction) be \u003ci\u003eaware of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ethings\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/i\u003e many and complicated in\r\nproportion to the number of other cells that have helped\r\nto modify the central cell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy a conception of this sort, one incurs neither of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[Pg 180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninternal contradictions which we found to beset the other\r\ntwo theories. One has no unintelligible self-combining of\r\npsychic units to account for on the one hand; and on the\r\nother hand, one need not treat as the physical counterpart\r\nof the stream of consciousness under observation, a \u0027total\r\nbrain-activity\u0027 which is non-existent as a genuinely physical\r\nfact. But, to offset these advantages, one has physiological\r\ndifficulties and improbabilities. There is no cell\r\nor group of cells in the brain of such anatomical or functional\r\npre-eminence as to appear to be the keystone or centre\r\nof gravity of the whole system. And even if there were\r\nsuch a cell, the theory of multiple monadism would, in\r\nstrictness of thought, have no right to stop at it and treat\r\nit as a unit. The cell is no more a unit, materially considered,\r\nthan the total brain is a unit. It is a compound of\r\nmolecules, just as the brain is a compound of cells and fibres.\r\nAnd the molecules, according to the prevalent physical theories,\r\nare in turn compounds of atoms. The theory in question,\r\ntherefore, if radically carried out, must set up for its\r\nelementary and irreducible psycho-physic couple, not the\r\ncell and its consciousness, but the primordial and eternal\r\natom and its consciousness. We are back at Leibnitzian\r\nmonadism, and therewith leave physiology behind us and\r\ndive into regions inaccessible to experience and verification;\r\nand our doctrine, although not self-contradictory, becomes\r\nso remote and unreal as to be almost as bad as if it were.\r\nSpeculative minds alone will take an interest in it; and\r\nmetaphysics, not psychology, will be responsible for its\r\ncareer. That the career may be a successful one must be\r\nadmitted as a possibility—a theory which Leibnitz, Herbart,\r\nand Lotze have taken under their protection must\r\nhave some sort of a destiny.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE SOUL-THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut is this my last word? By no means. Many\r\nreaders have certainly been saying to themselves for the\r\nlast few pages: \"Why on earth doesn\u0027t the poor man say\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe Soul\u003c/i\u003e and have done with it?\" Other readers, of anti-spiritualistic\r\ntraining and prepossessions, advanced thinkers,\r\nor popular evolutionists, will perhaps be a little surprised\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[Pg 181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto find this much-despised word now sprung upon\r\nthem at the end of so physiological a train of thought. But\r\nthe plain fact is that all the arguments for a \u0027pontifical cell\u0027\r\nor an \u0027arch-monad\u0027 are also arguments for that well-known\r\nspiritual agent in which scholastic psychology and common-sense\r\nhave always believed. And my only reason for\r\nbeating the bushes so, and not bringing it in earlier as a\r\npossible solution of our difficulties, has been that by this\r\nprocedure I might perhaps force some of these materialistic\r\nminds to feel the more strongly the logical respectability of\r\nthe spiritualistic position. The fact is that one cannot\r\nafford to despise any of these great traditional objects of\r\nbelief. Whether we realize it or not, there is always a great\r\ndrift of reasons, positive and negative, towing us in their\r\ndirection. If there be such entities as Souls in the universe,\r\nthey may possibly be affected by the manifold occurrences\r\nthat go on in the nervous centres. To the state of the entire\r\nbrain at a given moment they may respond by inward\r\nmodifications of their own. These changes of state may be\r\npulses of consciousness, cognitive of objects few or many,\r\nsimple or complex. The soul would be thus a medium\r\nupon which (to use our earlier phraseology) the manifold\r\nbrain-processes \u003ci\u003ecombine their effects\u003c/i\u003e. Not needing to consider\r\nit as the \u0027inner aspect\u0027 of any arch-molecule or brain-cell,\r\nwe escape that physiological improbability; and as its\r\npulses of consciousness are unitary and integral affairs from\r\nthe outset, we escape the absurdity of supposing feelings\r\nwhich exist separately and then \u0027fuse together\u0027 by themselves.\r\nThe separateness is in the brain-world, on this\r\ntheory, and the unity in the soul-world; and the only\r\ntrouble that remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of\r\nunderstanding how one sort of world or existent thing can\r\naffect or influence another at all. This trouble, however,\r\nsince it also exists inside of both worlds, and involves\r\nneither physical improbability nor logical contradiction, is\r\nrelatively small.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI confess, therefore, that to posit a soul influenced in\r\nsome mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to\r\nthem by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the\r\nline of least logical resistance, so far as we yet have attained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[Pg 182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf it does not strictly \u003ci\u003eexplain\u003c/i\u003e anything, it is at any rate\r\nless positively objectionable than either mind-stuff or a\r\nmaterial-monad creed. \u003ci\u003eThe bare\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ephenomenon,\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ehowever, the\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eimmediately known\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ething which on the mental side is in apposition\r\nwith the entire brain-process is the state of consciousness\r\nand not the soul itself.\u003c/i\u003e Many of the stanchest believers in\r\nthe soul admit that we know it only as an inference from\r\nexperiencing its \u003ci\u003estates\u003c/i\u003e. In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter X\u003c/a\u003e, accordingly, we must\r\nreturn to its consideration again, and \u003ci\u003eask ourselves whether,\r\nafter all, the ascertainment of a blank unmediated correspondence,\r\nterm for term, of the succession of states of consciousness\r\nwith the succession of total brain-processes, be not the simplest\r\npsycho-physic formula, and the last word of a psychology\r\nwhich contents itself with verifiable laws, and seeks only to\r\nbe clear, and to avoid unsafe hypotheses.\u003c/i\u003e Such a mere admission\r\nof the empirical parallelism will there appear the\r\nwisest course. By keeping to it, our psychology will remain\r\npositivistic and non-metaphysical; and although this\r\nis certainly only a provisional halting-place, and things\r\nmust some day be more thoroughly thought out, we shall\r\nabide there in this book, and just as we have rejected mind-dust,\r\nwe shall take no account of the soul. The spiritualistic\r\nreader may nevertheless believe in the soul if he will;\r\nwhilst the positivistic one who wishes to give a tinge of\r\nmystery to the expression of his positivism can continue to\r\nsay that nature in her unfathomable designs has mixed us\r\nof clay and flame, of brain and mind, that the two things\r\nhang indubitably together and determine each other\u0027s being,\r\nbut how or why, no mortal may ever know.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_160_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_160_160\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[160]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychol. § 62.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_161_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_161_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[161]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e § 272.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_162_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_162_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[162]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Fragments of Science, 5th ed., p. 420.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_163_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_163_163\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[163]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Belfast Address, \u0027Nature,\u0027 August 20, 1874, p. 318. I cannot help\r\nremarking that the disparity between motions and feelings on which these\r\nauthors lay so much stress, is somewhat less absolute than at first sight\r\nit seems. There are categories common to the two worlds. Not only temporal\r\nsuccession (as Helmholtz admits, Physiol. Optik, p. 445), but such\r\nattributes as intensity, volume, simplicity or complication, smooth or impeded\r\nchange, rest or agitation, are habitually predicated of both physical\r\nfacts and mental facts. Where such analogies obtain, the things do have\r\nsomething in common.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_164_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_164_164\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[164]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychology, § 131\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_165_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_165_165\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[165]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Nature,\u0027 as above, 317-8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_166_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_166_166\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[166]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Nascent\u0027 is Mr. Spencer\u0027s great word. In showing how at a certain\r\npoint consciousness must appear upon the evolving scene this author fairly\r\noutdoes himself in vagueness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"In its higher forms, Instinct is probably accompanied by a rudimentary\r\nconsciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of many stimuli without\r\nsome ganglion through which they are all brought into relation. In the\r\nprocess of bringing them into relation, this ganglion must be subject to\r\nthe influence of each—must undergo many changes. And the quick succession\r\nof changes in a ganglion, implying as it does perpetual experiences\r\nof differences and likenesses, constitutes the \u003ci\u003eraw material\u003c/i\u003e of consciousness.\r\nThe \u003ci\u003eimplication\u003c/i\u003e is that as fast as Instinct is developed, some kind of consciousness\r\nbecomes nascent.\" (Psychology, § 195.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe words \u0027raw material\u0027 and \u0027implication\u0027 which I have italicized\r\nare the words which do the \u003ci\u003eevolving\u003c/i\u003e. They are supposed to have all the\r\nrigor which the \u0027synthetic philosophy\u0027 requires. In the following passage,\r\nwhen \u0027impressions\u0027 pass through a common \u0027centre of communication\u0027\r\nin succession (much as people might pass into a theatre through a turnstile)\r\nconsciousness, non-existent until then, is supposed to result:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Separate impressions are received by the senses—by different parts of the\r\nbody. If they go no further than the places at which they are received, they\r\nare useless. Or if only some of them are brought into relation with one another,\r\nthey are useless. That an effectual adjustment may be made, they must\r\nbe all brought into relation with one another. But this implies some centre\r\nof communication common to them all, through which they severally pass;\r\nand as they cannot pass through it simultaneously, they must pass through\r\nit in succession. So that as the external phenomena responded to become\r\ngreater in number and more complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity\r\nof the changes to which this common centre of communication is subject\r\nmust increase—there must result an unbroken series of these changes-\u003ci\u003ethere\r\nmust arise a consciousness\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Hence the progress of the correspondence between the organism and its\r\nenvironment necessitates a gradual reduction of the sensorial changes to a\r\nsuccession; and by so doing \u003ci\u003eevolves a distinct consciousness\u003c/i\u003e—a consciousness\r\nthat becomes higher as the succession becomes more rapid and the correspondence\r\nmore complete.\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e § 179.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is true that in the Fortnightly Review (vol. xiv, p. 716) Mr. Spencer\r\ndenies that he means by this passage to tell us anything about the origin of\r\nconsciousness at all. It resembles, however, too many other places in his\r\nPsychology (e.g. §§ 43, 110, 244) not to be taken as a serious attempt to explain\r\nhow consciousness must at a certain point be \u0027evolved.\u0027 That,\r\nwhen a critic calls his attention to the inanity of his words, Mr. Spencer\r\nshould say he never meant anything particular by them, is simply an\r\nexample of the scandalous vagueness with which this sort of \u0027chromo-philosophy\u0027\r\nis carried on.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_167_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_167_167\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[167]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e His own words are: \"Mistakes are made in the sense that he admits\r\nhaving been touched, when in reality it was radiant heat that affected his\r\nskin. In our own before-mentioned experiments there was never any deception\r\non the entire palmar side of the hand or on the face. On the back\r\nof the hand in one case in a series of 60 stimulations 4 mistakes occurred,\r\nin another case 2 mistakes in 45 stimulations. On the extensor side of the\r\nupper arm 3 deceptions out of 48 stimulations were noticed, and in the case\r\nof another individual, 1 out of 31. In one case over the spine 3 deceptions\r\nin a series of 11 excitations were observed; in another, 4 out of 19. On\r\nthe lumbar spine 6 deceptions came among 29 stimulations, and again 4\r\nout of 7. There is certainly not yet enough material on which to rest a\r\ncalculation of probabilities, but any one can easily convince himself that\r\non the back there is no question of even a moderately accurate discrimination\r\nbetween warmth and a light pressure so far as but small portions of\r\nskin come into play. It has been as yet impossible to make corresponding\r\nexperiments with regard to sensibility to cold.\" (Lehrb. d. Anat. u.\r\nPhysiol. d. Sinnesorgane (1862), p. 29.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_168_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_168_168\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[168]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Principles of Psychology, § 60.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_169_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_169_169\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[169]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Oddly enough, Mr. Spencer seems quite unaware of the \u003ci\u003egeneral\u003c/i\u003e function\r\nof the theory of elementary units of mind-stuff in the evolutionary\r\nphilosophy. We have seen it to be absolutely indispensable, if that philosophy\r\nis to work, to postulate consciousness in the nebula,—-the simplest\r\nway being, of course, to suppose every atom animated. Mr. Spencer, however,\r\nwill have it (e.g. First Principles, § 71) that consciousness is only the\r\noccasional result of the \u0027transformation\u0027 of a certain amount of \u0027physical\r\nforce\u0027 to which it is \u0027equivalent.\u0027 Presumably a brain must already be there\r\nbefore any such \u0027transformation\u0027 can take place; and so the argument\r\nquoted in the text stands as a mere local detail, without general bearings.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_170_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_170_170\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[170]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The compounding of colors may be dealt with in an identical way.\r\nHelmholtz has shown that if green light and red light fall simultaneously\r\non the retina, we see the color yellow. The mind-stuff theory would interpret\r\nthis as a ease where the feeling green and the feeling red \u0027combine\u0027\r\ninto the \u003ci\u003etertium quid\u003c/i\u003e of feeling, yellow. What really occurs is no\r\ndoubt that a third kind of nerve-process is set up when the combined lights\r\nimpinge on the retina,—not simply the process of red plus the process of\r\ngreen, but something quite different from both or either. Of course, then,\r\nthere \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e no feelings, either of red or of green, present to the mind at all;\r\nbut the feeling of yellow which \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e there, answers as directly to the nerve-process\r\nwhich momentarily then exists, as the feelings of green and red\r\nwould answer to their respective nerve-processes did the latter happen to be\r\ntaking place.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_171_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_171_171\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[171]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Mill\u0027s Logic, book vi, chap. iv, § 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_172_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_172_172\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[172]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I find in my students an almost invincible tendency to think that we\r\ncan immediately perceive that feelings do combine. \"What!\" they say,\r\n\"is not the taste of lemonade composed of that of lemon \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e that of\r\nsugar?\" This is taking the combining of objects for that of feelings.\r\nThe physical lemonade contains both the lemon and the sugar, but its\r\ntaste does not contain their tastes, for if there are any two things which\r\nare certainly \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e present in the taste of lemonade, those are the lemon-sour\r\non the one hand and the sugar-sweet on the other. These tastes are\r\nabsent utterly. The entirely new taste which is present \u003ci\u003eresembles\u003c/i\u003e, it is true,\r\nboth those tastes; but in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XIII\u003c/a\u003e we shall see that resemblance can\r\nnot always be held to involve partial identity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_173_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_173_173\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[173]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E. Montgomery, in \u0027Mind,\u0027 v, 18-19. See also \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 24-5\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_174_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_174_174\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[174]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Royce, \u0027Mind,\u0027 vi, p. 376. Lotze has set forth the truth of this law\r\nmore clearly and copiously than any other writer. Unfortunately he is too\r\nlengthy to quote. See his Microcosmus, bk. ii, ch. i, § 5; Metaphysik,\r\n§§ 242, 260; Outlines of Metaphysics, part ii, chap. i, §§ 3, 4, 5. Compare\r\nalso Reid\u0027s Intellectual Powers, essay v, chap. iii, \u003ci\u003ead fin.\u003c/i\u003e; Bowne\u0027s Metaphysics,\r\npp. 361-76; St. J. Mivart: Nature and Thought, pp. 98-101; E.\r\nGurney: \u0027Monism,\u0027 in \u0027Mind,\u0027 vi, 153; and the article by Prof. Royce,\r\njust quoted, on \u0027Mind-stuff and Reality.\u0027\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eIn defence of the mind-stuff view,\u003c/i\u003e see W. K. Clifford: \u0027Mind,\u0027 iii, 57 (reprinted\r\nin his \u0027Lectures and Essays,\u0027 ii, 71); G. T. Fechner, Psychophysik,\r\nBd. ii, cap. xlv; H. Taine: on Intelligence, bk. iii; E. Haeckel:\r\n\u0027Zellseelen u. Seelenzellen\u0027 in Gesammelte pop. Vorträge, Bd. i, p. 143; W.\r\nS. Duncan: Conscious Matter, \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e; H. Zöllner: Natur d. Cometen, pp.\r\n320 ff.; Alfred Barratt: \u0027Physical Ethic\u0027 and \u0027Physical Metempiric,\u0027 \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nJ. Soury: \u0027Hylozoismus,\u0027 in \u0027Kosmos,\u0027 V. Jahrg., Heft x, p. 241; A.\r\nMain: \u0027Mind,\u0027 i, 292, 431, 566; ii, 129, 402; \u003ci\u003eId.\u003c/i\u003e Revue Philos., ii, 86, 88,\r\n419; iii, 51, 502; iv, 402; F. W. Frankland: \u0027Mind,\u0027 vi, 116; Whittaker:\r\n\u0027Mind,\u0027 vi, 498 (historical); Morton Prince: The Nature of Mind and\r\nHuman Automatism (1885); A. Riehl: Der philosophische Kriticismus, Bd.\r\nii, Theil 2, 2ter Abschnitt, 2tes Cap. (1887). The clearest of all these\r\nStatements is, as far as it goes, that of Prince.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_175_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_175_175\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[175]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Someone might say that although it is true that neither a blind\r\nman nor a deaf man by himself can compare sounds with colors, yet\r\nsince one hears and the other sees they might do so both together….\r\nBut whether they are apart or close together makes no difference; not even\r\nif they permanently keep house together; no, not if they were Siamese\r\ntwins, or more than Siamese twins, and were inseparably grown together,\r\nwould it make the assumption any more possible. Only when sound and\r\ncolor are represented in the same reality is it thinkable that they should\r\nbe compared.\" (Brentano: Psychologie, p. 209.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_176_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_176_176\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[176]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The reader must observe that we are reasoning altogether about the\r\n\u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e of the mind-stuff theory, about whether it can \u003ci\u003eexist in the constitution\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof higher mental states by viewing them as \u003ci\u003eidentical with lower ones\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsummed together. We say the two sorts of fact are not identical: a higher\r\nstate \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not a lot of lower states; it is itself. When, however, a lot of\r\nlower states have come together, or when certain brain-conditions occur\r\ntogether which, \u003ci\u003eif they occurred separately, would produce\u003c/i\u003e a lot of lower\r\nstates, we have not for a moment pretended that a higher state may not\r\nemerge. In fact it does emerge under those conditions; and our \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter\r\nIX\u003c/a\u003e will be mainly devoted to the proof of this fact. But such emergence\r\nis that of a new psychic entity, and is \u003ci\u003etoto cœlo\u003c/i\u003e different from such an\r\n\u0027integration\u0027 of the lower states as the mind-stuff theory affirms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may seem strange to suppose that anyone should mistake criticism of\r\na certain theory about a fact for doubt of the fact itself. And yet the\r\nconfusion is made in high quarters enough to justify our remarks. Mr. J.\r\nWard, in his article Psychology in the Encyclopædia Britannica, speaking\r\nof the hypothesis that \"a series of feelings can be aware of itself as\r\na series,\" says (p. 39): \"Paradox is too mild a word for it, even contradiction\r\nwill hardly suffice.\" Whereupon, Professor Bain takes him thus to task:\r\n\"As to \u0027a series of states being aware of itself,\u0027 I confess I see no insurmountable\r\ndifficulty. It may be a fact, or not a fact; it may be a very\r\nclumsy expression for what it is applied to; but it is neither paradox nor\r\ncontradiction. A series merely contradicts an individual, or it may be\r\ntwo or more individuals as coexisting; but that is too general to exclude\r\nthe possibility of self-knowledge. It certainly does not bring the property\r\nof self-knowledge into the foreground, which, however, is not the same\r\nas denying it. An algebraic series might know itself, without any contradiction:\r\nthe only thing against it is the want of evidence of the fact.\"\r\n(\u0027Mind,\u0027 xi, 459). Prof. Bain thinks, then, that all the bother is about the\r\ndifficulty of seeing how a series of feelings can have the knowledge of\r\nitself \u003ci\u003eadded to it!!!\u003c/i\u003e As if anybody ever was troubled about that. That,\r\nnotoriously enough, is a fact: our consciousness is a series of feelings to\r\nwhich every now and then is \u003ci\u003eadded\u003c/i\u003e a retrospective consciousness that they\r\nhave come and gone. What Mr. Ward and I are troubled about is merely\r\nthe silliness of the mind-stuffists and associationists continuing to say that\r\nthe \u0027series of states\u0027 \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the \u0027awareness of itself;\u0027 that if the states be posited\r\nseverally, their collective consciousness is \u003ci\u003eeo ipso\u003c/i\u003e given; and that we need\r\nno farther explanation, or \u0027evidence of the fact.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_177_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_177_177\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[177]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The writers about \u0027unconscious cerebration\u0027 seem sometimes to mean\r\nthat and sometimes unconscious thought. The arguments which follow\r\nare culled from various quarters. The reader will find them most systematically\r\nurged by E. von Hartmann: Philosophy of the Unconscious, vol.\r\ni; and by E. Colsenet: La Vie Inconsciente de l\u0027Esprit (1880). Consult also\r\nT. Laycock: Mind and Brain, vol. i, chap. v (1860); W. B. Carpenter:\r\nMental Physiology, chap. xiii; F. P. Cobbe: Darwinism in Morals and\r\nother Essays, essay xi, Unconscious Cerebration (1872); F. Bowen: Modern\r\nPhilosophy, pp. 428-480; R. H. Hutton: Contemporary Review, vol.\r\nxxiv, p. 201; J. S. Mill: Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xv; G. H. Lewes:\r\nProblems of Life and Mind, 3d series, Prob. ii, chap. x, and also Prob.\r\niii, chap. ii; D. G. Thompson: A System of Psychology, chap. xxxiii;\r\nJ. M. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, chap. iv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_178_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_178_178\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[178]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nouveaux Essais, Avant-propos.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_179_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_179_179\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[179]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. S. Mill, Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_180_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_180_180\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[180]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Dugald Stewart, Elements, chap. ii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_181_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_181_181\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[181]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. E. Maude: \u0027The Unconscious in Education,\u0027 in \u0027Education,\u0027 vol.\r\ni, p. 401 (1882).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_182_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_182_182\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[182]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Zur Lehre vor Lichtsinne (1878).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_183_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_183_183\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[183]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Wundt: Ueber den Einfluss der Philosophie, etc.—Antrittsrede\r\n(1876), pp. 10-11;—Helmholtz: Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung\r\n(1879), p. 27.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_184_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_184_184\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[184]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Satz vom Grunde, pp. 59-65. Compare also F. Zöllner\u0027s Natur\r\nder Kometen, pp. 342 ff. and 425.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_185_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_185_185\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[185]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. the statements from Helmholtz to be found later in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter\r\nXIII\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_186_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_186_186\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[186]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The text was written before Professor Lipps\u0027s Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens\r\n(1883) came into my hands. In Chapter III of that book the\r\nnotion of unconscious thought is subjected to the clearest and most searching\r\ncriticism which it has yet received. Some passages are so similar to\r\nwhat I have myself written that I must quote them in a note. After\r\nproving that dimness and clearness, incompleteness and completeness do\r\nnot pertain to a state of mind \u003ci\u003eas such\u003c/i\u003e—since every state of mind must be\r\n\u003ci\u003eexactly\u003c/i\u003e what it is, and nothing else—but only pertain to the way in which\r\nstates of mind stand for objects, which they more or less dimly, more\r\nor less clearly, \u003ci\u003erepresent\u003c/i\u003e; Lipps takes the case of those sensations which\r\nattention is said to make more clear. \"I perceive an object,\" he says,\r\n\"now in clear daylight, and again at night. Call the content of the day-perception\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, and that of the evening-perception \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. There will probably\r\nbe a considerable difference between \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. The colors of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e will be\r\nvaried and intense, and will be sharply bounded by each other; those of\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e will be less luminous, and less strongly contrasted, and will approach\r\na common gray or brown, and merge more into each other. Both percepts,\r\nhowever, as such, are completely determinate and distinct from all others.\r\nThe colors of \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e appear before my eye neither more nor less decidedly dark\r\nand blurred than the colors of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e appear bright and sharply bounded. But\r\nnow I know, or believe I know, that one and the same real Object A corresponds\r\nto both \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. I am convinced, moreover, that \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e represents A\r\nbetter than does \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. Instead, however, of giving to my conviction this, its\r\nonly correct, expression, and keeping the content of my consciousness and\r\nthe real object, the representation and what it means, distinct from each\r\nother, I substitute the real object for the content of the consciousness,\r\nand talk of the experience as if it consisted in one and the same object\r\n(namely, the surreptitiously introduced real one), constituting twice over\r\nthe content of my consciousness, once in a clear and distinct, the other\r\ntime in an obscure and vague fashion. I talk now of a distincter and of a\r\nless distinct \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e of A, whereas I am only justified in talking of\r\ntwo consciousnesses, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, equally distinct \u003ci\u003ein se\u003c/i\u003e, but to which the supposed\r\nexternal object A corresponds with different degrees of distinctness.\"\r\n(P. 38-9.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[Pg 183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_VII\"\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE METHODS AND SNARES OF PSYCHOLOGY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now finished the physiological preliminaries of\r\nour subject and must in the remaining chapters study the\r\nmental states themselves whose cerebral conditions and\r\nconcomitants we have been considering hitherto. Beyond\r\nthe brain, however, there is an outer world to which the\r\nbrain-states themselves \u0027correspond.\u0027 And it will be well,\r\nere we advance farther, to say a word about the relation of\r\nthe mind to this larger sphere of physical fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003ePSYCHOLOGY IS A NATURAL SCIENCE.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat is, the mind which the psychologist studies is the\r\nmind of distinct individuals inhabiting definite portions of\r\na real space and of a real time. With any other sort of\r\nmind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular\r\nbody, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist\r\nas such has nothing to do. \u0027Mind,\u0027 in his mouth, is\r\nonly a class name for \u003ci\u003eminds\u003c/i\u003e. Fortunate will it be if his\r\nmore modest inquiry result in any generalizations which\r\nthe philosopher devoted to absolute Intelligence as such\r\ncan use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo the psychologist, then, the minds he studies are\r\n\u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e, in a world of other objects. Even when he introspectively\r\nanalyzes his own mind, and tells what he finds\r\nthere, he talks about it in an objective way. He says, for\r\ninstance, that under certain circumstances the color gray\r\nappears to him green, and calls the appearance an illusion.\r\nThis implies that he compares two objects, a real color\r\nseen under certain conditions, and a mental perception\r\nwhich he believes to represent it, and that he declares the\r\nrelation between them to be of a certain kind. In making\r\nthis critical judgment, the psychologist stands as much outside\r\nof the perception which he criticises as he does of the\r\ncolor. Both are his objects. And if this is true of him when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[Pg 184]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe reflects on his own conscious states, how much truer is it\r\nwhen he treats of those of others! In German philosophy\r\nsince Kant the word \u003ci\u003eErkenntnisstheorie\u003c/i\u003e, criticism of the\r\nfaculty of knowledge, plays a great part. Now the psychologist\r\nnecessarily becomes such an \u003ci\u003eErkenntnisstheoretiker\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nBut the knowledge he theorizes about is not the bare\r\nfunction of knowledge which Kant criticises—he does not\r\ninquire into the possibility of knowledge \u003ci\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/i\u003e. He\r\nassumes it to be possible, he does not doubt its presence\r\nin himself at the moment he speaks. The knowledge he\r\ncriticises is the knowledge of particular men about the\r\nparticular things that surround them. This he may, upon\r\noccasion, in the light of his \u003ci\u003eown\u003c/i\u003e unquestioned knowledge,\r\npronounce true or false, and trace the reasons by which it\r\nhas become one or the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is highly important that this natural-science point\r\nof view should be understood at the outset. Otherwise\r\nmore may be demanded of the psychologist than he ought\r\nto be expected to perform.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA diagram will exhibit more emphatically what the\r\nassumptions of Psychology must be:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: 1px solid; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1. The Psychologist \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e2. The Thought Studied \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e3. The Thought\u0027s Object \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e4. The Psychologist\u0027s Reality\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese four squares contain the irreducible data of\r\npsychology. No. 1, the psychologist, believes Nos. 2, 3,\r\nand 4, which together form \u003ci\u003ehis \u003c/i\u003e total object, to be realities,\r\nand reports them and their mutual relations as truly as he\r\ncan without troubling himself with the puzzle of how he\r\ncan report them at all. About such \u003ci\u003eultimate \u003c/i\u003e puzzles he in\r\nthe main need trouble himself no more than the geometer,\r\nthe chemist, or the botanist do, who make precisely the\r\nsame assumptions as he.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_187_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_187_187\"\u003e[187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf certain fallacies to which the psychologist is exposed\r\nby reason of his peculiar point of view—that of being a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[Pg 185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreporter of subjective as well as of objective facts, we must\r\npresently speak. But not until we have considered the\r\nmethods he uses for ascertaining what the facts in question\r\nare.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE METHODS OF INVESTIGATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIntrospective Observation is what we have to rely on first\r\nand foremost and always.\u003c/i\u003e The word introspection need\r\nhardly be defined—it means, of course, the looking into our\r\nown minds and reporting what we there discover. \u003ci\u003eEvery\r\none agrees that we there discover states of consciousness.\u003c/i\u003e So\r\nfar as I know, the existence of such states has never been\r\ndoubted by any critic, however sceptical in other respects\r\nhe may have been. That we have \u003ci\u003ecogitations\u003c/i\u003e of some sort is\r\nthe \u003ci\u003einconcussum\u003c/i\u003e in a world most of whose other facts have\r\nat some time tottered in the breath of philosophic doubt.\r\nAll people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves\r\nthinking, and that they distinguish the mental state as an\r\ninward activity or passion, from all the objects with which\r\nit may cognitively deal. \u003ci\u003eI regard this belief as the most\r\nfundamental of all the postulates of Psychology,\u003c/i\u003e and shall discard\r\nall curious inquiries about its certainty as too metaphysical\r\nfor the scope of this book.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eA Question of Nomenclature.\u003c/i\u003e We ought to have some\r\ngeneral term by which to designate all states of consciousness\r\nmerely as such, and apart from their particular\r\nquality or cognitive function. Unfortunately most\r\nof the terms in use have grave objections. \u0027Mental\r\nstate,\u0027 \u0027state of consciousness,\u0027 \u0027conscious modification,\u0027 are\r\ncumbrous and have no kindred verbs. The same is true\r\nof \u0027subjective condition.\u0027 \u0027Feeling\u0027 has the verb \u0027to feel,\u0027\r\nboth active and neuter, and such derivatives as \u0027feelingly,\u0027\r\n\u0027felt,\u0027 \u0027feltness,\u0027 etc., which make it extremely convenient.\r\nBut on the other hand it has specific meanings as well as\r\nits generic one, sometimes standing for pleasure and pain,\r\nand being sometimes a synonym of \u0027\u003ci\u003esensation\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 as opposed\r\nto \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e; whereas we wish a term to cover sensation and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[Pg 186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthought indifferently. Moreover, \u0027feeling\u0027 has acquired in\r\nthe hearts of platonizing thinkers a very opprobrious set of\r\nimplications; and since one of the great obstacles to mutual\r\nunderstanding in philosophy is the use of words eulogistically\r\nand disparagingly, impartial terms ought always, if\r\npossible, to be preferred. The word \u003ci\u003epsychosis\u003c/i\u003e has been\r\nproposed by Mr. Huxley. It has the advantage of being\r\ncorrelative to \u003ci\u003eneurosis\u003c/i\u003e (the name applied by the same author\r\nto the corresponding nerve-process), and is moreover technical\r\nand devoid of partial implications. But it has no\r\nverb or other grammatical form allied to it. The expressions\r\n\u0027affection of the soul,\u0027 \u0027modification of the ego,\u0027 are\r\nclumsy, like \u0027state of consciousness,\u0027 and they implicitly\r\nassert theories which it is not well to embody in terminology\r\nbefore they have been openly discussed and approved.\r\n\u0027Idea\u0027 is a good vague neutral word, and was by Locke\r\nemployed in the broadest generic way; but notwithstanding\r\nhis authority it has not domesticated itself in the language\r\nso as to cover bodily sensations, and it moreover has no\r\nverb. \u0027Thought\u0027 would be by far the best word to use if\r\nit could be made to cover sensations. It has no opprobrious\r\nconnotation such as \u0027feeling\u0027 has, and it immediately\r\nsuggests the omnipresence of cognition (or reference to an\r\nobject other than the mental state itself), which we shall\r\nsoon see to be of the mental life\u0027s essence. But can the\r\nexpression \u0027thought of a toothache\u0027 ever suggest to the\r\nreader the actual present pain itself? It is hardly possible;\r\nand we thus seem about to be forced back on some\r\n\u003ci\u003epair\u003c/i\u003e of terms like Hume\u0027s \u0027impression and idea,\u0027 or Hamilton\u0027s\r\n\u0027presentation and representation,\u0027 or the ordinary\r\n\u0027feeling and thought,\u0027 if we wish to cover the whole ground.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this quandary we can make no definitive choice, but\r\nmust, according to the convenience of the context, use\r\nsometimes one, sometimes another of the synonyms that\r\nhave been mentioned. \u003ci\u003eMy own partiality is for either\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003efeeling\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ethought.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/i\u003e I shall probably often use both words\r\nin a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two\r\nclasses of readers by their unusual sound; but if the connection\r\nmakes it clear that mental states at large, irrespective\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[Pg 187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may\r\neven do some good.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_188_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_188_188\"\u003e[188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe inaccuracy of introspective observation\u003c/i\u003e has been made\r\na subject of debate. It is important to gain some fixed\r\nideas on this point before we proceed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe commonest spiritualistic opinion is that the Soul\r\nor \u003ci\u003eSubject\u003c/i\u003e of the mental life is a metaphysical entity, inaccessible\r\nto direct knowledge, and that the various mental\r\nstates and operations of which we reflectively become\r\naware are objects of an inner sense which does not lay hold\r\nof the real agent in itself, any more than sight or hearing\r\ngives us direct knowledge of matter in itself. From,\r\nthis point of view introspection is, of course, incompetent\r\nto lay hold of anything more than the Soul\u0027s \u003ci\u003ephenomena\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nBut even then the question remains, How well can it know\r\nthe phenomena themselves?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome authors take high ground here and claim for it a\r\nsort of infallibility. Thus Ueberweg:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When a mental image, as such, is the object of my apprehension,\r\nthere is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness\r\n(in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself);\r\nfor the object apprehended is, in this case, one which does not even\r\nexist, as the objects of external perception do, in itself outside of my\r\nconsciousness. It exists only within me.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_189_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_189_189\"\u003e[189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd Brentano:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The phenomena inwardly apprehended are true in themselves.\r\nAs they appear—of this the evidence with which they are apprehended\r\nis a warrant—so they are in reality. Who, then, can deny that in this\r\na great superiority of Psychology over the physical sciences comes to\r\nlight?\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in\r\nhimself \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e, and be \u003ci\u003eso\u003c/i\u003e, as he apprehends it. Whoever should doubt this\r\nwould have reached that \u003ci\u003efinished\u003c/i\u003e doubt which destroys itself in destroying\r\nevery fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowledge.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_190_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_190_190\"\u003e[190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOthers have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained\r\nthat we can have no introspective cognition of our\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[Pg 188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown minds at all. A deliverance of Auguste Comte to this\r\neffect has been so often quoted as to be almost classical;\r\nand some reference to it seems therefore indispensable\r\nhere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhilosophers, says Comte,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_191_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_191_191\"\u003e[191]\u003c/a\u003e have\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"in these latter days imagined themselves able to distinguish, by a\r\nvery singular subtlety, two sorts of observation of equal importance,\r\none external, the other internal, the latter being solely destined for the\r\nstudy of intellectual phenomena…. I limit myself to pointing out\r\nthe principal consideration which proves clearly that this pretended\r\ndirect contemplation of the mind by itself is a pure illusion….\r\nIt is in fact evident that, by an invincible necessity, the human mind\r\ncan observe directly all phenomena except its own proper states. For\r\nby whom shall the observation of these be made? It is conceivable\r\nthat a man might observe himself with respect to the \u003ci\u003epassions\u003c/i\u003e that\r\nanimate him, for the anatomical organs of passion are distinct from\r\nthose whose function is observation. Though we have all made such\r\nobservations on ourselves, they can never have much scientific value,\r\nand the best mode of knowing the passions will always be that of observing\r\nthem from without; for every strong state of passion … is\r\nnecessarily incompatible with the state of observation. But, as for\r\nobserving in the same way \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e phenomena at the time of their\r\nactual presence, that is a manifest impossibility. The thinker cannot\r\ndivide himself into two, of whom one reasons whilst the other observes\r\nhim reason. The organ observed and the organ observing being, in\r\nthis case, identical, how could observation take place? This pretended\r\npsychological method is then radically null and void. On the one\r\nhand, they advise you to isolate yourself, as far as possible, from every\r\nexternal sensation, especially every intellectual work,—for if you were\r\nto busy yourself even with the simplest calculation, what would become\r\nof \u003ci\u003einternal\u003c/i\u003e observation?—on the other hand, after having with the\r\nutmost care attained this state of intellectual slumber, you must begin\r\nto contemplate the operations going on in your mind, when nothing\r\nthere takes place! Our descendants will doubtless see such pretensions\r\nsome day ridiculed upon the stage. The results of so strange a procedure\r\nharmonize entirely with its principle. For all the two thousand\r\nyears during which metaphysicians have thus cultivated psychology,\r\nthey are not agreed about one intelligible and established proposition.\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eInternal observation\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 gives almost as many divergent results as there\r\nare individuals who think they practise it.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eComte hardly could have known anything of the English,\r\nand nothing of the German, empirical psychology. The\r\n\u0027results\u0027 which he had in mind when writing were probably\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[Pg 189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nscholastic ones, such as principles of internal activity, the\r\nfaculties, the ego, the \u003ci\u003eliberum arbitrium indifferentiæ\u003c/i\u003e, etc.\r\nJohn Mill, in replying to him,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_192_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_192_192\"\u003e[192]\u003c/a\u003e says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied\r\nthrough the medium of memory, not at the very moment of our perceiving\r\nit, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in which\r\nour best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. We\r\nreflect on what we have been doing when the act is past, but when its\r\nimpression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these ways,\r\nwe could not have acquired the knowledge which nobody denies us to\r\nhave, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have\r\naffirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We\r\nknow of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or\r\nby memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and\r\nnot (like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by\r\ntheir results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte\u0027s argument.\r\nWhatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere now does the truth lie? Our quotation from\r\nMill is obviously the one which expresses the most of\r\n\u003ci\u003epractical\u003c/i\u003e truth about the matter. Even the writers who\r\ninsist upon the absolute veracity of our immediate inner\r\napprehension of a conscious state have to contrast with\r\nthis the fallibility of our \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eobservation\u003c/i\u003e of it, a\r\nmoment later. No one has emphasized more sharply than\r\nBrentano himself the difference between the immediate\r\n\u003ci\u003efeltness\u003c/i\u003e of a feeling, and its perception by a subsequent reflective\r\nact. But which mode of consciousness of it is that\r\nwhich the psychologist must depend on? If to \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e feelings\r\nor thoughts in their immediacy were enough, babies\r\nin the cradle would be psychologists, and infallible ones.\r\nBut the psychologist must not only \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e his mental states\r\nin their absolute veritableness, he must report them and\r\nwrite about them, name them, classify and compare them\r\nand trace their relations to other things. Whilst alive they\r\nare their own property; it is only \u003ci\u003epost-mortem\u003c/i\u003e that they become\r\nhis prey.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_193_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_193_193\"\u003e[193]\u003c/a\u003e And as in the naming, classing, and knowing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[Pg 190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof things in general we are notoriously fallible, why not\r\nalso here? Comte is quite right in laying stress on the\r\nfact that a feeling, to be named, judged, or perceived, must\r\nbe already past. No subjective state, whilst present, is its\r\nown object; its object is always something else. There\r\nare, it is true, cases in which we appear to be naming our\r\npresent feeling, and so to be experiencing and observing\r\nthe same inner fact at a single stroke, as when we say \u0027I\r\nfeel tired,\u0027 \u0027I am angry,\u0027 etc. But these are illusory, and\r\na little attention unmasks the illusion. The present conscious\r\nstate, when I say \u0027I feel tired,\u0027 is not the direct\r\nstate of tire; when I say \u0027I feel angry,\u0027 it is not the direct\r\nstate of anger. It is the state of \u003ci\u003esaying-I-feel-tired\u003c/i\u003e, of\r\n\u003ci\u003esaying-I-feel-angry\u003c/i\u003e,—entirely different matters, so different\r\nthat the fatigue and anger apparently included in them are\r\nconsiderable modifications of the fatigue and anger directly\r\nfelt the previous instant. The act of naming them has\r\nmomentarily detracted from their force.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_194_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_194_194\"\u003e[194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only sound grounds on which the infallible veracity\r\nof the introspective judgment might be maintained are\r\nempirical. If we had reason to think it has never yet\r\ndeceived us, we might continue to trust it. This is the\r\nground actually maintained by Herr Mohr.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The illusions of our senses,\" says this author, \"have undermined\r\nour belief in the reality of the outer world; but in the sphere of inner\r\nobservation our confidence is intact, for we have never found ourselves\r\nto be in error about the reality of an act of thought or feeling. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[Pg 191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave never been misled into thinking we were \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e in doubt or in anger\r\nwhen these conditions were really states of our consciousness.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_195_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_195_195\"\u003e[195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut sound as the reasoning here would be, were the\r\npremises correct, I fear the latter cannot pass. However\r\nit may be with such strong feelings as doubt or anger,\r\nabout weaker feelings, and about the \u003ci\u003erelations to each other\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof all feelings, we find ourselves in continual error and\r\nuncertainty so soon as we are called on to name and class,\r\nand not merely to feel. Who can be sure of the exact \u003ci\u003eorder\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof his feelings when they are excessively rapid? Who can\r\nbe sure, in his sensible perception of a chair, how much\r\ncomes from the eye and how much is supplied out of the\r\nprevious knowledge of the mind? Who can compare with\r\nprecision the \u003ci\u003equantities\u003c/i\u003e of disparate feelings even where the\r\nfeelings are very much alike? For instance, where an object\r\nis felt now against the back and now against the cheek,\r\nwhich feeling is most extensive? Who can be sure that\r\ntwo given feelings are or are not exactly the same? Who\r\ncan tell which is briefer or longer than the other when\r\nboth occupy but an instant of time? Who knows, of many\r\nactions, for what motive they were done, or if for any motive\r\nat all? Who can enumerate all the distinct ingredients of\r\nsuch a complicated feeling as \u003ci\u003eanger\u003c/i\u003e? and who can tell off-hand\r\nwhether or no a perception of \u003ci\u003edistance\u003c/i\u003e be a compound\r\nor a simple state of mind? The whole mind-stuff controversy\r\nwould stop if we could decide conclusively by introspection\r\nthat what seem to us elementary feelings are\r\nreally elementary and not compound.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Sully, in his work on Illusions, has a chapter on\r\nthose of Introspection from which we might now quote.\r\nBut, since the rest of this volume will be little more than a\r\ncollection of illustrations of the difficulty of discovering by\r\ndirect introspection exactly what our feelings and their\r\nrelations are, we need not anticipate our own future details, I\r\nbut just state our general conclusion that \u003ci\u003eintrospection is\r\ndifficult and fallible; and that the difficulty is simply that\r\nof all observation of whatever kind\u003c/i\u003e. Something is before\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[Pg 192]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nus; we do our best to tell what it is, but in spite of our\r\ngood will we may go astray, and give a description more\r\napplicable to some other sort of thing. The only safeguard\r\nis in the final \u003ci\u003econsensus\u003c/i\u003e of our farther knowledge about the\r\nthing in question, later views correcting earlier ones, until\r\nat last the harmony of a consistent system is reached.\r\nSuch a system, gradually worked out, is the best guarantee\r\nthe psychologist can give for the soundness of any particular\r\npsychologic observation which he may report. Such a\r\nsystem we ourselves must strive, as far as may be, to attain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe English writers on psychology, and the school of\r\nHerbart in Germany, have in the main contented themselves\r\nwith such results as the immediate introspection of\r\nsingle individuals gave, and shown what a body of doctrine\r\nthey may make. The works of Locke, Hume, Reid, Hartley,\r\nStewart, Brown, the Mills, will always be classics in\r\nthis line; and in Professor Bain\u0027s Treatises we have probably\r\nthe last word of what this method taken mainly by\r\nitself can do—the last monument of the youth of our science,\r\nstill untechnical and generally intelligible, like the Chemistry\r\nof Lavoisier, or Anatomy before the microscope was\r\nused.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Experimental Method\u003c/i\u003e. But psychology is passing\r\ninto a less simple phase. Within a few years what one may\r\ncall a microscopic psychology has arisen in Germany, carried\r\non by experimental methods, asking of course every\r\nmoment for introspective data, but eliminating their uncertainty\r\nby operating on a large scale and taking statistical\r\nmeans. This method taxes patience to the utmost, and\r\ncould hardly have arisen in a country whose natives\r\ncould be \u003ci\u003ebored\u003c/i\u003e. Such Germans as Weber, Fechner,\r\nVierordt, and Wundt obviously cannot; and their success\r\nhas brought into the field an array of younger experimental\r\npsychologists, bent on studying the \u003ci\u003eelements\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nmental life, dissecting them out from the gross results in\r\nwhich they are embedded, and as far as possible reducing\r\nthem to quantitative scales. The simple and open method\r\nof attack having done what it can, the method of patience,\r\nstarving out, and harassing to death is tried; the Mind\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[Pg 193]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust submit to a regular \u003ci\u003esiege\u003c/i\u003e, in which minute advantages\r\ngained night and day by the forces that hem her in must\r\nsum themselves up at last into her overthrow. There is\r\nlittle of the grand style about these new prism, pendulum,\r\nand chronograph-philosophers. They mean business, not\r\nchivalry. What generous divination, and that superiority\r\nin virtue which was thought by Cicero to give a man the\r\nbest insight into nature, have failed to do, their spying\r\nand scraping, their deadly tenacity and almost diabolic\r\ncunning, will doubtless some day bring about.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo general description of the methods of experimental\r\npsychology would be instructive to one unfamiliar with the\r\ninstances of their application, so we will waste no words\r\nupon the attempt. \u003ci\u003eThe principal fields of experimentation\u003c/i\u003e\r\nso far have been: 1) the connection of conscious states\r\nwith their physical conditions, including the whole of brain-physiology,\r\nand the recent minutely cultivated physiology\r\nof the sense-organs, together with what is technically known\r\nas \u0027psycho-physics,\u0027 or the laws of correlation between\r\nsensations and the outward stimuli by which they are\r\naroused; 2) the analysis of space-perception into its sensational\r\nelements; 3) the measurement of the \u003ci\u003eduration\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nsimplest mental processes; 4) that of the \u003ci\u003eaccuracy of reproduction\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin the memory of sensible experiences and of\r\nintervals of space and time; 5) that of the manner in\r\nwhich simple mental states \u003ci\u003einfluence each other\u003c/i\u003e, call each\r\nother up, or inhibit each other\u0027s reproduction; 6) that of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003enumber of facts\u003c/i\u003e which consciousness can simultaneously\r\ndiscern; finally, 7) that of the elementary laws of oblivescence\r\nand retention. It must be said that in some of\r\nthese fields the results have as yet borne little theoretic\r\nfruit commensurate with the great labor expended in their\r\nacquisition. But facts are facts, and if we only get enough\r\nof them they are sure to combine. New ground will from\r\nyear to year be broken, and theoretic results will grow.\r\nMeanwhile the experimental method has quite changed the\r\nface of the science so far as the latter is a record of mere\r\nwork done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003ecomparative method\u003c/i\u003e, finally, supplements the introspective\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[Pg 194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand experimental methods. This method presupposes\r\na normal psychology of introspection to be established\r\nin its main features. But where the origin of these\r\nfeatures, or their dependence upon one another, is in question,\r\nit is of the utmost importance to trace the phenomenon\r\nconsidered through all its possible variations of type\r\nand combination. So it has come to pass that instincts of\r\nanimals are ransacked to throw light on our own; and that\r\nthe reasoning faculties of bees and ants, the minds of savages,\r\ninfants, madmen, idiots, the deaf and blind, criminals, and\r\neccentrics, are all invoked in support of this or that special\r\ntheory about some part of our own mental life. The history\r\nof sciences, moral and political institutions, and languages,\r\nas types of mental product, are pressed into the same service.\r\nMessrs. Darwin and Galton have set the example of\r\ncirculars of questions sent out by the hundred to those\r\nsupposed able to reply. The custom has spread, and it\r\nwill be well for us in the next generation if such circulars\r\nbe not ranked among the common pests of life.\r\nMeanwhile information grows, and results emerge. There\r\nare great sources of error in the comparative method.\r\nThe interpretation of the \u0027psychoses\u0027 of animals, savages,\r\nand infants is necessarily wild work, in which the personal\r\nequation of the investigator has things very much\r\nits own way. A savage will be reported to have no\r\nmoral or religious feeling if his actions shock the observer\r\nunduly. A child will be assumed without self-consciousness\r\nbecause he talks of himself in the third person,\r\netc., etc. No rules can be laid down in advance. Comparative\r\nobservations, to be definite, must usually be made\r\nto test some pre-existing hypothesis; and the only thing\r\nthen is to use as much sagacity as you possess, and to be\r\nas candid as you can.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE SOURCES OF ERROR IN PSYCHOLOGY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe first of them arises from the Misleading Influence of\r\nSpeech.\u003c/i\u003e Language was originally made by men who were\r\nnot psychologists, and most men to-day employ almost\r\nexclusively the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal\r\npassions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate, hope,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[Pg 195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual\r\nactivity, to remember, expect, think, know, dream, with\r\nthe broadest genera of æsthetic feeling, joy, sorrow,\r\npleasure, pain, are the only facts of a subjective order\r\nwhich this vocabulary deigns to note by special words.\r\nThe elementary qualities of sensation, bright, loud, red,\r\nblue, hot, cold, are, it is true, susceptible of being used in\r\nboth an objective and a subjective sense. They stand for\r\nouter qualities and for the feelings which these arouse. But\r\nthe objective sense is the original sense; and still to-day\r\nwe have to describe a large number of sensations by the\r\nname of the object from which they have most frequently\r\nbeen got. An orange color, an odor of violets, a cheesy\r\ntaste, a thunderous sound, a fiery smart, etc., will recall\r\nwhat I mean. This absence of a special vocabulary for subjective\r\nfacts hinders the study of all but the very coarsest\r\nof them. Empiricist writers are very fond of emphasizing\r\none great set of delusions which language inflicts on the\r\nmind. Whenever we have made a word, they say, to denote\r\na certain group of phenomena, we are prone to suppose a\r\nsubstantive entity existing beyond the phenomena, of which\r\nthe word shall be the name. But the \u003ci\u003elack\u003c/i\u003e of a word quite\r\nas often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then\r\nprone to suppose that no entity can be there; and so we\r\ncome to overlook phenomena whose existence would be\r\npatent to us all, had we only grown up to hear it familiarly\r\nrecognized in speech.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_196_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_196_196\"\u003e[196]\u003c/a\u003e It is hard to focus our attention on\r\nthe nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in\r\nthe descriptive parts of most psychologies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut a worse defect than vacuousness comes from the\r\ndependence of psychology on common speech. Naming\r\nour thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume\r\nthat as the objects are, so the thought must be. The\r\nthought of several distinct things can only consist of several\r\ndistinct bits of thought, or \u0027ideas;\u0027 that of an abstract or\r\nuniversal object can only be an abstract or universal idea.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[Pg 196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAs each object may come and go, be forgotten and then\r\nthought of again, it is held that the thought of it has a precisely\r\nsimilar independence, self-identity, and mobility.\r\nThe thought of the object\u0027s recurrent identity is regarded\r\nas the identity of its recurrent thought; and the perceptions\r\nof multiplicity, of coexistence, of succession, are severally\r\nconceived to be brought about only through a multiplicity,\r\na coexistence, a succession, of perceptions. The continuous\r\nflow of the mental stream is sacrificed, and in its\r\nplace an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is\r\npreached, for the existence of which no good introspective\r\ngrounds can be brought forward, and out of which presently\r\ngrow all sorts of paradoxes and contradictions, the\r\nheritage of woe of students of the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese words are meant to impeach the entire English\r\npsychology derived from Locke and Hume, and the entire\r\nGerman psychology derived from Herbart, so far as they\r\nboth treat \u0027ideas\u0027 as separate subjective entities that come\r\nand go. Examples will soon make the matter clearer.\r\nMeanwhile our psychologic insight is vitiated by still other\r\nsnares.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027\u003ci\u003eThe Psychologist\u0027s Fallacy.\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 The \u003ci\u003egreat\u003c/i\u003e snare of the psychologist\r\nis the \u003ci\u003econfusion of his own standpoint with that of the\r\nmental fact\u003c/i\u003e about which he is making his report. I shall\r\nhereafter call this the \u0027psychologist\u0027s fallacy\u0027 \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nFor some of the mischief, here too, language is to blame.\r\nThe psychologist, as we remarked above (\u003ca href=\"#Page_183\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 183\u003c/a\u003e), stands outside\r\nof the mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its\r\nobject are objects for him. Now when it is a \u003ci\u003ecognitive\u003c/i\u003e state\r\n(percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no other\r\nway of naming it than as the thought, percept, etc., \u003ci\u003eof that\r\nobject\u003c/i\u003e. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same\r\nobject in \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e way, gets easily led to suppose that the\r\nthought, which is \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e it, knows it in the same way in which\r\nhe knows it, although this is often very far from being the\r\ncase.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_197_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_197_197\"\u003e[197]\u003c/a\u003e The most fictitious puzzles have been introduced\r\ninto our science by this means. The so-called question of\r\npresentative or representative perception, of whether an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[Pg 197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobject is present to the thought that thinks it by a counterfeit\r\nimage of itself, or directly and without any intervening\r\nimage at all; the question of nominalism and conceptualism,\r\nof the shape in which things are present when only\r\na general notion of them is before the mind; are comparatively\r\neasy questions when once the psychologist\u0027s fallacy\r\nis eliminated from their treatment,—as we shall ere long\r\nsee (in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XII\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAnother variety of the psychologist\u0027s fallacy is the assumption\r\nthat the mental state studied must be conscious of itself\r\nas the psychologist is conscious of it.\u003c/i\u003e The mental state is\r\naware of itself only from within; it grasps what we call its\r\nown content, and nothing more. The psychologist, on the\r\ncontrary, is aware of it from without, and knows its relations\r\nwith all sorts of other things. What the thought sees is\r\nonly its own object; what the psychologist sees is the\r\nthought\u0027s object, plus the thought itself, plus possibly all\r\nthe rest of the world. We must be very careful therefore,\r\nin discussing a state of mind from the psychologist\u0027s point\r\nof view, to avoid foisting into its own ken matters that are\r\nonly there for ours. We must avoid substituting what we\r\nknow the consciousness \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, for what it is a consciousness \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand counting its outward, and so to speak physical, relations\r\nwith other facts of the world, in among the objects of which\r\nwe set it down as aware. Crude as such a confusion of\r\nstandpoints seems to be when abstractly stated, it is nevertheless\r\na snare into which no psychologist has kept himself\r\nat all times from falling, and which forms almost the entire\r\nstock-in-trade of certain schools. We cannot be too watchful\r\nagainst its subtly corrupting influence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSummary\u003c/i\u003e. To sum up the chapter, Psychology assumes\r\nthat thoughts successively occur, and that they know objects\r\nin a world which the psychologist also knows. \u003ci\u003eThese thoughts\r\nare the subjective data of which he treats, and their relations to\r\ntheir objects, to the brain, and to the rest of the world constitute\r\nthe subject-matter of psychologic science.\u003c/i\u003e Its methods are\r\nintrospection, experimentation, and comparison. But introspection\r\nis no sure guide to truths \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e our mental states;\r\nand in particular the poverty of the psychological vocabulary\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[Pg 198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nleads us to drop out certain states from our consideration,\r\nand to treat others as if they knew themselves and\r\ntheir objects as the psychologist knows both, which is a\r\ndisastrous fallacy in the science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_187_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_187_187\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[187]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On the relation between Psychology and General Philosophy, see G.\r\nC. Robertson, \u0027Mind,\u0027 vol. viii, p. 1, and J. Ward, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 153; J. Dewey\r\n\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e vol. ix, p. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_188_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_188_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[188]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare some remarks in Mill\u0027s Logic, bk. i, chap. iii, §§ 2, 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_189_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_189_189\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[189]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Logic, § 40.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_190_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_190_190\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[190]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologie, bk. ii, chap. iii, §§ 1, 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_191_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_191_191\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[191]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cours de Philosophie Positive, i, 34-8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_192_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_192_192\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[192]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3d edition (1882), p. 64.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_193_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_193_193\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[193]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Wundt says: \"The first rule for utilizing inward observation consists\r\nin taking, as far as possible, experiences that are accidental, unexpected,\r\nand not intentionally brought about…. \u003ci\u003eFirst\u003c/i\u003e it is best as far as\r\npossible to rely on \u003ci\u003eMemory\u003c/i\u003e and not on immediate Apprehension….\r\n\u003ci\u003eSecond\u003c/i\u003e, internal observation is better fitted to grasp clearly conscious\r\nstates, especially voluntary mental acts: such inner processes as are obscurely\r\nconscious and involuntary will almost entirely elude it, because\r\nthe effort to observe interferes with them, and because they seldom abide\r\nin memory.\" (Logik, ii, 432.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_194_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_194_194\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[194]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In cases like this, where the state outlasts the act of naming it, exists\r\nbefore it, and recurs when it is past, we probably run little practical risk\r\nof error when we talk as if the state knew itself. The state of feeling and\r\nthe state of naming the feeling are continuous, and the infallibility of\r\nsuch prompt introspective judgments is probably great. But even here the\r\ncertainty of our knowledge ought not to be argued on the \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e ground\r\nthat \u003ci\u003epercipi\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e are in psychology the same. The states are really\r\ntwo; the naming state and the named state are apart; \u0027\u003ci\u003epercipi\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is not\r\nthe principle that applies.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_195_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_195_195\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[195]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Mohr: Grundlage der Empirischen Psychologie (Leipzig, 1882),\r\np. 47.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_196_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_196_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[196]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In English we have not even the generic distinction between the-thing-thought-of\r\nand the-thought-thinking-it, which in German is expressed\r\nby the opposition between \u003ci\u003eGedachtes\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eGedanke\u003c/i\u003e, in Latin by that between\r\n\u003ci\u003ecogitatum\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ecogitatio\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_197_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_197_197\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[197]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare B. P. Bowne\u0027s Metaphysics (1882), p. 408.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[Pg 199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_VIII\"\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER THINGS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of\r\nother objects, its relation to those other objects must next\r\nbe surveyed. First of all, to its\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTIME-RELATIONS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMinds, as we know them, are temporary existences.\r\nWhether my mind had a being prior to the birth of my body,\r\nwhether it shall have one after the latter\u0027s decease, are\r\nquestions to be decided by my general philosophy or theology\r\nrather than by what we call \u0027scientific facts\u0027—I leave\r\nout the facts of so-called spiritualism, as being still in dispute.\r\nPsychology, as a natural science, confines itself to\r\nthe present life, in which every mind appears yoked to a\r\nbody through which its manifestations appear. In the\r\npresent world, then, minds precede, succeed, and coexist\r\nwith each other in the common receptacle of time, and of\r\ntheir \u003ci\u003ecollective\u003c/i\u003e relations to the latter nothing more can be\r\nsaid. The life of the \u003ci\u003eindividual\u003c/i\u003e consciousness in time seems,\r\nhowever, to be an interrupted one, so that the question:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eAre we ever wholly unconscious?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ebecomes one which must be discussed. Sleep, fainting,\r\ncoma, epilepsy, and other \u0027unconscious\u0027 conditions are apt\r\nto break in upon and occupy large durations of what we\r\nnevertheless consider the mental history of a single man.\r\nAnd, the fact of interruption being admitted, is it not\r\npossible that it may exist where we do not suspect it, and\r\neven perhaps in an incessant and fine-grained form?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis might happen, and yet the subject himself never\r\nknow it. We often take ether and have operations performed\r\nwithout a suspicion that our consciousness has suffered\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[Pg 200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na breach. The two ends join each other smoothly\r\nover the gap; and only the sight of our wound assures us\r\nthat we must have been living through a time which for\r\nour immediate consciousness was non-existent. Even in\r\nsleep this sometimes happens: We think we have had no\r\nnap, and it takes the clock to assure us that we are wrong.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_198_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_198_198\"\u003e[198]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWe thus may live through a real outward time, a time\r\nknown by the psychologist who studies us, and yet not\r\n\u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e the time, or infer it from any inward sign. The question\r\nis, how often does this happen? Is consciousness\r\nreally discontinuous, incessantly interrupted and recommencing\r\n(from the psychologist\u0027s point of view)? and does\r\nit only seem continuous to itself by an illusion analogous\r\nto that of the zoetrope? Or is it at most times as continuous\r\noutwardly as it inwardly seems?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be confessed that we can give no rigorous\r\nanswer to this question. Cartesians, who hold that the\r\n\u003ci\u003eessence\u003c/i\u003e of the soul is to think, can of course solve it\r\n\u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, and explain the appearance of thoughtless intervals\r\neither by lapses in our ordinary memory, or by the\r\nsinking of consciousness to a minimal state, in which perhaps\r\nall that it feels is a bare existence which leaves no\r\nparticulars behind to be recalled. If, however, one have\r\nno doctrine about the soul or its essence, one is free to take\r\nthe appearances for what they seem to be, and to admit\r\nthat the mind, as well as the body, may go to sleep.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke was the first prominent champion of this latter\r\nview, and the pages in which he attacks the Cartesian belief\r\nare as spirited as any in his Essay. \"Every drowsy nod\r\nshakes their doctrine who teach that their soul is always\r\nthinking.\" He will not believe that men so easily forget.\r\nM. Jouffroy and Sir W. Hamilton, attacking the question in\r\nthe same empirical way, are led to an opposite conclusion.\r\nTheir reasons, briefly stated, are these:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[Pg 201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn somnambulism, natural or induced, there is often a\r\ngreat display of intellectual activity, followed by complete\r\noblivion of all that has passed.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_199_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_199_199\"\u003e[199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn being suddenly awakened from a sleep, however profound,\r\nwe always catch ourselves in the middle of a dream.\r\nCommon dreams are often remembered for a few minutes\r\nafter waking, and then irretrievably lost.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrequently, when awake and absent-minded, we are\r\nvisited by thoughts and images which the next instant we\r\ncannot recall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur insensibility to habitual noises, etc., whilst awake,\r\nproves that we can neglect to attend to that which we nevertheless\r\nfeel. Similarly in sleep, we grow inured, and sleep\r\nsoundly in presence of sensations of sound, cold, contact,\r\netc., which at first prevented our complete repose. We have\r\nlearned to neglect them whilst asleep as we should whilst\r\nawake. The mere \u003ci\u003esense-impressions\u003c/i\u003e are the same when the\r\nsleep is deep as when it is light; the difference must lie in\r\na \u003ci\u003ejudgment\u003c/i\u003e on the part of the apparently slumbering mind\r\nthat they are not worth noticing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis discrimination is equally shown by nurses of the\r\nsick and mothers of infants, who will sleep through much\r\nnoise of an irrelevant sort, but waken at the slightest stirring\r\nof the patient or the babe. This last fact shows the\r\n\u003ci\u003esense-organ\u003c/i\u003e to be pervious for sounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany people have a remarkable faculty of registering\r\nwhen asleep the flight of time. They will habitually wake\r\nup at the same minute day after day, or will wake punctually\r\nat an unusual hour determined upon overnight. How\r\ncan this knowledge of the hour (more accurate often than\r\nanything the waking consciousness shows) be possible\r\nwithout mental activity during the interval?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch are what we may call the classical reasons for admitting\r\nthat the mind is active even when the person afterwards\r\nignores the fact.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_200_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_200_200\"\u003e[200]\u003c/a\u003e Of late years, or rather, one may\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[Pg 202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsay, of late months, they have been reinforced by a lot of\r\ncurious observations made on hysterical and hypnotic\r\nsubjects, which prove the existence of a highly developed\r\nconsciousness in places where it has hitherto not been suspected\r\nat all. These observations throw such a novel light\r\nupon human nature that I must give them in some detail.\r\nThat at least four different and in a certain sense rival observers\r\nshould agree in the same conclusion justifies us in\r\naccepting the conclusion as true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003e\u0027Unconsciousness\u0027 in Hysterics.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the most constant symptoms in persons suffering\r\nfrom hysteric disease in its extreme forms consists in\r\nalterations of the natural sensibility of various parts and\r\norgans of the body. Usually the alteration is in the direction\r\nof defect, or anæsthesia. One or both eyes are blind,\r\nor color-blind, or there is hemianopsia (blindness to one\r\nhalf the field of view), or the field is contracted. Hearing,\r\ntaste, smell may similarly disappear, in part or in totality.\r\nStill more striking are the cutaneous anæsthesias. The old\r\nwitch-finders looking for the \u0027devil\u0027s seals\u0027 learned well\r\nthe existence of those insensible patches on the skin of\r\ntheir victims, to which the minute physical examinations\r\nof recent medicine have but recently attracted attention\r\nagain. They may be scattered anywhere, but are very\r\napt to affect one side of the body. Not infrequently they\r\naffect an entire lateral half, from head to foot; and the\r\ninsensible skin of, say, the left side will then be found\r\nseparated from the naturally sensitive skin of the right by a\r\nperfectly sharp line of demarcation down the middle of the\r\nfront and back. Sometimes, most remarkable of all, the\r\nentire skin, hands, feet, face, everything, and the mucous\r\nmembranes, muscles and joints so far as they can be explored,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[Pg 203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbecome \u003ci\u003ecompletely\u003c/i\u003e insensible without the other vital\r\nfunctions becoming gravely disturbed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese hysterical anæsthesias can be made to disappear\r\nmore or less completely by various odd processes. It has\r\nbeen recently found that magnets, plates of metal, or the\r\nelectrodes of a battery, placed against the skin, have this\r\npeculiar power. And when one side is relieved in this way,\r\nthe anæsthesia is often found to have transferred itself to\r\nthe opposite side, which until then was well. Whether these\r\nstrange effects of magnets and metals be due to their direct\r\nphysiological action, or to a prior effect on the patient\u0027s\r\nmind (\u0027expectant attention\u0027 or \u0027suggestion\u0027) is still a\r\nmooted question. A still better awakener of sensibility is\r\nthe hypnotic trance, into which many of these patients can\r\nbe very easily placed, and in which their lost sensibility not\r\ninfrequently becomes entirely restored. Such returns of\r\nsensibility succeed the times of insensibility and alternate\r\nwith them. But Messrs. Pierre Janet\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_201_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_201_201\"\u003e[201]\u003c/a\u003e and A. Binet\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_202_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_202_202\"\u003e[202]\u003c/a\u003e have\r\nshown that during the times of anæsthesia, and coexisting\r\nwith it, \u003ci\u003esensibility to the anæsthetic parts is also there, in the\r\nform of a secondary consciousness\u003c/i\u003e entirely cut off from the\r\nprimary or normal one, but susceptible of being \u003ci\u003etapped\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nmade to testify to its existence in various odd ways.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eChief amongst these is what M. Janet calls \u0027the method\r\nof \u003ci\u003edistraction\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 These hysterics are apt to possess a very\r\nnarrow field of attention, and to be unable to think of more\r\nthan one thing at a time. When talking with any person\r\nthey forget everything else. \"When Lucie talked directly\r\nwith any one,\" says M. Janet, \"she ceased to be able to hear\r\nany other person. You may stand behind her, call her by\r\nname, shout abuse into her ears, without making her turn\r\nround; or place yourself before her, show her objects,\r\ntouch her, etc., without attracting her notice. When finally\r\nshe becomes aware of you, she thinks you have just come\r\ninto the room again, and greets you accordingly. This\r\nsingular forgetfulness makes her liable to tell all her secrets\r\naloud, unrestrained by the presence of unsuitable auditors.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[Pg 204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow M. Janet found in several subjects like this that if he\r\ncame up behind them whilst they were plunged in conversation\r\nwith a third party, and addressed them in a whisper, telling\r\nthem to raise their hand or perform other simple acts,\r\nthey would obey the order given, although their \u003ci\u003etalking\u003c/i\u003e\r\nintelligence was quite unconscious of receiving it. Leading\r\nthem from one thing to another, he made them reply by\r\nsigns to his whispered questions, and finally made them\r\nanswer in writing, if a pencil were placed in their hand.\r\nThe primary consciousness meanwhile went on with the\r\nconversation, entirely unaware of these performances on the\r\nhand\u0027s part. The consciousness which presided over these\r\nlatter appeared in its turn to be quite as little disturbed by\r\nthe upper consciousness\u0027s concerns. This \u003ci\u003eproof by \u0027automatic\u0027\r\nwriting\u003c/i\u003e, of a secondary consciousness\u0027s existence, is\r\nthe most cogent and striking one; but a crowd of other facts\r\nprove the same thing. If I run through them rapidly, the\r\nreader will probably be convinced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe apparently anæsthetic hand\u003c/i\u003e of these subjects, for\r\none thing, \u003ci\u003ewill often adapt itself discriminatingly\u003c/i\u003e to whatever\r\nobject may be put into it. With a pencil it will make\r\nwriting movements; into a pair of scissors it will put its fingers\r\nand will open and shut them, etc., etc. The primary consciousness,\r\nso to call it, is meanwhile unable to say whether\r\nor no \u003ci\u003eanything\u003c/i\u003e is in the hand, if the latter be hidden from\r\nsight. \"I put a pair of eyeglasses into Léonie\u0027s anæsthetic\r\nhand, this hand opens it and raises it towards the nose, but\r\nhalf way thither it enters the field of vision of Léonie, who\r\nsees it and stops stupefied: \u0027Why,\u0027 says she, \u0027I have an eye-glass\r\nin my left hand!\u0027\" M. Binet found a very curious sort\r\nof connection between the apparently anæsthetic skin and\r\nthe mind in some Salpétrière-subjects. Things placed in\r\nthe hand were not felt, but \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e of (apparently in visual\r\nterms) and in no wise referred by the subject to their starting\r\npoint in the hand\u0027s sensation. A key, a knife, placed in\r\nthe hand occasioned \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e of a key or a knife, but the hand\r\nfelt nothing. Similarly the subject \u003ci\u003ethought of\u003c/i\u003e the number\r\n3, 6, etc., if the hand or finger was bent three or six times\r\nby the operator, or if he stroked it three, six, etc., times.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn certain individuals there was found a still odder\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_205\"\u003e[Pg 205]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nphenomenon, which reminds one of that curious idiosyncrasy\r\nof \u0027colored hearing\u0027 of which a few cases have been lately\r\ndescribed with great care by foreign writers. These individuals,\r\nnamely, \u003ci\u003esaw\u003c/i\u003e the impression received by the hand,\r\nbut could not feel it; and the thing seen appeared by no\r\nmeans associated with the hand, but more like an independent\r\nvision, which usually interested and surprised the\r\npatient. Her hand being hidden by a screen, she was\r\nordered to look at another screen and to tell of any visual\r\nimage which might project itself thereon. Numbers would\r\nthen come, corresponding to the number of times the insensible\r\nmember was raised, touched, etc. Colored lines\r\nand figures would come, corresponding to similar ones\r\ntraced on the palm; the hand itself or its fingers would\r\ncome when manipulated and finally objects placed in it\r\nwould come; but on the hand itself nothing would ever be\r\nfelt. Of course simulation would not be hard here; but\r\nM. Binet disbelieves this (usually very shallow) explanation\r\nto be a probable one in cases in question.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_203_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_203_203\"\u003e[203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe usual way in which doctors measure the delicacy\r\nof our touch is by the compass-points. Two points are\r\nnormally felt as one whenever they are too close together\r\nfor discrimination; but what is \u0027too close\u0027 on one part of\r\nthe skin may seem very far apart on another. In the\r\nmiddle of the back or on the thigh, less than 3 inches may\r\nbe too close; on the finger-tip a tenth of an inch is far\r\nenough apart. Now, as tested in this way, with the appeal\r\nmade to the primary consciousness, which talks through\r\nthe mouth and seems to hold the field alone, a certain person\u0027s\r\nskin may be entirely anæsthetic and not feel the compass-points\r\nat all; and yet this same skin will prove to have\r\na perfectly normal sensibility if the appeal be made to that\r\nother secondary or sub-consciousness, which expresses\r\nitself automatically by writing or by movements of the hand.\r\nM. Binet, M. Pierre Janet, and M. Jules Janet have all found\r\nthis. The subject, whenever touched, would signify \u0027one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_206\"\u003e[Pg 206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npoint\u0027 or \u0027two points,\u0027 as accurately as if she were a normal\r\nperson. She would signify it only by these movements;\r\nand of the movements themselves her primary self would\r\nbe as unconscious as of the facts they signified, for what the\r\nsubmerged consciousness makes the hand do automatically\r\nis unknown to the consciousness which uses the mouth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMessrs. Bernheim and Pitres have also proved, by observations\r\ntoo complicated to be given in this spot,\r\nthat the hysterical blindness is no real blindness at all.\r\nThe eye of an hysteric which is totally blind when the\r\nother or seeing eye is shut, will do its share of vision perfectly\r\nwell when \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e eyes are open together. But even\r\nwhere both eyes are semi-blind from hysterical disease,\r\nthe method of automatic writing proves that their perceptions\r\nexist, only cut off from communication with the upper\r\nconsciousness. M. Binet has found the hand of his patients\r\nunconsciously writing down words which their eyes were\r\nvainly endeavoring to \u0027see,\u0027 i.e., to bring to the upper consciousness.\r\nTheir submerged consciousness was of course\r\nseeing them, or the hand could not have written as it did.\r\nColors are similarly perceived by the sub-conscious self,\r\nwhich the hysterically color-blind eyes cannot bring to the\r\nnormal consciousness. Pricks, burns, and pinches on the\r\nanæsthetic skin, all unnoticed by the upper self, are recollected\r\nto have been suffered, and complained of, as soon\r\nas the under self gets a chance to express itself by the\r\npassage of the subject into hypnotic trance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be admitted, therefore, that \u003ci\u003ein certain persons\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nat least, \u003ci\u003ethe total possible consciousness may be split into\r\nparts which coexist but mutually ignore each other,\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nshare the objects of knowledge between them. More remarkable\r\nstill, they are \u003ci\u003ecomplementary\u003c/i\u003e. Give an object\r\nto one of the consciousnesses, and by that fact you remove\r\nit from the other or others. Barring a certain common\r\nfund of information, like the command of language, etc.,\r\nwhat the upper self knows the under self is ignorant of,\r\nand \u003ci\u003evice versâ\u003c/i\u003e. M. Janet has proved this beautifully in his\r\nsubject Lucie. The following experiment will serve as the\r\ntype of the rest: In her trance he covered her lap with\r\ncards, each bearing a number. He then told her that on\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_207\"\u003e[Pg 207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwaking she should \u003ci\u003enot see\u003c/i\u003e any card whose number was a\r\nmultiple of three. This is the ordinary so-called \u0027post-hypnotic\r\nsuggestion,\u0027 now well known, and for which Lucie\r\nwas a well-adapted subject. Accordingly, when she was\r\nawakened and asked about the papers on her lap, she\r\ncounted and said she saw those only whose number was\r\nnot a multiple of 3. To the 12, 18, 9, etc., she was blind.\r\nBut the \u003ci\u003ehand\u003c/i\u003e, when the sub-conscious self was interrogated\r\nby the usual method of engrossing the upper self in another\r\nconversation, wrote that the only cards in Lucie\u0027s lap were\r\nthose numbered 12, 18, 9, etc., and on being asked to pick\r\nup all the cards which were there, picked up these and let\r\nthe others lie. Similarly when the sight of certain things\r\nwas suggested to the sub-conscious Lucie, the normal\r\nLucie suddenly became partially or totally blind. \"What\r\nis the matter? I can\u0027t see!\" the normal personage suddenly\r\ncried out in the midst of her conversation, when\r\nM. Janet whispered to the secondary personage to make\r\nuse of her eyes. The anæsthesias, paralyses, contractions\r\nand other irregularities from which hysterics suffer seem\r\nthen to be due to the fact that their secondary personage\r\nhas enriched itself by robbing the primary one of a function\r\nwhich the latter ought to have retained. The curative\r\nindication is evident: get at the secondary personage, by\r\nhypnotization or in whatever other way, and make her \u003ci\u003egive\r\nup\u003c/i\u003e the eye, the skin, the arm, or whatever the affected part\r\nmay be. The normal self thereupon regains possession, sees,\r\nfeels, or is able to move again. In this way M. Jules Janet\r\neasily cured the well-known subject of the Salpétrière, Wit….,\r\nof all sorts of afflictions which, until he discovered the\r\nsecret of her deeper trance, it had been difficult to subdue.\r\n\"Cessez cette mauvaise plaisanterie,\" he said to the secondary\r\nself—and the latter obeyed. The way in which the\r\nvarious personages share the stock of possible sensations\r\nbetween them seems to be amusingly illustrated in this\r\nyoung woman. When awake, her skin is insensible everywhere\r\nexcept on a zone about the arm where she habitually\r\nwears a gold bracelet. This zone has feeling; but in the\r\ndeepest trance, when all the rest of her body feels, this particular\r\nzone becomes absolutely anæsthetic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_208\"\u003e[Pg 208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSometimes the mutual ignorance of the selves leads to\r\nincidents which are strange enough. The acts and movements\r\nperformed by the sub-conscious self are withdrawn\r\nfrom the conscious one, and the subject will do all sorts of\r\nincongruous things of which he remains quite unaware.\r\n\"I order Lucie [by the method of \u003ci\u003edistraction\u003c/i\u003e] to make a\r\n\u003ci\u003epied de nez\u003c/i\u003e, and her hands go forthwith to the end of her\r\nnose. Asked what she is doing, she replies that she is\r\ndoing nothing, and continues for a long time talking, with\r\nno apparent suspicion that her fingers are moving in front\r\nof her nose. I make her walk about the room; she continues\r\nto speak and believes herself sitting down.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Janet observed similar acts in a man in alcoholic\r\ndelirium. Whilst the doctor was questioning him, M. J.\r\nmade him by whispered suggestion walk, sit, kneel, and even\r\nlie down on his face on the floor, he all the while believing\r\nhimself to be standing beside his bed. Such \u003ci\u003ebizarreries\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsound incredible, until one has seen their like. Long ago,\r\nwithout understanding it, I myself saw a small example of\r\nthe way in which a person\u0027s knowledge may be shared by\r\nthe two selves. A young woman who had been writing\r\nautomatically was sitting with a pencil in her hand, trying to\r\nrecall at my request the name of a gentleman whom she had\r\nonce seen. She could only recollect the first syllable. Her\r\nhand meanwhile, without her knowledge, wrote down the\r\nlast two syllables. In a perfectly healthy young man who\r\ncan write with the planchette, I lately found the hand to\r\nbe entirely anæsthetic during the writing act; I could prick\r\nit severely without the Subject knowing the fact. The \u003ci\u003ewriting\r\non the planchette\u003c/i\u003e, however, accused me in strong terms\r\nof hurting the hand. Pricks on the \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e (non-writing)\r\nhand, meanwhile, which awakened strong protest from the\r\nyoung man\u0027s vocal organs, were denied to exist by the self\r\nwhich made the planchette go.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_204_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_204_204\"\u003e[204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWe get exactly similar results in the so-called post-hypnotic\r\nsuggestion.\u003c/i\u003e It is a familiar fact that certain subjects,\r\nwhen told during a trance to perform an act or to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_209\"\u003e[Pg 209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexperience an hallucination after waking, will when the time\r\ncomes, obey the command. How is the command registered?\r\nHow is its performance so accurately timed?\r\nThese problems were long a mystery, for the primary personality\r\nremembers nothing of the trance or the suggestion,\r\nand will often trump up an improvised pretext for yielding\r\nto the unaccountable impulse which possesses the man so\r\nsuddenly and which he cannot resist. Edmund Gurney\r\nwas the first to discover, by means of automatic writing, that\r\nthe secondary self is awake, keeping its attention constantly\r\nfixed on the command and watching for the signal\r\nof its execution. Certain trance-subjects who were also\r\nautomatic writers, when roused from trance and put to the\r\nplanchette,—not knowing then what they wrote, and having\r\ntheir upper attention fully engrossed by reading aloud, talking,\r\nor solving problems in mental arithmetic,—would inscribe\r\nthe orders which they had received, together with\r\nnotes relative to the time elapsed and the time yet to run\r\nbefore the execution.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_205_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_205_205\"\u003e[205]\u003c/a\u003e It is therefore to no \u0027automatism\u0027\r\nin the mechanical sense that such acts are due: a self presides\r\nover them, a split-off, limited and buried, but yet a\r\nfully conscious, self. More than this, the buried self often\r\ncomes to the surface and drives out the other self whilst\r\nthe acts are performing. In other words, the subject\r\nlapses into trance again when the moment arrives for execution,\r\nand has no subsequent recollection of the act which\r\nhe has done. Gurney and Beaunis established this fact,\r\nwhich has since been verified on a large scale; and Gurney\r\nalso showed that the patient became \u003ci\u003esuggestible\u003c/i\u003e again during\r\nthe brief time of the performance. M. Janet\u0027s observations,\r\nin their turn, well illustrate the phenomenon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I tell Lucie to keep her arms raised after she shall have\r\nawakened. Hardly is she in the normal state, when up go her arms\r\nabove her head, but she pays no attention to them. She goes, comes,\r\nconverses, holding her arms high in the air. If asked what her arms\r\nare doing, she is surprised at such a question, and says very sincerely:\r\n\u0027My hands are doing nothing; they are just like yours.\u0027… I command\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_210\"\u003e[Pg 210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nher to weep, and when awake she really sobs, but continues in\r\nthe midst of her tears to talk of very gay matters. The sobbing over,\r\nthere remained no trace of this grief, which seemed to have been quite\r\nsub-conscious.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe primary self often has to invent an hallucination by\r\nwhich to mask and hide from its own view the deeds which\r\nthe other self is enacting. Léonie 3\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_206_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_206_206\"\u003e[206]\u003c/a\u003e writes real letters\r\nwhilst Léonie 1 believes that she is knitting; or Lucie 2\r\nreally comes to the doctor\u0027s office, whilst Lucie 1 believes\r\nherself to be at home. This is a sort of delirium. The\r\nalphabet, or the series of numbers, when handed over to\r\nthe attention of the secondary personage may for the\r\ntime be lost to the normal self. Whilst the hand writes\r\nthe alphabet, obediently to command, the \u0027subject,\u0027 to\r\nher great stupefaction, finds herself unable to recall it, etc.\r\nFew things are more curious than these relations of mutual\r\nexclusion, of which all gradations exist between the several\r\npartial consciousnesses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow far this splitting up of the mind into separate consciousnesses\r\nmay exist in each one of us is a problem. M.\r\nJanet holds that it is only possible where there is abnormal\r\nweakness, and consequently a defect of unifying or co-ordinating\r\npower. An hysterical woman abandons part of her\r\nconsciousness because she is too weak nervously to hold\r\nit together. The abandoned part meanwhile may solidify\r\ninto a secondary or sub-conscious self. In a perfectly sound\r\nsubject, on the other hand, what is dropped out of mind at\r\none moment keeps coming back at the next. The whole\r\nfund of experiences and knowledges remains integrated, and\r\nno split-off portions of it can get organized stably enough\r\nto form subordinate selves. The stability, monotony, and\r\nstupidity of these latter is often very striking. The post-hypnotic\r\nsub-consciousness seems to think of nothing but\r\nthe order which it last received; the cataleptic sub-consciousness,\r\nof nothing but the last position imprinted on the\r\nlimb. M. Janet could cause definitely circumscribed reddening\r\nand tumefaction of the skin on two of his subjects,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_211\"\u003e[Pg 211]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby suggesting to them in hypnotism the hallucination of a\r\nmustard-poultice of any special shape. \"J\u0027ai tout le\r\ntemps pensé à votre sinapisme,\" says the subject, when\r\nput back into trance after the suggestion has taken effect.\r\nA man N., whom M. Janet operated on at long intervals,\r\nwas betweenwhiles tampered with by another\r\noperator, and when put to sleep again by M. Janet, said he\r\nwas \u0027too far away to receive orders, being in Algiers.\u0027\r\nThe other operator, having suggested that hallucination,\r\nhad forgotten to remove it before waking the subject from\r\nhis trance, and the poor passive trance-personality had\r\nstuck for weeks in the stagnant dream. Léonie\u0027s sub-conscious\r\nperformances having been illustrated to a caller, by\r\na \u0027\u003ci\u003epied de nez\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 executed with her left hand in the course\r\nof conversation, when, a year later, she meets him again,\r\nup goes the same hand to her nose again, without Léonie\u0027s\r\nnormal self suspecting the fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll these facts, taken together, form unquestionably the\r\nbeginning of an inquiry which is destined to throw a new\r\nlight into the very abysses of our nature. It is for that\r\nreason that I have cited them at such length in this early\r\nchapter of the book. They prove one thing conclusively,\r\nnamely, that \u003ci\u003ewe must never take a person\u0027s testimony, however\r\nsincere, that he has felt nothing, as proof positive that\r\nno feeling has been there.\u003c/i\u003e It may have been there as part of\r\nthe consciousness of a \u0027secondary personage,\u0027 of whose experiences\r\nthe primary one whom we are consulting can\r\nnaturally give no account. In hypnotic subjects (as we\r\nshall see in a later chapter) just as it is the easiest thing in\r\nthe world to paralyze a movement or member by simple\r\nsuggestion, so it is easy to produce what is called a systematized\r\nanæsthesia by word of command. A systematized\r\nanæsthesia means an insensibility, not to any one element\r\nof things, but to some one concrete thing or class of things.\r\nThe subject is made blind or deaf to a certain person in the\r\nroom and to no one else, and thereupon denies that that person\r\nis present, or has spoken, etc. M. P. Janet\u0027s Lucie, blind\r\nto some of the numbered cards in her lap (\u003ca href=\"#Page_207\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 207\u003c/a\u003e above), is\r\na case in point. Now when the object is simple, like a red\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_212\"\u003e[Pg 212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwafer or a black cross, the subject, although he denies that\r\nhe sees it when he looks straight at it, nevertheless gets a\r\n\u0027negative after-image\u0027 of it when he looks away again,\r\nshowing that the \u003ci\u003eoptical impression\u003c/i\u003e of it has been received.\r\nMoreover reflection shows that such a subject must \u003ci\u003edistinguish\r\nthe object from others like it in order to be blind to\r\nit.\u003c/i\u003e Make him blind to one person in the room, set all\r\nthe persons in a row, and tell him to count them. He will\r\ncount all but that one. But how can he tell \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e one not\r\nto count without recognizing who he is? In like manner,\r\nmake a stroke on paper or blackboard, and tell him it is\r\nnot there, and he will see nothing but the clean paper or\r\nboard. Next (he not looking) surround the original stroke\r\nwith other strokes exactly like it, and ask him what he\r\nsees. He will point out one by one all the new strokes, and\r\nomit the original one every time, no matter how numerous\r\nthe new strokes may be, or in what order they are\r\narranged. Similarly, if the original single stroke to which\r\nhe is blind be \u003ci\u003edoubled\u003c/i\u003e by a prism of some sixteen degrees\r\nplaced before one of his eyes (both being kept open), he\r\nwill say that he now sees \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e stroke, and point in the direction\r\nin which the image seen through the prism lies, ignoring\r\nstill the original stroke.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObviously, then, he is not blind to the \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e of stroke in\r\nthe least. He is blind only to one individual stroke of that\r\nkind in a particular position on the board or paper—that\r\nis to a particular complex object; and, paradoxical as it\r\nmay seem to say so, he must distinguish it with great accuracy\r\nfrom others like it, in order to remain blind to it\r\nwhen the others are brought near. He discriminates it, as\r\na preliminary to not seeing it at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, when by a prism before one eye a previously invisible\r\nline has been made visible to that eye, and the other\r\neye is thereupon closed or screened, \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e closure makes no\r\ndifference; the line still remains visible. But if then the\r\nprism be removed, the line will disappear even to the eye\r\nwhich a moment ago saw it, and both eyes will revert to\r\ntheir original blind state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have, then, to deal in these cases neither with a blindness\r\nof the eye itself, nor with a mere failure to notice, but\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_213\"\u003e[Pg 213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith something much more complex; namely, an active\r\ncounting out and positive exclusion of certain objects. It\r\nis as when one \u0027cuts\u0027 an acquaintance, \u0027ignores\u0027 a claim,\r\nor \u0027refuses to be influenced\u0027 by a consideration. But the\r\nperceptive activity which works to this result is disconnected\r\nfrom the consciousness which is personal, so to\r\nspeak, to the subject, and makes of the object concerning\r\nwhich the suggestion is made, its own private possession\r\nand prey.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_207_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_207_207\"\u003e[207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mother who is asleep to every sound but the stirrings\r\nof her babe, evidently has the babe-portion of her auditory\r\nsensibility systematically awake. Relatively to that,\r\nthe rest of her mind is in a state of systematized anæsthesia.\r\nThat department, split off and disconnected from the sleeping\r\npart, can none the less wake the latter up in case of\r\nneed. So that on the whole the quarrel between Descartes\r\nand Locke as to whether the mind ever sleeps is less\r\nnear to solution than ever. On \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e speculative grounds\r\nLocke\u0027s view that thought and feeling may at times wholly\r\ndisappear seems the more plausible. As glands cease to\r\nsecrete and muscles to contract, so the brain should sometimes\r\ncease to carry currents, and with this minimum of its\r\nactivity might well coexist a minimum of consciousness.\r\nOn the other hand, we see how deceptive are appearances,\r\nand are forced to admit that a part of consciousness may\r\nsever its connections with other parts and yet continue to be.\r\nOn the whole it is best to abstain from a conclusion. The\r\nscience of the near future will doubtless answer this question\r\nmore wisely than we can now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_214\"\u003e[Pg 214]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us turn now to consider the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eRELATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO SPACE.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is the problem known in the history of philosophy\r\nas the \u003ci\u003equestion of the seat of the soul\u003c/i\u003e. It has given\r\nrise to much literature, but we must ourselves treat it very\r\nbriefly. Everything depends on what we conceive the soul\r\nto be, an extended or an inextended entity. If the former,\r\nit may occupy a seat. If the latter, it may not; though it\r\nhas been thought that even then it might still have a \u003ci\u003eposition\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nMuch hair-splitting has arisen about the possibility\r\nof an inextended thing nevertheless being \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e throughout\r\na certain amount of extension. We must distinguish\r\nthe kinds of presence. In some manner our consciousness\r\nis \u0027present\u0027 to everything with which it is in relation. I am\r\n\u003ci\u003ecognitively\u003c/i\u003e present to Orion whenever I perceive that constellation,\r\nbut I am not \u003ci\u003edynamically\u003c/i\u003e present there, I work\r\nno effects. To my brain, however, I am dynamically present,\r\ninasmuch as my thoughts and feelings seem to react upon\r\nthe processes thereof. If, then, by the seat of the mind is\r\nmeant nothing more than the locality with which it stands\r\nin immediate dynamic relations, we are certain to be\r\nright in saying that its seat is somewhere in the cortex of\r\nthe brain. Descartes, as is well known, thought that the\r\ninextended soul was immediately present to the pineal\r\ngland. Others, as Lotze in his earlier days, and W. Volkmann,\r\nthink its position must be at some point of the structureless\r\nmatrix of the anatomical brain-elements, at which\r\npoint they suppose that all nerve-currents may cross and\r\ncombine. The scholastic doctrine is that the soul is totally\r\npresent, both in the whole and in each and every part\r\nof the body. This mode of presence is said to be due to\r\nthe soul\u0027s inextended nature and to its simplicity. Two extended\r\nentities could only correspond in space with one\r\nanother, part to part,—but not so does the soul, which has\r\nno parts, correspond with the body. Sir Wm. Hamilton\r\nand Professor Bowen defend something like this view. I.\r\nH. Fichte, Ulrici, and, among American philosophers, Mr.\r\nJ. E. Walter,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_208_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_208_208\"\u003e[208]\u003c/a\u003e maintain the soul to be a space-filling principle.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_215\"\u003e[Pg 215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFichte calls it the inner body, Ulrici likens it to a\r\nfluid of non-molecular composition. These theories remind\r\nus of the \u0027theosophic\u0027 doctrines of the present day, and\r\ncarry us back to times when the soul as vehicle of consciousness\r\nwas not discriminated, as it now is, from the\r\nvital principle presiding over the formation of the body.\r\nPlato gave head, breast, and abdomen to the immortal reason,\r\nthe courage, and the appetites, as their seats respectively.\r\nAristotle argues that the heart is the sole seat.\r\nElsewhere we find the blood, the brain, the lungs, the liver\r\nthe kidneys even, in turn assigned as seat of the whole or\r\npart of the soul.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_209_209\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_209_209\"\u003e[209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth is that if the thinking principle is extended we\r\nneither know its form nor its seat; whilst if unextended, it\r\nis absurd to speak of its having any space-relations at all.\r\nSpace-relations we shall see hereafter to be \u003ci\u003esensible\u003c/i\u003e things.\r\nThe only objects that can have mutual relations of position\r\nare objects that are perceived coexisting in the same felt\r\nspace. A thing not perceived at all, such as the inextended\r\nsoul must be, cannot coexist with any perceived objects in\r\nthis way. No lines can be felt stretching from it to the\r\nother objects. It can form no terminus to any space-interval.\r\nIt can therefore in no intelligible sense enjoy position.\r\nIts relations cannot be spatial, but must be exclusively\r\ncognitive or dynamic, as we have seen. So far as they are\r\ndynamic, to talk of the soul being \u0027present\u0027 is only a figure\r\nof speech. Hamilton\u0027s doctrine that the soul is present to\r\nthe whole body is at any rate false: for cognitively its presence\r\nextends far beyond the body, and dynamically it does\r\nnot extend beyond the brain.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_216\"\u003e[Pg 216]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_210_210\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_210_210\"\u003e[210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER OBJECTS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eare either relations to \u003ci\u003eother minds\u003c/i\u003e, or to \u003ci\u003ematerial things\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nmaterial things are either the mind\u0027s \u003ci\u003eown brain\u003c/i\u003e, on the one\r\nhand, or \u003ci\u003eanything else\u003c/i\u003e, on the other. The relations of a\r\nmind to its own brain are of a unique and utterly mysterious\r\nsort; we discussed them in the last two chapters, and\r\ncan add nothing to that account.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mind\u0027s relations to other objects than the brain are\r\n\u003ci\u003ecognitive and emotional\u003c/i\u003e relations exclusively, so far as we\r\nknow. It \u003ci\u003eknows\u003c/i\u003e them, and it inwardly \u003ci\u003ewelcomes or rejects\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthem, but it has no other dealings with them. When it seems\r\nto \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e upon them, it only does so through the intermediary\r\nof its own body, so that not it but the body is what acts on\r\nthem, and the brain must first act upon the body. The\r\nsame is true when other things seem to act on it—they only\r\nact on the body, and through that on its brain.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_211_211\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_211_211\"\u003e[211]\u003c/a\u003e All that\r\nit \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e do \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e is to know other things, misknow or\r\nignore them, and to find that they interest it, in this fashion\r\nor in that.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the \u003ci\u003erelation of knowing\u003c/i\u003e is the most mysterious thing\r\nin the world. If we ask how one thing \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e know another\r\nwe are led into the heart of \u003ci\u003eErkenntnisstheorie\u003c/i\u003e and metaphysics.\r\nThe psychologist, for his part, does not consider the\r\nmatter so curiously as this. Finding a world before him\r\nwhich he cannot but believe that \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c/i\u003e knows, and setting\r\nhimself to study his own past thoughts, or someone else\u0027s\r\nthoughts, of what he believes to be that same world; he\r\ncannot but conclude that those other thoughts know it after\r\ntheir fashion even as he knows it after his. Knowledge becomes\r\nfor him an ultimate relation that must be admitted,\r\nwhether it be explained or not, just like difference or resemblance,\r\nwhich no one seeks to explain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere our topic Absolute Mind instead of being the concrete\r\nminds of individuals dwelling in the natural world,\r\nwe could not tell whether that Mind had the function of\r\nknowing or not, as knowing is commonly understood. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_217\"\u003e[Pg 217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmight learn the complexion of its thoughts; but, as we\r\nshould have no realities outside of it to compare them with,—for\r\nif we had, the Mind would not be Absolute,—we could\r\nnot criticise them, and find them either right or wrong; and\r\nwe should have to call them simply the thoughts, and not\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eknowledge\u003c/i\u003e, of the Absolute Mind. Finite minds, however,\r\ncan be judged in a different way, because the psychologist\r\nhimself can go bail for the independent reality of the\r\nobjects of which they think. He knows these to exist outside\r\nas well as inside the minds in question; he thus knows\r\nwhether the minds think and \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e, or only think; and\r\nthough his knowledge is of course that of a fallible mortal,\r\nthere is nothing in the conditions that should make it more\r\nlikely to be wrong in this case than in any other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow by what tests does the psychologist decide whether\r\nthe state of mind he is studying is a bit of knowledge, or\r\nonly a subjective fact not referring to anything outside\r\nitself?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe uses the tests we all practically use. If the state of\r\nmind \u003ci\u003eresembles\u003c/i\u003e his own idea of a certain reality; or if without\r\nresembling his idea of it, it seems to imply that reality and\r\nrefer to it by operating upon it through the bodily organs;\r\nor even if it resembles and operates on some other reality\r\nthat implies, and leads up to, and terminates in, the first\r\none,—in either or all of these cases the psychologist admits\r\nthat the state of mind takes cognizance, directly or remotely,\r\ndistinctly or vaguely, truly or falsely, of the reality\u0027s nature\r\nand position in the world. If, on the other hand, the\r\nmental state under examination neither resembles nor operates\r\non any of the realities known to the psychologist, he calls\r\nit a subjective state pure and simple, possessed of no cognitive\r\nworth. If, again, it resemble a reality or a set of\r\nrealities as he knows them, but altogether fail to operate\r\non them or modify their course by producing bodily motions\r\nwhich the psychologist sees, then the psychologist, like all\r\nof us, may be in doubt. Let the mental state, for example,\r\noccur during the sleep of its subject. Let the latter dream\r\nof the death of a certain man, and let the man simultaneously\r\ndie. Is the dream a mere coincidence, or a veritable\r\ncognition of the death? Such puzzling cases are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_218\"\u003e[Pg 218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat the Societies for \u0027Psychical Research\u0027 are collecting\r\nand trying to interpret in the most reasonable way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the dream were the only one of the kind the subject\r\never had in his life, if the context of the death in the dream\r\ndiffered in many particulars from the real death\u0027s context,\r\nand if the dream led to no action about the death, unquestionably\r\nwe should all call it a strange coincidence, and\r\nnaught besides. But if the death in the dream had a long\r\ncontext, agreeing point for point with every feature that\r\nattended the real death; if the subject were constantly\r\nhaving such dreams, all equally perfect, and if on awaking\r\nhe had a habit of acting immediately as if they were true\r\nand so getting \u0027the start\u0027 of his more tardily informed\r\nneighbors,—we should probably all have to admit that he\r\nhad some mysterious kind of clairvoyant power, that his\r\ndreams in an inscrutable way knew just those realities\r\nwhich they figured, and that the word \u0027coincidence\u0027 failed\r\nto touch the root of the matter. And whatever doubts any\r\none preserved would completely vanish if it should appear\r\nthat from the midst of his dream he had the power of \u003ci\u003einterfering\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith the course of the reality, and making the events\r\nin it turn this way or that, according as he dreamed they\r\nshould. Then at least it would be certain that he and the\r\npsychologist were dealing with the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e. It is by such\r\ntests as these that we are convinced that the waking minds\r\nof our fellows and our own minds know the same external\r\nworld.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe psychologist\u0027s attitude towards cognition\u003c/i\u003e will be so\r\nimportant in the sequel that we must not leave it until it is\r\nmade perfectly clear. \u003ci\u003eIt is a thoroughgoing dualism.\u003c/i\u003e It\r\nsupposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and\r\ntreats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or\r\ninto the other, neither in any way \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the other, neither\r\n\u003ci\u003emakes\u003c/i\u003e the other. They just stand face to face in a common\r\nworld, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its counterpart.\r\nThis singular relation is not to be expressed in any\r\nlower terms, or translated into any more intelligible name.\r\nSome sort of \u003ci\u003esignal\u003c/i\u003e must be given by the thing to the mind\u0027s\r\nbrain, or the knowing will not occur—we find as a matter\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_219\"\u003e[Pg 219]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof fact that the mere \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of a thing outside the brain\r\nis not a sufficient cause for our knowing it: it must strike\r\nthe brain in some way, as well as be there, to be known.\r\nBut the brain being struck, the knowledge is constituted\r\nby a new construction that occurs altogether \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the mind.\r\nThe thing remains the same whether known or not.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_212_212\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_212_212\"\u003e[212]\u003c/a\u003e And\r\nwhen once there, the knowledge may remain there, whatever\r\nbecomes of the thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the ancients, and by unreflecting people perhaps to-day,\r\nknowledge is explained as the \u003ci\u003epassage\u003c/i\u003e of something\r\nfrom without into the mind—the latter, so far, at least, as\r\nits sensible affections go, being passive and receptive.\r\nBut even in mere sense-impression the duplication of the\r\nobject by an inner construction must take place. Consider,\r\nwith Professor Bowne, what happens when two people converse\r\ntogether and know each other\u0027s mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"No thoughts leave the mind of one and cross into the mind of the\r\nother. When we speak of an exchange of thought, even the crudest\r\nmind knows that this is a mere figure of speech…. To perceive\r\nanother\u0027s thought, we must construct his thought within ourselves;…\r\nthis thought is our own and is strictly original with us. At the same\r\ntime we owe it to the other; and if it had not originated with him, it\r\nwould probably not have originated with us. But what has the other\r\ndone?… This: by an entirely mysterious world-order, the speaker\r\nis enabled to produce a series of signs which are totally unlike [the]\r\nthought, but which, by virtue of the same mysterious order, act as a\r\nseries of incitements upon the hearer, so that he constructs within\r\nhimself the corresponding mental state. The act of the speaker consists\r\nin availing himself of the proper incitements. The act of the hearer is\r\nimmediately only the reaction of the soul against the incitement….\r\nAll communion between finite minds is of this sort…. Probably no\r\nreflecting person would deny this conclusion, but when we say that\r\nwhat is thus true of perception of another\u0027s thought is equally true of\r\nthe perception of the outer world in general, many minds will be\r\ndisposed to question, and not a few will deny it outright. Yet there is\r\nno alternative but to affirm that to perceive the universe we must\r\nconstruct it in thought, and that our knowledge of the universe is but\r\nthe unfolding of the mind\u0027s inner nature…. By describing the mind\r\nas a waxen tablet, and things as impressing themselves upon it, we\r\nseem to get great insight until we think to ask where this extended\r\ntablet is, and how things stamp themselves on it, and how the perceptive\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_220\"\u003e[Pg 220]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nact would be explained even if they did…. The immediate\r\nantecedents of sensation and perception are a series of nervous changes\r\nin the brain. Whatever we know of the outer world is revealed only\r\nin and through these nervous changes. But these are totally unlike\r\nthe objects assumed to exist as their causes. If we might conceive the\r\nmind as in the light, and in direct contact with its objects, the\r\nimagination at least would be comforted; but when we conceive the\r\nmind as coming in contact with the outer world only in the dark\r\nchamber of the skull, and then not in contact with the objects perceived,\r\nbut only with a series of nerve-changes of which, moreover, it\r\nknows nothing, it is plain that the object is a long way off. All talk\r\nof pictures, impressions, etc., ceases because of the lack of all the\r\nconditions to give such figures any meaning. It is not even clear that\r\nwe shall ever find our way out of the darkness into the world of light\r\nand reality again. We begin with complete trust in physics and the\r\nsenses, and are forthwith led away from the object into a nervous\r\nlabyrinth, where the object is entirely displaced by a set of nervous\r\nchanges which are totally unlike anything but themselves. Finally,\r\nwe land in the dark chamber of the skull. The object has gone completely,\r\nand knowledge has not yet appeared. Nervous signs are the\r\nraw material of all knowledge of the outer world according to the most\r\ndecided realism. But in order to pass beyond these signs into a\r\nknowledge of the outer world, we must posit an interpreter who shall\r\nread back these signs into their objective meaning. But that interpreter,\r\nagain, must implicitly contain the meaning of the universe\r\nwithin itself; and these signs are really but excitations which cause the\r\nsoul to unfold what is within itself. Inasmuch as by common consent\r\nthe soul communicates with the outer world only through these signs,\r\nand never comes nearer to the object than such signs can bring it, it\r\nfollows that the principles of interpretation must be in the mind itself,\r\nand that the resulting construction is primarily only an expression of the\r\nmind\u0027s own nature. All reaction is of this sort; it expresses the nature\r\nof the reacting agent, and knowledge comes under the same head,\r\nthis fact makes it necessary for us either to admit a pre-established\r\nharmony between the laws and nature of thought and the laws and\r\nnature of things, or else to allow that the objects of perception, the\r\nuniverse as it appears, are purely phenomenal, being but the way in\r\nwhich the mind reacts against the ground of its sensations.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_213_213\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_213_213\"\u003e[213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe dualism of Object and Subject and their pre-established\r\nharmony are what the psychologist as such must\r\nassume, whatever ulterior monistic philosophy he may, as\r\nan individual who has the right also to be a metaphysician,\r\nhave in reserve. I hope that this general point is now\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_221\"\u003e[Pg 221]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmade clear, so that we may leave it, and descend to some\r\ndistinctions of detail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThere are two kinds of knowledge\u003c/i\u003e broadly and practically\r\ndistinguishable: we may call them respectively \u003ci\u003eknowledge\r\nof acquaintance\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eknowledge-about\u003c/i\u003e. Most languages express\r\nthe distinction; thus, \u003ci\u003eγνῶναι, εὶδέναι; noscere, scire;\r\nkennen, wissen; connaître, savoir\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_214_214\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_214_214\"\u003e[214]\u003c/a\u003e I am acquainted with\r\nmany people and things, which I know very little about,\r\nexcept their presence in the places where I have met them.\r\nI know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a\r\npear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my\r\nfinger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass;\r\nan effort of attention when I make it; a difference between\r\ntwo things when I notice it; but \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e the inner nature of\r\nthese facts or what makes them what they are, I can say\r\nnothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them\r\nto any one who has not already made it himself. I cannot\r\n\u003ci\u003edescribe\u003c/i\u003e them, make a blind man guess what blue is like,\r\ndefine to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just\r\nwhat respect distance is just what it is, and differs from\r\nother forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends,\r\nGo to certain places and act in certain ways, and these\r\nobjects will probably come. All the elementary natures of\r\nthe world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter\r\nand mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist\r\nbetween them, must either not be known at all, or known\r\nin this dumb way of acquaintance without \u003ci\u003eknowledge-about\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIn minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e knowledge\r\nabout everything. Things can at least be classed, and\r\nthe times of their appearance told. But in general, the less\r\nwe analyze a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive,\r\nthe less we know about it and the more our familiarity\r\nwith it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds\r\nof knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practically\r\nexerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought\r\nof a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison\r\nwith a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_222\"\u003e[Pg 222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit\r\nstill.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe grammatical sentence expresses this. Its \u0027subject\u0027\r\nstands for an object of acquaintance which, by the addition\r\nof the predicate, is to get something known about it. We\r\nmay already know a good deal, when we hear the subject\r\nnamed—its name may have rich connotations. But, know\r\nwe much or little then, we know more still when the sentence\r\nis done. We can relapse at will into a mere condition\r\nof acquaintance with an object by scattering our\r\nattention and staring at it in a vacuous trance-like way.\r\nWe can ascend to knowledge \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it by rallying our wits\r\nand proceeding to notice and analyze and think. What we\r\nare only acquainted with is only \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e to our minds; we\r\n\u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e it, or the idea of it. But when we know about it, we\r\ndo more than merely have it; we seem, as we think over its\r\nrelations, to subject it to a sort of \u003ci\u003etreatment\u003c/i\u003e and to \u003ci\u003eoperate\u003c/i\u003e\r\nupon it with our thought. The words \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngive voice to the antithesis. Through feelings we become\r\nacquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do we\r\nknow about them. Feelings are the germ and starting\r\npoint of cognition, thoughts the developed tree. The minimum\r\nof grammatical subject, of objective presence, of reality\r\nknown about, the mere beginning of knowledge, must be\r\nnamed by the word that says the least. Such a word is the\r\ninterjection, as \u003ci\u003elo! there! ecco! voilà!\u003c/i\u003e or the article or\r\ndemonstrative pronoun introducing the sentence, as \u003ci\u003ethe, it,\r\nthat\u003c/i\u003e. In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XII\u003c/a\u003e we shall see a little deeper into what\r\nthis distinction, between the mere mental having or feeling\r\nof an object and the thinking of it, portends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mental states usually distinguished as feelings are\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eemotions\u003c/i\u003e, and the \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e we get from skin, muscle,\r\nviscus, eye, ear, nose, and palate. The \u0027thoughts,\u0027 as\r\nrecognized in popular parlance, are the \u003ci\u003econceptions\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003ejudgments\u003c/i\u003e. When we treat of these mental states in particular\r\nwe shall have to say a word about the cognitive\r\nfunction and value of each. It may perhaps be well to\r\nnotice now that our senses only give us acquaintance with\r\nfacts of body, and that of the mental states of other persons\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_223\"\u003e[Pg 223]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe only have conceptual knowledge. Of our own past\r\nstates of mind we take cognizance in a peculiar way. They\r\nare \u0027objects of memory,\u0027 and appear to us endowed with\r\na sort of warmth and intimacy that makes the perception\r\nof them seem more like a process of sensation than like a\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_198_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_198_198\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[198]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Messrs. Payton Spence (Journal of Spec. Phil., x, 338, xiv, 286)\r\nand M. M. Garver (Amer. Jour. of Science, 3d series, xx, 189) argue, the\r\none from speculative, the other from experimental grounds, that, the physical\r\ncondition of consciousness being neural vibration, the consciousness\r\nmust itself be incessantly interrupted by unconsciousness—about fifty times\r\na second, according to Garver.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_199_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_199_199\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[199]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e That the appearance of mental activity here is real can be proved by\r\nsuggesting to the \u0027hypnotized\u0027 somnambulist that he shall remember when\r\nhe awakes. He will then often do so.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_200_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_200_200\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[200]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For more details, cf. Malebranche, Rech. de la Verité, bk. iii, chap.\r\ni; J. Locke, Essay conc. H. U., book iii, ch. i; C. Wolf, Psychol.\r\nrationalis, § 59; Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaph., lecture xvii;\r\nJ. Bascom, Science of Mind, § 12; Th. Jouffroy, Mélanges Philos., \u0027du\r\nSommeil\u0027; H. Holland, Chapters on Mental Physiol., p. 80; B. Brodie,\r\nPsychol. Researches, p. 147; E. M. Chesley, Journ. of Spec. Phil., vol. xi,\r\np. 72; Th. Ribot, Maladies de la Personnalité, pp. 8-10; H. Lotze, Metaphysics,\r\n§ 533.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_201_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_201_201\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[201]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e L\u0027Automatisme Psychologique, Paris, 1889, \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_202_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_202_202\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[202]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See his articles in the Chicago Open Court, for July, August and\r\nNovember, 1889. Also in the Revue Philosophique for 1889 and \u002790.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_203_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_203_203\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[203]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This whole phenomenon shows how an idea which remains itself below\r\nthe threshold of a certain conscious self may occasion associative effects\r\ntherein. The skin-sensations unfelt by the patient\u0027s primary consciousness\r\nawaken nevertheless their usual visual associates therein.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_204_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_204_204\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[204]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Proceedings of American Soc. for Psych. Research, vol. i, p.\r\n548.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_205_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_205_205\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[205]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Proceedings of the (London) Soc. for Psych. Research, May, 1887, p.\r\n268 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_206_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_206_206\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[206]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M. Janet designates by numbers the different personalities which the\r\nsubject may display.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_207_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_207_207\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[207]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e How to conceive of this state of mind is not easy. It would be much\r\nsimpler to understand the process, if adding new strokes made the first one\r\nvisible. There would then be two different objects apperceived as totals,—paper\r\nwith one stroke, paper with many strokes; and, blind to the former,\r\nhe would see all that was in the latter, because he would have apperceived\r\nit as a different total in the first instance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA process of this sort occurs sometimes (not always) when the new\r\nstrokes, instead of being mere repetitions of the original one, are lines\r\nwhich combine with it into a total object, say a human face. The subject\r\nof the trance then may regain his sight of the line to which he had\r\npreviously been blind, by seeing it as part of the face.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_208_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_208_208\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[208]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Perception of Space and Matter, 1879, part ii, chap. 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_209_209\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_209_209\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[209]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For a very good condensed history of the various opinions, see W.\r\nVolkmann von Volkmar, Lehrbuch d. Psychologie, § 16, Anm. Complete\r\nreferences to Sir W. Hamilton are given in J. E. Walter, Perception of\r\nSpace and Matter, pp. 65-6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_210_210\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_210_210\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[210]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Most contemporary writers ignore the question of the soul\u0027s seat.\r\nLotze is the only one who seems to have been much concerned about it,\r\nand his views have varied. Cf. Medicinische Psychol., § 10. Microcosmus,\r\nbk. iii, ch. 2. Metaphysic, bk. iii, ch. 5. Outlines of Psychol.,\r\npart ii, ch. 3. See also G. T. Fechner, Psychophysik, chap. xxxvii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_211_211\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_211_211\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[211]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I purposely ignore \u0027clairvoyance\u0027 and action upon distant things by\r\n\u0027mediums,\u0027 as not yet matters of common consent.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_212_212\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_212_212\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[212]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I disregard \u003ci\u003econsequences\u003c/i\u003e which may later come to the thing from the\r\nfact that it is known. The knowing \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e in no wise affects the thing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_213_213\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_213_213\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[213]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, pp. 407-10. Cf. also Lotze: Logik,\r\n§§ 308, 326-7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_214_214\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_214_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[214]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. John Grote: Exploratio Philosophica, p. 60; H. Helmholtz,\r\nPopular Scientific Lectures, London, p. 308-9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_224\"\u003e[Pg 224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_IX\"\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_215_215\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_215_215\"\u003e[215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE STREAM OF THOUGHT.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe now begin our study of the mind from within. Most\r\nbooks start with sensations, as the simplest mental facts,\r\nand proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage\r\nfrom those below it. But this is abandoning the empirical\r\nmethod of investigation. No one ever had a simple sensation\r\nby itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a\r\nteeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we\r\ncall simple sensations are results of discriminative attention,\r\npushed often to a very high degree. It is astonishing\r\nwhat havoc is wrought in psychology by admitting at the\r\noutset apparently innocent suppositions, that nevertheless\r\ncontain a flaw. The bad consequences develop themselves\r\nlater on, and are irremediable, being woven through the\r\nwhole texture of the work. The notion that sensations,\r\nbeing the simplest things, are the first things to take up in\r\npsychology is one of these suppositions. The only thing\r\nwhich psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is\r\nthe fact of thinking itself, and that must first be taken up\r\nand analyzed. If sensations then prove to be amongst the\r\nelements of the thinking, we shall be no worse off as respects\r\nthem than if we had taken them for granted at the\r\nstart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking\r\nof some sort goes on.\u003c/i\u003e I use the word thinking, in accordance\r\nwith what was said on \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 186\u003c/a\u003e, for every form of consciousness\r\nindiscriminately. If we could say in English \u0027it\r\nthinks,\u0027 as we say \u0027it rains \u0027or \u0027it blows,\u0027 we should be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_225\"\u003e[Pg 225]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption.\r\nAs we cannot, we must simply say that \u003ci\u003ethought\r\ngoes on\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eFIVE CHARACTERS IN THOUGHT.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow does it go on? We notice immediately five important\r\ncharacters in the process, of which it shall be the duty\r\nof the present chapter to treat in a general way:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always\r\nchanging.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly\r\ncontinuous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4) It always appears to deal with objects independent\r\nof itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the\r\nexclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—\u003ci\u003echooses\u003c/i\u003e from\r\namong them, in a word—all the while.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn considering these five points successively, we shall\r\nhave to plunge \u003ci\u003ein medias res\u003c/i\u003e as regards our vocabulary, and\r\nuse psychological terms which can only be adequately defined\r\nin later chapters of the book. But every one knows\r\nwhat the terms mean in a rough way; and it is only in a\r\nrough way that we are now to take them. This chapter is\r\nlike a painter\u0027s first charcoal sketch upon his canvas, in\r\nwhich no niceties appear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e1) \u003ci\u003eThought tends to Personal Form.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I say \u003ci\u003eevery thought is part of a personal consciousness\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u0027personal consciousness\u0027 is one of the terms in\r\nquestion. Its meaning we know so long as no one asks us\r\nto define it, but to give an accurate account of it is the most\r\ndifficult of philosophic tasks. This task we must confront\r\nin the next chapter; here a preliminary word will suffice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this room—this lecture-room, say—there are a multitude\r\nof thoughts, yours and mine, some of which cohere\r\nmutually, and some not. They are as little each-for-itself\r\nand reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging-together.\r\nThey are neither: no one of them is separate,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_226\"\u003e[Pg 226]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut each belongs with certain others and with none beside.\r\nMy thought belongs with my other thoughts, and your\r\nthought with your other thoughts. Whether anywhere in\r\nthe room there be a mere thought, which is nobody\u0027s\r\nthought, we have no means of ascertaining, for we have no\r\nexperience of its like. The only states of consciousness\r\nthat we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses,\r\nminds, selves, concrete particular I\u0027s and\r\nyou\u0027s.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach of these minds keeps its own thoughts to itself.\r\nThere is no giving or bartering between them. No thought\r\neven comes into direct \u003ci\u003esight\u003c/i\u003e of a thought in another personal\r\nconsciousness than its own. Absolute insulation,\r\nirreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the elementary\r\npsychic fact were not \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethis thought\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethat\r\nthought\u003c/i\u003e, but \u003ci\u003emy thought\u003c/i\u003e, every thought being \u003ci\u003eowned\u003c/i\u003e. Neither\r\ncontemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of\r\nquality and content are able to fuse thoughts together\r\nwhich are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different\r\npersonal minds. The breaches between such thoughts\r\nare the most absolute breaches in nature. Everyone will\r\nrecognize this to be true, so long as the existence of \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncorresponding to the term \u0027personal mind\u0027 is all that\r\nis insisted on, without any particular view of its nature\r\nbeing implied. On these terms the personal self rather\r\nthan the thought might be treated as the immediate datum\r\nin psychology. The universal conscious fact is not \u0027feelings\r\nand thoughts exist,\u0027 but \u0027I think\u0027 and \u0027I feel.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_216_216\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_216_216\"\u003e[216]\u003c/a\u003e No\r\npsychology, at any rate, can question the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of personal\r\nselves. The worst a psychology can do is so to\r\ninterpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their\r\nworth. A French writer, speaking of our ideas, says somewhere\r\nin a fit of anti-spiritualistic excitement that, misled\r\nby certain peculiarities which they display, we \u0027end by\r\npersonifying\u0027 the procession which they make,—such personification\r\nbeing regarded by him as a great philosophic\r\nblunder on our part. It could only be a blunder if the\r\nnotion of personality meant something essentially different\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_227\"\u003e[Pg 227]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom anything to be found in the mental procession. But if\r\nthat procession be itself the very \u0027original\u0027 of the notion of\r\npersonality, to personify it cannot possibly be wrong. It is\r\nalready personified. There are no marks of personality to\r\nbe gathered \u003ci\u003ealiunde\u003c/i\u003e, and then found lacking in the train of\r\nthought. It has them all already; so that to whatever\r\nfarther analysis we may subject that form of personal selfhood\r\nunder which thoughts appear, it is, and must remain,\r\ntrue that the thoughts which psychology studies do continually\r\ntend to appear as parts of personal selves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI say \u0027tend to appear\u0027 rather than \u0027appear,\u0027 on account\r\nof those facts of sub-conscious personality, automatic writing,\r\netc., of which we studied a few in the last chapter.\r\nThe buried feelings and thoughts proved now to exist in\r\nhysterical anæsthetics, in recipients of post-hypnotic suggestion,\r\netc., themselves are parts of \u003ci\u003esecondary personal\r\nselves\u003c/i\u003e. These selves are for the most part very stupid and\r\ncontracted, and are cut off at ordinary times from communication\r\nwith the regular and normal self of the individual;\r\nbut still they form conscious unities, have continuous memories,\r\nspeak, write, invent distinct names for themselves, or\r\nadopt names that are suggested; and, in short, are entirely\r\nworthy of that title of secondary personalities which is now\r\ncommonly given them. According to M. Janet these secondary\r\npersonalities are always abnormal, and result from the\r\nsplitting of what ought to be a single complete self into two\r\nparts, of which one lurks in the background whilst the other\r\nappears on the surface as the only self the man or woman\r\nhas. For our present purpose it is unimportant whether\r\nthis account of the origin of secondary selves is applicable\r\nto all possible cases of them or not, for it certainly is true\r\nof a large number of them. Now although the \u003ci\u003esize\u003c/i\u003e of a\r\nsecondary self thus formed will depend on the number of\r\nthoughts that are thus split-off from the main consciousness,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e of it tends to personality, and the later\r\nthoughts pertaining to it remember the earlier ones and\r\nadopt them as their own. M. Janet caught the actual moment\r\nof inspissation (so to speak) of one of these secondary\r\npersonalities in his anæsthetic somnambulist Lucie. He\r\nfound that when this young woman\u0027s attention was absorbed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_228\"\u003e[Pg 228]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin conversation with a third party, her anæsthetic hand\r\nwould write simple answers to questions whispered to her by\r\nhimself. \"Do you hear?\" he asked. \"\u003ci\u003eNo,\u003c/i\u003e\" was the unconsciously\r\nwritten reply. \"But to answer you must hear.\"\r\n\"\u003ci\u003eYes, quite so.\u003c/i\u003e\" \"Then how do you manage?\" \"\u003ci\u003eI don\u0027t\r\nknow.\u003c/i\u003e\" \"There must be some one who hears me.\" \"\u003ci\u003eYes.\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n\"Who?\" \"\u003ci\u003eSomeone other than Lucie.\u003c/i\u003e\" \"Ah! another person.\r\nShall we give her a name?\" \"\u003ci\u003eNo.\u003c/i\u003e\" \"Yes, it will\r\nbe more convenient.\" \"\u003ci\u003eWell, Adrienne, then.\u003c/i\u003e\" \"Once baptized,\r\nthe subconscious personage,\" M. Janet continues,\r\n\"grows more definitely outlined and displays better her\r\npsychological characters. In particular she shows us that\r\nshe is conscious of the feelings excluded from the consciousness\r\nof the primary or normal personage. She it is who\r\ntells us that I am pinching the arm or touching the little\r\nfinger in which Lucie for so long has had no tactile sensations.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_217_217\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_217_217\"\u003e[217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other cases the adoption of the name by the secondary\r\nself is more spontaneous. I have seen a number of\r\nincipient automatic writers and mediums as yet imperfectly\r\n\u0027developed,\u0027 who immediately and of their own accord\r\nwrite and speak in the name of departed spirits. These\r\nmay be public characters, as Mozart, Faraday, or real persons\r\nformerly known to the subject, or altogether imaginary\r\nbeings. Without prejudicing the question of real\r\n\u0027spirit-control\u0027 in the more developed sorts of trance-utterance,\r\nI incline to think that these (often deplorably\r\nunintelligent) rudimentary utterances are the work of an\r\ninferior fraction of the subject\u0027s own natural mind, set free\r\nfrom control by the rest, and working after a set pattern\r\nfixed by the prejudices of the social environment. In a\r\nspiritualistic community we get optimistic messages, whilst\r\nin an ignorant Catholic village the secondary personage\r\ncalls itself by the name of a demon, and proffers blasphemies\r\nand obscenities, instead of telling us how happy it\r\nis in the summer-land.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_229\"\u003e[Pg 229]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_218_218\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_218_218\"\u003e[218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBeneath these tracts of thought, which, however rudimentary,\r\nare still organized selves with a memory, habits,\r\nand sense of their own identity, M. Janet thinks that the\r\nfacts of catalepsy in hysteric patients drive us to suppose\r\nthat there are thoughts quite unorganized and impersonal.\r\nA patient in cataleptic trance (which can be produced artificially\r\nin certain hypnotized subjects) is without memory\r\non waking, and seems insensible and unconscious as long\r\nas the cataleptic condition lasts. If, however, one raises\r\nthe arm of such a subject it stays in that position, and the\r\nwhole body can thus be moulded like wax under the hands\r\nof the operator, retaining for a considerable time whatever\r\nattitude he communicates to it. In hysterics whose arm,\r\nfor example, is anæsthetic, the same thing may happen.\r\nThe anæsthetic arm may remain passively in positions which\r\nit is made to assume; or if the hand be taken and made to\r\nhold a pencil and trace a certain letter, it will continue\r\ntracing that letter indefinitely on the paper. These acts,\r\nuntil recently, were supposed to be accompanied by no\r\nconsciousness at all: they were physiological reflexes. M.\r\nJanet considers with much more plausibility that feeling\r\nescorts them. The feeling is probably merely that of the\r\nposition or movement of the limb, and it produces no more\r\nthan its natural effects when it discharges into the motor\r\ncentres which keep the position maintained, or the movement\r\nincessantly renewed.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_219_219\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_219_219\"\u003e[219]\u003c/a\u003e Such thoughts as these, says M.\r\nJanet, \"are known by \u003ci\u003eno one\u003c/i\u003e, for disaggregated sensations\r\nreduced to a state of mental dust are not synthetized in\r\nany personality.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_220_220\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_220_220\"\u003e[220]\u003c/a\u003e He admits, however, that these very\r\nsame unutterably stupid thoughts tend to develop memory,—the\r\ncataleptic ere long moves her arm at a bare hint; so\r\nthat they form no important exception to the law that all\r\nthought tends to assume the form of personal consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e2) \u003ci\u003eThought is in Constant Change.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not mean necessarily that no one state of mind has\r\nany duration—even if true, that would be hard to establish.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_230\"\u003e[Pg 230]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe change which I have more particularly in view is that\r\nwhich takes place in sensible intervals of time; and the result\r\non which I wish to lay stress is this, that \u003ci\u003eno state once gone\r\ncan recur and be identical with what it was before\u003c/i\u003e. Let us\r\nbegin with Mr. Shadworth Hodgson\u0027s description:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I go straight to the facts, without saying I go to perception, or\r\nsensation, or thought, or any special mode at all. What I find when I\r\nlook at my consciousness at all is that what I cannot divest myself of,\r\nor not have in consciousness, if I have any consciousness at all, is a\r\nsequence of different feelings. I may shut my eyes and keep perfectly\r\nstill, and try not to contribute anything of my own will; but whether\r\nI think or do not think, whether I perceive external things or not, I\r\nalways have a succession of different feelings. Anything else that I may\r\nhave also, of a more special character, comes in as parts of this succession,\r\nNot to have the succession of different feelings is not to be\r\nconscious at all…. The chain of consciousness is a sequence of\r\n\u003ci\u003edifferents\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_221_221\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_221_221\"\u003e[221]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a description as this can awaken no possible protest\r\nfrom any one. We all recognize as different great\r\nclasses of our conscious states. Now we are seeing, now\r\nhearing; now reasoning, now willing; now recollecting, now\r\nexpecting; now loving, now hating; and in a hundred other\r\nways we know our minds to be alternately engaged. But\r\nall these are complex states. The aim of science is always\r\nto reduce complexity to simplicity; and in psychological\r\nscience we have the celebrated \u0027theory of \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 which,\r\nadmitting the great difference among each other of what\r\nmay be called concrete conditions of mind, seeks to show\r\nhow this is all the resultant effect of variations in the \u003ci\u003ecombination\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof certain simple elements of consciousness that\r\nalways remain the same. These mental atoms or molecules\r\nare what Locke called \u0027simple ideas.\u0027 Some of Locke\u0027s\r\nsuccessors made out that the only simple ideas were the\r\nsensations strictly so called. Which ideas the simple ones\r\nmay be does not, however, now concern us. It is enough\r\nthat certain philosophers have thought they could see\r\nunder the dissolving-view-appearance of the mind elementary\r\nfacts of \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e sort that remained unchanged amid the\r\nflow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_231\"\u003e[Pg 231]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd the view of these philosophers has been called little\r\ninto question, for our common experience seems at first\r\nsight to corroborate it entirely. Are not the sensations we\r\nget from the same object, for example, always the same?\r\nDoes not the same piano-key, struck with the same force,\r\nmake us hear in the same way? Does not the same grass\r\ngive us the same feeling of green, the same sky the same\r\nfeeling of blue, and do we not get the same olfactory sensation\r\nno matter how many times we put our nose to the\r\nsame flask of cologne? It seems a piece of metaphysical\r\nsophistry to suggest that we do not; and yet a close attention\r\nto the matter shows that \u003ci\u003ethere is no proof that the\r\nsame bodily sensation is ever got by us twice\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWhat is got twice is the same\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eobject\u003c/span\u003e. We hear the same\r\n\u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e over and over again; we see the same \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e of green,\r\nor smell the same objective perfume, or experience the same\r\n\u003ci\u003especies\u003c/i\u003e of pain. The realities, concrete and abstract, physical\r\nand ideal, whose permanent existence we believe in,\r\nseem to be constantly coming up again before our thought,\r\nand lead us, in our carelessness, to suppose that our \u0027ideas\u0027\r\nof them are the same ideas. When we come, some time\r\nlater, to the chapter on Perception, we shall see how inveterate\r\nis our habit of not attending to sensations as subjective\r\nfacts, but of simply using them as stepping-stones to\r\npass over to the recognition of the realities whose presence\r\nthey reveal. The grass out of the window now looks to me\r\nof the same green in the sun as in the shade, and yet a\r\npainter would have to paint one part of it dark brown,\r\nanother part bright yellow, to give its real, sensational effect.\r\nWe take no heed, as a rule, of the different way in which\r\nthe same things look and sound and smell at different distances\r\nand under different circumstances. The sameness\r\nof the \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e is what we are concerned to ascertain; and\r\nany sensations that assure us of that will probably be considered\r\nin a rough way to be the same with each other.\r\nThis is what makes off-hand testimony about the subjective\r\nidentity of different sensations well-nigh worthless as a\r\nproof of the fact. The entire history of Sensation is a commentary\r\non our inability to tell whether two sensations\r\nreceived apart are exactly alike. What appeals to our\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_232\"\u003e[Pg 232]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nattention far more than the absolute quality or quantity of\r\na given sensation is its \u003ci\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e to whatever other sensations\r\nwe may have at the same time. When everything is dark\r\na somewhat less dark sensation makes us see an object\r\nwhite. Helmholtz calculates that the white marble painted\r\nin a picture representing an architectural view by moonlight\r\nis, when seen by daylight, from ten to twenty thousand\r\ntimes brighter than the real moonlit marble would be.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_222_222\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_222_222\"\u003e[222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a difference as this could never have been \u003ci\u003esensibly\u003c/i\u003e\r\nlearned; it had to be inferred from a series of indirect considerations.\r\nThere are facts which make us believe that\r\nour sensibility is altering all the time, so that the same\r\nobject cannot easily give us the same sensation over again.\r\nThe eye\u0027s sensibility to light is at its maximum when the\r\neye is first exposed, and blunts itself with surprising rapidity.\r\nA long night\u0027s sleep will make it see things twice as\r\nbrightly on wakening, as simple rest by closure will make\r\nit see them later in the day.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_223_223\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_223_223\"\u003e[223]\u003c/a\u003e We feel things differently\r\naccording as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh\r\nor tired; differently at night and in the morning, differently\r\nin summer and in winter, and above all things differently in\r\nchildhood, manhood, and old age. Yet we never doubt that\r\nour feelings reveal the same world, with the same sensible\r\nqualities and the same sensible things occupying it. The\r\ndifference of the sensibility is shown best by the difference\r\nof our emotion about the things from one age to another, or\r\nwhen we are in different organic moods. What was bright\r\nand exciting becomes weary, flat, and unprofitable. The\r\nbird\u0027s song is tedious, the breeze is mournful, the sky is\r\nsad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo these indirect presumptions that our sensations, following\r\nthe mutations of our capacity for feeling, are always\r\nundergoing an essential change, must be added another\r\npresumption, based on what must happen in the brain.\r\nEvery sensation corresponds to some cerebral action. For\r\nan identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the\r\nsecond time \u003ci\u003ein an unmodified brain\u003c/i\u003e. But as this, strictly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_233\"\u003e[Pg 233]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nspeaking, is a physiological impossibility, so is an unmodified\r\nfeeling an impossibility; for to every brain-modification,\r\nhowever small, must correspond a change of equal\r\namount in the feeling which the brain subserves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll this would be true if even sensations came to us pure\r\nand single and not combined into \u0027things.\u0027 Even then we\r\nshould have to confess that, however we might in ordinary\r\nconversation speak of getting the same sensation again, we\r\nnever in strict theoretic accuracy could do so; and that\r\nwhatever was true of the river of life, of the river of elementary\r\nfeeling, it would certainly be true to say, like Heraclitus,\r\nthat we never descend twice into the same stream.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if the assumption of \u0027simple ideas of sensation\u0027\r\nrecurring in immutable shape is so easily shown to be\r\nbaseless, how much more baseless is the assumption of\r\nimmutability in the larger masses of our thought!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor there it is obvious and palpable that our state of\r\nmind is never precisely the same. Every thought we have\r\nof a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a\r\nresemblance of kind with our other thoughts of the same\r\nfact. When the identical fact recurs, we \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e think of it\r\nin a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different angle,\r\napprehend it in different relations from those in which it\r\nlast appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is\r\nthe thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused\r\nwith the consciousness of all that dim context. Often we\r\nare ourselves struck at the strange differences in our successive\r\nviews of the same thing. We wonder how we ever\r\ncould have opined as we did last month about a certain\r\nmatter. We have outgrown the possibility of that state of\r\nmind, we know not how. From one year to another we see\r\nthings in new lights. What was unreal has grown real,\r\nand what was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to\r\ncare the world for are shrunken to shadows; the women,\r\nonce so divine, the stars, the woods, and the waters, how\r\nnow so dull and common! the young girls that brought an\r\naura of infinity, at present hardly distinguishable existences;\r\npictures so empty; and as for the books, what\r\n\u003ci\u003ewas\u003c/i\u003e there to find so mysteriously significant in Goethe, or in\r\nJohn Mill so full of weight? Instead of all this, more\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_234\"\u003e[Pg 234]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nzestful than ever is the work, the work; and fuller and\r\ndeeper the import of common duties and of common goods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut what here strikes us so forcibly on the flagrant\r\nscale exists on every scale, down to the imperceptible\r\ntransition from one hour\u0027s outlook to that of the next. Experience\r\nis remoulding us every moment, and our mental\r\nreaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our\r\nexperience of the whole world up to that date. The analogies\r\nof brain-physiology must again be appealed to to\r\ncorroborate our view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur earlier chapters have taught us to believe that,\r\nwhilst we think, our brain changes, and that, like the aurora\r\nborealis, its whole internal equilibrium shifts with every\r\npulse of change. The precise nature of the shifting at a\r\ngiven moment is a product of many factors. The accidental\r\nstate of local nutrition or blood-supply may be among\r\nthem. But just as one of them certainly is the influence of\r\noutward objects on the sense-organs during the moment,\r\nso is another certainly the very special susceptibility in\r\nwhich the organ has been left at that moment by all it\r\nhas gone through in the past. Every brain-state is partly\r\ndetermined by the nature of this entire past succession.\r\nAlter the latter in any part, and the brain-state must be\r\nsomewhat different. Each present brain-state is a record\r\nin which the eye of Omniscience might read all the foregone\r\nhistory of its owner. It is out of the question, then,\r\nthat any total brain-state should identically recur. Something\r\nlike it may recur; but to suppose \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e to recur would\r\nbe equivalent to the absurd admission that all the states\r\nthat had intervened between its two appearances had been\r\npure nonentities, and that the organ after their passage\r\nwas exactly as it was before. And (to consider shorter\r\nperiods) just as, in the senses, an impression feels very differently\r\naccording to what has preceded it; as one color\r\nsucceeding another is modified by the contrast, silence\r\nsounds delicious after noise, and a note, when the scale is\r\nsung up, sounds unlike itself when the scale is sung down;\r\nas the presence of certain lines in a figure changes the apparent\r\nform of the other lines, and as in music the whole\r\næsthetic effect comes from the manner in which one set of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_235\"\u003e[Pg 235]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsounds alters our feeling of another; so, in thought, we\r\nmust admit that those portions of the brain that have just\r\nbeen maximally excited retain a kind of soreness which is\r\na condition of our present consciousness, a codeterminant\r\nof how and what we now shall feel.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_224_224\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_224_224\"\u003e[224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEver some tracts are waning in tension, some waxing,\r\nwhilst others actively discharge. The states of tension\r\nhave as positive an influence as any in determining the\r\ntotal condition, and in deciding what the \u003ci\u003epsychosis\u003c/i\u003e shall be.\r\nAll we know of submaximal nerve-irritations, and of the\r\nsummation of apparently ineffective stimuli, tends to show\r\nthat \u003ci\u003eno\u003c/i\u003e changes in the brain are physiologically ineffective,\r\nand that presumably none are bare of psychological result.\r\nBut as the brain-tension shifts from one relative state of\r\nequilibrium to another, like the gyrations of a kaleidoscope,\r\nnow rapid and now slow, is it likely that its faithful\r\npsychic concomitant is heavier-footed than itself, and that\r\nit cannot match each one of the organ\u0027s irradiations by a\r\nshifting inward iridescence of its own? But if it can do\r\nthis, its inward iridescences must be infinite, for the brain-redistributions\r\nare in infinite variety. If so coarse a thing\r\nas a telephone-plate can be made to thrill for years and\r\nnever reduplicate its inward condition, how much more\r\nmust this be the case with the infinitely delicate brain?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI am sure that this concrete and total manner of regarding\r\nthe mind\u0027s changes is the only true manner, difficult as\r\nit may be to carry it out in detail. If anything seems obscure\r\nabout it, it will grow clearer as we advance. Meanwhile,\r\nif it be true, it is certainly also true that no two\r\n\u0027ideas\u0027 are ever exactly the same, which is the proposition\r\nwe started to prove. The proposition is more important\r\ntheoretically than it at first sight seems. For it makes it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_236\"\u003e[Pg 236]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalready impossible for us to follow obediently in the footprints\r\nof either the Lockian or the Herbartian school,\r\nschools which have had almost unlimited influence in Germany\r\nand among ourselves. No doubt it is often \u003ci\u003econvenient\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto formulate the mental facts in an atomistic sort\r\nof way, and to treat the higher states of consciousness as if\r\nthey were all built out of unchanging simple ideas. It is\r\nconvenient often to treat curves as if they were composed\r\nof small straight lines, and electricity and nerve-force as if\r\nthey were fluids. But in the one case as in the other we\r\nmust never forget that we are talking symbolically, and\r\nthat there is nothing in nature to answer to our words. \u003ci\u003eA\r\npermanently existing \u0027idea\u0027 or \u0027Vorstellung\u0027 which makes its\r\nappearance before the footlights of consciousness at periodical\r\nintervals, is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat makes it convenient to use the mythological formulas\r\nis the whole organization of speech, which, as was\r\nremarked a while ago, was not made by psychologists, but\r\nby men who were as a rule only interested in the facts their\r\nmental states revealed. They only spoke of their states as\r\n\u003ci\u003eideas of this or of that thing\u003c/i\u003e. What wonder, then, that the\r\nthought is most easily conceived under the law of the thing\r\nwhose name it bears! If the thing is composed of parts,\r\nthen we suppose that the thought of the thing must be\r\ncomposed of the thoughts of the parts. If one part of the\r\nthing have appeared in the same thing or in other things on\r\nformer occasions, why then we must be having even now the\r\nvery same \u0027idea\u0027 of that part which was there on those occasions.\r\nIf the thing is simple, its thought is simple. If it\r\nis multitudinous, it must require a multitude of thoughts\r\nto think it. If a succession, only a succession of thoughts\r\ncan know it. If permanent, its thought is permanent. And\r\nso on \u003ci\u003ead libitum\u003c/i\u003e. What after all is so natural as to assume\r\nthat one object, called by one name, should be known by\r\none affection of the mind? But, if language must thus influence\r\nus, the agglutinative languages, and even Greek and\r\nLatin with their declensions, would be the better guides.\r\nNames did not appear in them inalterable, but changed\r\ntheir shape to suit the context in which they lay. It must\r\nhave been easier then than now to conceive of the same\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_237\"\u003e[Pg 237]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobject as being thought of at different times in non-identical\r\nconscious states.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis, too, will grow clearer as we proceed. Meanwhile\r\na necessary consequence of the belief in permanent self-identical\r\npsychic facts that absent themselves and recur\r\nperiodically is the Humian doctrine that our thought is\r\ncomposed of separate independent parts and is not a sensibly\r\ncontinuous stream. That this doctrine entirely misrepresents\r\nthe natural appearances is what I next shall try\r\nto show.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e3) \u003ci\u003eWithin each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly continuous.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI can only define \u0027continuous\u0027 as that which is without\r\nbreach, crack, or division. I have already said that\r\nthe breach from one mind to another is perhaps the greatest\r\nbreach in nature. The only breaches that can well be\r\nconceived to occur within the limits of a single mind would\r\neither be \u003ci\u003einterruptions, time\u003c/i\u003e-gaps during which the consciousness\r\nwent out altogether to come into existence again\r\nat a later moment; or they would be breaks in the \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nor content, of the thought, so abrupt that the segment that\r\nfollowed had no connection whatever with the one that\r\nwent before. The proposition that within each personal\r\nconsciousness thought feels continuous, means two things:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. That even where there is a time-gap the consciousness\r\nafter it feels as if it belonged together with the consciousness\r\nbefore it, as another part of the same self;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. That the changes from one moment to another in the\r\nquality of the consciousness are never absolutely abrupt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe case of the time-gaps, as the simplest, shall be taken\r\nfirst. And first of all a word about time-gaps of which the\r\nconsciousness may not be itself aware.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 200\u003c/a\u003e we saw that such time-gaps existed, and\r\nthat they might be more numerous than is usually supposed.\r\nIf the consciousness is not aware of them, it cannot feel\r\nthem as interruptions. In the unconsciousness produced\r\nby nitrous oxide and other anæsthetics, in that of epilepsy\r\nand fainting, the broken edges of the sentient life may\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_238\"\u003e[Pg 238]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeet and merge over the gap, much as the feelings of space\r\nof the opposite margins of the \u0027blind spot\u0027 meet and\r\nmerge over that objective interruption to the sensitiveness\r\nof the eye. Such consciousness as this, whatever it be for\r\nthe onlooking psychologist, is for itself unbroken. It \u003ci\u003efeels\u003c/i\u003e\r\nunbroken; a waking day of it is sensibly a unit as long as\r\nthat day lasts, in the sense in which the hours themselves\r\nare units, as having all their parts next each other, with no\r\nintrusive alien substance between. To expect the consciousness\r\nto feel the interruptions of its objective continuity\r\nas gaps, would be like expecting the eye to feel a\r\ngap of silence because it does not hear, or the ear to feel a\r\ngap of darkness because it does not see. So much for the\r\ngaps that are unfelt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the felt gaps the case is different. On waking from\r\nsleep, we usually know that we have been unconscious,\r\nand we often have an accurate judgment of how long. The\r\njudgment here is certainly an inference from sensible signs,\r\nand its ease is due to long practice in the particular field.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_225_225\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_225_225\"\u003e[225]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe result of it, however, is that the consciousness is, \u003ci\u003efor\r\nitself,\u003c/i\u003e not what it was in the former case, but interrupted\r\nand discontinuous, in the mere sense of the words. But\r\nin the other sense of continuity, the sense of the parts being\r\ninwardly connected and belonging together because they\r\nare parts of a common whole, the consciousness remains\r\nsensibly continuous and one. What now is the common\r\nwhole? The natural name for it is \u003ci\u003emyself, I,\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Paul and Peter wake up in the same bed, and\r\nrecognize that they have been asleep, each one of them\r\nmentally reaches back and makes connection with but \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the two streams of thought which were broken by the\r\nsleeping hours. As the current of an electrode buried in\r\nthe ground unerringly finds its way to its own similarly\r\nburied mate, across no matter how much intervening earth;\r\nso Peter\u0027s present instantly finds out Peter\u0027s past, and never\r\nby mistake knits itself on to that of Paul. Paul\u0027s thought\r\nin turn is as little liable to go astray. The past thought of\r\nPeter is appropriated by the present Peter alone. He may\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_239\"\u003e[Pg 239]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave a \u003ci\u003eknowledge\u003c/i\u003e, and a correct one too, of what Paul\u0027s\r\nlast drowsy states of mind were as he sank into sleep, but it\r\nis an entirely different sort of knowledge from that which he\r\nhas of his own last states. He \u003ci\u003eremembers\u003c/i\u003e his own states,\r\nwhilst he only \u003ci\u003econceives\u003c/i\u003e Paul\u0027s. Remembrance is like direct\r\nfeeling; its object is suffused with a warmth and intimacy\r\nto which no object of mere conception ever attains. This\r\nquality of warmth and intimacy and immediacy is what\r\nPeter\u0027s \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e thought also possesses for itself. So sure\r\nas this present is me, is mine, it says, so sure is anything\r\nelse that comes with the same warmth and intimacy and\r\nimmediacy, me and mine. What the qualities called\r\nwarmth and intimacy may in themselves be will have to be\r\nmatter for future consideration. But whatever past feelings\r\nappear with those qualities must be admitted to receive\r\nthe greeting of the present mental state, to be owned\r\nby it, and accepted as belonging together with it in a common\r\nself. This community of self is what the time-gap\r\ncannot break in twain, and is why a present thought, although\r\nnot ignorant of the time-gap, can still regard itself\r\nas continuous with certain chosen portions of the past.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped\r\nup in bits. Such words as \u0027chain\u0027 or \u0027train\u0027 do not describe\r\nit fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It\r\nis nothing jointed; it flows. A \u0027river\u0027 or a \u0027stream\u0027 are\r\nthe metaphors by which it is most naturally described. \u003ci\u003eIn\r\ntalking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of\r\nconsciousness, or of subjective life.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut now there appears, even within the limits of the\r\nsame self, and between thoughts all of which alike have\r\nthis same sense of belonging together, a kind of jointing and\r\nseparateness among the parts, of which this statement\r\nseems to take no account. I refer to the breaks that are\r\nproduced by sudden \u003ci\u003econtrasts in the quality\u003c/i\u003e of the successive\r\nsegments of the stream of thought If the words \u0027chain\u0027\r\nand \u0027train\u0027 had no natural fitness in them, how came such\r\nwords to be used at all? Does not a loud explosion rend\r\nthe consciousness upon which it abruptly breaks, in twain?\r\nDoes not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_240\"\u003e[Pg 240]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor change in a sensation, create a real interruption, sensibly\r\nfelt as such, which cuts the conscious stream across at the\r\nmoment at which it appears? Do not such interruptions\r\nsmite us every hour of our lives, and have we the right, in\r\ntheir presence, still to call our consciousness a continuous\r\nstream?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis objection is based partly on a confusion and partly\r\non a superficial introspective view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe confusion is between the thoughts themselves, taken\r\nas subjective facts, and the things of which they are aware.\r\nIt is natural to make this confusion, but easy to avoid it\r\nwhen once put on one\u0027s guard. The things are discrete\r\nand discontinuous; they do pass before us in a train or\r\nchain, making often explosive appearances and rending\r\neach other in twain. But their comings and goings and\r\ncontrasts no more break the flow of the thought that thinks\r\nthem than they break the time and the space in which they\r\nlie. A silence may be broken by a thunder-clap, and we\r\nmay be so stunned and confused for a moment by the shock\r\nas to give no instant account to ourselves of what has happened.\r\nBut that very confusion is a mental state, and a\r\nstate that passes us straight over from the silence to the\r\nsound. The transition between the thought of one object\r\nand the thought of another is no more a break in the \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthan a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood. It is a\r\npart of the \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e as much as the joint is a part of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ebamboo\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe superficial introspective view is the overlooking,\r\neven when the things are contrasted with each other most\r\nviolently, of the large amount of affinity that may still remain\r\nbetween the thoughts by whose means they are\r\ncognized. Into the awareness of the thunder itself the\r\nawareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for\r\nwhat we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder\r\n\u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_226_226\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_226_226\"\u003e[226]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOur feeling of the same objective thunder, coming\r\nin this way, is quite different from what it would be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_241\"\u003e[Pg 241]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwere the thunder a continuation of previous thunder. The\r\nthunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence;\r\nbut the \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence\r\nas just gone; and it would be difficult to find in the actual\r\nconcrete consciousness of man a feeling so limited to the\r\npresent as not to have an inkling of anything that went before.\r\nHere, again, language works against our perception\r\nof the truth. We name our thoughts simply, each after its\r\nthing, as if each knew its own thing and nothing else.\r\nWhat each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for,\r\nwith dimly perhaps a thousand other things. It ought to\r\nbe named after all of them, but it never is. Some of them\r\nare always things known a moment ago more clearly; others\r\nare things to be known more clearly a moment hence.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_227_227\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_227_227\"\u003e[227]\u003c/a\u003e Our\r\nown bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things\r\nof which \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e awareness, however inattentive, invariably\r\naccompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_242\"\u003e[Pg 242]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthink; and as we think we feel our bodily selves as the seat\r\nof the thinking. If the thinking be \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e thinking, it must\r\nbe suffused through all its parts with that peculiar warmth\r\nand intimacy that make it come as ours. Whether the\r\nwarmth and intimacy be anything more than the feeling of\r\nthe same old body always there, is a matter for the next\r\nchapter to decide. \u003ci\u003eWhatever\u003c/i\u003e the content of the ego may be,\r\nit is habitually felt \u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e everything else by us humans,\r\nand must form a \u003ci\u003eliaison\u003c/i\u003e between all the things of which we\r\nbecome successively aware.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_228_228\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_228_228\"\u003e[228]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn this gradualness in the changes of our mental content\r\nthe principles of nerve-action can throw some more\r\nlight. When studying, in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_III\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter III\u003c/a\u003e, the summation of\r\nnervous activities, we saw that no state of the brain can be\r\nsupposed instantly to die away. If a new state comes, the\r\ninertia of the old state will still be there and modify the\r\nresult accordingly. Of course we cannot tell, in our ignorance,\r\nwhat in each instance the modifications ought to be.\r\nThe commonest modifications in sense-perception are\r\nknown as the phenomena of contrast. In æsthetics they\r\nare the feelings of delight or displeasure which certain\r\nparticular orders in a series of impressions give. In\r\nthought, strictly and narrowly so called, they are unquestionably\r\nthat consciousness of the \u003ci\u003ewhence\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003ewhither\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthat always accompanies its flows. If recently the brain-tract\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e was vividly excited, and then \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, and now vividly \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe total present consciousness is not produced simply by\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s excitement, but also by the dying vibrations of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\r\nas well. If we want to represent the brain-process we\r\nmust write it thus: \u003ci\u003e\u003csub\u003ea\u003c/sub\u003eb\u003csup\u003ec\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e—three different processes coexisting,\r\nand correlated with them a thought which is no one\r\nof the three thoughts which they would have produced had\r\neach of them occurred alone. But whatever this fourth\r\nthought may exactly be, it seems impossible that it should\r\nnot be something \u003ci\u003elike\u003c/i\u003e each of the three other thoughts\r\nwhose tracts are concerned in its production, though in a\r\nfast-waning phase.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_243\"\u003e[Pg 243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt all goes back to what we said in another connection\r\nonly a few pages ago (\u003ca href=\"#Page_233\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 233\u003c/a\u003e). As the total neurosis changes,\r\nso does the total psychosis change. But as the changes of\r\nneurosis are never absolutely discontinuous, so must the\r\nsuccessive psychoses shade gradually into each other,\r\nalthough their \u003ci\u003erate\u003c/i\u003e of change may be much faster at one\r\nmoment than at the next.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis difference in the rate of change lies at the basis of\r\na difference of subjective states of which we ought immediately\r\nto speak. When the rate is slow we are aware of the\r\nobject of our thought in a comparatively restful and stable\r\nway. When rapid, we are aware of a passage, a relation,\r\na transition \u003ci\u003efrom\u003c/i\u003e it, or \u003ci\u003ebetween\u003c/i\u003e it and something else. As\r\nwe take, in fact, a general view of the wonderful stream of\r\nour consciousness, what strikes us first is this different\r\npace of its parts. Like a bird\u0027s life, it seems to be made of\r\nan alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of\r\nlanguage expresses this, where every thought is expressed\r\nin a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period. The\r\nresting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations\r\nof some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be\r\nheld before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated\r\nwithout changing; the places of flight are filled with\r\nthoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most\r\npart obtain between the matters contemplated in the\r\nperiods of comparative rest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eLet us call the resting-places the \u0027substantive parts,\u0027 and\r\nthe places of flight the \u0027transitive parts,\u0027 of the stream of\r\nthought.\u003c/i\u003e It then appears that the main end of our\r\nthinking is at all times the attainment of some other substantive\r\npart than the one from which we have just been\r\ndislodged. And we may say that the main use of the\r\ntransitive parts is to lead us from one substantive conclusion\r\nto another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive\r\nparts for what they really are. If they are but flights\r\nto a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the\r\nconclusion is reached is really annihilating them. Whilst\r\nif we wait till the conclusion \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e reached, it so exceeds them\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_244\"\u003e[Pg 244]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin vigor and stability that it quite eclipses and swallows\r\nthem up in its glare. Let anyone try to cut a thought\r\nacross in the middle and get a look at its section, and he\r\nwill see how difficult the introspective observation of the\r\ntransitive tracts is. The rush of the thought is so headlong\r\nthat it almost always brings us up at the conclusion before\r\nwe can arrest it. Or if our purpose is nimble enough and\r\nwe do arrest it, it ceases forthwith to be itself. As a snow-flake\r\ncrystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal\r\nbut a drop, so, instead of catching the feeling of relation\r\nmoving to its term, we find we have caught some substantive\r\nthing, usually the last word we were pronouncing, statically\r\ntaken, and with its function, tendency, and particular\r\nmeaning in the sentence quite evaporated. The attempt\r\nat introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing\r\na spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up\r\nthe gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks.\r\nAnd the challenge to \u003ci\u003eproduce\u003c/i\u003e these psychoses, which is\r\nsure to be thrown by doubting psychologists at anyone\r\nwho contends for their existence, is as unfair as Zeno\u0027s\r\ntreatment of the advocates of motion, when, asking them\r\nto point out in what place an arrow \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e when it moves, he\r\nargues the falsity of their thesis from their inability to\r\nmake to so preposterous a question an immediate reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe results of this introspective difficulty are baleful.\r\nIf to hold fast and observe the transitive parts of thought\u0027s\r\nstream be so hard, then the great blunder to which all\r\nschools are liable must be the failure to register them, and\r\nthe undue emphasizing of the more substantive parts of the\r\nstream. Were we not ourselves a moment since in danger\r\nof ignoring any feeling transitive between the silence and\r\nthe thunder, and of treating their boundary as a sort of\r\nbreak in the mind? Now such ignoring as this has historically\r\nworked in two ways. One set of thinkers have been\r\nled by it to \u003ci\u003eSensationalism\u003c/i\u003e. Unable to lay their hands on any\r\ncoarse feelings corresponding to the innumerable relations\r\nand forms of connection between the facts of the world,\r\nfinding no \u003ci\u003enamed\u003c/i\u003e subjective modifications mirroring such\r\nrelations, they have for the most part denied that feelings\r\nof relation exist, and many of them, like Hume, have gone\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_245\"\u003e[Pg 245]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nso far as to deny the reality of most relations \u003ci\u003eout\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nmind as well as in it. Substantive psychoses, sensations\r\nand their copies and derivatives, juxtaposed like dominoes\r\nin a game, but really separate, everything else verbal illusion,—such\r\nis the upshot of this view.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_229_229\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_229_229\"\u003e[229]\u003c/a\u003e The \u003ci\u003eIntellectualists\u003c/i\u003e,\r\non the other hand, unable to give up the reality of\r\nrelations \u003ci\u003eextra mentem\u003c/i\u003e, but equally unable to point to any\r\ndistinct substantive feelings in which they were known, have\r\nmade the same admission that the feelings do not exist.\r\nBut they have drawn an opposite conclusion. The relations\r\nmust be known, they say, in something that is no\r\nfeeling, no mental modification continuous and consubstantial\r\nwith the subjective tissue out of which sensations\r\nand other substantive states are made. They are known,\r\nthese relations, by something that lies on an entirely\r\ndifferent plane, by an \u003ci\u003eactus purus\u003c/i\u003e of Thought, Intellect, or\r\nReason, all written with capitals and considered to mean\r\nsomething unutterably superior to any fact of sensibility\r\nwhatever.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut from our point of view both Intellectualists and Sensationalists\r\nare wrong. If there be such things as feelings\r\nat all, \u003ci\u003ethen so surely as relations between objects exist in rerum\r\nnaturâ, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which\r\nthese relations are known\u003c/i\u003e. There is not a conjunction or a\r\npreposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form,\r\nor inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express\r\nsome shading or other of relation which we at some moment\r\nactually feel to exist between the larger objects of our\r\nthought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations\r\nthat appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the\r\nstream of consciousness that matches each of them by an\r\ninward coloring of its own. In either case the relations\r\nare numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing\r\njustice to all their shades.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe ought to say a feeling of \u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e, a feeling of \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e, a feeling\r\nof \u003ci\u003ebut\u003c/i\u003e, and a feeling of \u003ci\u003eby\u003c/i\u003e, quite as readily as we say a feeling\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_246\"\u003e[Pg 246]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof \u003ci\u003eblue\u003c/i\u003e or a feeling of \u003ci\u003ecold\u003c/i\u003e. Yet we do not: so inveterate\r\nhas our habit become of recognizing the existence of\r\nthe substantive parts alone, that language almost refuses\r\nto lend itself to any other use. The Empiricists have always\r\ndwelt on its influence in making us suppose that\r\nwhere we have a separate name, a separate thing must\r\nneeds be there to correspond with it; and they have rightly\r\ndenied the existence of the mob of abstract entities,\r\nprinciples, and forces, in whose favor no other evidence\r\nthan this could be brought up. But they have said nothing\r\nof that obverse error, of which we said a word in Chapter\r\nVII, (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 195\u003c/a\u003e), of supposing that where there is \u003ci\u003eno\u003c/i\u003e name\r\nno entity can exist. All \u003ci\u003edumb\u003c/i\u003e or anonymous psychic states\r\nhave, owing to this error, been coolly suppressed; or, if\r\nrecognized at all, have been named after the substantive\r\nperception they led to, as thoughts \u0027about\u0027 this object or\r\n\u0027about\u0027 that, the stolid word \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e engulfing all their delicate\r\nidiosyncrasies in its monotonous sound. Thus the\r\ngreater and greater accentuation and isolation of the substantive\r\nparts have continually gone on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more take a look at the brain. We believe the\r\nbrain to be an organ whose internal equilibrium is always\r\nin a state of change,—the change affecting every part. The\r\npulses of change are doubtless more violent in one place\r\nthan in another, their rhythm more rapid at this time than\r\nat that. As in a kaleidoscope revolving at a uniform rate, although\r\nthe figures are always rearranging themselves, there\r\nare instants during which the transformation seems minute\r\nand interstitial and almost absent, followed by others when\r\nit shoots with magical rapidity, relatively stable forms thus\r\nalternating with forms we should not distinguish if seen\r\nagain; so in the brain the perpetual rearrangement must\r\nresult in some forms of tension lingering relatively long,\r\nwhilst others simply come and pass. But if consciousness\r\ncorresponds to the fact of rearrangement itself, why, if\r\nthe rearrangement stop not, should the consciousness ever\r\ncease? And if a lingering rearrangement brings with it\r\none kind of consciousness, why should not a swift rearrangement\r\nbring another kind of consciousness as peculiar as\r\nthe rearrangement itself? The lingering consciousnesses,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_247\"\u003e[Pg 247]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nif of simple objects, we call \u0027sensations\u0027 or \u0027images,\u0027 according\r\nas they are vivid or faint; if of complex objects,\r\nwe call them \u0027percepts\u0027 when vivid, \u0027concepts\u0027 or\r\n\u0027thoughts\u0027 when faint. For the swift consciousnesses we\r\nhave only those names of \u0027transitive states,\u0027 or \u0027feelings of\r\nrelation,\u0027 which we have used.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_230_230\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_230_230\"\u003e[230]\u003c/a\u003e As the brain-changes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_248\"\u003e[Pg 248]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare continuous, so do all these consciousnesses melt into\r\neach other like dissolving views. Properly they are but\r\none protracted consciousness, one unbroken stream.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_249\"\u003e[Pg 249]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eFeelings of Tendency.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the transitive states. But there are other\r\nunnamed states or qualities of states that are just as important\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_250\"\u003e[Pg 250]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand just as cognitive as they, and just as much\r\nunrecognized by the traditional sensationalist and intellectualist\r\nphilosophies of mind. The first fails to find them\r\nat all, the second finds their \u003ci\u003ecognitive function\u003c/i\u003e, but denies\r\nthat anything in the way of \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e has a share in bringing\r\nit about. Examples will make clear what these inarticulate\r\npsychoses, due to waxing and waning excitements of\r\nthe brain, are like.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_231_231\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_231_231\"\u003e[231]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose three successive persons say to us: \u0027Wait!\u0027\r\n\u0027Hark!\u0027 \u0027Look!\u0027 Our consciousness is thrown into\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_251\"\u003e[Pg 251]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthree quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no\r\ndefinite object is before it in any one of the three cases.\r\nLeaving out different actual bodily attitudes, and leaving\r\nout the reverberating images of the three words, which\r\nare of course diverse, probably no one will deny the existence\r\nof a residual conscious affection, a sense of the direction\r\nfrom which an impression is about to come, although\r\nno positive impression is yet there. Meanwhile we have\r\nno names for the psychoses in question but the names\r\nhark, look, and wait.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state\r\nof our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein;\r\nbut no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A\r\nsort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given\r\ndirection, making us at moments tingle with the sense of\r\nour closeness, and then letting us sink back without the\r\nlonged-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this\r\nsingularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate\r\nthem. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one\r\nword does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of\r\ncontent as both might seem necessarily to be when described\r\nas gaps. When I vainly try to recall the name of Spalding,\r\nmy consciousness is far removed from what it is when I\r\nvainly try to recall the name of Bowles. Here some ingenious\r\npersons will say: \"How \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e the two consciousnesses\r\nbe different when the terms which might make them different\r\nare not there? All that is there, so long as the effort\r\nto recall is vain, is the bare effort itself. How should that\r\ndiffer in the two cases? You are making it seem to differ\r\nby prematurely filling it out with the different names,\r\nalthough these, by the hypothesis, have not yet come.\r\nStick to the two efforts as they are, without naming them\r\nafter facts not yet existent, and you\u0027ll be quite unable to\r\ndesignate any point in which they differ.\" Designate, truly\r\nenough. We can only designate the difference by borrowing\r\nthe names of objects not yet in the mind. Which is to\r\nsay that our psychological vocabulary is wholly inadequate\r\nto name the differences that exist, even such strong differences\r\nas these. But namelessness is compatible with\r\nexistence. There are innumerable consciousnesses of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_252\"\u003e[Pg 252]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nemptiness, no one of which taken in itself has a name,\r\nbut all different from each other. The ordinary way is to\r\nassume that they are all emptinesses of consciousness, and\r\nso the same state. But the feeling of an absence is \u003ci\u003etoto cœlo\u003c/i\u003e\r\nother than the absence of a feeling. It is an intense feeling.\r\nThe rhythm of a lost word may be there without a\r\nsound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of something\r\nwhich is the initial vowel or consonant may mock us fitfully,\r\nwithout growing more distinct. Every one must\r\nknow the tantalizing effect of the blank rhythm of some\r\nforgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one\u0027s mind, striving\r\nto be filled out with words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, what is the strange difference between an experience\r\ntasted for the first time and the same experience\r\nrecognized as familiar, as having been enjoyed before,\r\nthough we cannot name it or say where or when? A tune,\r\nan odor, a flavor sometimes carry this inarticulate feeling\r\nof their familiarity so deep into our consciousness that we\r\nare fairly shaken by its mysterious emotional power. But\r\nstrong and characteristic as this psychosis is—it probably\r\nis due to the submaximal excitement of wide-spreading\r\nassociational brain-tracts—the only name we have for all\r\nits shadings is \u0027sense of familiarity.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we read such phrases as \u0027naught but,\u0027 \u0027either\r\none or the other,\u0027 \u0027\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, but,\u0027 \u0027although it is, nevertheless,\u0027\r\n\u0027it is an excluded middle, there is no \u003ci\u003etertium quid\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027\r\nand a host of other verbal skeletons of logical relation, is it\r\ntrue that there is nothing more in our minds than the\r\nwords themselves as they pass? What then is the meaning\r\nof the words which we think we understand as we read?\r\nWhat makes that meaning different in one phrase from\r\nwhat it is in the other? \u0027Who?\u0027 \u0027When?\u0027 \u0027Where?\u0027\r\nIs the difference of felt meaning in these interrogatives\r\nnothing more than their difference of sound? And is it\r\nnot (just like the difference of sound itself) known and\r\nunderstood in an affection of consciousness correlative to\r\nit, though so impalpable to direct examination? Is not\r\nthe same true of such negatives as \u0027no,\u0027 \u0027never,\u0027 \u0027not\r\nyet\u0027?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_253\"\u003e[Pg 253]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut \u003ci\u003esigns of direction\u003c/i\u003e in thought, of which direction we\r\nnevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, though\r\nno definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever.\r\nSensorial images are stable psychic facts; we can hold\r\nthem still and look at them as long as we like. These bare\r\nimages of logical movement, on the contrary, are psychic\r\ntransitions, always on the wing, so to speak, and not to be\r\nglimpsed except in flight. Their function is to lead from\r\none set of images to another. As they pass, we feel both\r\nthe waxing and the waning images in a way altogether\r\npeculiar and a way quite different from the way of their\r\nfull presence. If we try to hold fast the feeling of direction,\r\nthe full presence comes and the feeling of direction is\r\nlost. The blank verbal scheme of the logical movement\r\ngives us the fleeting sense of the movement as we read it,\r\nquite as well as does a rational sentence awakening definite\r\nimaginations by its words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is that first instantaneous glimpse of some one\u0027s\r\nmeaning which we have, when in vulgar phrase we say we\r\n\u0027twig\u0027 it? Surely an altogether specific affection of our\r\nmind. And has the reader never asked himself what kind\r\nof a mental fact is his \u003ci\u003eintention of saying a thing\u003c/i\u003e before he\r\nhas said it? It is an entirely definite intention, distinct\r\nfrom all other intentions, an absolutely distinct state of\r\nconsciousness, therefore; and yet how much of it consists of\r\ndefinite sensorial images, either of words or of things?\r\nHardly anything! Linger, and the words and things come\r\ninto the mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is\r\nthere no more. But as the words that replace it arrive, it\r\nwelcomes them successively and calls them right if they\r\nagree with it, it rejects them and calls them wrong if they\r\ndo not. It has therefore a nature of its own of the most\r\npositive sort, and yet what can we say about it without\r\nusing words that belong to the later mental facts that\r\nreplace it? The intention \u003ci\u003eto-say-so-and-so\u003c/i\u003e is the only name\r\nit can receive. One may admit that a good third of our\r\npsychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective\r\nviews of schemes of thought not yet articulate. How\r\ncomes it about that a man reading something aloud for the\r\nfirst time is able immediately to emphasize all his words\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_254\"\u003e[Pg 254]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\naright, unless from the very first he have a sense of at\r\nleast the form of the sentence yet to come, which sense is\r\nfused with his consciousness of the present word, and modifies\r\nits emphasis in his mind so as to make him give it\r\nthe proper accent as he utters it? Emphasis of this kind\r\nis almost altogether a matter of grammatical construction.\r\nIf we read \u0027no more\u0027 we expect presently to come upon a\r\n\u0027than\u0027; if we read \u0027however\u0027 at the outset of a sentence\r\nit is a \u0027yet,\u0027 a \u0027still,\u0027 or a \u0027nevertheless,\u0027 that we expect.\r\nA noun in a certain position demands a verb in a certain\r\nmood and number, in another position it expects a relative\r\npronoun. Adjectives call for nouns, verbs for adverbs,\r\netc., etc. And this foreboding of the coming grammatical\r\nscheme combined with each successive uttered word is so\r\npractically accurate that a reader incapable of understanding\r\nfour ideas of the book he is reading aloud, can nevertheless\r\nread it with the most delicately modulated expression of\r\nintelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome will interpret these facts by calling them all cases\r\nin which certain images, by laws of association, awaken\r\nothers so very rapidly that we think afterwards we felt the\r\nvery \u003ci\u003etendencies\u003c/i\u003e of the nascent images to arise, before they were\r\nactually there. For this school the only possible materials\r\nof consciousness are images of a perfectly definite nature.\r\nTendencies exist, but they are facts for the outside psychologist\r\nrather than for the subject of the observation. The\r\ntendency is thus a \u003ci\u003epsychical\u003c/i\u003e zero; only its \u003ci\u003eresults\u003c/i\u003e are felt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow what I contend for, and accumulate examples to\r\nshow, is that \u0027tendencies\u0027 are not only descriptions from\r\nwithout, but that they are among the \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e of the stream,\r\nwhich is thus aware of them from within, and must be\r\ndescribed as in very large measure constituted of \u003ci\u003efeelings\u003c/i\u003e of\r\n\u003ci\u003etendency\u003c/i\u003e, often so vague that we are unable to name them\r\nat all. It is, in short, the re-instatement of the vague to its\r\nproper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to\r\npress on the attention. Mr. Galton and Prof. Huxley have,\r\nas we shall see in Chapter XVIII, made one step in advance\r\nin exploding the ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley\r\nthat we can have no images but of perfectly definite things.\r\nAnother is made in the overthrow of the equally ridiculous\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_255\"\u003e[Pg 255]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnotion that, whilst simple objective qualities are revealed\r\nto our knowledge in subjective feelings, relations are not.\r\nBut these reforms are not half sweeping and radical enough.\r\nWhat must be admitted is that the definite images of traditional\r\npsychology form but the very smallest part of our\r\nminds as they actually live. The traditional psychology\r\ntalks like one who should say a river consists of nothing\r\nbut pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other\r\nmoulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots\r\nall actually standing in the stream, still between them the\r\nfree water would continue to flow. It is just this free water\r\nof consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook.\r\nEvery definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in\r\nthe free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense\r\nof its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence\r\nit came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead.\r\nThe significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo\r\nor penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,—or rather that\r\nis fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone\r\nand flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the\r\nsame \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e it was before, but making it an image of that\r\nthing newly taken and freshly understood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is that shadowy scheme of the \u0027form\u0027 of an\r\nopera, play, or book, which remains in our mind and on\r\nwhich we pass judgment when the actual thing is done?\r\nWhat is our notion of a scientific or philosophical system?\r\nGreat thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of schemes\r\nof relation between terms, which hardly even as verbal\r\nimages enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_232_232\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_232_232\"\u003e[232]\u003c/a\u003e We\r\nall of us have this permanent consciousness of whither our\r\nthought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_256\"\u003e[Pg 256]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof what thoughts are next to arise, before they have arisen.\r\nThis field of view of consciousness varies very much in\r\nextent, depending largely on the degree of mental freshness\r\nor fatigue. When very fresh, our minds carry an immense\r\nhorizon with them. The present image shoots its perspective\r\nfar before it, irradiating in advance the regions in which\r\nlie the thoughts as yet unborn. Under ordinary conditions\r\nthe halo of felt relations is much more circumscribed. And\r\nin states of extreme brain-fag the horizon is narrowed\r\nalmost to the passing word,—the associative machinery,\r\nhowever, providing for the next word turning up in orderly\r\nsequence, until at last the tired thinker is led to some kind\r\nof a conclusion. At certain moments he may find himself\r\ndoubting whether his thoughts have not come to a full stop;\r\nbut the vague sense of a \u003ci\u003eplus ultra\u003c/i\u003e makes him ever struggle\r\non towards a more definite expression of what it may be;\r\nwhilst the slowness of his utterance shows how difficult,\r\nunder such conditions, the labor of thinking must be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe awareness that our \u003ci\u003edefinite\u003c/i\u003e thought has come to a\r\nstop is an entirely different thing from the awareness that\r\nour thought is definitively completed. The expression of\r\nthe latter state of mind is the falling inflection which betokens\r\nthat the sentence is ended, and silence. The expression\r\nof the former state is \u0027hemming and hawing,\u0027 or\r\nelse such phrases as \u0027\u003ci\u003eet cetera\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 or \u0027and so forth.\u0027 But\r\nnotice that every part of the sentence to be left incomplete\r\nfeels differently as it passes, by reason of the premonition\r\nwe have that we shall be unable to end it. The \u0027and so\r\nforth\u0027 casts its shadow back, and is as integral a part of\r\nthe object of the thought as the distinctest of images\r\nwould be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, when we use a common noun, such as \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e, in a\r\nuniversal sense, as signifying all possible men, we are fully\r\naware of this intention on our part, and distinguish it carefully\r\nfrom our intention when we mean a certain group of\r\nmen, or a solitary individual before us. In the chapter on\r\nConception we shall see how important this difference of\r\nintention is. It casts its influence over the whole of the\r\nsentence, both before and after the spot in which the word\r\n\u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e is used.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_257\"\u003e[Pg 257]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing is easier than to symbolize all these facts in\r\nterms of brain-action. Just as the echo of the \u003ci\u003ewhence\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nsense of the starting point of our thought, is probably\r\ndue to the dying excitement of processes but a moment\r\nsince vividly aroused; so the sense of the whither, the foretaste\r\nof the terminus, must be due to the waxing excitement\r\nof tracts or processes which, a moment hence, will be\r\nthe cerebral correlatives of some thing which a moment\r\nhence will be vividly present to the thought. Represented\r\nby a curve, the neurosis underlying consciousness must at\r\nany moment be like this:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-257-0027.jpg\" style=\"width: 300px\" id=\"img_images_jame_257_0027.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 27.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach point of the horizontal line stands for some\r\nbrain-tract or process. The height of the curve above\r\nthe line stands for the intensity of the process. All the\r\nprocesses are \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e, in the intensities shown by the\r\ncurve. But those before the latter\u0027s apex \u003ci\u003ewere\u003c/i\u003e more intense\r\na moment ago; those after it \u003ci\u003ewill be\u003c/i\u003e more intense a\r\nmoment hence. If I recite \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e, f, g,\u003c/i\u003e at the moment\r\nof uttering \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, neither \u003ci\u003ea, b, c,\u003c/i\u003e nor \u003ci\u003ee, f, g,\u003c/i\u003e are out of my\r\nconsciousness altogether, but both, after their respective\r\nfashions, \u0027mix their dim lights\u0027 with the stronger one of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, because their neuroses are both awake in some\r\ndegree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a common class of mistakes which shows how\r\nbrain-processes begin to be excited before the thoughts\r\nattached to them are \u003ci\u003edue\u003c/i\u003e—due, that is, in substantive and\r\nvivid form. I mean those mistakes of speech or writing\r\nby which, in Dr. Carpenter\u0027s words, \"we mispronounce or\r\nmisspell a word, by introducing into it a letter or syllable\r\nof some other, whose turn is shortly to come; or, it may be,\r\nthe whole of the anticipated word is substituted for the one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_258\"\u003e[Pg 258]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich ought to have been expressed.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_233_233\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_233_233\"\u003e[233]\u003c/a\u003e In these cases\r\none of two things must have happened: either some local\r\naccident of nutrition \u003ci\u003eblocks\u003c/i\u003e the process that is \u003ci\u003edue\u003c/i\u003e, so that\r\nother processes discharge that ought as yet to be but nascently\r\naroused; or some opposite local accident \u003ci\u003efurthers\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe \u003ci\u003elatter processes\u003c/i\u003e and makes them explode before their\r\ntime. In the chapter on Association of Ideas, numerous\r\ninstances will come before us of the actual effect on consciousness\r\nof neuroses not yet maximally aroused.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is just like the \u0027overtones\u0027 in music. Different instruments\r\ngive the \u0027same note,\u0027 but each in a different\r\nvoice, because each gives more than that note, namely, various\r\nupper harmonics of it which differ from one instrument\r\nto another. They are not separately heard by the ear;\r\nthey blend with the fundamental note, and suffuse it, and\r\nalter it; and even so do the waxing and waning brain-processes\r\nat every moment blend with and suffuse and alter\r\nthe psychic effect of the processes which are at their culminating\r\npoint.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us use the words \u003ci\u003epsychic overtone, suffusion,\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003efringe\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nto designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our\r\nthought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but\r\ndimly perceived.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_234_234\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_234_234\"\u003e[234]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we then consider the \u003ci\u003ecognitive function\u003c/i\u003e of different\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_259\"\u003e[Pg 259]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstates of mind, we may feel assured that the difference between\r\nthose that are mere \u0027acquaintance,\u0027 and those that\r\nare \u0027knowledges-\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 221\u003c/a\u003e) is reducible almost\r\nentirely to the absence or presence of psychic fringes or\r\novertones. Knowledge \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e a thing is knowledge of its\r\nrelations. Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare\r\nimpression which it makes. Of most of its relations we are\r\nonly aware in the penumbral nascent way of a \u0027fringe\u0027 of\r\nunarticulated affinities about it. And, before passing to the\r\nnext topic in order, I must say a little of this sense of\r\naffinity, as itself one of the most interesting features of the\r\nsubjective stream.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or\r\nsubject about which all the members of the thought revolve.\r\nHalf the time this topic is a problem, a gap we cannot\r\nyet fill with a definite picture, word, or phrase, but which, in\r\nthe manner described some time back, influences us in an\r\nintensely active and determinate psychic way. Whatever\r\nmay be the images and phrases that pass before us, we feel\r\ntheir relation to this aching gap. To fill it up is our\r\nthoughts\u0027 destiny. Some bring us nearer to that consummation.\r\nSome the gap negates as quite irrelevant. Each\r\nswims in a felt fringe of relations of which the aforesaid\r\ngap is the term. Or instead of a definite gap we may\r\nmerely carry a mood of interest about with us. Then,\r\nhowever vague the mood, it will still act in the same way,\r\nthrowing a mantle of felt affinity over such representations,\r\nentering the mind, as suit it, and tingeing with the\r\nfeeling of tediousness or discord all those with which it\r\nhas no concern.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRelation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt\r\nin the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and\r\ndiscord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic. When\r\nthe sense of furtherance is there, we are \u0027all right;\u0027 with\r\nthe sense of hindrance we are dissatisfied and perplexed,\r\nand cast about us for other thoughts. Now \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e thought\r\nthe quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves \u0027all right,\u0027\r\nis an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever kind of\r\nthought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it\r\nto have a place in the scheme of relations in which the interesting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_260\"\u003e[Pg 260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntopic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make of\r\nit a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFor the important thing about a train of thought is its\r\nconclusion.\u003c/i\u003e That is the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e, or, as we say, the topic of\r\nthe thought. That is what abides when all its other members\r\nhave faded from memory. Usually this conclusion is\r\na word or phrase or particular image, or practical attitude\r\nor resolve, whether rising to answer a problem or fill a\r\npre-existing gap that worried us, or whether accidentally\r\nstumbled on in revery. In either case it stands out from\r\nthe other segments of the stream by reason of the peculiar\r\ninterest attaching to it. This interest \u003ci\u003earrests\u003c/i\u003e it, makes a\r\nsort of crisis of it when it comes, induces attention upon it\r\nand makes us treat it in a substantive way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe parts of the stream that precede these substantive\r\nconclusions are but the means of the latter\u0027s attainment.\r\nAnd, provided the same conclusion be reached, the means\r\nmay be as mutable as we like, for the \u0027meaning\u0027 of the stream\r\nof thought will be the same. What difference does it make\r\nwhat the means are? \"\u003ci\u003eQu\u0027importe le flacon, pourvu qu\u0027on\r\nait l\u0027ivresse?\u003c/i\u003e\" The relative unimportance of the means\r\nappears from the fact that when the conclusion is there, we\r\nhave always forgotten most of the steps preceding its attainment.\r\nWhen we have uttered a proposition, we are rarely\r\nable a moment afterwards to recall our exact words, though\r\nwe can express it in different words easily enough. The\r\npractical upshot of a book we read remains with us, though\r\nwe may not recall one of its sentences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only paradox would seem to lie in supposing that\r\nthe fringe of felt affinity and discord can be the same in\r\ntwo heterogeneous sets of images. Take a train of words\r\npassing through the mind and leading to a certain conclusion\r\non the one hand, and on the other hand an almost\r\nwordless set of tactile, visual and other fancies leading to\r\nthe same conclusion. Can the halo, fringe, or scheme in\r\nwhich we feel the words to lie be the same as that in which\r\nwe feel the images to lie? Does not the discrepancy of\r\nterms involve a discrepancy of felt relations among them?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the terms be taken \u003ci\u003equâ\u003c/i\u003e mere sensations, it assuredly\r\ndoes. For instance, the words may rhyme with each\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_261\"\u003e[Pg 261]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nother,—the visual images can have no such affinity as \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nBut \u003ci\u003equâ\u003c/i\u003e thoughts, \u003ci\u003equâ\u003c/i\u003e sensations \u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e, the words have\r\ncontracted by long association fringes of mutual repugnance\r\nor affinity with each other and with the conclusion, which\r\nrun exactly parallel with like fringes in the visual, tactile\r\nand other ideas. The most important element of these\r\nfringes is, I repeat, the mere feeling of harmony or discord,\r\nof a right or wrong direction in the thought. Dr. Campbell\r\nhas, so far as I know, made the best analysis of this\r\nfact, and his words, often quoted, deserve to be quoted again.\r\nThe chapter is entitled \"What is the cause that nonsense\r\nso often escapes being detected, both by the writer and by\r\nthe reader?\" The author, in answering this question, makes\r\n(\u003ci\u003einter alia\u003c/i\u003e) the following remarks:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_235_235\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_235_235\"\u003e[235]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"That connection [he says] or relation which comes gradually to subsist\r\namong the different words of a language, in the minds of those who\r\nspeak it,… is merely consequent on this, that those words are\r\nemployed as signs of connected or related things. It is an axiom in\r\ngeometry that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another.\r\nIt may, in like manner, be admitted as an axiom in psychology that\r\nideas associated by the same idea will associate one another. Hence it\r\nwill happen that if, from experiencing the connection of two things,\r\nthere results, as infallibly there will result, an association between the\r\nideas or notions annexed to them, as each idea will moreover be associated\r\nby its sign, there will likewise be an association between the ideas\r\nof the signs. Hence the sounds considered as signs will be conceived to\r\nhave a connection analogous to that which subsisteth among the things\r\nsignified; I say, the sounds considered as signs; for this way of considering\r\nthem constantly attends us in speaking, writing, hearing, and\r\nreading. When we purposely abstract from it, and regard them merely\r\nas sounds, we are instantly sensible that they are quite unconnected, and\r\nhave no other relation than what ariseth from similitude of tone or\r\naccent. But to consider them in this manner commonly results from\r\nprevious design, and requires a kind of effort which is not exerted in the\r\nordinary use of speech. In ordinary use they are regarded solely as\r\nsigns, or, rather, they are confounded with the things they signify; the\r\nconsequence of which is that, in the manner just now explained, we come\r\ninsensibly to conceive a connection among them of a very different sort\r\nfrom that of which sounds are naturally susceptible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now this conception, habit, or tendency of the mind, call it which\r\nyou please, is considerably strengthened by the frequent use of language\r\nand by the structure of it. Language is the sole channel through which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_262\"\u003e[Pg 262]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe communicate our knowledge and discoveries to others, and through\r\nwhich the knowledge and discoveries of others are communicated to us.\r\nBy reiterated recourse to this medium, it necessarily happens that\r\nwhen things are related to each other, the words signifying those\r\nthings are more commonly brought together in discourse. Hence the\r\nwords and names by themselves, by customary vicinity, contract in the\r\nfancy a relation additional to that which they derive purely from being\r\nthe symbols of related things. Farther, this tendency is strengthened\r\nby the structure of language. All languages whatever, even the most\r\nbarbarous, as far as hath yet appeared, are of a regular and analogical\r\nmake. The consequence is that similar relations in things will be expressed\r\nsimilarly; that is, by similar inflections, derivations, compositions,\r\narrangement of words, or juxtaposition of particles, according to\r\nthe genius or grammatical form of the particular tongue. Now as, by\r\nthe habitual use of a language (even though it were quite irregular),\r\nthe signs would insensibly become connected in the imagination wherever\r\nthe things signified are connected in nature, so, by the regular\r\nstructure of a language, this connection among the signs is conceived\r\nas analogous to that which subsisteth among their archetypes.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we know English and French and begin a sentence in\r\nFrench, all the later words that come are French; we hardly\r\never drop into English. And this affinity of the French\r\nwords for each other is not something merely operating mechanically\r\nas a brain-law, it is something we feel at the time.\r\nOur understanding of a French sentence heard never falls\r\nto so low an ebb that we are not aware that the words linguistically\r\nbelong together. Our attention can hardly so\r\nwander that if an English word be suddenly introduced we\r\nshall not start at the change. Such a vague sense as this\r\nof the words belonging together is the very minimum of\r\nfringe that can accompany them, if \u0027thought\u0027 at all.\r\nUsually the vague perception that all the words we hear\r\nbelong to the same language and to the same special vocabulary\r\nin that language, and that the grammatical sequence\r\nis familiar, is practically equivalent to an admission that\r\nwhat we hear is sense. But if an unusual foreign word\r\nbe introduced, if the grammar trip, or if a term from an\r\nincongruous vocabulary suddenly appear, such as \u0027rat-trap\u0027\r\nor \u0027plumber\u0027s bill\u0027 in a philosophical discourse, the\r\nsentence detonates, as it were, we receive a shock from the\r\nincongruity, and the drowsy assent is gone. The feeling of\r\nrationality in these cases seems rather a negative than a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_263\"\u003e[Pg 263]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npositive thing, being the mere absence of shock, or sense\r\nof discord, between the terms of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo delicate and incessant is this recognition by the\r\nmind of the mere fitness of words to be mentioned together\r\nthat the slightest misreading, such as \u0027casualty\u0027 for\r\n\u0027causality,\u0027 or \u0027perpetual\u0027 for \u0027perceptual,\u0027 will be corrected\r\nby a listener whose attention is so relaxed that he\r\ngets no idea of the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of the sentence at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConversely, if words do belong to the same vocabulary,\r\nand if the grammatical structure is correct, sentences with\r\nabsolutely no meaning may be uttered in good faith and\r\npass unchallenged. Discourses at prayer-meetings, reshuffling\r\nthe same collection of cant phrases, and the whole\r\ngenus of penny-a-line-isms and newspaper-reporter\u0027s\r\nflourishes give illustrations of this. \"The birds filled the\r\ntree-tops with their morning song, making the air moist,\r\ncool, and pleasant,\" is a sentence I remember reading once\r\nin a report of some athletic exercises in Jerome Park. It\r\nwas probably written unconsciously by the hurried reporter,\r\nand read uncritically by many readers. An entire\r\nvolume of 784 pages lately published in Boston\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_236_236\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_236_236\"\u003e[236]\u003c/a\u003e is composed\r\nof stuff like this passage picked out at random:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The flow of the efferent fluids of all these vessels from their outlets\r\nat the terminal loop of each culminate link on the surface of the\r\nnuclear organism is continuous as their respective atmospheric fruitage\r\nup to the altitudinal limit of their expansibility, whence, when atmosphered\r\nby like but coalescing essences from higher altitudes,—those\r\nsensibly expressed as the essential qualities of external forms,—they\r\ndescend, and become assimilated by the afferents of the nuclear organism.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_237_237\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_237_237\"\u003e[237]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_264\"\u003e[Pg 264]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are every year works published whose contents\r\nshow them to be by real lunatics. To the reader, the\r\nbook quoted from seems pure nonsense from beginning to\r\nend. It is impossible to divine, in such a case, just what\r\nsort of feeling of rational relation between the words may\r\nhave appeared to the author\u0027s mind. The border line\r\nbetween objective sense and nonsense is hard to draw;\r\nthat between subjective sense and nonsense, impossible.\r\nSubjectively, any collocation of words may make sense—even\r\nthe wildest words in a dream—if one only does not\r\ndoubt their belonging together. Take the obscurer passages\r\nin Hegel: it is a fair question whether the rationality\r\nincluded in them be anything more than the fact that the\r\nwords all belong to a common vocabulary, and are strung\r\ntogether on a scheme of predication and relation,—immediacy,\r\nself-relation, and what not,—which has habitually\r\nrecurred. Yet there seems no reason to doubt that the\r\nsubjective feeling of the rationality of these sentences was\r\nstrong in the writer as he penned them, or even that some\r\nreaders by straining may have reproduced it in themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo sum up, certain kinds of verbal associate, certain\r\ngrammatical expectations fulfilled, stand for a good part of\r\nour impression that a sentence has a meaning and is\r\ndominated by the Unity of one Thought. Nonsense in\r\ngrammatical form sounds half rational; sense with grammatical\r\nsequence upset sounds nonsensical; e.g., \"Elba the\r\nNapoleon English faith had banished broken to be Saint\r\nbecause Helena at.\" Finally, there is about each word the\r\npsychic \u0027overtone\u0027 of feeling that it brings us nearer to a\r\nforefelt conclusion. Suffuse all the words of a sentence,\r\nas they pass, with these three fringes or haloes of relation,\r\nlet the conclusion seem worth arriving at, and all will\r\nadmit the sentence to be an expression of thoroughly\r\ncontinuous, unified, and rational thought.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_265\"\u003e[Pg 265]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_238_238\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_238_238\"\u003e[238]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach word, in such a sentence, is felt, not only as a\r\nword, but as having a \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e. The \u0027meaning\u0027 of a word\r\ntaken thus dynamically in a sentence may be quite different\r\nfrom its meaning when taken statically or without context.\r\nThe dynamic meaning is usually reduced to the bare\r\nfringe we have described, of felt suitability or unfitness to\r\nthe context and conclusion. The static meaning, when the\r\nword is concrete, as \u0027table,\u0027 \u0027Boston,\u0027 consists of sensory\r\nimages awakened; when it is abstract, as \u0027criminal legislation,\u0027\r\n\u0027fallacy,\u0027 the meaning consists of other words aroused,\r\nforming the so-called \u0027definition.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHegel\u0027s celebrated dictum that pure being is identical\r\nwith pure nothing results from his taking the words statically,\r\nor without the fringe they wear in a context. Taken\r\nin isolation, they agree in the single point of awakening no\r\nsensorial images. But taken dynamically, or as significant,—as\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e,—their fringes of relation, their affinities and\r\nrepugnances, their function and meaning, are felt and\r\nunderstood to be absolutely opposed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch considerations as these remove all appearance of\r\nparadox from those cases of extremely deficient visual imagery\r\nof whose existence Mr. Galton has made us aware (see\r\nbelow). An exceptionally intelligent friend informs me that\r\nhe can frame no image whatever of the appearance of his\r\nbreakfast-table. When asked how he then remembers it at\r\nall, he says he simple \u0027\u003ci\u003eknows\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 that it seated four people, and\r\nwas covered with a white cloth on which were a butter-dish,\r\na coffee-pot, radishes, and so forth. The mind-stuff\r\nof which this \u0027knowing\u0027 is made seems to be verbal images\r\nexclusively. But if the words \u0027coffee,\u0027 \u0027bacon,\u0027 \u0027muffins,\u0027\r\nand \u0027eggs\u0027 lead a man to speak to his cook, to pay his\r\nbills, and to take measures for the morrow\u0027s meal exactly as\r\nvisual and gustatory memories would, why are they not,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_266\"\u003e[Pg 266]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor all practical intents and purposes, as good a kind of\r\nmaterial in which to think? In fact, we may suspect them\r\nto be for most purposes better than terms with a richer\r\nimaginative coloring. The scheme of relationship and the\r\nconclusion being the essential things in thinking, that kind\r\nof mind-stuff which is handiest will be the best for the\r\npurpose. Now words, uttered or unexpressed, are the\r\nhandiest mental elements we have. Not only are they very\r\n\u003ci\u003erapidly\u003c/i\u003e revivable, but they are revivable as actual sensations\r\nmore easily than any other items of our experience.\r\nDid they not possess some such advantage as\r\nthis, it would hardly be the case that the older men are and\r\nthe more effective as thinkers, the more, as a rule, they\r\nhave lost their visualizing power and depend on words.\r\nThis was ascertained by Mr. Galton to be the case with\r\nmembers of the Royal Society. The present writer observes\r\nit in his own person most distinctly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, a deaf and dumb man can weave\r\nhis tactile and visual images into a system of thought quite\r\nas effective and rational as that of a word-user. \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nquestion whether thought is possible without language\u003c/i\u003e has\r\nbeen a favorite topic of discussion among philosophers.\r\nSome interesting reminiscences of his childhood by Mr.\r\nBallard, a deaf-mute instructor in the National College at\r\nWashington, show it to be perfectly possible. A few\r\nparagraphs may be quoted here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In consequence of the loss of my hearing in infancy, I was debarred\r\nfrom enjoying the advantages which children in the full possession\r\nof their senses derive from the exercises of the common primary\r\nschool, from the every-day talk of their school-fellows and playmates,\r\nand from the conversation of their parents and other grown-up persons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I could convey my thoughts and feelings to my parents and\r\nbrothers by natural signs or pantomime, and I could understand what\r\nthey said to me by the same medium; our intercourse being, however,\r\nconfined to the daily routine of home affairs and hardly going beyond\r\nthe circle of my own observation….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"My father adopted a course which he thought would, in some\r\nmeasure, compensate me for the loss of my hearing. It was that of\r\ntaking me with him when business required him to ride abroad; and\r\nhe took me more frequently than he did my brothers; giving, as the\r\nreason for his apparent partiality, that they could acquire information\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_267\"\u003e[Pg 267]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough the ear, while I depended solely upon my eye for acquaintance\r\nwith affairs of the outside world….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I have a vivid recollection of the delight I felt in watching the\r\ndifferent scenes we passed through, observing the various phases of\r\nnature, both animate and inanimate; though we did not, owing to my\r\ninfirmity, engage in conversation. It was during those delightful rides,\r\nsome two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of\r\nwritten language, that I began to ask myself the question: \u003ci\u003eHow came\r\nthe world into being?\u003c/i\u003e When this question occurred to my mind, I set\r\nmyself to thinking it over a long time. My curiosity was awakened as\r\nto what was the origin of human life in its first appearance upon the\r\nearth, and of vegetable life as well, and also the cause of the existence\r\nof the earth, sun, moon, and stars.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I remember at one time when my eye fell upon a very large old\r\nstump which we happened to pass in one of our rides, I asked myself,\r\n\u0027Is it possible that the first man that ever came into the world rose out\r\nof that stump? But that stump is only a remnant of a once noble magnificent\r\ntree, and how came that tree? Why, it came only by beginning\r\nto grow out of the ground just like those little trees now coming up.\u0027\r\nAnd I dismissed from my mind, as an absurd idea, the connection\r\nbetween the origin of man and a decaying old stump….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I have no recollection of what it was that first suggested to me the\r\nquestion as to the origin of things. I had before this time gained ideas\r\nof the descent from parent to child, of the propagation of animals, and\r\nof the production of plants from seeds. The question that occurred to\r\nmy mind was: whence came the first man, the first animal, and the\r\nfirst plant, at the remotest distance of time, before which there was no\r\nman, no animal, no plant; since I knew they all had a beginning and\r\nan end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is impossible to state the exact order in which these different\r\nquestions arose, i.e., about men, animals, plants, the earth, sun, moon,\r\netc. The lower animals did not receive so much thought as was bestowed\r\nupon man and the earth; perhaps because I put man and beast in the\r\nsame class, since I believed that man would be annihilated and there was\r\nno resurrection beyond the grave,—though I am told by my mother that,\r\nin answer to my question, in the case of a deceased uncle who looked\r\nto me like a person in sleep, she had tried to make me understand that\r\nhe would awake in the far future. It was my belief that man and\r\nbeast derived their being from the same source, and were to be laid\r\ndown in the dust in a state of annihilation. Considering the brute\r\nanimal as of secondary importance, and allied to man on a lower level,\r\nman and the earth were the two things on which my mind dwelled\r\nmost.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I think I was five years old, when I began to understand the descent\r\nfrom parent to child and the propagation of animals. I was\r\nnearly eleven years old, when I entered the Institution where I was educated;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_268\"\u003e[Pg 268]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand I remember distinctly that it was at least two years before\r\nthis time that I began to ask myself the question as to the origin of the\r\nuniverse. My age was then about eight, not over nine years.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Of the form of the earth, I had no idea in my childhood, except\r\nthat, from a look at a map of the hemispheres, I inferred there were\r\ntwo immense disks of matter lying near each other. I also believed the\r\nsun and moon to be round, flat plates of illuminating matter; and for\r\nthose luminaries I entertained a sort of reverence on account of their\r\npower of lighting and heating the earth. I thought from their coming\r\nup and going down, travelling across the sky in so regular a manner\r\nthat there must be a certain something having power to govern their\r\ncourse. I believed the sun went into a hole at the west and came out\r\nof another at the east, travelling through a great tube in the earth, describing\r\nthe same curve as it seemed to describe in the sky. The stars\r\nseemed to me to be tiny lights studded in the sky.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The source from which the universe came was the question about\r\nwhich my mind revolved in a vain struggle to grasp it, or rather to\r\nfight the way up to attain to a satisfactory answer. When I had occupied\r\nmyself with this subject a considerable time, I perceived that it was a\r\nmatter much greater than my mind could comprehend; and I remember\r\nwell that I became so appalled at its mystery and so bewildered at\r\nmy inability to grapple with it that I laid the subject aside and out of\r\nmy mind, glad to escape being, as it were, drawn into a vortex of inextricable\r\nconfusion. Though I felt relieved at this escape, yet I could not\r\nresist the desire to know the truth; and I returned to the subject; but\r\nas before, I left it, after thinking it over for some time. In this state of\r\nperplexity, I hoped all the time to get at the truth, still believing that\r\nthe more I gave thought to the subject, the more my mind would penetrate\r\nthe mystery. Thus I was tossed like a shuttlecock, returning to\r\nthe subject and recoiling from it, till I came to school.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I remember that my mother once told me about a being up above,\r\npointing her finger towards the sky and with a solemn look on her countenance.\r\nI do not recall the circumstance which led to this communication.\r\nWhen she mentioned the mysterious being up in the sky, I was\r\neager to take hold of the subject, and plied her with questions concerning\r\nthe form and appearance of this unknown being, asking if it was\r\nthe sun, moon, or one of the stars. I knew she meant that there was a\r\nliving one somewhere up in the sky; but when I realized that she could\r\nnot answer my questions, I gave it up in despair, feeling sorrowful that\r\nI could not obtain a definite idea of the mysterious living one up in the\r\nsky.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"One day, while we were haying in a field, there was a series of heavy\r\nthunder-claps. I asked one of my brothers where they came from. He\r\npointed to the sky and made a zigzag motion with his finger, signifying\r\nlightning. I imagined there was a great man somewhere in the blue\r\nvault, who made a loud noise with his voice out of it; and each time I\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_269\"\u003e[Pg 269]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nheard\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_239_239\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_239_239\"\u003e[239]\u003c/a\u003e a thunder-clap I was frightened, and looked up at the sky, fearing\r\nhe was speaking a threatening word.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_240_240\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_240_240\"\u003e[240]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-269-0028.jpg\" style=\"width: 150px\" id=\"img_images_jame_269_0028.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 28.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere we may pause. The reader sees by this time that\r\nit makes little or no difference in what sort of mind-stuff, in\r\nwhat quality of imagery, his thinking goes on. The only\r\nimages \u003ci\u003eintrinsically\u003c/i\u003e important are the halting-places, the\r\nsubstantive conclusions, provisional or final, of the thought.\r\nThroughout all the rest of the stream, the feelings of relation\r\nare everything, and the terms related almost naught.\r\nThese feelings of relation, these psychic overtones, halos,\r\nsuffusions, or fringes about the terms, may be the same\r\nin very different systems of imagery. A diagram may help\r\nto accentuate this indifference of the mental means where\r\nthe end is the same. Let \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e be some experience from\r\nwhich a number of thinkers start. Let \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e be the practical\r\nconclusion rationally inferrible from it. One gets to the\r\nconclusion by one line, another by another; one follows a\r\ncourse of English, another of\r\nGerman, verbal imagery.\r\nWith one, visual images predominate;\r\nwith another, tactile.\r\nSome trains are tinged\r\nwith emotions, others not;\r\nsome are very abridged, synthetic\r\nand rapid, others, hesitating\r\nand broken into many steps. But when the penultimate\r\nterms of all the trains, however differing \u003ci\u003einter se\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nfinally shoot into the same conclusion, we say and rightly\r\nsay, that all the thinkers have had substantially the same\r\nthought. It would probably astound each of them beyond\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_270\"\u003e[Pg 270]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeasure to be let into his neighbor\u0027s mind and to find how\r\ndifferent the scenery there was from that in his own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThought is in fact a kind of Algebra, as Berkeley long ago\r\nsaid, \"in which, though a particular quantity be marked by\r\neach letter, yet to proceed right, it is not requisite that in\r\nevery step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular\r\nquantity it was appointed to stand for.\" Mr. Lewes\r\nhas developed this algebra-analogy so well that I must\r\nquote his words:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The leading characteristic of algebra is that of operation on relations.\r\nThis also is the leading characteristic of Thought. Algebra cannot\r\nexist without values, nor Thought without Feelings. The operations\r\nare so many blank forms till the values are assigned. Words are vacant\r\nsounds, ideas are blank forms, unless they symbolize images and\r\nsensations which are their values. Nevertheless it is rigorously true,\r\nand of the greatest importance, that analysts carry on very extensive\r\noperations with blank forms, never pausing to supply the symbols with\r\nvalues until the calculation is completed; and ordinary men, no less\r\nthan philosophers, carry on long trains of thought without pausing to\r\ntranslate their ideas (words) into images…. Suppose some one from\r\na distance shouts \u0027a lion!\u0027 At once the man starts in alarm….\r\nTo the man the word is not only an … expression of all that he has\r\nseen and heard of lions, capable of recalling various experiences, but is\r\nalso capable of taking its place in a connected series of thoughts without\r\nrecalling any of those experiences, without reviving an image, however\r\nfaint, of the lion—simply as a sign of a certain relation included in the\r\ncomplex so named. Like an algebraic symbol it may be operated on\r\nwithout conveying other significance than an abstract relation: it is a\r\nsign of Danger, related to fear with all its motor sequences. Its logical\r\nposition suffices…. Ideas are \u003ci\u003esubstitutions\u003c/i\u003e which require a secondary\r\nprocess when what is symbolized by them is translated into the images\r\nand experiences it replaces; and this secondary process is frequently not\r\nperformed at all, generally only performed to a very small extent. Let\r\nanyone closely examine what has passed in his mind when he has constructed\r\na chain of reasoning, and he will be surprised at the fewness\r\nand faintness of the images which have accompanied the ideas. Suppose\r\nyou inform me that \u0027the blood rushed violently from the man\u0027s\r\nheart, quickening his pulse at the sight of his enemy.\u0027 Of the many latent\r\nimages in this phrase, how many were salient in your mind and in\r\nmine? Probably two—the man and his enemy—and these images were\r\nfaint. Images of blood, heart, violent rushing, pulse, quickening, and\r\nsight, were either not revived at all, or were passing shadows. Had\r\nany such images arisen, they would have hampered thought, retarding\r\nthe logical process of judgment by irrelevant connections. The symbols\r\nhad substituted \u003ci\u003erelations\u003c/i\u003e for these \u003ci\u003evalues\u003c/i\u003e…. There are no images of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_271\"\u003e[Pg 271]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntwo things and three things, when I say \u0027two and three equal five;\u0027\r\nthere are simply familiar symbols having precise relations…. The\r\nverbal symbol \u0027horse,\u0027 which stands for all our experiences of horses,\r\nserves all the purposes of Thought, without recalling one of the images\r\nclustered in the perception of horses, just as the sight of a horse\u0027s form\r\nserves all the purposes of \u003ci\u003erecognition\u003c/i\u003e without recalling the sound of its\r\nneighing or its tramp, its qualities as an animal of draught, and so\r\nforth.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_241_241\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_241_241\"\u003e[241]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt need only be added that as the Algebrist, though the\r\nsequence of his terms is fixed by their relations rather than\r\nby their several values, must give a real value to the \u003ci\u003efinal\u003c/i\u003e one\r\nhe reaches; so the thinker in words must let his concluding\r\nword or phrase be translated into its full sensible-image-value,\r\nunder penalty of the thought being left unrealized\r\nand pale.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is all I have to say about the sensible continuity\r\nand unity of our thought as contrasted with the apparent\r\ndiscreteness of the words, images, and other means by\r\nwhich it seems to be carried on. Between all their substantive\r\nelements there is \u0027transitive\u0027 consciousness, and\r\nthe words and images are \u0027fringed,\u0027 and not as discrete as\r\nto a careless view they seem. Let us advance now to the\r\nnext head in our description of Thought\u0027s stream.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e4. \u003ci\u003eHuman thought appears to deal with objects independent\r\nof itself; that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the function of\r\nknowing.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor Absolute Idealism, the infinite Thought and its objects\r\nare one. The Objects are, through being thought;\r\nthe eternal Mind is, through thinking them. Were a\r\nhuman thought alone in the world there would be no\r\nreason for any other assumption regarding it. Whatever\r\nit might have before it would be its vision, would be there,\r\nin \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e \u0027there,\u0027 or then, in \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e \u0027then\u0027; and the question would\r\nnever arise whether an extra-mental duplicate of it existed or\r\nnot. The reason why we all believe that the objects of our\r\nthoughts have a duplicate existence outside, is that there\r\nare \u003ci\u003emany\u003c/i\u003e human thoughts, each with the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e objects, as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_272\"\u003e[Pg 272]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe cannot help supposing. The judgment that \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e thought\r\nhas the same object as \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e thought is what makes the\r\npsychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer reality.\r\nThe judgment that my own past thought and my own present\r\nthought are of the same object is what makes \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e take\r\nthe object out of either and project it by a sort of triangulation\r\ninto an independent position, from which it may\r\n\u003ci\u003eappear\u003c/i\u003e to both. \u003ci\u003eSameness\u003c/i\u003e in a multiplicity of objective\r\nappearances is thus the basis of our belief in realities\r\noutside of thought.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_242_242\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_242_242\"\u003e[242]\u003c/a\u003e In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XII\u003c/a\u003e we shall have to take\r\nup the judgment of sameness again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo show that the question of reality being extra-mental\r\nor not is not likely to arise in the absence of repeated experiences\r\nof the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e, take the example of an altogether\r\nunprecedented experience, such as a new taste in the throat.\r\nIs it a subjective quality of feeling, or an objective quality\r\nfelt? You do not even ask the question at this point. It\r\nis simply \u003ci\u003ethat taste\u003c/i\u003e. But if a doctor hears you describe it,\r\nand says: \"Ha! Now you know what \u003ci\u003eheartburn\u003c/i\u003e is,\" then\r\nit becomes a quality already existent \u003ci\u003eextra mentem tuam\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhich you in turn have come upon and learned. The first\r\nspaces, times, things, qualities, experienced by the child\r\nprobably appear, like the first heartburn, in this absolute\r\nway, as simple \u003ci\u003ebeings\u003c/i\u003e, neither in nor out of thought. But\r\nlater, by having other thoughts than this present one, and\r\nmaking repeated judgments of sameness among their objects,\r\nhe corroborates in himself the notion of realities,\r\npast and distant as well as present, which realities no one\r\nsingle thought either possesses or engenders, but which all\r\nmay contemplate and know. This, as was stated in the last\r\nchapter, is the \u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e point of view, the relatively\r\nuncritical non-idealistic point of view of all natural science,\r\nbeyond which this book cannot go. A mind which has\r\nbecome conscious of its own cognitive function, plays what\r\nwe have called \u0027the psychologist\u0027 upon itself. It not only\r\nknows the things that appear before it; it knows that it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_273\"\u003e[Pg 273]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknows them. This stage of reflective condition is, more or\r\nless explicitly, our habitual adult state of mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt cannot, however, be regarded as primitive. The consciousness\r\nof objects must come first. We seem to lapse\r\ninto this primordial condition when consciousness is reduced\r\nto a minimum by the inhalation of anæsthetics or\r\nduring a faint. Many persons testify that at a certain stage\r\nof the anæsthetic process objects are still cognized whilst\r\nthe thought of self is lost. Professor Herzen says:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_243_243\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_243_243\"\u003e[243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"During the syncope there is absolute psychic annihilation, the absence\r\nof all consciousness; then at the beginning of coming to, one has\r\nat a certain moment a vague, limitless, infinite feeling—a sense of \u003ci\u003eexistence\r\nin general\u003c/i\u003e without the least trace of distinction between the me and\r\nthe not-me.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Shoemaker of Philadelphia describes during the\r\ndeepest conscious stage of ether-intoxication a vision of\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"two endless parallel lines in swift longitudinal motion … on a uniform\r\nmisty background … together with a constant sound or whirr,\r\nnot loud but distinct … which seemed to be connected with the parallel\r\nlines…. These phenomena occupied the whole field. There were\r\npresent no dreams or visions in any way connected with human affairs,\r\nno ideas or impressions akin to anything in past experience, no emotions,\r\nof course no idea of personality. There was no conception as to\r\nwhat being it was that was regarding the two lines, or that there existed\r\nany such thing as such a being; the lines and waves were all.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_244_244\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_244_244\"\u003e[244]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSimilarly a friend of Mr. Herbert Spencer, quoted by\r\nhim in \u0027Mind\u0027 (vol iii, p. 556), speaks of \"an undisturbed\r\nempty quiet everywhere except that a stupid presence lay\r\nlike a heavy intrusion \u003ci\u003esomewhere\u003c/i\u003e—a blotch on the calm.\"\r\nThis sense of objectivity and lapse of subjectivity, even\r\nwhen the object is almost indefinable, is, it seems to me, a\r\nsomewhat familiar phase in chloroformization, though in\r\nmy own case it is too deep a phase for any articulate after-memory\r\nto remain. I only know that as it vanishes I\r\nseem to wake to a sense of my own existence as something\r\nadditional to what had previously been there.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_274\"\u003e[Pg 274]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_245_245\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_245_245\"\u003e[245]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany philosophers, however, hold that the reflective\r\nconsciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function\r\nof thought. They hold that a thought, in order to know\r\na thing at all, must expressly distinguish between the thing\r\nand its own self.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_246_246\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_246_246\"\u003e[246]\u003c/a\u003e This is a perfectly wanton assumption,\r\nand not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing\r\nit true. As well might I contend that I cannot dream\r\nwithout dreaming that I dream, swear without swearing\r\nthat I swear, deny without denying that I deny, as maintain\r\nthat I cannot know without knowing that I know. I\r\nmay have either acquaintance-with, or knowledge-about,\r\nan object O without think about myself at all. It suffices\r\nfor this that I think O, and that it exist. If, in addition\r\nto thinking O, I also think that I exist and that I know O,\r\nwell and good; I then know one more thing, a fact about O,\r\nof which I previously was unmindful. That, however, does\r\nnot prevent me from having already known O a good deal.\r\nO \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, or O \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e P, are as good objects of knowledge as\r\nO \u003ci\u003eplus me\u003c/i\u003e is. The philosophers in question simply substitute\r\none particular object for all others, and call it \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e object\r\n\u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e. It is a case of the \u0027psychologist\u0027s fallacy\u0027\r\n(see \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 197\u003c/a\u003e). \u003ci\u003eThey\u003c/i\u003e know the object to be one thing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_275\"\u003e[Pg 275]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the thought another; and they forthwith foist their\r\nown knowledge into that of the thought of which they pretend\r\nto give a true account. To conclude, then, \u003ci\u003ethought may,\r\nbut need not, in knowing, discriminate between its object and\r\nitself.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have been using the word Object. \u003ci\u003eSomething must\r\nnow be said about the proper use of the term Object in Psychology.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn popular parlance the word object is commonly taken\r\nwithout reference to the act of knowledge, and treated as\r\nsynonymous with individual subject of existence. Thus\r\nif anyone ask what is the mind\u0027s object when you say\r\n\u0027Columbus discovered America in 1492,\u0027 most people will\r\nreply \u0027Columbus,\u0027 or \u0027America,\u0027 or, at most, \u0027the discovery\r\nof America.\u0027 They will name a substantive kernel or nucleus\r\nof the consciousness, and say the thought is \u0027about\u0027\r\nthat,—as indeed it is,—and they will call that your thought\u0027s\r\n\u0027object.\u0027 Really that is usually only the grammatical\r\nobject, or more likely the grammatical subject, of your sentence.\r\nIt is at most your \u0027fractional object;\u0027 or you may call\r\nit the \u0027topic\u0027 of your thought, or the \u0027subject of your discourse.\u0027\r\nBut the \u003ci\u003eObject\u003c/i\u003e of your thought is really its entire\r\ncontent or deliverance, neither more nor less. It is a vicious\r\nuse of speech to take out a substantive kernel from its content\r\nand call that its object; and it is an equally vicious use\r\nof speech to add a substantive kernel not articulately included\r\nin its content, and to call that its object. Yet either\r\none of these two sins we commit, whenever we content ourselves\r\nwith saying that a given thought is simply \u0027about\u0027 a\r\ncertain topic, or that that topic is its \u0027object.\u0027 The object of\r\nmy thought in the previous sentence, for example, is strictly\r\nspeaking neither Columbus, nor America, nor its discovery.\r\nIt is nothing short of the entire sentence, \u0027Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492.\u0027\r\nAnd if we wish to speak of it\r\nsubstantively, we must make a substantive of it by writing\r\nit out thus with hyphens between all its words. Nothing\r\nbut this can possibly name its delicate idiosyncrasy. And\r\nif we wish to \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e that idiosyncrasy we must reproduce the\r\nthought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_276\"\u003e[Pg 276]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhole sentence bathed in that original halo of obscure relations,\r\nwhich, like an horizon, then spread about its meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur psychological duty is to cling as closely as possible\r\nto the actual constitution of the thought we are studying.\r\nWe may err as much by excess as by defect. If the kernel\r\nor \u0027topic,\u0027 Columbus, is in one way less than the thought\u0027s\r\nobject, so in another way it may be more. That is, when\r\nnamed by the psychologist, it may mean much more than\r\nactually is present to the thought of which he is reporter.\r\nThus, for example, suppose you should go on to think:\r\n\u0027He was a daring genius!\u0027 An ordinary psychologist would\r\nnot hesitate to say that the object of your thought was still\r\n\u0027Columbus.\u0027 True, your thought is \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e Columbus. It\r\n\u0027terminates\u0027 in Columbus, leads from and to the direct\r\nidea of Columbus. But for the moment it is not fully and\r\nimmediately Columbus, it is only \u0027he,\u0027 or rather \u0027he-was-a-daring-genius;\u0027\r\nwhich, though it may be an unimportant\r\ndifference for conversational purposes, is, for introspective\r\npsychology, as great a difference as there can be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe object of every thought, then, is neither more nor\r\nless than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the thought\r\nthinks it, however complicated the matter, and however\r\nsymbolic the manner of the thinking may be. It is needless\r\nto say that memory can seldom accurately reproduce\r\nsuch an object, when once it has passed from before the\r\nmind. It either makes too little or too much of it. Its\r\nbest plan is to repeat the verbal sentence, if there was\r\none, in which the object was expressed. But for inarticulate\r\nthoughts there is not even this resource, and introspection\r\nmust confess that the task exceeds her powers.\r\nThe mass of our thinking vanishes for ever, beyond hope\r\nof recovery, and psychology only gathers up a few of the\r\ncrumbs that fall from the feast.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next point to make clear is that, \u003ci\u003ehowever complex the\r\nobject may be, the thought of it is one undivided state of consciousness\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAs Thomas Brown says:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_247_247\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_247_247\"\u003e[247]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I have already spoken too often to require again to caution you\r\nagainst the mistake into which, I confess, that the terms which the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_277\"\u003e[Pg 277]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npoverty of our language obliges us to use might of themselves very\r\nnaturally lead you; the mistake of supposing that the most complex\r\nstates of mind are not truly, in their very essence, as much one and\r\nindivisible as those which we term simple—the complexity and seeming\r\ncoexistence which they involve being relative to our feeling\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_248_248\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_248_248\"\u003e[248]\u003c/a\u003e only,\r\nnot to their own absolute nature. I trust I need not repeat to you\r\nthat, in itself, every notion, however seemingly complex, is, and must\r\nbe, truly simple—being one state or affection, of one simple substance,\r\nmind. Our conception of a whole army, for example, is as truly this\r\none mind existing in this one state, as our conception of any of the\r\nindividuals that compose an army. Our notion of the abstract numbers,\r\neight, four, two, is as truly one feeling of the mind as our notion\r\nof simple unity.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ordinary associationist-psychology supposes, in\r\ncontrast with this, that whenever an object of thought contains\r\nmany elements, the thought itself must be made up\r\nof just as many ideas, one idea for each element, and all\r\nfused together in appearance, but really separate.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_249_249\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_249_249\"\u003e[249]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nenemies of this psychology find (as we have already seen)\r\nlittle trouble in showing that such a bundle of separate\r\nideas would never form one thought at all, and they contend\r\nthat an Ego must be added to the bundle to give it\r\nunity, and bring the various ideas into relation with each\r\nother.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_250_250\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_250_250\"\u003e[250]\u003c/a\u003e We will not discuss the ego just yet, but it is obvious\r\nthat if things are to be thought in relation, they must\r\nbe thought together, and in one \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e, be that something\r\nego, psychosis, state of consciousness, or whatever you\r\nplease. If not thought with each other, things are not\r\nthought in relation at all. Now most believers in the ego\r\nmake the same mistake as the associationists and sensationists\r\nwhom they oppose. Both agree that the elements\r\nof the subjective stream are discrete and separate and constitute\r\nwhat Kant calls a \u0027manifold.\u0027 But while the associationists\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_278\"\u003e[Pg 278]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthink that a \u0027manifold\u0027 can form a single knowledge,\r\nthe egoists deny this, and say that the knowledge\r\ncomes only when the manifold is subjected to the synthetizing\r\nactivity of an ego. Both make an identical initial\r\nhypothesis; but the egoist, finding it won\u0027t express the\r\nfacts, adds another hypothesis to correct it. Now I do not\r\nwish just yet to \u0027commit myself\u0027 about the existence or non-existence\r\nof the ego, but I do contend that we need not\r\ninvoke it for this particular reason—namely, because the\r\nmanifold of ideas has to be reduced to unity. \u003ci\u003eThere is no\r\nmanifold of coexisting ideas;\u003c/i\u003e the notion of such a thing is\r\na chimera. \u003ci\u003eWhatever things are thought in relation are\r\nthought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity,\r\na single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reason why this fact is so strangely garbled in the\r\nbooks seems to be what on an earlier page (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 196\u003c/a\u003e ff.) I\r\ncalled the psychologist\u0027s fallacy. We have the inveterate\r\nhabit, whenever we try introspectively to describe one of\r\nour thoughts, of dropping the thought as it is in itself and\r\ntalking of something else. We describe the things that\r\nappear to the thought, and we describe other thoughts\r\n\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e those things—as if these and the original thought\r\nwere the same. If, for example, the thought be \u0027the pack\r\nof cards is on the table,\u0027 we say, \"Well, isn\u0027t it a thought of\r\nthe pack of cards? Isn\u0027t it of the cards as included in the\r\npack? Isn\u0027t it of the table? And of the legs of the table\r\nas well? The table has legs—how can you think the table\r\nwithout virtually thinking its legs? Hasn\u0027t our thought\r\nthen, all these parts—one part for the pack and another for\r\nthe table? And within the pack-part a part for each card,\r\nas within the table-part a part for each leg? And isn\u0027t\r\neach of these parts an idea? And can our thought, then,\r\nbe anything but an assemblage or pack of ideas, each\r\nanswering to some element of what it knows?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow not one of these assumptions is true. The thought\r\ntaken as an example is, in the first place, not of \u0027a pack of\r\ncards.\u0027 It is of \u0027the-pack-of-cards-is-on-the-table,\u0027 an entirely\r\ndifferent subjective phenomenon, whose Object implies\r\nthe pack, and every one of the cards in it, but whose conscious\r\nconstitution bears very little resemblance to that of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_279\"\u003e[Pg 279]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthought of the pack \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e. What a thought \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, and what it\r\nmay be developed into, or explained to stand for, and be\r\nequivalent to, are two things, not one.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_251_251\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_251_251\"\u003e[251]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn analysis of what passes through the mind as we utter\r\nthe phrase \u003ci\u003ethe pack of cards is on the table\u003c/i\u003e will, I hope, make\r\nthis clear, and may at the same time condense into a concrete\r\nexample a good deal of what has gone before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-279-0029.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_279_0029.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 29.—The Stream of Consciousness.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt takes time to utter the phrase. Let the horizontal\r\nline in Fig. 29 represent time. Every part of it will then\r\nstand for a fraction, every point for an instant, of the time.\r\nOf course the thought has \u003ci\u003etime-parts\u003c/i\u003e. The part 2-3 of it,\r\nthough continuous with 1-2, is yet a different part from 1-2.\r\nNow I say of these time-parts that we cannot take any one\r\nof them so short that it will not after some fashion or other\r\nbe a thought of the whole object \u0027the pack of cards is on\r\nthe table.\u0027 They melt into each other like dissolving views,\r\nand no two of them feel the object just alike, but each feels\r\nthe total object in a unitary undivided way. This is what\r\nI mean by denying that in the thought any parts can be\r\nfound corresponding to the object\u0027s parts. Time-parts are\r\nnot such parts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_280\"\u003e[Pg 280]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow let the vertical dimensions of the figure stand for\r\nthe objects or contents of the thoughts. A line vertical to\r\nany point of the horizontal, as \u003ci\u003e1-1\u0027\u003c/i\u003e, will then symbolize the\r\nobject in the mind at the instant 1; a space above the horizontal,\r\nas 1-1\u0027-2\u0027-2, will symbolize all that passes through\r\nthe mind during the time 1-2 whose line it covers. The\r\nentire diagram from 0 to 0\u0027 represents a finite length of\r\nthought\u0027s stream.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCan we now define the psychic constitution of each vertical\r\nsection of this segment? We can, though in a very\r\nrough way. Immediately after 0, even before we have\r\nopened our mouths to speak, the entire thought is present to\r\nour mind in the form of an intention to utter that sentence.\r\nThis intention, though it has no simple name, and though\r\nit is a transitive state immediately displaced by the first\r\nword, is yet a perfectly determinate phase of thought,\r\nunlike anything else (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_253\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 253\u003c/a\u003e). Again, immediately\r\nbefore 0\u0027, after the last word of the sentence is spoken, all\r\nwill admit that we again think its entire content as we\r\ninwardly realize its completed deliverance. All vertical\r\nsections made through any other parts of the diagram will\r\nbe respectively filled with other ways of feeling the sentence\u0027s\r\nmeaning. Through 2, for example, the cards will\r\nbe the part of the object most emphatically present to the\r\nmind; through 4, the table. The stream is made higher in\r\nthe drawing at its end than at its beginning, because the\r\nfinal way of feeling the content is fuller and richer than the\r\ninitial way. As Joubert says, \"we only know just what we\r\nmeant to say, after we have said it.\" And as M. V. Egger\r\nremarks, \"before speaking, one barely knows what one intends\r\nto say, but afterwards one is filled with admiration\r\nand surprise at having said and thought it so well.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis latter author seems to me to have kept at much\r\ncloser quarters with the facts than any other analyst of consciousness.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_252_252\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_252_252\"\u003e[252]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut even he does not quite hit the mark, for,\r\nas I understand him, he thinks that each word as it occupies\r\nthe mind \u003ci\u003edisplaces\u003c/i\u003e the rest of the thought\u0027s content.\r\nHe distinguishes the \u0027idea\u0027 (what I have called the total\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_281\"\u003e[Pg 281]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e or meaning) from the consciousness of the words,\r\ncalling the former a very feeble state, and contrasting it\r\nwith the liveliness of the words, even when these are only\r\nsilently rehearsed. \"The feeling,\" he says, \"of the words\r\nmakes ten or twenty times more noise in our consciousness\r\nthan the sense of the phrase, which for consciousness is a\r\nvery slight matter.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_253_253\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_253_253\"\u003e[253]\u003c/a\u003e And having distinguished these two\r\nthings, he goes on to separate them in time, saying that the\r\nidea may either precede or follow the words, but that it is\r\na \u0027pure illusion\u0027 to suppose them simultaneous.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_254_254\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_254_254\"\u003e[254]\u003c/a\u003e Now I\r\nbelieve that in all cases where the words are \u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\ntotal idea may be and usually is present not only before\r\nand after the phrase has been spoken, but also whilst each\r\nseparate word is uttered.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_255_255\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_255_255\"\u003e[255]\u003c/a\u003e It is the overtone, halo, or fringe\r\nof the word, \u003ci\u003eas spoken in that sentence\u003c/i\u003e. It is never absent;\r\nno word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness\r\nas a mere noise. We feel its meaning as it passes; and\r\nalthough our object differs from one moment to another as\r\nto its verbal kernel or nucleus, yet it is \u003ci\u003esimilar\u003c/i\u003e throughout\r\nthe entire segment of the stream. The same object is\r\nknown everywhere, now from the point of view, if we may\r\nso call it, of this word, now from the point of view of that.\r\nAnd in our feeling of each word there chimes an echo or\r\nforetaste of every other. The consciousness of the \u0027Idea\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_282\"\u003e[Pg 282]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand that of the words are thus consubstantial. They\r\nare made of the same \u0027mind-stuff,\u0027 and form an unbroken\r\nstream. Annihilate a mind at any instant, cut\r\nits thought through whilst yet uncompleted, and examine\r\nthe object present to the cross-section thus suddenly\r\nmade; you will find, not the bald word in process of utterance,\r\nbut that word suffused with the whole idea. The\r\nword may be so loud, as M. Egger would say, that we\r\ncannot \u003ci\u003etell\u003c/i\u003e just how its suffusion, as such, feels, or how it\r\ndiffers from the suffusion of the next word. But it does\r\ndiffer; and we maybe sure that, could we see into the brain,\r\nwe should find the same processes active through the entire\r\nsentence in different degrees, each one in turn becoming\r\nmaximally excited and then yielding the momentary verbal\r\n\u0027kernel,\u0027 to the thought\u0027s content, at other times being only\r\nsub-excited, and then combining with the other sub-excited\r\nprocesses to give the overtone or fringe.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_256_256\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_256_256\"\u003e[256]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 110px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-282-0030-01.jpg\" style=\"width: 125px\" id=\"img_images_jame_282_0030_01.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e The pack of cards is on the table.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 30.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 119px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-282-0030-02.jpg\" style=\"width: 125px\" id=\"img_images_jame_282_0030_02.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e The pack of cards is on the table.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 31.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-282-0030-03.jpg\" style=\"width: 125px\" id=\"img_images_jame_282_0030_03.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e The pack of cards is on the table.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 32.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may illustrate this by a farther\r\ndevelopment of the diagram on \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 279\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nLet the objective content of any vertical\r\nsection through the stream be\r\nrepresented no longer by a line, but by\r\na plane figure, highest opposite whatever part of the object\r\nis most prominent in consciousness\r\nat the moment when the section is\r\nmade. This part, in verbal thought,\r\nwill usually be some word. A series\r\nof sections 1-1\u0027, taken at the moments\r\n1, 2, 3, would then look like this:\r\nhorizontal breadth stands for the entire object\r\nin each of the figures; the height\r\nof the curve above each part of\r\nthat object marks the relative\r\nprominence of that part in the\r\nthought. At the moment symbolized\r\nby the first figure \u003ci\u003epack\u003c/i\u003e is the\r\nprominent part; in the third figure it is \u003ci\u003etable\u003c/i\u003e, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_283\"\u003e[Pg 283]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe can easily add all these plane sections together to\r\nmake a solid, one of whose solid dimensions will represent\r\ntime, whilst a cut across this at right angles will give the\r\nthought\u0027s content at the moment when the cut is made.\r\nLet it be the thought, \u0027I am the same I that I was yesterday.\u0027\r\nIf at the fourth moment of time we annihilate the thinker and\r\nexamine how the last pulsation of his consciousness was\r\nmade, we find that it was an awareness of the whole content\r\nwith \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e most prominent, and the other parts of the thing\r\nknown relatively less distinct. With each prolongation of\r\nthe scheme in the time-direction, the summit of the curve\r\nof section would come further towards the end of the sentence.\r\nIf we make a solid wooden frame with the sentence\r\nwritten on its front, and the time-scale on one of its sides,\r\nif we spread flatly a sheet of India rubber over its top, on\r\nwhich rectangular co-ordinates are painted, and slide a\r\nsmooth ball under the rubber in the direction from 0 to\r\n\u0027yesterday,\u0027 the bulging of the membrane along this diagonal\r\nat successive moments will symbolize the changing of the\r\nthought\u0027s content in a way plain enough, after what has\r\nbeen said, to call for no more explanation. Or to express\r\nit in cerebral terms, it will show the relative intensities, at\r\nsuccessive moments, of the several nerve-processes to\r\nwhich the various parts of the thought-object correspond.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-283-0031.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_283_0031.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 33.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe last peculiarity of consciousness to which attention\r\nis to be drawn in this first rough description of its stream\r\nis that\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_284\"\u003e[Pg 284]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e5) \u003ci\u003eIt is always interested more in one part of its object than in\r\nanother, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while\r\nit thinks.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phenomena of selective attention and of deliberative\r\nwill are of course patent examples of this choosing\r\nactivity. But few of us are aware how incessantly it is at\r\nwork in operations not ordinarily called by these names.\r\nAccentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception\r\nwe have. We find it quite impossible to disperse our\r\nattention impartially over a number of impressions. A\r\nmonotonous succession of sonorous strokes is broken up\r\ninto rhythms, now of one sort, now of another, by the different\r\naccent which we place on different strokes. The\r\nsimplest of these rhythms is the double one, tick-tóck, tick-tóck,\r\ntick-tóck. Dots dispersed on a surface are perceived\r\nin rows and groups. Lines separate into diverse figures.\r\nThe ubiquity of the distinctions, \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethat, here\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003ethere, now\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e, in our minds is the result of our laying\r\nthe same selective emphasis on parts of place and time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we do far more than emphasize things, and unite\r\nsome, and keep others apart. We actually \u003ci\u003eignore\u003c/i\u003e most of the\r\nthings before us. Let me briefly show how this goes on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo begin at the bottom, what are our very senses themselves\r\nbut organs of selection? Out of the infinite chaos\r\nof movements, of which physics teaches us that the outer\r\nworld consists, each sense-organ picks out those which fall\r\nwithin certain limits of velocity. To these it responds, but\r\nignores the rest as completely as if they did not exist. It\r\nthus accentuates particular movements in a manner for\r\nwhich objectively there seems no valid ground; for, as\r\nLange says, there is no reason whatever to think that the\r\ngap in Nature between the highest sound-waves and the\r\nlowest heat-waves is an abrupt break like that of our sensations;\r\nor that the difference between violet and ultra-violet\r\nrays has anything like the objective importance subjectively\r\nrepresented by that between light and darkness.\r\nOut of what is in itself an undistinguishable, swarming\r\n\u003ci\u003econtinuum\u003c/i\u003e, devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses\r\nmake for us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_285\"\u003e[Pg 285]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt changes,\r\nof picturesque light and shade.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the sensations we receive from a given organ have\r\ntheir causes thus picked out for us by the conformation of\r\nthe organ\u0027s termination, Attention, on the other hand, out\r\nof all the sensations yielded, picks out certain ones as\r\nworthy of its notice and suppresses all the rest. Helmholtz\u0027s\r\nwork on Optics is little more than a study of those\r\nvisual sensations of which common men never become\r\naware—blind spots, \u003ci\u003emuscæ volitantes\u003c/i\u003e, after-images, irradiation,\r\nchromatic fringes, marginal changes of color, double\r\nimages, astigmatism, movements of accommodation and\r\nconvergence, retinal rivalry, and more besides. We do not\r\neven know without special training on which of our eyes an\r\nimage falls. So habitually ignorant are most men of this\r\nthat one may be blind for years of a single eye and never\r\nknow the fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHelmholtz says that we notice only those sensations\r\nwhich are signs to us of \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e. But what are things? Nothing,\r\nas we shall abundantly see, but special groups of sensible\r\nqualities, which happen practically or æsthetically to\r\ninterest us, to which we therefore give substantive names, and\r\nwhich we exalt to this exclusive status of independence and\r\ndignity. But in itself, apart from my interest, a particular\r\ndust-wreath on a windy day is just as much of an individual\r\nthing, and just as much or as little deserves an individual\r\nname, as my own body does.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd then, among the sensations we get from each separate\r\nthing, what happens? The mind selects again. It\r\nchooses certain of the sensations to represent the thing\r\nmost \u003ci\u003etruly\u003c/i\u003e, and considers the rest as its appearances, modified\r\nby the conditions of the moment. Thus my table-top\r\nis named \u003ci\u003esquare\u003c/i\u003e, after but one of an infinite number of\r\nretinal sensations which it yields, the rest of them being\r\nsensations of two acute and two obtuse angles; but I call\r\nthe latter \u003ci\u003eperspective\u003c/i\u003e views, and the four right angles the\r\n\u003ci\u003etrue\u003c/i\u003e form of the table, and erect the attribute squareness;\r\ninto the table\u0027s essence, for æsthetic reasons of my own.\r\nIn like manner, the real form of the circle is deemed to be\r\nthe sensation it gives when the line of vision is perpendicular\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_286\"\u003e[Pg 286]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto its centre—all its other sensations are signs of this\r\nsensation. The real sound of the cannon is the sensation\r\nit makes when the ear is close by. The real color of the\r\nbrick is the sensation it gives when the eye looks squarely\r\nat it from a near point, out of the sunshine and yet not in\r\nthe gloom; under other circumstances it gives us other\r\ncolor-sensations which are but signs of this—we then see\r\nit looks pinker or blacker than it really is. The reader\r\nknows no object which he does not represent to himself by\r\npreference as in some typical attitude, of some normal size,\r\nat some characteristic distance, of some standard tint,\r\netc., etc. But all these essential characteristics, which together\r\nform for us the genuine objectivity of the thing and\r\nare contrasted with what we call the subjective sensations\r\nit may yield us at a given moment, are mere sensations like\r\nthe latter. The mind chooses to suit itself, and decides\r\nwhat particular sensation shall be held more real and valid\r\nthan all the rest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus perception involves a twofold choice. Out of all\r\npresent sensations, we notice mainly such as are significant\r\nof absent ones; and out of all the absent associates which\r\nthese suggest, we again pick out a very few to stand for the\r\nobjective reality \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e. We could have no more\r\nexquisite example of selective industry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat industry goes on to deal with the things thus given\r\nin perception. A man\u0027s empirical thought depends on the\r\nthings he has experienced, but what these shall be is to a\r\nlarge extent determined by his habits of attention. A thing\r\nmay be present to him a thousand times, but if he persistently\r\nfails to notice it, it cannot be said to enter into his experience.\r\nWe are all seeing flies, moths, and beetles by the\r\nthousand, but to whom, save an entomologist, do they say\r\nanything distinct? On the other hand, a thing met only once\r\nin a lifetime may leave an indelible experience in the memory.\r\nLet four men make a tour in Europe. One will bring\r\nhome only picturesque impressions—costumes and colors,\r\nparks and views and works of architecture, pictures and statues.\r\nTo another all this will be non-existent; and distances\r\nand prices, populations and drainage-arrangements, door-\r\nand window-fastenings, and other useful statistics will take\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_287\"\u003e[Pg 287]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir place. A third will give a rich account of the theatres,\r\nrestaurants, and public balls, and naught beside; whilst\r\nthe fourth will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own\r\nsubjective broodings as to tell little more than a few names\r\nof places through which he passed. Each has selected, out\r\nof the same mass of presented objects, those which suited\r\nhis private interest and has made his experience thereby.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, now, leaving the empirical combination of objects,\r\nwe ask how the mind proceeds \u003ci\u003erationally\u003c/i\u003e to connect them,\r\nwe find selection again to be omnipotent. In a future\r\nchapter we shall see that all Reasoning depends on the\r\nability of the mind to break up the totality of the phenomenon\r\nreasoned about, into parts, and to pick out from\r\namong these the particular one which, in our given emergency,\r\nmay lead to the proper conclusion. Another predicament\r\nwill need another conclusion, and require another\r\nelement to be picked out. The man of genius is he who\r\nwill always stick in his bill at the right point, and bring it\r\nout with the right element—\u0027reason\u0027 if the emergency be\r\ntheoretical, \u0027means\u0027 if it be practical—transfixed upon it.\r\nI here confine myself to this brief statement, but it may\r\nsuffice to show that Reasoning is but another form of the\r\nselective activity of the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf now we pass to its æsthetic department, our law is\r\nstill more obvious. The artist notoriously selects his items,\r\nrejecting all tones, colors, shapes, which do not harmonize\r\nwith each other and with the main purpose of his work.\r\nThat unity, harmony, \u0027convergence of characters,\u0027 as M.\r\nTaine calls it, which gives to works of art their superiority\r\nover works of nature, is wholly due to \u003ci\u003eelimination\u003c/i\u003e. Any\r\nnatural subject will do, if the artist has wit enough to\r\npounce upon some one feature of it as characteristic, and\r\nsuppress all merely accidental items which do not harmonize\r\nwith this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAscending still higher, we reach the plane of Ethics,\r\nwhere choice reigns notoriously supreme. An act has no\r\nethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several\r\nall equally possible. To sustain the arguments for the\r\ngood course and keep them ever before us, to stifle our\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_288\"\u003e[Pg 288]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlonging for more flowery ways, to keep the foot unflinchingly\r\non the arduous path, these are characteristic ethical\r\nenergies. But more than these; for these but deal with\r\nthe means of compassing interests already felt by the man\r\nto be supreme. The ethical energy \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e has to go\r\nfarther and choose which \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e out of several, equally\r\ncoercive, shall become supreme. The issue here is of the\r\nutmost pregnancy, for it decides a man\u0027s entire career.\r\nWhen he debates, Shall I commit this crime? choose that\r\nprofession? accept that office, or marry this fortune?—his\r\nchoice really lies between one of several equally possible\r\nfuture Characters. What he shall \u003ci\u003ebecome\u003c/i\u003e is fixed by the\r\nconduct of this moment. Schopenhauer, who enforces his\r\ndeterminism by the argument that with a given fixed character\r\nonly one reaction is possible under given circumstances,\r\nforgets that, in these critical ethical moments, what consciously\r\n\u003ci\u003eseems\u003c/i\u003e to be in question is the complexion of the\r\ncharacter itself. The problem with the man is less what\r\nact he shall now choose to do, than what being he shall\r\nnow resolve to become.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLooking back, then, over this review, we see that the mind\r\nis at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.\r\nConsciousness consists in the comparison of these with each\r\nother, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest\r\nby the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention. The\r\nhighest and most elaborated mental products are filtered\r\nfrom the data chosen by the faculty next beneath, out of\r\nthe mass offered by the faculty below that, which mass in\r\nturn was sifted from a still larger amount of yet simpler\r\nmaterial, and so on. The mind, in short, works on the\r\ndata it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block\r\nof stone. In a sense the statue stood there from eternity.\r\nBut there were a thousand different ones beside it, and\r\nthe sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this one\r\nfrom the rest. Just so the world of each of us, howsoever\r\ndifferent our several views of it may be, all lay embedded\r\nin the primordial chaos of sensations, which gave the mere\r\n\u003ci\u003ematter\u003c/i\u003e to the thought of all of us indifferently. We may,\r\nif we like, by our reasonings unwind things back to that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_289\"\u003e[Pg 289]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nblack and jointless continuity of space and moving clouds\r\nof swarming atoms which science calls the only real world.\r\nBut all the while the world \u003ci\u003ewe\u003c/i\u003e feel and live in will be that\r\nwhich our ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes\r\nof choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors, by\r\nsimply rejecting certain portions of the given stuff. Other\r\nsculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other minds,\r\nother worlds from the same monotonous and inexpressive\r\nchaos! My world is but one in a million alike embedded,\r\nalike real to those who may abstract them. How different\r\nmust be the worlds in the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish,\r\nor crab!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in my mind and your mind the rejected portions and\r\nthe selected portions of the original world-stuff are to a\r\ngreat extent the same. The human race as a whole largely\r\nagrees as to what it shall notice and name, and what not.\r\nAnd among the noticed parts we select in much the same\r\nway for accentuation and preference or subordination and\r\ndislike. There is, however, one entirely extraordinary case\r\nin which no two men ever are known to choose alike. One\r\ngreat splitting of the whole universe into two halves is\r\nmade by each of us; and for each of us almost all of the\r\ninterest attaches to one of the halves; but we all draw\r\nthe line of division between them in a different place.\r\nWhen I say that we all call the two halves by the same;\r\nnames, and that those names are \u0027\u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 and \u0027\u003ci\u003enot-me\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 respectively,\r\nit will at once be seen what I mean. The altogether\r\nunique kind of interest which each human mind\r\nfeels in those parts of creation which it can call \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmay be a moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological\r\nfact. No mind can take the same interest in his neighbor\u0027s\r\n\u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e as in his own. The neighbor\u0027s me falls together\r\nwith all the rest of things in one foreign mass, against which\r\nhis own \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e stands out in startling relief. Even the trodden\r\nworm, as Lotze somewhere says, contrasts his own suffering\r\nself with the whole remaining universe, though he have\r\nno clear conception either of himself or of what the universe\r\nmay be. He is for me a mere part of the world;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_290\"\u003e[Pg 290]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor him it is I who am the mere part. Each of us dichotomizes\r\nthe Kosmos in a different place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDescending now to finer work than this first general\r\nsketch, let us in the next chapter try to trace the psychology\r\nof this fact of self-consciousness to which we have\r\nthus once more been led.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_215_215\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_215_215\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[215]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A good deal of this chapter is reprinted from an article \u0027On some\r\nOmissions of Introspective Psychology\u0027 which appeared in \u0027Mind\u0027 for\r\nJanuary 1884.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_216_216\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_216_216\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[216]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, p. 362.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_217_217\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_217_217\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[217]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e L\u0027Automatisme Psychologique, p. 318.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_218_218\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_218_218\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[218]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. A. Constans: Relation sur une Épidémie d\u0027hystéro-démonopathie\r\nen 1861. 2me ed. Paris, 1863.—Chiap e Franzolin: L\u0027Epidemia d\u0027istero-demonopatie\r\nin Verzegnis. Reggio, 1879.—See also J. Kerner\u0027s little\r\nwork: Nachricht von dem Vorkommen des Besessenseins. 1836.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_219_219\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_219_219\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[219]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For the Physiology of this compare the chapter on the Will.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_220_220\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_220_220\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[220]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 316.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_221_221\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_221_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[221]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Philosophy of Reflection, i, 248, 290.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_222_222\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_222_222\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[222]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Populäre Wissenschaftliche Vorträge, Drittes Heft (1876). p. 72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_223_223\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_223_223\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[223]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Fick, in L. Hermann\u0027s Handb. d. Physiol., Bd. iii, Th. i, p. 225.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_224_224\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_224_224\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[224]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It need of course not follow, because a total brain-state does not recur,\r\nthat no \u003ci\u003epoint\u003c/i\u003e of the brain can ever be twice in the same condition.\r\nThat would be as improbable a consequence as that in the sea a wave-crest\r\nshould never come twice at the same point of space. What can hardly\r\ncome twice is an identical \u003ci\u003ecombination\u003c/i\u003e of wave-forms all with their crests\r\nand hollows reoccupying identical places. For such a total combination\r\nas this is the analogue of the brain-state to which our actual consciousness\r\nat any moment is due.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_225_225\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_225_225\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[225]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The accurate registration of the \u0027how long\u0027 is still a little mysterious.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_226_226\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_226_226\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[226]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Brentano; Psychologie, vol. i, pp. 219-20. Altogether this\r\nchapter of Brentano\u0027s on the Unity of Consciousness is as good as anything\r\nwith which I am acquainted.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_227_227\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_227_227\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[227]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Honor to whom honor is due! The most explicit acknowledgment I\r\nhave anywhere found of all this is in a buried and forgotten paper by the\r\nRev. Jas. Wills, on \u0027Accidental Association,\u0027 in the Transactions of the\r\nRoyal Irish Academy, vol xxi, part i (1846). Mr. Wills writes:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"At every instant of conscious thought there is a certain sum of perceptions,\r\nor reflections, or both together, present, and together constituting\r\none whole state of apprehension. Of this some definite portion may be far\r\nmore distinct than all the rest; and the rest be in consequence proportionally\r\nvague, even to the limit of obliteration. But still, within this\r\nlimit, the most dim shade of perception enters into, and in some infinitesimal\r\ndegree modifies, the whole existing state. This state will thus be in\r\nsome way modified by any sensation or emotion, or act of distinct attention,\r\nthat may give prominence to any part of it; so that the actual result is\r\ncapable of the utmost variation, according to the person or the occasion….\r\nTo any portion of the entire scope here described there may be a\r\nspecial direction of the attention, and this special direction is recognized\r\nas strictly what is \u003ci\u003erecognized\u003c/i\u003e as the idea present to the mind. This idea is\r\nevidently not commensurate with the entire state of apprehension, and\r\nmuch perplexity has arisen from not observing this fact. However deeply\r\nwe may suppose the attention to be engaged by any thought, any considerable\r\nalteration of the surrounding phenomena would still be perceived; the\r\nmost abstruse demonstration in this room would not prevent a listener,\r\nhowever absorbed, from noticing the sudden extinction of the lights. Our\r\nmental states have always an \u003ci\u003eessential unity\u003c/i\u003e, such that each state of apprehension,\r\nhowever variously compounded, is a single whole, of which every\r\ncomponent is, therefore, strictly apprehended (so far as it is apprehended)\r\nas a part. Such is the elementary basis from which all our intellectual\r\noperations commence.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_228_228\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_228_228\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[228]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare the charming passage in Taine on Intelligence (N. Y. ed.),\r\ni, 83-4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_229_229\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_229_229\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[229]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g.: \"The stream of thought is not a continuous current, but a series\r\nof distinct ideas, more or less rapid in their succession; the rapidity being\r\nmeasurable by the number that pass through the mind in a given time.\"\r\n(Bain: E. and W., p. 29.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_230_230\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_230_230\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[230]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Few writers have admitted that we cognize relations through feeling.\r\nThe intellectualists have explicitly denied the possibility of such a thing—e.g.,\r\nProf. T. H. Green (\u0027Mind,\u0027 vol. vii, p. 28): \"No feeling, as such\r\nor as felt, is [of?] a relation…. Even a relation between feelings is not\r\nitself a feeling or felt.\" On the other hand, the sensationists have either\r\nsmuggled in the cognition without giving any account of it, or have denied\r\nthe relations to be cognized, or even to exist, at all. A few honorable exceptions,\r\nhowever, deserve to be named among the sensationists. Destutt\r\nde Tracy, Laromiguière, Cardaillac, Brown, and finally Spencer, have explicitly\r\ncontended for feelings of relation, consubstantial with our feelings\r\nor thoughts of the terms \u0027between\u0027 which they obtain. Thus Destutt de\r\nTracy says (Éléments d\u0027Idéologie, T. Ier, chap. iv): \"The faculty of\r\njudgment is itself a sort of sensibility, for it is the faculty of feeling the\r\nrelations among our ideas; and to feel relations is to feel.\" Laromiguière\r\nwrites (Leçons de Philosophie, IIme Partie, 3me Leçon):\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"There is no one whose intelligence does not embrace simultaneously\r\nmany ideas, more or less distinct, more or less confused. Now, when we\r\nhave many ideas at once, a peculiar feeling arises in us: we feel, among\r\nthese ideas, resemblances, differences, relations. Let us call this mode of\r\nfeeling, common to us all, the feeling of relation, or relation-feeling\r\n(\u003ci\u003esentiment-rapport\u003c/i\u003e). One sees immediately that these relation-feelings, resulting\r\nfrom the propinquity of ideas, must be infinitely more numerous\r\nthan the sensation-feelings (\u003ci\u003esentiments-sensations\u003c/i\u003e) or the feelings we have\r\nof the action of our faculties. The slightest knowledge of the mathematical\r\ntheory of combinations will prove this…. \u003ci\u003eIdeas\u003c/i\u003e of relation originate\r\nin feelings of relation. They are the effect of our comparing them and\r\nreasoning about them.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSimilarly, de Cardaillac (Études Élémentaires de Philosophie, Section i,\r\nchap. vii):\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"By a natural consequence, we are led to suppose that at the same time\r\nthat we have several sensations or several ideas in the mind, we feel the relations\r\nwhich exist between these sensations, and the relations which exist between\r\nthese ideas…. If the feeling of relations exists in us,… it is\r\nnecessarily the most varied and the most fertile of all human feelings:\r\n1°, the most varied, because, relations being more numerous than beings,\r\nthe feelings of relation must be in the same proportion more numerous\r\nthan the sensations whose presence gives rise to their formation; 2°, the\r\nmost fertile, for the relative ideas of which the feeling-of-relation is the\r\nsource … are more important than absolute ideas, if such exist…. If\r\nwe interrogate common speech, we find the feeling of relation expressed\r\nthere in a thousand different ways. If it is easy to seize a relation, we say\r\nthat it is \u003ci\u003esensible\u003c/i\u003e, to distinguish it from one which, because its terms are\r\ntoo remote, cannot be as quickly perceived. A sensible difference, or resemblance….\r\nWhat is taste in the arts, in intellectual productions?\r\nWhat but the feeling of those relations among the parts which constitutes\r\ntheir merit?… Did we not feel relations we should never attain to true\r\nknowledge,… for almost all our knowledge is of relations…. We\r\nnever have an isolated sensation;… we are therefore never without the\r\nfeeling of relation…. An \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e strikes our senses; we see in it only a\r\nsensation…. The relative is so near the absolute, the relation-feeling so\r\nnear the sensation-feeling, the two are so intimately fused in the composition\r\nof the object, that the relation appears to us as part of the sensation\r\nitself. It is doubtless to this sort of fusion between sensations and feelings\r\nof relation that the silence of metaphysicians as to the latter is due; and\r\nit is for the same reason that they have obstinately persisted in asking from\r\nsensation alone those ideas of relation which it was powerless to give.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDr. Thomas Brown writes (Lectures, xlv, \u003ci\u003einit.\u003c/i\u003e): \"There is an extensive\r\norder of our feelings which involve this notion of relation, and which\r\nconsist indeed in the mere perception of a relation of some sort….\r\nWhether the relation be of two or of many external objects, or of two or\r\nmany affections of the mind, the feeling of this relation … is what I term\r\na relative suggestion; that phrase being the simplest which it is possible to\r\nemploy, for expressing, without any theory, the mere fact of the rise of\r\ncertain feelings of relation, after certain other feelings which precede\r\nthem; and therefore, as involving no particular theory, and simply expressive\r\nof an undoubted fact…. That the feelings of relation are states\r\nof the mind essentially different from our simple perceptions, or conceptions\r\nof the objects,… that they are not what Condillac terms \u003ci\u003etransformed\r\nsensations\u003c/i\u003e, I proved in a former lecture, when I combated the excessive\r\nsimplification of that ingenious but not very accurate philosopher.\r\nThere is an original tendency or susceptibility of the mind, by which, on\r\nperceiving together different objects, we are instantly, without the intervention\r\nof any other mental process, sensible of their relation in certain\r\nrespects, as truly as there is an original tendency or susceptibility by which,\r\nwhen external objects are present and have produced a certain affection of\r\nour sensorial organ, we are instantly affected with the primary elementary\r\nfeelings of perception; and, I may add, that as our sensations or perceptions\r\nare of various species, so are there various species of relations;—the\r\nnumber of relations, indeed, even of external things, being almost infinite,\r\nwhile the number of perceptions is, necessarily, limited by that of the objects\r\nwhich have the power of producing some affection of our organs of\r\nsensation…. Without that susceptibility of the mind by which it has\r\nthe feeling of relation, our consciousness would be as truly limited to a\r\nsingle point, as our body would become, were it possible to fetter it to a\r\nsingle atom.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMr. Spencer is even more explicit. His philosophy is crude in that he\r\nseems to suppose that it is only in transitive states that outward relations\r\nare known; whereas in truth space-relations, relations of contrast, etc., are\r\nfelt along with their terms, in substantive states as well as in transitive\r\nstates, as we shall abundantly see. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer\u0027s passage is\r\nso clear that it also deserves to be quoted in full (Principles of Psychology,\r\n§ 65):\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"The proximate components of Mind are of two broadly-contrasted\r\nkinds—Feelings and the relations between feelings. Among the members\r\nof each group there exist multitudinous unlikenesses, many of which are\r\nextremely strong; but such unlikenesses are small compared with those\r\nwhich distinguish members of the one group from members of the other.\r\nLet us, in the first place, consider what are the characters which all Feelings\r\nhave in common, and what are the characters which all Relations\r\nbetween feelings have in common.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Each feeling, as we here define it, is any portion of consciousness\r\nwhich occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a perceivable individuality;\r\nwhich has its individuality marked off from adjacent portions of\r\nconsciousness by qualitative contrasts; and which, when introspectively\r\ncontemplated, appears to be homogeneous. These are the essentials.\r\nObviously if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable\r\ninto unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not\r\none feeling but two or more. Obviously if it is indistinguishable from an\r\nadjacent portion of consciousness, it forms one with that portion—is not\r\nan individual feeling, but part of one. And obviously if it does not\r\noccupy in consciousness an appreciable area, or an appreciable duration, it\r\ncannot be known as a feeling.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"A Relation between feelings is, on the contrary, characterized by\r\noccupying no appreciable part of consciousness. Take away the terms it\r\nunites, and it disappears along with them; having no independent place,\r\nno individuality of its own. It is true that, under an ultimate analysis,\r\nwhat we call a relation proves to be itself a kind of feeling—the momentary\r\nfeeling accompanying the transition from one conspicuous feeling to\r\nan adjacent conspicuous feeling. And it is true that, notwithstanding its\r\nextreme brevity, its qualitative character is appreciable; for relations are\r\n(as we shall hereafter see) distinguishable from one another only by the\r\nunlikenesses of the feelings which accompany the momentary transitions.\r\nEach relational feeling may, in fact, be regarded as one of those nervous\r\nshocks which we suspect to be the units of composition of feelings; and,\r\nthough instantaneous, it is known as of greater or less strength, and as\r\ntaking place with greater or less facility. But the contrast between these\r\nrelational feelings and what we ordinarily call feelings is so strong that\r\nwe must class them apart. Their extreme brevity, their small variety, and\r\ntheir dependence on the terms they unite, differentiate them in an unmistakable\r\nway.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Perhaps it will be well to recognize more fully the truth that this distinction\r\ncannot be absolute. Besides admitting that, as an element of\r\nconsciousness, a relation is a momentary feeling, we must also admit that\r\njust as a relation can have no existence apart from the feelings which form\r\nits terms, so a feeling can exist only by relations to other feelings which\r\nlimit it in space or time or both. Strictly speaking, neither a feeling nor\r\na relation is an independent element of consciousness: there is throughout\r\na dependence such that the appreciable areas of consciousness occupied by\r\nfeelings can no more possess individualities apart from the relations which\r\nlink them, than these relations can possess individualities apart from the\r\nfeelings they link. The essential distinction between the two, then,\r\nappears to be that whereas a relational feeling is a portion of consciousness\r\ninseparable into parts, a feeling, ordinarily so called, is a portion of consciousness\r\nthat admits imaginary division into like parts which are related\r\nto one another in sequence or coexistence. A feeling proper is either\r\nmade up of like parts that occupy time, or it is made up of like parts that\r\noccupy space, or both. In any case, a feeling proper is an aggregate of\r\nrelated like parts, while a relational feeling is undecomposable. And this\r\nis exactly the contrast between the two which must result if, as we have\r\ninferred, feelings are composed of units of feelings, or shocks.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_231_231\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_231_231\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[231]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M. Paulhan (Revue Philosophique, xx, 455-6), after speaking of the\r\nfaint mental images of objects and emotions, says: \"We find other vaguer\r\nstates still, upon which attention seldom rests, except in persons who by\r\nnature or profession are addicted to internal observation. It is even difficult\r\nto name them precisely, for they are little known and not classed;\r\nbut we may cite as an example of them that peculiar impression which we\r\nfeel when, strongly preoccupied by a certain subject, we nevertheless are\r\nengaged with, and have our attention almost completely absorbed by, matters\r\nquite disconnected therewithal. We do not then exactly think of the\r\nobject of our preoccupation; we do not represent it in a clear manner; and\r\nyet our mind is not as it would be without this preoccupation. Its object,\r\nabsent from consciousness, is nevertheless represented there by a peculiar\r\nunmistakable impression, which often persists long and is a strong feeling,\r\nalthough so obscure for our intelligence.\" \"A mental sign of the kind is\r\nthe unfavorable disposition left in our mind towards an individual by painful\r\nincidents erewhile experienced and now perhaps forgotten. The sign\r\nremains, but is not understood; its definite meaning is lost.\" (P. 458.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_232_232\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_232_232\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[232]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mozart describes thus his manner of composing: First bits and crumbs\r\nof the piece come and gradually join together in his mind; then the soul\r\ngetting warmed to the work, the thing grows more and more, \"and I\r\nspread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my\r\nhead, even when it is a long piece, so that I can see the whole of it at a\r\nsingle glance in my mind, as if it were a beautiful painting or a handsome\r\nhuman being; in which way I do not hear it in my imagination at all as\r\na succession—the way it must come later—but all at once, as it were. If\r\nis a rare feast! All the inventing and making goes on in me as in a beautiful\r\nstrong dream. But the best of all is the \u003ci\u003ehearing of it all at once\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_233_233\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_233_233\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[233]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mental Physiology, § 236. Dr. Carpenter\u0027s explanation differs materially\r\nfrom that given in the text.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_234_234\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_234_234\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[234]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. also S. Stricker: Vorlesungen über allg. u. exp. Pathologie (1879),\r\npp. 462-3, 501, 547; Romanes: Origin of Human Faculty, p. 82. It is so\r\nhard to make one\u0027s self clear that I may advert to a misunderstanding of\r\nmy views by the late Prof. Thos. Maguire of Dublin (Lectures on Philosophy,\r\n1885). This author considers that by the \u0027fringe\u0027 I mean some sort\r\nof psychic material by which sensations in themselves separate are made\r\nto cohere together, and wittily says that I ought to \"see that uniting sensations\r\nby their \u0027fringes\u0027 is more vague than to construct the universe out\r\nof oysters by platting their beards\" (p. 211). But the fringe, as I use the\r\nword, means nothing like this; it is part of the \u003ci\u003eobject cognized\u003c/i\u003e,—substantive\r\n\u003ci\u003equalities\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e appearing to the mind in a \u003ci\u003efringe of relations\u003c/i\u003e. Some parts—the\r\ntransitive parts—of our stream of thought cognize the relations rather\r\nthan the things; but both the transitive and the substantive parts form one\r\ncontinuous stream, with no discrete \u0027sensations\u0027 in it such as Prof. Maguire\r\nsupposes, and supposes me to suppose, to be there.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_235_235\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_235_235\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[235]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e George Campbell: Philosophy of Rhetoric, book ii, chap. vii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_236_236\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_236_236\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[236]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Substantialism or Philosophy of Knowledge, by \u0027Jean Story\u0027 (1879).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_237_237\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_237_237\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[237]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M. G. Tarde, quoting (in Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p.\r\n226) some nonsense-verses from a dream, says they show \"how prosodic\r\nforms may subsist in a mind from which logical rules are effaced….\r\nI was able, in dreaming, to preserve the faculty of finding two words which\r\nrhymed, to appreciate the rhyme, to fill up the verse as it first presented\r\nitself with other words which, added, gave the right number of syllables,\r\nand yet I was ignorant of the sense of the words…. Thus we have the\r\nextraordinary fact that the words called each other up, without calling up\r\ntheir sense…. Even when awake, it is more difficult to ascend to the\r\nmeaning of a word than to pass from one word to another; or to put it\r\notherwise, \u003ci\u003eit is harder to be a thinker than to be a rhetorician\u003c/i\u003e, and on the\r\nwhole nothing is commoner than trains of words not understood.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_238_238\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_238_238\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[238]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We think it odd that young children should listen with such rapt\r\nattention to the reading of stories expressed in words half of which they\r\ndo not understand, and of none of which they ask the meaning. But\r\ntheir thinking is in form just what ours is when it is rapid. Both of us\r\nmake flying leaps over large portions of the sentences uttered and we give\r\nattention only to substantive starting points, turning points, and conclusions\r\nhere and there. All the rest, \u0027substantive\u0027 and separately intelligible\r\nas it may \u003ci\u003epotentially\u003c/i\u003e be, actually serves only as so much transitive material.\r\nIt is \u003ci\u003einternodal\u003c/i\u003e consciousness, giving us the sense of continuity, but having\r\nno significance apart from its mere gap-filling function. The children\r\nprobably feel no gap when through a lot of unintelligible words they are\r\nswiftly carried to a familiar and intelligible terminus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_239_239\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_239_239\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[239]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Not literally \u003ci\u003eheard\u003c/i\u003e, of course. Deaf mutes are quick to perceive\r\nshocks and jars that can be felt, even when so slight as to be unnoticed by\r\nthose who can hear.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_240_240\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_240_240\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[240]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Quoted by Samuel Porter: \u0027Is Thought possible without Language?\u0027\r\nin Princeton Review, 57th year, pp. 108-12 (Jan. 1881?). Cf. also W. W.\r\nIreland: The Blot upon the Brain (1886), Paper x, part ii; G. J. Romanes:\r\nMental Evolution in Man, pp. 81-83, and references therein made. Prof.\r\nMax Müller gives a very complete history of this controversy in pp. 30-64 of\r\nhis \u0027Science of Thought\u0027 (1887). His own view is that Thought and Speech\r\nare inseparable; but under speech he includes any conceivable sort of symbolism\r\nor even mental imagery, and he makes no allowance for the wordless\r\nsummary glimpses which we have of systems of relation and direction.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_241_241\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_241_241\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[241]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Problem iv, chapter 5. Compare\r\nalso Victor Egger: La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), chap. vi.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_242_242\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_242_242\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[242]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If but one person sees an apparition we consider it his private hallucination.\r\nIf more than one, we begin to think it may be a real external\r\npresence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_243_243\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_243_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[243]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 671.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_244_244\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_244_244\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[244]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Quoted from the Therapeutic Gazette, by the N. Y. Semi-weekly\r\nEvening Post for Nov. 2, 1886.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_245_245\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_245_245\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[245]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In half-stunned states self-consciousness may lapse. A friend writes\r\nme: \"We were driving back from —— in a wagonette. The door flew\r\nopen and X., alias \u0027Baldy,\u0027 fell out on the road. We pulled up at once,\r\nand then he said, \u0027Did anybody fall out?\u0027 or \u0027Who fell out?\u0027—I don\u0027t\r\nexactly remember the words. When told that Baldy fell out, he said, \u0027Did\r\nBaldy fall out? Poor Baldy!\u0027\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_246_246\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_246_246\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[246]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Kant originated this view. I subjoin a few English statements of it.\r\nJ. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, Proposition i: \"Along with whatever\r\nany intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its\r\nknowledge, have some knowledge of itself.\" Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discussions,\r\np. 47: \"We know, and we know that we know,—these propositions,\r\nlogically distinct, are really identical; each implies the other…. So true\r\nis the scholastic brocard: \u003ci\u003enon sentimus nisi sentiamus nos sentire\u003c/i\u003e.\" H. L.\r\nMansel, Metaphysics, p. 58: \"Whatever variety of materials may exist\r\nwithin reach of my mind, I can become conscious of them only by recognizing\r\nthem as mine…. Relation to the conscious self is thus the permanent\r\nand universal feature which every state of consciousness as such must\r\nexhibit.\" T. H. Green, Introduction to Hume, p. 12: \"A consciousness\r\nby the man … of himself, in negative relation to the thing that is his\r\nobject, and this consciousness must be taken to go along with the perceptive\r\nact itself. Not less than this indeed can be involved in any act that is\r\nto be the beginning of knowledge at all. It is the minimum of possible\r\nthought or intelligence.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_247_247\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_247_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[247]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture 45.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_248_248\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_248_248\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[248]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Instead of saying \u003ci\u003eto our feeling only\u003c/i\u003e, he should have said, to the \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e\r\nonly.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_249_249\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_249_249\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[249]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"There can be no difficulty in admitting that association does form\r\nthe ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea;\r\nbecause it is an acknowledged fact. Have we not the idea of an army?\r\nAnd is not that precisely the ideas of an indefinite number of men formed\r\ninto one idea?\" (Jas. Mill\u0027s Analysis of the Human Mind (J. S. Mill\u0027s\r\nEdition), vol. i, p. 264.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_250_250\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_250_250\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[250]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For their arguments, see above.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_251_251\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_251_251\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[251]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I know there are readers whom nothing can convince that the thought\r\nof a complex object has not as many parts as are discriminated in the object\r\nitself. Well, then, let the word parts pass. Only observe that these\r\nparts are not the separate \u0027ideas\u0027 of traditional psychology. No one of\r\nthem can live out of that particular thought, any more than my head can\r\nlive off of my particular shoulders. In a sense a soap-bubble has parts; it is\r\na sum of juxtaposed spherical triangles. But these triangles are not separate\r\nrealities; neither are the \u0027parts\u0027 of the thought separate realities.\r\nTouch the bubble and the triangles are no more. Dismiss the thought\r\nand out go its parts. You can no more make a new thought out of \u0027ideas\u0027\r\nthat have once served than you can make a new bubble out of old triangles\r\nEach bubble, each thought, is a fresh organic unity, \u003ci\u003esui generis\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_252_252\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_252_252\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[252]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In his work, La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), especially chapters\r\nvi and vii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_253_253\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_253_253\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[253]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Page 301.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_254_254\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_254_254\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[254]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Page 218. To prove this point, M. Egger appeals to the fact that we\r\noften hear some one speak whilst our mind is preoccupied, but do not understand\r\nhim until some moments afterwards, when we suddenly \u0027realize\u0027\r\nwhat he meant. Also to our digging out the meaning of a sentence in an\r\nunfamiliar tongue, where the words are present to us long before the idea\r\nis taken in. In these special cases the word does indeed precede the idea.\r\nThe idea, on the contrary, precedes the word whenever we try to express\r\nourselves with effort, as in a foreign tongue, or in an unusual field of intellectual\r\ninvention. Both sets of cases, however, are exceptional, and M.\r\nEgger would probably himself admit, on reflection, that in the former class\r\nthere is some sort of a verbal suffusion, however evanescent, of the idea,\r\nwhen it is grasped—we hear the echo of the words as we catch their meaning.\r\nAnd he would probably admit that in the second class of cases the\r\nidea persists after the words that came with so much effort are found. In\r\nnormal cases the simultaneity, as he admits, is obviously there.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_255_255\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_255_255\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[255]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A good way to get the words and the sense separately is to inwardly\r\narticulate word for word the discourse of another. One then finds that\r\nthe meaning will often come to the mind in pulses, after clauses or sentences\r\nare finished.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_256_256\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_256_256\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[256]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The nearest approach (with which I am acquainted) to the doctrine\r\nset forth here is in O. Liebmaun\u0027s Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, pp.\r\n427-438.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_291\"\u003e[Pg 291]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_X\"\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us begin with the Self in its widest acceptation,\r\nand follow it up to its most delicate and subtle form, advancing\r\nfrom the study of the empirical, as the Germans\r\ncall it, to that of the pure, Ego.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE EMPIRICAL SELF OR ME.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is\r\ntempted to call by the name of \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e. But it is clear that\r\nbetween what a man calls \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e and what he simply calls\r\n\u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about\r\ncertain things that are ours very much as we feel and act\r\nabout ourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of our\r\nhands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse\r\nthe same feelings and the same acts of reprisal if attacked.\r\nAnd our bodies themselves, are they simply ours, or are\r\nthey \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e? Certainly men have been ready to disown their\r\nvery bodies and to regard them as mere vestures, or even\r\nas prisons of clay from which they should some day be glad\r\nto escape.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe see then that we are dealing with a fluctuating\r\nmaterial. The same object being sometimes treated as a\r\npart of me, at other times as simply mine, and then again\r\nas if I had nothing to do with it at all. \u003ci\u003eIn its widest\r\npossible sense\u003c/i\u003e, however, \u003ci\u003ea man\u0027s Self is the sum total of all\r\nthat he\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ecan\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ecall his\u003c/i\u003e, not only his body and his psychic powers,\r\nbut his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his\r\nancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands\r\nand horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things\r\ngive him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he\r\nfeels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels\r\ncast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_292\"\u003e[Pg 292]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthing, but in much the same way for all. Understanding\r\nthe Self in this widest sense, we may begin by dividing the\r\nhistory of it into three parts, relating respectively to—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Its constituents;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The feelings and emotions they arouse,—\u003ci\u003eSelf-feelings;\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The actions to which they prompt,—\u003ci\u003eSelf-seeking and\r\nSelf-preservation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003ci\u003eThe constituents of the Self\u003c/i\u003e may be divided into two\r\nclasses, those which make up respectively—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The material Self;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) The social Self;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) The spiritual Self; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) The pure Ego.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The body is the innermost part of \u003ci\u003ethe material Self\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin each of us; and certain parts of the body seem more\r\nintimately ours than the rest. The clothes come next.\r\nThe old saying that the human person is composed of\r\nthree parts—soul, body and clothes—is more than a joke.\r\nWe so appropriate our clothes and identify ourselves with\r\nthem that there are few of us who, if asked to choose\r\nbetween having a beautiful body clad in raiment perpetually\r\nshabby and unclean, and having an ugly and blemished\r\nform always spotlessly attired, would not hesitate a moment\r\nbefore making a decisive reply.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_257_257\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_257_257\"\u003e[257]\u003c/a\u003e Next, our immediate\r\nfamily is a part of ourselves. Our father and mother, our\r\nwife and babes, are bone of our bone and flesh of our\r\nflesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is gone.\r\nIf they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are\r\ninsulted, our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in\r\ntheir place. Our home comes next. Its scenes are part\r\nof our life; its aspects awaken the tenderest feelings of\r\naffection; and we do not easily forgive the stranger who,\r\nin visiting it, finds fault with its arrangements or treats it\r\nwith contempt. All these different things are the objects\r\nof instinctive preferences coupled with the most important\r\npractical interests of life. We all have a blind impulse\r\nto watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_293\"\u003e[Pg 293]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan ornamental sort, to cherish parents, wife and babes,\r\nand to find for ourselves a home of our own which we may\r\nlive in and \u0027improve.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect property;\r\nand the collections thus made become, with different\r\ndegrees of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves. The\r\nparts of our wealth most intimately ours are those which\r\nare saturated with our labor. There are few men who\r\nwould not feel personally annihilated if a life-long construction\r\nof their hands or brains—say an entomological\r\ncollection or an extensive work in manuscript—were\r\nsuddenly swept away. The miser feels similarly towards\r\nhis gold, and although it is true that a part of our depression\r\nat the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we\r\nmust now go without certain goods that we expected the\r\npossessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there\r\nremains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of\r\nour personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to\r\nnothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by\r\nitself. We are all at once assimilated to the tramps and\r\npoor devils whom we so despise, and at the same time removed\r\nfarther than ever away from the happy sons of\r\nearth who lord it over land and sea and men in the full-blown\r\nlustihood that wealth and power can give, and\r\nbefore whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to\r\nanti-snobbish first principles, we cannot escape an emotion,\r\nopen or sneaking, of respect and dread.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003eA man\u0027s Social Self\u003c/i\u003e is the recognition which he gets\r\nfrom his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking\r\nto be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity\r\nto get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our\r\nkind. No more fiendish punishment could be devised,\r\nwere such a thing physically possible, than that one should\r\nbe turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed\r\nby all the members thereof. If no one turned round when\r\nwe entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we\r\ndid, but if every person we met \u0027cut us dead,\u0027 and acted as\r\nif we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent\r\ndespair would ere long well up in us, from which the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_294\"\u003e[Pg 294]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncruellest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would\r\nmake us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had\r\nnot sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention\r\nat all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProperly speaking, \u003ci\u003ea man has as many social selves as\r\nthere are individuals who recognize him\u003c/i\u003e and carry an image\r\nof him in their mind. To wound any one of these his\r\nimages is to wound him.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_258_258\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_258_258\"\u003e[258]\u003c/a\u003e But as the individuals who\r\ncarry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically\r\nsay that he has as many different social selves as\r\nthere are distinct \u003ci\u003egroups\u003c/i\u003e of persons about whose opinion\r\nhe cares. He generally shows a different side of himself\r\nto each of these different groups. Many a youth who is\r\ndemure enough before his parents and teachers, swears\r\nand swaggers like a pirate among his \u0027tough\u0027 young friends.\r\nWe do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions,\r\nto our customers as to the laborers we employ,\r\nto our own masters and employers as to our intimate\r\nfriends. From this there results what practically is a\r\ndivision of the man into several selves; and this may be a\r\ndiscordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of\r\nhis acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may\r\nbe a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one\r\ntender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners\r\nunder his command.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most peculiar social self which one is apt to have\r\nis in the mind of the person one is in love with. The\r\ngood or bad fortunes of this self cause the most intense\r\nelation and dejection—unreasonable enough as measured\r\nby every other standard than that of the organic feeling of\r\nthe individual. To his own consciousness he \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not, so long\r\nas this particular social self fails to get recognition, and\r\nwhen it is recognized his contentment passes all bounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA man\u0027s \u003ci\u003efame\u003c/i\u003e, good or bad, and his \u003ci\u003ehonor\u003c/i\u003e or dishonor,\r\nare names for one of his social selves. The particular\r\nsocial self of a man called his honor is usually the result\r\nof one of those splittings of which we have spoken. It is\r\nhis image in the eyes of his own \u0027set,\u0027 which exalts or condemns\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_295\"\u003e[Pg 295]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhim as he conforms or not to certain requirements\r\nthat may not be made of one in another walk of life. Thus\r\na layman may abandon a city infected with cholera; but a\r\npriest or a doctor would think such an act incompatible\r\nwith his honor. A soldier\u0027s honor requires him to fight or\r\nto die under circumstances where another man can apologize\r\nor run away with no stain upon his social self. A\r\njudge, a statesman, are in like manner debarred by the\r\nhonor of their cloth from entering into pecuniary relations\r\nperfectly honorable to persons in private life. Nothing is\r\ncommoner than to hear people discriminate between their\r\ndifferent selves of this sort: \"As a man I pity you, but as\r\nan official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I\r\nregard him as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him;\" etc.,\r\netc. What may be called \u0027club-opinion\u0027 is one of the very\r\nstrongest forces in life.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_259_259\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_259_259\"\u003e[259]\u003c/a\u003e The thief must not steal from\r\nother thieves; the gambler must pay his gambling-debts,\r\nthough he pay no other debts in the world. The code of\r\nhonor of fashionable society has throughout history been\r\nfull of permissions as well as of vetoes, the only reason for\r\nfollowing either of which is that so we best serve one of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_296\"\u003e[Pg 296]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour social selves. You must not lie in general, but you\r\nmay lie as much as you please if asked about your relations\r\nwith a lady; you must accept a challenge from an equal,\r\nbut if challenged by an inferior you may laugh him to\r\nscorn: these are examples of what is meant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the\r\nEmpirical Me, I mean a man\u0027s inner or subjective being, his\r\npsychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely; not the\r\nbare principle of personal Unity, or \u0027pure\u0027 Ego, which\r\nremains still to be discussed. These psychic dispositions\r\nare the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that\r\nwhich we most verily seem to be. We take a purer self-satisfaction\r\nwhen we think of our ability to argue and discriminate,\r\nof our moral sensibility and conscience, of our\r\nindomitable will, than when we survey any of our other\r\npossessions. Only when these are altered is a man said to\r\nbe \u003ci\u003ealienatus a se\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow this spiritual self may be considered in various\r\nways. We may divide it into faculties, as just instanced,\r\nisolating them one from another, and identifying ourselves\r\nwith either in turn. This is an \u003ci\u003eabstract\u003c/i\u003e way of dealing with\r\nconsciousness, in which, as it actually presents itself, a\r\nplurality of such faculties are always to be simultaneously\r\nfound; or we may insist on a concrete view, and then the\r\nspiritual self in us will be either the entire stream of our\r\npersonal consciousness, or the present \u0027segment\u0027 or \u0027section\u0027\r\nof that stream, according as we take a broader or a\r\nnarrower view—both the stream and the section being concrete\r\nexistences in time, and each being a unity after its\r\nown peculiar kind. But whether we take it abstractly or\r\nconcretely, our considering the spiritual self at all is a\r\nreflective process, is the result of our abandoning the outward-looking\r\npoint of view, and of our having become able\r\nto think of subjectivity as such, \u003ci\u003eto think ourselves as thinkers\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis attention to thought as such, and the identification\r\nof ourselves with it rather than with any of the objects\r\nwhich it reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a\r\nrather mysterious operation, of which we need here only\r\nsay that as a matter of fact it exists; and that in everyone,\r\nat an early age, the distinction between thought as such,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_297\"\u003e[Pg 297]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand what it is \u0027of\u0027 or \u0027about,\u0027 has become familiar to the\r\nmind. The deeper grounds for this discrimination may\r\npossibly be hard to find; but superficial grounds are plenty\r\nand near at hand. Almost anyone will tell us that thought\r\nis a different sort of existence from things, because many\r\nsorts of thought are of no things—e.g., pleasures, pains,\r\nand emotions; others are of non-existent things—errors\r\nand fictions; others again of existent things, but in a form\r\nthat is symbolic and does not resemble them—abstract\r\nideas and concepts; whilst in the thoughts that do resemble\r\nthe things they are \u0027of\u0027 (percepts, sensations), we can\r\nfeel, alongside of the thing known, the thought of it going\r\non as an altogether separate act and operation in the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow this subjective life of ours, distinguished as such\r\nso clearly from the objects known by its means, may, as\r\naforesaid, be taken by us in a concrete or in an abstract\r\nway. Of the concrete way I will say nothing just now, except\r\nthat the actual \u0027section\u0027 of the stream will ere long,\r\nin our discussion of the nature of the principle of \u003ci\u003eunity\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nconsciousness, play a very important part. The abstract\r\nway claims our attention first. If the stream as a whole is\r\nidentified with the Self far more than any outward thing, a\r\n\u003ci\u003ecertain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest\u003c/i\u003e is so\r\nidentified in an altogether peculiar degree, and is felt by all\r\nmen as a sort of innermost centre within the circle, of sanctuary\r\nwithin the citadel, constituted by the subjective life\r\nas a whole. Compared with this element of the stream,\r\nthe other parts, even of the subjective life, seem transient\r\nexternal possessions, of which each in turn can be disowned,\r\nwhilst that which disowns them remains. Now, \u003ci\u003ewhat is\r\nthis self of all the other selves?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProbably all men would describe it in much the same\r\nway up to a certain point. They would call it the \u003ci\u003eactive\u003c/i\u003e\r\nelement in all consciousness; saying that whatever qualities\r\na man\u0027s feelings may possess, or whatever content his\r\nthought may include, there is a spiritual something in\r\nhim which seems to \u003ci\u003ego out\u003c/i\u003e to meet these qualities and\r\ncontents, whilst they seem to \u003ci\u003ecome in\u003c/i\u003e to be received by it.\r\nIt is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception\r\nof sensations, and by giving or withholding its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_298\"\u003e[Pg 298]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassent it influences the movements they tend to arouse.\r\nIt is the home of interest,—not the pleasant or the painful,\r\nnot even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to\r\nwhich pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak.\r\nIt is the source of effort and attention, and the place from\r\nwhich appear to emanate the fiats of the will. A physiologist\r\nwho should reflect upon it in his own person could\r\nhardly help, I should think, connecting it more or less\r\nvaguely with the process by which ideas or incoming sensations\r\nare \u0027reflected\u0027 or pass over into outward acts. Not\r\nnecessarily that it should \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e this process or the mere feeling\r\nof this process, but that it should be in some close way\r\n\u003ci\u003erelated\u003c/i\u003e to this process; for it plays a part analogous to it in\r\nthe psychic life, being a sort of junction at which sensory\r\nideas terminate and from which motor ideas proceed, and\r\nforming a kind of link between the two. Being more incessantly\r\nthere than any other single element of the mental\r\nlife, the other elements end by seeming to accrete round it\r\nand to belong to it. It become opposed to them as the permanent\r\nis opposed to the changing and inconstant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne may, I think, without fear of being upset by any\r\nfuture Galtonian circulars, believe that all men must single\r\nout from the rest of what they call themselves some central\r\nprinciple of which each would recognize the foregoing to be\r\na fair general description,—accurate enough, at any rate, to\r\ndenote what is meant, and keep it unconfused with other\r\nthings. The moment, however, they came to closer quarters\r\nwith it, trying to define more accurately its precise nature,\r\nwe should find opinions beginning to diverge. Some would\r\nsay that it is a simple active substance, the soul, of which\r\nthey are thus conscious; others, that it is nothing but a\r\nfiction, the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun I; and\r\nbetween these extremes of opinion all sorts of intermediaries\r\nwould be found.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLater we must ourselves discuss them all, and sufficient\r\nto that day will be the evil thereof. \u003ci\u003eNow\u003c/i\u003e, let us try to\r\nsettle for ourselves as definitely as we can, just how this\r\ncentral nucleus of the Self may \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e, no matter whether it be\r\na spiritual substance or only a delusive word.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor this central part of the Self is \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e. It may be all that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_299\"\u003e[Pg 299]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nTranscendentalists say it is, and all that Empiricists say it\r\nis into the bargain, but it is at any rate no \u003ci\u003emere ens rationis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ncognized only in an intellectual way, and no \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e summation\r\nof memories or \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e sound of a word in our ears. It is something\r\nwith which we also have direct sensible acquaintance,\r\nand which is as fully present at any moment of consciousness\r\nin which it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e present, as in a whole lifetime of such\r\nmoments. When, just now, it was called an abstraction,\r\nthat did not mean that, like some general notion, it could\r\nnot be presented in a particular experience. It only meant\r\nthat in the stream of consciousness it never was found all\r\nalone. But when it is found, it is \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e; just as the body is\r\nfelt, the feeling of which is also an abstraction, because never\r\nis the body felt all alone, but always together with other\r\nthings. \u003ci\u003eNow can we tell more precisely in what the feeling of\r\nthis central active self consists,\u003c/i\u003e—not necessarily as yet what\r\nthe active self \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, as a being or principle, but what we \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhen we become aware of its existence?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI think I can in my own case; and as what I say will\r\nbe likely to meet with opposition if generalized (as indeed\r\nit may be in part inapplicable to other individuals), I had\r\nbetter continue in the first person, leaving my description,\r\nto be accepted by those to whose introspection it may commend\r\nitself as true, and confessing my inability to meet the\r\ndemands of others, if others there be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, I am aware of a constant play of furtherances\r\nand hindrances in my thinking, of checks and releases, tendencies\r\nwhich run with desire, and tendencies which run the\r\nother way. Among the matters I think of, some range themselves\r\non the side of the thought\u0027s interests, whilst others\r\nplay an unfriendly part thereto. The mutual inconsistencies\r\nand agreements, reinforcements and obstructions, which\r\nobtain amongst these objective matters reverberate backwards\r\nand produce what seem to be incessant reactions of\r\nmy spontaneity upon them, welcoming or opposing, appropriating\r\nor disowning, striving with or against, saying yes\r\nor no. This palpitating inward life is, in me, that central\r\nnucleus which I just tried to describe in terms that all men\r\nmight use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut when I forsake such general descriptions and grapple\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_300\"\u003e[Pg 300]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith particulars, coming to the closest possible quarters\r\nwith the facts, \u003ci\u003eit is difficult for me to detect in the activity any\r\npurely spiritual element at all. Whenever my introspective\r\nglance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch one of\r\nthese manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel\r\ndistinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place\r\nwithin the head.\u003c/i\u003e Omitting for a moment what is obscure in\r\nthese introspective results, let me try to state those particulars\r\nwhich to my own consciousness seem indubitable and\r\ndistinct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, the acts of attending, assenting, negating,\r\nmaking an effort, are felt as movements of something\r\nin the head. In many cases it is possible to describe\r\nthese movements quite exactly. In attending to either an\r\nidea or a sensation belonging to a particular sense-sphere,\r\nthe movement is the adjustment of the sense-organ, felt as\r\nit occurs. I cannot think in visual terms, for example,\r\nwithout feeling a fluctuating play of pressures, convergences,\r\ndivergences, and accommodations in my eyeballs.\r\nThe direction in which the object is conceived to lie determines\r\nthe character of these movements, the feeling of\r\nwhich becomes, for my consciousness, identified with the\r\nmanner in which I make myself ready to receive the visible\r\nthing. My brain appears to me as if all shot across with\r\nlines of direction, of which I have become conscious as my\r\nattention has shifted from one sense-organ to another, in\r\npassing to successive outer things, or in following trains of\r\nvarying sense-ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I try to remember or reflect, the movements in\r\nquestion, instead of being directed towards the periphery,\r\nseem to come from the periphery inwards and feel like a\r\nsort of \u003ci\u003ewithdrawal\u003c/i\u003e from the outer world. As far as I can\r\ndetect, these feelings are due to an actual rolling outwards\r\nand upwards of the eyeballs, such as I believe occurs in\r\nme in sleep, and is the exact opposite of their action in fixating\r\na physical thing. In reasoning, I find that I am apt\r\nto have a kind of vaguely localized diagram in my mind,\r\nwith the various fractional objects of the thought disposed\r\nat particular points thereof; and the oscillations of my attention\r\nfrom one of them to another are most distinctly felt\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_301\"\u003e[Pg 301]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas alternations of direction in movements occurring inside\r\nthe head.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_260_260\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_260_260\"\u003e[260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn consenting and negating, and in making a mental\r\neffort, the movements seem more complex, and I find them\r\nharder to describe. The opening and closing of the glottis\r\nplay a great part in these operations, and, less distinctly,\r\nthe movements of the soft palate, etc., shutting off the posterior\r\nnares from the mouth. My glottis is like a sensitive\r\nvalve, intercepting my breath instantaneously at every\r\nmental hesitation or felt aversion to the objects of my\r\nthought, and as quickly opening, to let the air pass through\r\nmy throat and nose, the moment the repugnance is overcome.\r\nThe feeling of the movement of this air is, in me,\r\none strong ingredient of the feeling of assent. The movements\r\nof the muscles of the brow and eyelids also respond\r\nvery sensitively to every fluctuation in the agreeableness\r\nor disagreeableness of what comes before my mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eeffort\u003c/i\u003e of any sort, contractions of the jaw-muscles and\r\nof those of respiration are added to those of the brow and\r\nglottis, and thus the feeling passes out of the head properly\r\nso called. It passes out of the head whenever the welcoming\r\nor rejecting of the object is \u003ci\u003estrongly\u003c/i\u003e felt. Then a\r\nset of feelings pour in from many bodily parts, all \u0027expressive\u0027\r\nof my emotion, and the head-feelings proper are\r\nswallowed up in this larger mass.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person\r\nat least, \u003ci\u003ethe \u0027Self of selves,\u0027 when carefully examined,\r\nis found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar\r\nmotions in the head or between the head and throat\u003c/i\u003e. I do\r\nnot for a moment say that this is \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e it consists of, for I\r\nfully realize how desperately hard is introspection in this\r\nfield. But I feel quite sure that these cephalic motions are\r\nthe portions of my innermost activity of which I am \u003ci\u003emost\r\ndistinctly aware\u003c/i\u003e. If the dim portions which I cannot yet\r\ndefine should prove to be like unto these distinct portions\r\nin me, and I like other men, \u003ci\u003eit would follow that our entire\r\nfeeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_302\"\u003e[Pg 302]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ename, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature\r\nis by most men overlooked.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, without pledging ourselves in any way to adopt this\r\nhypothesis, let us dally with it for a while to see to what\r\nconsequences it might lead if it were true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, the nuclear part of the Self, intermediary\r\nbetween ideas and overt acts, would be a collection\r\nof activities physiologically in no essential way different\r\nfrom the overt acts themselves. If we divide all possible\r\nphysiological acts into \u003ci\u003eadjustments\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eexecutions\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nnuclear self would be the adjustments collectively considered;\r\nand the less intimate, more shifting self, so far as\r\nit was active, would be the executions. But both adjustments\r\nand executions would obey the reflex type. Both\r\nwould be the result of sensorial and ideational processes\r\ndischarging either into each other within the brain, or into\r\nmuscles and other parts outside. The peculiarity of the\r\nadjustments would be that they are minimal reflexes, few\r\nin number, incessantly repeated, constant amid great fluctuations\r\nin the rest of the mind\u0027s content, and entirely\r\nunimportant and uninteresting except through their uses\r\nin furthering or inhibiting the presence of various things,\r\nand actions before consciousness. These characters would\r\nnaturally keep us from introspectively paying much attention\r\nto them in detail, whilst they would at the same time\r\nmake us aware of them as a coherent group of processes,\r\nstrongly contrasted with all the other things consciousness\r\ncontained,—even with the other constituents of the \u0027Self,\u0027\r\nmaterial, social, or spiritual, as the case might be. They\r\nare reactions, and they are \u003ci\u003eprimary\u003c/i\u003e reactions. Everything\r\narouses them; for objects which have no other effects\r\nwill for a moment contract the brow and make the glottis\r\nclose. It is as if all that visited the mind had to stand an\r\nentrance-examination, and just show its face so as to be\r\neither approved or sent back. These primary reactions\r\nare like the opening or the closing of the door. In the\r\nmidst of psychic change they are the permanent core\r\nof turnings-towards and turnings-from, of yieldings and\r\narrests, which naturally seem central and interior in comparison\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_303\"\u003e[Pg 303]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith the foreign matters, \u003ci\u003ea propos\u003c/i\u003e to which they\r\noccur, and hold a sort of arbitrating, decisive position, quite\r\nunlike that held by any of the other constituents of the Me.\r\nIt would not be surprising, then, if we were to feel them as\r\nthe birthplace of conclusions and the starting point of acts,\r\nor if they came to appear as what we called a while back\r\nthe \u0027sanctuary within the citadel\u0027 of our personal life.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_304\"\u003e[Pg 304]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_261_261\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_261_261\"\u003e[261]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf they really were the innermost sanctuary, the \u003ci\u003eultimate\u003c/i\u003e\r\none of all the selves whose being we can ever directly\r\nexperience, it would follow that \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e that is experienced is,\r\nstrictly considered, \u003ci\u003eobjective\u003c/i\u003e; that this Objective falls asunder\r\ninto two contrasted parts, one realized as \u0027Self,\u0027 the\r\nother as \u0027not-Self; \u0027and that over and above these parts\r\nthere \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e nothing save the fact that they are known, the fact\r\nof the stream of thought being there as the indispensable\r\nsubjective condition of their being experienced at all. But\r\nthis \u003ci\u003econdition\u003c/i\u003e of the experience is not one of the \u003ci\u003ethings experienced\u003c/i\u003e\r\nat the moment; this knowing is not immediately\r\n\u003ci\u003eknown\u003c/i\u003e. It is only known in subsequent reflection. Instead,\r\nthen, of the stream of thought being one of \u003ci\u003econ\u003c/i\u003e-sciousness,\r\n\"thinking its own existence along with whatever else it\r\nthinks,\" (as Ferrier says) it might be better called a stream\r\nof \u003ci\u003eScious\u003c/i\u003eness pure and simple, thinking objects of some of\r\nwhich it makes what it calls a \u0027Me,\u0027 and only aware of its\r\n\u0027pure\u0027 Self in an abstract, hypothetic or conceptual way.\r\nEach \u0027section\u0027 of the stream would then be a bit of sciousness\r\nor knowledge of this sort, including and contemplating\r\nits \u0027me\u0027 and its \u0027not-me\u0027 as objects which work out their\r\ndrama together, but not yet including or contemplating its\r\nown subjective being. The sciousness in question would be\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eThinker\u003c/i\u003e, and the existence of this thinker would be given\r\nto us rather as a logical postulate than as that direct inner\r\nperception of spiritual activity which we naturally believe\r\nourselves to have. \u0027Matter,\u0027 as something behind physical\r\nphenomena, is a postulate of this sort. Between the postulated\r\nMatter and the postulated Thinker, the sheet of phenomena\r\nwould then swing, some of them (the \u0027realities\u0027)\r\npertaining more to the matter, others (the fictions, opinions,\r\nand errors) pertaining more to the Thinker. But \u003ci\u003ewho\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nThinker would be, or how many distinct Thinkers we ought\r\nto suppose in the universe, would all be subjects for an\r\nulterior metaphysical inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpeculations like this traverse common-sense; and not\r\nonly do they traverse common sense (which in philosophy\r\nis no insuperable objection) but they contradict the fundamental\r\nassumption of \u003ci\u003eevery\u003c/i\u003e philosophic school. Spiritualists,\r\ntranscendentalists, and empiricists alike admit in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_305\"\u003e[Pg 305]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nus a continual direct perception of the thinking activity in\r\nthe concrete. However they may otherwise disagree, they\r\nvie with each other in the cordiality of their recognition of\r\nour \u003ci\u003ethoughts\u003c/i\u003e as the one sort of existent which skepticism\r\ncannot touch.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_262_262\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_262_262\"\u003e[262]\u003c/a\u003e I will therefore treat the last few pages as\r\na parenthetical digression, and from now to the end of the\r\nvolume revert to the path of common-sense again. I mean\r\nby this that I will continue to assume (as I have assumed\r\nall along, especially in the last chapter) a direct awareness\r\nof the process of our thinking as such, simply insisting on\r\nthe fact that it is an even more inward and subtle phenomenon\r\nthan most of us suppose. At the conclusion of the\r\nvolume, however, I may permit myself to revert again to the\r\ndoubts here provisionally mooted, and will indulge in some\r\nmetaphysical reflections suggested by them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt present, then, the only conclusion I come to is the\r\nfollowing: That (in some persons at least) the part of the\r\ninnermost Self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist\r\nfor the most part of a collection of cephalic movements\r\nof \u0027adjustments\u0027 which, for want of attention and\r\nreflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what\r\nthey are; that over and above these there is an obscurer\r\nfeeling of something more; but whether it be of fainter\r\nphysiological processes, or of nothing objective at all, but\r\nrather of subjectivity as such, of thought become \u0027its own\r\nobject,\u0027 must at present remain an open question,—like the\r\nquestion whether it be an indivisible active soul-substance,\r\nor the question whether it be a personification of the pronoun\r\nI, or any other of the guesses as to what its nature may\r\nbe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFarther than this we cannot as yet go clearly in our\r\nanalysis of the Self\u0027s constituents. So let us proceed to the\r\nemotions of Self which they arouse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e2. SELF-FEELING.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese are primarily \u003ci\u003eself-complacency\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eself-dissatisfaction\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nOf what is called \u0027self-love,\u0027 I will treat a little\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_306\"\u003e[Pg 306]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfarther on. Language has synonyms enough for both primary\r\nfeelings. Thus pride, conceit, vanity, self-esteem,\r\narrogance, vainglory, on the one hand; and on the other\r\nmodesty, humility, confusion, diffidence, shame, mortification,\r\ncontrition, the sense of obloquy and personal despair.\r\nThese two opposite classes of affection seem to be direct and\r\nelementary endowments of our nature. Associationists\r\nwould have it that they are, on the other hand, secondary\r\nphenomena arising from a rapid computation of the sensible\r\npleasures or pains to which our prosperous or debased\r\npersonal predicament is likely to lead, the sum of the represented\r\npleasures forming the self-satisfaction, and the sum\r\nof the represented pains forming the opposite feeling of\r\nshame. No doubt, when we are self-satisfied, we do fondly\r\nrehearse all possible rewards for our desert, and when in a\r\nfit of self-despair we forebode evil. But the mere expectation\r\nof reward \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not the self-satisfaction, and the mere\r\napprehension of the evil \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not the self-despair, for there is\r\na certain average tone of self-feeling which each one of us\r\ncarries about with him, and which is independent of the\r\nobjective reasons we may have for satisfaction or discontent.\r\nThat is, a very meanly-conditioned man may abound in\r\nunfaltering conceit, and one whose success in life is secure\r\nand who is esteemed by all may remain diffident of his\r\npowers to the end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne may say, however, that the normal \u003ci\u003eprovocative\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nself-feeling is one\u0027s actual success or failure, and the good\r\nor bad actual position one holds in the world. \"He put in\r\nhis thumb and pulled out a plum, and said what a good boy\r\nam I.\" A man with a broadly extended empirical Ego,\r\nwith powers that have uniformly brought him success, with\r\nplace and wealth and friends and fame, is not likely to be\r\nvisited by the morbid diffidences and doubts about himself\r\nwhich he had when he was a boy. \"Is not this great\r\nBabylon, which I have planted?\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_263_263\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_263_263\"\u003e[263]\u003c/a\u003e Whereas he who has\r\nmade one blunder after another, and still lies in middle life\r\namong the failures at the foot of the hill, is liable to grow\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_307\"\u003e[Pg 307]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall sicklied o\u0027er with self-distrust, and to shrink from trials\r\nwith which his powers can really cope.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe emotions themselves of self-satisfaction and abasement\r\nare of a unique sort, each as worthy to be classed as\r\na primitive emotional species as are, for example, rage or\r\npain. Each has its own peculiar physiognomical expression.\r\nIn self-satisfaction the extensor muscles are innervated,\r\nthe eye is strong and glorious, the gait rolling and\r\nelastic, the nostril dilated, and a peculiar smile plays upon\r\nthe lips. This whole complex of symptoms is seen in an\r\nexquisite way in lunatic asylums, which always contain\r\nsome patients who are literally mad with conceit, and\r\nwhose fatuous expression and absurdly strutting or swaggering\r\ngait is in tragic contrast with their lack of any\r\nvaluable personal quality. It is in these same castles of\r\ndespair that we find the strongest examples of the opposite\r\nphysiognomy, in good people who think they have committed\r\n\u0027the unpardonable sin\u0027 and are lost forever, who\r\ncrouch and cringe and slink from notice, and are unable to\r\nspeak aloud or look us in the eye. Like fear and like\r\nanger, in similar morbid conditions, these opposite feelings\r\nof Self may be aroused with no adequate exciting cause.\r\nAnd in fact we ourselves know how the barometer of our\r\nself-esteem and confidence rises and falls from one day to\r\nanother through causes that seem to be visceral and organic\r\nrather than rational, and which certainly answer to no corresponding\r\nvariations in the esteem in which we are held\r\nby our friends. Of the origin of these emotions in the race,\r\nwe can speak better when we have treated of—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e3. SELF-SEEKING AND SELF-PRESERVATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese words cover a large number of our fundamental\r\ninstinctive impulses. We have those of \u003ci\u003ebodily self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthose of \u003ci\u003esocial self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e, and those of \u003ci\u003espiritual self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll the ordinary useful reflex actions and movements\r\nof alimentation and defence are acts of bodily self-preservation.\r\nFear and anger prompt to acts that are useful\r\nin the same way. Whilst if by self-seeking we mean\r\nthe providing for the future as distinguished from maintaining\r\nthe present, we must class both anger and fear\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_308\"\u003e[Pg 308]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith the hunting, the acquisitive, the home-constructing\r\nand the tool-constructing instincts, as impulses to self-seeking\r\nof the bodily kind. Really, however, these latter\r\ninstincts, with amativeness, parental fondness, curiosity\r\nand emulation, seek not only the development of the\r\nbodily Self, but that of the material Self in the widest possible\r\nsense of the word.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur \u003ci\u003esocial self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e, in turn, is carried on directly\r\nthrough our amativeness and friendliness, our desire to\r\nplease and attract notice and admiration, our emulation\r\nand jealousy, our love of glory, influence, and power,\r\nand indirectly through whichever of the material self-seeking\r\nimpulses prove serviceable as means to social\r\nends. That the direct social self-seeking impulses are\r\nprobably pure instincts is easily seen. The noteworthy\r\nthing about the desire to be \u0027recognized\u0027 by others is that\r\nits strength has so little to do with the worth of the recognition\r\ncomputed in sensational or rational terms. We are\r\ncrazy to get a visiting-list which shall be large, to be able\r\nto say when any one is mentioned, \"Oh! I know him well,\"\r\nand to be bowed to in the street by half the people we\r\nmeet. Of course distinguished friends and admiring\r\nrecognition are the most desirable—Thackeray somewhere\r\nasks his readers to confess whether it would not give\r\neach of \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e an exquisite pleasure to be met walking down\r\nPall Mall with a duke on either arm. But in default of\r\ndukes and envious salutations almost anything will do for\r\nsome of us; and there is a whole race of beings to-day\r\nwhose passion is to keep their names in the newspapers,\r\nno matter under what heading, \u0027arrivals and departures,\u0027\r\n\u0027personal paragraphs,\u0027 \u0027interviews,\u0027—gossip, even scandal,\r\nwill suit them if nothing better is to be had. Guiteau,\r\nGarfield\u0027s assassin, is an example of the extremity to which\r\nthis sort of craving for the notoriety of print may go in a\r\npathological case. The newspapers bounded his mental\r\nhorizon; and in the poor wretch\u0027s prayer on the scaffold,\r\none of the most heartfelt expressions was: \"The newspaper\r\npress of this land has a big bill to settle with thee, O Lord!\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot only the people but the places and things I know\r\nenlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric social way. \"\u003ci\u003eÇa\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_309\"\u003e[Pg 309]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nme connaît\u003c/i\u003e,\" as the French workman says of the implement\r\nhe can use well. So that it comes about that persons for\r\nwhose \u003ci\u003eopinion\u003c/i\u003e we care nothing are nevertheless persons\r\nwhose notice we woo; and that many a man truly great,\r\nmany a woman truly fastidious in most respects, will take a\r\ndeal of trouble to dazzle some insignificant cad whose\r\nwhole personality they heartily despise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder the head of \u003ci\u003espiritual self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e ought to be\r\nincluded every impulse towards psychic progress, whether\r\nintellectual, moral, or spiritual in the narrow sense of the\r\nterm. It must be admitted, however, that much that commonly\r\npasses for spiritual self-seeking in this narrow sense\r\nis only material and social self-seeking beyond the grave.\r\nIn the Mohammedan desire for paradise and the Christian\r\naspiration not to be damned in hell, the materiality of the\r\ngoods sought is undisguised. In the more positive and\r\nrefined view of heaven many of its goods, the fellowship of\r\nthe saints and of our dead ones, and the presence of God,\r\nare but social goods of the most exalted kind. It is only\r\nthe search of the redeemed inward nature, the spotlessness\r\nfrom sin, whether here or hereafter, that can count as\r\nspiritual self-seeking pure and undefined.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this broad external review of the facts of the life of\r\nthe Self will be incomplete without some account of the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eRIVALRY AND CONFLICT OF THE DIFFERENT SELVES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith most objects of desire, physical nature restricts our\r\nchoice to but one of many represented goods, and even so it\r\nis here. I am often confronted by the necessity of standing\r\nby one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest.\r\nNot that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and\r\nfat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million\r\na year, be a wit, a \u003ci\u003ebon-vivant\u003c/i\u003e, and a lady-killer, as well as a\r\nphilosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and\r\nAfrican explorer, as well as a \u0027tone-poet\u0027 and saint. But\r\nthe thing is simply impossible. The millionaire\u0027s work\r\nwould run counter to the saint\u0027s; the \u003ci\u003ebon-vivant\u003c/i\u003e and the\r\nphilanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher\r\nand the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_310\"\u003e[Pg 310]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably\r\nat the outset of life be alike \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e to a man. But\r\nto make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less\r\nbe suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest,\r\ndeepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out the\r\none on which to stake his salvation. All other selves\r\nthereupon become unreal, but the fortunes of this self are\r\nreal. Its failures are real failures, its triumphs real triumphs,\r\ncarrying shame and gladness with them. This is\r\nas strong an example as there is of that selective industry\r\nof the mind on which I insisted some pages back (\u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 284\u003c/a\u003e ff.).\r\nOur thought, incessantly deciding, among many things of\r\na kind, which ones for it shall be realities, here chooses\r\none of many possible selves or characters, and forthwith\r\nreckons it no shame to fail in any of those not adopted\r\nexpressly as its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI, who for the time have staked my all on being a\r\npsychologist, am mortified if others know much more\r\npsychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the\r\ngrossest ignorance of Greek. My deficiencies there give me\r\nno sense of personal humiliation at all. Had I \u0027pretensions\u0027\r\nto be a linguist, it would have been just the reverse. So\r\nwe have the paradox of a man shamed to death because he\r\nis only the second pugilist or the second oarsman in the\r\nworld. That he is able to beat the whole population of the\r\nglobe minus one is nothing; he has \u0027pitted\u0027 himself to\r\nbeat that one; and as long as he doesn\u0027t do that nothing\r\nelse counts. He is to his own regard as if he were not, indeed\r\nhe \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYonder puny fellow, however, whom every one can beat,\r\nsuffers no chagrin about it, for he has long ago abandoned\r\nthe attempt to \u0027carry that line,\u0027 as the merchants say, of\r\nself at all. With no attempt there can be no failure; with\r\nno failure no humiliation. So our self-feeling in this world\r\ndepends entirely on what we \u003ci\u003eback\u003c/i\u003e ourselves to be and do.\r\nIt is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed\r\npotentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions\r\nare the denominator and the numerator our success: thus,\r\nSelf-esteem = Success/ Pretensions. Such a fraction may be increased\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_311\"\u003e[Pg 311]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas well by diminishing the denominator as by increasing the\r\nnumerator.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_264_264\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_264_264\"\u003e[264]\u003c/a\u003e To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as\r\nto get them gratified; and where disappointment is incessant,\r\nand the struggle unending, this is what men will always do.\r\nThe history of evangelical theology, with its conviction of\r\nsin, its self-despair, and its abandonment of salvation by\r\nworks, is the deepest of possible examples, but we meet\r\nothers in every walk of life. There is the strangest lightness\r\nabout the heart when one\u0027s nothingness in a particular\r\nline is once accepted in good faith. \u003ci\u003eAll\u003c/i\u003e is not bitterness in\r\nthe lot of the lover sent away by the final inexorable \u0027No.\u0027\r\nMany Bostonians, \u003ci\u003ecrede experto\u003c/i\u003e (and inhabitants of other\r\ncities, too, I fear), would be happier women and men to-day,\r\nif they could once for all abandon the notion of keeping up\r\na Musical Self, and without shame let people hear them\r\ncall a symphony a nuisance. How pleasant is the day when\r\nwe give up striving to be young,—or slender! Thank God!\r\nwe say, \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e illusions are gone. Everything added to the\r\nSelf is a burden as well as a pride. A certain man who\r\nlost every penny during our civil war went and actually\r\nrolled in the dust, saying he had not felt so free and happy\r\nsince he was born.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, then, our self-feeling is in our power. As\r\nCarlyle says: \"Make thy claim of wages a zero, then hast\r\nthou the world under thy feet. Well did the wisest of our\r\ntime write, it is only with \u003ci\u003erenunciation\u003c/i\u003e that life, properly\r\nspeaking, can be said to begin.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNeither threats nor pleadings can move a man unless\r\nthey touch some one of his potential or actual selves. Only\r\nthus can we, as a rule, get a \u0027purchase\u0027 on another\u0027s will.\r\nThe first care of diplomatists and monarchs and all who wish\r\nto rule or influence is, accordingly, to find out their victim\u0027s\r\nstrongest principle of self-regard, so as to make that the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_312\"\u003e[Pg 312]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfulcrum of all appeals. But if a man has given up those\r\nthings which are subject to foreign fate, and ceased to\r\nregard them as parts of himself at all, we are well-nigh\r\npowerless over him. The Stoic receipt for contentment\r\nwas to dispossess yourself in advance of all that was out of\r\nyour own power,—then fortune\u0027s shocks might rain down\r\nunfelt. Epictetus exhorts us, by thus narrowing and at the\r\nsame time solidifying our Self to make it invulnerable: \"I\r\nmust die; well, but must I die groaning too? I will speak\r\nwhat appears to be right, and if the despot says, then I\r\nwill put you to death, I will reply, \u0027When did I ever tell\r\nyou that I was immortal? You will do your part and I\r\nmine; it is yours to kill and mine to die intrepid; yours to\r\nbanish, mine to depart untroubled.\u0027 How do we act in a\r\nvoyage? We choose the pilot, the sailors, the hour. Afterwards\r\ncomes a storm. What have I to care for? My part\r\nis performed. This matter belongs to the pilot. But the\r\nship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone\r\nI can do—submit to being drowned without fear, without\r\nclamor or accusing of God, but as one who knows that\r\nwhat is born must likewise die.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_265_265\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_265_265\"\u003e[265]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis Stoic fashion, though efficacious and heroic enough\r\nin its place and time, is, it must be confessed, only possible\r\nas an habitual mood of the soul to narrow and unsympathetic\r\ncharacters. It proceeds altogether by exclusion. If\r\nI am a Stoic, the goods I cannot appropriate cease to be \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngoods, and the temptation lies very near to deny that they\r\nare goods at all. We find this mode of protecting the Self\r\nby exclusion and denial very common among people who\r\nare in other respects not Stoics. All narrow people \u003ci\u003eintrench\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntheir Me, they \u003ci\u003eretract\u003c/i\u003e it,—from the region of what they cannot\r\nsecurely possess. People who don\u0027t resemble them, or\r\nwho treat them with indifference, people over whom they\r\ngain no influence, are people on whose existence, however\r\nmeritorious it may intrinsically be, they look with chill\r\nnegation, if not with positive hate. Who will not be mine\r\nI will exclude from existence altogether; that is, as far as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_313\"\u003e[Pg 313]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nI can make it so, such people shall be as if they were not.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_266_266\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_266_266\"\u003e[266]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThus may a certain absoluteness and definiteness in the\r\noutline of my Me console me for the smallness of its content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSympathetic people, on the contrary, proceed by the\r\nentirely opposite way of expansion and inclusion. The outline\r\nof their self often gets uncertain enough, but for this\r\nthe spread of its content more than atones. \u003ci\u003eNil humani a\r\nme alienum.\u003c/i\u003e Let them despise this little person of mine,\r\nand treat me like a dog, \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e shall not negate \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e so long as\r\nI have a soul in my body. They are realities as much as I\r\nam. What positive good is in them shall be mine too, etc.,\r\netc. The magnanimity of these expansive natures is often\r\ntouching indeed. Such persons can feel a sort of delicate\r\nrapture in thinking that, however sick, ill-favored, mean-conditioned,\r\nand generally forsaken they may be, they yet\r\nare integral parts of the whole of this brave world, have a\r\nfellow\u0027s share in the strength of the dray-horses, the happiness\r\nof the young people, the wisdom of the wise ones,\r\nand are not altogether without part or lot in the good fortunes\r\nof the Vanderbilts and the Hohenzollerns themselves.\r\nThus either by negating or by embracing, the Ego may\r\nseek to establish itself in reality. He who, with Marcus\r\nAurelius, can truly say, \"O Universe, I wish all that thou\r\nwishest,\" has a self from which every trace of negativeness\r\nand obstructiveness has been removed—no wind can blow\r\nexcept to fill its sails.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different\r\nselves of which a man may be \u0027seized and possessed,\u0027 and\r\nthe consequent different orders of his self-regard, in an\r\n\u003ci\u003ehierarchical scale, with the bodily Self at the bottom, the\r\nspiritual Self at top, and the extracorporeal material selves\r\nand the various social selves between\u003c/i\u003e. Our merely natural\r\nself-seeking would lead us to aggrandize all these selves;\r\nwe give up deliberately only those among them which we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_314\"\u003e[Pg 314]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfind we cannot keep. Our unselfishness is thus apt to be a\r\n\u0027virtue of necessity\u0027; and it is not without all show of reason\r\nthat cynics quote the fable of the fox and the grapes in\r\ndescribing our progress therein. But this is the moral\r\neducation of the race; and if we agree in the result that\r\non the whole the selves we can keep are the intrinsically\r\nbest, we need not complain of being led to the knowledge\r\nof their superior worth in such a tortuous way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course this is not the only way in which we learn\r\nto subordinate our lower selves to our higher. A direct\r\nethical judgment unquestionably also plays its part, and last,\r\nnot least, we apply to our own persons judgments originally\r\ncalled forth by the acts of others. It is one of the strangest\r\nlaws of our nature that many things which we are well satisfied\r\nwith in ourselves disgust us when seen in others.\r\nWith another man\u0027s bodily \u0027hoggishness\u0027 hardly anyone\r\nhas any sympathy;—almost as little with his cupidity, his\r\nsocial vanity and eagerness, his jealousy, his despotism,\r\nand his pride. Left absolutely to myself I should probably\r\nallow all these spontaneous tendencies to luxuriate in me\r\nunchecked, and it would be long before I formed a distinct\r\nnotion of the order of their subordination. But having\r\nconstantly to pass judgment on my associates, I come ere\r\nlong to see, as Herr Horwicz says, my own lusts in the\r\nmirror of the lusts of others, and to \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e about them in a\r\nvery different way from that in which I simply \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e. Of\r\ncourse, the moral generalities which from childhood have\r\nbeen instilled into me accelerate enormously the advent of\r\nthis reflective judgment on myself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo it comes to pass that, as aforesaid, men have arranged\r\nthe various selves which they may seek in an hierarchical\r\nscale according to their worth. A certain amount of bodily\r\nselfishness is required as a basis for all the other selves.\r\nBut too much sensuality is despised, or at best condoned\r\non account of the other qualities of the individual. The\r\nwider material selves are regarded as higher than the\r\nimmediate body. He is esteemed a poor creature who is\r\nunable to forego a little meat and drink and warmth and\r\nsleep for the sake of getting on in the world. The social\r\nself as a whole, again, ranks higher than the material self\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_315\"\u003e[Pg 315]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas a whole. We must care more for our honor, our friends,\r\nour human ties, than for a sound skin or wealth. And the\r\nspiritual self is so supremely precious that, rather than\r\nlose it, a man ought to be willing to give up friends and\r\ngood fame, and property, and life itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn each kind of self, material, social, and spiritual, men\r\ndistinguish between the immediate and actual, and the remote\r\nand potential,\u003c/i\u003e between the narrower and the wider\r\nview, to the detriment of the former and advantage of the\r\nlatter. One must forego a present bodily enjoyment for\r\nthe sake of one\u0027s general health; one must abandon the\r\ndollar in the hand for the sake of the hundred dollars to\r\ncome; one must make an enemy of his present interlocutor\r\nif thereby one makes friends of a more valued circle; one\r\nmust go without learning and grace, and wit, the better to\r\ncompass one\u0027s soul\u0027s salvation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf all these wider, more potential selves, \u003ci\u003ethe potential\r\nsocial self\u003c/i\u003e is the most interesting, by reason of certain\r\napparent paradoxes to which it leads in conduct, and by\r\nreason of its connection with our moral and religious life.\r\nWhen for motives of honor and conscience I brave the condemnation\r\nof my own family, club, and \u0027set\u0027; when, as a\r\nprotestant, I turn catholic; as a catholic, freethinker; as a\r\n\u0027regular practitioner,\u0027 homœopath, or what not, I am always\r\ninwardly strengthened in my course and steeled against the\r\nloss of my actual social self by the thought of other and\r\nbetter \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e social judges than those whose verdict goes\r\nagainst me now. The ideal social self which I thus seek\r\nin appealing to their decision may be very remote: it may\r\nbe represented as barely possible. I may not hope for its\r\nrealization during my lifetime; I may even expect the\r\nfuture generations, which would approve me if they knew\r\nme, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone.\r\nYet still the emotion that beckons me on is indubitably\r\nthe pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least\r\n\u003ci\u003eworthy\u003c/i\u003e of approving recognition by the highest \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e\r\njudging companion, if such companion there be.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_267_267\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_267_267\"\u003e[267]\u003c/a\u003e This\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_316\"\u003e[Pg 316]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nself is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent\r\nMe which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute\r\nMind, the \u0027Great Companion.\u0027 We hear, in these days of\r\nscientific enlightenment, a great deal of discussion about\r\nthe efficacy of prayer; and many reasons are given us why\r\nwe should not pray, whilst others are given us why we\r\nshould. But in all this very little is said of the reason why\r\nwe \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e pray, which is simply that we cannot \u003ci\u003ehelp\u003c/i\u003e praying.\r\nIt seems probable that, in spite of all that \u0027science\u0027 may do\r\nto the contrary, men will continue to pray to the end of time,\r\nunless their mental nature changes in a manner which\r\nnothing we know should lead us to expect. The impulse\r\nto pray is a necessary consequence of the fact that whilst\r\nthe innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a Self of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e sort, it yet can find its only adequate \u003ci\u003eSocius\u003c/i\u003e in an\r\nideal world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll progress in the social Self is the substitution of\r\nhigher tribunals for lower; this ideal tribunal is the highest;\r\nand most men, either continually or occasionally,\r\ncarry a reference to it in their breast. The humblest outcast\r\non this earth can feel himself to be real and valid by\r\nmeans of this higher recognition. And, on the other hand,\r\nfor most of us, a world with no such inner refuge when the\r\nouter social self failed and dropped from us would be the\r\nabyss of horror. I say \u0027for most of us,\u0027 because it is\r\nprobable that individuals differ a good deal in the degree\r\nin which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal spectator.\r\nIt is a much more essential part of the consciousness\r\nof some men than of others. Those who have the most of\r\nit are possibly the most \u003ci\u003ereligious\u003c/i\u003e men. But I am sure that\r\neven those who say they are altogether without it deceive\r\nthemselves, and really have it in some degree. Only a\r\nnon-gregarious animal could be completely without it.\r\nProbably no one can make sacrifices for \u0027right,\u0027 without\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_317\"\u003e[Pg 317]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto some degree personifying the principle of right for\r\nwhich the sacrifice is made, and expecting thanks from it.\r\n\u003ci\u003eComplete\u003c/i\u003e social unselfishness, in other words, can hardly\r\nexist; \u003ci\u003ecomplete\u003c/i\u003e social suicide hardly occur to a man\u0027s mind.\r\nEven such texts as Job\u0027s, \"Though He slay me yet will I\r\ntrust Him,\" or Marcus Aurelius\u0027s, \"If gods hate me and\r\nmy children, there is a reason for it,\" can least of all be\r\ncited to prove the contrary. For beyond all doubt Job\r\nrevelled in the thought of Jehovah\u0027s recognition of the worship\r\nafter the slaying should have been done; and the Roman\r\nemperor felt sure the Absolute Reason would not be all\r\nindifferent to his acquiescence in the gods\u0027 dislike. The\r\nold test of piety, \"Are you willing to be damned for the\r\nglory of God?\" was probably never answered in the affirmative\r\nexcept by those who felt sure in their heart of hearts\r\nthat God would \u0027credit\u0027 them with their willingness, and\r\nset more store by them thus than if in His unfathomable\r\nscheme He had not damned them at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll this about the impossibility of suicide is said on the\r\nsupposition of \u003ci\u003epositive\u003c/i\u003e motives. When possessed by the\r\nemotion of \u003ci\u003efear\u003c/i\u003e, however, we are in a \u003ci\u003enegative\u003c/i\u003e state of mind;\r\nthat is, our desire is limited to the mere banishing of something,\r\nwithout regard to what shall take its place. In this\r\nstate of mind there can unquestionably be genuine thoughts,\r\nand genuine acts, of suicide, spiritual and social, as well as\r\nbodily. Anything, \u003ci\u003eanything\u003c/i\u003e, at such times, so as to escape\r\nand not to be! But such conditions of suicidal frenzy are\r\npathological in their nature and run dead against everything\r\nthat is regular in the life of the Self in man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eWHAT SELF IS LOVED IN \u0027SELF-LOVE\u0027?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe must now try to interpret the facts of self-love and\r\nself-seeking a little more delicately from within.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA man in whom self-seeking of any sort is largely\r\ndeveloped is said to be selfish.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_268_268\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_268_268\"\u003e[268]\u003c/a\u003e He is on the other hand\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_318\"\u003e[Pg 318]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncalled unselfish if he shows consideration for the interests of\r\nother selves than his own. Now what is the intimate \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the selfish emotion in him? and what is the primary\r\n\u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of its regard? We have described him pursuing and\r\nfostering as his self first one set of things and then another;\r\nwe have seen the same set of facts gain or lose interest in his\r\neyes, leave him indifferent, or fill him either with triumph\r\nor despair according as he made pretensions to appropriate\r\nthem, treated them as if they were potentially or actually\r\nparts of himself, or not. We know how little it matters to\r\nus whether \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e man, a man taken at large and in the\r\nabstract, prove a failure or succeed in life,—he may be\r\nhanged for aught we care,—but we know the utter momentousness\r\nand terribleness of the alternative when the man\r\nis the one whose name we ourselves bear. \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e must not be\r\na failure, is the very loudest of the voices that clamor in\r\neach of our breasts: let fail who may, \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e at least must succeed.\r\nNow the first conclusion which these facts suggest\r\nis that each of us is animated by a \u003ci\u003edirect feeling of regard\r\nfor his own pure principle of individual existence\u003c/i\u003e, whatever\r\nthat may be, taken merely as such. It appears as if all our\r\nconcrete manifestations of selfishness might be the conclusions\r\nof as many syllogisms, each with this principle as the\r\nsubject of its major premiss, thus: Whatever is me is\r\nprecious; this is me; therefore this is precious; whatever\r\nis mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore this must\r\nnot fail, etc. It appears, I say, as if this principle inoculated\r\nall it touched with its own intimate quality of worth;\r\nas if, previous to the touching, everything might be matter\r\nof indifference, and nothing interesting in its own right; as\r\nif my regard for my own body even were an interest not\r\nsimply in this body, but in this body only so far as it is\r\nmine.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut what is this abstract numerical principle of identity,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_319\"\u003e[Pg 319]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis \u0027Number One\u0027 within me, for which, according to proverbial\r\nphilosophy, I am supposed to keep so constant a\r\n\u0027lookout\u0027? Is it the inner nucleus of my spiritual self, that\r\ncollection of obscurely felt \u0027adjustments,\u0027 \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e perhaps that\r\nstill more obscurely perceived subjectivity as such, of which\r\nwe recently spoke? Or is it perhaps the concrete stream\r\nof my thought in its entirety, or some one section of the\r\nsame? Or may it be the indivisible Soul-Substance, in\r\nwhich, according to the orthodox tradition, my faculties\r\ninhere? Or, finally, can it be the mere pronoun I? Surely\r\nit is none of these things, that self for which I feel such hot\r\nregard. Though all of them together were put within me,\r\nI should still be cold, and fail to exhibit anything worthy\r\nof the name of selfishness or of devotion to \u0027Number One.\u0027\r\nTo have a self that I can \u003ci\u003ecare for\u003c/i\u003e, nature must first present\r\nme with some \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e interesting enough to make me instinctively\r\nwish to appropriate it for its \u003ci\u003eown\u003c/i\u003e sake, and out of it\r\nto manufacture one of those material, social, or spiritual\r\nselves, which we have already passed in review. We shall\r\nfind that all the facts of rivalry and substitution that have\r\nso struck us, all the shiftings and expansions and contractions\r\nof the sphere of what shall be considered me and\r\nmine, are but results of the fact that certain \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e appeal\r\nto primitive and instinctive impulses of our nature, and\r\nthat we follow their destinies with an excitement that owes\r\nnothing to a reflective source. These objects our consciousness\r\ntreats as the primordial constituents of its Me.\r\nWhatever other objects, whether by association with the\r\nfate of these, or in any other way, come to be followed with\r\nthe same sort of interest, form our remoter and more secondary\r\nself. \u003ci\u003eThe words\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eme,\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ethen, and\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eself,\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eso far as they\r\narouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eobjective\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003edesignations, meaning\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eall the things\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ewhich have the power\r\nto produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a\r\ncertain peculiar sort.\u003c/i\u003e Let us try to justify this proposition\r\nin detail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most palpable selfishness of a man is his bodily\r\nselfishness; and his most palpable self is the body to which\r\nthat selfishness relates. Now I say that he identifies himself\r\nwith this body because he loves \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e, and that he does\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_320\"\u003e[Pg 320]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot love it because he finds it to be identified with himself.\r\nReverting to natural history-psychology will help us to see\r\nthe truth of this. In the chapter on Instincts we shall\r\nlearn that every creature has a certain selective interest in\r\ncertain portions of the world, and that this interest is as\r\noften connate as acquired. Our \u003ci\u003einterest in things\u003c/i\u003e means\r\nthe attention and emotion which the thought of them will\r\nexcite, and the actions which their presence will evoke.\r\nThus every species is particularly interested in its own\r\nprey or food, its own enemies, its own sexual mates, and\r\nits own young. These things fascinate by their intrinsic\r\npower to do so; they are cared for for their own sakes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, it stands not in the least otherwise with our bodies.\r\nThey too are percepts in our objective field—they are\r\nsimply the most interesting percepts there. What happens\r\nto them excites in us emotions and tendencies to action\r\nmore energetic and habitual than any which are excited by\r\nother portions of the \u0027field.\u0027 What my comrades call my\r\nbodily selfishness or self-love, is nothing but the sum of\r\nall the outer acts which this interest in my body spontaneously\r\ndraws from me. My \u0027selfishness\u0027 is here but a descriptive\r\nname for grouping together the outward symptoms\r\nwhich I show. When I am led by self-love to keep\r\nmy seat whilst ladies stand, or to grab something first and\r\ncut out my neighbor, what I really love is the comfortable\r\nseat, is the thing itself which I grab. I love them primarily,\r\nas the mother loves her babe, or a generous man an\r\nheroic deed. Wherever, as here, self-seeking is the outcome\r\nof simple instinctive propensity, it is but a name for\r\ncertain reflex acts. Something rivets my attention fatally,\r\nand fatally provokes the \u0027selfish\u0027 response. Could an automaton\r\nbe so skilfully constructed as to ape these acts, it\r\nwould be called selfish as properly as I. It is true that I\r\nam no automaton, but a thinker. But my thoughts, like\r\nmy acts, are here concerned only with the outward things.\r\nThey need neither know nor care for any pure principle\r\nwithin. In fact the more utterly \u0027selfish\u0027 I am in this\r\nprimitive way, the more blindly absorbed my thought will\r\nbe in the objects and impulses of my lusts, and the more\r\ndevoid of any inward looking glance. A baby, whose consciousness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_321\"\u003e[Pg 321]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the pure Ego, of himself as a thinker, is not\r\nusually supposed developed, is, in this way, as some German\r\nhas said, \u0027\u003ci\u003eder vollendeteste Egoist\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 His corporeal person,\r\nand what ministers to its needs, are the only self he\r\ncan possibly be said to love. His so-called self-love is but\r\na name for his insensibility to all but this one set of things.\r\nIt may be that he needs a pure principle of subjectivity, a\r\nsoul or pure Ego (he certainly needs a stream of thought)\r\nto make him sensible at all to anything, to make him discriminate\r\nand love \u003ci\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/i\u003e,—how that may be, we shall\r\nsee ere long; but this pure Ego, which would then be the\r\n\u003ci\u003econdition\u003c/i\u003e of his loving, need no more be the \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of his\r\nlove than it need be the object of his thought. If his interests\r\nlay altogether in other bodies than his own, if all\r\nhis instincts were altruistic and all his acts suicidal, still he\r\nwould need a principle of \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e just as he does now.\r\nSuch a principle cannot then be the principle of his bodily\r\n\u003ci\u003eselfishness\u003c/i\u003e any more than it is the principle of any other tendency\r\nhe may show.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the bodily self-love. But my \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e self-love,\r\nmy interest in the images other men have framed of\r\nme, is also an interest in a set of objects external to my\r\nthought. These thoughts in other men\u0027s minds are out of\r\nmy mind and \u0027ejective\u0027 to me. They come and go, and\r\ngrow and dwindle, and I am puffed up with pride, or blush\r\nwith shame, at the result, just as at my success or failure\r\nin the pursuit of a material thing. So that here again, just\r\nas in the former case, the pure principle seems out of the\r\ngame as an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of regard, and present only as the general\r\nform or condition under which the regard and the thinking\r\ngo on in me at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, it will immediately be objected, this is giving a\r\nmutilated account of the facts. Those images of me in the\r\nminds of other men are, it is true, things outside of me,\r\nwhose changes I perceive just as I perceive any other outward\r\nchange. But the pride and shame which I feel are\r\nnot concerned merely with \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e changes. I feel as if something\r\nelse had changed too, when I perceive my image in\r\nyour mind to have changed for the worse, something in me\r\nto which that image belongs, and which a moment ago I felt\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_322\"\u003e[Pg 322]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninside of me, big and strong and lusty, but now weak, contracted,\r\nand collapsed. Is not this latter change the change\r\nI feel the shame about? Is not the condition of this thing\r\ninside of me the proper object of my egoistic concern, of my\r\nself-regard? And is it not, after all, my pure Ego, my bare\r\nnumerical principle of distinction from other men, and no\r\nempirical part of me at all?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo, it is no such pure principle, it is simply my total\r\nempirical selfhood again, my historic Me, a collection of\r\nobjective facts, to which the depreciated image in your mind\r\n\u0027belongs.\u0027 In what capacity is it that I claim and demand\r\na respectful greeting from you instead of this expression of\r\ndisdain? It is not as being a bare I that I claim it; it is\r\nas being an I who has always been treated with respect,\r\nwho belongs to a certain family and \u0027set,\u0027 who has certain\r\npowers, possessions, and public functions, sensibilities,\r\nduties, and purposes, and merits and deserts. All this is\r\nwhat your disdain negates and contradicts; this is \u0027the\r\nthing inside of me\u0027 whose changed treatment I feel the\r\nshame about; this is what was lusty, and now, in consequence\r\nof your conduct, is collapsed; and this certainly is\r\nan empirical objective thing. Indeed, the thing that is felt\r\nmodified and changed for the worse during my feeling of\r\nshame is often more concrete even than this,—it is simply\r\nmy bodily person, in which your conduct immediately and\r\nwithout any reflection at all on my part works those\r\nmuscular, glandular, and vascular changes which together\r\nmake up the \u0027expression\u0027 of shame. In this instinctive,\r\nreflex sort of shame, the body is just as much the entire\r\nvehicle of the self-feeling as, in the coarser cases which we\r\nfirst took up, it was the vehicle of the self-seeking. As, in\r\nsimple \u0027hoggishness,\u0027 a succulent morsel gives rise, by the\r\nreflex mechanism, to behavior which the bystanders find\r\n\u0027greedy,\u0027 and consider to flow from a certain sort of \u0027self-regard;\u0027\r\nso here your disdain gives rise, by a mechanism\r\nquite as reflex and immediate, to another sort of behavior,\r\nwhich the bystanders call \u0027shame-faced\u0027 and which they\r\nconsider due to another kind of self-regard. But in both\r\ncases there may be no particular self \u003ci\u003eregarded\u003c/i\u003e at all by the\r\nmind: and the name self-regard may be only a descriptive\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_323\"\u003e[Pg 323]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntitle imposed from without the reflex acts themselves, and\r\nthe feelings that immediately result from their discharge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter the bodily and social selves come the spiritual.\r\nBut which of my spiritual selves do I really care for? My\r\nSoul-substance? my \u0027transcendental Ego, or Thinker\u0027?\r\nmy pronoun I? my subjectivity as such? my nucleus of\r\ncephalic adjustments? or my more phenomenal and perishable\r\npowers, my loves and hates, willingnesses and sensibilities,\r\nand the like? Surely the latter. But they, relatively\r\nto the central principle, whatever it may be, are external\r\nand objective. They come and go, and it remains—\"so\r\nshakes the magnet, and so stands the pole.\" It may indeed\r\nhave to be there for them to be loved, but being there is\r\nnot identical with being loved itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo sum up, then, \u003ci\u003ewe see no reason to suppose that \u0027self-love\u0027\r\nis primarily, or secondarily, or ever, love for one\u0027s mere principle\r\nof conscious identity.\u003c/i\u003e It is always love for something\r\nwhich, as compared with that principle, is superficial, transient,\r\nliable to be taken up or dropped at will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd zoological psychology again comes to the aid of\r\nour understanding and shows us that this must needs be\r\nso. In fact, in answering the question what things it is that\r\na man loves in his self-love, we have implicitly answered the\r\nfarther question, of why he loves them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnless his consciousness were something more than\r\ncognitive, unless it experienced a partiality for certain of\r\nthe objects, which, in succession, occupy its ken, it could\r\nnot long maintain itself in existence; for, by an inscrutable\r\nnecessity, each human mind\u0027s appearance on this earth is\r\nconditioned upon the integrity of the body with which it\r\nbelongs, upon the treatment which that body gets from\r\nothers, and upon the spiritual dispositions which use it as\r\ntheir tool, and lead it either towards longevity or to destruction.\r\n\u003ci\u003eIts own body, then, first of all, its friends next, and\r\nfinally its spiritual dispositions,\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ebe the supremely interesting\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eobjects\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003efor each human mind.\u003c/i\u003e Each mind, to\r\nbegin with, must have a certain minimum of selfishness in\r\nthe shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist.\r\nThis minimum must be there as a basis for all farther conscious\r\nacts, whether of self-negation or of a selfishness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_324\"\u003e[Pg 324]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore subtle still. All minds must have come, by the way\r\nof the survival of the fittest, if by no directer path, to take\r\nan intense interest in the bodies to which they are yoked,\r\naltogether apart from any interest in the pure Ego which\r\nthey also possess.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd similarly with the images of their person in the\r\nminds of others. I should not be extant now had I not become\r\nsensitive to looks of approval or disapproval on the\r\nfaces among which my life is cast. Looks of contempt cast\r\non other persons need affect me in no such peculiar way.\r\nWere my mental life dependent exclusively on some other\r\nperson\u0027s welfare, either directly or in an indirect way, then\r\nnatural selection would unquestionably have brought it\r\nabout that I should be as sensitive to the social vicissitudes\r\nof that other person as I now am to my own. Instead of\r\nbeing egoistic I should be spontaneously altruistic, then.\r\nBut in this case, only partially realized in actual human\r\nconditions, though the self I empirically love would have\r\nchanged, my pure Ego or Thinker would have to remain\r\njust what it is now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy spiritual powers, again, must interest me more than\r\nthose of other people, and for the same reason. I should\r\nnot be here at all unless I had cultivated them and kept\r\nthem from decay. And the same law which made me once\r\ncare for them makes me care for them still.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMy own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the\r\nprimitive object, instinctively determined, of my egoistic interests.\r\nOther objects may become interesting derivatively\u003c/i\u003e through\r\nassociation with any of these things, either as means or as\r\nhabitual concomitants; \u003ci\u003eand so in a thousand ways the primitive\r\nsphere of the egoistic emotions may enlarge\u003c/i\u003e and change\r\nits boundaries.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis sort of interest is really the \u003ci\u003emeaning of the word\r\n\u0027my.\u0027\u003c/i\u003e Whatever has it is \u003ci\u003eeo ipso\u003c/i\u003e a part of me. My child,\r\nmy friend dies, and where he goes I feel that part of myself\r\nnow is and evermore shall be:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"For this losing is true dying;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eThis is lordly man\u0027s down-lying;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eThis his slow but sure reclining,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eStar by star his world resigning.\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_325\"\u003e[Pg 325]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fact remains, however, that certain special sorts of\r\nthing tend primordially to possess this interest, and form\r\nthe \u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e me. But all these things are \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e, properly\r\nso called, to the subject which does the thinking.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_269_269\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_269_269\"\u003e[269]\u003c/a\u003e And\r\nthis latter fact upsets at once the dictum of the old-fashioned\r\nsensationalist psychology, that altruistic passions\r\nand interests are contradictory to the nature of things, and\r\nthat if they appear anywhere to exist, it must be as secondary\r\nproducts, resolvable at bottom into cases of selfishness,\r\ntaught by experience a hypocritical disguise. If the zoological\r\nand evolutionary point of view is the true one, there is\r\nno reason why any object whatever \u003ci\u003emight\u003c/i\u003e not arouse passion\r\nand interest as primitively and instinctively as any other,\r\nwhether connected or not with the interests of the me.\r\nThe phenomenon of passion is in origin and essence the\r\nsame, whatever be the target upon which it is discharged;\r\nand what the target actually happens to be is solely a question\r\nof fact. I might conceivably be as much fascinated,\r\nand as primitively so, by the care of my neighbor\u0027s body\r\nas by the care of my own. The only check to such exuberant\r\naltruistic interests is natural selection, which would\r\nweed out such as were very harmful to the individual or to\r\nhis tribe. Many such interests, however, remain unweeded\r\nout—the interest in the opposite sex, for example, which\r\nseems in mankind stronger than is called for by its utilitarian\r\nneed; and alongside of them remain interests, like\r\nthat in alcoholic intoxication, or in musical sounds, which,\r\nfor aught we can see, are without any utility whatever.\r\nThe sympathetic instincts and the egoistic ones are thus\r\nco-ordinate. They arise, so far as we can tell, on the same\r\npsychologic level. The only difference between them is,\r\nthat the instincts called egoistic form much the larger mass.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only author whom I know to have discussed the\r\nquestion whether the \u0027pure Ego,\u0027 \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, can be an object\r\nof regard, is Herr Horwicz, in his extremely able and acute\r\n\u003ci\u003ePsychologische Analysen\u003c/i\u003e. He too says that all self-regard\r\nis regard for certain objective things. He disposes so well\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_326\"\u003e[Pg 326]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof one kind of objection that I must conclude by quoting a\r\npart of his own words:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, the objection:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The fact is indubitable that one\u0027s own children always pass for\r\nthe prettiest and brightest, the wine from one\u0027s own cellar for the best—at\r\nleast for its price,—one\u0027s own house and horses for the finest.\r\nWith what tender admiration do we con over our own little deed of\r\nbenevolence! our own frailties and misdemeanors, how ready we are to\r\nacquit ourselves for them, when we notice them at all, on the ground of\r\n\u0027extenuating circumstances\u0027! How much more really comic are our\r\nown jokes than those of others, which, unlike ours, will not bear being\r\nrepeated ten or twelve times over! How eloquent, striking, powerful,\r\nour own speeches are! How appropriate our own address! In short,\r\nhow much more intelligent, soulful, better, is everything about us than\r\nin anyone else. The sad chapter of artists\u0027 and authors\u0027 conceit and\r\nvanity belongs here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The prevalence of this obvious preference which we feel for everything\r\nof our own is indeed striking. Does it not look as if our dear Ego\r\nmust first lend its color and flavor to anything in order to make it please\r\nus?… Is it not the simplest explanation for all these phenomena, so\r\nconsistent among themselves, to suppose that the Ego, the self, which\r\nforms the origin and centre of our \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e life, is at the same time the\r\noriginal and central object of our life of feeling, and the ground both\r\nof whatever special ideas and of whatever special feelings ensue?\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHerr Horwicz goes on to refer to what we have already\r\nnoticed, that various things which disgust us in others do\r\nnot disgust us at all in ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To most of us even the bodily warmth of another, for example the\r\nchair warm from another\u0027s sitting, is felt unpleasantly, whereas there\r\nis nothing disagreeable in the warmth of the chair in which we have\r\nbeen sitting ourselves.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter some further remarks, he replies to these facts\r\nand reasonings as follows;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We may with confidence affirm that our own possessions in most\r\ncases please us better [not because they are ours], but simply because we\r\nknow them better, \u0027realize\u0027 them more intimately, feel them more\r\ndeeply. We learn to appreciate what is ours in all its details and shadings,\r\nwhilst the goods of others appear to us in coarse outlines and rude\r\naverages. Here are some examples: A piece of music which one plays\r\none\u0027s self is heard and understood better than when it is played by another.\r\nWe get more exactly all the details, penetrate more deeply into\r\nthe musical thought. We may meanwhile perceive perfectly well that\r\nthe other person is the better performer, and yet nevertheless—at times—get\r\nmore enjoyment from our own playing because it brings the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_327\"\u003e[Pg 327]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmelody and harmony so much nearer home to us. This case may almost\r\nbe taken as typical for the other cases of self-love. On close examination,\r\nwe shall almost always find that a great part of our feeling about\r\nwhat is ours is due to the fact that we \u003ci\u003elive closer\u003c/i\u003e to our own things, and\r\nso feel them more thoroughly and deeply. As a friend of mine was\r\nabout to marry, he often bored me by the repeated and minute way in\r\nwhich he would discuss the details of his new household arrangements.\r\nI wondered that so intellectual a man should be so deeply interested in\r\nthings of so external a nature. But as I entered, a few years later, the\r\nsame condition myself, these matters acquired for me an entirely different\r\ninterest, and it became my turn to turn them over and talk of them\r\nunceasingly…. The reason was simply this, that in the first instance\r\nI \u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e nothing of these things and their importance for domestic\r\ncomfort, whilst in the latter ease they came home to me with irresistible\r\nurgency, and vividly took possession of my fancy. So it is with many\r\na one who mocks at decorations and titles, until he gains one himself.\r\nAnd this is also surely the reason why one\u0027s own portrait or reflection in\r\nthe mirror is so peculiarly interesting a thing to contemplate … not on\r\naccount of any absolute \u0027\u003ci\u003ec\u0027est moi\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 but just as with the music played\r\nby ourselves. What greets our eyes is what we know best, most deeply\r\nunderstand; because we ourselves have felt it and lived through it. We\r\nknow what has ploughed these furrows, deepened these shadows,\r\nblanched this hair; and other faces may be handsomer, but none can\r\nspeak to us or interest us like this.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_270_270\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_270_270\"\u003e[270]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, this author goes on to show that our own\r\nthings are \u003ci\u003efuller\u003c/i\u003e for us than those of others because of the\r\nmemories they awaken and the practical hopes and expectations\r\nthey arouse. This alone would emphasize them, apart\r\nfrom any value derived from their belonging to ourselves.\r\nWe may conclude with him, then, that \u003ci\u003ean original central\r\nself-feeling can never explain the passionate warmth of our self-regarding\r\nemotions, which must, on the contrary, be addressed\r\ndirectly to special things less abstract and empty of content. To\r\nthese things the name of \u0027self\u0027 may be given, or to our conduct\r\ntowards them the name of \u0027selfishness,\u0027 but neither in the self\r\nnor the selfishness does the pure Thinker play the \u0027title-role.\u0027\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly one more point connected with our self-regard need\r\nbe mentioned. We have spoken of it so far as active instinct\r\nor emotion. It remains to speak of it as cold \u003ci\u003eintellectual\r\nself-estimation\u003c/i\u003e. We may weigh our own Me in the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_328\"\u003e[Pg 328]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbalance of praise and blame as easily as we weigh other\r\npeople,—though with difficulty quite as fairly. The \u003ci\u003ejust\u003c/i\u003e\r\nman is the one who can weigh himself impartially. Impartial\r\nweighing presupposes a rare faculty of abstraction from\r\nthe vividness with which, as Herr Horwicz has pointed out,\r\nthings known as intimately as our own possessions and\r\nperformances appeal to our imagination; and an equally\r\nrare power of vividly representing the affairs of others. But,\r\ngranting these rare powers, there is no reason why a man\r\nshould not pass judgment on himself quite as objectively\r\nand well as on anyone else. No matter how he \u003ci\u003efeels\u003c/i\u003e about\r\nhimself, unduly elated or unduly depressed, he may still\r\ntruly \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e his own worth by measuring it by the outward\r\nstandard he applies to other men, and counteract the injustice\r\nof the feeling he cannot wholly escape. This self-measuring\r\nprocess has nothing to do with the instinctive\r\nself-regard we have hitherto been dealing with. Being\r\nmerely one application of intellectual comparison, it need\r\nno longer detain us here. Please note again, however, how\r\nthe pure Ego appears merely as the vehicle in which the\r\nestimation is carried on, the objects estimated being all of\r\nthem facts of an empirical sort,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_271_271\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_271_271\"\u003e[271]\u003c/a\u003e one\u0027s body, one\u0027s credit,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_329\"\u003e[Pg 329]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none\u0027 fame, one\u0027s intellectual ability, one\u0027s goodness, or\r\nwhatever the case may be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe empirical life of Self is divided, as below, into\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 2px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMATERIAL.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSOCIAL.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSPIRITUAL.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSELF-SEEKING.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eBodily Appetites and Instincts\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eDesire to please, be noticed, admired, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eIntellectual, Moral and Religious Aspiration, Conscientiousness.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eLove of Adornment, Foppery, Acquisitiveness, Constructiveness.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSociability, Emulation, Envy, Love, Pursuit of Honor, Ambition, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eLove of Home, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSELF-ESTIMATION.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ePersonal Vanity, Modesty, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSocial and Family Pride, Vainglory, Snobbery, Humility, Shame, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSense of Moral or Mental Superiority, Purity, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ePride of Wealth, Fear of Poverty\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSense of Inferiority or of Guilt\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PURE EGO.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving summed up in the above table the principal\r\nresults of the chapter thus far, I have said all that need\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_330\"\u003e[Pg 330]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe said of the constituents of the phenomenal self, and\r\nof the nature of self-regard. Our decks are consequently\r\ncleared for the struggle with that pure principle of personal\r\nidentity which has met us all along our preliminary exposition,\r\nbut which we have always shied from and treated as\r\na difficulty to be postponed. Ever since Hume\u0027s time, it\r\nhas been justly regarded as the most puzzling puzzle with\r\nwhich psychology has to deal; and whatever view one may\r\nespouse, one has to hold his position against heavy odds.\r\nIf, with the Spiritualists, one contend for a substantial soul,\r\nor transcendental principle of unity, one can give no positive\r\naccount of what that may be. And if, with the Humians,\r\none deny such a principle and say that the stream of passing\r\nthoughts is all, one runs against the entire common-sense\r\nof mankind, of which the belief in a distinct principle\r\nof selfhood seems an integral part. Whatever solution be\r\nadopted in the pages to come, we may as well make up our\r\nminds in advance that it will fail to satisfy the majority of\r\nthose to whom it is addressed. The best way of approaching\r\nthe matter will be to take up first—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Sense of Personal Identity.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the last chapter it was stated in as radical a way as\r\npossible that the thoughts which we actually know to exist\r\ndo not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_331\"\u003e[Pg 331]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthinker and not to another. Each thought, out of a multitude\r\nof other thoughts of which it may think, is able to\r\ndistinguish those which belong to its own Ego from those\r\nwhich do not. The former have a warmth and intimacy\r\nabout them of which the latter are completely devoid, being\r\nmerely conceived, in a cold and foreign fashion, and not\r\nappearing as blood-relatives, bringing their greetings to us\r\nfrom out of the past.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow this consciousness of personal sameness may be\r\ntreated either as a subjective phenomenon or as an objective\r\ndeliverance, as a feeling, or as a truth. We may explain\r\nhow one bit of thought can come to judge other bits\r\nto belong to the same Ego with itself; or we may criticise\r\nits judgment and decide how far it may tally with the\r\nnature of things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a mere subjective phenomenon the judgment presents\r\nno difficulty or mystery peculiar to itself. It belongs to\r\nthe great class of judgments of sameness; and there is\r\nnothing more remarkable in making a judgment of sameness\r\nin the first person than in the second or the third.\r\nThe intellectual operations seem essentially alike, whether\r\nI say \u0027I am the same,\u0027 or whether I say \u0027the pen is the\r\nsame, as yesterday.\u0027 It is as easy to think this as to think\r\nthe opposite and say \u0027neither I nor the pen is the same.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis sort of \u003ci\u003ebringing of things together into the object of a\r\nsingle judgment\u003c/i\u003e is of course essential to all thinking. The\r\nthings are conjoined \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the thought, whatever may be the\r\nrelation in which they appear to the thought. The thinking\r\nthem is \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e them together, even if only with the result\r\nof judging that they do not \u003ci\u003ebelong\u003c/i\u003e together. This sort of\r\n\u003ci\u003esubjective synthesis\u003c/i\u003e, essential to knowledge as such (whenever\r\nit has a complex object), must not be confounded with\r\n\u003ci\u003eobjective synthesis\u003c/i\u003e or union instead of difference or disconnection,\r\nknown among the things.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_272_272\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_272_272\"\u003e[272]\u003c/a\u003e The subjective synthesis\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_332\"\u003e[Pg 332]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthesis is involved in thought\u0027s mere existence. Even a\r\nreally disconnected world could only be \u003ci\u003eknown\u003c/i\u003e to be such\r\nby having its parts temporarily united in the Object of some\r\npulse of consciousness.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_273_273\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_273_273\"\u003e[273]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sense of personal identity is not, then, this mere\r\nsynthetic form essential to all thought. It is the sense of a\r\nsameness perceived \u003ci\u003eby\u003c/i\u003e thought and predicated of things\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought-about\u003c/i\u003e. These things are a present self and a self\r\nof yesterday. The thought not only thinks them both, but\r\nthinks that they are identical. The psychologist, looking on\r\nand playing the critic, might prove the thought wrong, and\r\nshow there was no real identity,—there might have been no\r\nyesterday, or, at any rate, no self of yesterday; or, if there\r\nwere, the sameness predicated might not obtain, or might\r\nbe predicated on insufficient grounds. In either case the\r\npersonal identity would not exist as a \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e; but it would\r\nexist as a \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e all the same; the consciousness of it by\r\nthe thought would be there, and the psychologist would\r\nstill have to analyze that, and show where its illusoriness\r\nlay. Let us now be the psychologist and see whether it be\r\nright or wrong when it says, \u003ci\u003eI am the same self that I was\r\nyesterday\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may immediately call it right and intelligible so far\r\nas it posits a past time with past thoughts or selves contained\r\ntherein—these were data which we assumed at the\r\noutset of the book. Right also and intelligible so far as it\r\nthinks of a present self—that present self we have just\r\nstudied in its various forms. The only question for us is\r\nas to what the consciousness may mean when it calls the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_333\"\u003e[Pg 333]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npresent self the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e with one of the past selves which it\r\nhas in mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe spoke a moment since of warmth and intimacy.\r\nThis leads us to the answer sought. For, whatever the\r\nthought we are criticising may think about its present self,\r\nthat self comes to its acquaintance, or is actually felt, with\r\nwarmth and intimacy. Of course this is the case with the\r\n\u003ci\u003ebodily\u003c/i\u003e part of it; we feel the whole cubic mass of our body\r\nall the while, it gives us an unceasing sense of personal\r\nexistence. Equally do we feel the inner \u0027nucleus of the\r\nspiritual self,\u0027 either in the shape of yon faint physiological\r\nadjustments, or (adopting the universal psychological belief),\r\nin that of the pure activity of our thought taking\r\nplace as such. Our remoter spiritual, material, and social\r\nselves, so far as they are realized, come also with a glow\r\nand a warmth; for the thought of them infallibly brings\r\nsome degree of organic emotion in the shape of quickened\r\nheart-beats, oppressed breathing, or some other alteration,\r\neven though it be a slight one, in the general bodily tone.\r\nThe character of \u0027warmth,\u0027 then, in the present self, reduces\r\nitself to either of two things,—something in the feeling\r\nwhich we have of the thought itself, as thinking, or else\r\nthe feeling of the body\u0027s actual existence at the moment,—or\r\nfinally to both. We cannot realize our present self without\r\nsimultaneously feeling one or other of these two things.\r\nAny other fact which brings these two things with it into\r\nconsciousness will be thought with a warmth and an intimacy\r\nlike those which cling to the present self.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny \u003ci\u003edistant\u003c/i\u003e self which fulfils this condition will be\r\nthought with such warmth and intimacy. But which\r\ndistant selves \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e fulfil the condition, when represented?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObviously those, and only those, which fulfilled it when\r\nthey were alive. \u003ci\u003eThem\u003c/i\u003e we shall imagine with the animal\r\nwarmth upon them, to them may possibly cling the aroma,\r\nthe echo of the thinking taken in the act. And by a natural\r\nconsequence, we shall assimilate them to each other and\r\nto the warm and intimate self we now feel within us as we\r\nthink, and separate them as a collection from whatever\r\nselves have not this mark, much as out of a herd of cattle\r\nlet loose for the winter on some wide western prairie the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_334\"\u003e[Pg 334]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nowner picks out and sorts together when the time for the\r\nround-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which he\r\nfinds his own particular brand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe various members of the collection thus set apart\r\nare felt to belong with each other whenever they are\r\nthought at all. The animal warmth, etc., is their herd-mark,\r\nthe brand from which they can never more escape. It\r\nruns through them all like a thread through a chaplet and\r\nmakes them into a whole, which we treat as a unit, no\r\nmatter how much in other ways the parts may differ \u003ci\u003einter\r\nse\u003c/i\u003e. Add to this character the farther one that the distant\r\nselves appear to our thought as having for hours of time\r\nbeen \u003ci\u003econtinuous\u003c/i\u003e with each other, and the most recent ones\r\nof them continuous with the Self of the present moment,\r\nmelting into it by slow degrees; and we get a still stronger\r\nbond of union. As we think we see an identical bodily\r\nthing when, in spite of changes of structure, it exists continuously\r\nbefore our eyes, or when, however interrupted its\r\npresence, its quality returns unchanged; so here we think\r\nwe experience an identical \u003ci\u003eSelf\u003c/i\u003e when it appears to us in an\r\nanalogous way. Continuity makes us unite what dissimilarity\r\nmight otherwise separate; similarity makes us unite\r\nwhat discontinuity might hold apart. And thus it is,\r\nfinally, that Peter, awakening in the same bed with Paul,\r\nand recalling what both had in mind before they went to\r\nsleep, reidentifies and appropriates the \u0027warm\u0027 ideas as his,\r\nand is never tempted to confuse them with those cold and\r\npale-appearing ones which he ascribes to Paul. As well\r\nmight he confound Paul\u0027s body, which he only sees, with\r\nhis own body, which he sees but also feels. Each of us\r\nwhen he awakens says, Here\u0027s the same old self again, just\r\nas he says, Here\u0027s the same old bed, the same old room, the\r\ncame old world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like\r\nany one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena.\r\nIt is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental\r\nrespect; or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena\r\ncompared.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd it must not be taken to mean more than these\r\ngrounds warrant, or treated as a sort of metaphysical or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_335\"\u003e[Pg 335]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabsolute Unity in which all differences are overwhelmed.\r\nThe past and present selves compared are the same just so\r\nfar as they \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e the same, and no farther. A uniform feeling\r\nof \u0027warmth,\u0027 of bodily existence (or an equally uniform feeling\r\nof pure psychic energy?) pervades them all; and this is\r\nwhat gives them a \u003ci\u003egeneric\u003c/i\u003e unity, and makes them the same\r\nin \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e. But this generic unity coexists with generic differences\r\njust as real as the unity. And if from the one point\r\nof view they are one self, from others they are as truly\r\nnot one but many selves. And similarly of the attribute of\r\ncontinuity; it gives its own kind of unity to the self—that\r\nof mere connectedness, or unbrokenness, a perfectly definite\r\nphenomenal thing—but it gives not a jot or tittle more.\r\nAnd this unbrokenness in the stream of selves, like the\r\nunbrokenness in an exhibition of \u0027dissolving views,\u0027 in no\r\nwise implies any farther unity or contradicts any amount\r\nof plurality in other respects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd accordingly we find that, where the resemblance and\r\nthe continuity are no longer felt, the sense of personal identity\r\ngoes too. We hear from our parents various anecdotes\r\nabout our infant years, but we do not appropriate them as\r\nwe do our own memories. Those breaches of decorum\r\nawaken no blush, those bright sayings no self-complacency.\r\nThat child is a foreign creature with which our present\r\nself is no more identified in feeling than it is with some\r\nstranger\u0027s living child to-day. Why? Partly because\r\ngreat time-gaps break up all these early years—we cannot\r\nascend to them by continuous memories; and partly because\r\nno representation of how the child \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e comes up with\r\nthe stories. We know what he said and did; but no sentiment\r\nof his little body, of his emotions, of his psychic strivings\r\nas they felt to him, comes up to contribute an element\r\nof warmth and intimacy to the narrative we hear, and the\r\nmain bond of union with our present self thus disappears.\r\nIt is the same with certain of our dimly-recollected experiences.\r\nWe hardly know whether to appropriate them or\r\nto disown them as fancies, or things read or heard and not\r\nlived through. Their animal heat has evaporated; the feelings\r\nthat accompanied them are so lacking in the recall, or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_336\"\u003e[Pg 336]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nso different from those we now enjoy, that no judgment of\r\nidentity can be decisively cast.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eResemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(especially bodily feelings) experienced along with things\r\nwidely different in all other regards, \u003ci\u003ethus constitutes the real\r\nand verifiable \u0027personal identity\u0027 which we feel\u003c/i\u003e. There is\r\nno other identity than this in the \u0027stream\u0027 of subjective\r\nconsciousness which we described in the last chapter. Its\r\nparts differ, but under all their differences they are knit\r\nin these two ways; and if either way of knitting disappears,\r\nthe sense of unity departs. If a man wakes up some fine\r\nday unable to recall any of his past experiences, so that\r\nhe has to learn his biography afresh, or if he only recalls\r\nthe facts of it in a cold abstract way as things that he is sure\r\nonce happened; or if, without this loss of memory, his\r\nbodily and spiritual habits all change during the night, each\r\norgan giving a different tone, and the act of thought becoming\r\naware of itself in a different way; he \u003ci\u003efeels\u003c/i\u003e, and he \u003ci\u003esays\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthat he is a changed person. He disowns his former me,\r\ngives himself a new name, identifies his present life with\r\nnothing from out of the older time. Such cases are not\r\nrare in mental pathology; but, as we still have some reasoning\r\nto do, we had better give no concrete account of\r\nthem until the end of the chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis description of personal identity will be recognized\r\nby the instructed reader as the ordinary doctrine professed\r\nby the empirical school. Associationists in England and\r\nFrance, Herbartians in Germany, all describe the Self as\r\nan aggregate of which each part, as to its \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e, is a separate\r\nfact. So far so good, then; thus much is true whatever\r\nfarther things may be true; and it is to the imperishable\r\nglory of Hume and Herbart and their successors to have\r\ntaken so much of the meaning of personal identity out of\r\nthe clouds and made of the Self an empirical and verifiable\r\nthing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in leaving the matter here, and saying that this sum\r\nof passing things is all, these writers have neglected certain\r\nmore subtle aspects of the Unity of Consciousness, to which\r\nwe next must turn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_337\"\u003e[Pg 337]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur recent simile of the herd of cattle will help us. It\r\nwill be remembered that the beasts were brought together\r\ninto one herd because their owner found on each of them\r\nhis brand. The \u0027owner\u0027 symbolizes here that \u0027section\u0027 of\r\nconsciousness, or pulse of thought, which we have all along\r\nrepresented as the vehicle of the judgment of identity; and\r\nthe \u0027brand\u0027 symbolizes the characters of warmth and continuity,\r\nby reason of which the judgment is made. There\r\nis found a \u003ci\u003eself\u003c/i\u003e-brand, just as there is found a herd-brand.\r\nEach brand, so far, is the mark, or cause of our knowing,\r\nthat certain things belong-together. But if the brand\r\nis the \u003ci\u003eratio cognoscendi\u003c/i\u003e of the belonging, the belonging,\r\nin the case of the herd, is in turn the \u003ci\u003eratio existendi\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe brand. No beast would be so branded unless he belonged\r\nto the owner of the herd. They are not his because\r\nthey are branded; they are branded because they are his.\r\nSo that it seems as if our description of the belonging-together\r\nof the various selves, as a belonging-together which\r\nis merely \u003ci\u003erepresented\u003c/i\u003e, in a later pulse of thought, had\r\nknocked the bottom out of the matter, and omitted the\r\nmost characteristic one of all the features found in the herd—a\r\nfeature which common-sense finds in the phenomenon\r\nof personal identity as well, and for our omission of which\r\nshe will hold us to a strict account. For common-sense\r\ninsists that the unity of all the selves is not a mere appearance\r\nof similarity or continuity, ascertained after the\r\nfact. She is sure that it involves a real belonging to a real\r\nOwner, to a pure spiritual entity of some kind. Relation\r\nto this entity is what makes the self\u0027s constituents stick together\r\nas they do for thought. The individual beasts do\r\nnot stick together, for all that they wear the same brand.\r\nEach wanders with whatever accidental mates it finds. The\r\nherd\u0027s unity is only potential, its centre ideal, like the\r\n\u0027centre of gravity\u0027 in physics, until the herdsman or owner\r\ncomes. He furnishes a real centre of accretion to which\r\nthe beasts are driven and by which they are held. The\r\nbeasts stick together by sticking severally to him. Just so,\r\ncommon-sense insists, there must be a real proprietor in\r\nthe case of the selves, or else their actual accretion into a\r\n\u0027personal consciousness\u0027 would never have taken place.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_338\"\u003e[Pg 338]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nTo the usual empiricist explanation of personal consciousness\r\nthis is a formidable reproof, because all the individual\r\nthoughts and feelings which have succeeded each other \u0027up\r\nto date\u0027 are represented by ordinary Associationism as in\r\nsome inscrutable way \u0027integrating\u0027 or gumming themselves\r\ntogether on their own account, and thus fusing into a stream.\r\nAll the incomprehensibilities which in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter VI\u003c/a\u003e we saw\r\nto attach to the idea of things fusing without a \u003ci\u003emedium\u003c/i\u003e\r\napply to the empiricist description of personal identity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in our own account the medium is fully assigned,\r\nthe herdsman is there, in the shape of something not among\r\nthe things collected, but superior to them all, namely, the\r\nreal, present onlooking, remembering, \u0027judging thought\u0027\r\nor identifying \u0027section\u0027 of the stream. This is what collects,—\u0027owns\u0027\r\nsome of the past facts which it surveys, and\r\ndisowns the rest,—and so makes a unity that is actualized\r\nand anchored and does not merely float in the blue air of\r\npossibility. And the reality of such pulses of thought, with\r\ntheir function of knowing, it will be remembered that we\r\ndid not seek to deduce or explain, but simply assumed them\r\nas the ultimate kind of fact that the psychologist must admit\r\nto exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this assumption, though it yields much, still does\r\nnot yield all that common-sense demands. The unity into\r\nwhich the Thought—as I shall for a time proceed to call,\r\nwith a capital T, the present mental state—binds the individual\r\npast facts with each other and with itself, does not\r\nexist until the Thought is there. It is as if wild cattle were\r\nlassoed by a newly-created settler and then owned for the\r\nfirst time. But the essence of the matter to common-sense\r\nis that the past thoughts never were wild cattle, they were\r\nalways owned. The Thought does not capture them, but\r\nas soon as it comes into existence it finds them already its\r\nown. How is this possible unless the Thought have a\r\n\u003ci\u003esubstantial\u003c/i\u003e identity with a former owner,—not a mere continuity\r\nor a resemblance, as in our account, but a \u003ci\u003ereal unity\u003c/i\u003e?\r\nCommon-sense in fact would drive us to admit what we\r\nmay for the moment call an Arch-Ego, dominating the entire\r\nstream of thought and all the selves that may be\r\nrepresented in it, as the ever self-same and changeless\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_339\"\u003e[Pg 339]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprinciple implied in their union. The \u0027Soul\u0027 of Metaphysics\r\nand the \u0027Transcendental Ego\u0027 of the Kantian\r\nPhilosophy, are, as we shall soon see, but attempts to satisfy\r\nthis urgent demand of common-sense. But, for a time\r\nat least, we can still express without any such hypotheses\r\nthat appearance of never-lapsing ownership for which common-sense\r\ncontends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor how would it be if the Thought, the present judging\r\nThought, instead of being in any way substantially or\r\ntranscendentally identical with the former owner of the\r\npast self, merely inherited his \u0027title,\u0027 and thus stood as\r\nhis legal representative now? It would then, if its birth\r\ncoincided exactly with the death of another owner, \u003ci\u003efind\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe past self already its own as soon as it found it at all,\r\nand the past self would thus never be wild, but always\r\nowned, by a title that never lapsed. We can imagine a\r\nlong succession of herdsmen coming rapidly into possession\r\nof the same cattle by transmission of an original title by\r\nbequest. May not the \u0027title\u0027 of a collective self be passed\r\nfrom one Thought to another in some analogous way?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is a patent fact of consciousness that a transmission\r\nlike this actually occurs. Each pulse of cognitive consciousness,\r\neach Thought, dies away and is replaced by another.\r\nThe other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor,\r\nand finding it \u0027warm,\u0027 in the way we have described,\r\ngreets it, saying: \"Thou art \u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e, and part of the\r\nsame self with me.\" Each later Thought, knowing and including\r\nthus the Thoughts which went before, is the final\r\nreceptacle—and appropriating them is the final owner—of\r\nall that they contain and own. Each Thought is thus\r\nborn an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it\r\nrealized as its Self to its own later proprietor. As Kant\r\nsays, it is as if elastic balls were to have not only motion\r\nbut knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both\r\nits motion and its consciousness to a second, which took\r\nboth up into \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e consciousness and passed them to a third,\r\nuntil the last ball held all that the other balls had held,\r\nand realized it as its own. It is this trick which the nascent\r\nthought has of immediately taking up the expiring\r\nthought and \u0027adopting\u0027 it, which is the foundation of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_340\"\u003e[Pg 340]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nappropriation of most of the remoter constituents of the\r\nself. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last,\r\nfor what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is impossible to discover any \u003ci\u003everifiable\u003c/i\u003e features in\r\npersonal identity, which this sketch does not contain, impossible\r\nto imagine how any transcendent non-phenomenal\r\nsort of an Arch-Ego, were he there, could shape matters to\r\nany other result, or be known in time by any other fruit,\r\nthan just this production of a stream of consciousness each\r\n\u0027section\u0027 of which should know, and knowing, hug to\r\nitself and adopt, all those that went before,—thus standing\r\nas the \u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e of the entire past stream; and which\r\nshould similarly adopt the objects already adopted by\r\nany portion of this spiritual stream. Such standing-as-representative,\r\nand such adopting, are perfectly clear phenomenal\r\nrelations. The Thought which, whilst it knows\r\nanother Thought and the Object of that Other, appropriates\r\nthe Other and the Object which the Other appropriated,\r\nis still a perfectly distinct phenomenon from that\r\nOther; it may hardly resemble it; it may be far removed\r\nfrom it in space and time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only point that is obscure is the \u003ci\u003eact of appropriation\u003c/i\u003e\r\nitself. Already in enumerating the constituents of the\r\nself and their rivalry, I had to use the word appropriate.\r\nAnd the quick-witted reader probably noticed at the time,\r\nin hearing how one constituent was let drop and disowned\r\nand another one held fast to and espoused, that the phrase\r\nwas meaningless unless the constituents were objects in the\r\nhands of something else. A thing cannot appropriate itself;\r\nit \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e itself; and still less can it disown itself. There must\r\nbe an agent of the appropriating and disowning; but that\r\nagent we have already named. It is the Thought to whom\r\nthe various \u0027constituents\u0027 are known. That Thought is a\r\nvehicle of choice as well as of cognition; and among the\r\nchoices it makes are these appropriations, or repudiations,\r\nof its \u0027own.\u0027 But the Thought never is an object in its own\r\nhands, it never appropriates or disowns itself. It appropriates\r\n\u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e itself, it is the actual focus of accretion, the hook\r\nfrom which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_341\"\u003e[Pg 341]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the Present, which alone passes for real, and thus keeping\r\nthe chain from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the\r\nhook itself will drop into the past with all it carries, and\r\nthen be treated as an object and appropriated by a new\r\nThought in the new present which will serve as living\r\nhook in turn. The present moment of consciousness is\r\nthus, as Mr. Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series.\r\nIt may feel its own immediate existence—we have all along\r\nadmitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspection\r\nto ascertain the fact—but nothing can be known\r\n\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it till it be dead and gone. Its appropriations are\r\ntherefore less to \u003ci\u003eitself\u003c/i\u003e than to the most intimately felt \u003ci\u003epart\r\nof its present Object, the body, and the central adjustments,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich accompany the act of thinking, in the head. \u003ci\u003eThese\r\nare the real nucleus of our personal identity,\u003c/i\u003e and it is their\r\nactual existence, realized as a solid present fact, which\r\nmakes us say \u0027as sure \u003ci\u003eas I exist\u003c/i\u003e, those past facts were part\r\nof myself.\u0027 They are the kernel to which the \u003ci\u003erepresented\u003c/i\u003e\r\nparts of the Self are assimilated, accreted, and knit on;\r\nand even were Thought entirely unconscious of itself in\r\nthe act of thinking, these \u0027warm\u0027 parts of its present\r\nobject would be a firm basis on which the consciousness\r\nof personal identity would rest.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_274_274\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_274_274\"\u003e[274]\u003c/a\u003e Such consciousness, then,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_342\"\u003e[Pg 342]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas a psychologic fact, can be fully described without supposing\r\nany other agent than a succession of perishing\r\nthoughts, endowed with the functions of appropriation and\r\nrejection, and of which some can know and appropriate or\r\nreject objects already known, appropriated, or rejected by\r\nthe rest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 375px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption1\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-342-0032.jpg\" style=\"width: 375px\" id=\"img_images_jame_342_0032.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 34.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo illustrate by diagram, let A, B, and C stand for three\r\nsuccessive thoughts, each with its object inside of it. If B\u0027s\r\nobject be A, and C\u0027s object be B; then A, B, and C would\r\nstand for three pulses in a consciousness of personal identity.\r\nEach pulse would \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e something different from the\r\nothers; but B would know and adopt A, and C would\r\nknow and adopt A and B. Three successive states of the\r\nsame brain, on which each experience in passing leaves its\r\nmark, might very well engender thoughts differing from\r\neach other in just such a way as this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe passing Thought then seems to be the Thinker;\r\nand though there \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be another non-phenomenal Thinker\r\nbehind that, so far we do not seem to need him to express\r\nthe facts. But we cannot definitively make up our mind\r\nabout him until we have heard the reasons that have historically\r\nbeen used to prove his reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PURE SELF OR INNER PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL UNITY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo a brief survey of the theories of the Ego let us then\r\nnext proceed. They are three in number, as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) The Spiritualist theory;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) The Associationist theory;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) The Transcendentalist theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of the Soul.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter VI\u003c/a\u003e we were led ourselves to the spiritualist\r\ntheory of the \u0027Soul,\u0027 as a means of escape from the unintelligibilities\r\nof mind-stuff \u0027integrating\u0027 with itself, and from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_343\"\u003e[Pg 343]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe physiological improbability of a material monad, with\r\nthought attached to it, in the brain. But at the end of the\r\nchapter we said we should examine the \u0027Soul\u0027 critically in\r\na later place, to see whether it had any other advantages\r\nas a theory over the simple phenomenal notion of a stream\r\nof thought accompanying a stream of cerebral activity, by\r\na law yet unexplained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philosophy\r\nand of scholasticism, which is only popular philosophy\r\nmade systematic. It declares that the principle of individuality\r\nwithin us must be \u003ci\u003esubstantial\u003c/i\u003e, for psychic phenomena\r\nare activities, and there can be no activity without a concrete\r\nagent. This substantial agent cannot be the brain but\r\nmust be something \u003ci\u003eimmaterial\u003c/i\u003e; for its activity, thought, is\r\nboth immaterial, and takes cognizance of immaterial things,\r\nand of material things in general and intelligible, as well as\r\nin particular and sensible ways,—all which powers are incompatible\r\nwith the nature of matter, of which the brain\r\nis composed. Thought moreover is simple, whilst the activities\r\nof the brain are compounded of the elementary activities\r\nof each of its parts. Furthermore, thought is spontaneous\r\nor free, whilst all material activity is determined\r\n\u003ci\u003eab extra\u003c/i\u003e; and the will can turn itself against all corporeal\r\ngoods and appetites, which would be impossible were it a\r\ncorporeal function. For these objective reasons the principle\r\nof psychic life must be both immaterial and simple as\r\nwell as substantial, must be what is called \u003ci\u003ea Soul\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nsame consequence follows from subjective reasons. Our\r\nconsciousness of personal identity assures us of our essential\r\nsimplicity: the owner of the various constituents of the\r\nself, as we have seen them, the hypothetical Arch-Ego\r\nwhom we provisionally conceived as possible, is a real entity\r\nof whose existence self-consciousness makes us directly\r\naware. No material agent could thus turn round and grasp\r\n\u003ci\u003eitself\u003c/i\u003e—material activities always grasp something else than\r\nthe agent. And if a brain \u003ci\u003ecould\u003c/i\u003e grasp itself and be self-conscious,\r\nit would be conscious of itself \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e a brain and\r\nnot as something of an altogether different kind. The Soul\r\nthen exists as a simple spiritual substance in which the\r\nvarious psychic faculties, operations, and affections inhere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_344\"\u003e[Pg 344]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we ask what a Substance is, the only answer is that\r\nit is a self-existent being, or one which needs no other subject\r\nin which to inhere. At bottom its only positive determination\r\nis Being, and this is something whose meaning\r\nwe all realize even though we find it hard to explain. The\r\nSoul is moreover an \u003ci\u003eindividual\u003c/i\u003e being, and if we ask what\r\nthat is, we are told to look in upon our Self, and we shall\r\nlearn by direct intuition better than through any abstract\r\nreply. Our direct perception of our own inward being is\r\nin fact by many deemed to be the original prototype out\r\nof which our notion of simple active substance in general is\r\nfashioned. The \u003ci\u003econsequences\u003c/i\u003e of the simplicity and substantiality\r\nof the Soul are its incorruptibility and natural \u003ci\u003eimmortality\u003c/i\u003e—nothing\r\nbut God\u0027s direct \u003ci\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e can annihilate it—and\r\nits \u003ci\u003eresponsibility\u003c/i\u003e at all times for whatever it may have\r\never done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis substantialist view of the soul was essentially the\r\nview of Plato and of Aristotle. It received its completely\r\nformal elaboration in the middle ages. It was believed in\r\nby Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Wolf, Berkeley, and\r\nis now defended by the entire modern dualistic or spiritualistic\r\nor common-sense school. Kant held to it while\r\ndenying its fruitfulness as a premise for deducing consequences\r\nverifiable here below. Kant\u0027s successors, the absolute\r\nidealists, profess to have discarded it,—how that may\r\nbe we shall inquire ere long. Let us make up our minds\r\nwhat to think of it ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIt is at all events needless for expressing the actual subjective\r\nphenomena of consciousness as they appear.\u003c/i\u003e We\r\nhave formulated them all without its aid, by the supposition\r\nof a stream of thoughts, each substantially different\r\nfrom the rest, but cognitive of the rest and \u0027appropriative\u0027\r\nof each other\u0027s content. At least, if I have not already\r\nsucceeded in making this plausible to the reader, I am\r\nhopeless of convincing him by anything I could add now.\r\nThe unity, the identity, the individuality, and the immateriality\r\nthat appear in the psychic life are thus accounted for\r\nas phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with no\r\nneed of reference to any more simple or substantial agent\r\nthan the present Thought or \u0027section\u0027 of the stream. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_345\"\u003e[Pg 345]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave seen it to be single and unique in the sense of having\r\nno \u003ci\u003eseparable\u003c/i\u003e parts (above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_239\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 239\u003c/a\u003e ff.)—perhaps that is the only\r\nkind of simplicity meant to be predicated of the soul. The\r\npresent Thought also has being,—at least all believers in\r\nthe Soul believe so—and if there be no other Being in\r\nwhich it \u0027inheres,\u0027 it ought itself to be a \u0027substance.\u0027 If\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e kind of simplicity and substantiality were all that is\r\npredicated of the Soul, then it might appear that we had\r\nbeen talking of the soul all along, without knowing it, when\r\nwe treated the present Thought as an agent, an owner, and\r\nthe like. But the Thought is a perishing and not an immortal\r\nor incorruptible thing. Its successors may continuously\r\nsucceed to it, resemble it, and appropriate it, but\r\nthey \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e not it, whereas the Soul-Substance is supposed to\r\nbe a fixed unchanging thing. By the Soul is always meant\r\nsomething \u003ci\u003ebehind\u003c/i\u003e the present Thought, another kind of\r\nsubstance, existing on a non-phenomenal plane.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we brought in the Soul at the end of \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter VI\u003c/a\u003e,\r\nas an entity which the various brain-processes were supposed\r\nto affect simultaneously, and which responded to\r\ntheir combined influence by single pulses of its thought, it\r\nwas to escape integrated mind-stuff on the one hand, and\r\nan improbable cerebral monad on the other. But when\r\n(as now, after all we have been through since that earlier\r\npassage) we take the two formulations, first of a brain to\r\nwhose processes pulses of thought \u003ci\u003esimply\u003c/i\u003e correspond, and\r\nsecond, of one to whose processes pulses of thought \u003ci\u003ein a\r\nSoul\u003c/i\u003e correspond, and compare them together, we see that at\r\nbottom the second formulation is only a more roundabout\r\nway than the first, of expressing the same bald fact.\r\nThat bald fact is that \u003ci\u003ewhen the brain acts, a thought occurs.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nThe spiritualistic formulation says that the brain-processes\r\nknock the thought, so to speak, out of a Soul which stands\r\nthere to receive their influence. The simpler formulation\r\nsays that the thought simply \u003ci\u003ecomes\u003c/i\u003e. But what positive\r\nmeaning has the Soul, when scrutinized, but the \u003ci\u003eground of\r\npossibility\u003c/i\u003e of the thought? And what is the \u0027knocking\u0027 but\r\nthe \u003ci\u003edetermining of the possibility to actuality\u003c/i\u003e? And what is this\r\nafter all but giving a sort of concreted form to one\u0027s belief\r\nthat the coming of the thought, when the brain-processes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_346\"\u003e[Pg 346]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\noccur, has \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e sort of ground in the nature of things? If\r\nthe world Soul be understood merely to express that claim,\r\nit is a good word to use. But if it be held to do more,\r\nto gratify the claim,—for instance, to connect rationally the\r\nthought which comes, with the processes which occur, and\r\nto mediate intelligibly between their two disparate natures,—then\r\nit is an illusory term. It is, in fact, with the word\r\nSoul as with the word Substance in general. To say that\r\nphenomena inhere in a Substance is at bottom only to\r\nrecord one\u0027s protest against the notion that the bare existence\r\nof the phenomena is the total truth. A phenomenon\r\nwould not itself be, we insist, unless there were something\r\n\u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e than the phenomenon. To the more we give the provisional\r\nname of Substance. So, in the present instance,\r\nwe ought certainly to admit that there is more than the\r\nbare fact of coexistence of a passing thought with a\r\npassing brain-state. But we do not answer the question\r\n\u0027What is that more?\u0027 when we say that it is a \u0027Soul\u0027\r\nwhich the brain-state affects. This kind of more \u003ci\u003eexplains\u003c/i\u003e\r\nnothing; and when we are once trying metaphysical explanations\r\nwe are foolish not to go as far as we can. For my\r\nown part I confess that the moment I become metaphysical\r\nand try to define the more, I find the notion of some sort of\r\nan \u003ci\u003eanima mundi\u003c/i\u003e thinking in all of us to be a more promising\r\nhypothesis, in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a\r\nlot of absolutely individual souls. Meanwhile, as \u003ci\u003epsychologists\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwe need not be metaphysical at all. The phenomena\r\nare enough, the passing Thought itself is the only \u003ci\u003everifiable\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthinker, and its empirical connection with the brain-process\r\nis the ultimate known law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo the other arguments which would prove the need of\r\na soul, we may also turn a deaf ear. The argument from\r\nfree-will can convince only those who believe in free-will;\r\nand even they will have to admit that spontaneity is just as\r\npossible, to say the least, in a temporary spiritual agent\r\nlike our \u0027Thought\u0027 as in a permanent one like the supposed\r\nSoul. The same is true of the argument from the kinds of\r\nthings cognized. Even if the brain could not cognize universal,\r\nimmaterials, or its \u0027Self,\u0027 still the \u0027Thought\u0027 which\r\nwe have relied upon in our account \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not the brain, closely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_347\"\u003e[Pg 347]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas it seems connected with it; and after all, if the brain could\r\ncognize at all, one does not well see why it might not cognize\r\none sort of thing as well as another. The great difficulty\r\nis in seeing how a thing can cognize \u003ci\u003eanything\u003c/i\u003e. This\r\ndifficulty is not in the least removed by giving to the thing\r\nthat cognizes the name of Soul. The Spiritualists do not\r\ndeduce any of the properties of the mental life from\r\notherwise known properties of the soul. They simply find\r\nvarious characters ready-made in the mental life, and\r\nthese they clap into the Soul, saying, \"Lo! behold the\r\nsource from whence they flow!\" The merely verbal character\r\nof this \u0027explanation\u0027 is obvious. The Soul invoked, far\r\nfrom making the phenomena more intelligible, can only be\r\nmade intelligible itself by borrowing their form,—it must\r\nbe represented, if at all, as a transcendent stream of consciousness\r\nduplicating the one we know.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAltogether, the Soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing\r\nwhose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson,\r\nis: \"Whatever you are \u003ci\u003etotally\u003c/i\u003e ignorant of, assert to be the\r\nexplanation of everything else.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke and Kant, whilst still believing in the soul, began\r\nthe work of undermining the notion that we know anything\r\nabout it. Most modern writers of the mitigated spiritualistic,\r\nor dualistic philosophy—the Scotch school, as it is\r\noften called among us—are forward to proclaim this ignorance,\r\nand to attend exclusively to the verifiable phenomena\r\nof self-consciousness, as we have laid them down. Dr.\r\nWayland, for example, begins his Elements of Intellectual\r\nPhilosophy with the phrase \"Of the essence of Mind we\r\nknow nothing,\" and goes on: \"All that we are able to affirm\r\nof it is that it is \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e which perceives, reflects, remembers,\r\nimagines, and wills; but what that something \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich exerts these energies we know not. It is only as we\r\nare conscious of the action of these energies that we are\r\nconscious of the existence of mind. It is only by the exertion\r\nof its own powers that the mind becomes cognizant of\r\ntheir existence. The cognizance of its powers, however,\r\ngives us no knowledge of that essence of which they are\r\npredicated. In these respects our knowledge of mind is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_348\"\u003e[Pg 348]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprecisely analogous to our knowledge of matter.\" This\r\nanalogy of our two ignorances is a favorite remark in the\r\nScotch school. It is but a step to lump them together\r\ninto a single ignorance, that of the \u0027Unknowable\u0027 to which\r\nany one fond of superfluities in philosophy may accord the\r\nhospitality of his belief, if it so please him, but which any\r\none else may as freely ignore and reject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Soul-theory is, then, a complete superfluity, so far\r\nas accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious\r\nexperience goes. So far, no one can be compelled to subscribe\r\nto it for definite scientific reasons. The case would\r\nrest here, and the reader be left free to make his choice,\r\nwere it not for other demands of a more practical kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first of these is \u003ci\u003eImmortality\u003c/i\u003e, for which the simplicity\r\nand substantiality of the Soul seem to offer a solid\r\nguarantee. A \u0027stream\u0027 of thought, for aught that we see\r\nto be contained in its essence, may come to a full stop at\r\nany moment; but a simple substance is incorruptible, and\r\nwill, by its own inertia, persist in Being so long as the Creator\r\ndoes not by a direct miracle snuff it out. Unquestionably\r\nthis is the stronghold of the spiritualistic belief,—as\r\nindeed the popular touchstone for all philosophies is the\r\nquestion, \"What is their bearing on a future life?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Soul, however, when closely scrutinized, guarantees\r\nno immortality of a sort \u003ci\u003ewe care for\u003c/i\u003e. The enjoyment of the\r\natom-like simplicity of their substance \u003ci\u003ein sæcula sæculorum\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwould not to most people seem a consummation devoutly\r\nto be wished. The substance must give rise to a stream of\r\nconsciousness continuous with the present stream, in order\r\nto arouse our hope, but of this the mere persistence of the\r\nsubstance \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e offers no guarantee. Moreover, in the\r\ngeneral advance of our moral ideas, there has come to be\r\nsomething ridiculous in the way our forefathers had of\r\ngrounding their hopes of immortality on the simplicity of\r\ntheir substance. The demand for immortality is nowadays\r\nessentially teleological. We believe ourselves immortal\r\nbecause we believe ourselves \u003ci\u003efit\u003c/i\u003e for immortality. A \u0027substance\u0027\r\nought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy\r\nto survive; and an insubstantial \u0027stream\u0027 to prolong itself,\r\nprovided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organized\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_349\"\u003e[Pg 349]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the rational way in which we trust it is. Substance or\r\nno substance, soul or \u0027stream,\u0027 what Lotze says of immortality\r\nis about all that human wisdom can say:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We have no other principle for deciding it than this general idealistic\r\nbelief: that every created thing will continue whose continuance\r\nbelongs to the meaning of the world, and so long as it does so belong;\r\nwhilst every one will pass away whose reality is justified only in a transitory\r\nphase of the world\u0027s course. That this principle admits of no\r\nfurther application in human hands need hardly be said. \u003ci\u003eWe\u003c/i\u003e surely\r\nknow not the merits which may give to one being a claim on eternity,\r\nnor the defects which would cut others off.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_275_275\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_275_275\"\u003e[275]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA second alleged necessity for a soul-substance is our\r\nforensic responsibility before God. Locke caused an uproar\r\nwhen he said that the unity of \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e made a\r\nman the same \u003ci\u003eperson\u003c/i\u003e, whether supported by the same \u003ci\u003esubstance\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor no, and that God would not, in the great day,\r\nmake a person answer for what he remembered nothing of.\r\nIt was supposed scandalous that our forgetfulness might\r\nthus deprive God of the chance of certain retributions,\r\nwhich otherwise would have enhanced his \u0027glory.\u0027 This is\r\ncertainly a good speculative ground for retaining the Soul—at\r\nleast for those who demand a plenitude of retribution.\r\nThe mere stream of consciousness, with its lapses of memory,\r\ncannot possibly be as \u0027responsible\u0027 as a soul which \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nat the judgment day all that it ever was. To modern readers,\r\nhowever, who are less insatiate for retribution than\r\ntheir grandfathers, this argument will hardly be as convincing\r\nas it seems once to have been.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne great use of the Soul has always been to account\r\nfor, and at the same time to guarantee, the closed individuality\r\nof each personal consciousness. The thoughts of one\r\nsoul must unite into one self, it was supposed, and must be\r\neternally insulated from those of every other soul. But we\r\nhave already begun to see that, although unity is the rule of\r\neach man\u0027s consciousness, yet in some individuals, at least,\r\nthoughts may split away from the others and form separate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_350\"\u003e[Pg 350]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nselves. As for insulation, it would be rash, in view of\r\nthe phenomena of thought-transference, mesmeric influence\r\nand spirit-control, which are being alleged nowadays on\r\nbetter authority than ever before, to be too sure about\r\nthat point either. The definitively closed nature of our\r\npersonal consciousness is probably an average statistical\r\nresultant of many conditions, but not an elementary force\r\nor fact; so that, if one wishes to preserve the Soul, the less\r\nhe draws his arguments from \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e quarter the better. So\r\nlong as our self, on the whole, makes itself good and practically\r\nmaintains itself as a closed individual, why, as Lotze\r\nsays, is not that enough? And why is the \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e-an-individual\r\nin some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder\r\nan achievement?\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_276_276\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_276_276\"\u003e[276]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is\r\nthat it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive\r\nthoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable\r\nthings about it, and definitely to ascertain the correlations\r\nof these with brain-processes is as much as psychology can\r\nempirically do. From the metaphysical point of view, it is\r\ntrue that one may claim that the correlations have a rational\r\nground; and if the word Soul could be taken to mean\r\nmerely some such vague problematic ground, it would be\r\nunobjectionable. But the trouble is that it professes to\r\ngive the ground in positive terms of a very dubiously credible\r\nsort. I therefore feel entirely free to discard the word\r\nSoul from the rest of this book. If I ever use it, it will be\r\nin the vaguest and most popular way. The reader who\r\nfinds any comfort in the idea of the Soul, is, however, perfectly\r\nfree to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings\r\nhave not established the non-existence of the Soul; they\r\nhave only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next theory of the pure Self to which we pass is\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Associationist Theory.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke paved the way for it by the hypothesis he suggested\r\nof the same substance having two successive consciousnesses,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_351\"\u003e[Pg 351]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor of the same consciousness being supported\r\nby more than one substance. He made his readers feel\r\nthat the \u003ci\u003eimportant\u003c/i\u003e unity of the Self was its verifiable and\r\nfelt unity, and that a metaphysical or absolute unity would\r\nbe insignificant, so long as a \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e of diversity might\r\nbe there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHume showed how great the consciousness of diversity\r\nactually was. In the famous chapter on Personal Identity,\r\nin his Treatise on Human Nature, he writes as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment\r\nintimately conscious of what we call our \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf\u003c/span\u003e; that we feel its existence\r\nand its continuance in existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence\r\nof a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity….\r\nUnluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very\r\nexperience which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of Self,\r\nafter the manner it is here explained…. It must be some one impression\r\nthat gives rise to every real idea…. If any impression gives\r\nrise to the idea of Self, that impression must continue invariably\r\nthe same through the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed\r\nto exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and\r\ninvariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations\r\nsucceed each other, and never all exist at the same time…. For my\r\npart, when I enter most intimately into what I call \u003ci\u003emyself\u003c/i\u003e, I always\r\nstumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or\r\nshade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch \u003ci\u003emyself\u003c/i\u003e at\r\nany time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the\r\nperception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by\r\nsound sleep, so long am I insensible of \u003ci\u003emyself\u003c/i\u003e and may truly be said\r\nnot to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could\r\nI neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution\r\nof my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is\r\nfarther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone, upon\r\nserious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of\r\n\u003ci\u003ehimself\u003c/i\u003e I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can\r\nallow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are\r\nessentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive\r\nsomething simple and continued which he calls \u003ci\u003ehimself\u003c/i\u003e; though I am\r\ncertain there is no such principle in me.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture\r\nto affirm of the rest of mankind that they are \u003ci\u003enothing but a bundle or\r\ncollection of different perceptions\u003c/i\u003e, which succeed each other with an\r\ninconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our\r\neyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our\r\nthought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses\r\nand faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_352\"\u003e[Pg 352]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment\r\nThe mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively\r\nmake their appearance; pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infinite\r\nvariety of postures and situations. \u003ci\u003eThere is properly no simplicity\r\nin it at one time, nor identity in different\u003c/i\u003e; whatever natural propension\r\nwe may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison\r\nof the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions\r\nonly, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant\r\nnotion of the place where these scenes are represented, nor of the material\r\nof which it is composed.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut Hume, after doing this good piece of introspective\r\nwork, proceeds to pour out the child with the bath, and to\r\nfly to as great an extreme as the substantialist philosophers.\r\nAs they say the Self is nothing but Unity, unity abstract and\r\nabsolute, so Hume says it is nothing but Diversity, diversity\r\nabstract and absolute; whereas in truth it is that mixture\r\nof unity and diversity which we ourselves have already\r\nfound so easy to pick apart. We found among the objects\r\nof the stream certain feelings that hardly changed, that\r\nstood out warm and vivid in the past just as the present\r\nfeeling does now; and we found the present feeling to be\r\nthe centre of accretion to which, \u003ci\u003ede proche en proche\u003c/i\u003e, these\r\nother feelings are, \u003ci\u003eby the judging Thought\u003c/i\u003e, felt to cling. Hume\r\nsays nothing of the judging Thought; and he denies this\r\nthread of resemblance, this core of sameness running\r\nthrough the ingredients of the Self, to exist even as a phenomenal\r\nthing. To him there is no \u003ci\u003etertium quid\u003c/i\u003e between\r\npure unity and pure separateness. A succession of ideas\r\n\"connected by a close relation affords to an accurate view\r\nas perfect a notion of diversity as if there was \u003ci\u003eno manner\r\nof relation\" at all.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind\r\nnever perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our\r\nperceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or \u003ci\u003edid the\r\nmind perceive some real connection\u003c/i\u003e among them, there would be no\r\ndifficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a\r\nsceptic and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding,\r\nI pretend not, however, to pronounce it insuperable. Others, perhaps,…\r\nmay discover some hypothesis that will reconcile these contradictions.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_277_277\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_277_277\"\u003e[277]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_353\"\u003e[Pg 353]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHume is at bottom as much of a metaphysician as\r\nThomas Aquinas. No wonder he can discover no \u0027hypothesis.\u0027\r\nThe unity of the parts of the stream is just as \u0027real\u0027\r\na connection as their diversity is a real separation; both\r\nconnection and separation are ways in which the past\r\nthoughts appear to the present Thought;—unlike each\r\nother in respect of date and certain qualities—this is the\r\nseparation; alike in other qualities, and continuous in time—this\r\nis the connection. In demanding a more \u0027real\u0027 connection\r\nthan this obvious and verifiable likeness and continuity,\r\nHume seeks \u0027the world behind the looking glass,\u0027\r\nand gives a striking example of that Absolutism which is\r\nthe great disease of philosophic Thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe chain of distinct existences into which Hume thus\r\nchopped up our \u0027stream\u0027 was adopted by all of his successors\r\nas a complete inventory of the facts. The associationist\r\nPhilosophy was founded. Somehow, out of \u0027ideas,\u0027 each\r\nseparate, each ignorant of its mates, but sticking together\r\nand calling each other up according to certain laws, all the\r\nhigher forms of consciousness were to be explained, and\r\namong them the consciousness of our personal identity.\r\nThe task was a hard one, in which what we called the\r\npsychologist\u0027s fallacy (\u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 196\u003c/a\u003e ff.) bore the brunt of the\r\nwork. Two ideas, one of \u0027A,\u0027 succeeded by another of \u0027B,\u0027\r\nwere transmuted into a third idea of \u0027\u003ci\u003eB after A\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 An idea\r\nfrom last year returning now was taken to be an idea \u003ci\u003eof last\r\nyear\u003c/i\u003e; two similar ideas stood for an \u003ci\u003eidea of similarity\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nthe like; palpable confusions, in which certain facts \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe ideas, possible only to an outside knower of them, were\r\nput into the place of the ideas\u0027 own proper and limited deliverance\r\nand content. Out of such recurrences and resemblances\r\nin a series of discrete ideas and feelings a knowledge\r\nwas somehow supposed to be engendered in each\r\nfeeling that it \u003ci\u003ewas\u003c/i\u003e recurrent and resembling, and that it\r\nhelped to form a series to whose unity the name \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e came to\r\nbe joined. In the same way, substantially, Herbart,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_278_278\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_278_278\"\u003e[278]\u003c/a\u003e in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_354\"\u003e[Pg 354]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nGermany, tried to show how a conflict of ideas would fuse\r\ninto a \u003ci\u003emanner of representing itself\u003c/i\u003e for which \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e was the consecrated\r\nname.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_279_279\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_279_279\"\u003e[279]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe defect of all these attempts is that the conclusion\r\npretended to follow from certain premises is by no means\r\nrationally involved in the premises. A feeling of any kind,\r\nif it simply \u003ci\u003ereturns\u003c/i\u003e, ought to be nothing else than what it\r\nwas at first. If memory of previous existence and all sorts\r\nof other cognitive functions are attributed to it when it returns,\r\nit is no longer the same, but a widely different feeling,\r\nand ought to be so described. \u003ci\u003eWe\u003c/i\u003e have so described\r\nit with the greatest explicitness. We have said that feelings\r\nnever do return. We have not pretended to \u003ci\u003eexplain\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthis; we have recorded it as an empirically ascertained\r\nlaw, analogous to certain laws of brain-physiology; and,\r\nseeking to define the way in which new feelings do differ\r\nfrom the old, we have found them to be \u003ci\u003ecognizant\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eappropriative\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the old, whereas the old were always cognizant\r\nand appropriative of something else. Once more, this\r\naccount pretended to be nothing more than a complete\r\ndescription of the facts. It explained them no more than\r\nthe associationist account explains them. But the latter\r\nboth assumes to explain them and in the same breath falsifies\r\nthem, and for each reason stands condemned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is but just to say that the associationist writers as a\r\nrule seem to have a lurking bad conscience about the Self;\r\nand that although they are explicit enough about what it is,\r\nnamely, a train of feelings or thoughts, they are very shy\r\nabout openly tackling the problem of how it comes to be\r\naware of itself. Neither Bain nor Spencer, for example,\r\ndirectly touch this problem. As a rule, associationist\r\nwriters keep talking about \u0027the mind\u0027 and about what \u0027we\u0027\r\ndo; and so, smuggling in surreptitiously what they ought\r\navowedly to have postulated in the form of a present\r\n\u0027judging Thought,\u0027 they either trade upon their reader\u0027s\r\nlack of discernment or are undiscerning themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. D. G. Thompson is the only associationist writer I\r\nknow who perfectly escapes this confusion, and \u003ci\u003epostulates\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_355\"\u003e[Pg 355]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nopenly what he needs. \"All states of consciousness,\" he\r\nsays, \"imply and postulate a subject Ego, whose substance\r\nis unknown and unknowable, to which [why not say\r\n\u003ci\u003eby\u003c/i\u003e which?] states of consciousness are referred as attributes,\r\nbut which in the process of reference becomes objectified\r\nand becomes itself an attribute of a subject Ego\r\nwhich lies still beyond, and which ever eludes cognition\r\nthough ever postulated for cognition.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_280_280\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_280_280\"\u003e[280]\u003c/a\u003e This is exactly\r\nour judging and remembering present \u0027Thought,\u0027 described\r\nin less simple terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter Mr. Thompson, M. Taine and the two Mills deserve\r\ncredit for seeking to be as clear as they can. Taine tells us\r\nin the first volume of his \u0027Intelligence\u0027 what the Ego \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e,—a\r\ncontinuous web of conscious events no more really distinct\r\nfrom each other\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_281_281\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_281_281\"\u003e[281]\u003c/a\u003e than rhomboids, triangles, and\r\nsquares marked with chalk on a plank are really distinct,\r\nfor the plank itself is one. In the second volume he \u003ci\u003esays\u003c/i\u003e\r\nall these parts have a common character embedded in them,\r\nthat of being \u003ci\u003einternal\u003c/i\u003e [this is our character of \u0027warmness,\u0027\r\notherwise named]. This character is abstracted and isolated\r\nby a mental fiction, and is what we are \u003ci\u003econscious of\u003c/i\u003e as\r\nour self—\u0027this stable \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e is what each of us calls \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e or\r\nme.\u0027 Obviously M. Taine forgets to tell us what this \u0027each\r\nof us\u0027 is, which suddenly starts up and performs the abstraction\r\nand \u0027calls\u0027 its product I or me. The character\r\ndoes not abstract \u003ci\u003eitself\u003c/i\u003e. Taine means by \u0027each of us\u0027\r\nmerely the present \u0027judging Thought\u0027 with its memory and\r\ntendency to appropriate, but he does not name it distinctly\r\nenough, and lapses into the fiction that the entire series of\r\nthoughts, the entire \u0027plank,\u0027 is the reflecting psychologist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJames Mill, after defining Memory as a train of associated\r\nideas beginning with that of my past self and ending\r\nwith that of my present self, defines my Self as a train of\r\nideas of which Memory declares the first to be continuously\r\nconnected with the last. The successive associated ideas\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_356\"\u003e[Pg 356]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0027run, as it were, into a single point of consciousness.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_282_282\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_282_282\"\u003e[282]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJohn Mill, annotating this account, says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The phenomenon of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides\r\nof the same fact, or two different modes of viewing the same fact. We\r\nmay, as psychologists, set out from either of them, and refer the other\r\nto it…. But it is hardly allowable to do both. At least it must\r\nbe said that by doing so we explain neither. We only show that the\r\ntwo things are essentially the same; that my memory of having ascended\r\nSkiddaw on a given day, and my consciousness of being the\r\nsame person who ascended Skiddaw on that day, are two modes of stating\r\nthe same fact: a fact which psychology has as yet failed to resolve\r\ninto anything more elementary. In analyzing the complex phenomena\r\nof consciousness, we must come to something ultimate; and we seem\r\nto have reached two elements which have a good \u003ci\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e claim to\r\nthat title. There is, first,… the difference between a fact and the\r\nThought of that fact: a distinction which we are able to cognize in the\r\npast, and which then constitutes Memory, and in the future, when it\r\nconstitutes Expectation; but in neither case can we give any account\r\nof it except that it exists…. Secondly, in addition to this, and\r\nsetting out from the belief … that the idea I now have was derived\r\nfrom a previous sensation … there is the further conviction\r\nthat this sensation … was my own; that it happened to my self.\r\nIn other words, I am aware of a long and uninterrupted succession\r\nof past feelings, going back as far as memory reaches, and terminating\r\nwith the sensations I have at the present moment, all of which are connected\r\nby an inexplicable tie, that distinguishes them not only from any\r\nsuccession or combination in mere thought, but also from the parallel\r\nsuccessions of feelings which I believe, on satisfactory evidence, to have\r\nhappened to each of the other beings, shaped like myself, whom I perceive\r\naround me. This succession of feelings, which I call my memory\r\nof the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self. Myself is the\r\nperson who had that series of feelings, and I know nothing of myself,\r\nby direct knowledge, except that I had them. But there is a bond of\r\nsome sort among all the parts of the series, which makes me say that\r\nthey were feelings of a person who was the same person throughout\r\n[according to us this is their \u0027warmth\u0027 and resemblance to the \u0027central\r\nspiritual self\u0027 now actually felt] and a different person from those who\r\nhad any of the parallel successions of feelings; and this bond, to me,\r\nconstitutes my Ego. Here I think the question must rest, until some\r\npsychologist succeeds better than anyone else has done, in showing a\r\nmode in which the analysis can be carried further.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_283_283\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_283_283\"\u003e[283]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_357\"\u003e[Pg 357]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader must judge of our own success in carrying\r\nthe analysis farther. The various distinctions we have\r\nmade are all parts of an endeavor so to do. John Mill himself,\r\nin a later-written passage, so far from advancing in the\r\nline of analysis, seems to fall back upon something perilously\r\nnear to the Soul. He says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The fact of recognizing a sensation,… remembering that it\r\nhas been felt before, is the simplest and most elementary fact of memory:\r\nand the \u003ci\u003einexplicable tie\u003c/i\u003e … which connects the present consciousness\r\nwith the past one of which it reminds me, is as near as I\r\nthink we can get to a positive conception of Self. That there is something\r\nreal in this tie, real as the sensations themselves, and not a mere\r\nproduct of the laws of thought without any fact corresponding to it, I\r\nhold to be indubitable…. This original element,… to which we\r\ncannot give any name but its own peculiar one, without implying some\r\nfalse or ungrounded theory, is the Ego, or Self. As such I ascribe a\r\nreality to the Ego—to my own mind—different from that real existence\r\nas a Permanent Possibility, which is the only reality I acknowledge in\r\nMatter…. We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as\r\nlinked with the other parts by \u003ci\u003esomething in common\u003c/i\u003e which is not the\r\nfeelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the\r\nfeelings themselves; and as that which is the same in the first as in the\r\nsecond, in the second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth,\r\nand so on, must be the same in the first and in the fiftieth, this common\r\nelement is a permanent element. But beyond this we can affirm\r\nnothing of it except the states of consciousness themselves. The feelings\r\nor consciousnesses which belong or have belonged to it, and its\r\npossibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be asserted\r\nof Self—the only positive attributes, except permanence, which we can\r\nascribe to it.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_284_284\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_284_284\"\u003e[284]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Mill\u0027s habitual method of philosophizing was to\r\naffirm boldly some general doctrine derived from his father,\r\nand then make so many concessions of detail to its enemies\r\nas practically to abandon it altogether.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_285_285\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_285_285\"\u003e[285]\u003c/a\u003e In this place the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_358\"\u003e[Pg 358]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconcessions amount, so far as they are intelligible, to the\r\nadmission of something very like the Soul. This \u0027inexplicable\r\ntie\u0027 which connects the feelings, this \u0027something\r\nin common\u0027 by which they are linked and which is not the\r\npassing feelings themselves, but something \u0027permanent,\u0027 of\r\nwhich we can \u0027affirm nothing\u0027 save its attributes and its\r\npermanence, what is it but metaphysical Substance come\r\nagain to life? Much as one must respect the fairness of\r\nMill\u0027s temper, quite as much must one regret his failure\r\nof acumen at this point. At bottom he makes the same\r\nblunder as Hume: the sensations \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, he thinks, have\r\nno \u0027tie.\u0027 The tie of resemblance and continuity which the\r\nremembering Thought finds among them is not a \u0027real tie\u0027\r\nbut \u0027a mere product of the laws of thought;\u0027 and the\r\nfact that the present Thought \u0027appropriates\u0027 them is also\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_359\"\u003e[Pg 359]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno real tie. But whereas Hume was contented to say that\r\nthere might after all \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e no \u0027real tie,\u0027 Mill, unwilling to admit\r\nthis possibility, is driven, like any scholastic, to place it\r\nin a non-phenomenal world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJohn Mill\u0027s concessions may be regarded as the \u003ci\u003edefinitive\r\nbankruptcy of the associationist description\u003c/i\u003e of the consciousness\r\nof self, starting, as it does, with the best\r\nintentions, and dimly conscious of the path, but \u0027perplexed\r\nin the extreme\u0027 at last with the inadequacy of those \u0027simple\r\nfeelings,\u0027 non-cognitive, non-transcendent of themselves,\r\nwhich were the only baggage it was willing to take along.\r\nOne must \u003ci\u003ebeg\u003c/i\u003e memory, knowledge on the part of the feelings\r\nof something outside themselves. That granted, every\r\nother true thing follows naturally, and it is hard to go\r\nastray. The knowledge the present feeling has of the past\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_360\"\u003e[Pg 360]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nones is a real tie between them, so is their resemblance;\r\nso is their continuity; so is the one\u0027s \u0027appropriation\u0027\r\nof the other: all are real ties, realized in the judging\r\nThought of every moment, the only place where \u003ci\u003edisconnections\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncould be realized, did they exist. Hume and Mill\r\nboth imply that a disconnection can be realized there, whilst\r\na tie cannot. But the ties and the disconnections are exactly\r\non a par, in this matter of self-consciousness. The\r\nway in which the present Thought appropriates the past is\r\na real way, so long as no other owner appropriates it in a\r\nmore real way, and so long as the Thought has no grounds\r\nfor repudiating it stronger than those which lead to its\r\nappropriation. But no other owner ever does in point of\r\nfact present himself for my past; and the grounds which I\r\nperceive for appropriating it—viz., continuity and resemblance\r\nwith the present—outweigh those I perceive for disowning\r\nit—viz., distance in time. My present Thought\r\nstands thus in the plenitude of ownership of the train of\r\nmy past selves, is owner not only \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e, but \u003ci\u003ede jure\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nmost real owner there can be, and all without the supposition\r\nof any \u0027inexplicable tie,\u0027 but in a perfectly verifiable\r\nand phenomenal way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTurn we now to what we may call\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE TRANSCENDENTALIST THEORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ewhich owes its origin to Kant. Kant\u0027s own statements are\r\ntoo lengthy and obscure for verbatim quotation here, so I\r\nmust give their substance only. Kant starts, as I understand\r\nhim, from a view of the \u003ci\u003eObject\u003c/i\u003e essentially like our own description\r\nof it on \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 275\u003c/a\u003e ff., that is, it is a system of things,\r\nqualities or facts in relation. \"\u003ci\u003eObject\u003c/i\u003e is that in the knowledge\r\n(Begriff) of which the Manifold of a given Perception\r\nis connected.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_286_286\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_286_286\"\u003e[286]\u003c/a\u003e But whereas we simply begged the vehicle\r\nof this connected knowledge in the shape of what we\r\ncall the present Thought, or section of the Stream of Consciousness\r\n(which we declared to be the ultimate fact\r\nfor psychology), Kant denies this to be an ultimate fact\r\nand insists on analyzing it into a large number of distinct,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_361\"\u003e[Pg 361]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthough equally essential, elements. The \u0027Manifoldness\u0027 of\r\nthe Object is due to Sensibility, which \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e is chaotic,\r\nand the unity is due to the synthetic handling which this\r\nManifold receives from the higher faculties of Intuition,\r\nApprehension, Imagination, Understanding, and Apperception.\r\nIt is the one essential spontaneity of the Understanding\r\nwhich, under these different names, brings unity\r\ninto the manifold of sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The Understanding \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, in fact, nothing more than the faculty of\r\nbinding together \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, and of bringing the Manifold of given ideas\r\nunder the unity of Apperception, which consequently is the supreme\r\nprinciple in all human knowledge\" (§ 16).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe material connected must be \u003ci\u003egiven\u003c/i\u003e by lower faculties\r\nto the Understanding, for the latter is not an intuitive\r\nfaculty, but by nature \u0027empty.\u0027 And the bringing of\r\nthis material \u0027under the unity of Apperception\u0027 is explained\r\nby Kant to mean the thinking it always so that,\r\nwhatever its other determinations be, it may be known as\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought by me\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_287_287\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_287_287\"\u003e[287]\u003c/a\u003e Though this consciousness, that \u003ci\u003eI think\r\nit\u003c/i\u003e, need not be at every moment explicitly realized, it is\r\nalways \u003ci\u003ecapable\u003c/i\u003e of being realized. For if an object \u003ci\u003eincapable\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof being combined with the idea of a thinker were there,\r\nhow could it be known, how related to other objects, how\r\nform part of \u0027experience\u0027 at all?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe awareness that \u003ci\u003eI think\u003c/i\u003e is therefore implied in all experience.\r\nNo connected consciousness of anything without\r\nthat of \u003ci\u003eSelf\u003c/i\u003e as its presupposition and \u0027transcendental\u0027 condition!\r\nAll things, then, so far as they are intelligible at all,\r\nare so through combination with pure consciousness of \u003ci\u003eSelf\u003c/i\u003e,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_362\"\u003e[Pg 362]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand apart from this, at least potential, combination nothing\r\nis knowable \u003ci\u003eto us\u003c/i\u003e at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this self, whose consciousness Kant thus established\r\ndeductively as a \u003ci\u003econditio sine quâ non\u003c/i\u003e of experience, is in the\r\nsame breath denied by him to have any positive attributes.\r\nAlthough Kant\u0027s name for it—the \u0027original transcendental\r\nsynthetic Unity of Apperception\u0027—is so long, our consciousness\r\n\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it is, according to him, short enough. Self-consciousness\r\nof this \u0027transcendental\u0027 sort tells us, \u0027not\r\nhow we appear, not how we inwardly are, but only \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e we\r\nare\u0027 (§ 25). At the basis of our knowledge of our selves\r\nthere lies only \"the simple and utterly empty idea: \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e; of\r\nwhich we cannot even say we have a notion, but only a consciousness\r\nwhich accompanies all notions. In this \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e (the thing) which thinks, nothing more is represented\r\nthan the bare transcendental Subject of the knowledge = \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhich is only recognized by the thoughts which are its predicates,\r\nand of which, taken by itself, we cannot form the\r\nleast conception\" (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e \u0027Paralogisms\u0027). The pure Ego of\r\nall apperception is thus for Kant not the soul, but only that\r\n\u0027Subject\u0027 which is the necessary correlate of the Object in\r\nall knowledge. There \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e a soul, Kant thinks, but this mere\r\nego-form of our consciousness tells us nothing about it,\r\nneither whether it be substantial, nor whether it be immaterial,\r\nnor whether it be simple, nor whether it be permanent.\r\nThese declarations on Kant\u0027s part of the utter\r\nbarrenness of the consciousness of the pure Self, and of the\r\nconsequent impossibility of any deductive or \u0027rational\u0027\r\npsychology, are what, more than anything else, earned for\r\nhim the title of the \u0027all-destroyer.\u0027 The only self we know\r\nanything positive \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e, he thinks, is the empirical \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e, not\r\nthe pure \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e; the self which is an object among other objects\r\nand the \u0027constituents\u0027 of which we ourselves have seen, and\r\nrecognized to be phenomenal things appearing in the form\r\nof space as well as time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis, for our purposes, is a sufficient account of the\r\n\u0027transcendental\u0027 Ego.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThose purposes go no farther than to ascertain whether\r\nanything in Kant\u0027s conception ought to make us give up our\r\nown, of a remembering and appropriating Thought incessantly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_363\"\u003e[Pg 363]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrenewed. In many respects Kant\u0027s meaning is obscure,\r\nbut it will not be necessary for us to squeeze the\r\ntexts in order to make sure what it actually and historically\r\nwas. If we can define clearly two or three things which it\r\nmay \u003ci\u003epossibly\u003c/i\u003e have been, that will help us just as much to\r\nclear our own ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the whole, a defensible interpretation of Kant\u0027s\r\nview would take somewhat the following shape. Like ourselves\r\nhe believes in a Reality outside the mind of which he\r\nwrites, but the critic who vouches for that reality does so\r\non grounds of faith, for it is not a verifiable phenomenal\r\nthing. Neither is it manifold. The \u0027Manifold\u0027 which the\r\nintellectual functions combine is a mental manifold altogether,\r\nwhich thus \u003ci\u003estands between\u003c/i\u003e the Ego of Apperception\r\nand the outer Reality, but still stands inside the mind.\r\nIn the function of knowing there is a multiplicity to be connected,\r\nand Kant brings this multiplicity inside the mind.\r\nThe Reality becomes a mere empty \u003ci\u003elocus\u003c/i\u003e, or unknowable,\r\nthe so-called Noumenon; the manifold phenomenon is in\r\nthe mind. We, on the contrary, put the Multiplicity with\r\nthe Reality outside, and leave the mind simple. Both of us\r\ndeal with the same elements—thought and object—the only\r\nquestion is in which of them the multiplicity shall be\r\nlodged. Wherever it is lodged it must be \u0027synthetized\u0027\r\nwhen it comes to be thought. And that particular way of\r\nlodging it will be the better, which, in addition to describing\r\nthe facts naturally, makes the \u0027mystery of synthesis\u0027\r\nleast hard to understand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, Kant\u0027s way of describing the facts is mythological.\r\nThe notion of our thought being this sort of an elaborate\r\ninternal machine-shop stands condemned by all we said in\r\nfavor of its simplicity on \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epages 276 ff\u003c/a\u003e. Our Thought is not\r\ncomposed of parts, however so composed its objects may\r\nbe. There is no originally chaotic manifold in it to be reduced\r\nto order. There is something almost shocking in the\r\nnotion of so chaste a function carrying this Kantian hurly-burly\r\nin her womb. If we are to have a dualism of Thought\r\nand Reality at all, the multiplicity should be lodged in the\r\nlatter and not in the former member of the couple of related\r\nterms. The parts and their relations surely belong less to\r\nthe knower than to what is known.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_364\"\u003e[Pg 364]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even were all the mythology true, the process of\r\nsynthesis would in no whit be \u003ci\u003eexplained\u003c/i\u003e by calling the inside\r\nof the mind its seat. No mystery would be made lighter by\r\nsuch means. It is just as much a puzzle \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e the \u0027Ego\u0027 can\r\nemploy the productive Imagination to make the Understanding\r\nuse the categories to combine the data which Recognition,\r\nAssociation, and Apprehension receive from sensible Intuition,\r\nas how the Thought can combine the objective facts.\r\nPhrase it as one may, the difficulty is always the same: \u003ci\u003ethe\r\nMany known by the One\u003c/i\u003e. Or does one seriously think he\r\nunderstands better \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e the knower \u0027connects\u0027 its objects,\r\nwhen one calls the former a transcendental Ego and the\r\nlatter a \u0027Manifold of Intuition\u0027 than when one calls them\r\nThought and Things respectively? Knowing must have a\r\nvehicle. Call the vehicle Ego, or call it Thought, Psychosis,\r\nSoul, Intelligence, Consciousness, Mind, Reason, Feeling,—what\r\nyou like—it must \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e. The best grammatical\r\nsubject for the verb \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e would, if possible, be one from\r\nwhose other properties the knowing could be deduced.\r\nAnd if there be no such subject, the best one would be\r\nthat with the fewest ambiguities and the least pretentious\r\nname. By Kant\u0027s confession, the transcendental Ego has no\r\nproperties, and from it nothing can be deduced. Its name\r\nis pretentious, and, as we shall presently see, has its meaning\r\nambiguously mixed up with that of the substantial\r\nsoul. So on every possible account we are excused from\r\nusing it instead of our own term of the present passing\r\n\u0027Thought,\u0027 as the principle by which the Many is simultaneously\r\nknown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eambiguity\u003c/i\u003e referred to in the meaning of the transcendental\r\nEgo is as to whether Kant signified by it an\r\n\u003ci\u003eAgent\u003c/i\u003e, and by the Experience it helps to constitute, an\r\noperation; or whether the experience is an event \u003ci\u003eproduced\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin an unassigned way, and the Ego a mere indwelling \u003ci\u003eelement\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntherein contained. If an operation be meant, then\r\nEgo and Manifold must both be existent prior to that collision\r\nwhich results in the experience of one by the other.\r\nIf a mere analysis is meant, there is no such prior existence,\r\nand the elements only \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e in so far as they are in union.\r\nNow Kant\u0027s tone and language are everywhere the very\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_365\"\u003e[Pg 365]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwords of one who is talking of operations and the agents\r\nby which they are performed.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_288_288\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_288_288\"\u003e[288]\u003c/a\u003e And yet there is reason to\r\nthink that at bottom he may have had nothing of the sort\r\nin mind.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_289_289\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_289_289\"\u003e[289]\u003c/a\u003e In this uncertainty we need again do no more\r\nthan decide what to think of his transcendental Ego \u003ci\u003eif it be\u003c/i\u003e\r\nan agent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, if it be so, Transcendentalism is only Substantialism\r\ngrown shame-faced, and the Ego only a \u0027cheap and\r\nnasty\u0027 edition of the soul. All our reasons for preferring\r\nthe \u0027Thought\u0027 to the \u0027Soul\u0027 apply with redoubled force\r\nwhen the Soul is shrunk to this estate. The Soul truly explained\r\nnothing; the \u0027syntheses,\u0027 which she performed,\r\nwere simply taken ready-made and clapped on to her as\r\nexpressions of her nature taken after the fact; but at least\r\nshe had some semblance of nobility and outlook. She\r\nwas called active; might select; was responsible, and permanent\r\nin her way. The Ego is simply \u003ci\u003enothing\u003c/i\u003e: as ineffectual\r\nand windy an abortion as Philosophy can show.\r\nIt would indeed be one of Reason\u0027s tragedies if the good\r\nKant, with all his honesty and strenuous pains, should\r\nhave deemed this conception an important outbirth of his\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we have seen that Kant deemed it of next to no importance\r\nat all. It was reserved for his Fichtean and Hegelian\r\nsuccessors to call it the first Principle of Philosophy,\r\nto spell its name in capitals and pronounce it with adoration,\r\nto act, in short, as if they were going up in a balloon,\r\nwhenever the notion of it crossed their mind. Here again,\r\nhowever, I am uncertain of the facts of history, and know\r\nthat I may not read my authors aright. The whole lesson\r\nof Kantian and post-Kantian speculation is, it seems to me,\r\nthe lesson of simplicity. With Kant, complication both of\r\nthought and statement was an inborn infirmity, enhanced\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_366\"\u003e[Pg 366]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby the musty academicism of his Königsberg existence.\r\nWith Hegel it was a raging fever. Terribly, therefore, do\r\nthe sour grapes which these fathers of philosophy have\r\neaten set our teeth on edge. We have in England and\r\nAmerica, however, a contemporary continuation of Hegelism\r\nfrom which, fortunately, somewhat simpler deliverances\r\ncome; and, unable to find any definite psychology in what\r\nHegel, Rosenkranz, or Erdmann tells us of the Ego, I turn\r\nto Caird and Green.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe great difference, practically, between these authors\r\nand Kant is their complete abstraction from the onlooking\r\nPsychologist and from the Reality he thinks he knows; or\r\nrather it is the absorption of both of these outlying terms\r\ninto the proper topic of Psychology, viz., the mental experience\r\nof the mind under observation. The Reality\r\ncoalesces with the connected Manifold, the Psychologist\r\nwith the Ego, knowing becomes \u0027connecting,\u0027 and there\r\nresults no longer a finite or criticisable, but an \u0027absolute\u0027\r\nExperience, of which the Object and the Subject are always\r\nthe same. Our finite \u0027Thought\u0027 is virtually and potentially\r\nthis eternal (or rather this \u0027timeless\u0027), absolute Ego, and\r\nonly provisionally and speciously the limited thing which\r\nit seems \u003ci\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e to be. The later \u0027sections\u0027 of our\r\n\u0027Stream,\u0027 which come and appropriate the earlier ones,\r\n\u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e those earlier ones, just as in substantialism the Soul is\r\nthroughout all time the same.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_290_290\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_290_290\"\u003e[290]\u003c/a\u003e This \u0027solipsistic\u0027 character\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_367\"\u003e[Pg 367]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof an Experience conceived as absolute really annihilates\r\npsychology as a distinct body of science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychology is a natural science, an account of particular\r\nfinite streams of thought, coexisting and succeeding\r\nin time. It is of course conceivable (though far from clearly\r\nso) that in the last metaphysical resort all these streams\r\nof thought may be thought by one universal All-thinker.\r\nBut in this metaphysical notion there is no profit for psychology;\r\nfor grant that one Thinker does think in all of us,\r\nstill what He thinks in me and what in you can never be deduced\r\nfrom the bare idea of Him. The idea of Him seems\r\neven to exert a positively paralyzing effect on the mind.\r\nThe existence of finite thoughts is suppressed altogether.\r\nThought\u0027s characteristics, as Professor Green says, are\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"not to be sought in the incidents of individual lives which last\r\nbut for a day…. No knowledge, nor any mental act involved in\r\nknowledge, can properly be called a \u0027phenomenon of consciousness.\u0027…\r\nFor a phenomenon is a sensible event, related in the way of\r\nantecedence or consequence to other sensible events, but the consciousness\r\nwhich constitutes a knowledge … is not an event so related\r\nnor made up of such events.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, if\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"we examine the constituents of any perceived object,… we\r\nshall find alike that it is only for consciousness that they can exist, and\r\nthat the consciousness for which they thus exist cannot be merely a\r\nseries of phenomena or a succession of states…. It then becomes clear\r\nthat there is a function of consciousness, as exercised in the most rudimentary\r\nexperience [namely, the function of \u003ci\u003esynthesis\u003c/i\u003e] which is incompatible\r\nwith the definition of consciousness as any sort of succession of\r\nany sort of phenomena.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_291_291\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_291_291\"\u003e[291]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere we to follow these remarks, we should have to\r\nabandon our notion of the \u0027Thought\u0027 (perennially renewed in\r\ntime, but always cognitive thereof), and to espouse instead of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_368\"\u003e[Pg 368]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit an entity copied from thought in all essential respects, but\r\ndiffering from it in being \u0027out of time.\u0027 What psychology\r\ncan gain by this barter would be hard to divine. Moreover\r\nthis resemblance of the timeless Ego to the Soul is\r\ncompleted by other resemblances still. The monism of\r\nthe post-Kantian idealists seems always lapsing into a\r\nregular old-fashioned spiritualistic dualism. They incessantly\r\ntalk as if, like the Soul, their All-thinker were an\r\nAgent, operating on detached materials of sense. This may\r\ncome from the accidental fact that the English writings of\r\nthe school have been more polemic than constructive, and\r\nthat a reader may often take for a positive profession a\r\nstatement \u003ci\u003ead hominem\u003c/i\u003e meant as part of a reduction to the\r\nabsurd, or mistake the analysis of a bit of knowledge into\r\nelements for a dramatic myth about its creation. But I\r\nthink the matter has profounder roots. Professor Green\r\nconstantly talks of the \u0027activity\u0027 of Self as a \u0027condition\u0027 of\r\nknowledge taking place. Facts are said to become incorporated\r\nwith other facts only through the \u0027\u003ci\u003eaction\u003c/i\u003e of a combining\r\nself-consciousness upon data of sensation.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Every object we perceive … requires, in order to its presentation,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eaction\u003c/i\u003e of a principle of consciousness, not itself subject to\r\nconditions of time, upon successive appearances, such action as may\r\n\u003ci\u003ehold the appearances together\u003c/i\u003e, without fusion, in an apprehended\r\nfact.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_292_292\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_292_292\"\u003e[292]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is needless to repeat that the connection of things in\r\nour knowledge is in no whit \u003ci\u003eexplained\u003c/i\u003e by making it the\r\ndeed of an agent whose essence is self-identity and who is\r\nout of time. The agency of phenomenal thought coming\r\nand going in time is just as easy to \u003ci\u003eunderstand\u003c/i\u003e. And when\r\nit is furthermore said that the agent that combines is the\r\nsame \u0027self-distinguishing subject\u0027 which \u0027in another mode\r\nof its activity\u0027 presents the manifold object to itself, the\r\nunintelligibilities become quite paroxysmal, and we are\r\nforced to confess that the entire school of thought in question,\r\nin spite of occasional glimpses of something more refined,\r\nstill dwells habitually in that mythological stage of\r\nthought where phenomena are explained as results of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_369\"\u003e[Pg 369]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndramas enacted by entities which but reduplicate the characters\r\nof the phenomena themselves. The self must not\r\nonly \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e its object,—that is too bald and dead a relation\r\nto be written down and left in its static state. The knowing\r\nmust be painted as a \u0027famous victory\u0027 in which the\r\nobject\u0027s distinctness is in some way \u0027overcome.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The self exists as one self only as it opposes itself, as object, to\r\nitself as subject, and immediately denies and transcends that opposition.\r\nOnly because it is such a concrete unity, which has in itself a\r\nresolved contradiction, can the intelligence cope with all the manifoldness\r\nand division of the mighty universe, and hope to master its secrets.\r\nAs the lightning sleeps in the dew-drop, so in the simple and transparent\r\nunity of self-consciousness there is held in equilibrium that vital\r\nantagonism of opposites which … seems to rend the world asunder.\r\nThe intelligence is able to understand the world, or, in other words, to\r\nbreak down the barrier between itself and things and find itself in them,\r\njust because its own existence is implicitly the solution of all the division\r\nand conflict of things.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_293_293\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_293_293\"\u003e[293]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis dynamic (I had almost written dynamitic) way of\r\nrepresenting knowledge has the merit of not being tame.\r\nTo turn from it to our own psychological formulation is like\r\nturning from the fireworks, trap-doors, and transformations\r\nof the pantomime into the insipidity of the midnight, where\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 4em;\"\u003e\"ghastly through the drizzling rain,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eOn the bald street breaks the blank day!\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_294_294\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_294_294\"\u003e[294]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd yet turn we must, with the confession that our\r\n\u0027Thought\u0027—a cognitive phenomenal event in time—is, if\r\nit exist at all, itself the only Thinker which the facts require.\r\nThe only service that transcendental egoism has done to\r\npsychology has been by its protests against Hume\u0027s \u0027bundle\u0027-theory\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_370\"\u003e[Pg 370]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof mind. But this service has been ill-performed;\r\nfor the Egoists themselves, let them say what they will,\r\nbelieve in the bundle, and in their own system merely \u003ci\u003etie it\r\nup\u003c/i\u003e, with their special transcendental string, invented for\r\nthat use alone. Besides, they talk as if, with this miraculous\r\ntying or \u0027relating,\u0027 the Ego\u0027s duties were done. Of its far\r\nmore important duty of choosing some of the things it ties\r\nand appropriating them, to the exclusion of the rest, they\r\ntell us never a word. To sum up, then, my own opinion of\r\nthe transcendentalist school, it is (whatever ulterior metaphysical\r\ntruth it may divine) a school in which psychology\r\nat least has naught to learn, and whose deliverances about\r\nthe Ego in particular in no wise oblige us to revise our own\r\nformulation of the Stream of Thought.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_295_295\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_295_295\"\u003e[295]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith this, all possible rival formulations have been discussed.\r\nThe literature of the Self is large, but all its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_371\"\u003e[Pg 371]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nauthors may be classed as radical or mitigated representatives\r\nof the three schools we have named, substantialism,\r\nassociationism, or transcendentalism. Our own opinion\r\nmust be classed apart, although it incorporates essential\r\nelements from all three schools. \u003ci\u003eThere need never have\r\nbeen a quarrel between associationism and its rivals if the former\r\nhad admitted the indecomposable unity of every pulse of thought,\r\nand the latter been willing to allow that \u0027perishing\u0027 pulses of\r\nthought might recollect and know.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may sum up by saying that personality implies the\r\nincessant presence of two elements, an objective person,\r\nknown by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as\r\ncontinuing in time. \u003ci\u003eHereafter let us use the words\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eme\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eI\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003efor the empirical person and the judging Thought.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eCertain vicissitudes in the me demand our notice.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, although its changes are gradual,\r\nthey become in time great. The central part of the \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nthe feeling of the body and of the adjustments in the head;\r\nand in the feeling of the body should be included that of\r\nthe general emotional tones and tendencies, for at bottom\r\nthese are but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities\r\nrun. Well, from infancy to old age, this assemblage\r\nof feelings, most constant of all, is yet a prey to slow\r\nmutation. Our powers, bodily and mental, change at least\r\nas fast.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_296_296\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_296_296\"\u003e[296]\u003c/a\u003e Our possessions notoriously are perishable facts.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_372\"\u003e[Pg 372]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe identity which the \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e discovers, as it surveys this long\r\nprocession, can only be a relative identity, that of a slow\r\nshifting in which there is always some common ingredient\r\nretained.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_297_297\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_297_297\"\u003e[297]\u003c/a\u003e The commonest element of all, the most uniform,\r\nis the possession of the same memories. However\r\ndifferent the man may be from the youth, both look back\r\non the same childhood, and call it their own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the identity found by the \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e in its \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e is only a\r\nloosely construed thing, an identity \u0027on the whole,\u0027 just\r\nlike that which any outside observer might find in the same\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_373\"\u003e[Pg 373]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassemblage of facts. We often say of a man \u0027he is so\r\nchanged one would not know him\u0027; and so does a man,\r\nless often, speak of himself. These changes in the \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nrecognized by the I, or by outside observers, may be grave\r\nor slight. They deserve some notice here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE MUTATIONS OF THE SELF\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003emay be divided into two main classes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Alterations of memory; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Alterations in the present bodily and spiritual selves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003ci\u003eAlterations of memory\u003c/i\u003e are either \u003ci\u003elosses\u003c/i\u003e or false recollections.\r\nIn either case the \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e is changed. Should a man\r\nbe punished for what he did in his childhood and no longer\r\nremembers? Should he be punished for crimes enacted\r\nin post-epileptic unconsciousness, somnambulism, or in any\r\ninvoluntarily induced state of which no recollection is retained?\r\nLaw, in accord with common-sense, says: \"No;\r\nhe is not the same person forensically now which he was\r\nthen.\" These losses of memory are a normal incident of\r\nextreme old age, and the person\u0027s \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e shrinks in the ratio\r\nof the facts that have disappeared.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn dreams we forget our waking experiences; they are\r\nas if they were not. And the converse is also true. As a\r\nrule, no memory is retained during the waking state of\r\nwhat has happened during mesmeric trance, although when\r\nagain entranced the person may remember it distinctly, and\r\nmay then forget facts belonging to the waking state. We\r\nthus have, within the bounds of healthy mental life, an\r\napproach to an alternation of \u003ci\u003eme\u0027s\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFalse memories are by no means rare occurrences in\r\nmost of us, and, whenever they occur, they distort the consciousness\r\nof the me. Most people, probably, are in doubt\r\nabout certain matters ascribed to their past. They may\r\nhave seen them, may have said them, done them, or they\r\nmay only have dreamed or imagined they did so. The\r\ncontent of a dream will oftentimes insert itself into the\r\nstream of real life in a most perplexing way. The most\r\nfrequent source of false memory is the accounts we give to\r\nothers of our experiences. Such accounts we almost always\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_374\"\u003e[Pg 374]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmake both more simple and more interesting than the\r\ntruth. We quote what we should have said or done,\r\nrather than what we really said or did; and in the first\r\ntelling we may be fully aware of the distinction. But ere\r\nlong the fiction expels the reality from memory and reigns\r\nin its stead alone. This is one great source of the fallibility\r\nof testimony meant to be quite honest. Especially\r\nwhere the marvellous is concerned, the story takes a tilt\r\nthat way, and the memory follows the story. Dr. Carpenter\r\nquotes from Miss Cobbe the following, as an instance\r\nof a very common sort:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It happened once to the Writer to hear a most scrupulously conscientious\r\nfriend narrate an incident of table-turning, to which she\r\nappended an assurance that the table rapped when \u003ci\u003enobody was within\r\na yard of it\u003c/i\u003e. The writer being confounded by this latter fact, the\r\nlady, though fully satisfied of the accuracy of her statement, promised\r\nto look at the note she had made ten years previously of the transaction.\r\nThe note was examined, and was found to contain the distinct\r\nstatement that the table rapped when \u003ci\u003ethe hands of six persons rested\r\non it!\u003c/i\u003e The lady\u0027s memory as to all other points proved to be strictly\r\ncorrect; and in this point she had erred in entire good faith.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_298_298\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_298_298\"\u003e[298]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is next to impossible to get a story of this sort accurate\r\nin all its details, although it is the inessential details\r\nthat suffer most change.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_299_299\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_299_299\"\u003e[299]\u003c/a\u003e Dickens and Balzac were said to\r\nhave constantly mingled their fictions with their real experiences.\r\nEvery one must have known \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e specimen of\r\nour mortal dust so intoxicated with the thought of his own\r\nperson and the sound of his own voice as never to be able\r\neven to think the truth when his autobiography was in\r\nquestion. Amiable, harmless, radiant J. V.! mayst thou\r\nne\u0027er wake to the difference between thy real and thy\r\nfondly-imagined self!\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_375\"\u003e[Pg 375]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_300_300\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_300_300\"\u003e[300]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. When we pass beyond alterations of memory to abnormal\r\n\u003ci\u003ealterations in the present self\u003c/i\u003e we have still graver\r\ndisturbances. These alterations are of three main types,\r\nfrom the descriptive point of view. But certain cases unite\r\nfeatures of two or more types; and our knowledge of the\r\nelements and causes of these changes of personality is so\r\nslight that the division into types must not be regarded as\r\nhaving any profound significance. The types are:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) Insane delusions;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Alternating selves;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Mediumships or possessions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) In insanity we often have delusions projected into\r\nthe past, which are melancholic or sanguine according to\r\nthe character of the disease. But the worst alterations of\r\nthe self come from present perversions of sensibility and\r\nimpulse which leave the past undisturbed, but induce the\r\npatient to think that the present \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e is an altogether new\r\npersonage. Something of this sort happens normally in\r\nthe rapid expansion of the whole character, intellectual as\r\nwell as volitional, which takes place after the time of\r\npuberty. The pathological cases are curious enough to\r\nmerit longer notice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe basis of our personality, as M. Ribot says, is that\r\nfeeling of our vitality which, because it is so perpetually\r\npresent, remains in the background of our consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is the basis because, always present, always acting, without\r\npeace or rest, it knows neither sleep nor fainting, and lasts as long as\r\nlife itself, of which it is one form. It serves as a support to that self-conscious\r\n\u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e which memory constitutes, it is the medium of association\r\namong its other parts…. Suppose now that it were possible at once\r\nto change our body and put another into its place: skeleton, vessels,\r\nviscera, muscles, skin, everything made new, except the nervous system\r\nwith its stored-up memory of the past. There can be no doubt\r\nthat in such a case the afflux of unaccustomed vital sensations would\r\nproduce the gravest disorders. Between the old sense of existence engraved\r\non the nervous system, and the new one acting with all the\r\nintensity of its reality and novelty, there would be irreconcilable contradiction.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_301_301\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_301_301\"\u003e[301]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_376\"\u003e[Pg 376]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the beginnings of cerebral disease there often\r\nhappens something quite comparable to this:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Masses of new sensation, hitherto foreign to the individual, impulses\r\nand ideas of the same inexperienced kind, for example terrors,\r\nrepresentations of enacted crime, of enemies pursuing one, etc. At the\r\noutset, these stand in contrast with the old familiar \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e, as a strange,\r\noften astonishing and abhorrent \u003ci\u003ethou\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_302_302\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_302_302\"\u003e[302]\u003c/a\u003e Often their invasion into the\r\nformer circle of feelings is felt as if the old self were being taken possession\r\nof by a dark overpowering might, and the fact of such \u0027possession\u0027\r\nis described in fantastic images. Always this doubleness, this\r\nstruggle of the old self against the new discordant forms of experience,\r\nis accompanied with painful mental conflict, with passion, with violent\r\nemotional excitement. This is in great part the reason for the common\r\nexperience, that the first stage in the immense majority of cases of\r\nmental disease is an emotional alteration particularly of a melancholic\r\nsort. If now the brain-affection, which is the immediate cause of the\r\nnew abnormal train of ideas, be not relieved, the latter becomes confirmed.\r\nIt may gradually contract associations with the trains of ideas\r\nwhich characterized the old self, or portions of the latter may be extinguished\r\nand lost in the progress of the cerebral malady, so that little\r\nby little the opposition of the two conscious \u003ci\u003eme\u0027s\u003c/i\u003e abates, and the emotional\r\nstorms are calmed. But by that time \u003ci\u003ethe old me itself has been\r\nfalsified and turned into another\u003c/i\u003e by those associations, by that reception\r\ninto itself of the abnormal elements of feeling and of will. The\r\npatient may again be quiet, and his thought sometimes logically correct,\r\nbut in it the morbid erroneous ideas are always present, with the adhesions\r\nthey have contracted, as uncontrollable premises, and the man is\r\nno longer the same, but a really new person, his old self transformed.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_303_303\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_303_303\"\u003e[303]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_377\"\u003e[Pg 377]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the patient himself rarely continues to describe the\r\nchange in just these terms unless new \u003ci\u003ebodily sensations\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nhim or the loss of old ones play a predominant part.\r\nMere perversions of sight and hearing, or even of impulse,\r\nsoon cease to be felt as contradictions of the unity of the\r\nme.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat the particular perversions of the bodily sensibility\r\nmay be, which give rise to these contradictions, is for the\r\nmost part impossible for a sound-minded person to conceive.\r\nOne patient has another self that repeats all his\r\nthoughts for him. Others, among whom are some of the\r\nfirst characters in history, have familiar dæmons who speak\r\nwith them, and are replied to. In another someone\r\n\u0027makes\u0027 his thoughts for him. Another has two bodies,\r\nlying in different beds. Some patients feel as if they had\r\nlost parts of their bodies, teeth, brain, stomach, etc. In\r\nsome it is made of wood, glass, butter, etc. In some it\r\ndoes not exist any longer, or is dead, or is a foreign object\r\nquite separate from the speaker\u0027s self. Occasionally, parts\r\nof the body lose their connection for consciousness with\r\nthe rest, and are treated as belonging to another person\r\nand moved by a hostile will. Thus the right hand may\r\nfight with the left as with an enemy.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_304_304\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_304_304\"\u003e[304]\u003c/a\u003e Or the cries of the\r\npatient himself are assigned to another person with whom\r\nthe patient expresses sympathy. The literature of insanity\r\nis filled with narratives of such illusions as these. M.\r\nTaine quotes from a patient of Dr. Krishaber an account of\r\nsufferings, from which it will be seen how completely aloof\r\nfrom what is normal a man\u0027s experience may suddenly become:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"After the first or second day it was for some weeks impossible to\r\nobserve or analyze myself. The suffering—angina pectoris—was too\r\noverwhelming. It was not till the first days of January that I could\r\ngive an account to myself of what I experienced…. Here is the first\r\nthing of which I retain a clear remembrance. I was alone, and already\r\na prey to permanent visual trouble, when I was suddenly seized with a\r\nvisual trouble infinitely more pronounced. Objects grew small and receded\r\nto infinite distances—men and things together. I was myself immeasurably\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_378\"\u003e[Pg 378]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfar away, I looked about me with terror and astonishment;\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe world was escaping from me\u003c/i\u003e…. I remarked at the same\r\ntime that my voice was extremely far away from me, that it sounded no\r\nlonger as if mine. I struck the ground with my foot, and perceived its\r\nresistance; but this resistance seemed illusory—not that the soil was\r\nsoft, but that the weight of my body was reduced to almost nothing….\r\nI had the feeling of being without weight….\" In addition to\r\nbeing so distant, \"objects appeared to me \u003ci\u003eflat\u003c/i\u003e. When I spoke with\r\nanyone, I saw him like an image cut out of paper with no relief…. This\r\nsensation lasted intermittently for two years…. Constantly it seemed\r\nas if my legs did not belong to me. It was almost as bad with my arms.\r\nAs for my head, it seemed no longer to exist…. I appeared to myself\r\nto act automatically, by an impulsion foreign to myself…. There\r\nwas inside of me a new being, and another part of myself, the old being,\r\nwhich took no interest in the new-comer. I distinctly remember\r\nsaying to myself that the sufferings of this new being were to me\r\nindifferent. I was never really dupe of these illusions, but my mind\r\ngrew often tired of incessantly correcting the new impressions, and I\r\nlet myself go and lived the unhappy life of this new entity. I had an\r\nardent desire to see my old world again, to get back to my old self.\r\nThis desire kept me from killing myself…. I was another, and I\r\nhated, I despised this other; he was perfectly odious to me; it was certainly\r\nanother who had taken my form and assumed my functions.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_305_305\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_305_305\"\u003e[305]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn cases similar to this, it is as certain that the \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e is unaltered\r\nas that the \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e is changed. That is to say, the present\r\nThought of the patient is cognitive of both the old \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand the new, so long as its memory holds good. Only,\r\nwithin that objective sphere which formerly lent itself so\r\nsimply to the judgment of recognition and of egoistic appropriation,\r\nstrange perplexities have arisen. The present and\r\nthe past both seen therein will not unite. Where is my old\r\nme? What is this new one? Are they the same? Or have\r\nI two? Such questions, answered by whatever theory the\r\npatient is able to conjure up as plausible, form the beginning\r\nof his insane life.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_306_306\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_306_306\"\u003e[306]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_379\"\u003e[Pg 379]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA case with which I am acquainted through Dr. C. J.\r\nFisher of Tewksbury has possibly its origin in this way.\r\nThe woman, Bridget F.,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"has been many years insane, and always speaks of her supposed self\r\nas \u0027the rat,\u0027 asking me to \u0027bury the little rat,\u0027 etc. Her real self she\r\nspeaks of in the third person as \u0027the good woman,\u0027 saying, \u0027The good\r\nWoman knew Dr. F. and used to work for him,\u0027 etc. Sometimes she\r\nsadly asks: \u0027Do you think the good woman will ever come back?\u0027 She\r\nworks at needlework, knitting, laundry, etc., and shows her work, saying,\r\n\u0027Isn\u0027t that good for only a rat?\u0027 She has, during periods of depression,\r\nhid herself under buildings, and crawled into holes and under\r\nboxes. \u0027She was only a rat, and wants to die,\u0027 she would say when we\r\nfound her.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The phenomenon of \u003ci\u003ealternating personality\u003c/i\u003e in its simplest\r\nphases seems based on lapses of memory. Any man\r\nbecomes, as we say, \u003ci\u003einconsistent\u003c/i\u003e with himself if he forgets his\r\nengagements, pledges, knowledges, and habits; and it is\r\nmerely a question of degree at what point we shall say\r\nthat his personality is changed. In the pathological cases\r\nknown as those of double or alternate personality the lapse\r\nof memory is abrupt, and is usually preceded by a period\r\nof unconsciousness or syncope lasting a variable length of\r\ntime. In the hypnotic trance we can easily produce an\r\nalteration of the personality, either by telling the subject to\r\nforget all that has happened to him since such or such a date,\r\nin which case he becomes (it may be) a child again, or by\r\ntelling him he is another altogether imaginary personage, in\r\nwhich case all facts about himself seem for the time being\r\nto lapse from out his mind, and he throws himself into the\r\nnew character with a vivacity proportionate to the amount\r\nof histrionic imagination which he possesses.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_307_307\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_307_307\"\u003e[307]\u003c/a\u003e But in the\r\npathological cases the transformation is spontaneous. The\r\nmost famous case, perhaps, on record is that of Félida X.,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_380\"\u003e[Pg 380]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreported by Dr. Azam of Bordeaux.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_308_308\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_308_308\"\u003e[308]\u003c/a\u003e At the age of fourteen\r\nthis woman began to pass into a \u0027secondary\u0027 state\r\ncharacterized by a change in her general disposition and\r\ncharacter, as if certain \u0027inhibitions,\u0027 previously existing,\r\nwere suddenly removed. During the secondary state she\r\nremembered the first state, but on emerging from it into\r\nthe first state she remembered nothing of the second. At\r\nthe age of forty-four the duration of the secondary state\r\n(which was on the whole superior in quality to the original\r\nstate) had gained upon the latter so much as to occupy most\r\nof her time. During it she remembers the events belonging\r\nto the original state, but her complete oblivion of the secondary\r\nstate when the original state recurs is often very\r\ndistressing to her, as, for example, when the transition\r\ntakes place in a carriage on her way to a funeral, and she\r\nhasn\u0027t the least idea which one of her friends may be dead.\r\nShe actually became pregnant during one of her early secondary\r\nstates, and during her first state had no knowledge\r\nof how it had come to pass. Her distress at these blanks\r\nof memory is sometimes intense and once drove her to\r\nattempt suicide.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo take another example, Dr. Rieger gives an account\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_309_309\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_309_309\"\u003e[309]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof an epileptic man who for seventeen years had passed his\r\nlife alternately free, in prisons, or in asylums, his character\r\nbeing orderly enough in the normal state, but alternating\r\nwith periods, during which he would leave his home for\r\nseveral weeks, leading the life of a thief and vagabond, being\r\nsent to jail, having epileptic fits and excitement, being\r\naccused of malingering, etc., etc., and with never a memory\r\nof the abnormal conditions which were to blame for all\r\nhis wretchedness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I have never got from anyone,\" says Dr. Rieger, \"so singular an\r\nimpression as from this man, of whom it could not be said that he had\r\nany properly conscious past at all…. It is really impossible to think\r\none\u0027s self into such a state of mind. His last larceny had been performed\r\nin Nürnberg, he knew nothing of it, and saw himself before the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_381\"\u003e[Pg 381]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncourt and then in the hospital, but without in the least understanding\r\nthe reason why. That he had epileptic attacks, he knew. But it\r\nwas impossible to convince him that for hours together he raved and\r\nacted in an abnormal way.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother remarkable case is that of Mary Reynolds,\r\nlately republished again by Dr. Weir Mitchell.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_310_310\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_310_310\"\u003e[310]\u003c/a\u003e This dull\r\nand melancholy young woman, inhabiting the Pennsylvania\r\nwilderness in 1811,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"was found one morning, long after her habitual time for rising, in a\r\nprofound sleep from which it was impossible to arouse her. After\r\neighteen or twenty hours of sleeping she awakened, but in a state of\r\nunnatural consciousness. Memory had fled. To all intents and purposes\r\nshe was as a being for the first time ushered into the world. \u0027All\r\nof the past that remained to her was the faculty of pronouncing a few\r\nwords, and this seems to have been as purely instinctive as the wailings\r\nof an infant; for at first the words which she uttered were connected\r\nwith no ideas in her mind.\u0027 Until she was taught their significance\r\nthey were unmeaning sounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u0027Her eyes were virtually for the first time opened upon the world.\r\nOld things had passed away; all things had become new.\u0027 Her parents,\r\nbrothers, sisters, friends, were not recognized or acknowledged as such\r\nby her. She had never seen them before,—never known them,—was\r\nnot aware that such persons had been. Now for the first time she\r\nwas introduced to their company and acquaintance. To the scenes by\r\nwhich she was surrounded she was a perfect stranger. The house, the\r\nfields, the forest, the hills, the vales, the streams,—all were novelties.\r\nThe beauties of the landscape were all unexplored.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"She had not the slightest consciousness that she had ever existed\r\nprevious to the moment in which she awoke from that mysterious\r\nslumber. \u0027In a word, she was an infant, just born, yet born in a state of\r\nmaturity, with a capacity for relishing the rich, sublime, luxuriant\r\nwonders of created nature.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The first lesson in her education was to teach her by what ties she\r\nwas bound to those by whom she was surrounded, and the duties devolving\r\nupon her accordingly. This she was very slow to learn, and,\r\n\u0027indeed, never did learn, or, at least, never would acknowledge the\r\nties of consanguinity, or scarcely those of friendship. She considered\r\nthose she had once known as for the most part strangers and enemies,\r\namong whom she was, by some remarkable and unaccountable means,\r\ntransplanted, though from what region or state of existence was a problem\r\nunsolved.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The next lesson was to re-teach her the arts of reading and writing.\r\nShe was apt enough, and made such rapid progress in both that \u003ci\u003ein a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_382\"\u003e[Pg 382]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003efew weeks\u003c/i\u003e she had readily re-learned to read and write. In copying her\r\nname which her brother had written for her as a first lesson, she took\r\nher pen in a very awkward manner and began to copy from right to left\r\nin the Hebrew mode, as though she had been transplanted from an\r\nEastern soil….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The next thing that is noteworthy is the change which took place\r\nin her disposition. Instead of being melancholy she was now cheerful\r\nto extremity. Instead of being reserved she was buoyant and social.\r\nFormerly taciturn and retiring, she was now merry and jocose. Her\r\ndisposition was totally and absolutely changed. While she was, in this\r\nsecond state, extravagantly fond of company, she was much more enamoured\r\nof nature\u0027s works, as exhibited in the forests, hills, vales, and\r\nwater-courses. She used to start in the morning, either on foot or\r\nhorseback, and ramble until nightfall over the whole country; nor was\r\nshe at all particular whether she were on a path or in the trackless forest.\r\nHer predilection for this manner of life may have been occasioned by the\r\nrestraint necessarily imposed upon her by her friends, which caused her\r\nto consider them her enemies and not companions, and she was glad to\r\nkeep out of their way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"She knew no fear, and as bears and panthers were numerous in\r\nthe woods, and rattlesnakes and copperheads abounded everywhere,\r\nher friends told her of the danger to which she exposed herself, but it\r\nproduced no other effect than to draw forth a contemptuous laugh, as\r\nshe said, \u0027I know you only want to frighten me and keep me at home,\r\nbut you miss it, for I often see your bears and I am perfectly convinced\r\nthat they are nothing more than black hogs.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"One evening, after her return from her daily excursion, she told\r\nthe following incident: \u0027As I was riding to-day along a narrow path a\r\ngreat black hog came out of the woods and stopped before me. I never\r\nsaw such an impudent black hog before. It stood up on its hind feet\r\nand grinned and gnashed its teeth at me. I could not make the horse\r\ngo on. I told him he was a fool to be frightened at a hog, and tried to\r\nwhip him past, but he would not go and wanted to turn back. I told\r\nthe hog to get out of the way, but he did not mind me. \"Well,\" said I,\r\n\"if you won\u0027t for words, I\u0027ll try blows;\" so I got off and took a stick,\r\nand walked up toward it. When I got pretty close by, it got down on\r\nall fours and walked away slowly and sullenly, stopping every few steps\r\nand looking back and grinning and growling. Then I got on my horse\r\nand rode on.\u0027…\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Thus it continued for five weeks, when one morning, after a protracted\r\nsleep, she awoke and was herself again. She recognized the\r\nparental, the brotherly, and sisterly ties as though nothing had happened,\r\nand immediately went about the performance of duties incumbent\r\nupon her, and which she had planned five weeks previously.\r\nGreat was her surprise at the change which one night (as she supposed)\r\nhad produced. Nature bore a different aspect. Not a trace was left in\r\nher mind of the giddy scenes through which she had passed. Her ramblings\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_383\"\u003e[Pg 383]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough the forest, her tricks and humor, all were faded from her\r\nmemory, and not a shadow left behind. Her parents saw their child;\r\nher brothers and sisters saw their sister. She now had all the knowledge\r\nthat she had possessed in her first state previous to the change, still\r\nfresh and in as vigorous exercise as though no change had been. But\r\nany new acquisitions she had made, and any new ideas she had obtained,\r\nwere lost to her now—yet not lost, but laid up out of sight in safe-keeping\r\nfor future use. Of course her natural disposition returned; her\r\nmelancholy was deepened by the information of what had occurred. All\r\nwent on in the old-fashioned way, and it was fondly hoped that the\r\nmysterious occurrences of those five weeks would never be repeated, but\r\nthese anticipations were not to be realized. After the lapse of a few\r\nweeks she fell into a profound sleep, and awoke in her second state,\r\ntaking up her new life again precisely where she had left it when she\r\nbefore passed from that state. She was not now a daughter or a sister.\r\nAll the knowledge she possessed was that acquired during the few weeks\r\nof her former period of second consciousness. She knew nothing of\r\nthe intervening time. Two periods widely separated were brought into\r\ncontact. She thought it was but one night.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In this state she came to understand perfectly the facts of her case,\r\nnot from memory, but from information. Yet her buoyancy of spirits\r\nwas so great that no depression was produced. On the contrary, it\r\nadded to her cheerfulness, and was made the foundation, as was everything\r\nelse, of mirth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"These alternations from one state to another continued at intervals\r\nof varying length for fifteen or sixteen years, but finally ceased when\r\nshe attained the age of thirty-five or thirty-six, leaving her \u003ci\u003epermanently\r\nin her second state\u003c/i\u003e. In this she remained without change for the last\r\nquarter of a century of her life.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe emotional opposition of the two states seems, however,\r\nto have become gradually effaced in Mary Reynolds:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The change from a gay, hysterical, mischievous woman, fond of\r\njests and subject to absurd beliefs or delusive convictions, to one retaining\r\nthe joyousness and love of society, but sobered down to levels of practical\r\nusefulness, was gradual. The most of the twenty-five years which\r\nfollowed she was as different from her melancholy, morbid self as from\r\nthe hilarious condition of the early years of her second state. Some of\r\nher family spoke of it as her third state. She is described as becoming\r\nrational, industrious, and very cheerful, yet reasonably serious; possessed\r\nof a well-balanced temperament, and not having the slightest\r\nindication of an injured or disturbed mind. For some years she taught\r\nschool, and in that capacity was both useful and acceptable, being a\r\ngeneral favorite with old and young.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"During these last twenty-five years she lived in the same\r\nhouse with the Rev. Dr. John V. Reynolds, her nephew, part of that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_384\"\u003e[Pg 384]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntime keeping house for him, showing a sound judgment and a thorough\r\nacquaintance with the duties of her position.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Dr. Reynolds, who is still living in Meadville,\" says Dr. Mitchell,\r\n\"and who has most kindly placed the facts at my disposal, states in\r\nhis letter to me of January 4, 1888, that at a later period of her life she\r\nsaid she did sometimes seem to have a dim, dreamy idea of a shadowy\r\npast, which she could not fully grasp, and could not be certain whether\r\nit originated in a partially restored memory or in the statements of the\r\nevents by others during her abnormal state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Miss Reynolds died in January, 1854, at the age of sixty-one. On\r\nthe morning of the day of her death she rose in her usual health, ate\r\nher breakfast, and superintended household duties. While thus employed\r\nshe suddenly raised her hands to her head and exclaimed:\r\n\u0027Oh! I wonder what is the matter with my head!\u0027 and immediately\r\nfell to the floor. When carried to a sofa she gasped once or twice and\r\ndied.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn such cases as the preceding, in which the secondary\r\ncharacter is superior to the first, there seems reason to\r\nthink that the first one is the morbid one. The word \u003ci\u003einhibition\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndescribes its dulness and melancholy. Félida X.\u0027s\r\noriginal character was dull and melancholy in comparison\r\nwith that which she later acquired, and the change may be\r\nregarded as the removal of inhibitions which had maintained\r\nthemselves from earlier years. Such inhibitions we\r\nall know temporarily, when we can not recollect or in some\r\nother way command our mental resources. The systematized\r\namnesias (losses of memory) of hypnotic subjects ordered\r\nto forget all nouns, or all verbs, or a particular letter\r\nof the alphabet, or all that is relative to a certain person,\r\nare inhibitions of the sort on a more extensive scale. They\r\nsometimes occur spontaneously as symptoms of disease.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_311_311\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_311_311\"\u003e[311]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNow M. Pierre Janet has shown that such inhibitions when\r\nthey bear on a certain class of sensations (making the subject\r\nanæsthetic thereto) and also on the memory of such\r\nsensations, are the basis of changes of personality. The\r\nanæsthetic and \u0027amnesic\u0027 hysteric is one person; but when\r\nyou restore her inhibited sensibilities and memories by\r\nplunging her into the hypnotic trance—in other words, when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_385\"\u003e[Pg 385]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nyou rescue them from their \u0027dissociated\u0027 and split-off condition,\r\nand make them rejoin the other sensibilities and\r\nmemories—she is a different person. As said above (\u003ca href=\"#Page_203\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 203\u003c/a\u003e),\r\nthe hypnotic trance is one method of restoring sensibility\r\nin hysterics. But one day when the hysteric anæsthetic\r\nnamed Lucie was already in the hypnotic trance, M. Janet\r\nfor a certain reason continued to make passes over her for\r\na full half-hour as if she were not already asleep. The result\r\nwas to throw her into a sort of syncope from which,\r\nafter half an hour, she revived in a second somnambulic condition\r\nentirely unlike that which had characterized her\r\nthitherto—different sensibilities, a different memory, a different\r\nperson, in short. In the waking state the poor young\r\nwoman was anæsthetic all over, nearly deaf, and with a\r\nbadly contracted field of vision. Bad as it was, however,\r\nsight was her best sense, and she used it as a guide in all\r\nher movements. With her eyes bandaged she became entirely\r\nhelpless, and like other persons of a similar sort\r\nwhose cases have been recorded, she almost immediately\r\nfell asleep in consequence of the withdrawal of her last\r\nsensorial stimulus. M. Janet calls this waking or primary\r\n(one can hardly in such a connection say \u0027normal\u0027) state by\r\nthe name of Lucie 1. In Lucie 2, her first sort of hypnotic\r\ntrance, the anæsthesias were diminished but not removed.\r\nIn the deeper trance, \u0027Lucie 3,\u0027 brought about as just described,\r\nno trace of them remained. Her sensibility became\r\nperfect, and instead of being an extreme example of the\r\n\u0027visual\u0027 type, she was transformed into what in Prof.\r\nCharcot\u0027s terminology is known as a motor. That is to\r\nsay, that whereas when awake she had thought in visual\r\nterms exclusively, and could imagine things only by remembering\r\nhow they \u003ci\u003elooked\u003c/i\u003e, now in this deeper trance her\r\nthoughts and memories seemed to M. Janet to be largely\r\ncomposed of images of movement and of touch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving discovered this deeper trance and change of\r\npersonality in Lucie, M. Janet naturally became eager to\r\nfind it in his other subjects. He found it in Rose, in Marie,\r\nand in Léonie; and his brother, Dr. Jules Janet, who was\r\n\u003ci\u003einterne\u003c/i\u003e at the Salpétrière Hospital, found it in the celebrated\r\nsubject Wit…. whose trances had been studied for years\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_386\"\u003e[Pg 386]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby the various doctors of that institution without any of\r\nthem having happened to awaken this very peculiar individuality.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_312_312\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_312_312\"\u003e[312]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the return of all the sensibilities in the deeper\r\ntrance, these subjects turned, as it were, into normal\r\npersons. Their memories in particular grew more extensive,\r\nand hereupon M. Janet spins a theoretic generalization.\r\n\u003ci\u003eWhen a certain kind of sensation\u003c/i\u003e, he says, \u003ci\u003eis abolished\r\nin an hysteric patient, there is also abolished along with\r\nit all recollection of past sensations of that kind\u003c/i\u003e. If, for example,\r\nhearing be the anæsthetic sense, the patient becomes\r\nunable even to imagine sounds and voices, and has to\r\nspeak (when speech is still possible) by means of motor or\r\narticulatory cues. If the motor sense be abolished, the patient\r\nmust will the movements of his limbs by first defining\r\nthem to his mind in visual terms, and must innervate his\r\nvoice by premonitory ideas of the way in which the words\r\nare going to sound. The practical consequences of this\r\nlaw would be great, for all experiences belonging to a\r\nsphere of sensibility which afterwards became anæsthetic,\r\nas, for example, touch, would have been stored away and\r\nremembered in tactile terms, and would be incontinently\r\nforgotten as soon as the cutaneous and muscular sensibility\r\nshould come to be cut out in the course of disease.\r\nMemory of them would be restored again, on the\r\nother hand, so soon as the sense of touch came back.\r\nNow, in the hysteric subjects on whom M. Janet experimented,\r\ntouch did come back in the state of trance. The\r\nresult was that all sorts of memories, absent in the ordinary\r\ncondition, came back too, and they could then go back and\r\nexplain the origin of many otherwise inexplicable things in\r\ntheir life. One stage in the great convulsive crisis of hystero-epilepsy,\r\nfor example, is what French writers call the\r\n\u003ci\u003ephase des attitudes passionelles\u003c/i\u003e, in which the patient, without\r\nspeaking or giving any account of herself, will go through\r\nthe outward movements of fear, anger, or some other emotional\r\nstate of mind. Usually this phase is, with each\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_387\"\u003e[Pg 387]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npatient, a thing so stereotyped as to seem automatic, and\r\ndoubts have even been expressed as to whether any consciousness\r\nexists whilst it lasts. When, however, the\r\npatient Lucie\u0027s tactile sensibility came back in the deeper\r\ntrance, she explained the origin of her hysteric crisis in a\r\ngreat fright which she had had when a child, on a day\r\nwhen certain men, hid behind the curtains, had jumped out\r\nupon her; she told how she went through this scene again\r\nin all her crises; she told of her sleep-walking fits through\r\nthe house when a child, and how for several months she\r\nhad been shut in a dark room because of a disorder of the\r\neyes. All these were things of which she recollected nothing\r\nwhen awake, because they were records of experiences\r\nmainly of motion and of touch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut M. Janet\u0027s subject Léonie is interesting, and\r\nshows best how with the sensibilities and motor impulses\r\nthe memories and character will change.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This woman, whose life sounds more like an improbable romance\r\nthan a genuine history, has had attacks of natural somnambulism since\r\nthe age of three years. She has been hypnotized constantly by all sorts\r\nof persons from the age of sixteen upwards, and she is now forty-five.\r\nWhilst her normal life developed in one way in the midst of her poor\r\ncountry surroundings, her second life was passed in drawing-rooms and\r\ndoctors\u0027 offices, and naturally took an entirely different direction. To-day,\r\nwhen in her normal state, this poor peasant woman is a serious\r\nand rather sad person, calm and slow, very mild with every one, and\r\nextremely timid: to look at her one would never suspect the personage\r\nwhich she contains. But hardly is she put to sleep hypnotically when\r\na metamorphosis occurs. Her face is no longer the same. She keeps\r\nher eyes closed, it is true, but the acuteness of her other senses supplies\r\ntheir place. She is gay, noisy, restless, sometimes insupportably so.\r\nShe remains good-natured, but has acquired a singular tendency to irony\r\nand sharp jesting. Nothing is more curious than to hear her after a\r\nsitting when she has received a visit from strangers who wished to see\r\nher asleep. She gives a word-portrait of them, apes their manners,\r\npretends to know their little ridiculous aspects and passions, and for\r\neach invents a romance. To this character must be added the possession\r\nof an enormous number of recollections, whose existence she does\r\nnot even suspect when awake, for her amnesia is then complete….\r\nShe refuses the name of Léonie and takes that of Léontine (Léonie 2)\r\nto which her first magnetizers had accustomed her. \u0027That good woman\r\nis not myself,\u0027 she says, \u0027she is too stupid!\u0027 To herself, Léontine or\r\nLéonie 2, she attributes all the sensations and all the actions, in a word\r\nall the conscious experiences which she has undergone \u003ci\u003ein somnambulism\u003c/i\u003e,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_388\"\u003e[Pg 388]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand knits them together to make the history of her already long life.\r\nTo Léonie 1 [as M. Janet calls the waking woman] on the other hand, she\r\nexclusively ascribes the events lived through in waking hours. I was\r\nat first struck by an important exception to the rule, and was disposed\r\nto think that there might be something arbitrary in this partition of\r\nher recollections. In the normal state Léonie has a husband and children;\r\nbut Léonie 2, the somnambulist, whilst acknowledging the children\r\nas her own, attributes the husband to \u0027the other.\u0027 This choice, was\r\nperhaps explicable, but it followed no rule. It was not till later that I\r\nlearned that her magnetizers in early days, as audacious as certain hypnotizers\r\nof recent date, had somnambulized her for her first \u003ci\u003eaccouchements\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand that she had lapsed into that state spontaneously in the\r\nlater ones. Léonie 2 was thus quite right in ascribing to herself the\r\nchildren—it was she who had had them, and the rule that her first\r\ntrance-state forms a different personality was not broken. But it is\r\nthe same with her second or deepest state of trance. When after the\r\nrenewed passes, syncope, etc., she reaches the condition which I have\r\ncalled Léonie 3, she is another person still. Serious and grave, instead\r\nof being a restless child, she speaks slowly and moves but little. Again\r\nshe separates herself from the waking Léonie 1. \u0027A good but rather\r\nstupid woman,\u0027 she says, \u0027and not me.\u0027 And she also separates herself\r\nfrom Léonie 2: \u0027How can you see anything of me in that crazy creature?\u0027\r\nshe says. \u0027Fortunately I am nothing for her.\u0027\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLéonie 1 knows only of herself; Léonie 2, of herself and\r\nof Léonie 1; Léonie 3 knows of herself and of both the\r\nothers. Léonie 1 has a visual consciousness; Léonie 2 has\r\none both visual and auditory; in Léonie 3 it is at once\r\nvisual, auditory, and tactile. Prof. Janet thought at first\r\nthat he was Léonie 3\u0027s discoverer. But she told him\r\nthat she had been frequently in that condition before. A\r\nformer magnetizer had hit upon her just as M. Janet had,\r\nin seeking by means of passes to deepen the sleep of\r\nLéonie 2.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This resurrection of a somnambulic personage who had been\r\nextinct for twenty years is curious enough; and in speaking to Léonie\r\n3, I naturally now adopt the name of Léonore which was given her by her\r\nfirst master.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most carefully studied case of multiple personality\r\nis that of the hysteric youth Louis V. about whom MM.\r\nBourru and Burot have written a book.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_313_313\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_313_313\"\u003e[313]\u003c/a\u003e The symptoms\r\nare too intricate to be reproduced here with detail. Suffice\r\nit that Louis V. had led an irregular life, in the army, in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_389\"\u003e[Pg 389]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhospitals, and in houses of correction, and had had numerous\r\nhysteric anæsthesias, paralyses, and contractures attacking\r\nhim differently at different times and when he lived at\r\ndifferent places. At eighteen, at an agricultural House of\r\nCorrection he was bitten by a viper, which brought on a\r\nconvulsive crisis and left \u003ci\u003eboth of his legs\u003c/i\u003e paralyzed for\r\nthree years. During this condition he was gentle, moral,\r\nand industrious. But suddenly at last, after a long convulsive\r\nseizure, his paralysis disappeared, and with it his\r\nmemory for all the time during which it had endured. His\r\ncharacter also changed: he became quarrelsome, gluttonous,\r\nimpolite, stealing his comrades\u0027 wine, and money from\r\nan attendant, and finally escaped from the establishment\r\nand fought furiously when he was overtaken and caught.\r\nLater, when he first fell under the observation of the\r\nauthors, his \u003ci\u003eright side\u003c/i\u003e was half paralyzed and insensible,\r\nand his character intolerable; the application of metals\r\ntransferred the paralysis to the \u003ci\u003eleft\u003c/i\u003e side, abolished his\r\nrecollections of the other condition, and carried him psychically\r\nback to the hospital of Bicêtre where he had been\r\ntreated for a similar physical condition. His character,\r\nopinions, education, all underwent a concomitant transformation.\r\nHe was no longer the personage of the moment\r\nbefore. It appeared ere long that any present nervous disorder\r\nin him could be temporarily removed by metals,\r\nmagnets, electric or other baths, etc.; and that any past\r\ndisorder could be brought back by hypnotic suggestion.\r\nHe also went through a rapid spontaneous repetition of his\r\nseries of past disorders after each of the convulsive attacks\r\nwhich occurred in him at intervals. It was observed that\r\neach physical state in which he found himself, excluded\r\ncertain memories and brought with it a definite modification\r\nof character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The law of these changes,\" say the authors, \"is quite clear.\r\nThere exist precise, constant, and necessary relations between the\r\nbodily and the mental state, such that it is impossible to modify the\r\none without modifying the other in a parallel fashion.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_314_314\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_314_314\"\u003e[314]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_390\"\u003e[Pg 390]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe case of this proteiform individual would seem, then,\r\nnicely to corroborate M. P. Janet\u0027s law that anæsthesias and\r\ngaps in memory go together. Coupling Janet\u0027s law with\r\nLocke\u0027s that changes of memory bring changes of personality,\r\nwe should have an apparent explanation of some cases at\r\nleast of alternate personality. But mere anæsthesia does\r\nnot sufficiently explain the changes of disposition, which are\r\nprobably due to modifications in the perviousness of motor\r\nand associative paths, co-ordinate with those of the sensorial\r\npaths rather than consecutive upon them. And indeed\r\na glance at other cases than M. Janet\u0027s own, suffices to show\r\nus that sensibility and memory are not coupled in any\r\ninvariable way.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_315_315\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_315_315\"\u003e[315]\u003c/a\u003e M. Janet\u0027s law, true of his own cases,\r\ndoes not seem to hold good in all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course it is mere guesswork to speculate on what\r\nmay be the cause of the amnesias which lie at the bottom\r\nof changes in the Self. Changes of blood-supply have\r\nnaturally been invoked. Alternate action of the two hemispheres\r\nwas long ago proposed by Dr. Wigan in his book\r\non the Duality of the Mind. I shall revert to this explanation\r\nafter considering the third class of alterations of the\r\nSelf, those, namely, which I have called \u0027possessions.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have myself become quite recently acquainted with\r\nthe subject of a case of alternate personality of the \u0027ambulatory\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_391\"\u003e[Pg 391]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsort, who has given me permission to name him in\r\nthese pages.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_316_316\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_316_316\"\u003e[316]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Rev. Ansel Bourne, of Greene, R. I., was brought up to the\r\ntrade of a carpenter; but, in consequence of a sudden temporary loss,\r\nof sight and hearing under very peculiar circumstances, he became converted\r\nfrom Atheism to Christianity just before his thirtieth year, and\r\nhas since that time for the most part lived the life of an itinerant\r\npreacher. He has been subject to headaches and temporary fits of depression\r\nof spirits during most of his life, and has had a few fits of unconsciousness\r\nlasting an hour or less. He also has a region of somewhat\r\ndiminished cutaneous sensibility on the left thigh. Otherwise his\r\nhealth is good, and his muscular strength and endurance excellent.\r\nHe is of a firm and self-reliant disposition, a man whose yea is yea and\r\nhis nay, nay; and his character for uprightness is such in the community\r\nthat no person who knows him will for a moment admit the\r\npossibility of his case not being perfectly genuine.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn January 17, 1887, he drew 551 dollars from a bank in Providence\r\nwith which to pay for a certain lot of land in Greene, paid\r\ncertain bills, and got into a Pawtucket horse-car. This is the last\r\nincident which he remembers. He did not return home that day, and\r\nnothing was heard of him for two months. He was published in the\r\npapers as missing, and foul play being suspected, the police sought in\r\nvain his whereabouts. On the morning of March 14th, however, at\r\nNorristown, Pennsylvania, a man calling himself A. J. Brown, who\r\nhad rented a small shop six weeks previously, stocked it with stationery,\r\nconfectionery, fruit and small articles, and carried on his quiet\r\ntrade without seeming to any one unnatural or eccentric, woke up in\r\na fright and called in the people of the house to tell him where he was.\r\nHe said that his name was Ansel Bourne, that he was entirely ignorant\r\nof Norristown, that he knew nothing of shop-keeping, and that\r\nthe last thing he remembered—it seemed only yesterday—was drawing\r\nthe money from the bank, etc., in Providence. He would not believe\r\nthat two months had elapsed. The people of the house thought\r\nhim insane; and so, at first, did Dr. Louis H. Read, whom they called\r\nin to see him. But on telegraphing to Providence, confirmatory messages\r\ncame, and presently his nephew, Mr. Andrew Harris, arrived\r\nupon the scene, made everything straight, and took him home. He was\r\nvery weak, having lost apparently over twenty pounds of flesh during\r\nhis escapade, and had such a horror of the idea of the candy-store that\r\nhe refused to set foot in it again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first two weeks of the period remained unaccounted for, as he\r\nhad no memory, after he had once resumed his normal personality, of\r\nany part of the time, and no one who knew him seems to have seen him\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_392\"\u003e[Pg 392]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nafter he left home. The remarkable part of the change is, of course,\r\nthe peculiar occupation which the so-called Brown indulged in. Mr.\r\nBourne has never in his life had the slightest contact with trade.\r\n\u0027Brown\u0027 was described by the neighbors as taciturn, orderly in his\r\nhabits, and in no way queer. He went to Philadelphia several times;\r\nreplenished his stock; cooked for himself in the back shop, where he\r\nalso slept; went regularly to church; and once at a prayer-meeting\r\nmade what was considered by the hearers a good address, in the course\r\nof which he related an incident which he had witnessed in his natural\r\nstate of Bourne.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis was all that was known of the case up to June 1890, when I\r\ninduced Mr. Bourne to submit to hypnotism, so as to see whether, in the\r\nhypnotic trance, his \u0027Brown\u0027 memory would not come back. It did so\r\nwith surprising readiness; so much so indeed that it proved quite impossible\r\nto make him whilst in the hypnosis remember any of the facts\r\nof his normal life. He had heard of Ansel Bourne, but \"didn\u0027t know\r\nas he had ever met the man.\" When confronted with Mrs. Bourne he\r\nsaid that he had \"never seen the woman before,\" etc. On the other\r\nhand, he told of his peregrinations during the lost fortnight,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_317_317\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_317_317\"\u003e[317]\u003c/a\u003e and gave\r\nall sorts of details about the Norristown episode. The whole thing was\r\nprosaic enough; and the Brown-personality seems to be nothing but a\r\nrather shrunken, dejected, and amnesic extract of Mr. Bourne himself.\r\nHe gives no motive for the wandering except that there was \u0027trouble\r\nback there\u0027 and he \u0027wanted rest.\u0027 During the trance he looks old,\r\nthe corners of his mouth are drawn down, his voice is slow and weak,\r\nand he sits screening his eyes and trying vainly to remember what lay\r\nbefore and after the two months of the Brown experience. \"I\u0027m all\r\nhedged in,\" he says: \"I can\u0027t get out at either end. I don\u0027t know\r\nwhat set me down in that Pawtucket horse-car, and I don\u0027t know how\r\nI ever left that store, or what became of it.\" His eyes are practically\r\nnormal, and all his sensibilities (save for tardier response) about the\r\nsame in hypnosis as in waking. I had hoped by suggestion, etc.,\r\nto run the two personalities into one, and make the memories continuous,\r\nbut no artifice would avail to accomplish this, and Mr. Bourne\u0027s\r\nskull to-day still covers two distinct personal selves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe case (whether it contain an epileptic element or not) should\r\napparently be classed as one of spontaneous hypnotic trance, persisting\r\nfor two months. The peculiarity of it is that nothing else like it ever\r\noccurred in the man\u0027s life, and that no eccentricity of character came\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_393\"\u003e[Pg 393]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nout. In most similar cases, the attacks recur, and the sensibilities and\r\nconduct markedly change.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_318_318\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_318_318\"\u003e[318]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. In \u0027\u003ci\u003emediumships\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 or \u0027\u003ci\u003epossessions\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 the invasion and the\r\npassing away of the secondary state are both relatively\r\nabrupt, and the duration of the state is usually short—i.e.,\r\nfrom a few minutes to a few hours. Whenever the secondary\r\nstate is well developed no memory for aught that happened\r\nduring it remains after the primary consciousness\r\ncomes back. The subject during the secondary consciousness\r\nspeaks, writes, or acts as if animated by a foreign person,\r\nand often names this foreign person and gives his\r\nhistory. In old times the foreign \u0027control\u0027 was usually a\r\ndemon, and is so now in communities which favor that belief.\r\nWith us he gives himself out at the worst for an\r\nIndian or other grotesquely speaking but harmless personage.\r\nUsually he purports to be the spirit of a dead person\r\nknown or unknown to those present, and the subject is\r\nthen what we call a \u0027medium.\u0027 Mediumistic possession in\r\nall its grades seems to form a perfectly natural special type\r\nof alternate personality, and the susceptibility to it in some\r\nform is by no means an uncommon gift, in persons who have\r\nno other obvious nervous anomaly. The phenomena are\r\nvery intricate, and are only just beginning to be studied\r\nin a proper scientific way. The lowest phase of mediumship\r\nis automatic writing, and the lowest grade of that is\r\nwhere the Subject knows what words are coming, but feels\r\nimpelled to write them as if from without. Then comes\r\nwriting unconsciously, even whilst engaged in reading or\r\ntalk. Inspirational speaking, playing on musical instruments,\r\netc., also belong to the relatively lower phases of\r\npossession, in which the normal self is not excluded from\r\nconscious participation in the performance, though their\r\ninitiative seems to come from elsewhere. In the highest\r\nphase the trance is complete, the voice, language, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_394\"\u003e[Pg 394]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neverything are changed, and there is no after-memory\r\nwhatever until the next trance comes. One curious thing\r\nabout trance-utterances is their generic similarity in different\r\nindividuals. The \u0027control\u0027 here in America is either a\r\ngrotesque, slangy, and flippant personage (\u0027Indian\u0027 controls,\r\ncalling the ladies \u0027squaws,\u0027 the men \u0027braves,\u0027 the\r\nhouse a \u0027wigwam,\u0027 etc., etc., are excessively common); or,\r\nif he ventures on higher intellectual flights, he abounds in a\r\ncuriously vague optimistic philosophy-and-water, in which\r\nphrases about spirit, harmony, beauty, law, progression,\r\ndevelopment, etc., keep recurring. It seems exactly as if\r\none author composed more than half of the trance-messages,\r\nno matter by whom they are uttered. Whether all\r\nsub-conscious selves are peculiarly susceptible to a certain\r\nstratum of the \u003ci\u003eZeitgeist\u003c/i\u003e, and get their inspiration from it, I\r\nknow not; but this is obviously the case with the secondary\r\nselves which become \u0027developed\u0027 in spiritualist circles.\r\nThere the beginnings of the medium trance are indistinguishable\r\nfrom effects of hypnotic suggestion. The subject\r\nassumes the rôle of a medium simply because opinion\r\nexpects it of him under the conditions which are present;\r\nand carries it out with a feebleness or a vivacity proportionate\r\nto his histrionic gifts. But the odd thing is that\r\npersons unexposed to spiritualist traditions will so often act\r\nin the same way when they become entranced, speak in the\r\nname of the departed, go through the motions of their\r\nseveral death-agonies, send messages about their happy\r\nhome in the summer-land, and describe the ailments of\r\nthose present. I have no theory to publish of these cases,\r\nseveral of which I have personally seen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs an example of the automatic writing performances I\r\nwill quote from an account of his own case kindly furnished\r\nme by Mr. Sidney Dean of Warren, R I., member of Congress\r\nfrom Connecticut from 1855 to 1859, who has been all\r\nhis life a robust and active journalist, author, and man of\r\naffairs. He has for many years been a writing subject, and\r\nhas a large collection of manuscript automatically produced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Some of it,\" he writes us, \"is in hieroglyph, or strange compounded\r\narbitrary characters, each series possessing a seeming unity in general\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_395\"\u003e[Pg 395]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndesign or character, followed by what purports to be a translation or\r\nrendering into mother English. I never attempted the seemingly impossible\r\nfeat of copying the characters. They were cut with the precision\r\nof a graver\u0027s tool, and generally with a single rapid stroke of the pencil.\r\nMany languages, some obsolete and passed from history, are professedly\r\ngiven. To see them would satisfy you that no one could copy\r\nthem except by tracing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"These, however, are but a small part of the phenomena. The\r\n\u0027automatic\u0027 has given place to the \u003ci\u003eimpressional\u003c/i\u003e, and when the work is\r\nin progress I am in the normal condition, and seemingly two minds, intelligences,\r\npersons, are practically engaged. The writing is in my own\r\nhand but the dictation not of my own mind and will, but that of another,\r\nupon subjects of which I can have no knowledge and hardly a\r\ntheory; and I, myself, consciously criticise the thought, fact, mode of\r\nexpressing it, etc., while the hand is recording the subject-matter and\r\neven the words impressed to be written. If \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e refuse to write the sentence,\r\nor even the word, the impression instantly ceases, and my willingness\r\nmust be mentally expressed before the work is resumed, and it\r\nis resumed at the point of cessation, even if it should be in the middle\r\nof a sentence. Sentences are commenced without knowledge of mine as\r\nto their subject or ending. In fact, I have never known in advance the\r\nsubject of disquisition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There is in progress now, at uncertain times, not subject to my\r\nwill, a series of twenty-four chapters upon the scientific features of life,\r\nmoral, spiritual, eternal. Seven have already been written in the manner\r\nindicated. These were preceded by twenty-four chapters relating\r\ngenerally to the life beyond material death, its characteristics, etc.\r\nEach chapter is signed by the name of some person who has lived on\r\nearth,—some with whom I have been personally acquainted, others\r\nknown in history…. I know nothing of the alleged authorship\r\nof any chapter until it is completed and the name impressed and appended….\r\nI am interested not only in the reputed authorship,—of\r\nwhich I have nothing corroborative,—but in the philosophy taught,\r\nof which I was in ignorance until these chapters appeared. From my\r\nstandpoint of life—which has been that of biblical orthodoxy—the\r\nphilosophy is new, seems to be reasonable, and is logically put. I confess\r\nto an inability to successfully controvert it to my own satisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is an intelligent \u003ci\u003eego\u003c/i\u003e who writes, or else the influence assumes\r\nindividuality, which practically makes of the influence a personality. It\r\nis \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e myself; of that I am conscious at every step of the process. I\r\nhave also traversed the whole field of the claims of \u0027unconscious cerebration,\u0027\r\nso called, so far as I am competent to critically examine it, and\r\nit fails, as a theory, in numberless points, when applied to this strange\r\nwork through me. It would be far more reasonable and satisfactory for\r\nme to accept the silly hypothesis of re-incarnation,—the old doctrine of\r\nmetempsychosis,—as taught by some spiritualists to-day, and to believe\r\nthat I lived a former life here, and that once in a while it dominates my\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_396\"\u003e[Pg 396]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nintellectual powers, and writes chapters upon the philosophy of life, or\r\nopens a post-office for spirits to drop their effusions, and have them\r\nput into English script. No; the easiest and most natural solution to\r\nme is to admit the claim made, i.e., that it is a decarnated intelligence\r\nwho writes. But \u003ci\u003ewho?\u003c/i\u003e that is the question. The names of scholars\r\nand thinkers who once lived are affixed to the most ungrammatical and\r\nweakest of \u003ci\u003ebosh\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It seems reasonable to me—upon the hypothesis that it is a person\r\nusing another\u0027s mind or brain—that there must be more or less of\r\nthat other\u0027s style or tone incorporated in the message, and that to the\r\nunseen personality, i.e., the power which impresses, the thought, the\r\nfact, or the philosophy, and not the style or tone, belongs. For instance,\r\nwhile the influence is impressing my brain with the greatest\r\nforce and rapidity, so that my pencil fairly flies over the paper to record\r\nthe thoughts, I am conscious that, in many cases, the vehicle of the\r\nthought, i.e., the language, is very natural and familiar to me, as if,\r\nsomehow, \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e personality as a writer was getting mixed up with the\r\nmessage. And, again, the style, language, everything, is entirely\r\nforeign to my own style.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI am myself persuaded by abundant acquaintance with\r\nthe trances of one medium that the \u0027control\u0027 may be altogether\r\ndifferent from any \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e waking self of the person.\r\nIn the case I have in mind, it professes to be a certain departed\r\nFrench doctor; and is, I am convinced, acquainted\r\nwith facts about the circumstances, and the living and dead\r\nrelatives and acquaintances, of numberless sitters whom the\r\nmedium never met before, and of whom she has never heard\r\nthe names. I record my bare opinion here unsupported by\r\nthe evidence, not, of course, in order to convert anyone to\r\nmy view, but because I am persuaded that a serious study\r\nof these trance-phenomena is one of the greatest needs of\r\npsychology, and think that my personal confession may\r\npossibly draw a reader or two into a field which the \u003ci\u003esoi-disant\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u0027scientist\u0027 usually refuses to explore.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany persons have found evidence conclusive to their\r\nminds that in some cases the control is really the departed\r\nspirit whom it pretends to be. The phenomena shade\r\noff so gradually into cases where this is obviously absurd,\r\nthat the presumption (quite apart from \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e \u0027scientific\u0027\r\nprejudice) is great against its being true. The case\r\nof Lurancy Vennum is perhaps as extreme a case of \u0027possession\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_397\"\u003e[Pg 397]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the modern sort as one can find.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_319_319\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_319_319\"\u003e[319]\u003c/a\u003e Lurancy was\r\na young girl of fourteen, living with her parents at Watseka,\r\nIll., who (after various distressing hysterical disorders and\r\nspontaneous trances, during which she was possessed by departed\r\nspirits of a more or less grotesque sort) finally declared\r\nherself to be animated by the spirit of Mary Roff (a\r\nneighbor\u0027s daughter, who had died in an insane asylum\r\ntwelve years before) and insisted on being sent \u0027home\u0027 to Mr.\r\nRoff\u0027s house. After a week of \u0027homesickness\u0027 and importunity\r\non her part, her parents agreed, and the Roffs, who\r\npitied her, and who were spiritualists into the bargain, took\r\nher in. Once there, she seems to have convinced the family\r\nthat their dead Mary had exchanged habitations with Lurancy.\r\nLurancy was said to be temporarily in heaven, and\r\nMary\u0027s spirit now controlled her organism, and lived again\r\nin her former earthly home.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The girl, now in her new home, seemed perfectly happy and content,\r\nknowing every person and everything that Mary knew when in\r\nher original body, twelve to twenty-five years ago, recognizing and calling\r\nby name those who were friends and neighbors of the family from\r\n1852 to 1865, when Mary died, calling attention to scores, yes, hundreds\r\nof incidents that transpired during her natural life. During all the\r\nperiod of her sojourn at Mr. Roff\u0027s she had no knowledge of, and did\r\nnot recognize, any of Mr. Vennum\u0027s family, their friends or neighbors,\r\nyet Mr. and Mrs. Vennum and their children visited her and Mr. Roff\u0027s\r\npeople, she being introduced to them as to any strangers. After frequent\r\nvisits, and hearing them often and favorably spoken of, she\r\nlearned to love them as acquaintances, and visited them with Mrs. Roff\r\nthree times. From day to day she appeared natural, easy, affable, and\r\nindustrious, attending diligently and faithfully to her household duties,\r\nassisting in the general work of the family as a faithful, prudent daughter\r\nmight be supposed to do, singing, reading, or conversing as opportunity\r\noffered, upon all matters of private or general interest to the\r\nfamily.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe so-called Mary whilst at the Roffs\u0027 would sometimes\r\n\u0027go back to heaven,\u0027 and leave the body in a \u0027quiet trance,\u0027\r\ni.e., without the original personality of Lurancy returning.\r\nAfter eight or nine weeks, however, the memory and\r\nmanner of Lurancy would sometimes partially, but not entirely,\r\nreturn for a few minutes. Once Lurancy seems to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_398\"\u003e[Pg 398]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave taken full possession for a short time. At last, after\r\nsome fourteen weeks, conformably to the prophecy which\r\n\u0027Mary\u0027 had made when she first assumed \u0027control,\u0027 she\r\ndeparted definitively and the Lurancy-consciousness came\r\nback for good. Mr. Roff writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"She wanted me to take her home, which I did. She called me Mr.\r\nRoff, and talked with me as a young girl would, not being acquainted.\r\nI asked her how things appeared to her—if they seemed natural. She\r\nsaid it seemed like a dream to her. She met her parents and brothers\r\nin a very affectionate manner, hugging and kissing each one in tears of\r\ngladness. She clasped her arms around her father\u0027s neck a long time,\r\nfairly smothering him with kisses. I saw her father just now (eleven\r\no\u0027clock). He says she has been perfectly natural, and seems entirely\r\nwell.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLurancy\u0027s mother writes, a couple of months later, that\r\nshe was\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"perfectly and entirely well and natural. For two or three weeks after\r\nher return home, she seemed a little strange to what she had been before\r\nshe was taken sick last summer, but only, perhaps, the natural change\r\nthat had taken place with the girl, and except it seemed to her as\r\nthough she had been dreaming or sleeping, etc. Lurancy has been\r\nsmarter, more intelligent, more industrious, more womanly, and more\r\npolite than before. We give the credit of her complete cure and restoration\r\nto her family, to Dr. E. W. Stevens, and Mr. and Mrs. Roff, by\r\ntheir obtaining her removal to Mr. Roff\u0027s, where her cure was perfected.\r\nWe firmly believe that, had she remained at home, she would have died,\r\nor we would have been obliged to send her to the insane asylum; and\r\nif so, that she would have died there; and further, that I could not have\r\nlived but a short time with the care and trouble devolving on me.\r\nSeveral of the relatives of Lurancy, including ourselves, now believe\r\nshe was cured by spirit power, and that Mary Roff controlled the girl.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEight years later, Lurancy was reported to be married\r\nand a mother, and in good health. She had apparently outgrown\r\nthe mediumistic phase of her existence.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_320_320\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_320_320\"\u003e[320]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the condition of the sensibility during these invasions,\r\nfew observations have been made. I have found the\r\nhands of two automatic writers anæsthetic during the act.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_399\"\u003e[Pg 399]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn two others I have found this not to be the case. Automatic\r\nwriting is usually preceded by shooting pains along\r\nthe arm-nerves and irregular contractions of the arm-muscles.\r\nI have found one medium\u0027s tongue and lips\r\napparently insensible to pin-pricks during her (speaking)\r\ntrance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we speculate on the brain-condition during all these\r\ndifferent perversions of personality, we see that it must be\r\nsupposed capable of successively changing all its modes of\r\naction, and abandoning the use for the time being of whole\r\nsets of well-organized association-paths. In no other way\r\ncan we explain the loss of memory in passing from one\r\nalternating condition to another. And not only this, but\r\nwe must admit that organized systems of paths can be\r\nthrown out of gear with others, so that the processes in one\r\nsystem give rise to one consciousness, and those of another\r\nsystem to another \u003ci\u003esimultaneously\u003c/i\u003e existing consciousness.\r\nThus only can we understand the facts of automatic writing,\r\netc., whilst the patient is out of trance, and the false anæsthesias\r\nand amnesias of the hysteric type. But just what\r\nsort of dissociation the phrase \u0027thrown out of gear\u0027 may\r\nstand for, we cannot even conjecture; only I think we ought\r\nnot to talk of the doubling of the self as if it consisted in\r\nthe failure to combine on the part of certain systems of\r\n\u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e which usually do so. It is better to talk of \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e\r\nusually combined, and which are now divided between the\r\ntwo \u0027selves,\u0027 in the hysteric and automatic cases in question.\r\nEach of the selves is due to a system of cerebral\r\npaths acting by itself. If the brain acted normally, and\r\nthe dissociated systems came together again, we should get\r\na new affection of consciousness in the form of a third \u0027Self\u0027\r\ndifferent from the other two, but knowing their objects\r\ntogether, as the result.—After all I have said in the last\r\nchapter, this hardly needs further remark.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome peculiarities in the lower automatic performances\r\nsuggest that the systems thrown out of gear with each other\r\nare contained one in the right and the other in the left\r\nhemisphere. The subjects, e.g., often write backwards, or\r\nthey transpose letters, or they write mirror-script. All these\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_400\"\u003e[Pg 400]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare symptoms of agraphic disease. The left hand, if left\r\nto its natural impulse, will in most people write mirror-script\r\nmore easily than natural script. Mr. F. W. H. Myers\r\nhas laid stress on these analogies.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_321_321\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_321_321\"\u003e[321]\u003c/a\u003e He has also called\r\nattention to the usual inferior moral tone of ordinary planchette\r\nwriting. On Hughlings Jackson\u0027s principles, the\r\nleft hemisphere, being the more evolved organ, at ordinary\r\ntimes inhibits the activity of the right one; but Mr. Myers\r\nsuggests that during the automatic performances the usual\r\ninhibition may be removed and the right hemisphere set\r\nfree to act all by itself. This is very likely to some extent\r\nto be the case. But the crude explanation of \u0027two\u0027 selves\r\nby \u0027two\u0027 hemispheres is of course far from Mr. Myers\u0027s\r\nthought. The selves may be more than two, and the brain-systems\r\nseverally used for each must be conceived as interpenetrating\r\neach other in very minute ways.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSUMMARY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo sum up now this long chapter. The consciousness of\r\nSelf involves a stream of thought, each part of which as \u0027I\u0027\r\ncan 1) remember those which went before, and know the\r\nthings they knew; and 2) emphasize and care paramountly\r\nfor certain ones among them as \u0027me,\u0027 and \u003ci\u003eappropriate to\r\nthese\u003c/i\u003e the rest. The nucleus of the \u0027\u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is always the bodily\r\nexistence felt to be present at the time. Whatever remembered-past-feelings\r\n\u003ci\u003eresemble\u003c/i\u003e this present feeling are deemed\r\nto belong to the same \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e with it. Whatever other things\r\nare perceived to be \u003ci\u003eassociated\u003c/i\u003e with this feeling are deemed\r\nto form part of that me\u0027s \u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e; and of them certain\r\nones (which fluctuate more or less) are reckoned to be\r\nthemselves \u003ci\u003econstituents\u003c/i\u003e of the me in a larger sense,—such\r\nare the clothes, the material possessions, the friends, the\r\nhonors and esteem which the person receives or may receive.\r\nThis me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively\r\nknown. The \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e which knows them cannot itself be an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_401\"\u003e[Pg 401]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\naggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be\r\nconsidered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like\r\nthe Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as \u0027out\r\nof time.\u0027 It is a \u003ci\u003eThought\u003c/i\u003e, at each moment different from\r\nthat of the last moment, but \u003ci\u003eappropriative\u003c/i\u003e of the latter,\r\ntogether with all that the latter called its own. All the\r\nexperiential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered\r\nwith any hypothesis save that of the existence of\r\npassing thoughts or states of mind. The same brain may\r\nsubserve many conscious selves, either alternate or coexisting;\r\nbut by what modifications in its action, or whether\r\nultra-cerebral conditions may intervene, are questions which\r\ncannot now be answered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf anyone urge that I assign no \u003ci\u003ereason\u003c/i\u003e why the successive\r\npassing thoughts should inherit each other\u0027s possessions,\r\nor why they and the brain-states should be functions\r\n(in the mathematical sense) of each other, I reply that the\r\nreason, if there be any, must lie where all real reasons lie,\r\nin the total sense or meaning of the world. If there be such\r\na meaning, or any approach to it (as we are bound to trust\r\nthere is), it alone can make clear to us why such finite\r\nhuman streams of thought are called into existence in\r\nsuch functional dependence upon brains. This is as much\r\nas to say that the special natural science of \u003ci\u003epsychology\u003c/i\u003e must\r\nstop with the mere functional formula. \u003ci\u003eIf the passing thought\r\nbe the directly verifiable existent which no school has hitherto\r\ndoubted it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\npsychology need not look beyond. The only pathway that\r\nI can discover for bringing in a more transcendental thinker\r\nwould be to \u003ci\u003edeny\u003c/i\u003e that we have any \u003ci\u003edirect\u003c/i\u003e knowledge of the\r\nthought as such. The latter\u0027s existence would then be\r\nreduced to a postulate, an assertion that there \u003ci\u003emust be\u003c/i\u003e a\r\n\u003ci\u003eknower\u003c/i\u003e correlative to all this \u003ci\u003eknown\u003c/i\u003e; and the problem \u003ci\u003ewho\r\nthat knower is\u003c/i\u003e would have become a metaphysical problem.\r\nWith the question once stated in these terms, the spiritualist\r\nand transcendentalist solutions must be considered\r\nas \u003ci\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e on a par with our own psychological one,\r\nand discussed impartially. But that carries us beyond the\r\npsychological or naturalistic point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_257_257\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_257_257\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[257]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for a charming passage on the Philosophy of Dress, H. Lotze\u0027s\r\nMicrocosmus, Eng. tr. vol. i, p. 592 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_258_258\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_258_258\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[258]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Who filches from me my good name,\" etc.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_259_259\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_259_259\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[259]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"He who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong\r\nmotives on men … seems little skilled in the nature and history of mankind;\r\nthe greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly,\r\nif not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps\r\nthem in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God or the\r\nmagistrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God\u0027s laws some, nay,\r\nmost, men seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many,\r\nwhilst they break the laws, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation,\r\nand making their peace for such breaches: and as to the punishments due\r\nfrom the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves\r\nwith the hope of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncensure and dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the\r\ncompany he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one\r\nin ten thousand who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the\r\nconstant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a\r\nstrange and unusual constitution who can content himself to live in constant\r\ndisgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many\r\nmen have sought and been reconciled to; but nobody that has the least\r\nthought or sense of a man about him can live in society under the\r\nconstant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars and those he converses\r\nwith. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be\r\nmade up of irreconcilable contradictions who can take pleasure in company\r\nand yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.\"\r\n(Locke\u0027s Essay, book ii, ch. xxviii, § 12.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_260_260\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_260_260\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[260]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For some farther remarks on these feelings of movement see the\r\n\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003enext chapter\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_261_261\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_261_261\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[261]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Wundt\u0027s account of Self-consciousness deserves to be compared with\r\nthis. What I have called \u0027adjustments\u0027 he calls processes of \u0027Apperception.\u0027\r\n\"In this development (of consciousness) one particular group of percepts\r\nclaims a prominent significance, namely, those of which the spring\r\nlies in ourselves. The images of feelings we get from our own body, and\r\nthe representations of our own movements distinguish themselves from all\r\nothers by forming a \u003ci\u003epermanent\u003c/i\u003e group. As there are always some muscles\r\nin a state either of tension or of activity it follows that we never lack a\r\nsense, either dim or clear, of the positions or movements of our body….\r\nThis permanent sense, moreover, has this peculiarity, that we are aware of\r\nour power at any moment voluntarily to arouse any one of its ingredients.\r\nWe excite the sensations of movement immediately by such impulses of the\r\nwill as shall arouse the movements themselves; and we excite the visual\r\nand tactile feelings of our body by the voluntary movement of our organs\r\nof sense. So we come to conceive this permanent mass of feeling as\r\nimmediately or remotely subject to our will, and call it the \u003ci\u003econsciousness of\r\nourself\u003c/i\u003e. This self-consciousness is, at the outset, thoroughly sensational,…\r\nonly gradually the second-named of its characters, its subjection to\r\nour will, attains predominance. In proportion as the apperception of all\r\nour mental objects appears to us as an inward exercise of will, does our\r\nself-consciousness begin both to widen itself and to narrow itself at the\r\nsame time. It widens itself in that every mental act whatever comes to\r\nstand in relation to our will; and it narrows itself in that it concentrates\r\nitself more and more upon the inner activity of apperception, over against\r\nwhich our own body and all the representations connected with it appear\r\nas external objects, different from our proper self. This consciousness,\r\ncontracted down to the process of apperception, we call our Ego; and the\r\napperception of mental objects in general, may thus, after Leibnitz, be\r\ndesignated as the raising of them into our self-consciousness. Thus the\r\nnatural development of self-consciousness implicitly involves the most\r\nabstract forms in which this faculty has been described in philosophy; only\r\nphilosophy is fond of placing the abstract ego at the outset, and so reversing\r\nthe process of development. Nor should we overlook the fact that the\r\ncompletely abstract ego [as pure activity], although suggested by the\r\nnatural development of our consciousness, is never actually found therein.\r\nThe most speculative of philosophers is incapable of disjoining his ego\r\nfrom those bodily feelings and images which form the incessant background\r\nof his awareness of himself. The notion of his ego as such is, like\r\nevery notion, derived from sensibility, for the process of apperception itself\r\ncomes to our knowledge chiefly through those feelings of tension [what I\r\nhave above called inward adjustments] which accompany it.\" (Physiologische\r\nPsychologie, 2te Aufl. Bd. ii, pp. 217-19.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_262_262\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_262_262\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[262]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The only exception I know of is M. J. Souriau, in his important\r\narticle in the Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 449. M. Souriau\u0027s conclusion\r\nis \u0027que la conscience n\u0027existe pas\u0027 (p. 472).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_263_263\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_263_263\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[263]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See the excellent remarks by Prof. Bain on the \u0027Emotion of Power\u0027\r\nin his \u0027Emotions and the Will.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_264_264\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_264_264\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[264]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Carlyle: \u003ci\u003eSartor Resartus\u003c/i\u003e, \u0027The Everlasting Yea.\u0027 \"I tell thee,\r\nblockhead, it all comes of thy vanity; of what thou fanciest those same\r\ndeserts of thine to be. Fancy that thou deservest to be hanged (as is most\r\nlikely), thou wilt feel it happiness to be only shot: fancy that thou deservest\r\nto be hanged in a hair halter, it will be a luxury to die in hemp….\r\nWhat act of legislature was there that \u003ci\u003ethou\u003c/i\u003e shouldst be happy? A little\r\nwhile ago thou hadst no right to \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e at all.\" etc., etc.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_265_265\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_265_265\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[265]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e T. W. Higginson\u0027s translation (1866), p. 105.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_266_266\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_266_266\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[266]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"The usual mode of lessening the shock of disappointment or disesteem\r\nis to contract, if possible, a low estimate of the persons that inflict it.\r\nThis is our remedy for the unjust censures of party spirit, as well as of\r\npersonal malignity.\" (Bain: Emotion and Will, p. 209.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_267_267\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_267_267\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[267]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It must be observed that the qualities of the Self thus ideally constituted\r\nare all qualities approved by my actual fellows in the first instance;\r\nand that my reason for now appealing from their verdict to that of the\r\nideal judge lies in some outward peculiarity of the immediate case. What\r\nonce was admired in me as courage has now become in the eyes of men\r\n\u0027impertinence\u0027; what was fortitude is obstinacy; what was fidelity is\r\nnow fanaticism. The ideal judge alone, I now believe, can read my\r\nqualities, my willingnesses, my powers, for what they truly are. My\r\nfellows, misled by interest and prejudice, have gone astray.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_268_268\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_268_268\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[268]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e of selfishness varies with the self that is sought. If it be\r\nthe mere bodily self; if a man grabs the best food, the warm corner, the\r\nvacant seat; if he makes room for no one, spits about, and belches in our\r\nfaces,—we call it hoggishness. If it be the social self, in the form of popularity\r\nor influence, for which he is greedy, he may in material ways subordinate\r\nhimself to others as the best means to his end; and in this case he is\r\nvery apt to pass for a disinterested man. If it be the \u0027other-worldly\u0027 self\r\nwhich he seeks, and if he seeks it ascetically,—even though he would\r\nrather see all mankind damned eternally than lose his individual soul,—\u0027saintliness\u0027\r\nwill probably be the name by which his selfishness will be\r\ncalled.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_269_269\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_269_269\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[269]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lotze, Med. Psych. 498-501; Microcosmos, bk. ii, chap. v, §§ 3, 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_270_270\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_270_270\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[270]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologische Analysen auf Physiologischer Grundlage. Theil ii,\r\n2te Hälfte, § 11. The whole section ought to be read.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_271_271\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_271_271\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[271]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor Bain, in his chapter on \u0027Emotions of Self,\u0027 does scant justice\r\nto the primitive nature of a large part of our self-feeling, and seems to\r\nreduce it to reflective self-estimation of this sober intellectual sort, which\r\ncertainly \u003ci\u003emost\u003c/i\u003e of it is not. He says that when the attention is turned\r\ninward upon self as a Personality, \"we are putting forth towards ourselves\r\nthe kind of exercise that properly accompanies our contemplation of other\r\npersons. We are accustomed to scrutinize the actions and conduct of those\r\nabout us, to set a higher \u003ci\u003evalue\u003c/i\u003e upon one man than upon another, by comparing\r\nthe two; to \u003ci\u003epity\u003c/i\u003e one in distress; to feel \u003ci\u003ecomplacency\u003c/i\u003e towards a particular\r\nindividual; to \u003ci\u003econgratulate\u003c/i\u003e a man on some good fortune that it\r\npleases us to see him gain; to \u003ci\u003eadmire\u003c/i\u003e greatness or excellence as displayed\r\nby any of our fellows. All these exercises are intrinsically social, like\r\nLove and Resentment; an isolated individual could never attain to them,\r\nnor exercise them. By what means, then, through what fiction [!] can we\r\nturn round and play them off upon self? Or how comes it that we obtain\r\nany satisfaction by putting self in the place of the other party? Perhaps\r\nthe simplest form of the reflected act is that expressed by Self-worth and\r\nSelf-estimation, based and begun upon observation of the ways and conduct\r\nof our fellow-beings. We soon make comparisons among the individuals\r\nabout us; we see that one is stronger and does more work than\r\nanother, and, in consequence perhaps, receives more pay. We see one\r\nputting forth perhaps more kindness than another, and in consequence\r\nreceiving more love. We see some individuals surpassing the rest in astonishing\r\nfeats, and drawing after them the gaze and admiration of a crowd.\r\nWe acquire a series of fixed associations towards persons so situated; favorable\r\nin the case of the superior, and unfavorable to the inferior. To the\r\nstrong and laborious man we attach an estimate of greater reward, and feel\r\nthat to be in his place would be a happier lot than falls to others. Desiring,\r\nas we do, from the primary motives of our being, to possess good things,\r\nand observing these to come by a man\u0027s superior exertions, we feel a respect\r\nfor such exertion and a wish that it might be ours. We know that we also\r\nput forth exertions for our share of good things; and on witnessing others,\r\nwe are apt to be reminded of ourselves and to make comparisons with ourselves,\r\nwhich comparisons derive their interest from the substantial consequences.\r\nHaving thus once learned to look at other persons as performing\r\nlabors, greater or less, and as realizing fruits to accord; being,\r\nmoreover, in all respects like our fellows,—we find it an exercise neither\r\ndifficult nor unmeaning to contemplate self as doing work and receiving\r\nthe reward…. As we decide between one man and another,—which is\r\nworthier,… so we decide between self and all other men; being, however,\r\nin this decision under the bias of our own desires.\" A couple of pages\r\nfarther on we read: \"By the terms Self-complacency. Self-gratulation, is\r\nindicated a positive enjoyment in dwelling upon our own merits and\r\nbelongings. As in other modes, so here, the starting point is the contemplation\r\nof excellence or pleasing qualities \u003ci\u003ein another person\u003c/i\u003e, accompanied\r\nmore or less with fondness or love.\" Self-pity is also regarded by Professor\r\nBain, in this place, as an emotion diverted to ourselves from a more immediate\r\nobject, \"in a manner that we may term fictitious and unreal.\r\nStill, as we can view self in the light of another person, we can feel towards\r\nit the emotion of pity called forth by others in our situation.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis account of Professor Bain\u0027s is, it will be observed, a good specimen\r\nof the old-fashioned mode of explaining the several emotions as rapid calculations\r\nof results, and the transfer of feeling from one object to another,\r\nassociated by contiguity or similarity with the first. Zoological evolutionism,\r\nwhich came up since Professor Bain first wrote, has made us see, on\r\nthe contrary, that many emotions must be \u003ci\u003eprimitively\u003c/i\u003e aroused by special\r\nobjects. None are more worthy of being ranked primitive than the self-gratulation\r\nand humiliation attendant on our own successes and failures in\r\nthe main functions of life. We need no borrowed reflection for these feelings.\r\nProfessor Bain\u0027s account applies to but that small fraction of our\r\nself-feeling which reflective criticism can add to, or subtract from, the\r\ntotal mass.—Lotze has some pages on the modifications of our self-regard\r\nby universal judgments, in Microcosmus, book v, chap. v, § 5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_272_272\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_272_272\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[272]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Also nur dadurch, dass ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegehener Vorstellungen\r\nin \u003ci\u003eeinem Bewusstsein\u003c/i\u003e verbinden kann, ist es möglich dass ich die\r\n\u003ci\u003eIdentität des Bewusstseins\u003c/i\u003e in diesen \u003ci\u003eVorstellungen\u003c/i\u003e selbst vorstelle, d. h. die\r\nanalytische Einheit der Apperception ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend\r\neiner synthetischen möglich.\" In this passage (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,\r\n2te Aufl. § 16) Kant calls by the names of analytic and synthetic\r\napperception what we here mean by objective and subjective synthesis\r\nrespectively. It were much to be desired that some one might invent a\r\ngood pair of terms in which to record the distinction—those used in the\r\ntext are certainly very bad, but Kant\u0027s seem to me still worse. \u0027Categorical\r\nunity\u0027 and \u0027transcendental synthesis\u0027 would also be good Kantian, but\r\nhardly good human, speech.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_273_273\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_273_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[273]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e So that we might say, by a sort of bad pun, \"only a connected world\r\ncan be known as disconnected.\" I say bad pun, because the point of view\r\nshifts between the connectedness and the disconnectedness. The disconnectedness\r\nis of the realities known; the connectedness is of the knowledge\r\nof them; and reality and knowledge of it are, from the psychological\r\npoint of view held fast to in these pages, two different facts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_274_274\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_274_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[274]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Some subtle reader will object that the Thought cannot call any part\r\nof its Object \u0027I\u0027 and knit other parts on to it, without first knitting that\r\npart on to \u003ci\u003eItself\u003c/i\u003e; and that it cannot knit it on to Itself without knowing\r\nItself;—so that our supposition (above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_304\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 304\u003c/a\u003e) that the Thought may conceivably\r\nhave no immediate knowledge of Itself is thus overthrown. To\r\nwhich the reply is that we must take care not to be duped by words. The\r\nwords \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e signify nothing mysterious and unexampled—they are at\r\nbottom only names of \u003ci\u003eemphasis\u003c/i\u003e; and Thought is always emphasizing\r\nsomething. Within a tract of space which it cognizes, it contrasts a \u003ci\u003ehere\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith a \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e; within a tract of time a \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e with a \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e; of a pair of things\r\nit calls one \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e, the other \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e. I and \u003ci\u003ethou\u003c/i\u003e, I and \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e, are distinctions exactly\r\non a par with these,—distinctions possible in an exclusively \u003ci\u003eobjective\u003c/i\u003e field of\r\nknowledge, the \u0027I\u0027 meaning for the Thought nothing but the bodily life\r\nwhich it momentarily feels. The sense of my bodily existence, however\r\nobscurely recognized as such, \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e then be the absolute original of my conscious\r\nselfhood, the fundamental perception that \u003ci\u003eI am\u003c/i\u003e. All appropriations\r\n\u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be made \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e it, \u003ci\u003eby\u003c/i\u003e a Thought not at the moment immediately cognized\r\nby itself. Whether these are not only logical possibilities but actual facts\r\nis something not yet dogmatically decided in the text.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_275_275\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_275_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[275]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Metaphysik, § 245 \u003ci\u003efin\u003c/i\u003e. This writer, who in his early work, the Medizinische\r\nPsychologie, was (to my reading) a strong defender of the Soul-Substance\r\ntheory, has written in §§ 243-5 of his Metaphysik the most beautiful\r\ncriticism of this theory which exists.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_276_276\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_276_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[276]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On the empirical and transcendental conceptions of the self\u0027s unity,\r\nsee Lotze, Metaphysic, § 244.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_277_277\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_277_277\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[277]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Appendix to book i of Hume\u0027s Treatise on Human Nature.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_278_278\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_278_278\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[278]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Herbart believed in the Soul, too; but for him the \u0027Self\u0027 of which we\r\nare \u0027conscious\u0027 is the empirical Self—not the soul.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_279_279\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_279_279\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[279]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare again the remarks on \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 158-162\u003c/a\u003e above.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_280_280\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_280_280\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[280]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e System of Psychology (1884). vol. i, p. 114.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_281_281\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_281_281\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[281]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Distinct only to \u003ci\u003eobservation\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 he adds. To whose observation? the\r\noutside psychologist\u0027s, the Ego\u0027s, their own, or the plank\u0027s? \u003ci\u003eDarauf\r\nkommt es an!\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_282_282\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_282_282\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[282]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis, etc., J. S. Mill\u0027s Edition, vol. i, p. 331. The \u0027as it were\u0027\r\nis delightfully characteristic of the school.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_283_283\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_283_283\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[283]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Mill\u0027s Analysis, vol. ii, p. 175.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_284_284\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_284_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[284]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Examination of Hamilton. 4th ed. p. 263.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_285_285\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_285_285\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[285]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e His chapter on the Psychological Theory of Mind is a beautiful case in\r\npoint, and his concessions there have become so celebrated that they must\r\nbe quoted for the reader\u0027s benefit. He ends the chapter with these words\r\n(\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 247): \"The theory, therefore, which resolves Mind into a series\r\nof feelings, with a background of possibilities of feeling, can effectually\r\nwithstand the most invidious of the arguments directed against it. But\r\ngroundless as are the extrinsic objections, the theory has intrinsic difficulties\r\nwhich we have not set forth, and which it seems to me beyond the\r\npower of metaphysical analysis to remove….\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"The thread of consciousness which composes the mind\u0027s phenomenal\r\nlife consist not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories\r\nand expectations. Now what are these? In themselves, they are\r\npresent feelings, states of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished\r\nfrom sensations. They all, moreover, resemble some given sensations\r\nor feelings, of which we have previously had experience. But they\r\nare attended with the peculiarity that each of them involves a belief in\r\nmore than its own present existence. A sensation involves only this; but\r\na remembrance of sensation, even if not referred to any particular date, involves\r\nthe suggestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a copy or\r\nrepresentation, actually existed in the past; and an expectation involves\r\nthe belief, more or less positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which\r\nit directly refers will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved\r\nin these two states of consciousness be adequately expressed, without\r\nsaying that the belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or\r\nthat I myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered\r\nor expected. The fact believed is, that the sensations did actually form, or\r\nwill hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or thread of consciousness,\r\nof which the remembrance or expectation of those sensations is\r\nthe part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of\r\nfeelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of\r\nfeelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to\r\nthe alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different\r\nfrom any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the\r\nparadox that something which \u003ci\u003eex hypothesi\u003c/i\u003e is but a series of feelings, can\r\nbe aware of itself as a series.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability,\r\nat which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when\r\nwe reach ultimate facts; and in general, one mode of stating it only appears\r\nmore incomprehensible than another, because the whole of human language\r\nis accommodated to the one, and is so incongruous with the other\r\nthat it cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth. The\r\nreal stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the fact, but in the fact\r\nitself. The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has\r\nceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present; that a\r\nseries of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can\r\nbe gathered up, as it were, into a simple present conception, accompanied\r\nby a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept\r\nthe inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place; and when\r\nwe are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them\r\nwith a reservation as to their meaning.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn a later place in the same book (p. 561) Mill, speaking of what may\r\nrightly be demanded of a theorist, says: \"He is not entitled to frame a\r\ntheory from one class of phenomena, extend it to another class which\r\nit does not fit, and excuse himself by saying that if we cannot make it fit,\r\nit is because ultimate facts are inexplicable.\" The class of phenomena\r\nwhich the associationist school takes to frame its theory of the Ego are feelings\r\nunaware of each other. The class of phenomena the Ego presents are\r\nfeelings of which the later ones are intensely aware of those that went before.\r\nThe two classes do not \u0027fit,\u0027 and no exercise of ingenuity can ever\r\nmake them fit. No \u003ci\u003eshuffling\u003c/i\u003e of unaware feelings can make them aware.\r\nTo get the awareness we must openly beg it by postulating a new feeling\r\nwhich has it. This new feeling is no \u0027Theory\u0027 of the phenomena,\r\nbut a simple statement of them; and as such I postulate in the text the\r\npresent passing Thought as a psychic integer, with its knowledge of so\r\nmuch that has gone before.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_286_286\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_286_286\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[286]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 2te Aufl. § 17.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_287_287\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_287_287\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[287]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It must be noticed, in justice to what was said above on \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 274\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\nthat neither Kant nor his successors anywhere discriminate between the\r\n\u003ci\u003epresence\u003c/i\u003e of the apperceiving Ego to the combined object, and the \u003ci\u003eawareness\r\nby\u003c/i\u003e that Ego \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e its own presence and of its distinctness from what it\r\napperceives. That the Object must be known to something which \u003ci\u003ethinks\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand that it must be known to something which \u003ci\u003ethinks that it thinks\u003c/i\u003e, are\r\ntreated by them as identical necessities,—by what logic, does not appear.\r\nKant tries to soften the jump in the reasoning by saying the thought \u003ci\u003eof itself\u003c/i\u003e\r\non the part of the Ego need only be \u003ci\u003epotential\u003c/i\u003e—\"the \u0027I think\u0027 must \u003ci\u003ebe\r\ncapable\u003c/i\u003e of accompanying all other knowledge\"—but a thought which is\r\nonly potential is actually no thought at all, which practically gives up the\r\ncase.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_288_288\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_288_288\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[288]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"As regards the soul, now, or the \u0027I,\u0027 the \u0027thinker,\u0027 the whole drift of\r\nKant\u0027s advance upon Hume and sensational psychology is towards the\r\ndemonstration that the subject of knowledge is an \u003ci\u003eAgent\u003c/i\u003e.\" (G. S. Morris,\r\nKant\u0027s Critique, etc. (Chicago, 1882), p. 224.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_289_289\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_289_289\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[289]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"In Kant\u0027s Prolegomena,\" says H. Cohen,—I do not myself find the\r\npassage,—\"it is expressly said that the problem is not to show how experience\r\narises (ensteht), but of what it consists (besteht).\" (Kant\u0027s Theorie\r\nd. Erfahrung (1871), p. 138.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_290_290\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_290_290\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[290]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The contrast between the Monism thus reached and our own psychological\r\npoint of view can be exhibited schematically thus, the terms in\r\nsquares standing for what, for us, are the ultimate irreducible data of\r\npsychological science, and the vincula above it symbolizing the reductions\r\nwhich post-Kantian idealism performs:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"Chart\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-366fn-0033.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_366fn_0033.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese reductions account for the ubiquitousness of the \u0027psychologist\u0027s\r\nfallacy (bk. ii, ch. i, p. 32) in the modern monistic writings. For \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e it is\r\nan unpardonable logical sin, when talking of a thought\u0027s knowledge (either\r\nof an object or of itself), to change the terms without warning, and, substituting\r\nthe psychologist\u0027s knowledge therefor, still make as if we were\r\ncontinuing to talk of the same thing. For monistic idealism, this is the\r\nvery enfranchisement of philosophy, and of course cannot be too much indulged\r\nin.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_291_291\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_291_291\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[291]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 57, 61, 64.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_292_292\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_292_292\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[292]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e § 64.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_293_293\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_293_293\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[293]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E. Caird: Hegel (1883), p. 149.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_294_294\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_294_294\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[294]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e One is almost tempted to believe that the pantomime-state of mind\r\nand that of the Hegelian dialectics are, emotionally considered, one and the\r\nsame thing. In the pantomime all common things are represented to\r\nhappen in impossible ways, people jump down each other\u0027s throats, houses\r\nturn inside out, old women become young men, everything \u0027passes into\r\nits opposite\u0027 with inconceivable celerity and skill; and this, so far from\r\nproducing perplexity, brings rapture to the beholder\u0027s mind. And so in\r\nthe Hegelian logic, relations elsewhere recognized under the insipid name\r\nof distinctions (such as that between knower and object, many and one)\r\nmust first be translated into impossibilities and contradictions, then \u0027transcended\u0027\r\nand identified by miracle, ere the proper temper is induced for\r\nthoroughly enjoying the spectacle they show.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_295_295\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_295_295\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[295]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The reader will please understand that I am quite willing to leave the\r\nhypothesis of the transcendental Ego as a substitute for the passing\r\nThought open to discussion on \u003ci\u003egeneral speculative grounds\u003c/i\u003e. Only \u003ci\u003ein this\r\nbook\u003c/i\u003e I prefer to stick by the common sense assumption that we have successive\r\nconscious states, because all psychologists make it, and because one\r\ndoes not see how there can be a Psychology written which does not postulate\r\nsuch thoughts as its ultimate data. The data of all natural sciences become\r\nin turn subjects of a critical treatment more refined than that which\r\nthe sciences themselves accord; and so it may fare in the end with our\r\npassing Thought. We have ourselves seen (\u003ca href=\"#Page_299\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 299-305\u003c/a\u003e) that the \u003ci\u003esensible\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncertainty of its existence is less strong than is usually assumed. My\r\nquarrel with the transcendental Egoists is mainly about their \u003ci\u003egrounds\u003c/i\u003e for\r\ntheir belief. Did they consistently propose it as a \u003ci\u003esubstitute\u003c/i\u003e for the passing\r\nThought, did they consistently \u003ci\u003edeny the latter\u0027s existence\u003c/i\u003e, I should respect\r\ntheir position more. But so far as I can understand them, they habitually\r\nbelieve in the passing Thought also. They seem even to believe in the\r\nLockian stream of separate ideas, for the chief glory of the Ego in their\r\npages is always its power to \u0027overcome\u0027 this separateness and unite the\r\nnaturally disunited, \u003ci\u003e\u0027synthetizing,\u0027 \u0027connecting,\u0027 or \u0027relating\u0027 the ideas\r\ntogether\u003c/i\u003e being used as synonyms, by transcendentalist writers, for \u003ci\u003eknowing\r\nvarious objects at once\u003c/i\u003e. Not the being conscious at all, but the being conscious\r\nof \u003ci\u003emany things together\u003c/i\u003e is held to be the difficult thing, in our psychic\r\nlife, which only the wonder-working Ego can perform. But on what\r\nslippery ground does one get the moment one changes the definite notion\r\nof \u003ci\u003eknowing an object\u003c/i\u003e into the altogether vague one of \u003ci\u003euniting or synthetizing\r\nthe ideas\u003c/i\u003e of its various parts!—In the chapter on Sensation we shall come\r\nupon all this again.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_296_296\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_296_296\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[296]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"When we compare the listless inactivity of the infant, slumbering\r\nfrom the moment at which he takes his milky food to the moment at which\r\nhe wakes to require it again, with the restless energies of that mighty being\r\nwhich he is to become in his maturer years, pouring truth after truth, in\r\nrapid and dazzling profusion, upon the world, or grasping in his single hand\r\nthe destiny of empires, how few are the circumstances of resemblance\r\nwhich we can trace, of all that intelligence which is afterwards to be displayed;\r\nhow little more is seen than what serves to give feeble motion to\r\nthe mere machinery of life!… Every age, if we may speak of many\r\nages in the few years of human life, seems to be marked with a distinct\r\ncharacter. Each has its peculiar objects which excite lively affections; and\r\nin each, exertion is excited by affections, which in other periods terminate\r\nwithout inducing active desire. The boy finds a world in less space than\r\nthat which bounds his visible horizon; he wanders over his range of field\r\nand exhausts his strength in the pursuit of objects which, in the years that\r\nfollow, are seen only to be neglected; while to him the objects that are\r\nafterwards to absorb his whole soul are as indifferent as the objects of his\r\npresent passions are destined then to appear…. How many opportunities\r\nmust every one have had of witnessing the progress of intellectual\r\ndecay, and the coldness that steals upon the once benevolent heart! We\r\nquit our country, perhaps at an early period of life, and after an absence of\r\nmany years we return with all the remembrances of past pleasure which\r\ngrow more tender as they approach their objects. We eagerly seek him to\r\nwhose paternal voice we have been accustomed to listen with the same reverence\r\nas if its predictions had possessed oracular certainty,—who first led\r\nus into knowledge, and whose image has been constantly joined in our\r\nmind with all that veneration which does not forbid love. We find him\r\nsunk, perhaps, in the imbecility of idiotism, unable to recognize us,—ignorant\r\nalike of the past and of the future, and living only in the sensibility of\r\nanimal gratification. We seek the favorite companion of our childhood,\r\nwhose tenderness of heart, etc…. We find him hardened into a man,\r\nmeeting us scarcely with the cold hypocrisy of dissembled friendship—in\r\nhis general relations to the world careless of the misery \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c/i\u003e is not to feel….\r\nWhen we observe all this,… do we use only a metaphor of little\r\nmeaning when we say of him that he is become a different person, and that\r\nhis mind and character are changed? In what does the identity consist?…\r\nThe supposed test of identity, when applied to the mind in these\r\ncases, completely fails. It neither affects, nor is affected, in the same manner\r\nin the same circumstances. It therefore, if the test be a just one, is\r\nnot the same identical mind.\" (T. Brown: Lectures on the Philosophy of\r\nthe Human Mind, \u0027on Mental Identity.\u0027)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_297_297\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_297_297\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[297]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his\r\nmaid darned so often with silk that they became at last a pair of silk\r\nstockings. Now, supposing these stockings of Sir John\u0027s endued with\r\nsome degree of consciousness at every particular darning, they would have\r\nbeen sensible that they were the same individual pair of stockings both before\r\nand after the darning; and this sensation would have continued in\r\nthem through all the succession of darnings; and yet after the last of all,\r\nthere was not perhaps one thread left of the first pair of stockings: but\r\nthey were grown to be silk stockings, as was said before.\" (Pope\u0027s Martinus\r\nScriblerus, quoted by Brown, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_298_298\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_298_298\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[298]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hours of Work and Play, p. 100.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_299_299\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_299_299\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[299]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For a careful study of the errors in narratives, see E. Gurney: Phantasms\r\nof the Living, vol. i, pp. 126-158. In the Proceedings of the\r\nSociety for Psychical Research for May 1887 Mr. Richard Hodgson shows\r\nby an extraordinary array of instances how utterly inaccurate everyone\u0027s\r\ndescription from memory of a rapid series of events is certain to be.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_300_300\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_300_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[300]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Josiah Royce (Mind, vol. 13, p. 244, and Proceedings of Am. Soc.\r\nof Psych. Research, vol. i, p. 366), for evidence that a certain sort of hallucination\r\nof memory which he calls \u0027pseudo-presentiment\u0027 is no uncommon\r\nphenomenon.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_301_301\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_301_301\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[301]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 85. The little that would be left of personal\r\nconsciousness if \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e our senses stopped their work is ingenuously\r\nshown in the remark of the extraordinary anæsthetic youth whose case\r\nProfessor Strümpell reports (in the Deutsches Archiv f. klin. Med., xxii,\r\n847, 1878). This boy, whom we shall later find instructive in many connections,\r\nwas totally anæsthetic without and (so far as could be tested)\r\nwithin, save for the sight of one eye and the hearing of one ear. When\r\nhis eye was closed, he said: \"\u003ci\u003eWenn ich nicht sehen kann, da\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ebin\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eich gar\r\nnicht\u003c/i\u003e—I no longer \u003ci\u003eam\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_302_302\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_302_302\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[302]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"One can compare the state of the patient to nothing so well as to\r\nthat of a caterpillar, which, keeping all its caterpillar\u0027s ideas and remembrances,\r\nshould suddenly become a butterfly with a butterfly\u0027s senses and\r\nsensations. Between the old and the new state, between the first self, that\r\nof the caterpillar, and the second self, that of the butterfly, there is a deep\r\nscission, a complete rupture. The new feelings find no anterior series to\r\nwhich they can knit themselves on; the patient can neither interpret nor\r\nuse them; he does not recognize them; they are unknown. Hence two\r\nconclusions, the first which consists in his saying, \u003ci\u003eI no longer am\u003c/i\u003e; the\r\nsecond, somewhat later, which consists in his saying, \u003ci\u003eI am another person.\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n(H. Taine: de l\u0027Intelligence, 3me édition (1878), p. 462).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_303_303\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_303_303\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[303]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e W. Griesinger: Mental Diseases, § 29.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_304_304\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_304_304\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[304]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See the interesting case of \u0027old Stump\u0027 in the Proceedings of the Am.\r\nSoc. for Psych. Research, p. 552.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_305_305\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_305_305\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[305]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e De l\u0027Intelligence, 3me édition (1878), vol. ii, note, p. 461. Krishaber\u0027s\r\nbook (La Névropathie Cérébro-cardiaque, 1873) is full of similar\r\nobservations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_306_306\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_306_306\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[306]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sudden alterations in outward fortune often produce such a change\r\nin the empirical \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e as almost to amount to a pathological disturbance of\r\nself-consciousness. When a poor man draws the big prize in a lottery, or\r\nunexpectedly inherits an estate; when a man high in fame is publicly\r\ndisgraced, a millionaire becomes a pauper, or a loving husband and father\r\nsees his family perish at one fell swoop, there is temporarily such a rupture\r\nbetween all past habits, whether of an active or a passive kind, and the\r\nexigencies and possibilities of the new situation, that the individual may\r\nfind no medium of continuity or association to carry him over from the one\r\nphase to the other of his life. Under these conditions mental derangement\r\nis no unfrequent result.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_307_307\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_307_307\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[307]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The number of subjects who can do this with any fertility and exuberance\r\nis relatively quite small.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_308_308\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_308_308\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[308]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e First in the Revue Scientifique for May 26, 1876, then in his book,\r\nHypnotisme, Double Conscience, et Altérations de la Personnalité (Paris,\r\n1887).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_309_309\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_309_309\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[309]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Der Hypnotismus (1884), pp. 109-15.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_310_310\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_310_310\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[310]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, April 4,\r\n1888. Also, less complete, in Harper\u0027s Magazine, May 1860.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_311_311\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_311_311\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[311]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Ribot\u0027s Diseases of Memory for cases. See also a large number of\r\nthem in Forbes Winslow\u0027s Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Mind,\r\nchapters xiii-xvii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_312_312\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_312_312\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[312]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See the interesting account by M. J. Janet in the Revue Scientifique,\r\nMay 19, 1888.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_313_313\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_313_313\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[313]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Variations de la Personnalité (Paris, 1888).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_314_314\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_314_314\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[314]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 84. In this work and in Dr. Azam\u0027s (cited on a previous\r\npage), as well as in Prof. Th. Ribot\u0027s Maladies de la Personnalité (1885), the\r\nreader will find information and references relative to the other known\r\ncases of the kind.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_315_315\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_315_315\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[315]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e His own brother\u0027s subject Wit…., although in her anæsthetic waking\r\nstate she recollected nothing of either of her trances, yet remembered her\r\ndeeper trance (in which her sensibilities became perfect—see above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 207\u003c/a\u003e)\r\nwhen she was in her lighter trance. Nevertheless in the latter she was as\r\nanæsthetic as when awake. (\u003ci\u003eLoc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 619.)—It does not appear that\r\nthere was any important difference in the sensibility of Félida X. between\r\nher two states—as far as one can judge from M. Azam\u0027s account she was to\r\nsome degree anæsthetic in both (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 71, 96).—In the case of double\r\npersonality reported by M. Dufay (Revue Scientifique, vol. xviii, p. 69),\r\nthe memory seems to have been best in the more anæsthetic condition.—Hypnotic\r\nsubjects made blind do not necessarily lose their visual ideas. It\r\nappears, then, both that amnesias may occur without anæsthesias, and anæsthesias\r\nwithout amnesias, though they may also occur in combination.\r\nHypnotic subjects made blind by suggestion will tell you that they clearly\r\nimagine the things which they can no longer see.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_316_316\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_316_316\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[316]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A full account of the case, by Mr. R. Hodgson, will be found in the\r\nProceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for 1891.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_317_317\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_317_317\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[317]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e He had spent an afternoon in Boston, a night in New York, an afternoon\r\nin Newark, and ten days or more in Philadelphia, first in a certain\r\nhotel and next in a certain boarding-house, making no acquaintances, \u0027resting,\u0027\r\nreading, and \u0027looking round.\u0027 I have unfortunately been unable to\r\nget independent corroboration of these details, as the hotel registers are\r\ndestroyed, and the boarding-house named by him has been pulled down.\r\nHe forgets the name of the two ladies who kept it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_318_318\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_318_318\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[318]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The details of the case, it will be seen, are all \u003ci\u003ecompatible\u003c/i\u003e with simulation.\r\nI can only say of that, that no one who has examined Mr. Bourne\r\n(including Dr. Read, Dr. Weir Mitchell, Dr. Guy Hinsdale, and Mr. R.\r\nHodgson) practically doubts his ingrained honesty, nor, so far as I can\r\ndiscover, do any of his personal acquaintances indulge in a sceptical view.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_319_319\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_319_319\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[319]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Watseka Wonder, by E. W. Stevens. Chicago, Religio-Philosophical\r\nPublishing House, 1887.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_320_320\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_320_320\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[320]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e My friend Mr. R. Hodgson informs me that he visited Watseka in\r\nApril 1890, and cross-examined the principal witnesses of this case. His\r\nconfidence in the original narrative was strengthened by what he learned;\r\nand various unpublished facts were ascertained, which increased the plausibility\r\nof the spiritualistic interpretation of the phenomenon.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_321_321\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_321_321\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[321]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See his highly important series of articles on Automatic Writing, etc.,\r\nin the Proceedings of the Soc. for Psych. Research, especially Article ii\r\n(May 1885). Compare also Dr. Maudsley\u0027s instructive article in Mind,\r\nvol. xiv, p. 161, and Luys\u0027s essay, \u0027Sur le Dédoublement,\u0027 etc., in\r\nl\u0027Encéphale for 1889.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_402\"\u003e[Pg 402]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_XI\"\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eATTENTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStrange to say, so patent a fact as the perpetual presence\r\nof selective attention has received hardly any notice\r\nfrom psychologists of the English empiricist school. The\r\nGermans have explicitly treated of it, either as a faculty or\r\nas a resultant, but in the pages of such writers as Locke,\r\nHume, Hartley, the Mills, and Spencer the word hardly\r\noccurs, or if it does so, it is parenthetically and as if by inadvertence.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_322_322\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_322_322\"\u003e[322]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe motive of this ignoring of the phenomenon\r\nof attention is obvious enough. These writers are bent on\r\nshowing how the higher faculties of the mind are pure\r\nproducts of \u0027experience;\u0027 and experience is supposed to be\r\nof something simply \u003ci\u003egiven\u003c/i\u003e. Attention, implying a degree\r\nof reactive spontaneity, would seem to break through the\r\ncircle of pure receptivity which constitutes \u0027experience,\u0027\r\nand hence must not be spoken of under penalty of interfering\r\nwith the smoothness of the tale.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the moment one thinks of the matter, one sees how\r\nfalse a notion of experience that is which would make it\r\ntantamount to the mere presence to the senses of an outward\r\norder. Millions of items of the outward order are\r\npresent to my senses which never properly enter into my\r\nexperience. Why? Because they have no \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e for me.\r\n\u003ci\u003eMy experience is what I agree to attend to.\u003c/i\u003e Only those items\r\nwhich I \u003ci\u003enotice\u003c/i\u003e shape my mind—without selective interest,\r\nexperience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent\r\nand emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible\r\nperspective, in a word. It varies in every\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_403\"\u003e[Pg 403]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncreature, but without it the consciousness of every creature\r\nwould be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for\r\nus even to conceive. Such an empiricist writer as Mr.\r\nSpencer, for example, regards the creature as absolutely\r\npassive clay, upon which \u0027experience\u0027 rains down. The\r\nclay will be impressed most deeply where the drops fall\r\nthickest, and so the final shape of the mind is moulded.\r\nGive time enough, and all sentient things ought, at this\r\nrate, to end by assuming an identical mental constitution—for\r\n\u0027experience,\u0027 the sole shaper, is a constant fact, and the\r\norder of its items must end by being exactly reflected by\r\nthe passive mirror which we call the sentient organism.\r\nIf such an account were true, a race of dogs bred for generations,\r\nsay in the Vatican, with characters of visual shape,\r\nsculptured in marble, presented to their eyes, in every variety\r\nof form and combination, ought to discriminate before\r\nlong the finest shades of these peculiar characters.\r\nIn a word, they ought to become, if time were given, accomplished\r\n\u003ci\u003econnoisseurs\u003c/i\u003e of sculpture. Anyone may judge\r\nof the probability of this consummation. Surely an eternity\r\nof experience of the statues would leave the dog as inartistic\r\nas he was at first, for the lack of an original interest to knit\r\nhis discriminations on to. Meanwhile the odors at the bases\r\nof the pedestals would have organized themselves in the\r\nconsciousness of this breed of dogs into a system of \u0027correspondences\u0027\r\nto which the most hereditary caste of \u003ci\u003ecustodi\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwould never approximate, merely because to them, as\r\nhuman beings, the dog\u0027s interest in those smells would\r\nfor ever be an inscrutable mystery. These writers have,\r\nthen, utterly ignored the glaring fact that subjective interest\r\nmay, by laying its weighty index-finger on particular\r\nitems of experience, so accent them as to give to the least\r\nfrequent associations far more power to shape our thought\r\nthan the most frequent ones possess. The interest itself,\r\nthough its genesis is doubtless perfectly \u003ci\u003enatural, makes\u003c/i\u003e experience\r\nmore than it is made by it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession\r\nby the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of\r\nwhat seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_404\"\u003e[Pg 404]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness\r\nare of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things\r\nin order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition\r\nwhich has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatter-brained\r\nstate which in French is called \u003ci\u003edistraction\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eZerstreutheit\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin German.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe all know this latter state, even in its extreme degree.\r\nMost people probably fall several times a day into a fit\r\nof something like this: The eyes are fixed on vacancy, the\r\nsounds of the world melt into confused unity, the attention\r\nis dispersed so that the whole body is felt, as it were, at\r\nonce, and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if by\r\nanything, by a sort of solemn sense of surrender to the\r\nempty passing of time. In the dim background of our\r\nmind we know meanwhile what we ought to be doing: getting\r\nup, dressing ourselves, answering the person who has\r\nspoken to us, trying to make the next step in our reasoning.\r\nBut somehow we cannot \u003ci\u003estart\u003c/i\u003e; the \u003ci\u003epensée de derrière la\r\ntête\u003c/i\u003e fails to pierce the shell of lethargy that wraps our state\r\nabout. Every moment we expect the spell to break, for we\r\nknow no reason why it should continue. But it does continue,\r\npulse after pulse, and we float with it, until—also\r\nwithout reason that we can discover—an energy is given,\r\nsomething—we know not what—enables us to gather ourselves\r\ntogether, we wink our eyes, we shake our heads, the\r\nbackground-ideas become effective, and the wheels of life\r\ngo round again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis curious state of inhibition can for a few moments be\r\nproduced at will by fixing the eyes on vacancy. Some persons\r\ncan voluntarily empty their minds and \u0027think of nothing.\u0027\r\nWith many, as Professor Exner remarks of himself,\r\nthis is the most efficacious means of falling asleep. It is\r\ndifficult not to suppose something like this scattered condition\r\nof mind to be the usual state of brutes when not\r\nactively engaged in some pursuit. Fatigue, monotonous\r\nmechanical occupations that end by being automatically\r\ncarried on, tend to produce it in men. It is not sleep; and\r\nyet when aroused from such a state, a person will often\r\nhardly be able to say what he has been thinking about\r\nSubjects of the hypnotic trance seem to lapse into it when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_405\"\u003e[Pg 405]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nleft to themselves; asked what they are thinking of, they\r\nreply, \u0027of nothing particular\u0027!\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_323_323\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_323_323\"\u003e[323]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe abolition of this condition is what we call the awakening\r\nof the attention. One principal object comes then\r\ninto the focus of consciousness, others are temporarily suppressed.\r\nThe awakening may come about either by reason\r\nof a stimulus from without, or in consequence of some\r\nunknown inner alteration; and the change it brings with it\r\namounts to a concentration upon one single object with\r\nexclusion of aught besides, or to a condition anywhere between\r\nthis and the completely dispersed state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTO HOW MANY THINGS CAN WE ATTEND AT ONCE?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question of \u003ci\u003ethe \u0027span\u0027 of consciousness\u003c/i\u003e has often been\r\nasked and answered—sometimes \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, sometimes by experiment.\r\nThis seems the proper place for us to touch\r\nupon it; and our answer, according to the principles laid\r\ndown in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e, will not be difficult. The number of\r\n\u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e we may attend to is altogether indefinite, depending\r\non the power of the individual intellect, on the form of the\r\napprehension, and on what the things are. When apprehended\r\nconceptually as a connected system, their number\r\nmay be very large. But however numerous the things, they\r\ncan only be known in a single pulse of consciousness for\r\nwhich they form one complex \u0027object\u0027 (\u003ca href=\"#Page_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 276\u003c/a\u003e ff.), so that\r\nproperly speaking there is before the mind at no time a\r\nplurality of \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e, properly so called.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0027unity of the soul\u0027 has been supposed by many\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_406\"\u003e[Pg 406]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nphilosophers, who also believed in the distinct atomic nature\r\nof \u0027ideas,\u0027 to preclude the presence to it of more than\r\none objective fact, manifested in one idea, at a time. Even\r\nDugald Stuart opines that every \u003ci\u003eminimum visibile\u003c/i\u003e of a pictured\r\nfigure\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind as if it\r\nwere separated by an interval of empty space from the rest…. It\r\nis impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at\r\nonce; and as the perception of the figure implies a knowledge of the\r\nrelative situation of the different points with respect to each other, we\r\nmust conclude that the perception of figure by the eye is the result of\r\na number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however,\r\nare performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to\r\nus, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_324_324\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_324_324\"\u003e[324]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch glaringly artificial views can only come from fantastic\r\nmetaphysics or from the ambiguity of the word \u0027idea,\u0027\r\nwhich, standing sometimes for mental state and sometimes\r\nfor thing known, leads men to ascribe to the thing, not\r\nonly the unity which belongs to the mental state, but even\r\nthe simplicity which is thought to reside in the Soul.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the things are apprehended by the \u003ci\u003esenses\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nnumber of them that can be attended to at once is small,\r\n\"\u003ci\u003ePluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"By Charles Bonnet the Mind is allowed to have a distinct notion of\r\nsix objects at once; by Abraham Tucker the number is limited to four;\r\nwhile Destutt Tracy again amplifies it to six. The opinion of the first\r\nand last of these philosophers\" [continues Sir Wm. Hamilton] \"seems\r\nto me correct. You can easily make the experiments for yourselves,\r\nbut you must beware of grouping the objects into classes. If you\r\nthrow a handful of marbles on the floor, you will find it difficult to\r\nview at once more than six, or seven at most, without confusion; but\r\nif you group them into twos, or threes, or fives, you can comprehend as\r\nmany groups as you can units; because the mind considers these\r\ngroups only as units—it views them as wholes, and throws their parts\r\nout of consideration.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_325_325\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_325_325\"\u003e[325]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Jevons, repeating this observation, by counting\r\ninstantaneously beans thrown into a box, found that\r\nthe number 6 was guessed correctly 120 times out of 147, 5\r\ncorrectly 102 times out of 107, and 4 and 3 always right.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_326_326\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_326_326\"\u003e[326]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_407\"\u003e[Pg 407]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eIt is obvious that such observations decide nothing at all\r\nabout our attention, properly so called. They rather measure\r\nin part the distinctness of our vision—especially of the\r\nprimary-memory-image\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_327_327\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_327_327\"\u003e[327]\u003c/a\u003e—in part the amount of association\r\nin the individual between seen arrangements and the names\r\nof numbers.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_328_328\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_328_328\"\u003e[328]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach number-name is a way of grasping the beans as\r\none total object. In such a total object, all the parts converge\r\nharmoniously to the one resultant concept; no single\r\nbean has special discrepant associations of its own;\r\nand so, with \u003ci\u003epractice\u003c/i\u003e, they may grow quite numerous ere\r\nwe fail to estimate them aright. But where the \u0027object\u0027 before\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_408\"\u003e[Pg 408]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nus breaks into parts disconnected with each other, and\r\nforming each as it were a separate object or system, not\r\nconceivable in union with the rest, it becomes harder to\r\napprehend all these parts at once, and the mind tends to\r\nlet go of one whilst it attends to another. Still, within\r\nlimits this can be done. M. Paulhan has experimented\r\ncarefully on the matter by declaiming one poem aloud\r\nwhilst he repeated a different one mentally, or by writing\r\none sentence whilst speaking another, or by performing\r\ncalculations on paper whilst reciting poetry.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_329_329\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_329_329\"\u003e[329]\u003c/a\u003e He found\r\nthat\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"the most favorable condition for the doubling of the mind was its\r\nsimultaneous application to two easy and heterogeneous operations.\r\nTwo operations of the same sort, two multiplications, two recitations, or\r\nthe reciting one poem and writing another, render the process more\r\nuncertain and difficult.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe attention often, but not always, oscillates during\r\nthese performances; and sometimes a word from one part\r\nof the task slips into another. I myself find when I try to\r\nsimultaneously recite one thing and write another that the\r\nbeginning of each word or segment of a phrase is what requires\r\nthe attention. Once started, my pen runs on for a\r\nword or two as if by its own momentum. M. Paulhan\r\ncompared the time occupied by the same two operations\r\ndone simultaneously or in succession, and found that there\r\nwas often a considerable gain of time from doing them\r\nsimultaneously. For instance:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I write the first four verses of Athalie, whilst reciting eleven of\r\nMusset. The whole performance occupies 40 seconds. But reciting\r\nalone takes 22 and writing alone 31, or 53 altogether, so that there is a\r\ndifference in favor of the simultaneous operations.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr again:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I multiply 421 312 212 by 2; the operation takes 6 seconds; the\r\nrecitation of 4 verses also takes 6 seconds. But the two operations\r\ndone at once only take 6 seconds, so that there is no loss of time from\r\ncombining them.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course these time-measurements lack precision.\r\nWith three systems of object (writing with \u003ci\u003eeach\u003c/i\u003e hand whilst\r\nreciting) the operation became much more difficult.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_409\"\u003e[Pg 409]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, then, by the original question, how many ideas or\r\nthings can we attend to at once, be meant how many entirely\r\ndisconnected systems or processes of conception can go on\r\nsimultaneously, the answer is, \u003ci\u003enot easily more than one,\r\nunless the processes are very habitual; but then two, or\r\neven three,\u003c/i\u003e without very much oscillation of the attention.\r\nWhere, however, the processes are less automatic, as in the\r\nstory of Julius Cæsar dictating four letters whilst he writes\r\na fifth,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_330_330\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_330_330\"\u003e[330]\u003c/a\u003e there must be a rapid oscillation of the mind from\r\none to the next, and no consequent gain of time. Within\r\nany one of the systems the parts may be numberless, but\r\nwe attend to them collectively when we conceive the whole\r\nwhich they form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the things to be attended to are small sensations,\r\nand when the effort is to be exact in noting them, it is\r\nfound that attention to one interferes a good deal with the\r\nperception of the other. A good deal of fine work has been\r\ndone in this field, of which I must give some account.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has long been noticed, when expectant attention is\r\nconcentrated upon one of two sensations, that the other\r\none is apt to be displaced from consciousness for a moment\r\nand to appear subsequent; although in reality the two may\r\nhave been contemporaneous events. Thus, to use the stock\r\nexample of the books, the surgeon would sometimes see\r\nthe blood flow from the arm of the patient whom he was\r\nbleeding, \u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c/i\u003e he saw the instrument penetrate the skin.\r\nSimilarly the smith may see the sparks fly \u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c/i\u003e he sees\r\nthe hammer smite the iron, etc. There is thus a certain\r\ndifficulty in perceiving the exact \u003ci\u003edate\u003c/i\u003e of two impressions\r\nwhen they do not interest our attention equally, and when\r\nthey are of a disparate sort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Exner, whose experiments on the \u003ci\u003eminimal perceptible\r\nsuccession\u003c/i\u003e in time of two sensations we shall have to\r\nquote in another chapter, makes some noteworthy remarks\r\nabout the way in which the attention must be \u003ci\u003eset\u003c/i\u003e to catch\r\nthe interval and the right order of the sensations, when the\r\ntime is exceeding small. The point was to tell whether\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_410\"\u003e[Pg 410]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntwo signals were simultaneous or successive; and, if successive,\r\nwhich one of them came first.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first way of attending which he found himself to\r\nfall into, was when the signals did not differ greatly—when,\r\ne.g., they were similar sounds heard each by a different\r\near. Here he lay in wait for the \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e signal, whichever\r\nit might be, and identified it the next moment in memory.\r\nThe second, which could then always be known by default,\r\nwas often not clearly distinguished in itself. When the\r\ntime was too short, the first could not be isolated from the\r\nsecond at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second way was to accommodate the attention for a\r\ncertain \u003ci\u003esort\u003c/i\u003e of signal, and the next moment to become aware\r\nin memory of whether it came before or after its mate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This way brings great uncertainty with it. The impression not\r\nprepared for comes to us in the memory more weak than the other,\r\nobscure as it were, badly fixed in time. We tend to take the subjectively\r\nstronger stimulus, that which we were intent upon, for the first,\r\njust as we are apt to take an objectively stronger stimulus to be the\r\nfirst. Still, it may happen otherwise. In the experiments from touch\r\nto sight it often seemed to me as if the impression for which the attention\r\nwas \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e prepared were there already when the other came.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExner found himself employing this method oftenest\r\nwhen the impressions differed strongly.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_331_331\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_331_331\"\u003e[331]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn such observations (which must not be confounded\r\nwith those where the two signals were identical and their\r\nsuccessiveness known as mere \u003ci\u003edoubleness\u003c/i\u003e, without distinction\r\nof which came first), it is obvious that each signal must\r\ncombine stably in our perception with a \u003ci\u003edifferent\u003c/i\u003e instant of\r\ntime. It is the simplest possible case of two discrepant\r\nconcepts simultaneously occupying the mind. Now the case\r\nof the signals being \u003ci\u003esimultaneous\u003c/i\u003e seems of a different sort.\r\nWe must turn to Wundt for observations fit to cast a nearer\r\nlight thereon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader will remember the reaction-time experiments\r\nof which we treated in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_III\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter III\u003c/a\u003e. It happened occasionally\r\nin Wundt\u0027s experiments that the reaction-time was\r\nreduced to zero or even assumed a negative value, which,\r\nbeing translated into common speech, means that the observer\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_411\"\u003e[Pg 411]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas sometimes so intent upon the signal that his\r\nreaction \u003ci\u003eactually coincided in time with it, or even preceded it,\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninstead of coming a fraction of a second after it, as in the\r\nnature of things it should. More will be said of these results\r\nanon. Meanwhile Wundt, in explaining them, says\r\nthis:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In general \u003ci\u003ewe have a very exact feeling of the simultaneity of two\r\nstimuli,\u003c/i\u003e if they do not differ much in strength. And in a series of experiments\r\nin which a warning precedes, at a fixed interval, the stimulus,\r\nwe involuntarily try to react, not only as promptly as possible,\r\nbut also in such wise that our movement may coincide with the stimulus\r\nitself. We seek to make our own feelings of touch and innervation\r\n[muscular contraction] objectively \u003ci\u003econtemporaneous with the signal\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich we hear; and experience shows that in many cases we approximately\r\nsucceed. In these cases we have a distinct consciousness of\r\nhearing the signal, reacting upon it, and feeling our reaction take\r\nplace,—all at one and the same moment.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_332_332\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_332_332\"\u003e[332]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn another place, Wundt adds:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The difficulty of these observations and the comparative infrequency\r\nwith which the reaction-time can be made thus to disappear shows how\r\nhard it is, when our attention is intense, to keep it fixed even on \u003ci\u003etwo\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndifferent ideas at once. Note besides that when this happens, one\r\nalways tries to bring the ideas into a certain connection, to grasp them\r\nas components of a certain complex representation. Thus in the experiments\r\nin question, it has often seemed to me that I produced by\r\nmy own recording movement the sound which the ball made in dropping\r\non the board.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_333_333\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_333_333\"\u003e[333]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0027difficulty,\u0027 in the cases of which Wundt speaks, is\r\nthat of forcing two non-simultaneous events into apparent\r\ncombination with the same instant of time. There is no\r\ndifficulty, as he admits, in so dividing our attention between\r\ntwo \u003ci\u003ereally\u003c/i\u003e simultaneous impressions as to feel them\r\nto be such. The cases he describes are really cases of\r\nanachronistic perception, of subjective time-displacement,\r\nto use his own term. Still more curious cases of it have\r\nbeen most carefully studied by him. They carry us a step\r\nfarther in our research, so I will quote them, using as far\r\nas possible his exact words:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The conditions become more complicated when we receive a series\r\nof impressions separated by distinct intervals, into the midst of which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_412\"\u003e[Pg 412]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na heterogeneous impression is suddenly brought. Then comes the\r\nquestion, with which member of the series do we perceive the additional\r\nimpression to coincide? with that member with whose presence it\r\nreally coexists, or is there some aberration?… If the additional\r\nstimulus belongs to a different sense very considerable aberrations may\r\noccur.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The best way to experiment is with a number of visual impressions\r\n(which one can easily get from a moving object) for the series, and\r\nwith a sound as the disparate impression. Let, e.g., an index-hand\r\nmove over a circular scale with uniform and sufficiently slow velocity,\r\nso that the impressions it gives will not fuse, but permit its position at\r\nany instant to be distinctly seen. Let the clockwork which turns it\r\nhave an arrangement which rings a bell once in every revolution, but\r\nat a point which can be varied, so that the observer need never know\r\nin advance just when the bell-stroke takes place. In such observations\r\nthree cases are possible. The bell-stroke can be perceived either exactly\r\nat the moment to which the index points when it sounds—in this\r\ncase there will be no time-displacement; or we can combine it with a\r\nlater position of the index—… \u003ci\u003epositive time-displacement\u003c/i\u003e, as we\r\nshall call it; or finally we can combine it with a position of the index\r\nearlier than that at which the sound occurred—and this we will call a\r\n\u003ci\u003enegative displacement\u003c/i\u003e. The most natural displacement would apparently\r\nbe the positive, since for apperception a certain time is always required….\r\nBut experience shows that the opposite is the case: it\r\nhappens most frequently that the sound appears earlier than its real\r\ndate—far less often coincident with it, or later. It should be observed\r\nthat in all these experiments it takes some time to get a distinctly perceived\r\ncombination of the sound with a particular position of the index,\r\nand that a single revolution of the latter is never enough for the\r\npurpose. The motion must go on long enough for the sounds themselves\r\nto form a regular series—the outcome being a simultaneous perception\r\nof two distinct series of events, of which either may by changes\r\nin its rapidity modify the result. The first thing one remarks is that\r\nthe sound belongs in a certain region of the scale; only gradually is it\r\nperceived to combine with a particular position of the index. But even\r\na result gained by observation of many revolutions may be deficient in\r\ncertainty, for accidental combinations of attention have a great influence\r\nupon it. If we deliberately try to combine the bell-stroke with\r\nan arbitrarily chosen position of the index, we succeed without difficulty,\r\nprovided this position be not too remote from the true one. If,\r\nagain, we cover the whole scale, except a single division over which we\r\nmay see the index pass, we have a strong tendency to combine the\r\nbell-stroke with this actually seen position; and in so doing may easily\r\noverlook more than 1/4 of a second of time. Results, therefore, to be of\r\nany value, must be drawn from long-continued and very numerous observations,\r\nin which such irregular oscillations of the attention neutralize\r\neach other according to the law of great numbers, and allow the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_413\"\u003e[Pg 413]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntrue laws to appear. Although my own experiments extend over many\r\nyears (with interruptions), they are not even yet numerous enough to exhaust\r\nthe subject—still, they bring out the principal laws which the\r\nattention follows under such conditions.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_334_334\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_334_334\"\u003e[334]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt accordingly distinguishes the \u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e from the\r\n\u003ci\u003eamount\u003c/i\u003e of the apparent displacement in time of the bell-stroke.\r\nThe direction depends on the rapidity of the\r\nmovement of the index and (consequently) on that of the\r\nsuccession of the bell-strokes. The moment at which the\r\nbell struck was estimated by him with the least tendency\r\nto error, when the revolutions took place once in a second.\r\nFaster than this, \u003ci\u003epositive\u003c/i\u003e errors began to prevail; slower,\r\n\u003ci\u003enegative\u003c/i\u003e ones almost always were present. On the other\r\nhand, if the rapidity went \u003ci\u003equickening\u003c/i\u003e, errors became \u003ci\u003enegative\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nif \u003ci\u003eslowing, positive\u003c/i\u003e. The amount of error is, in general,\r\nthe greater the slower the speed and its alterations.\r\nFinally, individual differences prevail, as well as differences\r\nin the same individual at different times.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_335_335\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_335_335\"\u003e[335]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_414\"\u003e[Pg 414]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt\u0027s pupil von Tschisch has carried out these experiments\r\non a still more elaborate scale,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_336_336\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_336_336\"\u003e[336]\u003c/a\u003e using, not only\r\nthe single bell-stroke, but 2, 3, 4, or 5 simultaneous impressions,\r\nso that the attention had to note the place of the\r\nindex at the moment when a whole group of things was\r\nhappening. The single bell-stroke was always heard too\r\nearly by von Tschisch—the displacement was invariably\r\n\u0027negative.\u0027 As the other simultaneous impressions were\r\nadded, the displacement first became zero and finally positive,\r\ni.e. the impressions were connected with a position of\r\nthe index that was too late. This retardation was greater\r\nwhen the simultaneous impressions were disparate (electric\r\ntactile stimuli on different places, simple touch-stimuli,\r\ndifferent sounds) than when they were all of the same sort.\r\nThe increment of retardation became relatively less with\r\neach additional impression, so that it is probable that six\r\nimpressions would have given almost the same result as\r\nfive, which was the maximum number used by Herr von T.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt explains all these results by his previous observation\r\nthat a reaction sometimes antedates the signal (see\r\nabove, \u003ca href=\"#Page_411\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 411\u003c/a\u003e). The mind, he supposes, is so intent upon\r\nthe bell-strokes that its \u0027apperception\u0027 keeps ripening\r\nperiodically after each stroke in anticipation of the next.\r\nIts most natural rate of ripening may be faster or slower\r\nthan the rate at which the strokes come. If faster, then it\r\nhears the stroke too early; if slower, it hears it too late.\r\nThe position of the index on the scale, meanwhile, is noted\r\nat the moment, early or late, at which the bell-stroke is\r\nsubjectively heard. Substituting several impressions for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_415\"\u003e[Pg 415]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe single bell-stroke makes the ripening of the perception\r\nslower, and the index is seen too late. So, at least, do I\r\nunderstand the explanations which Herren Wundt and v.\r\nTschisch give.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_337_337\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_337_337\"\u003e[337]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_416\"\u003e[Pg 416]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is all I have to say about the difficulty of having\r\ntwo discrepant concepts together, and about the number of\r\nthings to which we can simultaneously attend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE VARIETIES OF ATTENTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe things to which we attend are said to \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e us.\r\nOur interest in them is supposed to be the \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e of our attending.\r\nWhat makes an object interesting we shall see\r\npresently; and later inquire in what sense interest may\r\ncause attention. Meanwhile\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAttention may be divided into kinds in various ways.\r\nIt is either to\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Objects of sense (sensorial attention); or to\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Ideal or represented objects (intellectual attention).\r\nIt is either\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Immediate; or\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) Derived: immediate, when the topic or stimulus is\r\ninteresting in itself, without relation to anything else; derived,\r\nwhen it owes its interest to association with some\r\nother immediately interesting thing. What I call derived\r\nattention has been named \u0027apperceptive\u0027 attention. Furthermore,\r\nAttention may be either\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e) Passive, reflex, non-voluntary, effortless; or\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e) Active and voluntary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVoluntary attention is always derived\u003c/i\u003e; we never make an\r\n\u003ci\u003eeffort\u003c/i\u003e to attend to an object except for the sake of some \u003ci\u003eremote\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninterest which the effort will serve. But both sensorial and\r\nintellectual attention may be either passive or voluntary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003epassive immediate sensorial attention\u003c/i\u003e the stimulus is a\r\nsense-impression, either very intense, voluminous, or sudden,—in\r\nwhich case it makes no difference what its nature\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_417\"\u003e[Pg 417]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay be, whether sight, sound, smell, blow, or inner pain,—or\r\nelse it is an \u003ci\u003einstinctive\u003c/i\u003e stimulus, a perception which, by\r\nreason of its nature rather than its mere force, appeals to\r\nsome one of our normal congenital impulses and has a\r\ndirectly exciting quality. In the chapter on Instinct we\r\nshall see how these stimuli differ from one animal to another,\r\nand what most of them are in man: strange things, moving\r\nthings, wild animals, bright things, pretty things, metallic\r\nthings, words, blows, blood, etc., etc., etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSensitiveness to immediately exciting sensorial stimuli\r\ncharacterizes the attention of childhood and youth. In\r\nmature age we have generally selected those stimuli which\r\nare connected with one or more so-called permanent interests,\r\nand our attention has grown irresponsive to the rest.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_338_338\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_338_338\"\u003e[338]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut childhood is characterized by great active energy, and\r\nhas few organized interests by which to meet new impressions\r\nand decide whether they are worthy of notice or not,\r\nand the consequence is that extreme mobility of the attention\r\nwith which we are all familiar in children, and which\r\nmakes their first lessons such rough affairs. Any strong\r\nsensation whatever produces accommodation of the organs\r\nwhich perceive it, and absolute oblivion, for the time being,\r\nof the task in hand. This reflex and passive character of\r\nthe attention which, as a French writer says, makes the\r\nchild seem to belong less to himself than to every object\r\nwhich happens to catch his notice, is the first thing which\r\nthe teacher must overcome. It never is overcome in some\r\npeople, whose work, to the end of life, gets done in the\r\ninterstices of their mind-wandering.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe passive sensorial attention is \u003ci\u003ederived\u003c/i\u003e when the\r\nimpression, without being either strong or of an instinctively\r\nexciting nature, is connected by previous experience and\r\neducation with things that are so. These things may be\r\ncalled the \u003ci\u003emotives\u003c/i\u003e of the attention. The impression draws\r\nan interest from them, or perhaps it even fuses into a single\r\ncomplex object with them; the result is that it is brought\r\ninto the focus of the mind. A faint tap \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e is not an\r\ninteresting sound; it may well escape being discriminated\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_418\"\u003e[Pg 418]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom the general rumor of the world. But when it is a\r\nsignal, as that of a lover on the window-pane, it will hardly\r\ngo unperceived. Herbart writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"How a bit of bad grammar wounds the ear of the purist! How a\r\nfalse note hurts the musician! or an offence against good manners the\r\nman of the world! How rapid is progress in a science when its first\r\nprinciples have been so well impressed upon us that we reproduce them\r\nmentally with perfect distinctness and ease! How slow and uncertain, on\r\nthe other hand, is our learning of the principles themselves, when\r\nfamiliarity with the still more elementary percepts connected with the\r\nsubject has not given us an adequate predisposition!—Apperceptive\r\nattention may be plainly observed in very small children when, hearing\r\nthe speech of their elders, as yet unintelligible to them, they suddenly\r\ncatch a single known word here and there, and repeat it to themselves;\r\nyes! even in the dog who looks round at us when we speak of him and\r\npronounce his name. Not far removed is the talent which mind-wandering\r\nschool-boys display during the hours of instruction, of noticing\r\nevery moment in which the teacher tells a story. I remember classes\r\nin which, instruction being uninteresting, and discipline relaxed, a buzzing\r\nmurmur was always to be heard, which invariably stopped for as\r\nlong a time as an anecdote lasted. How could the boys, since they\r\nseemed to hear nothing, notice when the anecdote began? Doubtless\r\nmost of them always heard something of the teacher\u0027s talk; but most of\r\nit had no connection with their previous knowledge and occupations,\r\nand therefore the separate words no sooner entered their consciousness\r\nthan they fell out of it again; but, on the other hand, no sooner did the\r\nwords awaken old thoughts, forming strongly-connected series with\r\nwhich the new impression easily combined, than out of new and old\r\ntogether a total interest resulted which drove the vagrant ideas below\r\nthe threshold of consciousness, and brought for a while settled attention\r\ninto their place.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_339_339\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_339_339\"\u003e[339]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePassive intellectual attention\u003c/i\u003e is immediate when we follow\r\nin thought a train of images exciting or interesting \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nderived, when the images are interesting only as means to a\r\nremote end, or merely because they are associated with\r\nsomething which makes them dear. Owing to the way in\r\nwhich immense numbers of real things become integrated\r\ninto single objects of thought for us, there is no clear line\r\nto be drawn between immediate and derived attention of\r\nan intellectual sort. When absorbed in intellectual attention\r\nwe may become so inattentive to outer things as to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_419\"\u003e[Pg 419]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0027absent-minded,\u0027 \u0027abstracted,\u0027 or \u0027\u003ci\u003edistraits\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 All revery or\r\nconcentrated meditation is apt to throw us into this state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Archimedes, it is well known, was so absorbed in geometrical meditation\r\nthat he was first aware of the storming of Syracuse by his own\r\ndeath-wound, and his exclamation on the entrance of the Roman soldiers\r\nwas: \u003ci\u003eNoli turbare circulos meos!\u003c/i\u003e In like manner Joseph Scaliger,\r\nthe most learned of men, when a Protestant student in Paris, was so\r\nengrossed in the study of Homer that he became aware of the massacre\r\nof St. Bartholomew, and of his own escape, only on the day subsequent\r\nto the catastrophe. The philosopher Carneades was habitually liable to\r\nfits of meditation so profound that, to prevent him sinking from\r\ninanition, his maid found it necessary to feed him like a child. And\r\nit is reported of Newton that, while engaged in his mathematical researches,\r\nhe sometimes forgot to dine. Cardan, one of the most illustrious\r\nof philosophers and mathematicians, was once, upon a journey,\r\nso lost in thought that he forgot both his way and the object of his\r\njourney. To the questions of his driver whether he should proceed, he\r\nmade no answer; and when he came to himself at nightfall, he was surprised\r\nto find the carriage at a standstill, and directly under a gallows.\r\nThe mathematician Vieta was sometimes so buried in meditation that\r\nfor hours he bore more resemblance to a dead person than to a living,\r\nand was then wholly unconscious of everything going on around him.\r\nOn the day of his marriage the great Budæus forgot everything in his\r\nphilological speculations, and he was only awakened to the affairs of the\r\nexternal world by a tardy embassy from the marriage-party, who found\r\nhim absorbed in the composition of his \u003ci\u003eCommentarii\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_340_340\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_340_340\"\u003e[340]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe absorption may be so deep as not only to banish\r\nordinary sensations, but even the severest pain. Pascal,\r\nWesley, Robert Hall, are said to have had this capacity.\r\nDr. Carpenter says of himself that\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"he has frequently begun a lecture whilst suffering neuralgic pain so\r\nsevere as to make him apprehend that he would find it impossible to\r\nproceed; yet no sooner has he by a determined effort fairly launched\r\nhimself into the stream of thought, than he has found himself continuously\r\nborne along without the least distraction, until the end has\r\ncome, and the attention has been released; when the pain has recurred\r\nwith a force that has overmastered all resistance, making him\r\nwonder how he could have ever ceased to feel it.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_341_341\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_341_341\"\u003e[341]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Carpenter speaks of launching himself by a determined\r\n\u003ci\u003eeffort\u003c/i\u003e. This effort characterizes what we called\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_420\"\u003e[Pg 420]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eactive or voluntary attention\u003c/i\u003e. It is a feeling which every one\r\nknows, but which most people would call quite indescribable.\r\nWe get it in the sensorial sphere whenever we seek\r\nto catch an impression of extreme \u003ci\u003efaintness\u003c/i\u003e, be it of sight,\r\nhearing, taste, smell, or touch; we get it whenever we seek\r\nto \u003ci\u003ediscriminate\u003c/i\u003e a sensation merged in a mass of others that\r\nare similar; we get it whenever we \u003ci\u003eresist the attractions\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nmore potent stimuli and keep our mind occupied with\r\nsome object that is naturally unimpressive. We get it in\r\nthe intellectual sphere under exactly similar conditions:\r\nas when we strive to sharpen and make distinct an idea\r\nwhich we but vaguely seem to have; or painfully discriminate\r\na shade of meaning from its similars; or resolutely\r\nhold fast to a thought so discordant with our impulses\r\nthat, if left unaided, it would quickly yield place to images\r\nof an exciting and impassioned kind. All forms of attentive\r\neffort would be exercised at once by one whom we\r\nmight suppose at a dinner-party resolutely to listen to a\r\nneighbor giving him insipid and unwelcome advice in a\r\nlow voice, whilst all around the guests were loudly laughing\r\nand talking about exciting and interesting things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThere is no such thing as voluntary attention sustained for\r\nmore than a few seconds at a time.\u003c/i\u003e What is called sustained\r\nvoluntary attention is a repetition of successive efforts\r\nwhich bring back the topic to the mind.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_342_342\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_342_342\"\u003e[342]\u003c/a\u003e The topic once\r\nbrought back, if a congenial one, \u003ci\u003edevelops\u003c/i\u003e; and if its development\r\nis interesting it engages the attention passively\r\nfor a time. Dr. Carpenter, a moment back, described the\r\nstream of thought, once entered, as \u0027bearing him along.\u0027\r\nThis passive interest may be short or long. As soon as it\r\nflags, the attention is diverted by some irrelevant thing, and\r\nthen a voluntary effort may bring it back to the topic\r\nagain; and so on, under favorable conditions, for hours together.\r\nDuring all this time, however, note that it is not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_421\"\u003e[Pg 421]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan identical \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e in the psychological sense (\u003ca href=\"#Page_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 275\u003c/a\u003e), but a\r\nsuccession of mutually related objects forming an identical\r\n\u003ci\u003etopic\u003c/i\u003e only, upon which the attention is fixed. \u003ci\u003eNo one can\r\npossibly attend continuously to an object that does not change.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow there are always some objects that for the time\r\nbeing \u003ci\u003ewill not develop\u003c/i\u003e. They simply \u003ci\u003ego out\u003c/i\u003e; and to keep\r\nthe mind upon anything related to them requires such incessantly\r\nrenewed effort that the most resolute Will ere long\r\ngives out and lets its thoughts follow the more stimulating\r\nsolicitations after it has withstood them for what length of\r\ntime it can. There are topics known to every man from\r\nwhich he shies like a frightened horse, and which to get a\r\nglimpse of is to shun. Such are his ebbing assets to the\r\nspendthrift in full career. But why single out the spendthrift\r\nwhen to every man actuated by passion the thought\r\nof interests which negate the passion can hardly for more\r\nthan a fleeting instant stay before the mind? It is like\r\n\u0027memento mori\u0027 in the heyday of the pride of life. Nature\r\nrises at such suggestions, and excludes them from the\r\nview:—How long, O healthy reader, can you now continue\r\nthinking of your tomb?—In milder instances the difficulty\r\nis as great, especially when the brain is fagged. One\r\nsnatches at any and every passing pretext, no matter how\r\ntrivial or external, to escape from the odiousness of the\r\nmatter in hand. I know a person, for example, who will\r\npoke the fire, set chairs straight, pick dust-specks from\r\nthe floor, arrange his table, snatch up the newspaper, take\r\ndown any book which catches his eye, trim his nails, waste\r\nthe morning \u003ci\u003eanyhow\u003c/i\u003e, in short, and all without premeditation,—simply\r\nbecause the only thing he \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to attend to\r\nIs the preparation of a noonday lesson in formal logic\r\nwhich he detests. Anything but \u003ci\u003ethat!\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, the object must change. When it is one of\r\nsight, it will actually become invisible; when of hearing,\r\ninaudible,—if we attend to it too unmovingly. Helmholtz,\r\nwho has put his sensorial attention to the severest tests,\r\nby using his eyes on objects which in common life are expressly\r\noverlooked, makes some interesting remarks on\r\nthis point in his chapter on retinal rivalry.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_343_343\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_343_343\"\u003e[343]\u003c/a\u003e The phenomenon\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_422\"\u003e[Pg 422]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncalled by that name is this, that if we look with\r\neach eye upon a different picture (as in the annexed stereoscopic\r\nslide), sometimes one picture, sometimes the other,\r\nor parts of both, will come to consciousness, but hardly\r\never both combined. Helmholtz now says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I find that I am able to attend voluntarily, now to one and now\r\nto the other system of lines; and that then this system remains visible\r\nalone for a certain time, whilst the other completely vanishes.\r\nThis happens, for example, whenever I try to count the lines first of\r\none and then of the other system…. But it is extremely hard to\r\nchain the attention down to one of the systems for long, unless we\r\nassociate with our looking some distinct purpose which keeps the activity\r\nof the attention perpetually renewed. Such a one is counting the\r\nlines, comparing their intervals, or the like. An equilibrium of the\r\nattention, persistent for any length of time, is under no circumstances\r\nattainable. The natural tendency of attention when left to itself is to\r\nwander to ever new things; and so soon as the interest of its object is\r\nover, so soon as nothing new is to be noticed there, it passes, in spite of\r\nour will, to something else. If we wish to keep it upon one and the same\r\nobject, we must seek constantly to find out something new about the\r\nlatter, especially if other powerful impressions are attracting us away.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 375px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-422-0035.jpg\" style=\"width: 375px\" id=\"img_images_jame_422_0035.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 36.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again criticising an author who had treated of attention\r\nas an activity absolutely subject to the conscious\r\nwill, Helmholtz writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This is only restrictedly true. We move our eyes by our will; but\r\none without training cannot so easily execute the intention of making\r\nthem converge. At any moment, however, he can execute that of\r\nlooking at a near object, in which act convergence is involved. Now\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_423\"\u003e[Pg 423]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njust as little can we carry out our purpose to keep our attention steadily\r\nfixed upon a certain object, when our interest in the object is exhausted,\r\nand the purpose is inwardly formulated in this abstract way. \u003ci\u003eBut we\r\ncan set ourselves new questions about the object, so that a new interest\r\nin it arises, and then the attention will remain riveted.\u003c/i\u003e The relation\r\nof attention to will is, then, less one of immediate than of mediate\r\ncontrol.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese words of Helmholtz are of fundamental importance.\r\nAnd if true of sensorial attention, how much more\r\ntrue are they of the intellectual variety! The \u003ci\u003econditio sine\r\nquâ non\u003c/i\u003e of sustained attention to a given topic of thought\r\nis that we should roll it over and over incessantly and consider\r\ndifferent aspects and relations of it in turn. Only in\r\npathological states will a fixed and ever monotonously recurring\r\nidea possess the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd now we can see why it is that what is called sustained\r\nattention is the easier, the richer in acquisitions and\r\nthe fresher and more original the mind. In such minds,\r\nsubjects bud and sprout and grow. At every moment, they\r\nplease by a new consequence and rivet the attention afresh.\r\nBut an intellect unfurnished with materials, stagnant, unoriginal,\r\nwill hardly be likely to consider any subject long.\r\nA glance exhausts its possibilities of interest. Geniuses\r\nare commonly believed to excel other men in their power\r\nof sustained attention.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_344_344\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_344_344\"\u003e[344]\u003c/a\u003e In most of them, it is to be feared,\r\nthe so-called \u0027power\u0027 is of the passive sort. Their ideas\r\ncoruscate, every subject branches infinitely before their\r\nfertile minds, and so for hours they may be rapt. \u003ci\u003eBut it\r\nis their genius making them attentive, not their attention\r\nmaking geniuses of them.\u003c/i\u003e And, when we come down to\r\nthe root of the matter, we see that they differ from ordinary\r\nmen less in the character of their attention than in the\r\nnature of the objects upon which it is successively bestowed.\r\nIn the genius, these form a concatenated series, suggesting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_424\"\u003e[Pg 424]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neach other mutually by some rational law. Therefore we\r\ncall the attention \u0027sustained\u0027 and the topic of meditation\r\nfor hours \u0027the same.\u0027 In the common man the series is\r\nfor the most part incoherent, the objects have no rational\r\nbond, and we call the attention wandering and unfixed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is probable that genius tends actually to prevent a\r\nman from acquiring habits of voluntary attention, and that\r\nmoderate intellectual endowments are the soil in which we\r\nmay best expect, here as elsewhere, the virtues of the will,\r\nstrictly so called, to thrive. But, whether the attention\r\ncome by grace of genius or by dint of will, the longer one\r\ndoes attend to a topic the more mastery of it one has. And\r\nthe faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention,\r\nover and over again, is the very root of judgment,\r\ncharacter, and will. No one is \u003ci\u003ecompos sui\u003c/i\u003e if he have it not.\r\nAn education which should improve this faculty would be\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e education \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e. But it is easier to define this\r\nideal than to give practical directions for bringing it about.\r\nThe only general pedagogic maxim bearing on attention is\r\nthat the more interest the child has in advance in the subject,\r\nthe better he will attend. Induct him therefore in\r\nsuch a way as to knit each new thing on to some acquisition\r\nalready there; and if possible awaken curiosity, so\r\nthat the new thing shall seem to come as an answer, or\r\npart of an answer, to a question pre-existing in his mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt present having described the varieties, let us turn to\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE EFFECTS OF ATTENTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIts remote effects are too incalculable to be recorded.\r\nThe practical and theoretical life of whole species, as well\r\nas of individual beings, results from the selection which the\r\nhabitual direction of their attention involves. In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIV463\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapters\r\nXIV\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XV512\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eXV\u003c/a\u003e some of these consequences will come to light.\r\nSuffice it meanwhile that each of us literally \u003ci\u003echooses\u003c/i\u003e, by his\r\nways of attending to things, what sort of a universe he\r\nshall appear to himself to inhabit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe immediate effects of attention are to make us:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) perceive—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) conceive—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) distinguish—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) remember—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_425\"\u003e[Pg 425]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ebetter than otherwise we could—both more successive\r\nthings and each thing more clearly. It also\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e) shortens \u0027reaction-time.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e. Most people would say that a sensation attended\r\nto becomes stronger than it otherwise would be.\r\nThis point is, however, not quite plain, and has occasioned\r\nsome discussion.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_345_345\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_345_345\"\u003e[345]\u003c/a\u003e From the strength or intensity of a\r\nsensation must be distinguished its clearness; and to increase\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e is, for some psychologists, the utmost that\r\nattention can do. When the facts are surveyed, however,\r\nit must be admitted that to some extent the relative intensity\r\nof two sensations may be changed when one of them is\r\nattended to and the other not. Every artist knows how he\r\ncan make a scene before his eyes appear warmer or colder\r\nin color, according to the way he sets his attention. If\r\nfor warm, he soon begins to \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e the red color start out of\r\neverything; if for cold, the blue. Similarly in listening for\r\ncertain notes in a chord, or overtones in a musical sound,\r\nthe one we attend to sounds probably a little more loud as\r\nwell as more emphatic than it did before. When we mentally\r\nbreak a series of monotonous strokes into a rhythm,\r\nby accentuating every second or third one, etc., the stroke\r\non which the stress of attention is laid seems to become\r\nstronger as well as more emphatic. The increased visibility\r\nof optical after-images and of double images, which\r\nclose attention brings about, can hardly be interpreted\r\notherwise than as a real strengthening of the retinal\r\nsensations themselves. And this view is rendered particularly\r\nprobable by the fact that an imagined visual\r\nobject may, if attention be concentrated upon it long\r\nenough, acquire before the mind\u0027s eye almost the brilliancy\r\nof reality, and (in the case of certain exceptionally\r\ngifted observers) leave a negative after-image of itself when\r\nit passes away (see Chapter XVIII). Confident expectation\r\nof a certain intensity or quality of impression will often\r\nmake us sensibly see or hear it in an object which really\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_426\"\u003e[Pg 426]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfalls far short of it. In face of such facts it is rash to say\r\nthat attention cannot make a sense-impression more intense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, on the other hand, the intensification which may be\r\nbrought about seems never to lead the judgment astray.\r\nAs we rightly perceive and name the same color under\r\nvarious lights, the same sound at various distances; so we\r\nseem to make an analogous sort of allowance for the varying\r\namounts of attention with which objects are viewed;\r\nand whatever changes of feeling the attention may bring\r\nwe charge, as it were, to the attention\u0027s account, and still\r\nperceive and conceive the object as the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A gray paper appears to us no lighter, the pendulum-beat of a\r\nclock no louder, no matter how much we increase the strain of our attention\r\nupon them. No one, by doing this, can make the gray paper\r\nlook white, or the stroke of the pendulum sound like the blow of a\r\nstrong hammer,—everyone, on the contrary, feels the increase as that\r\nof his own conscious activity turned upon the thing.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_346_346\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_346_346\"\u003e[346]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere it otherwise, we should not be able to note \u003ci\u003eintensities\u003c/i\u003e\r\nby attending to them. Weak impressions would, as\r\nStumpf says,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_347_347\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_347_347\"\u003e[347]\u003c/a\u003e become stronger by the very fact of being\r\nobserved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I should not be able to observe faint sounds at all, but only such\r\nas appeared to me of maximal strength, or at least of a strength that\r\nincreased with the amount of my observation. In reality, however, I\r\ncan, with steadily increasing attention, follow a diminuendo perfectly\r\nwell.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subject is one which would well repay exact experiment,\r\nif methods could be devised. Meanwhile there is no\r\nquestion whatever that attention augments the \u003ci\u003eclearness\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nall that we perceive or conceive by its aid. But what is\r\nmeant by clearness here?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec. Clearness\u003c/i\u003e, so far as attention produces it, \u003ci\u003emeans distinction\r\nfrom other things\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003einternal analysis or subdivision\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThese are essentially products of intellectual \u003ci\u003ediscrimination\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ninvolving comparison, memory, and perception of various\r\nrelations. The attention \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e does not distinguish and\r\nanalyze and relate. The most we can say is that it is a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_427\"\u003e[Pg 427]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncondition of our doing so. And as these processes are to\r\nbe described later, the clearness they produce had better\r\nnot be farther discussed here. The important point to notice\r\nhere is that it is not attention\u0027s \u003ci\u003eimmediate\u003c/i\u003e fruit.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_348_348\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_348_348\"\u003e[348]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e Whatever future conclusion we may reach as to\r\nthis, we cannot deny that \u003ci\u003ean object once attended to will remain\r\nin the memory\u003c/i\u003e, whilst one inattentively allowed to pass\r\nwill leave no traces behind. Already in Chapter VI (see\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_163\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 163\u003c/a\u003e ff.) we discussed whether certain states of mind\r\nwere \u0027unconscious,\u0027 or whether they were not rather states\r\nto which no attention had been paid, and of whose passage\r\nrecollection could afterwards find no vestiges. Dugald\r\nStewart says:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_349_349\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_349_349\"\u003e[349]\u003c/a\u003e \"The connection between attention and\r\nmemory has been remarked by many authors.\" He quotes\r\nQuintilian, Locke, and Helvetius; and goes on at great\r\nlength to explain the phenomena of \u0027secondary automatism\u0027\r\n(see above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 114\u003c/a\u003e ff.) by the presence of a mental action\r\ngrown so inattentive as to preserve no memory of itself.\r\nIn our chapter on Memory, later on, the point will come\r\nup again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e) Under this head, the \u003ci\u003eshortening of reaction-time\u003c/i\u003e, there\r\nis a good deal to be said of Attention\u0027s effects. Since\r\nWundt has probably worked over the subject more thoroughly\r\nthan any other investigator and made it peculiarly\r\nhis own, what follows had better, as far as possible, be in\r\nhis words. The reader will remember the method and results\r\nof experimentation on \u0027reaction-time,\u0027 as given in\r\n\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_III\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter III\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe facts I proceed to quote may also be taken as a\r\nsupplement to that chapter. Wundt writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When we wait with strained attention for a stimulus, it will often\r\nhappen that instead of registering the stimulus, we react upon some\r\nentirely different impression,—and this not through confounding the\r\none with the other. On the contrary, we are perfectly well aware at\r\nthe moment of making the movement that we respond to the wrong\r\nstimulus. Sometimes even, though not so often, the latter may be another\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_428\"\u003e[Pg 428]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nkind of sensation altogether,—one may, for example, in experimenting\r\nwith sound, register a flash of light, produced either by\r\naccident or design. We cannot well explain these results otherwise\r\nthan by assuming that the strain of the attention towards the impression\r\nwe expect coexists with a preparatory innervation of the motor\r\ncentre for the reaction, which innervation the slightest shock then\r\nsuffices to turn into an actual discharge. This shock may be given by\r\nany chance impression, even by one to which we never intended to respond.\r\nWhen the preparatory innervation has once reached this pitch\r\nof intensity, the time that intervenes between the stimulus and the\r\ncontraction of the muscles which react, may become vanishingly\r\nsmall.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_350_350\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_350_350\"\u003e[350]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The perception of an impression is facilitated when the impression\r\nis preceded by a warning which announces beforehand that it is\r\nabout to occur. This case is realized whenever several stimuli follow\r\neach other at equal intervals,—when, e.g. we note pendulum movements\r\nby the eye, or pendulum-strokes by the ear. Each single stroke forms\r\nhere the signal for the next, which is thus met by a fully prepared attention.\r\nThe same thing happens when the stimulus to be perceived is\r\npreceded, at a certain interval, by a single warning: the time is\r\nalways notably shortened…. I have made comparative observations\r\non reaction-time with and without a warning signal. The impression\r\nto be reacted on was the sound made by the dropping of a\r\nball on the board of the \u0027drop apparatus.\u0027… In a first series no\r\nwarning preceded the stroke of the ball; in the second, the noise made\r\nby the apparatus in liberating the ball served as a signal…. Here\r\nare the averages of two series of such experiments:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eHeight of Fall.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eAverage. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMean Error. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eNo. of Expts.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e25 cm.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eNo warning \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.253\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.051\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e13\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWarning\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.076\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.060\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e17\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e5 cm.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eNo warning\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.266\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.036\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e14\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWarning\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.175\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.035\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e17\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"… In a long series of experiments, (the interval between warning\r\nand stimulus remaining the same) the reaction-time grows less and\r\nless, and it is possible occasionally to reduce it to a vanishing quantity\r\n(a few thousandths of a second), to zero, or even to a negative value.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_351_351\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_351_351\"\u003e[351]\u003c/a\u003e…\r\nThe only ground that we can assign for this phenomenon is \u003ci\u003ethe\r\npreparation (vorbereitende Spannung) of the attention\u003c/i\u003e. It is easy to\r\nunderstand that the reaction-time should be shortened by this means;\r\nbut that it should sometimes sink to zero and even assume negative\r\nvalues, may appear surprising. Nevertheless this latter case is also\r\nexplained by what happens in the simple reaction-time experiments\"\r\njust referred to, in which, \"when the strain of the attention has reached\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_429\"\u003e[Pg 429]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits climax, the movement we stand ready to execute escapes from the\r\ncontrol of on will, and we register a wrong signal. In these other experiments,\r\nin which a warning foretells the moment of the stimulus, it\r\nis also plain that attention accommodates itself so exactly to the latter\u0027s\r\nreception that \u003ci\u003eno sooner is it objectively given than it is fully\r\napperceived, and with the apperception the motor discharge coincides\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_352_352\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_352_352\"\u003e[352]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUsually, when the impression is fully anticipated, attention\r\nprepares the motor centres so completely for both\r\nstimulus and reaction that the only time lost is that of the\r\nphysiological conduction downwards. But even this interval\r\nmay disappear, i.e. the stimulus and reaction may become\r\nobjectively contemporaneous; or more remarkable\r\nstill, the reaction may be discharged before the stimulus has\r\nactually occurred.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_353_353\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_353_353\"\u003e[353]\u003c/a\u003e Wundt, as we saw some pages back\r\n(\u003ca href=\"#Page_411\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 411\u003c/a\u003e), explains this by the effort of the mind so to react\r\nthat we may feel our own movement and the signal which\r\nprompts it, both at the same instant. As the execution of\r\nthe movement must precede our feeling of it, so it must\r\nalso precede the stimulus, if that and our movement are to\r\nbe felt at once.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe peculiar theoretic interest of these experiments\r\nlies in their \u003ci\u003eshowing expectant attention and sensation to be\r\ncontinuous or identical processes, since they may have identical\r\nmotor effects\u003c/i\u003e. Although other exceptional observations\r\nshow them likewise to be continuous \u003ci\u003esubjectively\u003c/i\u003e, Wundt\u0027s\r\nexperiments do not: he seems never, at the moment of\r\nreacting prematurely, to have been misled into the belief\r\nthat the real stimulus was there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs concentrated attention accelerates perception, so,\r\nconversely, perception of a stimulus is \u003ci\u003eretarded by anything\r\nwhich either baffles or distracts the attention\u003c/i\u003e with which we\r\nawait it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If, e.g., we make reactions on a sound in such a way that weak\r\nand strong stimuli irregularly alternate so that the observer can never\r\nexpect a determinate strength with any certainty, the reaction-time for\r\n\u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e the various signals is increased,—and so is the average error. I\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_430\"\u003e[Pg 430]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nappend two examples…. In Series I a strong and a weak sound\r\nalternated regularly, so that the intensity was each time known in advance.\r\nIn II they came irregularly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eI. \u003ci\u003eRegular Alternation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eAverage Time. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eAverage Error. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eNo. of Expts.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eStrong sound\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.116\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.010\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e18\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWeak sound\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.127\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.012\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e9\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eII. \u003ci\u003eIrregular Alternation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eStrong sound\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.189\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.038\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e9\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWeak sound\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.298\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.076\"\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e15\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Still greater is the increase of the time when, unexpectedly into a\r\nseries of strong impressions, a weak one is interpolated, or \u003ci\u003evice versâ\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIn this way I have seen the time of reaction upon a sound so weak as\r\nto be barely perceived rise to 0.4\" or 0.5\", and for a strong sound to\r\n0 25\". It is also matter of general experience that a stimulus expected in\r\na general way, but for whose intensity attention cannot be adapted in\r\nadvance, demands a longer reaction-time. In such cases … the\r\nreason for the difference can only lie in the fact that wherever a preparation\r\nof the attention is impossible, the time of both perception and\r\nvolition is prolonged. Perhaps also the conspicuously large reaction-times\r\nwhich are got with stimuli so faint as to be just perceptible may\r\nbe explained by the attention tending always to adapt itself for something\r\nmore than this minimal amount of stimulus, so that a state ensues\r\nsimilar to that in the case of unexpected stimuli…. Still\r\nmore than by previously unknown stimuli is the reaction-time\r\nprolonged by \u003ci\u003ewholly unexpected\u003c/i\u003e impressions. This is sometimes accidentally\r\nbrought about, when the observer\u0027s attention, instead of being\r\nconcentrated on the coming signal, is dispersed. It can be realized\r\npurposely by suddenly thrusting into a long series of equidistant\r\nstimuli a much shorter interval which the observer does not expect.\r\nThe mental effect here is like that of being startled;—often the startling\r\nis outwardly visible. The time of reaction may then easily be lengthened\r\nto one quarter of a second with strong signals, or with weak ones\r\nto a half-second. Slighter, but still very noticeable, is the retardation\r\nwhen the experiment is so arranged that the observer, ignorant whether\r\nthe stimulus is to be an impression of light, sound, or touch, cannot\r\nkeep his attention turned to any particular sense-organ in advance.\r\nOne notices then at the same time a peculiar unrest, as the feeling of\r\nstrain which accompanies the attention keeps vacillating between the\r\nseveral senses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Complications of another sort arise when what is registered is an\r\nimpression anticipated both in point of quality and strength, but accompanied\r\nby other stimuli which make the concentration of the attention\r\ndifficult. The reaction-time is here always more or less prolonged.\r\nThe simplest case of the sort is where a momentary impression is registered\r\nin the midst of another, and continuous, sensorial-stimulation of\r\nconsiderable strength. The continuous stimulus may belong to the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_431\"\u003e[Pg 431]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsame sense as the stimulus to be reacted on, or to another. When it is\r\nof the same sense, the retardation it causes may be partly due to the\r\ndistraction of the attention by it, but partly also to the fact that the\r\nstimulus to be reacted on stands out less strongly than if alone, and\r\npractically becomes a less intense sensation. But other factors in reality\r\nare present; for we find the reaction-time more prolonged by the concomitant\r\nstimulation when the stimulus is weak than when it is strong\r\nI made experiments in which the principal impression, or signal for reaction,\r\nwas a bell-stroke whose strength could be graduated by a spring\r\nagainst the hammer with a movable counterpoise. Each set of observations\r\ncomprised two series; in one of which the bell-stroke was registered\r\nin the ordinary way, whilst in the other a toothed wheel belonging\r\nto the chronometric apparatus made during the entire experiment a\r\nsteady noise against a metal spring. In one half of the latter series (A)\r\nthe bell-stroke was only moderately strong, so that the accompanying\r\nnoise diminished it considerably, without, however, making it indistinguishable.\r\nIn the other half (B) the bell-sound was so loud as to be\r\nheard with perfect distinctness above the noise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMean. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMaximum. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMinimum. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eNo. of Experiments.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eA\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWithout noise \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.189\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.214\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.156\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e21\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e(Bell-stroke \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWith noise\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.313\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.499\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.183\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e16\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003emoderate)\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eB\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWithout noise\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.158\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.206\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.133\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e20\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e(Bell-stroke\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWith noise\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.203\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.295\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.140\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e19\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eloud)\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Since, in these experiments, the sound B even with noise made a\r\nconsiderably stronger impression than the sound A without, we must\r\nsee in the figures a direct influence of the disturbing noise on the process\r\nof reaction. This influence is freed from mixture with other factors\r\nwhen the momentary stimulus and the concomitant disturbance appeal\r\nto different senses. I chose, to test this, sight and hearing. The momentary\r\nsignal was an induction-spark leaping from one platinum point\r\nto another against a dark background. The steady stimulation was the\r\nnoise above described.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSpark.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMean. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMaximum. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMinimum. \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eNo. of Expts.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWithout noise \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.222\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.284\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.158\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e20\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWith noise\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.300\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.390\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.250\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e18\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When one reflects that in the experiments with one and the same\r\nsense the relative intensity of the signal is always depressed [which by\r\nitself is a retarding condition] the amount of retardation in these last\r\nobservations makes it probable that \u003ci\u003ethe disturbing influence upon attention\r\nis greater when the stimuli are disparate than when they belong\r\nto the same sense\u003c/i\u003e. One does not, in fact, find it particularly hard to\r\nregister immediately, when the bell rings in the midst of the noise; but\r\nwhen the spark is the signal one has a feeling of being coerced, as one\r\nturns away from the noise towards it. This fact is immediately connected\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_432\"\u003e[Pg 432]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith other properties of our attention. The effort of the latter\r\nis accompanied by various corporeal sensations, according to the sense\r\nwhich is engaged. The innervation which exists during the effort of\r\nattention is therefore probably a different one for each sense-organ.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_354_354\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_354_354\"\u003e[354]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt then, after some theoretical remarks which we\r\nneed not quote now, gives a table of retardations, as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eRetardation.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eUnexpected strength of impression:\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Unexpectedly strong sound \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.073\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Unexpectedly weak sound \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.171\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e2. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eInterference by like stimulus (sound by sound) \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.045\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_355_355\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_355_355\"\u003e[355]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e3. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eInterference by unlike stimulus (light by sound) \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.078\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt seems probable, from these results obtained with elementary\r\nprocesses of mind, that all processes, even the\r\nhigher ones of reminiscence, reasoning, etc., whenever attention\r\nis concentrated upon them instead of being diffused\r\nand languid, are thereby more rapidly performed.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_356_356\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_356_356\"\u003e[356]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStill more interesting reaction-time observations have\r\nbeen made by Münsterberg. The reader will recollect the\r\nfact noted in Chapter III (\u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 93\u003c/a\u003e) that reaction-time is\r\nshorter when one concentrates his attention on the expected\r\nmovement than when one concentrates it on the expected\r\nsignal. Herr Münsterberg found that this is equally the\r\ncase when the reaction is no simple reflex, but can take\r\nplace only after an intellectual operation. In a series of\r\nexperiments the five fingers were used to react with, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_433\"\u003e[Pg 433]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe reacter had to use a different finger according as the\r\nsignal was of one sort or another. Thus when a word in\r\nthe nominative case was called out he used the thumb, for\r\nthe dative he used another finger; similarly adjectives,\r\nsubstantives, pronouns, numerals, etc., or, again, towns,\r\nrivers, beasts, plants, elements; or poets, musicians, philosophers,\r\netc., were co-ordinated each with its finger, so\r\nthat when a word belonging to either of these classes was\r\nmentioned, a particular finger and no other had to perform\r\nthe reaction. In a second series of experiments the reaction\r\nconsisted in the utterance of a word in answer to a\r\nquestion, such as \"name an edible fish,\" etc.; or \"name\r\nthe first drama of Schiller,\" etc.; or \"which is greater,\r\nHume or Kant?\" etc.; or (first naming apples and cherries,\r\nand several other fruits) \"which do you prefer, apples or\r\ncherries?\" etc.; or \"which is Goethe\u0027s finest drama?\" etc.;\r\nor \"which letter comes the later in the alphabet, the letter\r\nL or the first letter of the most beautiful tree?\" etc.; or\r\n\"which is less, 15 or 20 \u003ci\u003eminus\u003c/i\u003e 8?\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_357_357\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_357_357\"\u003e[357]\u003c/a\u003e etc. etc. etc. Even in\r\nthis series of reactions \u003ci\u003ethe time was much quicker token the\r\nreacter turned his attention in advance towards the answer than\r\nwhen he turned it towards the question\u003c/i\u003e. The shorter reaction-time\r\nwas seldom more than one fifth of a second; the\r\nlonger, from four to eight times as long.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo understand such results, one must bear in mind that\r\nin these experiments the reacter always knew in advance\r\nin a general way the \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e of question which he was to receive,\r\nand consequently the \u003ci\u003esphere within which\u003c/i\u003e his possible\r\nanswer lay.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_358_358\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_358_358\"\u003e[358]\u003c/a\u003e In turning his attention, therefore, from the\r\noutset towards the answer, those brain-processes in him\r\nwhich were connected with this entire \u0027sphere\u0027 were kept\r\nsub-excited, and the question could then discharge with a\r\nminimum amount of lost time that particular answer out of\r\nthe \u0027sphere\u0027 which belonged especially to it. When, on the\r\ncontrary, the attention was kept looking towards the question\r\nexclusively and averted from the possible reply, all\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_434\"\u003e[Pg 434]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis preliminary sub-excitement of motor tracts failed to\r\noccur, and the entire process of answering had to be gone\r\nthrough with \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e the question was heard. No wonder\r\nthat the time was prolonged. It is a beautiful example of\r\nthe summation of stimulations, and of the way in which\r\nexpectant attention, even when not very strongly focalized,\r\nwill prepare the motor centres, and shorten the work which\r\na stimulus has to perform on them, in order to produce a\r\ngiven effect when it comes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE INTIMATE NATURE OF THE ATTENTIVE PROCESS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now a sufficient number of facts to warrant our\r\nconsidering this more recondite question. And two physiological\r\nprocesses, of which we have got a glimpse, immediately\r\nsuggest themselves as possibly forming in combination\r\na complete reply. I mean\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003ci\u003eThe accommodation or adjustment of the sensory organs\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \u003ci\u003eThe anticipatory preparation from within of the ideational\r\ncentres concerned with the object to which the attention is\r\npaid.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The sense-organs and the bodily muscles which favor\r\ntheir exercise are adjusted most energetically in sensorial\r\nattention, whether immediate and reflex, or derived. But\r\nthere are good grounds for believing that even intellectual\r\nattention, attention to the \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of a sensible object, is also\r\naccompanied with some degree of excitement of the sense-organs\r\nto which the object appeals. The preparation of\r\nthe ideational centres exists, on the other hand, wherever\r\nour interest in the object—be it sensible or ideal—is \u003ci\u003ederived\u003c/i\u003e\r\nfrom, or in any way connected with, other interests,\r\nor the presence of other objects, in the mind. It exists as\r\nwell when the attention thus derived is classed as passive\r\nas when it is classed as voluntary. So that on the whole\r\nwe may confidently conclude—since in mature life we never\r\nattend to anything without our interest in it being in some\r\ndegree derived from its connection with other objects—that\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe two processes of sensorial adjustment and ideational preparation\r\nprobably coexist in all our concrete attentive acts.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_435\"\u003e[Pg 435]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe two points must now be proved in more detail.\r\nFirst, as respects the sensorial adjustment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat it is present when we attend to \u003ci\u003esensible\u003c/i\u003e things is\r\nobvious. When we look or listen we accommodate our\r\neyes and ears involuntarily, and we turn our head and body\r\nas well; when we taste or smell we adjust the tongue, lips,\r\nand respiration to the object; in feeling a surface we move\r\nthe palpatory organ in a suitable way; in all these acts, besides\r\nmaking involuntary muscular contractions of a positive\r\nsort, we inhibit others which might interfere with the\r\nresult—we close the eyes in tasting, suspend the respiration\r\nin listening, etc. The result is a more or less massive organic\r\nfeeling that attention is going on. This organic feeling\r\ncomes, in the way described on \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 302\u003c/a\u003e, to be contrasted\r\nwith that of the objects which it accompanies, and\r\nregarded as peculiarly ours, whilst the objects form the not-me.\r\nWe treat it as a sense of our \u003ci\u003eown activity\u003c/i\u003e, although\r\nit comes in to us from our organs after they are accommodated,\r\njust as the feeling of any object does. Any object,\r\nif \u003ci\u003eimmediately\u003c/i\u003e exciting, causes a reflex accommodation of\r\nthe sense-organ, and this has two results—first, the object\u0027s\r\nincrease in clearness; and second, the feeling of activity in\r\nquestion. Both are sensations of an \u0027afferent\u0027 sort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e attention, as we have already seen,\r\n(\u003ca href=\"#Page_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 300\u003c/a\u003e), similar feelings of activity occur. Fechner was the\r\nfirst, I believe, to analyze these feelings, and discriminate\r\nthem from the stronger ones just named. He writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When we transfer the attention from objects of one sense to those\r\nof another, we have an indescribable feeling (though at the same time\r\none perfectly determinate, and reproducible at pleasure), of altered\r\n\u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e or differently localized tension (\u003ci\u003eSpannung\u003c/i\u003e). We feel a strain\r\nforward in the eyes, one directed sidewise in the ears, increasing with\r\nthe degree of our attention, and changing according as we look at an\r\nobject carefully, or listen to something attentively; and we speak accordingly\r\nof \u003ci\u003estraining the attention\u003c/i\u003e. The difference is most plainly\r\nfelt when the attention oscillates rapidly between eye and ear; and the\r\nfeeling localizes itself with most decided difference in regard to the\r\nvarious sense-organs, according as we wish to discriminate a thing delicately\r\nby touch, taste, or smell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But now I have, when I try to vividly recall a picture of memory\r\nor fancy, a feeling perfectly analogous to that which I experience when I\r\nseek to apprehend a thing keenly by eye or ear; and this analogous feeling\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_436\"\u003e[Pg 436]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis very differently localized. While in sharpest possible attention to\r\nreal objects (as well as to after-images) the strain is plainly forwards,\r\nand when the attention changes from one sense to another only alters its\r\ndirection between the several external sense-organs, leaving the rest of\r\nthe head free from strain, the case is different in memory or fancy, for\r\nhere the feeling withdraws entirely from the external sense-organs, and\r\nseems rather to take refuge in that part of the head which the brain\r\nfills; if I wish, for example, to recall a place or person it will arise before\r\nme with vividness, not according as I strain my attention forwards,\r\nbut rather in proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_359_359\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_359_359\"\u003e[359]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn myself the \u0027backward retraction\u0027 which is felt during\r\nattention to ideas of memory, etc., seems to be principally\r\nconstituted by the feeling of an actual rolling outwards and\r\nupwards of the eyeballs, such as occurs in sleep, and is the\r\nexact opposite of their behavior when we look at a physical\r\nthing. I have already spoken of this feeling on \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 300\u003c/a\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_360_360\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_360_360\"\u003e[360]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_437\"\u003e[Pg 437]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eThe reader who doubts the presence of these organic feelings\r\nis requested to read the whole of that passage again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been said, however, that we may attend to an\r\nobject on the periphery of the visual field and yet not\r\naccommodate the eye for it. Teachers thus notice the acts\r\nof children in the school-room at whom they appear not to\r\nbe looking. Women in general train their peripheral visual\r\nattention more than men. This would be an objection to\r\nthe \u003ci\u003einvariable and universal\u003c/i\u003e presence of movements of adjustment\r\nas ingredients of the attentive process. Usually,\r\nas is well known, no object lying in the marginal portions\r\nof the field of vision can catch our attention without at the\r\nsame time \u0027catching our eye\u0027—that is, fatally provoking\r\nsuch movements of rotation and accommodation as will\r\nfocus its image on the fovea, or point of greatest sensibility.\r\nPractice, however, enables us, \u003ci\u003ewith effort\u003c/i\u003e, to attend to a\r\nmarginal object whilst keeping the eyes immovable. The\r\nobject under these circumstances never becomes perfectly\r\ndistinct—the place of its image on the retina makes distinctness\r\nimpossible—but (as anyone can satisfy himself by\r\ntrying) we become more vividly conscious of it than we were\r\nbefore the effort was made. Helmholtz states the fact so\r\nstrikingly that I will quote his observation in full. He was\r\ntrying to combine in a single solid percept pairs of stereoscopic\r\npictures illuminated instantaneously by the electric\r\nspark. The pictures were in a dark box which the spark\r\nfrom time to time lighted up; and, to keep the eyes from\r\nwandering betweenwhiles, a pin-hole was pricked through\r\nthe middle of each picture, through which the light of the\r\nroom came, so that each eye had presented to it during the\r\ndark intervals a single bright point. With parallel optical\r\naxes the points combined into a single image; and the\r\nslightest movement of the eyeballs was betrayed by this\r\nimage at once becoming double. Helmholtz now found\r\nthat simple linear figures could, when the eyes were thus\r\nkept immovable, be perceived as solids at a single flash of\r\nthe spark. But when the figures were complicated photographs,\r\nmany successive flashes were required to grasp\r\ntheir totality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_438\"\u003e[Pg 438]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now it is interesting,\" he says, \"to find that, although we keep\r\nsteadily fixating the pin-holes and never allow their combined image to\r\nbreak into two, we can, nevertheless, before the spark comes, keep our\r\nattention voluntarily turned to any particular portion we please of the\r\ndark field, so as then, when the spark comes, to receive an impression\r\nonly from such parts of the picture as lie in this region. In this respect,\r\nthen, our attention is quite independent of the position and accommodation\r\nof the eyes, and of any known alteration in these organs; and\r\nfree to direct itself by a conscious and voluntary effort upon any selected\r\nportion of a dark and undifferenced field of view. This is one of the\r\nmost important observations for a future theory of attention.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_361_361\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_361_361\"\u003e[361]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHering, however, adds the following detail:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Whilst attending to the marginal object we must always,\" he says,\r\n\"\u003ci\u003eattend at the same time\u003c/i\u003e to the object directly fixated. If even for a\r\nsingle instant we let the latter slip out of our mind, our eye moves\r\ntowards the former, as may be easily recognized by the after-images\r\nproduced, or by the muscular sounds heard. The case is then less\r\nproperly to be called one of translocation, than one of unusually wide\r\n\u003ci\u003edispersion\u003c/i\u003e, of the attention, in which dispersion the largest share still\r\nfalls upon the thing directly looked at,\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_362_362\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_362_362\"\u003e[362]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eand consequently directly accommodated for. Accommodation\r\nexists here, then, as it does elsewhere, and without it\r\nwe should lose a part of our sense of attentive activity. In\r\nfact, the \u003ci\u003estrain\u003c/i\u003e of that activity (which is remarkably great in\r\nthe experiment) is due in part to unusually strong contractions\r\nof the muscles needed to keep the eyeballs still, which\r\nproduce unwonted feelings of pressure in those organs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. But if the peripheral part of the picture in this experiment\r\nbe not physically accommodated for, what is meant\r\nby its sharing our attention? What happens when we\r\n\u0027distribute\u0027 or \u0027disperse\u0027 the latter upon a thing for which\r\nwe remain unwilling to \u0027adjust\u0027? This leads us to that\r\nsecond feature in the process, the \u0027\u003ci\u003eideational preparation\u003c/i\u003e\u0027\r\nof which we spoke. \u003ci\u003eThe effort to attend to the marginal\r\nregion of the picture consists in nothing more nor less than the\r\neffort to form as clear an idea as is possible of what is there\r\nportrayed.\u003c/i\u003e The idea is to come to the help of the sensation\r\nand make it more distinct. It comes with effort, and such\r\na mode of coming is the remaining part of what we know as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_439\"\u003e[Pg 439]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour attention\u0027s \u0027strain\u0027 under the circumstances. Let us\r\nshow how universally present in our acts of attention this\r\nreinforcing imagination, this inward reproduction, this anticipatory\r\nthinking of the thing we attend to, is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must as a matter of course be present when the attention\r\nis of the intellectual variety, for the thing attended to\r\nthen \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e nothing but an idea, an inward reproduction or conception.\r\nIf then we prove ideal construction of the object\r\nto be present in \u003ci\u003esensorial\u003c/i\u003e attention, it will be present everywhere.\r\nWhen, however, sensorial attention is at its height,\r\nit is impossible to tell how much of the percept comes from\r\nwithout and how much from within; but if we find that the\r\n\u003ci\u003epreparation\u003c/i\u003e we make for it always partly consists of the\r\ncreation of an imaginary duplicate of the object in the mind,\r\nwhich shall stand ready to receive the outward impression\r\nas if in a matrix, that will be quite enough to establish the\r\npoint in dispute.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Wundt\u0027s and Exner\u0027s experiments quoted above, the\r\nlying in wait for the impressions, and the preparation to\r\nreact, consist of nothing but the anticipatory imagination\r\nof what the impressions or the reactions are to be. Where\r\nthe stimulus is unknown and the reaction undetermined,\r\ntime is lost, because no stable image can under such circumstances\r\nbe formed in advance. But where both nature\r\nand time of signal and reaction are foretold, so completely\r\ndoes the expectant attention consist in premonitory imagination\r\nthat, as we have seen (\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_273_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eFootnote 273\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 373\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_377\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e377\u003c/a\u003e), it may\r\nmimic the intensity of reality, or at any rate produce\r\nreality\u0027s motor effects. It is impossible to read Wundt\u0027s\r\nand Exner\u0027s pages of description and not to interpret the\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eApperception\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 and \u0027\u003ci\u003eSpannung\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 and other terms as equivalents\r\nof \u003ci\u003eimagination\u003c/i\u003e. With Wundt, in particular, the word\r\n\u003ci\u003eApperception\u003c/i\u003e (which he sets great store by) is quite interchangeable\r\nwith both imagination and attention. All three\r\nare names for the excitement from within of ideational\r\nbrain-centres, for which Mr. Lewes\u0027s name of \u003ci\u003epreperception\u003c/i\u003e\r\nseems the best possible designation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the impression to be caught is very weak, the\r\nway not to miss it is to sharpen our attention for it by preliminary\r\ncontact with it in a stronger form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_440\"\u003e[Pg 440]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If we wish to begin to observe overtones, it is advisable, just\r\nbefore the sound which is to be analyzed, to sound very softly the note\r\nof which we are in search…. The piano and harmonium are well\r\nfitted for this use, as both give overtones that are strong. Strike upon\r\nthe piano first the \u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e [of a certain musical example previously given in\r\nthe text]; then, when its vibrations have objectively ceased, strike\r\npowerfully the note \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, in whose sound \u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e is the third overtone, and keep\r\nyour attention steadily bent upon the pitch of the just heard \u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e; you\r\nwill now hear this tone sounding in the midst of the \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e…. If you\r\nplace the resonator which corresponds to a certain overtone, for example\r\n\u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e of the sound \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, against your ear, and then make the note \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsound, you will hear \u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e much strengthened by the resonator…. This\r\nstrengthening by the resonator can be used to make the naked ear\r\nattentive to the sound which it is to catch. For when the resonator\r\nis gradually removed, the \u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e grows weaker; but the attention, once\r\ndirected to it, holds it now more easily fast, and the observer hears the\r\ntone \u003ci\u003eg\u0027\u003c/i\u003e now in the natural unaltered sound of the note with his unaided\r\near.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_363_363\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_363_363\"\u003e[363]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt, commenting on experiences of this sort, says\r\nthat\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"on carefully observing, one will always find that one tries first to\r\nrecall the image in memory of the tone to be heard, and that then one\r\nhears it in the total sound. The same thing is to be noticed in weak or\r\nfugitive visual impressions. Illuminate a drawing by electric sparks\r\nseparated by considerable intervals, and after the first, and often after\r\nthe second and third spark, hardly anything will be recognized. But\r\nthe confused image is held fast in memory; each successive illumination\r\ncompletes it; and so at last we attain to a clearer perception. The\r\nprimary motive to this inward activity proceeds usually from the outer\r\nimpression itself. We hear a sound in which, from certain associations,\r\nwe suspect a certain overtone; the next thing is to recall the overtone\r\nin memory; and finally we catch it in the sound we hear. Or perhaps\r\nwe see some mineral substance we have met before; the impression\r\nawakens the memory-image, which again more or less completely melts\r\nwith the impression itself. In this way every idea takes a certain time\r\nto penetrate to the focus of consciousness. And during this time we\r\nalways find in ourselves the peculiar \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e of attention…. The\r\nphenomena show that an \u003ci\u003eadaptation\u003c/i\u003e of attention to the impression takes\r\nplace. The surprise which unexpected impressions give us is due essentially\r\nto the fact that our attention, at the moment when the impression\r\noccurs, is not accommodated for it. The accommodation itself is of the\r\ndouble sort, relating as it does to the intensity as well as to the quality\r\nof the stimulus. Different qualities of impression require disparate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_441\"\u003e[Pg 441]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadaptations. And we remark that our feeling of the \u003ci\u003estrain\u003c/i\u003e of our\r\ninward attentiveness increases with every increase in the strength of\r\nthe impressions on whose perception we are intent.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_364_364\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_364_364\"\u003e[364]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe natural way of conceiving all this is under the symbolic\r\nform of a brain-cell played upon from two directions.\r\nWhilst the object excites it from without, other brain-cells,\r\nor perhaps spiritual forces, arouse it from within. The latter\r\ninfluence is the \u0027adaptation of the attention.\u0027 \u003ci\u003eThe plenary\r\nenergy of the brain-cell demands the co-operation of both factors:\u003c/i\u003e\r\nnot when merely present, but when both present and\r\nattended to, is the object fully perceived.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA few additional experiences will now be perfectly clear.\r\nHelmholtz, for instance, adds this observation to the passage\r\nwe quoted a while ago concerning the stereoscopic\r\npictures lit by the electric spark.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"These experiments,\" he says, \"are interesting as regards the part\r\nwhich attention plays in the matter of double images…. For in\r\npictures so simple that it is relatively difficult for me to see them double,\r\nI can succeed in seeing them double, even when the illumination is only\r\ninstantaneous, the moment I strive to \u003ci\u003eimagine in a lively way how\r\nthey ought then to look\u003c/i\u003e. The influence of attention is here pure; for\r\nall eye movements are shut out.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_365_365\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_365_365\"\u003e[365]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn another place\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_366_366\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_366_366\"\u003e[366]\u003c/a\u003e the same writer says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When I have before my eyes a pair of stereoscopic drawings which\r\nare hard to combine, it is difficult to bring the lines and points that\r\ncorrespond, to cover each other, and with every little motion of the eyes\r\nthey glide apart. \u003ci\u003eBut if I chance to gain a lively mental image (Anschauungsbild)\r\nof the represented solid form\u003c/i\u003e (a thing that often occurs\r\nby lucky chance), I then move my two eyes with perfect certainty over\r\nthe figure without the picture separating again.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, writing of retinal rivalry, Helmholtz says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is not a trial of strength between two sensations, but depends\r\non our fixing or failing to fix the attention. Indeed, there is scarcely\r\nany phenomenon so well fitted for the study of the causes which are\r\ncapable of determining the attention. It is not enough to form the\r\nconscious intention of seeing first with one eye and then with the other;\r\n\u003ci\u003ewe must form as clear a notion as possible of what we expect to see.\r\nThen it will actually appear\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_367_367\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_367_367\"\u003e[367]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_442\"\u003e[Pg 442]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn figures 37 and 38, where the result is ambiguous,\r\nwe can make the change from one apparent form to\r\nthe other by imagining strongly in advance the form we\r\nwish to see. Similarly in those puzzles where certain lines\r\nin a picture form by their combination an object that has\r\nno connection with what the picture ostensibly represents;\r\nor indeed in every case where an object is inconspicuous\r\nand hard to discern from the background; we may not be\r\nable to see it for a long time; but, having once seen it, we\r\ncan attend to it again whenever we like, on account of the\r\nmental duplicate of it which our imagination now bears. In\r\nthe meaningless French words \u0027\u003ci\u003epas de lieu Rhône que nous\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027\r\nwho can recognize immediately the English \u0027paddle your\r\nown canoe\u0027?\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_368_368\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_368_368\"\u003e[368]\u003c/a\u003e But who that has once noticed the identity\r\ncan fail to have it arrest his attention again? When watching\r\nfor the distant clock to strike, our mind is so filled with\r\nits image that at every moment we think we hear the longed-for\r\nor dreaded sound. So of an awaited footstep. Every\r\nstir in the wood is for the hunter his game; for the fugitive\r\nhis pursuers. Every bonnet in the street is momentarily\r\ntaken by the lover to enshroud the head of his idol.\r\nThe image in the mind \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the attention; the \u003ci\u003epreperception\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nas Mr. Lewes calls it, is half of the perception of the looked-for\r\nthing.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_369_369\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_369_369\"\u003e[369]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 375px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-442-0036.jpg\" style=\"width: 375px\" id=\"img_images_jame_442_0036.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFigs.\u003c/span\u003e 37 \u0026amp; 38.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_443\"\u003e[Pg 443]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is for this reason that men have no eyes but for those\r\naspects of things which they have already been taught to\r\ndiscern. Any one of us can notice a phenomenon after it\r\nhas once been pointed out, which not one in ten thousand\r\ncould ever have discovered for himself. Even in poetry\r\nand the arts, some one has to come and tell us what aspects\r\nwe may single out, and what effects we may admire, before\r\nour æsthetic nature can \u0027dilate\u0027 to its full extent and never\r\n\u0027with the wrong emotion.\u0027 In kindergarten instruction one\r\nof the exercises is to make the children see how many\r\nfeatures they can point out in such an object as a flower or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_444\"\u003e[Pg 444]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na stuffed bird. They readily name the features they know\r\nalready, such as leaves, tail, bill, feet. But they may look\r\nfor hours without distinguishing nostrils, claws, scales, etc.,\r\nuntil their attention is called to these details; thereafter,\r\nhowever, they see them every time. In short, \u003ci\u003ethe only\r\nthings which we commonly see are those which we preperceive\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nand the only things which we preperceive are those which\r\nhave been labelled for us, and the labels stamped into our\r\nmind. If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually\r\nlost in the midst of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOrganic adjustment, then, and ideational preparation or\r\npreperception are concerned in all attentive acts. An interesting\r\ntheory is defended by no less authorities than Professors\r\nBain\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_370_370\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_370_370\"\u003e[370]\u003c/a\u003e and Ribot,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_371_371\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_371_371\"\u003e[371]\u003c/a\u003e and still more ably advocated by Mr. N.\r\nLange,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_372_372\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_372_372\"\u003e[372]\u003c/a\u003e who will have it that the ideational preparation\r\nitself is a consequence of muscular adjustment, so that the\r\nlatter may be called the essence of the attentive process\r\nthroughout. This at least is what the theory of these\r\nauthors practically amounts to, though the former two do\r\nnot state it in just these terms. The proof consists in the\r\nexhibition of cases of intellectual attention which organic\r\nadjustment accompanies, or of objects in thinking which we\r\nhave to execute a movement. Thus Lange says that when\r\nhe tries to imagine a certain colored circle, he finds himself\r\nfirst making with his eyes the movement to which the circle\r\ncorresponds, and \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e imagining the color, etc., as a consequence\r\nof the movement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Let my reader,\" he adds, \"close his eyes and think of an extended\r\nobject, for instance a \u003ci\u003epencil\u003c/i\u003e. He will easily notice that he first makes\r\na slight movement [of the eyes] corresponding to the straight line, and\r\nthat he often gets a weak feeling of innervation of the hand as if touching\r\nthe pencil\u0027s surface. So, in thinking of a certain sound, we turn\r\ntowards its direction or repeat muscularly its rhythm, or articulate an\r\nimitation of it.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_373_373\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_373_373\"\u003e[373]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_445\"\u003e[Pg 445]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is one thing to point out the presence of muscular\r\ncontractions as constant concomitants of our thoughts,\r\nand another thing to say, with Herr Lange, that thought is\r\n\u003ci\u003emade possible\u003c/i\u003e by muscular contraction alone. It may well\r\nbe that where the object of thought consists of two parts,\r\none perceived by movement and another not, the part perceived\r\nby movement is habitually called up first and fixed\r\nin the mind by the movement\u0027s execution, whilst the other\r\npart comes secondarily as the movement\u0027s mere associate.\r\nBut even were this the rule with all men (which I doubt\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_374_374\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_374_374\"\u003e[374]\u003c/a\u003e),\r\nit would only be a practical habit, not an ultimate necessity.\r\nIn the chapter on the Will we shall learn that movements\r\nthemselves are results of images coming before the mind,\r\nimages sometimes of feelings in the moving part, sometimes\r\nof the movement\u0027s effects on eye and ear, and sometimes\r\n(if the movement be originally reflex or instinctive),\r\nof its natural stimulus or exciting cause. It is, in truth,\r\ncontrary to all wider and deeper analogies to deny that any\r\nquality of feeling whatever can directly rise up in the form\r\nof an idea, and to assert that only ideas of movement can\r\ncall other ideas to the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for adjustment and preperception. The only\r\nthird process I can think of as always present is the inhibition\r\nof irrelevant movements and ideas. This seems, however,\r\nto be a feature incidental to voluntary attention rather\r\nthan the essential feature of attention at large,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_375_375\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_375_375\"\u003e[375]\u003c/a\u003e and need\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_446\"\u003e[Pg 446]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot concern us particularly now. Noting merely the intimate\r\nconnection which our account so far establishes between\r\nattention, on the one hand, and imagination, discrimination,\r\nand memory, on the other, let us draw a couple of\r\npractical inferences, and then pass to the more speculative\r\nproblem that remains.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe practical inferences are pedagogic. First, \u003ci\u003eto\r\nstrengthen attention in children\u003c/i\u003e who care nothing for the subject\r\nthey are studying and let their wits go wool-gathering.\r\nThe interest here must be \u0027derived\u0027 from something that\r\nthe teacher associates with the task, a reward or a punishment\r\nif nothing less external comes to mind. Prof. Ribot\r\nsays:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A child refuses to read; he is incapable of keeping his mind fixed\r\non the letters, which have no attraction for him; but he looks with avidity\r\nupon the pictures contained in a book. \u0027What do they mean?\u0027 he\r\nasks. The father replies: \u0027When you can read, the book will tell you.\u0027\r\nAfter several colloquies like this, the child resigns himself and falls to\r\nwork, first slackly, then the habit grows, and finally he shows an ardor\r\nwhich has to be restrained. This is a case of the genesis of voluntary\r\nattention. An artificial and indirect desire has to be grafted on a natural\r\nand direct one. Reading has no immediate attractiveness, but it\r\nhas a borrowed one, and that is enough. The child is caught in the\r\nwheelwork, the first step is made.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI take another example, from M. B. Perez:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_376_376\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_376_376\"\u003e[376]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A child of six years, habitually prone to mind-wandering, sat\r\ndown one day to the piano of his own accord to repeat an air by which\r\nhis mother had been charmed. His exercises lasted an hour. The\r\nsame child at the age of seven, seeing his brother busy with tasks in\r\nvacation, went and sat at his father\u0027s desk. \u0027What are you doing there?\u0027\r\nhis nurse said, surprised at so finding him. \u0027I am,\u0027 said the child,\r\n\u0027learning a page of German; it isn\u0027t very amusing, but it is for an\r\nagreeable surprise to mamma.\u0027\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere, again, a birth of voluntary attention, grafted this\r\ntime on a sympathetic instead of a selfish sentiment like\r\nthat of the first example. The piano, the German, awaken\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_447\"\u003e[Pg 447]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno spontaneous attention; but they arouse and maintain it\r\nby borrowing a force from elsewhere.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_377_377\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_377_377\"\u003e[377]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, take that mind-wandering which at a later age\r\nmay trouble us \u003ci\u003ewhilst reading or listening to a discourse\u003c/i\u003e. If\r\nattention be the reproduction of the sensation from within,\r\nthe habit of reading not merely with the eye, and of listening\r\nnot merely with the ear, but of articulating to one\u0027s self\r\nthe words seen or heard, ought to deepen one\u0027s attention to\r\nthe latter. Experience shows that this is the case. I can\r\nkeep my wandering mind a great deal more closely upon a\r\nconversation or a lecture if I actively re-echo to myself the\r\nwords than if I simply hear them; and I find a number of\r\nmy students who report benefit from voluntarily adopting\r\na similar course.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_378_378\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_378_378\"\u003e[378]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, \u003ci\u003ea teacher who wishes to engage the attention of his\r\nclass must knit his novelties on to things of which they already\r\nhave preperceptions\u003c/i\u003e. The old and familiar is readily attended\r\nto by the mind and helps to hold in turn the new,\r\nforming, in Herbartian phraseology, an \u0027\u003ci\u003eApperceptionsmasse\u003c/i\u003e\u0027\r\nfor it. Of course it is in every case a very delicate\r\nproblem to know what \u0027Apperceptionsmasse\u0027 to use.\r\nPsychology can only lay down the general rule.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIS VOLUNTARY ATTENTION A RESULTANT OR A FORCE?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen, a few pages back, I symbolized the \u0027ideational\r\npreparation\u0027 element in attention by a brain-cell played\r\nupon from within, I added \u0027by other brain-cells, or by\r\nsome spiritual force,\u0027 without deciding which. The question\r\n\u0027which?\u0027 is one of those central psychologic mysteries\r\nwhich part the schools. When we reflect that the\r\nturnings of our attention form the nucleus of our inner\r\nself; when we see (as in the chapter on the Will we\r\nshall see) that volition is nothing but attention; when we\r\nbelieve that our autonomy in the midst of nature depends\r\non our not being pure effect, but a cause,—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ePrincipium quoddam quod fati fœdera rumpat,\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eEx infinito ne causant causa sequatur—\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_448\"\u003e[Pg 448]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ewe must admit that the question whether attention involve\r\nsuch a principle of spiritual activity or not is metaphysical\r\nas well as psychological, and is well worthy of all the pains\r\nwe can bestow on its solution. It is in fact the pivotal\r\nquestion of metaphysics, the very hinge on which our\r\npicture of the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism,\r\nmonism, towards spiritualism, freedom, pluralism,—or else\r\nthe other way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt goes back to the automaton-theory. If feeling is an\r\ninert accompaniment, then of course the brain-cell can be\r\nplayed upon only by other brain-cells, and the attention\r\nwhich we give at any time to any subject, whether in the\r\nform of sensory adaptation or of \u0027preperception,\u0027 is the\r\nfatally predetermined \u003ci\u003eeffect\u003c/i\u003e of exclusively material laws.\r\nIf, on the other hand, the feeling which coexists with the\r\nbrain-cells\u0027 activity reacts dynamically upon that activity,\r\nfurthering or checking it, then the attention is in part, at\r\nleast, a \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e. It does not necessarily follow, of course,\r\nthat this reactive feeling should be \u0027free\u0027 in the sense of\r\nhaving its amount and direction undetermined in advance,\r\nfor it might very well be predetermined in all these particulars.\r\nIf it were so, our attention would not be \u003ci\u003ematerially\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndetermined, nor yet would it be \u0027free\u0027 in the\r\nsense of being spontaneous or unpredictable in advance.\r\nThe question is of course a purely speculative one, for we\r\nhave no means of objectively ascertaining whether our feelings\r\nreact on our nerve-processes or not; and those who\r\nanswer the question in either way do so in consequence\r\nof general analogies and presumptions drawn from other\r\nfields. As mere \u003ci\u003econceptions\u003c/i\u003e, the effect-theory and the cause-theory\r\nof attention are equally clear; and whoever affirms\r\neither conception to be true must do so on metaphysical or\r\nuniversal rather than on scientific or particular grounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs regards \u003ci\u003eimmediate sensorial attention\u003c/i\u003e hardly any one\r\nis tempted to regard it as anything but an effect.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_379_379\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_379_379\"\u003e[379]\u003c/a\u003e We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_449\"\u003e[Pg 449]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare \u0027evolved\u0027 so as to respond to special stimuli by special\r\naccommodative acts which produce clear perceptions on\r\nthe one hand in us, and on the other hand such feelings of\r\ninner activity as were above described. The accommodation\r\nand the resultant feeling \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e the attention. We don\u0027t\r\nbestow it, the object draws it from us. The object has the\r\ninitiative, not the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eDerived attention, where there is no voluntary effort, seems\r\nalso most plausibly to be a mere effect.\u003c/i\u003e The object again\r\ntakes the initiative and draws our attention to itself, not\r\nby reason of its own intrinsic interest, but because it is\r\nconnected with some other interesting thing. Its brain-process\r\nis connected with another that is either excited, or\r\ntending to be excited, and the liability to share the excitement\r\nand become aroused is the liability to \u0027preperception\u0027\r\nin which the attention consists. If I have received an\r\ninsult, I may not be actively thinking of it all the time, yet\r\nthe thought of it is in such a state of heightened irritability,\r\nthat the place where I received it or the man who\r\ninflicted it cannot be mentioned in my hearing without my\r\nattention bounding, as it were, in that direction, as the imagination\r\nof the whole transaction revives. Where such a\r\nstirring-up occurs, organic adjustment must exist as well,\r\nand the ideas must innervate to some degree the muscles.\r\nThus the whole process of involuntary derived attention is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_450\"\u003e[Pg 450]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\naccounted for if we grant that there is something interesting\r\nenough to arouse and fix the thought of whatever may\r\nbe connected with it. This fixing \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the attention; and it\r\ncarries with it a vague sense of activity going on, and of\r\nacquiescence, furtherance, and adoption, which makes us\r\nfeel the activity to be our own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis reinforcement of ideas and impressions by the pre-existing\r\ncontents of the mind was what Herbart had in\r\nmind when he gave the name of \u003ci\u003eapperceptive\u003c/i\u003e attention to the\r\nvariety we describe. We easily see now why the lover\u0027s tap\r\nshould be heard—it finds a nerve-centre half ready in advance\r\nto explode. We see how we can attend to a companion\u0027s\r\nvoice in the midst of noises which pass unnoticed\r\nthough objectively much louder than the words we hear.\r\nEach word is \u003ci\u003edoubly\u003c/i\u003e awakened; once from without by the\r\nlips of the talker, but already before that from within by\r\nthe premonitory processes irradiating from the previous\r\nwords, and by the dim arousal of all processes that are\r\nconnected with the \u0027topic\u0027 of the talk. The irrelevant\r\nnoises, on the other hand, are awakened only once. They\r\nform an unconnected train. The boys at school, inattentive\r\nto the teacher except when he begins an anecdote, and\r\nthen all pricking up their ears, are as easily explained.\r\nThe words of the anecdote shoot into association with exciting\r\nobjects which react and fix them; the other words do\r\nnot. Similarly with the grammar heard by the purist and\r\nHerbart\u0027s other examples quoted on \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 418\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven where the attention is voluntary, it is possible to\r\nconceive of it as an effect, and not a cause, a product and\r\nnot an agent. The things we attend to \u003ci\u003ecome to us\u003c/i\u003e by their\r\nown laws. Attention \u003ci\u003ecreates\u003c/i\u003e no idea; an idea must already\r\nbe there before we can attend to it. Attention only fixes\r\nand retains what the ordinary laws of association bring \u0027before\r\nthe footlights\u0027 of consciousness. But the moment we\r\nadmit this we see that the attention \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, the \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e of attending\r\nneed no more fix and retain the ideas than it need\r\nbring them. The associates which bring them also fix them\r\nby the interest which they lend. In short, voluntary and\r\ninvoluntary attention may be essentially the same. It is\r\ntrue that where the ideas are intrinsically very unwelcome\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_451\"\u003e[Pg 451]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the effort to attend to them is great, it seems to us as\r\nif the frequent renewal of the effort were the very cause by\r\nwhich they are held fast, and we naturally think of the effort\r\nas an original force. In fact it is only to the \u003ci\u003eeffort to\r\nattend\u003c/i\u003e, not to the mere \u003ci\u003eattending\u003c/i\u003e, that we are seriously\r\ntempted to ascribe spontaneous power. We think we can\r\nmake more of it \u003ci\u003eif we will\u003c/i\u003e; and the amount which we make\r\ndoes not seem a fixed function of the ideas themselves, as\r\nit would necessarily have to be if our effort were an effect\r\nand not a spiritual force. But even here it is possible to\r\nconceive the facts mechanically and to regard the effort as\r\na mere effect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEffort is felt only where there is a conflict of interests\r\nin the mind. The idea A may be intrinsically exciting to\r\nus. The idea Z may derive its interest from association\r\nwith some remoter good. A may be our sweetheart, Z\r\nmay be some condition of our soul\u0027s salvation. Under\r\nthese circumstances, if we succeed in attending to Z at all it\r\nis always with expenditure of effort. The \u0027ideational preparation,\u0027\r\nthe \u0027preperception\u0027 of A keeps going on of its own\r\naccord, whilst that of Z needs incessant pulses of voluntary\r\nreinforcement—that is, we have the \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e of voluntary reinforcement\r\n(or effort) at each successive moment in which\r\nthe thought of Z flares brightly up in our mind. Dynamically,\r\nhowever, that may mean only this: that the associative\r\nprocesses which make Z triumph are really the\r\nstronger, and in A\u0027s absence would make us give a \u0027passive\u0027\r\nand unimpeded attention to Z; but, so long as A is present,\r\nsome of of their force is used to inhibit the processes concerned\r\nwith A. Such inhibition is a partial neutralization\r\nof the brain-energy which would otherwise be available\r\nfor fluent thought. But what is lost for thought is converted\r\ninto feeling, in this case into the peculiar feeling of\r\neffort, difficulty, or strain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe stream of our thought is like a river. On the\r\nwhole easy simple flowing predominates in it, the drift of\r\nthings is with the pull of gravity, and effortless attention\r\nis the rule. But at intervals an obstruction, a set-back, a\r\nlog-jam occurs, stops the current, creates an eddy, and\r\nmakes things temporarily move the other way. If a real\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_452\"\u003e[Pg 452]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nriver could feel, it would feel these eddies and set-backs as\r\nplaces of effort. \"I am here flowing,\" it would say, \"in the\r\ndirection of greatest resistance, instead of flowing, as usual,\r\nin the direction of least. My effort is what enables me to perform\r\nthis feat.\" Really, the effort would only be a passive index\r\nthat the feat was being performed. The agent would all\r\nthe while be the total downward drift of the rest of the water,\r\nforcing \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e of it upwards in this spot; and although, \u003ci\u003eon\r\nthe average\u003c/i\u003e, the direction of least resistance is downwards,\r\nthat would be no reason for its not being upwards now\r\nand then. Just so with our voluntary acts of attention.\r\nThey are momentary arrests, coupled with a peculiar feeling,\r\nof portions of the stream. But the arresting force,\r\ninstead of being this peculiar feeling itself, may be nothing\r\nbut the processes by which the collision is produced. The\r\nfeeling of effort may be \u0027an accompaniment,\u0027 as Mr. Bradley\r\nsays, \u0027more or less superfluous,\u0027 and no more contribute\r\nto the result than the pain in a man\u0027s finger, when a hammer\r\nfalls on it, contributes to the hammer\u0027s weight. Thus\r\nthe notion that our effort in attending is an original faculty,\r\na force additional to the others of which brain and mind\r\nare the seat, may be an abject superstition. Attention may\r\nhave to go, like many a faculty once deemed essential, like\r\nmany a verbal phantom, like many an idol of the tribe. It\r\nmay be an excrescence on Psychology. No need of it to\r\ndrag ideas before consciousness or fix them, when we see\r\nhow perfectly they drag and fix each other there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have stated the effect-theory as persuasively as I can.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_380_380\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_380_380\"\u003e[380]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt is a clear, strong, well-equipped conception, and like all\r\nsuch, is fitted to carry conviction, where there is no contrary\r\nproof. The feeling of effort certainly \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be an inert\r\naccompaniment and not the active element which it seems.\r\nNo measurements are as yet performed (it is safe to say\r\nnone ever will be performed) which can show that it contributes\r\nenergy to the result. We \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e then regard attention\r\nas a superfluity, or a \u0027Luxus,\u0027 and dogmatize against\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_453\"\u003e[Pg 453]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits causal function with no feeling in our hearts but one of\r\npride that we are applying Occam\u0027s razor to an entity that\r\nhas multiplied itself \u0027beyond necessity.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut Occam\u0027s razor, though a very good rule of method,\r\nis certainly no law of nature. The laws of stimulation and\r\nof association may well be indispensable actors in all attention\u0027s\r\nperformances, and may even be a good enough\r\n\u0027stock-company\u0027 to carry on many performances without\r\naid; and yet they \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e at times simply form the background\r\nfor a \u0027star-performer,\u0027 who is no more their \u0027inert accompaniment\u0027\r\nor their \u0027incidental product\u0027 than Hamlet is\r\nHoratio\u0027s and Ophelia\u0027s. Such a star-performer would be\r\nthe voluntary effort to attend, if it were an original psychic\r\nforce. Nature \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e, I say, indulge in these complications;\r\nand the conception that she has done so in this case is, I\r\nthink, just as clear (if not as \u0027parsimonious\u0027 logically) as the\r\nconception that she has not. To justify this assertion, \u003ci\u003elet\r\nus ask just what the effort to attend would effect if it were an\r\noriginal force\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt would deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness\r\nof innumerable ideas which else would fade more quickly\r\naway. The delay thus gained might not be more than a\r\nsecond in duration—but that second might be \u003ci\u003ecritical\u003c/i\u003e; for\r\nin the constant rising and falling of considerations in the\r\nmind, where two associated systems of them are nearly in\r\nequilibrium it is often a matter of but a second more or less\r\nof attention at the outset, whether one system shall gain\r\nforce to occupy the field and develop itself, and exclude\r\nthe other, or be excluded itself by the other. When developed,\r\nit may make us act; and that act may seal our doom.\r\nWhen we come to the chapter on the Will, we shall see that\r\nthe whole drama of the voluntary life hinges on the amount\r\nof attention, slightly more or slightly less, which rival\r\nmotor ideas may receive. But the whole feeling of reality,\r\nthe whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends\r\non our sense that in it things are \u003ci\u003ereally being decided\u003c/i\u003e from\r\none moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling\r\noff of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago. This\r\nappearance, which makes life and history tingle with such\r\na tragic zest, \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e not be an illusion. As we grant to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_454\"\u003e[Pg 454]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe advocate of the mechanical theory that it may be one,\r\nso he must grant to us that it may \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e. And the result is\r\ntwo conceptions of possibility face to face with no facts\r\ndefinitely enough known to stand as arbiter between them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder these circumstances, one can leave the question\r\nopen whilst waiting for light, or one can do what most speculative\r\nminds do, that is, look to one\u0027s general philosophy\r\nto incline the beam. The believers in mechanism do so\r\nwithout hesitation, and they ought not to refuse a similar\r\nprivilege to the believers in a spiritual force. I count myself\r\namong the latter, but as my reasons are ethical they\r\nare hardly suited for introduction into a psychological\r\nwork.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_381_381\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_381_381\"\u003e[381]\u003c/a\u003e The last word of psychology here is ignorance, for\r\nthe \u0027forces\u0027 engaged are certainly too delicate and numerous\r\nto be followed in detail. Meanwhile, in view of the strange\r\narrogance with which the wildest materialistic speculations\r\npersist in calling themselves \u0027science,\u0027 it is well to recall\r\njust what the reasoning is, by which the effect-theory of\r\nattention is confirmed. It is an argument from analogy,\r\ndrawn from rivers, reflex actions and other material phenomena\r\nwhere no consciousness \u003ci\u003eappears\u003c/i\u003e to exist at all, and\r\nextended to cases where consciousness seems the phenomenon\u0027s\r\nessential feature. \u003ci\u003eThe consciousness doesn\u0027t count,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthese reasoners say; it doesn\u0027t exist for science, it is \u003ci\u003enil\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nyou mustn\u0027t think about it at all. The intensely reckless\r\ncharacter of all this needs no comment. It is making the mechanical\r\ntheory true \u003ci\u003eper fas aut nefas\u003c/i\u003e. For the sake of that\r\ntheory we make inductions from phenomena to others that\r\nare startlingly \u003ci\u003eunlike\u003c/i\u003e them; and we assume that a complication\r\nwhich Nature has introduced (the presence of feeling\r\nand of effort, namely) is not worthy of scientific recognition\r\nat all. Such conduct may conceivably be \u003ci\u003ewise\u003c/i\u003e, though I\r\ndoubt it; but scientific, as contrasted with metaphysical,\r\nit cannot seriously be called.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_382_382\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_382_382\"\u003e[382]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_455\"\u003e[Pg 455]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eINATTENTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving spoken fully of attention, let me add a word\r\nabout \u003ci\u003einattention\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe do not notice the ticking of the clock, the noise of\r\nthe city streets, or the roaring of the brook near the\r\nhouse; and even the din of a foundry or factory will\r\nnot mingle with the thoughts of its workers, if they have\r\nbeen there long enough. When we first put on spectacles,\r\nespecially if they be of certain curvatures, the bright reflections\r\nthey give of the windows, etc., mixing with the field\r\nof view, are very disturbing. In a few days we ignore them\r\naltogether. Various entoptic images, \u003ci\u003emuscæ volitantes\u003c/i\u003e, etc.,\r\nalthough constantly present, are hardly ever known. The\r\npressure of our clothes and shoes, the beating of our hearts\r\nand arteries, our breathing, certain steadfast bodily pains,\r\nhabitual odors, tastes in the mouth, etc., are examples from\r\nother senses, of the same lapse into unconsciousness of any\r\ntoo unchanging content—a lapse which Hobbes has expressed\r\nin the well-known phrase, \"\u003ci\u003eSemper idem sentire\r\nac non sentire ad idem revertunt\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe cause of the unconsciousness is certainly not the\r\nmere blunting of the sense-organs. Were the sensation\r\nimportant, we should notice it well enough; and we can at\r\nany moment notice it by expressly throwing our attention\r\nupon it,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_383_383\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_383_383\"\u003e[383]\u003c/a\u003e provided it have not become so inveterate that inattention\r\nto it is ingrained in our very constitution, as in the\r\ncase of the \u003ci\u003emuscæ volitantes\u003c/i\u003e the double retinal images, etc.\r\nBut even in these cases artificial conditions of observation\r\nand patience soon give us command of the impression\r\nwhich we seek. The inattentiveness must then be a habit\r\ngrounded on higher conditions than mere sensorial fatigue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_456\"\u003e[Pg 456]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHelmholtz has formulated a general law of inattention\r\nwhich we shall have to study in the next chapter but\r\none. Helmholtz\u0027s law is that we leave all impressions unnoticed\r\nwhich are valueless to us as signs by which to \u003ci\u003ediscriminate\r\nthings\u003c/i\u003e. At most such impressions fuse with their\r\nconsorts into an aggregate effect. The upper partial tones\r\nwhich make human voices differ make them differ as wholes\r\nonly—we cannot dissociate the tones themselves. The\r\nodors which form integral parts of the characteristic taste\r\nof certain substances, meat, fish, cheese, butter, wine, do\r\nnot come as odors to our attention. The various muscular\r\nand tactile feelings that make up the perception of the\r\nattributes \u0027wet,\u0027 \u0027elastic,\u0027 \u0027doughy,\u0027 etc., are not singled out\r\nseparately for what they are. And all this is due to an inveterate\r\nhabit we have contracted, of passing from them\r\nimmediately to their import and letting their substantive\r\nnature alone. They have formed connections in the mind\r\nwhich it is now difficult to break; they are constituents of\r\nprocesses which it is hard to arrest, and which differ altogether\r\nfrom what the processes of catching the attention\r\nwould be. In the cases Helmholtz has in mind, not only\r\nwe but our ancestors have formed these habits. In the\r\ncases we started from, however, of the mill-wheel, the\r\nspectacles, the factory din, the tight shoes, etc., the habits\r\nof inattention are more recent, and the manner of their\r\ngenesis seems susceptible, hypothetically at least, of being\r\ntraced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e impressions that are not needed by the intellect\r\nbe thus shunted off from all relation to the rest of\r\nconsciousness? Professor G. E. Müller has made a plausible\r\nreply to this question, and most of what follows is\r\nborrowed from him.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_384_384\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_384_384\"\u003e[384]\u003c/a\u003e He begins with the fact that\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When we first come out of a mill or factory, in which we have remained\r\nlong enough to get wonted to the noise, we feel as if something\r\nwere \u003ci\u003elacking\u003c/i\u003e. Our total feeling of existence is different from what it\r\nwas when we were in the mill…. A friend writes to me: \u0027I have in\r\nmy room a little clock which does not run quite twenty-four hours without\r\nwinding. In consequence of this, it often stops. So soon as this\r\nhappens, I notice it, whereas I naturally fail to notice it when going.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_457\"\u003e[Pg 457]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhen this first began to happen, there was this modification: I suddenly\r\nfelt an undefined uneasiness or sort of void, without being able to\r\nsay what was the matter; and only after some consideration did I find\r\nthe cause in the stopping of the clock.\u0027\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat the stopping of an unfelt stimulus may itself be\r\nfelt is a well-known fact: the sleeper in church who wakes\r\nwhen the sermon ends; the miller who does the same when\r\nhis wheel stands still, are stock examples. Now (since\r\nevery impression falling on the nervous system must propagate\r\nitself somewhither), Müller suggests that impressions\r\nwhich come to us when the thought-centres are preoccupied\r\nwith other matters may thereby be blocked or inhibited\r\nfrom invading these centres, and may then overflow into\r\nlower paths of discharge. And he farther suggests that if\r\nthis process recur often enough, the side-track thus created\r\nwill grow so permeable as to be used, no matter what may\r\nbe going on in the centres above. In the acquired inattention\r\nmentioned, the constant stimulus always caused\r\ndisturbance \u003ci\u003eat first\u003c/i\u003e; and consciousness of it was extruded\r\nsuccessfully only when the brain was \u003ci\u003estrongly excited\u003c/i\u003e about\r\nother things. Gradually the extrusion became easier, and\r\nat last automatic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe side-tracks which thus learn to draft off the stimulations\r\nthat interfere with thought cannot be assigned with\r\nany precision. They probably terminate in organic processes,\r\nor insignificant muscular contractions which, when\r\nstopped by the cessation of their instigating cause, immediately\r\ngive us the feeling that something is gone from our\r\nexistence (as Müller says), or (as his friend puts it) the feeling\r\nof a void.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_385_385\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_385_385\"\u003e[385]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMüller\u0027s suggestion awakens another. It is a well-known\r\nfact that persons striving to keep their attention on\r\na difficult subject will resort to movements of various unmeaning\r\nkinds, such as pacing the room, drumming with\r\nthe fingers, playing with keys or watch-chain, scratching\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_458\"\u003e[Pg 458]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhead, pulling mustache, vibrating foot, or what not, according\r\nto the individual. There is an anecdote of Sir W. Scott,\r\nwhen a boy, rising to the head of his class by cutting off\r\nfrom the jacket of the usual head-boy a button which the\r\nlatter was in the habit of twirling in his fingers during the\r\nlesson. The button gone, its owner\u0027s power of reciting\r\nalso departed.—Now much of this activity is unquestionably\r\ndue to the overflow of emotional excitement during anxious\r\nand concentrated thought. It drains away nerve-currents\r\nwhich if pent up within the thought-centres would very\r\nlikely make the confusion there worse confounded. But\r\nmay it not also be a means of drafting off all the irrelevant\r\nsensations of the moment, and so keeping the attention\r\nmore exclusively concentrated upon its inner task? Each\r\nindividual usually has his own peculiar habitual movement\r\nof this sort. A downward nerve-path is thus kept constantly\r\nopen during concentrated thought; and as it seems\r\nto be a law of frequent (if not of universal) application, that\r\nincidental stimuli tend to discharge through paths that are\r\nalready discharging rather than through others, the whole\r\narrangement might protect the thought-centres from interference\r\nfrom without. Were this the true \u003ci\u003erationale\u003c/i\u003e of these\r\npeculiar movements, we should have to suppose that the\r\nsensations produced by each phase of the movement itself\r\nare also drafted off immediately by the next phase and help\r\nto keep the circular process agoing. I offer the suggestion\r\nfor what it is worth; the connection of the movements themselves\r\nwith the continued effort of attention is certainly a\r\ngenuine and curious fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_322_322\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_322_322\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[322]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bain mentions attention in the Senses and the Intellect, p. 558, and\r\neven gives a theory of it on pp. 370-374 of the Emotions of the Will. I\r\nshall recur to this theory later on.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_323_323\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_323_323\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[323]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"The first and most important, but also the most difficult, task at the\r\noutset of an education is to overcome gradually the inattentive dispersion\r\nof mind which shows itself wherever the organic life preponderates over\r\nthe intellectual. The training of animals … must be in the first instance\r\nbased on the awakening of attention (cf. Adrian Leonard, \u003ci\u003eEssai sur\r\nl\u0027Education des Animaux\u003c/i\u003e, Lille, 1842), that is to say, we must seek to make\r\nthem gradually perceive separately things which, if left to themselves,\r\nwould not be attended to, because they would fuse with a great sum of\r\nother sensorial stimuli to a confused total impression of which each separate\r\nitem only darkens and interferes with the rest. Similarly at first with the\r\nhuman child. The enormous difficulties of deaf-mute- and especially of\r\nidiot-instruction is principally due to the slow and painful manner in\r\nwhich we succeed in bringing out from the general confusion of perception\r\nsingle items with sufficient sharpness.\" (Waitz, Lehrb. d. Psychol., p. 632.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_324_324\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_324_324\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[324]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Elements, part i, chap. ii, \u003ci\u003efin.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_325_325\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_325_325\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[325]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lectures on Metaphysics, lecture xiv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_326_326\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_326_326\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[326]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nature, vol. iii, p. 281 (1871).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_327_327\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_327_327\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[327]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If a lot of dots or strokes on a piece of paper be exhibited for a moment\r\nto a person in \u003ci\u003enormal\u003c/i\u003e condition, with the request that he say how\r\nmany are there, he will find that they break into groups in his mind\u0027s eye,\r\nand that whilst he is analyzing and counting one group in his memory the\r\nothers dissolve. In short, the impression made by the dots changes rapidly\r\ninto something else. In the \u003ci\u003etrance-subject\u003c/i\u003e, on the contrary, it seems to\r\n\u003ci\u003estick\u003c/i\u003e; I find that persons in the hypnotic state easily count the dots in\r\nthe mind\u0027s eye so long as they do not much exceed twenty in number.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_328_328\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_328_328\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[328]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mr. Cattell made Jevons\u0027s experiment in a much more precise way\r\n(Philosophische Studien, iii, 121 ff.). Cards were ruled with short lines,\r\nvarying in number from four to fifteen, and exposed to the eye for a hundredth\r\nof a second. When the number was but four or five, no mistakes\r\nas a rule were made. For higher numbers the tendency was to under- rather\r\nthan to over-estimate. Similar experiments were tried with letters\r\nand figures, and gave the same result. When the letters formed familiar\r\nwords, three times as many of them could be named as when their combination\r\nwas meaningless. If the words formed a sentence, twice as many\r\nof them could be caught as when they had no connection. \"The sentence\r\nwas then apprehended as a whole. If not apprehended thus, almost nothing\r\nis apprehended of the several words; but if the sentence as a whole is\r\napprehended, then the words appear very distinct.\"—Wundt and his pupil\r\nDietze had tried similar experiments on rapidly repeated strokes of sound.\r\nWundt made them follow each other in groups, and found that groups of\r\ntwelve strokes at most could be recognized and identified when they succeeded\r\neach other at the most favorable rate, namely, from three to five\r\ntenths of a second (Phys. Psych., ii, 215). Dietze found that by mentally\r\nsubdividing the groups into sub-groups as one listened, as many as forty\r\nstrokes could be identified as a whole. They were then grasped as eight\r\nsub-groups of five, or as five of eight strokes each. (Philosophische Studien,\r\nii, 362.)—Later in Wundt\u0027s Laboratory, Bechterew made observations on\r\ntwo \u003ci\u003esimultaneously\u003c/i\u003e elapsing series of metronome strokes, of which one contained\r\none stroke more than the other. The most favorable rate of succession\r\nwas 0.3 sec., and he then discriminated a group of 18 from one of\r\n18 + 1, apparently. (Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, 272.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_329_329\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_329_329\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[329]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Revue Scientifique, vol. 39, p. 684 (May 28, 1887).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_330_330\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_330_330\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[330]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Chr. Wolff: Psychologia Empirica, § 245. Wolff\u0027s account of the\r\nphenomena of attention is in general excellent.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_331_331\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_331_331\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[331]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, xi, 429-31.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_332_332\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_332_332\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[332]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, pp. 238-40.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_333_333\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_333_333\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[333]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIb.\u003c/i\u003e p. 262.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_334_334\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_334_334\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[334]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 264-6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_335_335\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_335_335\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[335]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This was the original \u0027personal equation\u0027 observation of Bessel. An\r\nObserver looked through his equatorial telescope to note the moment at\r\nwhich a star crossed the meridian, the latter being marked in the telescopic\r\nfield of view by a visible thread, beside which other equidistant threads\r\nappear. \"Before the star reached the thread he looked at the clock, and\r\nthen, with eye at telescope, counted the seconds by the beat of the pendulum.\r\nSince the star seldom passed the meridian at the exact moment of a\r\nbeat, the observer, in order to estimate fractions, had to note its position\r\nat the stroke before and at the stroke after the passage, and to divide the\r\ntime as the meridian-line seemed to divide the space. If, e.g., one had\r\ncounted 20 seconds, and at the 21st the star seemed removed by \u003ci\u003eac\u003c/i\u003e from\r\nthe meridian-thread \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, whilst at the 22d it was at the distance \u003ci\u003ebc\u003c/i\u003e; then, if\r\n\u003ci\u003eac: bc\u003c/i\u003e:: 1: 2, the star would have passed at 21 1/8 seconds. The conditions\r\nresemble those in our experiment: the star is the index-hand, the threads\r\nare the scale; and a time-displacement is to be expected, which with high\r\nrapidities may be positive, and negative with low. The astronomic observations\r\ndo not permit us to measure its absolute amount; but that it exists\r\nis made certain by the fact than after all other possible errors are eliminated,\r\nthere still remains between different observers a personal difference\r\nwhich is often much larger than that between mere reaction-times, amounting …\r\nsometimes to more than a second.\" (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 270.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 275px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption3\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-413-0034.jpg\" style=\"width: 275px\" id=\"img_images_jame_413_0034.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 35.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_336_336\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_336_336\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[336]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, ii, 601.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_337_337\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_337_337\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[337]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 273-4; 3d ed. ii, 339; Philosophische\r\nStudien, ii, 621 ff.—I know that I am stupid, but I confess I find these\r\ntheoretical statements, especially Wundt\u0027s, a little hazy. Herr v. Tschisch\r\nconsiders it impossible that the perception of the index\u0027s position should\r\ncome in too late, and says it demands no particular attention (p. 622). It\r\nseems, however, that this can hardly be the case. Both observers speak of\r\nthe difficulty of seeing the index at the right moment. The case is quite\r\ndifferent from that of distributing the attention impartially over simultaneous\r\nmomentary sensations. The bell or other signal gives a momentary\r\nsensation, the index a continuous one, of motion. To note any one \u003ci\u003eposition\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the latter is to \u003ci\u003einterrupt\u003c/i\u003e this sensation of motion and to substitute an\r\nentirely different percept—one, namely, of position—for it, during a time\r\nhowever brief. This involves a sudden change in the manner of attending\r\nto the revolutions of the index; which change \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to take place neither\r\nsooner nor later than the momentary impression, and \u003ci\u003efix\u003c/i\u003e the index as it is\r\nthen and there visible. Now this is not a case of simply getting two sensations\r\nat once and so feeling them—which would be an harmonious act;\r\nbut of \u003ci\u003estopping one\u003c/i\u003e and changing it into another, whilst we simultaneously\r\nget a third. Two of these acts are discrepant, and the whole three rather\r\ninterfere with each other. It becomes hard to \u0027fix\u0027 the index at the very\r\ninstant that we catch the momentary impression; so we fall into a way of\r\nfixing it either at the last possible moment before, or at the first possible\r\nmoment after, the impression comes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis at least seems to me the more probable state of affairs. If we fix\r\nthe index before the impression really comes, that means that we perceive\r\nit too late. But why do we fix it \u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c/i\u003e when the impressions come slow\r\nand simple, and \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e when they come rapid and complex? And why\r\nunder certain conditions is there no displacement at all? The answer\r\nwhich suggests itself is that when there is just enough leisure between the\r\nimpressions for the attention to adapt itself comfortably both to them and\r\nto the index (one second in W.\u0027s experiments), it carries on the two processes\r\nat once; when the leisure is excessive, the attention, following its\r\nown laws of ripening, and being \u003ci\u003eready\u003c/i\u003e to note the index before the other\r\nimpression comes, notes it \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e, since that is the moment of easiest action,\r\nwhilst the impression, which comes a moment later, interferes with noting\r\nit again; and finally, that when the leisure is insufficient, the momentary\r\nimpressions, being the more fixed data, are attended to first, and the index\r\nis fixed a little later on. The noting of the index at too early a moment\r\nwould be the noting of a real fact, with its analogue in many other rhythmical\r\nexperiences. In reaction-time experiments, for example, when, in a\r\nregularly recurring series, the stimulus is once in a while omitted, the observer\r\nsometimes reacts as if it came. Here, as Wundt somewhere observes,\r\nwe catch ourselves acting merely because our inward preparation is complete.\r\nThe \u0027fixing\u0027 of the index is a sort of action; so that my interpretation\r\ntallies with facts recognized elsewhere; but Wundt\u0027s explanation (if\r\nI understand it) of the experiments requires us to believe that an observer\r\nlike v. Tschisch shall steadily and without exception get an hallucination\r\nof a bell-stroke before the latter occurs, and \u003ci\u003enot hear the real bell-stroke afterwards\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nI doubt whether this is possible, and I can think of no analogue\r\nto it in the rest of our experience. The whole subject deserves to be gone\r\nover again. To Wundt is due the highest credit for his patience in working\r\nout the facts. His explanation of them in his earlier work (Vorlesungen\r\nüb. Menschen und Thierseele, i, 37-42, 365-371) consisted merely in the\r\nappeal to the unity of consciousness, and may be considered quite crude.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_338_338\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_338_338\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[338]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Note that the permanent interests are themselves grounded in certain\r\nobjects and relations in which our interest is immediate and instinctive.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_339_339\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_339_339\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[339]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Herbart: Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 128.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_340_340\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_340_340\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[340]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sir W. Hamilton. Metaphysics, lecture xiv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_341_341\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_341_341\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[341]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mental Physiol., § 124. The oft-cited case of soldiers not perceiving\r\nthat they are wounded is of an analogous sort.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_342_342\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_342_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[342]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Prof. J. M. Cattell made experiments to which we shall refer further\r\non, on the degree to which reaction-times might be shortened by distracting\r\nor voluntarily concentrating the attention. He says of the latter series\r\nthat \"the averages show that the attention can be kept strained, that is, the\r\ncentres kept in a state of unstable equilibrium, for one second\" (Mind, xi,\r\n240).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_343_343\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_343_343\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[343]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiologische Optik, § 32.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_344_344\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_344_344\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[344]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"\u0027Genius,\u0027 says Helvetius, \u0027is nothing but a continued attention (\u003ci\u003eune\r\nattention suivie\u003c/i\u003e).\u0027 \u0027Genius,\u0027 says Buffon, \u0027is only a protracted patience\r\n(\u003ci\u003eune longue patience\u003c/i\u003e).\u0027 \u0027In the exact sciences, at least,\u0027 says Cuvier, \u0027it\r\nis the patience of a sound intellect, when invincible, which truly constitutes\r\ngenius.\u0027 And Chesterfield has also observed that \u0027the power of applying\r\nan attention, steady and undissipated, to a single object, is the sure\r\nmark of a superior genius.\u0027\" (Hamilton: Lect. on Metaph., lecture xiv.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_345_345\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_345_345\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[345]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, e.g., Ulrici: Leib u. Seele, ii, 28; Lotze: Metaphysik, § 273;\r\nFechner, Revision d. Psychophysik, xix; G. E. Müller: Zur Theorie d.\r\nsinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, $ 1; Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i, 71.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_346_346\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_346_346\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[346]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Fechner, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 271.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_347_347\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_347_347\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[347]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Tonpsychologie, i, p. 71.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_348_348\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_348_348\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[348]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare, on clearness as the essential fruit of attention, Lotze\u0027s Metaphysic,\r\n§ 273.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_349_349\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_349_349\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[349]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Elements, part i, chap. ii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_350_350\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_350_350\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[350]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 226.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_351_351\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_351_351\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[351]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e By a negative value of the reaction-time Wundt means the case of the\r\nreactive movement occurring \u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c/i\u003e the stimulus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_352_352\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_352_352\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[352]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e ii, 239.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_353_353\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_353_353\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[353]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The reader must not suppose this phenomenon to be of frequent\r\noccurrence. Experienced observers, like Exner and Cattell, deny having\r\nmet with it in their personal experience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_354_354\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_354_354\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[354]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 241-5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_355_355\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_355_355\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[355]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It should be added that Mr. J. M. Cattell (Mind, xi, 33) found, on\r\nrepeating Wundt\u0027s experiments with a disturbing noise upon two practised\r\nobservers, that the simple reaction-time either for light or sound was\r\nhardly perceptibly increased. Making strong voluntary concentration of\r\nattention shortened it by about 0.013 seconds on an average (p. 240).\r\nPerforming mental additions whilst waiting for the stimulus lengthened it\r\nmore than anything, apparently. For other, less careful, observations,\r\ncompare Obersteiner, in Brain, i, 439. Cattell\u0027s negative results show how\r\nfar some persons can abstract their attention from stimuli by which others\r\nwould be disturbed.—A. Bartels (Versuche über die Ablenkung d. Aufmerksamkeit,\r\nDorpat, 1889) found that a stimulus to one eye sometimes\r\nprevented, sometimes improved, the perception of a quickly ensuing very\r\nfaint stimulus to the other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_356_356\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_356_356\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[356]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., 1st ed. p. 794.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_357_357\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_357_357\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[357]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Beiträge zur Experimentellen Psychologie, Heft i, pp. 73-106 (1889).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_358_358\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_358_358\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[358]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e To say the very least, he always brought his articulatory innervation\r\nclose to the discharging point. Herr M. describes a tightening of the head-muscles\r\nas characteristic of the attitude of attention to the reply.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_359_359\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_359_359\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[359]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychophysik, Bd. ii, pp. 475-6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_360_360\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_360_360\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[360]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I must say that I am wholly unconscious of the peculiar feelings in\r\nthe scalp which Fechner goes on to describe. \"The feeling of strained\r\nattention in the different sense-organs seems to be only a muscular one produced\r\nin using these various organs by setting in motion, by a sort of reflex\r\naction, the muscles which belong to them. One can ask, then, with what\r\nparticular muscular contraction the sense of strained attention in the effort\r\nto recall something is associated? On this question my own feeling gives\r\nme a decided answer; it comes to me distinctly, not as a sensation of tension\r\nin the inside of the head, but as a feeling of strain and contraction in\r\nthe scalp with a pressure from without inwards over the whole cranium,\r\nundoubtedly caused by a contraction of the muscles of the scalp. This\r\nharmonizes very well with the German popular expression \u003ci\u003eden Kopf zusammennehmen\u003c/i\u003e,\r\netc., etc. In a former illness, in which I could not endure\r\nthe slightest effort of continuous thought, and had no theoretical bias on\r\nthis question, the muscles of the scalp, especially those of the occiput,\r\nassumed a fairly morbid degree of sensibility whenever I tried to \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e.\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 490-491.) In an early writing by Professor Mach, after speaking\r\nof the way in which by attention we decompose complex musical\r\nsounds into their elements, this investigator continues: \"It is more than a\r\nfigure of speech when one says that we \u0027search\u0027 among the sounds. This\r\nhearkening search is very observably a bodily activity, just like attentive\r\nlooking in the case of the eye. If, obeying the drift of physiology, we\r\nunderstand by attention nothing mystical, but a bodily disposition, it is\r\nmost natural to seek it in the variable tension of the muscles of the ear.\r\nJust so, what common men call attentive looking reduces itself mainly to\r\naccommodating and setting of the optic axes…. According to this, it\r\nseems to me a very plausible view that quite generally Attention has its seat\r\nin the mechanism of the body. If nervous work is being done through\r\ncertain channels, that by itself is a mechanical ground for other channels\r\nbeing closed.\" (Wien. Sitzungsberichte, Math. Naturw., xlviii, 2, 297.\r\n1863.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_361_361\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_361_361\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[361]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Optik, p. 741.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_362_362\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_362_362\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[362]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hermann\u0027s Handbuch, iii, i, 548.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_363_363\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_363_363\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[363]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Helmholtz: Tonempfindungen, 3d ed. 85-9 (Engl. tr., 2d ed. 50, 51;\r\nsee also pp. 60-1).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_364_364\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_364_364\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[364]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 209.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_365_365\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_365_365\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[365]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Optik, 741.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_366_366\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_366_366\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[366]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 728.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_367_367\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_367_367\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[367]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Popular Scientific Lectures, Eng. Trans., p. 295.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_368_368\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_368_368\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[368]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Similarly in the verses which some one tried to puzzle me with the\r\nother day: \"\u003ci\u003eGui n\u0027a beau dit, qui sabot dit, nid a beau dit elle?\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Footnote_369_369\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_369_369\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[369]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I cannot refrain from referring in a note to an additional set of facts\r\ninstanced by Lotze in his Medizinische Psychologie, § 431, although I am\r\nnot satisfied with the explanation, fatigue of the sense-organ, which \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngives. \"In quietly lying and contemplating a wall-paper pattern, sometimes\r\nit is the ground, sometimes the design, which is clearer and consequently\r\ncomes nearer…. Arabesques of monochromic many-convoluted\r\nlines now strike us as composed of one, now of another connected linear\r\nsystem, and all without any intention on our part. [This is beautifully\r\nseen in Moorish patterns; but a simple diagram like Fig. 39 also shows it\r\nwell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 155px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-443-0037.jpg\" style=\"width: 200px\" id=\"img_images_jame_443_0037.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 39.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe see it sometimes as two\r\nlarge triangles superposed, sometimes\r\nas a hexagon with angles\r\nspanning its sides, sometimes as six\r\nsmall triangles stuck together at\r\ntheir corners.]… Often it happens\r\nin revery that when we stare\r\nat a picture, suddenly some one of\r\nits features will be lit up with especial\r\nclearness, although neither\r\nits optical character nor its meaning\r\ndiscloses any motive for such\r\nan arousal of the attention….\r\nTo one in process of becoming\r\ndrowsy the surroundings alternately\r\nfade into darkness and\r\nabruptly brighten up. The talk of\r\nthe bystanders seems now to come\r\nfrom indefinite distances; but at the next moment it startles us by\r\nits threatening loudness at our very ear,\" etc. These variations, which\r\neveryone will have noticed, are, it seems to me, easily explicable by the\r\nvery unstable equilibrium of our ideational centres, of which constant\r\nchange is the law. We \u003ci\u003econceive\u003c/i\u003e one set of lines as object, the other as\r\nbackground, and forthwith the first set becomes the set we \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e. There\r\nneed be no \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e motive for the conceptual change, the irradiations of\r\nbrain-tracts by each other, according to accidents of nutrition, \u0027like sparks\r\nin burnt-up paper,\u0027 suffice. The changes during drowsiness are still more\r\nobviously due to this cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_370_370\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_370_370\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[370]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed. p. 370.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_371_371\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_371_371\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[371]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologie de l\u0027Attention (1889), p. 32 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_372_372\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_372_372\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[372]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, iv, 413 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_373_373\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_373_373\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[373]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Lange, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 417, for another proof of his view, drawn from\r\nthe phenomenon of retinal rivalry.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_374_374\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_374_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[374]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Many of my students have at my request experimented with imagined\r\nletters of the alphabet and syllables, and they tell me that they can see\r\nthem inwardly as total colored pictures without following their outlines\r\nwith the eye. I am myself a bad visualizer, and make movements all the\r\nwhile.—M. L. Marillier, in an article of eminent introspective power which\r\nappeared after my text was written (Remarques sur le Mécanisme de l\u0027Attention,\r\nin Revue Philosophique, vol. xxvii, p. 566), has contended against\r\nRibot and others for the non-dependence of sensory upon motor images in\r\ntheir relations to attention. I am glad to cite him as an ally.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_375_375\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_375_375\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[375]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Drs. Ferrier (Functions of the Brain, §§ 102-3) and Obersteiner (Brain,\r\ni, 439 ff.) treat it as the essential feature. The author whose treatment\r\nof the subject is by far the most thorough and satisfactory is Prof. G. E.\r\nMüller, whose little work Zur Théorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit,\r\nInauguraldissertation, Leipzig, Edelmann (1874?), is for learning and\r\nacuteness a model of what a monograph should be. I should like to have\r\nquoted from it, but the Germanism of its composition makes quotation quite\r\nimpossible. See also G. H. Lewes: Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series,\r\nProb. 2, chap. 10; G. H. Schneider: Der menschliche Wille, 294 ff., 309\r\nff.; C. Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i, 67-75; W. B. Carpenter: Mental Physiology,\r\nchap. 3; Cappie in \u0027Brain,\u0027 July 1886 (hyperæmia-theory); J. Sully\r\nin \u0027Brain,\u0027 Oct. 1890.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_376_376\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_376_376\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[376]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e L\u0027Enfant de trois à sept Ans, p. 108.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_377_377\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_377_377\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[377]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologie de l\u0027Attention, p. 53.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_378_378\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_378_378\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[378]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Repetition of this sort does not confer \u003ci\u003eintelligence\u003c/i\u003e of what is said, it only\r\nkeeps the mind from wandering into other channels. The intelligence\r\nsometimes comes in beats, as it were, at the end of sentences, or in the\r\nmidst of words which were mere words until then. See above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 281\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_379_379\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_379_379\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[379]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The reader will please observe that I am saying all that can \u003ci\u003epossibly\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbe said in favor of the effect-theory, since, inclining as I do myself to the\r\ncause-theory, I do not want to undervalue the enemy. As a matter of\r\nfact, one might begin to take one\u0027s stand against the effect theory at\r\nthe outset, with the phenomenon of immediate sensorial attention. One\r\nmight say that attention causes the movements of adjustment of the eyes,\r\nfor example, and is not merely their effect. Hering writes most emphatically\r\nto this effect: \"The movements from one point of fixation to another\r\nare occasioned and regulated by the changes of place of the attention.\r\nWhen an object, seen at first indirectly, draws our attention to itself, the\r\ncorresponding movement of the eye follows without further ado, as a consequence\r\nof the attention\u0027s migration and of our effort to make the object\r\ndistinct. The wandering of the attention entails that of the fixation point.\r\nBefore its movement begins, its goal is already in consciousness and\r\ngrasped by the attention, and the location of this spot in the total space\r\nseen is what determines the direction and amount of the movement of the\r\neye.\" (Hermann\u0027s Handbuch, p. 534.) I do not here insist on this, because\r\nit is hard to tell whether the attention or the movement comes first (Hering\u0027s\r\nreasons, pp. 535-6, also 544-6, seem to me ambiguous), and because,\r\neven if the attention to the object does come first, it may be a mere effect of\r\nstimulus and association. Mach\u0027s theory that the \u003ci\u003ewill to look\u003c/i\u003e is the \u003ci\u003espace-feeling\r\nitself\u003c/i\u003e may be compared with Hering\u0027s in this place. See Mach\u0027s\r\nBeiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen (1886), pp. 55 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_380_380\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_380_380\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[380]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e F. H. Bradley, \"Is there a Special Activity of Attention?\" in \u0027Mind,\u0027\r\nxi, 305, and Lipps, Grundtatsachen, chaps. iv and xxx, have stated it\r\nsimilarly.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_381_381\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_381_381\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[381]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e More will be said of the matter when we come to the chapter on the\r\nWill.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_382_382\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_382_382\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[382]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for a defence of the notion of inward activity, Mr. James Ward\u0027s\r\nsearching articles in \u0027Mind,\u0027 xii, 45 and 564.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_383_383\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_383_383\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[383]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It must be admitted that some little time will often elapse before this\r\neffort succeeds. As a child, I slept in a nursery with a very loud-ticking\r\nclock, and remember my astonishment more than once, on listening for its\r\ntick, to find myself unable to catch it for what seemed a long space of\r\ntime; then suddenly it would break into my consciousness with an almost\r\nstartling loudness.—M. Delbœuf somewhere narrates how, sleeping in the\r\ncountry near a mill-dam, he woke in the night and thought the water had\r\nceased to flow, but on looking out of the open window saw it flowing in the\r\nmoonlight, and then heard it too.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_384_384\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_384_384\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[384]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Zur Theorie d. sinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, p. 128 foll.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_385_385\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_385_385\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[385]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have begun to inquire experimentally whether any of the measurable\r\nfunctions of the workmen change after the din of machinery stops at a\r\nworkshop. So far I have found no constant results as regards either pulse,\r\nbreathing, or strength of squeeze by the hand. I hope to prosecute the inquiry\r\nfarther (May, 1890).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_459\"\u003e[Pg 459]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_XII\"\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCONCEPTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE SENSE OF SAMENESS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Chapter VIII, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 221\u003c/a\u003e, the distinction was drawn between\r\ntwo kinds of knowledge of things, bare acquaintance\r\nwith them and knowledge about them. The possibility of\r\ntwo such knowledges depends on a fundamental psychical\r\npeculiarity which may be entitled \"\u003ci\u003ethe principle of constancy\r\nin the mind\u0027s meanings\u003c/i\u003e\" and which may be thus expressed:\r\n\"\u003ci\u003eThe same matters can be thought of in successive portions of\r\nthe mental stream, and some of these portions can know that\r\nthey mean the same matters which the other portions meant.\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\nOne might put it otherwise by saying that \"\u003ci\u003ethe mind can\r\nalways intend, and know when it intends, to think of the Same.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis \u003ci\u003esense of sameness\u003c/i\u003e is the very keel and backbone of\r\nour thinking. We saw in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter X\u003c/a\u003e how the consciousness\r\nof personal identity reposed on it, the present thought\r\nfinding in its memories a warmth and intimacy which it\r\nrecognizes as the same warmth and intimacy it now feels.\r\nThis sense of identity of the knowing subject is held by\r\nsome philosophers to be the only vehicle by which the\r\nworld hangs together. It seems hardly necessary to say\r\nthat a sense of identity of the known object would perform\r\nexactly the same unifying function, even if the sense of\r\nsubjective identity were lost. And without the intention to\r\nthink of the same outer things over and over again, and the\r\nsense that we were doing so, our sense of our own personal\r\nsameness would carry us but a little way towards making\r\na universe of our experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNote, however, that we are in the first instance speaking\r\nof the sense of sameness from the point of view of the\r\nmind\u0027s structure alone, and not from the point of view of\r\nthe universe. We are psychologizing, not philosophizing,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_460\"\u003e[Pg 460]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThat is, we do not care whether there be any \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e sameness\r\nin \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e or not, or whether the mind be true or false in its\r\nassumptions of it. Our principle only lays it down that\r\nthe mind makes continual use of the \u003ci\u003enotion\u003c/i\u003e of sameness,\r\nand if deprived of it, would have a different structure from\r\nwhat it has. In a word, the principle that the mind can\r\nmean the Same is true of its \u003ci\u003emeanings\u003c/i\u003e, but not necessarily\r\nof aught besides.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_386_386\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_386_386\"\u003e[386]\u003c/a\u003e The mind must conceive as possible\r\nthat the Same should be before it, for our experience to be\r\nthe sort of thing it is. Without the psychological sense of\r\nidentity, sameness might rain down upon us from the outer\r\nworld for ever and we be none the wiser. With the psychological\r\nsense, on the other hand, the outer world might\r\nbe an unbroken flux, and yet we should perceive a repeated\r\nexperience. Even now, the world may be a place in which\r\nthe same thing never did and never will come twice. The\r\nthing we mean to point at may change from top to bottom\r\nand we be ignorant of the fact. But in our meaning itself\r\nwe are not deceived; our intention is to think of the same.\r\nThe name which I have given to the principle, in calling it\r\nthe law of constancy in our meanings, accentuates its subjective\r\ncharacter, and justifies us in laying it down as the\r\nmost important of all the features of our mental structure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot all psychic life need be assumed to have the sense\r\nof sameness developed in this way. In the consciousness\r\nof worms and polyps, though the same realities may frequently\r\nimpress it, the feeling of sameness may seldom\r\nemerge. We, however, running back and forth, like spiders\r\non the web they weave, feel ourselves to be working over\r\nidentical materials and thinking them in different ways.\r\nAnd the man who identifies the materials most is held to\r\nhave the most philosophic human mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_461\"\u003e[Pg 461]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCONCEPTION DEFINED.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct\r\nand permanent subject of discourse is called\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003econception\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nand the thoughts which are its vehicles are called \u003ci\u003econcepts\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nBut the word \u0027concept\u0027 is often used as if it stood for the\r\nobject of discourse itself; and this looseness feeds such\r\nevasiveness in discussion that I shall avoid the use of the\r\nexpression concept altogether, and speak of \u0027conceiving\r\nstate of mind,\u0027 or something similar, instead. The word\r\n\u0027conception\u0027 is unambiguous. It properly denotes neither\r\nthe mental state nor what the mental state signifies, but\r\nthe relation between the two, namely, the \u003ci\u003efunction\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nmental state in signifying just that particular thing. It is\r\nplain that one and the same mental state can be the vehicle\r\nof many conceptions, can mean a particular thing,\r\nand a great deal more besides. If it has such a multiple\r\nconceptual function, it may be called an act of compound\r\nconception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may conceive realities supposed to be extra-mental,\r\nas steam-engine; fictions, as mermaid; or mere \u003ci\u003eentia rationis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nlike difference or nonentity. But whatever we do\r\nconceive, our conception is of that and nothing else—nothing\r\nelse, that is, \u003ci\u003einstead\u003c/i\u003e of that, though it may be of much\r\nelse \u003ci\u003ein addition\u003c/i\u003e to that. Each act of conception results\r\nfrom our attention singling out some one part of the mass\r\nof matter for thought which the world presents, and holding\r\nfast to it, without confusion.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_387_387\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_387_387\"\u003e[387]\u003c/a\u003e Confusion occurs when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_462\"\u003e[Pg 462]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe do not know whether a certain object proposed to us\r\nis the same with one of our meanings or not; so that the\r\nconceptual function requires, to be complete, that the\r\nthought should not only say \u0027I mean this,\u0027 but also say \u0027I\r\ndon\u0027t mean that.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_388_388\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_388_388\"\u003e[388]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach conception thus eternally remains what it is, and\r\nnever can become another. The mind may change its\r\nstates, and its meanings, at different times; may drop one\r\nconception and take up another, but the dropped conception\r\ncan in no intelligible sense be said to \u003ci\u003echange into\u003c/i\u003e its\r\nsuccessor. The paper, a moment ago white, I may now see\r\nto have been scorched black. But my conception \u0027white\u0027\r\ndoes not change into my conception \u0027black.\u0027 On the contrary,\r\nit stays alongside of the objective blackness, as a\r\ndifferent meaning in my mind, and by so doing lets me\r\njudge the blackness as the paper\u0027s change. Unless it\r\nstayed, I should simply say \u0027blackness\u0027 and know no more.\r\nThus, amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the\r\nworld of conceptions, or things intended to be thought\r\nabout, stands stiff and immutable, like Plato\u0027s Realm of\r\nIdeas.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_389_389\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_389_389\"\u003e[389]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome conceptions are of things, some of events, some of\r\nqualities. Any fact, be it thing, event, or quality, may be\r\nconceived sufficiently for purposes of identification, if only\r\nit be singled out and marked so as to separate it from\r\nother things. Simply calling it \u0027this\u0027 or \u0027that\u0027 will suffice.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_463\"\u003e[Pg 463]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nTo speak in technical language, a subject may be conceived\r\nby its \u003ci\u003edenotation\u003c/i\u003e, with no \u003ci\u003econnotation\u003c/i\u003e, or a very minimum of\r\nconnotation, attached. The essential point is that it should\r\nbe re-identified by us as that which the talk is about; and\r\nno full representation of it is necessary for this, even when\r\nit is a fully representable thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this sense, creatures extremely low in the intellectual\r\nscale may have conception. All that is required is that\r\nthey should recognize the same experience again. A polyp\r\nwould be a conceptual thinker if a feeling of \u0027Hollo! thingumbob\r\nagain!\u0027 ever flitted through its mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost of the objects of our thought, however, are to\r\nsome degree represented as well as merely pointed out.\r\nEither they are things and events perceived or imagined,\r\nor they are qualities apprehended in a positive way. Even\r\nwhere we have no intuitive acquaintance with the nature of\r\na thing, if we know any of the relations of it at all, anything\r\n\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it, that is enough to individualize and distinguish it\r\nfrom all the other things which we might mean. Many of\r\nour topics of discourse are thus \u003ci\u003eproblematical\u003c/i\u003e, or defined by\r\ntheir relations only. We think of a thing \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e which certain\r\nfacts must obtain, but we do not yet know how the\r\nthing will look when it is realized. Thus we conceive of a\r\nperpetual-motion machine. It is a \u003ci\u003equæsitum\u003c/i\u003e of a perfectly\r\ndefinite kind,—we can always tell whether the actual\r\nmachines offered us do or do not agree with what we mean\r\nby it. The natural possibility or impossibility of the thing\r\ndoes not touch the question of its conceivability in this\r\nproblematic way. \u0027Round square,\u0027 \u0027black-white-thing,\u0027 are\r\nabsolutely definite conceptions; it is a mere accident, as far\r\nas conception goes, that they happen to stand for things\r\nwhich nature never lets us sensibly perceive.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_390_390\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_390_390\"\u003e[390]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_464\"\u003e[Pg 464]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCONCEPTIONS ARE UNCHANGEABLE.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fact that the same real topic of discourse is at one\r\ntime conceived as a mere \u0027that\u0027 or \u0027that which, etc.,\u0027 and\r\nis at another time conceived with additional specifications,\r\nhas been treated by many authors as a proof that conceptions\r\nthemselves are fertile and self-developing. A conception,\r\naccording to the Hegelizers in philosophy, \u0027develops\r\nits own significance,\u0027 \u0027makes explicit what it implicitly contained,\u0027\r\npasses, on occasion, \u0027over into its opposite,\u0027 and in\r\nshort loses altogether the blankly self-identical character\r\nwe supposed it to maintain. The figure we viewed as a\r\npolygon appears to us now as a sum of juxtaposed triangles;\r\nthe number hitherto conceived as thirteen is at last noticed\r\nto be six plus seven, or prime; the man thought honest is\r\nbelieved a rogue. Such changes of our opinion are viewed\r\nby these thinkers as evolutions of our conception, from\r\nwithin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe facts are unquestionable; our knowledge does\r\ngrow and change by rational and inward processes, as well\r\nas by empirical discoveries. Where the discoveries are\r\nempirical, no one pretends that the propulsive agency, the\r\nforce that makes the knowledge develop, is mere conception.\r\nAll admit it to be our continued exposure to the\r\n\u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e, with its power to impress our senses. Thus strychnin,\r\nwhich tastes bitter, we find will also kill, etc. Now I say\r\nthat where the new knowledge merely comes from \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe facts are essentially the same, and that \u003ci\u003eto talk of self-development\r\non the part of our conceptions is a very bad\r\nway of stating the case\u003c/i\u003e. Not new sensations, as in the empirical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_465\"\u003e[Pg 465]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninstance, but new conceptions, are the indispensable\r\nconditions of advance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor if the alleged cases of self-development be examined\r\nit will be found, I believe, that the new truth affirms in\r\nevery case a \u003ci\u003erelation\u003c/i\u003e between the original subject of conception\r\nand some new subject conceived later on. These\r\nnew subjects of conception arise in various ways. Every\r\none of our conceptions is of something which our attention\r\noriginally tore out of the continuum of felt experience, and\r\nprovisionally isolated so as to make of it an individual\r\ntopic of discourse. Every one of them has a way, if the\r\nmind is left alone with it, of suggesting other parts of the\r\ncontinuum from which it was torn, for conception to work\r\nupon in a similar way. This \u0027suggestion\u0027 is often no more\r\nthan what we shall later know as the association of ideas.\r\nOften, however, it is a sort of invitation to the mind to play,\r\nadd lines, break number-groups, etc. Whatever it is, it brings\r\nnew conceptions into consciousness, which latter thereupon\r\nmay or may not expressly attend to the relation in which\r\nthe new stands to the old. Thus I have a conception of\r\nequidistant lines. Suddenly, I know not whence, there\r\npops into my head the conception of their meeting. Suddenly\r\nagain I think of the meeting and the equidistance both\r\ntogether, and perceive them incompatible. \"\u003ci\u003eThose\u003c/i\u003e lines\r\nwill never meet,\" I say. Suddenly again the word \u0027parallel\u0027\r\npops into my head. \u0027They are parallels,\u0027 I continue;\r\nand so on. Original conceptions to start with; adventitious\r\nconceptions pushed forward by multifarious psychologic\r\ncauses; comparisons and combinations of the two; resultant\r\nconceptions to end with; which latter may be of either\r\nrational or empirical relations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs regards these relations, they are conceptions of the\r\nsecond degree, as one might say, and their birthplace is\r\nthe mind itself. In Chapter XXVIII I shall at considerable\r\nlength defend the mind\u0027s claim to originality and fertility\r\nin bringing them forth. But no single one of the mind\u0027s\r\nconceptions is fertile \u003ci\u003eof itself\u003c/i\u003e as the opinion which I criticise\r\npretends. When the several notes of a chord are\r\nsounded together, we get a new feeling from their combination.\r\nThis feeling is due to the mind reacting upon that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_466\"\u003e[Pg 466]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngroup of sounds in that determinate way, and no one would\r\nthink of saying of any single note of the chord that it \u0027developed\u0027\r\nof itself into the other notes or into the feeling of\r\nharmony. So of Conceptions. No one of them develops\r\ninto any other. But if two of them are thought at once,\r\ntheir \u003ci\u003erelation\u003c/i\u003e may come to consciousness, and form matter\r\nfor a third conception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake \u0027thirteen\u0027 for example, which is said to develop\r\ninto \u0027prime.\u0027 What really happens is that we compare the\r\nutterly changeless conception of thirteen with various other\r\nconceptions, those of the different multiples of two, three,\r\nfour, five, and six, and ascertain that it \u003ci\u003ediffers\u003c/i\u003e from them\r\nall. Such difference is a freshly ascertained relation. It is\r\nonly for mere brevity\u0027s sake that we call it a property of the\r\noriginal thirteen, the property of being prime. We shall see\r\nin the next chapter that (if we count out æsthetic and moral\r\nrelations between things) the only important relations of\r\nwhich the mere inspection of conceptions makes us aware are\r\nrelations of comparison, that is, of difference and no-difference,\r\nbetween them. The judgment 6 + 7 = 13 expresses\r\nthe relation of \u003ci\u003eequality\u003c/i\u003e between two ideal objects, 13 on the\r\none hand and 6 + 7 on the other, successively conceived\r\nand compared. The judgments 6 + 7 \u0026gt; 12, or 6 + 7 \u0026lt; 14,\r\nexpress in like manner relations of inequality between\r\nideal objects. But if it be unfair to say that the conception\r\nof 6 + 7 generates that of 12 or of 14, surely it is as unfair\r\nto say that it generates that of 13.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conceptions of 12, 13, and 14 are each and all generated\r\nby individual acts of the mind, playing with its materials.\r\nWhen, comparing two ideal objects, we find them\r\nequal, the conception of one of them may be that of a whole\r\nand of the other that of all its parts. This particular case\r\nis, it seems to me, the only case which makes the notion of\r\none conception evolving into another sound plausible. But\r\neven in this case the conception, as such, of the whole does\r\nnot evolve into the conception, as such, of the parts. Let\r\nthe conception of some object as a whole be given first.\r\nTo begin with, it points to and identifies for future thought\r\na certain \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e. The \u0027whole\u0027 in question might be one of\r\nthose mechanical puzzles of which the difficulty is to unlock\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_467\"\u003e[Pg 467]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe parts. In this case, nobody would pretend that\r\nthe richer and more elaborate conception which we gain\r\nof the puzzle after solving it came directly out of our first\r\ncrude conception of it, for it is notoriously the outcome of\r\nexperimenting with our hands. It is true that, as they\r\nboth mean \u003ci\u003ethat same puzzle\u003c/i\u003e, our earlier thought and our later\r\nthought have one conceptual function, are vehicles of one\r\nconception. But in addition to being the vehicle of this\r\nbald unchanging conception, \u0027that same puzzle,\u0027 the later\r\nthought is the vehicle of all those other conceptions which\r\nit took the manual experimentation to acquire. Now, it is\r\njust the same where the whole is mathematical instead of\r\nbeing mechanical. Let it be a polygonal space, which we\r\ncut into triangles, and of which we then affirm that it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthose triangles. Here the experimentation (although usually\r\ndone by a pencil in the hands) may be done by the\r\nunaided imagination. We hold the space, first conceived\r\nas polygonal simply, in our mind\u0027s eye until our attention\r\nwandering to and fro within it has carved it into the\r\ntriangles. The triangles are a new conception, the result of\r\nthis new operation. Having once conceived them, however,\r\nand compared them with the old polygon which we originally\r\nconceived and which we have never ceased conceiving,\r\nwe judge them to fit exactly into its area. The earlier and\r\nlater conceptions, we say, are of one and the same space.\r\nBut this relation between triangles and polygon which the\r\nmind cannot help finding if it compares them at all, is very\r\nbadly expressed by saying that the old conception has developed\r\ninto the new. New conceptions come from new\r\nsensations, new movements, new emotions, new associations,\r\nnew acts of attention, and new comparisons of old conceptions,\r\nand not in other ways. Endogenous prolification\r\nis not a mode of growth to which conceptions can lay\r\nclaim.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI hope, therefore, that I shall not be accused of huddling\r\nmysteries out of sight, when I insist that the psychology\r\nof conception is not the place in which to treat of those\r\nof continuity and change. Conceptions form the one class\r\nof entities that cannot under any circumstances change.\r\nThey can cease to be, altogether; or they can stay, as what\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_468\"\u003e[Pg 468]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey severally are; but there is for them no middle way.\r\nThey form an essentially discontinuous system, and translate\r\nthe process of our perceptual experience, which is naturally\r\na flux, into a set of stagnant and petrified terms. The\r\nvery conception of flux itself is an absolutely changeless\r\nmeaning in the mind: it signifies just that one thing, flux,\r\nimmovably.—And, with this, the doctrine of the flux of the\r\nconcept may be dismissed, and need not occupy our attention\r\nagain.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_391_391\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_391_391\"\u003e[391]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0027ABSTRACT\u0027 IDEAS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now to pass to a less excusable mistake.\r\nThere are philosophers who deny that associated things\r\ncan be broken asunder at all, even provisionally, by the\r\nconceiving mind. The opinion known as Nominalism says\r\nthat we really never frame any conception of the partial\r\nelements of an experience, but are compelled, whenever we\r\nthink it, to think it in its totality, just as it came.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI will be silent of mediæval Nominalism, and begin with\r\nBerkeley, who is supposed to have rediscovered the doctrine\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_469\"\u003e[Pg 469]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor himself. His asseverations against \u0027abstract\r\nideas\u0027 are among the oftenest quoted passages in philosophic\r\nliterature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is agreed,\" he says, \"on all hands that the qualities or modes\r\nof things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated\r\nfrom all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together,\r\nseveral in the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to\r\nconsider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities\r\nwith which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract\r\nideas…. After this manner, it is said, we come by the abstract idea\r\nof man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is\r\ntrue there is included color, because there is no man but has some\r\ncolor, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular\r\ncolor, because there is no one particular color wherein all men partake.\r\nSo likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature\r\nnor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from\r\nall these. And so of the rest…. Whether others have this wonderful\r\nfaculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I\r\nfind indeed I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself the\r\nideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding\r\nand dividing them…. I can consider the hand, the eye,\r\nthe nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the\r\nbody. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some\r\nparticular shape and color. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to\r\nmyself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or\r\na crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any\r\neffort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it\r\nis equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct\r\nfrom the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear\r\nnor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general\r\nideas whatsoever…. And there is ground to think most men will\r\nacknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men\r\nwhich are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions. It is\r\nsaid they are difficult, and not to be attained without pains and study.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in\r\nsurmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary\r\nhelps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for\r\nthen it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains\r\ntherefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the\r\ngreat and multiplied labor of framing abstract notions will be found a\r\nhard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a\r\ncouple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles\r\nand the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together\r\nnumberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract\r\ngeneral ideas, and annexed them to every common name they\r\nmake use of?\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_392_392\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_392_392\"\u003e[392]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_470\"\u003e[Pg 470]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe note, so bravely struck by Berkeley, could not,\r\nhowever, be well sustained in face of the fact patent to\r\nevery human being that we \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e mean color without meaning\r\nany particular color, and stature without meaning any\r\nparticular height. James Mill, to be sure, chimes in heroically\r\nin the chapter on Classification of his \u0027Analysis\u0027; but\r\nin his son John the nominalistic voice has grown so weak\r\nthat, although \u0027abstract ideas\u0027 are repudiated as a matter\r\nof traditional form, the opinions uttered are really nothing\r\nbut a conceptualism ashamed to call itself by its own legitimate\r\nname.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_393_393\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_393_393\"\u003e[393]\u003c/a\u003e Conceptualism says the mind can conceive\r\nany quality or relation it pleases, and mean nothing but it,\r\nin isolation from everything else in the world. This is, of\r\ncourse, the doctrine which we have professed. John Mill\r\nsays:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The formation of a Concept does not consist in separating the attributes\r\nwhich are said to compose it from all other attributes of the\r\nsame object, and enabling us to conceive those attributes, disjoined\r\nfrom any others. We neither conceive them, nor think them, nor cognize\r\nthem in any way, as a thing apart, but solely as forming, in combination\r\nwith numerous other attributes, the idea of an individual object.\r\nBut, though meaning them only as part of a larger agglomeration,\r\nwe have the power of fixing our attention on them, to the neglect\r\nof the other attributes with which we think them combined. \u003ci\u003eWhile\r\nthe concentration of attention lasts, if it is sufficiently intense, we may\r\nbe temporarily unconscious of any of the other attributes, and may\r\nreally, for a brief interval, have nothing-present to our mind but the\r\nattributes constituent of the concept\u003c/i\u003e…. General concepts, therefore,\r\nwe have, properly speaking, none; we have only complex ideas of objects\r\nin the concrete: but we are able to \u003ci\u003eattend exclusively to certain\r\nparts\u003c/i\u003e of the concrete idea: and by that \u003ci\u003eexclusive attention\u003c/i\u003e we enable\r\nthose parts to \u003ci\u003edetermine exclusively the course of our thoughts\u003c/i\u003e as\r\nsubsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry\r\non a train of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, \u003ci\u003eexactly\r\nas if\u003c/i\u003e we were able to \u003ci\u003econceive\u003c/i\u003e them separately from the rest.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_394_394\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_394_394\"\u003e[394]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is a lovely example of Mill\u0027s way of holding piously\r\nto his general statements, but conceding in detail all that\r\ntheir adversaries ask. If there be a better description extant,\r\nof a mind in possession of an \u0027abstract idea,\u0027 than is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_471\"\u003e[Pg 471]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontained in the words I have italicized, I am unacquainted\r\nwith it. The Berkeleyan nominalism thus breaks down.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is easy to lay bare the false assumption which underlies\r\nthe whole discussion of the question as hitherto carried\r\non. That assumption is that ideas, in order to know, must\r\nbe cast in the exact likeness of whatever things they know,\r\nand that the only things that can be known are those which\r\nideas can resemble. The error has not been confined to\r\nnominalists. \u003ci\u003eOmnis cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis\r\net cogniti\u003c/i\u003e has been the maxim, more or less explicitly\r\nassumed, of writers of every school. Practically it amounts\r\nto saying that an idea must \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e a duplicate edition of what\r\nit knows\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_395_395\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_395_395\"\u003e[395]\u003c/a\u003e—in other words, that it can only know itself—or,\r\nmore shortly still, that knowledge in any strict sense of the\r\nword, as a self-transcendent function, is impossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow our own blunt statements about the ultimateness\r\nof the cognitive relation, and the difference between the\r\n\u0027object\u0027 of the thought and its mere \u0027topic\u0027 or \u0027subject of\r\ndiscourse\u0027 (cf. \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 275\u003c/a\u003e ff.), are all at variance with any such\r\ntheory; and we shall find more and more occasion, as we\r\nadvance in this book, to deny its general truth. All that a\r\nstate of mind need do, in order to take cognizance of a reality,\r\nintend it, or be \u0027about\u0027 it, is to lead to a remoter state\r\nof mind which either acts upon the reality or resembles it.\r\nThe only class of thoughts which can with any show of\r\nplausibility be said to resemble their objects are sensations.\r\nThe stuff of which all our other thoughts are composed is\r\nsymbolic, and a thought attests its pertinency to a topic by\r\nsimply \u003ci\u003eterminating\u003c/i\u003e, sooner or later, in a sensation which resembles\r\nthe latter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut Mill and the rest believe that a thought must \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhat it means, and mean what it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, and that if it be a picture\r\nof an entire individual, it cannot mean any part of him\r\nto the exclusion of the rest. I say nothing here of the preposterously\r\nfalse descriptive psychology involved in the\r\nstatement that the only things we can mentally picture are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_472\"\u003e[Pg 472]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindividuals completely determinate in all regards. Chapter\r\nXVIII will have something to say on that point, and we\r\ncan ignore it here. For even if it were true that our images\r\nwere always of concrete individuals, it would not in the\r\nleast follow that our meanings were of the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element\r\nof the thought.\u003c/i\u003e It is one of those evanescent and\r\n\u0027transitive\u0027 facts of mind which introspection cannot turn\r\nround upon, and isolate and hold up for examination, as an\r\nentomologist passes round an insect on a pin. In the\r\n(somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it pertains to\r\nthe \u0027fringe\u0027 of the subjective state, and is a \u0027feeling of tendency,\u0027\r\nwhose neural counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of\r\ndawning and dying processes too faint and complex to be\r\ntraced. The geometer, with his one definite figure before\r\nhim, knows perfectly that his thoughts apply to countless\r\nother figures as well, and that although he \u003ci\u003esees\u003c/i\u003e lines of a\r\ncertain special bigness, direction, color, etc., he \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e not\r\none of these details. When I use the word \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e in two different\r\nsentences, I may have both times exactly the same\r\nsound upon my lips and the same picture in my mental\r\neye, but I may mean, and at the very moment of uttering\r\nthe word and imagining the picture, know that I mean,\r\ntwo entirely different things. Thus when I say: \"What a\r\nwonderful man Jones is!\" I am perfectly aware that I mean\r\nby man to exclude Napoleon Bonaparte or Smith. But\r\nwhen I say: \"What a wonderful thing Man is!\" I am\r\nequally well aware that I mean to \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003eclude not only Jones,\r\nbut Napoleon and Smith as well. This added consciousness\r\nis an absolutely positive sort of feeling, transforming\r\nwhat would otherwise be mere noise or vision into something\r\n\u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e; and determining the sequel of my thinking,\r\nthe later words and images, in a perfectly definite way.\r\nWe saw in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e that the image \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, the nucleus,\r\nis \u003ci\u003efunctionally\u003c/i\u003e the least important part of the thought. \u003ci\u003eOur\r\ndoctrine, therefore, of the \u0027fringe\u0027 leads to a perfectly satisfactory\r\ndecision of the nominalistic and conceptualistic controversy,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nso far as it touches psychology. \u003ci\u003eWe must decide in favor of\r\nthe conceptualists,\u003c/i\u003e and affirm that the power to think things,\r\nqualities, relations, or whatever other elements there may\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_473\"\u003e[Pg 473]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe, isolated and abstracted from the total experience in\r\nwhich they appear, is the most indisputable function of our\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eUNIVERSALS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter abstractions, universals! The \u0027fringe,\u0027 which\r\nlets us believe in the one, lets us believe in the other too.\r\nAn individual conception is of something restricted, in its\r\napplication, to a single case. A universal or general conception\r\nis of an entire class, or of something belonging to\r\nan entire class, of things. The conception of an abstract\r\nquality is, taken by itself, neither universal nor particular.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_396_396\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_396_396\"\u003e[396]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIf I abstract \u003ci\u003ewhite\u003c/i\u003e from the rest of the wintry landscape\r\nthis morning, it is a perfectly definite conception, a self-identical\r\nquality which I may mean again; but, as I have\r\nnot yet individualized it by expressly meaning to restrict it\r\nto this particular snow, nor thought at all of the possibility\r\nof other things to which it may be applicable, it is so far\r\nnothing but a \u0027that,\u0027 a \u0027floating adjective,\u0027 as Mr. Bradley\r\ncalls it, or a topic broken out from the rest of the\r\nworld. Properly it is, in this state, a singular—I have\r\n\u0027singled it out;\u0027 and when, later, I universalize or individualize\r\nits application, and my thought turns to mean\r\neither \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e white or \u003ci\u003eall possible\u003c/i\u003e whites, I am in reality meaning\r\ntwo new things and forming two new conceptions.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_397_397\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_397_397\"\u003e[397]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSuch an alteration of my meaning has nothing to do with\r\nany change in the image I may have in my mental eye, but\r\nsolely with the vague consciousness that surrounds the\r\nimage, of the sphere to which it is intended to apply. We\r\ncan give no more definite account of this vague consciousness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_474\"\u003e[Pg 474]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan has been given on \u003ca href=\"#Page_249\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 249-266\u003c/a\u003e. But that is no\r\nreason for denying its presence.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_398_398\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_398_398\"\u003e[398]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the nominalists and traditional conceptualists find\r\nmatter for an inveterate quarrel in these simple facts. Full\r\nof their notion that an idea, feeling, or state of consciousness\r\ncan at bottom only be aware of its own quality; and\r\nagreeing, as they both do, that such an idea or state of consciousness\r\nis a perfectly determinate, singular, and transitory\r\nthing; they find it impossible to conceive how it\r\nshould become the vehicle of a knowledge of anything\r\npermanent or universal. \"To know a universal, it must\r\nbe universal; for like can only be known by like,\" etc.\r\nUnable to reconcile these incompatibles, the knower and\r\nthe known, each side immolates one of them to save the\r\nother. The nominalists \u0027settle the hash\u0027 of the thing known\r\nby denying it to be ever a genuine universal; the conceptualists\r\ndespatch the knower by denying it to be a state of\r\nmind, in the sense of being a perishing segment of thoughts\u0027\r\nstream, consubstantial with other facts of sensibility. They\r\ninvent, instead of it, as the vehicle of the knowledge of\r\nuniversals, an \u003ci\u003eactus purus intellectus\u003c/i\u003e, or an Ego, whose function\r\nis treated as quasi-miraculous and nothing if not awe-inspiring,\r\nand which it is a sort of blasphemy to approach\r\nwith the intent to explain and make common, or reduce to\r\nlower terms. Invoked in the first instance as a vehicle for\r\nthe knowledge of universals, the higher principle presently\r\nis made the indispensable vehicle of all thinking whatever,\r\nfor, it is contended, \"a universal element is present in\r\nevery thought.\" The nominalists meanwhile, who dislike\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_475\"\u003e[Pg 475]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eactus purus\u003c/i\u003e and awe-inspiring principles and despise\r\nthe reverential mood, content themselves with saying\r\nthat we are mistaken in supposing we ever get sight of\r\nthe face of an universal; and that what deludes us is\r\nnothing but the swarm of \u0027individual ideas\u0027 which may\r\nat any time be awakened by the hearing of a name.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we open the pages of either school, we find it impossible\r\nto tell, in all the whirl about universal and\r\nparticular, when the author is talking about universals\r\nin the mind, and when about objective universals, so\r\nstrangely are the two mixed together. James Ferrier,\r\nfor example, is the most brilliant of anti-nominalist\r\nwriters. But who is nimble-witted enough to count, in\r\nthe following sentences from him, the number of times\r\nhe steps from the known to the knower, and attributes\r\nto both whatever properties he finds in either one?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To think is to pass from the singular or particular to the idea\r\n[concept] or universal…. Ideas are necessary because no thinking\r\ncan take place without them. They are universal, inasmuch as they\r\nare completely divested of the particularity which characterizes all the\r\nphenomena of mere sensation. To grasp the nature of this universality\r\nis not easy. Perhaps the best means by which this end may be\r\ncompassed is by contrasting it with the particular. It is not difficult\r\nto understand that a sensation, a phenomenon of sense, is never more\r\nthan the particular which it is. As such, that is, in its strict particularity,\r\nit is absolutely unthinkable. In the very act of being thought,\r\nsomething more than it emerges, and this something more cannot be\r\nagain the particular…. Ten particulars \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e cannot be thought\r\nof any more than one particular can be thought of;… there always\r\nemerges in thought an additional something, which is the possibility of\r\nother particulars to an indefinite extent…. The indefinite additional\r\nsomething which they are instances of is a universal…. The idea\r\nor universal cannot possibly be pictured in the imagination, for this\r\nwould at once reduce it to the particular…. This inability to form\r\nany sort of picture or representation of an idea does not proceed\r\nfrom any imperfection or limitation of our faculties, but is a quality\r\ninherent in the very nature of intelligence. A contradiction is involved\r\nin the supposition that an idea or a universal can become the\r\nobject either of sense or of the imagination. An idea is thus diametrically\r\nopposed to an image.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_399_399\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_399_399\"\u003e[399]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe nominalists, on their side, admit a \u003ci\u003equasi\u003c/i\u003e-universal,\r\nsomething which we think \u003ci\u003eas if it were\u003c/i\u003e universal, though it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_476\"\u003e[Pg 476]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis not; and in all that they say about this something, which\r\nthey explain to be \u0027an indefinite number of particular\r\nideas,\u0027 the same vacillation between the subjective and the\r\nobjective points of view appears. The reader never can\r\ntell whether an \u0027idea\u0027 spoken of is supposed to be a knower\r\nor a known. The authors themselves do not distinguish.\r\nThey want to get something in the mind which shall \u003ci\u003eresemble\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhat is out of the mind, however vaguely, and they think\r\nthat when that fact is accomplished, no farther questions\r\nwill be asked. James Mill writes:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_400_400\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_400_400\"\u003e[400]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The word, man, we shall say, is first applied to an individual; it\r\nis first associated with the idea of that individual, and acquires the\r\npower of calling up the idea of him; it is next applied to another individual\r\nand acquires the power of calling up the idea of him; so of another\r\nand another, till it has become associated with an indefinite number,\r\nand has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of\r\nthose ideas indifferently. What happens? It does call up an indefinite\r\nnumber of the ideas of individuals as often as it occurs; and calling\r\nthem in close connection, it forms a species of complex idea of them….\r\nIt is also a fact, that when an idea becomes to a certain extent\r\ncomplex, from the multiplicity of the ideas it \u003ci\u003ecomprehends\u003c/i\u003e, it is of necessity\r\nindistinct;… and this indistinctness has, doubtless, been a\r\nmain cause of the mystery which has appeared to belong to it…. It\r\nthus appears that the word \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e is not a word having a very simple\r\nidea, as was the opinion of the realists; nor a word having no idea at\r\nall, as was that of the [earlier] nominalists; but a word calling up an\r\nindefinite number of ideas, by the irresistible laws of association, and\r\nforming them into one very complex and indistinct, but not therefore\r\nunintelligible, idea.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBerkeley had already said:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_401_401\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_401_401\"\u003e[401]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract\r\ngeneral idea, but of many several particular ideas, any one of\r\nwhich it indifferently suggests to the mind. An idea which, considered\r\nin itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent\r\nor stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027Stand for,\u0027 not \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e; \u0027becomes general,\u0027 not becomes\r\n\u003ci\u003eaware of something\u003c/i\u003e general; \u0027particular ideas,\u0027 not particular\r\n\u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e—everywhere the same timidity about begging\r\nthe fact of knowing, and the pitifully impotent attempt\r\nto foist it in the shape of a mode of \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e of \u0027ideas.\u0027 If\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_477\"\u003e[Pg 477]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe fact to be conceived be the indefinitely numerous actual\r\nand possible members of a class, then it is assumed\r\nthat if we can only get enough ideas to huddle together for\r\na moment in the mind, the \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e of each several one of\r\nthem there will be an equivalent for the \u003ci\u003eknowing\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nof \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e member of the class in question; and their number\r\nwill be so large as to confuse our tally and leave it\r\ndoubtful whether all the possible members of the class\r\nhave thus been satisfactorily told off or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course this is nonsense. An idea neither is what it\r\nknows, nor knows what it is; nor will swarms of copies of\r\nthe same \u0027idea,\u0027 recurring in stereotyped form, or \u0027by the\r\nirresistible laws of association formed into one idea,\u0027 ever\r\nbe the same thing as a thought of \u0027\u003ci\u003eall the possible members\u003c/i\u003e\u0027\r\nof a class. We must mean \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e by an altogether special\r\nbit of consciousness \u003ci\u003ead hoc\u003c/i\u003e. But it is easy to translate\r\nBerkeley\u0027s, Hume\u0027s, and Mill\u0027s notion of a swarm of ideas\r\ninto cerebral terms, and so to make them stand for something\r\nreal; and, in this sense, I think the doctrine of these\r\nauthors less hollow than the opposite one which makes\r\nthe vehicle of universal conceptions to be an \u003ci\u003eactus purus\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe soul. If each \u0027idea\u0027 stand for some special nascent\r\nnerve-process, then the aggregate of these nascent processes\r\nmight have for its conscious correlate a psychic \u0027fringe,\u0027\r\nwhich should be just that universal meaning, or intention\r\nthat the name or mental picture employed should mean all\r\nthe possible individuals of the class. Every peculiar complication\r\nof brain-processes must have some peculiar correlate\r\nin the soul. To one set of processes will correspond the\r\nthought of an indefinite taking of the extent of a word like\r\n\u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e; to another set that of a particular taking; and to a\r\nthird set that of a universal taking, of the extent of the\r\nsame word. The thought corresponding to either set of\r\nprocesses, is always itself a unique and singular event,\r\nwhose dependence on its peculiar nerve-process I of course\r\nam far from professing to explain.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_402_402\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_402_402\"\u003e[402]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_478\"\u003e[Pg 478]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTruly in comparison with the fact that every conception,\r\nwhatever it be of, is one of the mind\u0027s immutable possessions,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_479\"\u003e[Pg 479]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe question whether a single thing, or a whole class\r\nof things, or only an unassigned quality, be meant by it, is\r\nan insignificant matter of detail. Our meanings are of\r\nsingulars, particulars, indefinites, and universals, mixed\r\ntogether in every way. A singular individual is as much\r\n\u003ci\u003econceived\u003c/i\u003e when he is isolated and identified away from the\r\nrest of the world in my mind, as is the most rarefied and\r\nuniversally applicable quality he may possess—\u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e, for\r\nexample, when treated in the same way.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_403_403\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_403_403\"\u003e[403]\u003c/a\u003e From every\r\npoint of view, the overwhelming and portentous character\r\nascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why, from\r\nPlato and Aristotle downwards, philosophers should have\r\nvied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular,\r\nand in adoration of that of the general, is hard to\r\nunderstand, seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought\r\nto be that of the more adorable things, and that the \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof worth are all concretes and singulars. The only value\r\nof universal characters is that they help us, by reasoning,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_480\"\u003e[Pg 480]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto know new truths about individual things. The restriction\r\nof one\u0027s meaning, moreover, to an individual thing,\r\nprobably requires even more complicated brain-processes\r\nthan its extension to all the instances of a kind; and the\r\nmere mystery, as such, of the knowledge, is equally great,\r\nwhether generals or singulars be the things known. In sum,\r\ntherefore, the traditional universal-worship can only be\r\ncalled a bit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophic \u0027idol\r\nof the cave.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt may seem hardly necessary to add (what follows\r\nas a matter of course from \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 229-237\u003c/a\u003e, and what has\r\nbeen implied in our assertions all along) that \u003ci\u003enothing can\r\nbe conceived twice over without being conceived in entirely\r\ndifferent states of mind\u003c/i\u003e. Thus, my arm-chair is one of the\r\nthings of which I have a conception; I knew it yesterday\r\nand recognized it when I looked at it. But if I think of it\r\nto-day as the same arm-chair which I looked at yesterday,\r\nit is obvious that the very conception of it as the same is an\r\nadditional complication to the thought, whose inward constitution\r\nmust alter in consequence. In short, it is logically\r\nimpossible that the same thing should be \u003ci\u003eknown as the same\u003c/i\u003e\r\nby two successive copies of the same thought. As a matter of\r\nfact, the thoughts by which we know that we mean the same\r\nthing are apt to be very different indeed from each other.\r\nWe think the thing now in one context, now in another;\r\nnow in a definite image, now in a symbol. Sometimes our\r\nsense of its identity pertains to the mere fringe, sometimes\r\nit involves the nucleus, of our thought. We never can\r\nbreak the thought asunder and tell just which one of its bits\r\nis the part that lets us know which subject is referred to;\r\nbut nevertheless we always \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e know which of all possible\r\nsubjects we have in mind. Introspective psychology must\r\nhere throw up the sponge; the fluctuations of subjective life\r\nare too exquisite to be arrested by its coarse means. It\r\nmust confine itself to bearing witness to the fact that all sorts\r\nof different subjective states do form the vehicle by which\r\nthe same is known; and it must contradict the opposite\r\nview.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ordinary Psychology of \u0027ideas\u0027 constantly talks as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_481\"\u003e[Pg 481]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nif the vehicle of the same thing-known must be the same recurrent\r\nstate of mind, and as if the having over again of the\r\nsame \u0027idea\u0027 were not only a necessary but a sufficient condition\r\nfor meaning the same thing twice. But this recurrence\r\nof the same idea would utterly defeat the existence of\r\na repeated knowledge of anything. It would be a simple reversion\r\ninto a pre-existent state, with nothing gained in the\r\ninterval, and with complete unconsciousness of the state\r\nhaving existed before. Such is not the way in which we\r\nthink. As a rule we are fully aware that we have thought\r\nbefore of the thing we think of now. The continuity and\r\npermanency of the topic is of the essence of our intellection.\r\nWe recognize the old problem, and the old solutions; and\r\nwe go on to alter and improve and substitute one predicate\r\nfor another without ever letting the subject change.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is what is meant when it is said that thinking consists\r\nin making \u003ci\u003ejudgments\u003c/i\u003e. A succession of judgments may\r\nall be about the same thing. The general practical postulate\r\nwhich encourages us to keep thinking at all is that by going\r\non to do so we shall judge better \u003ci\u003eof the same things\u003c/i\u003e than if\r\nwe do not.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_404_404\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_404_404\"\u003e[404]\u003c/a\u003e In the successive judgments, all sorts of new\r\noperations are performed on the things, and all sorts of\r\nnew results brought out, without the sense of the main\r\ntopic ever getting lost. At the outset, we merely \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e the\r\ntopic; then we \u003ci\u003eoperate\u003c/i\u003e on it; and finally we have it again\r\nin a richer and truer way. A compound conception has\r\nbeen substituted for the simple one, but with full consciousness\r\nthat both are of the Same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between having and operating is as\r\nnatural in the mental as in the material world. As our\r\nhands may hold a bit of wood and a knife, and yet do\r\nnaught with either; so our mind may simply be aware of a\r\nthing\u0027s existence, and yet neither attend to it nor discriminate\r\nit, neither locate nor count nor compare nor like nor\r\ndislike nor deduce it, nor recognize it articulately as having\r\nbeen met with before. At the same time we know that,\r\ninstead of staring at it in this entranced and senseless way,\r\nwe may rally our activity in a moment, and locate, class,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_482\"\u003e[Pg 482]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompare, count, and judge it. There is nothing involved in\r\nall this which we did not postulate at the very outset of our\r\nintrospective work: realities, namely, \u003ci\u003eextra mentem\u003c/i\u003e, thoughts,\r\nand possible relations of cognition between the two. The\r\nresult of the thoughts\u0027 operating on the data given to\r\nsense is to transform the order in which experience \u003ci\u003ecomes\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninto an entirely different order, that of the \u003ci\u003econceived\u003c/i\u003e world.\r\nThere is no spot of light, for example, which I pick out and\r\nproceed to define as a pebble, which is not thereby torn\r\nfrom its mere time- and space-neighbors, and thought in\r\nconjunction with things physically parted from it by the\r\nwidth of nature. Compare the form in which facts appear\r\nin a text-book of physics, as logically subordinated laws,\r\nwith that in which we naturally make their acquaintance.\r\nThe conceptual scheme is a sort of sieve in which we try to\r\ngather up the world\u0027s contents. Most facts and relations\r\nfall through its meshes, being either too subtle or insignificant\r\nto be fixed in any conception. But whenever a\r\nphysical reality is caught and identified as the same with\r\nsomething already conceived, it remains on the sieve, and\r\nall the predicates and relations of the conception with\r\nwhich it is identified become its predicates and relations\r\ntoo; it is subjected to the sieve\u0027s network, in other words.\r\nThus comes to pass what Mr. Hodgson calls the translation\r\nof the perceptual into the conceptual order of the world.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_405_405\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_405_405\"\u003e[405]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn Chapter XXII we shall see how this translation\r\nalways takes place for the sake of some subjective \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand how the conception with which we handle a bit of sensible\r\nexperience is really nothing but a teleological instrument.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThis whole function of conceiving, of fixing, and holding\r\nfast to meanings, has no significance apart from the fact\r\nthat the conceiver is a creature with partial purposes and private\r\nends.\u003c/i\u003e There remains, therefore, much more to be said\r\nabout conception, but for the present this will suffice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_386_386\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_386_386\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[386]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There are two other \u0027principles of identity\u0027 in philosophy. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eontological\u003c/i\u003e one asserts that every real thing is what it is, that \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eb,\r\nb\u003c/i\u003e. The \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e one says that what is once true of the subject of a judgment\r\nis always true of that subject. The ontological law is a tautological\r\ntruism; the logical principle is already more, for it implies subjects unalterable\r\nby time. The \u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e law also implies facts which might not\r\nbe realized: there might be no succession of thoughts; or if there were, the\r\nlater ones might not think of the earlier; or if they did, they might not\r\nrecall the content thereof; or, recalling the content, they might not take it\r\nas \u0027the same\u0027 with anything else.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_387_387\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_387_387\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[387]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In later chapters we shall see that determinate relations exist between\r\nthe various data thus fixed upon by the mind. These are called \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor axiomatic relations. Simple inspection of the data enables us to perceive\r\nthem; and one inspection is as effective as a million for engendering\r\nin us the conviction that between \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e data that relation must always hold.\r\nTo change the relation we should have to make the data different. \u0027The\r\nguarantee for the uniformity and adequacy\u0027 of the data can only be the\r\nmind\u0027s own power to fix upon any objective content, and to mean that\r\ncontent as often as it likes. This right of the mind to \u0027construct\u0027 permanent\r\nideal objects for itself out of the data of experience seems, singularly\r\nenough, to be a stumbling-block to many. Professor Robertson in his\r\nclear and instructive article \u0027Axioms\u0027 in the Encyclopædia Britannica (9th\r\nedition) suggests that it may only be where \u003ci\u003emovements\u003c/i\u003e enter into the constitution\r\nof the ideal object (as they do in geometrical figures) that we can\r\n\"\u003ci\u003emake\u003c/i\u003e the ultimate relations to be what for us they must be in all circumstances.\"\r\nHe makes, it is true, a concession in favor of conceptions of\r\nnumber abstracted from \"subjective occurrences succeeding each other in\r\ntime\" because these also are acts \"of construction, dependent on the\r\npower we have of voluntarily determining the flow of subjective consciousness.\"\r\n\"The content of passive sensation,\" on the other hand, \"may\r\nindefinitely vary beyond any control of ours.\" What if it do vary, so long\r\nas we can continue to think of and mean the qualities it varied from? We\r\ncan \u0027make\u0027 ideal objects for ourselves out of irrecoverable bits of passive\r\nexperience quite as perfectly as out of easily repeatable active experiences.\r\nAnd when we have got our objects together and compared them, we do\r\nnot \u003ci\u003emake\u003c/i\u003e, but \u003ci\u003efind\u003c/i\u003e, their relations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_388_388\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_388_388\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[388]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Hodgson, Time and Space, § 46. Lotze, Logic, § 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_389_389\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_389_389\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[389]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste\r\nwhich at another time would produce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in\r\nthat man\u0027s mind would be as distinct as if he had tasted only gall.\" (Locke\u0027s\r\nEssay bk. ii, chap. xi, § 3. Read the whole section!)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_390_390\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_390_390\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[390]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Black round things, square white things, \u003ci\u003eper contra\u003c/i\u003e, Nature gives us\r\nfreely enough. But the combinations which she refuses to realize may exist\r\nas distinctly, in the shape of postulates, as those which she gives may exist\r\nin the shape of positive images, in our mind. As a matter of fact, she \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e\r\nrealize a warm cold thing whenever two points of the skin, so near together\r\nas not to be locally distinguished, are touched, the one with a warm, the\r\nother with a cold, piece of metal. The warmth and the cold are then often\r\nfelt as if in the same objective place. Under similar conditions two objects,\r\none sharp and the other blunt, may feel like one sharp blunt thing. The\r\nsame space may appear of two colors if, by optical artifice, one of the\r\ncolors is made to appear as if seen \u003ci\u003ethrough\u003c/i\u003e the other.—Whether any two\r\nattributes whatever shall be compatible or not, in the sense of appearing\r\nor not to occupy the same place and moment, depends simply on \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e\r\npeculiarities of natural bodies and of our sense-organs. \u003ci\u003eLogically\u003c/i\u003e, anyone\r\ncombination of qualities is to the full as \u003ci\u003econceivable\u003c/i\u003e as any other, and has\r\nas distinct a meaning for thought. What necessitates this remark is the\r\nconfusion deliberately kept up by certain authors (e.g. Spencer, Psychology,\r\n§§ 420-7) between the inconceivable and the not-distinctly-imaginable.\r\nHow do we know \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e things we cannot imagine unless by first conceiving\r\nthem, meaning \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e and not other things?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_391_391\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_391_391\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[391]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Arguments seldom make converts in matters philosophical; and some\r\nreaders, I know, who find that they conceive a certain matter differently\r\nfrom what they did, will still prefer saying they have two different editions\r\nof the same conception, one evolved from the other, to saying they have\r\ntwo different conceptions of the same thing. It depends, after all, on how\r\nwe define conception. We ourselves defined it as the function by which\r\na state of mind means to think the same whereof it thought on a former\r\noccasion. Two states of mind will accordingly be two editions of the same\r\nconception just so far as either does mean to think what the other thought;\r\nbut no farther. If either mean to think what the other did not think, it\r\nis a different conception from the other. And if either mean to think all\r\nthat the other thought, \u003ci\u003eand more\u003c/i\u003e, it is a different conception, so far as the\r\n\u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e goes. In this last case one state of mind has two conceptual functions.\r\nEach thought decides, by its own authority, which, out of all the conceptive\r\nfunctions open to it, it shall now renew; with which other thought\r\nit shall identify itself as a conceiver, and just how far. \"The same\r\nA which I once meant,\" it says, \"I shall now mean again, and mean it\r\nwith C as its predicate (or what not) instead of B, as before.\" In all this,\r\ntherefore, there is absolutely no changing, but only uncoupling and recoupling\r\nof conceptions. Compound conceptions come, as functions of\r\nnew states of mind. Some of these functions are the same with previous\r\nones, some not. Any changed opinion, then, \u003ci\u003epartly\u003c/i\u003e contains new editions\r\n(absolutely identical with the old, however) of former conceptions, \u003ci\u003epartly\u003c/i\u003e\r\nabsolutely new conceptions. The division is a perfectly easy one to make\r\nin each particular case.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_392_392\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_392_392\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[392]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 10, 14.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_393_393\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_393_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[393]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Conceptualisme honteux,\u0027 Rabier, Psychologie, 310.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_394_394\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_394_394\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[394]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Exam. of Hamilton, p. 393. Cf. also Logic, bk. ii, chap. v, § 1, and\r\nbk iv, chap ii, § 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_395_395\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_395_395\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[395]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g.: \"The knowledge of things must mean that the mind finds\r\nitself in them, or that, in some way, the difference between them and the\r\nmind is dissolved.\" (E. Caird, Philosophy of Kant, first edition, p. 553.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_396_396\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_396_396\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[396]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The traditional conceptualist doctrine is that an abstract must \u003ci\u003eeo ipso\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbe a universal. Even modern and independent authors like Prof. Dewey\r\n(Psychology, 207) obey the tradition: \"The mind seizes upon some one\r\naspect,… abstracts or prescinds it. This very seizure of some one\r\nelement generalizes the one abstracted…. Attention, in drawing it\r\nforth, makes it a distinct content of consciousness, and thus universalizes\r\nit; it is considered no longer in its particular connection with the object,\r\nbut on its own account; that is, as an idea, or what it signifies to the\r\nmind; and significance is always universal.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_397_397\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_397_397\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[397]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e C. F. Reid\u0027s Intellectual Powers, Essay v, chap. iii.—\u003ci\u003eWhiteness\u003c/i\u003e is\r\none thing, \u003ci\u003ethe whiteness of this sheet of paper\u003c/i\u003e another thing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_398_398\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_398_398\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[398]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mr. F. H. Bradley says the conception or the \u0027meaning\u0027 \"consists\r\nof a part of the content, cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart\r\nfrom the existence of the sign. It would not be correct to add, and referred\r\naway to another real subject; for where we think without judging,\r\nand where we deny, that description would not be applicable.\" This\r\nseems to be the same doctrine as ours; the application to one or to all subjects\r\nof the abstract fact conceived (i.e. its individuality or its universality),\r\nconstituting a new conception. I am, however, not quite sure that Mr.\r\nBradley steadily maintains this ground. Cf. the first chapter of his\r\nPrinciples of Logic. The doctrine I defend is stoutly upheld in Rosmini\u0027s\r\nPhilosophical System, Introduction by Thomas Davidson, p. 43 (London,\r\n1882).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_399_399\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_399_399\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[399]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lectures on Greek Philosophy, pp. 33-39.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_400_400\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_400_400\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[400]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis, chap. viii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_401_401\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_401_401\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[401]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 11, 12.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_402_402\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_402_402\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[402]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It may add to the effect of the text to quote a passage from the essay\r\nin \u0027Mind,\u0027 referred to on \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 224\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Why may we not side with the conceptualists in saying that the universal\r\nsense of a word does correspond to a mental fact of \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e kind, but\r\nat the same time, agreeing with the nominalists that all mental facts are\r\nmodifications of subjective sensibility, why may we not call that fact a\r\n\u0027feeling\u0027? \u003ci\u003eMan\u003c/i\u003e meant for \u003ci\u003emankind\u003c/i\u003e is in short a different feeling from\r\n\u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e as a mere noise, or from \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e meant for \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e man, to wit, John Smith\r\nalone. Not that the difference consists simply in the fact that, when\r\ntaken universally, the word has one of Mr. Galton\u0027s \u0027blended\u0027 images of\r\nman associated with it. Many persons have seemed to think that these\r\nblended or, as Prof. Huxley calls them, \u0027generic\u0027 images are equivalent\r\nto concepts. But, in itself, a blurred thing is just as particular as\r\na sharp thing; and the generic character of either sharp image or\r\nblurred image depends on its being felt \u003ci\u003ewith its representative function\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThis function is the mysterious \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e, the understood meaning. But it is\r\nnothing applied to the image from above, no pure act of reason inhabiting\r\na supersensible and semi-supernatural plane. It can be diagrammatized as\r\ncontinuous with all the other segments of the subjective stream. It is\r\njust that staining, fringe, or halo of obscurely felt relation to masses of\r\nother imagery about to come, but not yet distinctly in focus, which we\r\nhave so abundantly set forth [in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"If the image come unfringed, it reveals but a simple quality, thing,\r\nor event; if it come fringed, it may reveal something expressly taken universally\r\nor in a scheme of relations. The difference between thought and\r\nfeeling thus reduces itself, in the last subjective analysis, to the presence\r\nor absence of \u0027fringe.\u0027 And this in turn reduces itself, with much probability,\r\nin the last physiological analysis, to the absence or presence of sub-excitements\r\nin other convolutions of the brain than those whose discharges\r\nunderlie the more definite nucleus, the substantive ingredient, of the\r\nthought,—in this instance, the word or image it may happen to arouse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"The contrast is not, then, as the Platonists would have it, between\r\ncertain subjective facts called images and sensations, and others called\r\nacts of relating intelligence; the former being blind perishing things,\r\nknowing not even their own existence as such, whilst the latter combine\r\nthe poles in the mysterious synthesis of their cognitive sweep. The contrast\r\nis really between two \u003ci\u003easpects\u003c/i\u003e, in which all mental facts without exception\r\nmay be taken; their structural aspect, as being subjective, and their\r\nfunctional aspect, as being cognitions. In the former aspect, the highest\r\nas well as the lowest is a feeling, a peculiarly tinged segment of the stream.\r\nThis tingeing is its sensitive body, the \u003ci\u003ewie ihm zu Muthe ist\u003c/i\u003e, the way it feels\r\nwhilst passing. In the latter aspect, the lowest mental fact as well as the\r\nhighest may grasp some bit of truth as its content, even though that truth\r\nwere as relationless a matter as a bare unlocalized and undated quality of\r\npain. From the cognitive point of view, all mental facts are intellections.\r\nFrom the subjective point of view all are feelings. Once admit that the\r\npassing and evanescent are as real parts of the stream as the distinct\r\nand comparatively abiding; once allow that fringes and halos, inarticulate\r\nperceptions, whereof the objects are as yet unnamed, mere nascencies of\r\ncognition, premonitions, awarenesses of direction, are thoughts \u003ci\u003esui generis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nas much as articulate imaginings and propositions are; once restore, I say,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003evague\u003c/i\u003e to its psychological rights, and the matter presents no further\r\ndifficulty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"And then we see that the current opposition of Feeling to Knowledge\r\nis quite a false issue. If every feeling is at the same time a bit of knowledge,\r\nwe ought no longer to talk of mental states differing by having more\r\nor less of the cognitive quality; they only differ in knowing more or less,\r\nin having much fact or little fact for their object. The feeling of a broad\r\nscheme of relations is a feeling that knows much; the feeling of a simple\r\nquality is a feeling that knows little. But the knowing itself, whether of\r\nmuch or of little, has the same essence, and is as good knowing in the one\r\ncase as in the other. Concept and image, thus discriminated through\r\ntheir objects, are consubstantial in their inward nature, as modes of feeling.\r\nThe one, as particular, will no longer be held to be a relatively base sort of\r\nentity, to be taken as a matter of course, whilst the other, as universal,\r\nis celebrated as a sort of standing miracle, to be adored but not explained.\r\nBoth concept and image, \u003ci\u003equâ\u003c/i\u003e subjective, are singular and particular. Both\r\nare moments of the stream, which come and in an instant are no more.\r\nThe word universality has no meaning as applied to their psychic body or\r\nstructure, which is always finite. It only has a meaning when applied to\r\ntheir use, import, or reference to the kind of object they may reveal. The\r\nrepresentation, as such, of the universal object is as particular as that of\r\nan object about which we know so little that the interjection \u0027Ha!\u0027 is all\r\nit can evoke from us in the way of speech. Both should be weighed in the\r\nsame scales, and have the same measure meted out to them whether of\r\nworship or of contempt.\" (Mind, ix, pp. 18-19.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_403_403\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_403_403\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[403]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 404.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_404_404\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_404_404\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[404]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare the admirable passage in Hodgson\u0027s Time and Space, p. 310.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_405_405\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_405_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[405]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophy of Reflection, i, 273-308.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_483\"\u003e[Pg 483]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_XIII\"\u003eCHAPTER XIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eDISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is matter of popular observation that some men have\r\nsharper senses than others, and that some have acuter\r\nminds and are able to \u0027split hairs\u0027 and see two shades of\r\nmeaning where the majority see but one. Locke long ago\r\nset apart the faculty of discrimination as one in which men\r\ndiffer individually. What he wrote is good enough to quote\r\nas an introduction to this chapter:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of\r\ndiscerning and distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is\r\nnot enough to have a confused perception of something in general: unless\r\nthe mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their\r\nqualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge; though the\r\nbodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the\r\nmind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of distinguishing\r\none thing from another depends the evidence and certainty\r\nof several even very general propositions, which have passed for innate\r\ntruths; because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions\r\nfind universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions;\r\nwhereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the\r\nmind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or different. But\r\nof this more hereafter?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one\r\nfrom another lies either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense,\r\nor want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the understanding, or\r\nhastiness and precipitancy natural to some tempers, I will not here examine:\r\nit suffices to take notice that this is one of the operations that\r\nthe mind may reflect on and observe in itself. It is of that consequence\r\nto its other knowledge, that so far as this faculty is in itself\r\ndull, or not rightly made use of for the distinguishing one thing\r\nfrom another, so far our notions are confused, and our reason and\r\njudgment disturbed or misled. If in having our ideas in the memory\r\nready at hand consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused,\r\nand being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another\r\nwhere there is but the least difference, consists in a great measure the\r\nexactness of judgment and clearness of reason which is to be observed\r\nin one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_484\"\u003e[Pg 484]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreason of that common observation,—that men who have a great\r\ndeal of wit and prompt memories have not always the clearest judgment\r\nor deepest reason. For, wit lying most in the assemblage\r\nof ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety\r\nwherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to\r\nmake up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy;\r\njudgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating\r\ncarefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least\r\ndifference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by\r\naffinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding\r\nquite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein for the most part\r\nlies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit which strikes so lively on\r\nthe fancy, and therefore, so acceptable to all people because its beauty\r\nappears at first sight, and there is required no labor of thought to examine\r\nwhat truth or reason there is in it.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_406_406\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_406_406\"\u003e[406]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut Locke\u0027s descendants have been slow to enter into the\r\npath whose fruitfulness was thus pointed out by their master,\r\nand have so neglected the study of discrimination that\r\none might almost say that the classic English psychologists\r\nhave, as a school, hardly recognized it to exist. \u0027Association\u0027\r\nhas proved itself in their hands the one all-absorbing\r\npower of the mind. Dr. Martineau, in his review of Bain,\r\nmakes some very weighty remarks on this onesidedness of\r\nthe Lockian school. Our mental history, says he, is, in\r\nits view,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"a perpetual formation of new compounds: and the words \u0027association,\u0027\r\n\u0027cohesion,\u0027 \u0027fusion,\u0027 \u0027indissoluble connection,\u0027 all express the\r\nchange from plurality of data to some unity of result. An explanation\r\nof the process therefore requires two things: a true enumeration of\r\nthe primary constituents, and a correct statement of their laws of combination:\r\njust as, in chemistry, we are furnished with a list of the\r\nsimple elements, and the with then principles of their synthesis. Now\r\nthe latter of these two conditions we find satisfied by the association-psychologists:\r\nbut not the former. They are not agreed upon their\r\ncatalogue of elements, or the marks by which they may know the simple\r\nfrom the compound. The psychologic unit is not fixed; that which is\r\ncalled one impression by Hartley is treated as half-a-dozen or more by\r\nMill: and the tendency of the modern teachers on this point is to recede\r\nmore and more from the better-chosen track of their master. Hartley,\r\nfor example, regarded the whole present effect upon us of any single\r\nobject—say, an orange—as a single sensation; and the whole vestige\r\nit left behind, as a single \u0027idea of sensation.\u0027 His modern disciples,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_485\"\u003e[Pg 485]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\non the other hand, consider this same effect as an aggregate from a\r\nplurality of sensations, and the ideal trace it leaves as highly compound.\r\n\u0027The idea of an object,\u0027 instead of being an elementary starting-point\r\nwith them, is one of the elaborate results of repetition and experience;\r\nand is continually adduced as remarkably illustrating the fusing power\r\nof habitual association. Thus James Mill observes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u0027It is to this great law of association that we trace the formation of\r\nour ideas of what we call external objects; that is, the ideas of a certain\r\nnumber of sensations, received together so frequently that they\r\ncoalesce as it were, and are spoken of under the idea of unity. Hence,\r\nwhat we call the idea of a tree, the idea of a stone, the idea of a horse,\r\nthe idea of a man. In using the names, tree, horse, man, the names\r\nof what I call objects, I am referring, and can be referring, only to my\r\nown sensations; in fact, therefore, only naming a certain number of\r\nsensations regarded as in a particular state of combination, that is,\r\nconcomitance. Particular sensations of sight, of touch, of the muscles,\r\nare the sensations to the ideas of which, color, extension, roughness,\r\nhardness, smoothness, taste, smell, so coalescing as to appear one idea,\r\nI give the name of the idea of a tree.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_407_407\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_407_407\"\u003e[407]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To precisely the same effect Mr. Bain remarks:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u0027External objects usually affect us through a plurality of senses.\r\nThe pebble on the sea-shore is pictured on the eye as form and color.\r\nWe take it up in the hand and repeat the impression of form, with the\r\nadditional feeling of touch. Knock two together, and there is a characteristic\r\nsound. To preserve the impression of an object of this kind,\r\nthere must be an association of all these different effects. Such association,\r\nwhen matured and firm, is our idea, our intellectual grasp of the\r\npebble. Passing to the organic world, and plucking a rose, we have\r\nthe same effects of form to the eye and hand, color and touch, with\r\nnew effects of odor and taste. A certain time is requisite for the coherence\r\nof all these qualities in one aggregate, so as to give us for all\r\npurposes the enduring image of the rose. When fully acquired, any\r\none of the characteristic impressions will revive the others; the odor,\r\nthe sight, the feeling of the thorny stalk—each of these by itself will\r\nhoist the entire impression into the view.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_408_408\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_408_408\"\u003e[408]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now, this order of derivation, making our objective knowledge begin\r\nwith plurality of impression and arrive at unity, we take to be a\r\ncomplete inversion of our psychological history. Hartley, we think,\r\nwas perfectly right in taking no notice of the number of inlets through\r\nwhich an object delivers its effect upon us, and, in spite of this circumstance,\r\ntreating the effect as one…. Even now, after life has read\r\nus so many analytic lessons, in proportion as we can fix the attitude of\r\nour scene and ourselves, the sense of plurality in our impressions retreats,\r\nand we lapse into an undivided consciousness; losing, for instance,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_486\"\u003e[Pg 486]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe separate notice of any uniform hum in the ear, or light in\r\nthe eye, or weight of clothes on the body, though not one of them is inoperative\r\non the complexion of our feeling. This law, once granted,\r\nmust be carried far beyond Hartley\u0027s point. Not only must each object\r\npresent itself to us integrally before it shells off into its qualities,\r\nbut the whole scene around us must disengage for us object after object\r\nfrom its still background by emergence and change; and even our\r\nself-detachment from the world over against us must wait for the\r\nstart of collision between the force we issue and that which we receive.\r\nTo confine ourselves to the simplest case: when a red ivory ball, seen\r\nfor the first time, has been withdrawn, it will leave a mental representation\r\nof itself, in which all that it simultaneously gave us will indistinguishably\r\ncoexist. Let a white ball succeed to it; now, and not\r\nbefore, will an attribute detach itself, and the color, by force of contrast,\r\nbe shaken out into the foreground. Let the white ball be replaced\r\nby an egg: and this new difference will bring the form into\r\nnotice from its previous slumber. And thus, that which began by\r\nbeing simply an object, cut out from the surrounding scene, becomes\r\nfor us first a \u003ci\u003ered\u003c/i\u003e object, and then a \u003ci\u003ered round\u003c/i\u003e object; and so on. Instead,\r\ntherefore, of the qualities, as separately given, subscribing together\r\nand adding themselves up to present us with the object as their\r\naggregate, the object is beforehand with them, and from its integrity\r\ndelivers them out to our knowledge, one by one. In this disintegration,\r\nthe primary nucleus never loses its substantive character or name;\r\nwhilst the difference which it throws off appears as a mere attribute, expressed\r\nby an adjective. Hence it is that we are compelled to think of\r\nthe object as \u003ci\u003ehaving\u003c/i\u003e, not as \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e, its qualities; and can never heartily\r\nadmit the belief of any loose lot of attributes really fusing themselves\r\ninto a \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e. The unity of the original whole is not felt to go to pieces\r\nand be resolved into the properties which it successively gives off; it\r\nretains a residuary existence, which constitutes it a \u003ci\u003esubstance\u003c/i\u003e, as against\r\nthe emerging quality, which is only its \u003ci\u003ephenomenal predicate\u003c/i\u003e. Were\r\nit not for this perpetual process of differentiation of self from the\r\nworld, of object from its scene, of attribute from object, no step of\r\nAbstraction could be taken; no qualities could fall under our notice;\r\nand had we ten thousand senses, they would all converge and meet in\r\nbut one consciousness. But if this be so, it is an utter falsification of\r\nthe order of nature to speak of sensations grouping themselves into\r\naggregates, and so composing for us the objects of which we think;\r\nand the whole language of the theory, in regard to the field of\r\nsynchronous existences, is a direct inversion of the truth. Experience\r\nproceeds and intellect is trained, not by Association, but by \u003ci\u003eDissociation\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nnot by reduction of pluralities of impression to one, but by the\r\nopening out of one into many; and a true psychological history must\r\nexpound itself in analytic rather than synthetic terms. Precisely those\r\nideas—of Substance, of Mind, of Cause, of Space—which this system\r\ntreats as infinitely complex, the last result of myriads of confluent elements,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_487\"\u003e[Pg 487]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare in truth the residuary simplicities of consciousness, whose\r\nstability the eddies and currents of phenomenal experience have left\r\nundisturbed.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_409_409\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_409_409\"\u003e[409]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth is that Experience is trained by \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e association\r\nand dissociation, and that psychology must be writ\r\n\u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e in synthetic and in analytic terms. Our original sensible\r\ntotals are, on the one hand, subdivided by discriminative\r\nattention, and, on the other, united with other totals,—either\r\nthrough the agency of our own movements, carrying\r\nour senses from one part of space to another, or because\r\nnew objects come successively and replace those by which\r\nwe were at first impressed. The \u0027simple impression\u0027 of\r\nHume, the \u0027simple idea\u0027 of Locke are both abstractions,\r\nnever realized in experience. Experience, from the very\r\nfirst, presents us with concreted objects, vaguely continuous\r\nwith the rest of the world which envelops them in space\r\nand time, and potentially divisible into inward elements\r\nand parts. These objects we break asunder and reunite.\r\nWe must treat them in both ways for our knowledge of\r\nthem to grow; and it is hard to say, on the whole, which\r\nway preponderates. But since the elements with which\r\nthe traditional associationism performs its constructions—\u0027simple\r\nsensations,\u0027 namely—are all products of discrimination\r\ncarried to a high pitch, it seems as if we ought to\r\ndiscuss the subject of analytic attention and discrimination\r\nfirst.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe noticing of any \u003ci\u003epart\u003c/i\u003e whatever of our object is an\r\nact of discrimination. Already on \u003ca href=\"#Page_404\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 404\u003c/a\u003e I have described\r\nthe manner in which we often spontaneously lapse into the\r\nundiscriminating state, even with regard to objects which\r\nwe have already learned to distinguish. Such anæsthetics\r\nas chloroform, nitrous oxide, etc., sometimes bring about\r\ntransient lapses even more total, in which numerical discrimination\r\nespecially seems gone; for one sees light and\r\nhears sound, but whether one or many lights and sounds\r\nis quite impossible to tell. Where the parts of an object\r\nhave already been discerned, and each made the object of\r\na special discriminative act, we can with difficulty feel the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_488\"\u003e[Pg 488]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobject again in its pristine unity; and so prominent may\r\nour consciousness of its composition be, that we may hardly\r\nbelieve that it ever could have appeared undivided. But\r\nthis is an erroneous view, the undeniable fact being that\r\n\u003ci\u003eany number of impressions, from any number of sensory sources,\r\nfalling simultaneously on a mind\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ewhich has not yet experienced\r\nthem separately\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ewill fuse into a single undivided object\r\nfor that mind.\u003c/i\u003e The law is that all things fuse that \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e\r\nfuse, and nothing separates except what must. What makes\r\nimpressions separate we have to study in this chapter.\r\nAlthough they separate easier if they come in through distinct\r\nnerves, yet distinct nerves are not an unconditional\r\nground of their discrimination, as we shall presently see.\r\nThe baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails\r\nat once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion;\r\nand to the very end of life, our location of all things\r\nin one space is due to the fact that the original extents or\r\nbignesses of all the sensations which came to our notice at\r\nonce, coalesced together into one and the same space.\r\nThere is no other reason than this why \"the hand I touch\r\nand see coincides spatially with the hand I immediately\r\nfeel.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_410_410\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_410_410\"\u003e[410]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is true that we may sometimes be tempted to exclaim,\r\nwhen once a lot of hitherto unnoticed details of the object lie\r\nbefore us, \"How could we ever have been ignorant of these\r\nthings and yet have felt the object, or drawn the conclusion,\r\nas if it were a \u003ci\u003econtinuum\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003ci\u003eplenum\u003c/i\u003e? There would have\r\nbeen \u003ci\u003egaps\u003c/i\u003e—but we felt no gaps; wherefore we must have seen\r\nand heard these details, leaned upon these steps; they must\r\nhave been operative upon our minds, just as they are now, only\r\n\u003ci\u003eunconsciously\u003c/i\u003e, or at least \u003ci\u003einattentively\u003c/i\u003e. Our first unanalyzed\r\nsensation was really composed of these elementary sensations,\r\nour first rapid conclusion was really based on these\r\nintermediate inferences, all the while, only we failed to note\r\nthe fact.\" But this is nothing but the fatal \u0027psychologist\u0027s fallacy\u0027\r\n(\u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 196\u003c/a\u003e) of treating an inferior state of mind as if it\r\nmust somehow know implicitly all that is explicitly known\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_489\"\u003e[Pg 489]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eabout the same topic\u003c/i\u003e by superior states of mind. The thing\r\nthought of is unquestionably the same, but it is thought\r\ntwice over in two absolutely different psychoses,—once as an\r\nunbroken unit, and again as a sum of discriminated parts. It\r\nis not one thought in two editions, but two entirely distinct\r\nthoughts of one thing. And each thought is within itself a\r\n\u003ci\u003econtinuum\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003ci\u003eplenum\u003c/i\u003e, needing no contributions from the other\r\nto fill up its gaps. As I sit here, I think objects, and I\r\nmake inferences, which the future is sure to analyze and\r\narticulate and riddle with discriminations, showing me many\r\nthings wherever I now notice one. Nevertheless, my\r\nthought feels quite sufficient unto itself for the time being;\r\nand ranges from pole to pole, as free, and as unconscious\r\nof having overlooked anything, as if it possessed the greatest\r\ndiscriminative enlightenment. We all cease analyzing\r\nthe world at some point, and notice no more differences.\r\nThe last units with which we stop are our objective elements\r\nof being. Those of a dog are different from those of a\r\nHumboldt; those of a practical man from those of a metaphysician.\r\nBut the dog\u0027s and the practical man\u0027s thoughts\r\n\u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e continuous, though to the Humboldt or the metaphysician\r\nthey would appear full of gaps and defects. And\r\nthey \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e continuous, \u003ci\u003eas thoughts\u003c/i\u003e. It is only \u003ci\u003eas mirrors of\r\nthings\u003c/i\u003e that the superior minds find them full of omissions.\r\nAnd when the omitted things are discovered and the unnoticed\r\ndifferences laid bare, it is not that the old \u003ci\u003ethoughts\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsplit up, but that \u003ci\u003enew thoughts supersede\u003c/i\u003e them, which make\r\nnew judgments about the same objective world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PRINCIPLE OF MEDIATE COMPARISON.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we discriminate an element, we may contrast it\r\nwith the case of its own absence, of its simply not being\r\nthere, without reference to what \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e there; or we may also\r\ntake the latter into account. Let the first sort of discrimination\r\nbe called \u003ci\u003eexistential\u003c/i\u003e, the latter \u003ci\u003edifferential\u003c/i\u003e discrimination.\r\nA peculiarity of differential discriminations is that\r\nthey result in a perception of differences which are felt as\r\n\u003ci\u003egreater or less\u003c/i\u003e one than the other. Entire groups of differences\r\nmay be ranged in series: the musical scale, the color\r\nscale, are examples. Every department of our experience\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_490\"\u003e[Pg 490]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay have its data written down in an evenly gradated order,\r\nfrom a lowest to a highest member. And any one datum\r\nmay be a term in several such orders. A given note may\r\nhave a high place in the pitch-series, a low place in the\r\nloudness-series, and a medium place in the series of agreeablenesses.\r\nA given tint must, in order to be fully determined,\r\nhave its place assigned in the series of qualities, in\r\nthe series of purities (freedom from white), and in the series\r\nof intensities or brightnesses. It may be low in one of\r\nthese respects, but high in another. In passing from term\r\nto term in any such series we are conscious not only of each\r\nstep of difference being equal to (or greater or less than)\r\nthe last, but we are conscious of proceeding in a \u003ci\u003euniform\r\ndirection\u003c/i\u003e, different from other possible directions. This\r\n\u003ci\u003econsciousness of serial increase of differences\u003c/i\u003e is one of the\r\nfundamental facts of our intellectual life. More, \u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003emore\u003c/span\u003e, of the same kind of difference, we say, as we advance\r\nfrom term to term, and realize that the farther on we get\r\nthe larger grows the breach between the term we are at\r\nand the one from which we started. Between any two\r\nterms of such a series the difference is greater than that between\r\nany intermediate terms, or than that between an intermediate\r\nterm and either of the extremes. The louder than\r\nthe loud is louder than the less loud; the farther than the\r\nfar is farther than the less far; the earlier than the early is\r\nearlier than the late; the higher than the high is higher\r\nthan the low; the bigger than the big is bigger than the\r\nsmall; or, to put it briefly and universally, \u003ci\u003ethe more than the\r\nmore is more than the less\u003c/i\u003e; such is \u003ci\u003ethe great synthetic principle\r\nof mediate comparison which is involved in the possession\r\nby the human mind of the sense of serial increase\u003c/i\u003e. In\r\nChapter XXVIII we shall see the altogether overwhelming\r\nimportance of this principle in the conduct of all our higher\r\nrational operations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eARE ALL DIFFERENCES DIFFERENCES OF COMPOSITION?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach of the differences in one of these uniform series\r\nfeels like a definite sensible quantity, and each term seems\r\nlike the last term with this quantity added. In many concrete\r\nobjects which differ from one another we can plainly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_491\"\u003e[Pg 491]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsee that the difference does consist singly in the fact that\r\none object is the same as the other \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e something else, or\r\nthat they both have an identical part, to which each adds\r\na distinct remainder. Thus two pictures may be struck\r\nfrom the same block, but one of them may differ in having\r\ncolor added; or two carpets may show an identical pattern\r\nwhich in each is woven in distinct hues. Similarly, two\r\nclasses of sensation may have the same emotional tone but\r\nnegate each other in remaining respects—a dark color and\r\na deep sound, for example; or two faces may have the same\r\nshape of nose but everything else unlike. The similarity\r\nof the same note sounded by instruments of different timbre\r\nis explained by the coexistence of a fundamental tone\r\ncommon to both, with over-tones in one which the other\r\nlacks. Dipping my hand into water and anon into a colder\r\nwater, I may then observe certain additional feelings, broader\r\nand deeper irradiations of the cold, so to speak, which were\r\nnot in the earlier experience, though for aught I can tell,\r\nthe feelings may be otherwise the same. \u0027Hefting\u0027 first\r\none weight, and then another, new feelings may start out\r\nin my elbow-joint, wrist, and elsewhere, and make me call\r\nthe second weight the heavier of the twain. In all these\r\ncases each of the differing things may be represented by\r\ntwo parts, one that is common to it and the others, and another\r\nthat is peculiar to itself. If they form a series,\r\n\u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D,\u003c/i\u003e etc., and the common part be called \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e, whilst\r\nthe lowest difference be called \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, then the composition\r\nof the series would be as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e = \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e = (\u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) + \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e + 2\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e = \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e + 3\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eD\u003c/i\u003e = \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e + 4\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e . . . . . . .\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e itself were ultimately composed of \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s we should\r\nhave the entire series explained as due to the varying combination\r\nand re-combination with itself of an unvarying element;\r\nand all the apparent differences of quality would be\r\ntranslated into differences of quantity alone. This is the\r\nsort of reduction which the atomic theory in physics and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_492\"\u003e[Pg 492]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe mind-stuff theory in psychology regard as their ideal.\r\nSo that, following the analogy of our instances, one might\r\neasily be tempted to generalize and to say that all difference\r\nis but addition and subtraction, and that what we called\r\n\u0027differential\u0027 discrimination is only \u0027existential\u0027 discrimination\r\nin disguise; that is to say, that where \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e differ,\r\nwe merely discern something in the one which the other is\r\nwithout. \u003ci\u003eAbsolute identity in things up to a certain point,\r\nthen absolute non-identity,\u003c/i\u003e would on this theory take the\r\nplace of those ultimate qualitative unlikenesses between\r\nthem, in which we naturally believe; and the mental function\r\nof discrimination, ceasing to be regarded as an ultimate\r\none, would resolve itself into mere logical affirmation and\r\nnegation, or perception that a feature found in one thing,\r\nin another does not exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTheoretically, however, this theory is full of difficulty.\r\nIf all the differences which we feel were \u003ci\u003ein one direction\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nso that all objects could be arranged in one series (however\r\nlong), it might still work. But when we consider the\r\nnotorious fact that objects differ from each other in \u003ci\u003edivergent\r\ndirections\u003c/i\u003e, it grows well nigh impossible to make it do so.\r\nFor then, supposing that an object differed from things in\r\none direction by the increment \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, it would have to differ\r\nfrom things in another direction by a different sort of increment,\r\ncall it \u003ci\u003ed\u0027\u003c/i\u003e; so that, after getting rid of qualitative unlikeness\r\nbetween objects, we should have it back on our\r\nhands again between their increments. We may of course\r\nre-apply our method, and say that the difference between\r\n\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ed\u0027\u003c/i\u003e is not a qualitative unlikeness, but a fact of composition,\r\none of them being the same as the other \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e an\r\nincrement of still higher order, \u003ci\u003eδ\u003c/i\u003e for example, added. But\r\nwhen we recollect that everything in the world can be compared\r\nwith everything else, and that the number of directions\r\nof difference is indefinitely great, then we see that the\r\ncomplication of self-compoundings of the ultimate differential\r\nincrement by which, on this theory, all the innumerable\r\nunlikenesses of the world are explained, in order to avoid\r\nwriting any of them down as ultimate differences of kind,\r\nwould beggar all conception. It is the mind-dust theory;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_493\"\u003e[Pg 493]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith all its difficulties in a particularly uncompromising\r\nform; and all for the sake of the fantastic pleasure of being\r\nable arbitrarily to say that there is between the things in\r\nthe world and between the \u0027ideas\u0027 in the mind nothing but\r\nabsolute sameness and absolute not-sameness of elements,\r\nthe not-sameness admitting no degrees.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo me it seems much wiser to turn away from such\r\ntranscendental extravagances of speculation, and to abide\r\nby the natural appearances. These would leave unlikeness\r\nas an indecomposable relation amongst things, and a relation\r\nmoreover of which there were all degrees. Absolute\r\nnot-sameness would be the maximal degree, absolute sameness\r\nthe minimal degree of this unlikeness, the discernment\r\nof which would be one of our ultimate cognitive powers.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_411_411\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_411_411\"\u003e[411]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCertainly the natural appearances are dead against the notion\r\nthat no qualitative differences exist. With the same clearness\r\nwith which, in certain objects, we do feel a difference to\r\nbe a mere matter of \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eminus\u003c/i\u003e, in other objects we feel\r\nthat this is not the case. Contrast our feeling of the difference\r\nbetween the length of two lines with our feeling of the\r\ndifference between blue and yellow, or with that between\r\nright and left. Is right equal to left with something added?\r\nIs blue yellow \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e something? If so, \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e what?\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_412_412\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_412_412\"\u003e[412]\u003c/a\u003e So\r\nlong as we stick to \u003ci\u003everifiable\u003c/i\u003e psychology, \u003ci\u003ewe are forced to\r\nadmit that differences of simple\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eform an irreducible sort\r\nof relation\u003c/i\u003e between some of the elements of our experience,\r\nand forced to deny that differential discrimination\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_494\"\u003e[Pg 494]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncan everywhere be reduced to the mere ascertainment\r\nthat elements present in one fact, in another fail to exist.\r\nThe perception that an element exists in one thing and does\r\nnot exist in another and the perception of qualitative difference\r\nare, in short, entirely disconnected mental functions.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_413_413\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_413_413\"\u003e[413]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut at the same time that we insist on this, we must\r\nalso admit that differences of quality, however abundant,\r\nare not the only distinctions with which our mind has to\r\ndeal. Differences which seem of mere composition, of\r\nnumber, of \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eminus\u003c/i\u003e, also abound.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_414_414\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_414_414\"\u003e[414]\u003c/a\u003e But it will be\r\nbest for the present to disregard all these quantitative\r\ncases and, taking the others (which, by the least favorable\r\ncalculation, will still be numerous enough), to consider\r\nnext \u003ci\u003ethe manner in which we come to cognize simple differences\r\nof kind\u003c/i\u003e. We cannot \u003ci\u003eexplain\u003c/i\u003e the cognition; we can only ascertain\r\nthe conditions by virtue of which it occurs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE CONDITIONS OF DISCRIMINATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWhat, then, are the conditions under which we discriminate\r\nthings differing in a simple way?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, \u003ci\u003ethe things must\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003edifferent\u003c/i\u003e, either in time, or\r\nplace, or quality. If the difference in any of these regards\r\nis sufficiently great, then we cannot overlook it, except by\r\nnot noticing the things at all. No one can help singling\r\nout a black stripe on a white ground, or feeling the contrast\r\nbetween a bass note and a high one sounded immediately\r\nafter it. Discrimination is here \u003ci\u003einvoluntary\u003c/i\u003e. But where\r\nthe objective difference is less, discrimination need not so\r\ninevitably occur, and may even require considerable effort\r\nof attention to be performed at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_495\"\u003e[Pg 495]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother condition which then favors it is that the sensations\r\nexcited by \u003ci\u003ethe differing objects should not come to\r\nus simultaneously but fall in immediate\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003esuccession\u003c/span\u003e upon the\r\nsame organ. It is easier to compare successive than simultaneous\r\nsounds, easier to compare two weights or two temperatures\r\nby testing one after the other with the same hand,\r\nthan by using both hands and comparing both at once.\r\nSimilarly it is easier to discriminate shades of light or color\r\nby moving the eye from one to the other, so that they successively\r\nstimulate the same retinal tract. In testing the\r\nlocal discrimination of the skin, by applying compass-points,\r\nit is found that they are felt to touch different spots\r\nmuch more readily when set down one after the other than\r\nwhen both are applied at once. In the latter case they\r\nmay be two or three inches apart on the back, thighs, etc.,\r\nand still feel as if they were set down in one spot. Finally,\r\nin the case of smell and taste it is well-nigh impossible to\r\ncompare simultaneous impressions at all. The reason why\r\nsuccessive impression so much favors the result seems to\r\nbe that there is a real \u003ci\u003esensation of difference\u003c/i\u003e, aroused by the\r\nshock of transition from one perception to another which\r\nis unlike the first. This sensation of difference has its own\r\npeculiar quality, as difference, which remains sensible, no\r\nmatter of what sort the terms may be, between which it\r\nobtains. It is, in short, one of those transitive feelings,\r\nor feelings of relation, of which I treated in a former\r\nplace (\u003ca href=\"#Page_245\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 245\u003c/a\u003e ff.); and, when once aroused, its object\r\nlingers in the memory along with the substantive terms\r\nwhich precede and follow, and enables our \u003ci\u003ejudgments of\r\ncomparison\u003c/i\u003e to be made. We shall soon see reason to believe\r\nthat no two terms can possibly be \u003ci\u003esimultaneously\u003c/i\u003e perceived\r\nto differ, unless, in a preliminary operation, we have successively\r\nattended to each, and, in so doing, had the transitional\r\nsensation of difference between them aroused. A\r\nfield of consciousness, however complex, is never analyzed\r\nunless some of its ingredients have changed. We \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndiscern, \u0027tis true, a multitude of coexisting things about\r\nus at every moment: but this is because we have had a\r\nlong education, and each thing we now see distinct has\r\nbeen already differentiated from its neighbors by repeated\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_496\"\u003e[Pg 496]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nappearances in successive order. To the infant, sounds,\r\nsights, touches, and pains, form probably one unanalyzed\r\nbloom of confusion.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_415_415\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_415_415\"\u003e[415]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the difference between the successive sensations\r\nis but slight, the transition between them must be made as\r\nimmediate as possible, and both must be compared \u003ci\u003ein memory\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nin order to get the best results. One cannot judge\r\naccurately of the difference between two similar wines,\r\nwhilst the second is still in one\u0027s mouth. So of sounds,\r\nwarmths, etc.—we must get the dying phases of both sensations\r\nof the pair we are comparing. Where, however,\r\nthe difference is strong, this condition is immaterial, and\r\nwe can then compare a sensation actually felt with another\r\ncarried in memory only. The longer the interval of time\r\nbetween the sensations, the more uncertain is their discrimination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difference, thus immediately felt between two terms,\r\nis independent of our ability to identify either of the terms\r\nby itself. I can feel two distinct spots to be touched on\r\nmy skin, yet not know which is above and which below. I\r\ncan observe two neighboring musical tones to differ, and\r\nstill not know which of the two is the higher in pitch.\r\nSimilarly I may discriminate two neighboring tints, whilst\r\nremaining uncertain which is the bluer or the yellower,\r\nor \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e either differs from its mate.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_416_416\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_416_416\"\u003e[416]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith such direct perceptions of difference as this, we\r\nmust not confound those entirely unlike cases in which we\r\n\u003ci\u003einfer\u003c/i\u003e that two things must differ because we know enough\r\n\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e each of them taken by itself to warrant our classing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_497\"\u003e[Pg 497]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem under distinct heads. It often happens, when the\r\ninterval is long between two experiences, that our judgments\r\nare guided, not so much by a positive image or copy\r\nof the earlier one, as by our recollection of certain facts\r\nabout it. Thus I know that the sunshine to-day is less\r\nbright than on a certain day last week, because I then said\r\nit was quite dazzling, a remark I should not now care to\r\nmake. Or I know myself to feel better now than I was last\r\nsummer, because I can now psychologize, and then I could\r\nnot. We are constantly busy comparing feelings with\r\nwhose quality our imagination has no sort of \u003ci\u003eacquaintance\u003c/i\u003e\r\nat the time—pleasures, or pains, for example. It is notoriously\r\nhard to conjure up in imagination a lively image of\r\neither of these classes of feeling. The associationists may\r\nprate of an idea of pleasure being a pleasant idea, of an\r\nidea of pain being a painful one, but the unsophisticated\r\nsense of mankind is against them, agreeing with Homer\r\nthat the memory of griefs when past may be a joy, and with\r\nDante that there is no greater sorrow than, in misery, to\r\nrecollect one\u0027s happier time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFeelings remembered in this imperfect way \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be\r\ncompared with present or recent feelings by the aid of what\r\nwe know about them. We identify the remote experience\r\nin such a case by \u003ci\u003econceiving it\u003c/i\u003e. The most perfect way of\r\nconceiving it is by defining it in terms of some standard\r\nscale. If I know the thermometer to stand at zero to-day\r\nand to have stood at 32° last Sunday, I know to-day to be\r\ncolder, and I know just how much colder, than it was last\r\nSunday. If I know that a certain note was \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, and that this\r\nnote is \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, I know that this note must be the higher of the\r\ntwo.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe inference that two things differ because their concomitants,\r\neffects, names, kinds, or—to put it generally—their\r\n\u003ci\u003esigns\u003c/i\u003e, differ, is of course susceptible of unlimited\r\ncomplication. The sciences furnish examples, in the way\r\nin which men are led, by noticing differences in effects, to\r\nassume new hypothetical causes, differing from any known\r\nheretofore. But no matter how many may be the steps by\r\nwhich such inferential discriminations are made, \u003ci\u003ethey all\r\nend in a direct intuition of difference somewhere\u003c/i\u003e. The \u003ci\u003elast\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_498\"\u003e[Pg 498]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nground for inferring that A and B differ must be that,\r\nwhilst A is an \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, B is an \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, and that \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e are \u003ci\u003eseen to\r\ndiffer\u003c/i\u003e. Let us then neglect the complex cases, the A\u0027s and\r\nthe B\u0027s, and go back to the study of the unanalyzable perception\r\nof difference between their signs, the \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s and the\r\n\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s, when these are seemingly simple terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI said that in their immediate succession the shock of\r\ntheir difference was \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e. It is felt \u003ci\u003erepeatedly\u003c/i\u003e when we go\r\nback and forth from \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e; and we make a point of getting\r\nit thus repeatedly (by alternating our attention at least)\r\nwhenever the shock is so slight as to be with difficulty perceived.\r\nBut in addition to being felt at the brief instant\r\nof transition, the difference also feels as if incorporated\r\nand taken up into the second term, which feels \u0027different-from-the-first\u0027\r\neven while it lasts. It is obvious that the\r\n\u0027second term\u0027 of the mind in this case is not bald \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, but\r\na very complex object; and that the sequence is not simply\r\nfirst \u0027\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then \u0027\u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then \u0027\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027; but first \u0027\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027\r\nthen \u0027\u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then \u0027\u003ci\u003en-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 The several\r\nthoughts, however, to which these three several objects are\r\nrevealed, are three ordinary \u0027segments\u0027 of the mental\r\n\u0027stream.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs our brains and minds are actually made, it is impossible\r\nto get certain \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s in immediate sequence and\r\nto keep them \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e. If kept pure, it would mean that they\r\nremained uncompared. With us, inevitably, by a mechanism\r\nwhich we as yet fail to understand, the shock of difference\r\nis felt between them, and the second object is not \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\r\npure, but \u003ci\u003en-as-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_417_417\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_417_417\"\u003e[417]\u003c/a\u003e It is no more a paradox\r\nthat under these conditions this cognition of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nmutual relation should occur, than that under other conditions\r\nthe cognition of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s or \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s simple quality should\r\noccur. But as it has been treated as a paradox, and as a\r\nspiritual agent, not itself a portion of the stream, has been\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_499\"\u003e[Pg 499]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninvoked to account for it, a word of further remark seems\r\ndesirable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy account, it will be noted, is merely a description of\r\nthe facts as they occur: feelings (or thoughts) each knowing\r\nsomething, but the later one knowing, if preceded by\r\na certain earlier one, a more complicated object than it\r\nwould have known had the earlier one not been there. I\r\noffer no \u003ci\u003eexplanation\u003c/i\u003e of such a sequence of cognitions. The\r\nexplanation (I devoutly expect) will be found some day to\r\ndepend on cerebral conditions. Until it is forthcoming, we\r\ncan only treat the sequence as a special case of the general\r\nlaw that every experience undergone by the brain leaves in\r\nit a modification which is one factor in determining what\r\nmanner of experiences the following ones shall be (\u003ci\u003ecf.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_232\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 232-236\u003c/a\u003e). To anyone who denies the possibility of such\r\na law I have nothing to say, until he brings his proofs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sensationalists and the spiritualists meanwhile\r\n(filled both of them with their notion that the mind must\r\nin some fashion \u003ci\u003econtain\u003c/i\u003e what it knows) begin by giving a\r\ncrooked account of the facts. Both admit that for \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e to be known in any way whatever, little rounded and finished\r\noff duplicates of each must be contained in the mind\r\nas separate entities. These pure ideas, so called, of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e respectively, succeed each other there. And since they\r\n\u003ci\u003eare distinct\u003c/i\u003e, say the sensationalists, they are \u003ci\u003eeo ipso\u003c/i\u003e distinguished.\r\n\"To have ideas different and ideas distinguished,\r\nare synonymous expressions; different and distinguished\r\nmeaning exactly the same thing,\" says James Mill.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_418_418\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_418_418\"\u003e[418]\u003c/a\u003e \"Distinguished!\"\r\nsay the spiritualists, \"distinguished \u003ci\u003eby what\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nforsooth? Truly the respective ideas of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e and of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e in the\r\nmind are distinct. But for that very reason neither can\r\ndistinguish itself from the other, for to do that it would\r\nhave to be aware of the other, and thus for the time being\r\nbecome the other, and that would be to get mixed up with\r\nthe other and to lose its own distinctness. Distinctness\r\nof ideas and idea of distinctness, are not one thing, but\r\ntwo. This last is a \u003ci\u003erelation\u003c/i\u003e. Only a \u003ci\u003erelating principle\u003c/i\u003e, opposed\r\nin nature to all facts of feeling, an Ego, Soul, or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_500\"\u003e[Pg 500]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nSubject, is competent, by being present to both of the\r\nideas alike, to hold them together and at the same time to\r\nkeep them distinct.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if the plain facts be admitted that the \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e idea of\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is \u003ci\u003enever in the mind at all\u003c/i\u003e, when \u0027\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 has once gone before;\r\nand that the feeling \u0027\u003ci\u003en-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is itself an\r\nabsolutely unique pulse of thought, the bottom of this\r\nprecious quarrel drops out and neither party is left with\r\nanything to fight about. Surely such a consummation\r\nought to be welcomed, especially when brought about, us\r\nhere, by a formulation of the facts which offers itself so\r\nnaturally and unsophistically.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_419_419\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_419_419\"\u003e[419]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_501\"\u003e[Pg 501]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may, then, conclude our examination of the manner\r\nin which simple involuntary discrimination comes about, by\r\nsaying, 1) that its vehicle is a thought possessed of a knowledge\r\nof both terms compared and of their difference; 2)\r\nthat the necessary and sufficient condition (as the human\r\nmind goes) for arousing this thought is that a thought or\r\nfeeling of one of the terms discriminated should, as immediately\r\nas possible, precede that in which the other term is\r\nknown; and 3) and that the thought which knows the second\r\nterm will then also know the difference (or in more difficult\r\ncases will be continuously succeeded by one which does\r\nknow the difference) and both of the terms between which\r\nit holds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis last thought need, however, not \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e these terms with\r\ntheir difference, nor \u003ci\u003econtain\u003c/i\u003e them. A man\u0027s thought can\r\nknow and mean all sorts of things without those things getting\r\nbodily into it—the distant, for example, the future, and\r\nthe past.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_420_420\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_420_420\"\u003e[420]\u003c/a\u003e The vanishing term in the case which occupies\r\nus vanishes; but because it is the specific term it is and\r\nnothing else, it leaves a specific influence behind it when it\r\nvanishes, the effect of which is to determine the succeeding\r\npulse of thought in a perfectly characteristic way. Whatever\r\nconsciousness comes next must know the vanished\r\nterm and call it different from the one now there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere we are at the end of our tether about involuntary\r\ndiscrimination of successively felt simple things; and must\r\ndrop the subject, hopeless of seeing any deeper into it for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_502\"\u003e[Pg 502]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe present, and turn to discriminations of a less simple\r\nsort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PROCESS OF ANALYSIS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd first, of the discrimination of simultaneously felt\r\nimpressions! Our first way of looking at a reality is often\r\nto suppose it simple, but later we may learn to perceive it\r\nas compound. This new way of knowing the same reality\r\nmay conveniently be called by the name of \u003ci\u003eAnalysis\u003c/i\u003e. It is\r\nmanifestly one of the most incessantly performed of all our\r\nmental processes, so let us examine the conditions under\r\nwhich it occurs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI think we may safely lay down at the outset this fundamental\r\nprinciple, that \u003ci\u003eany total impression made on the\r\nmind must be unanalyzable, whose elements are never experienced\r\napart\u003c/i\u003e. The components of an absolutely changeless\r\ngroup of not-elsewhere-occurring attributes could never\r\nbe discriminated. If all cold things were wet and all wet\r\nthings cold, if all hard things pricked our skin, and no\r\nother things did so; is it likely that we should discriminate\r\nbetween coldness and wetness, and hardness and\r\npungency respectively? If all liquids were transparent\r\nand no non-liquid were transparent, it would be long before\r\nwe had separate names for liquidity and transparency. If\r\nheat were a function of position above the earth\u0027s surface,\r\nso that the higher a thing was the hotter it became, one\r\nword would serve for hot and high. We have, in fact, a\r\nnumber of sensations whose concomitants are almost invariably\r\nthe same, and we find it, accordingly, almost impossible\r\nto analyze them out from the totals in which they\r\nare found. The contraction of the diaphragm and the expansion\r\nof the lungs, the shortening of certain muscles and\r\nthe rotation of certain joints, are examples. The converging\r\nof the eyeballs and the accommodation for near objects\r\nare, for each distance of the object (in the common use\r\nof the eyes) inseparably linked, and neither can (without a\r\nsort of artificial training which shall presently be mentioned)\r\nbe felt by itself. We learn that the \u003ci\u003ecauses\u003c/i\u003e of such groups\r\nof feelings are multiple, and therefore we frame theories\r\nabout the composition of the feelings themselves, by \u0027fusion,\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_503\"\u003e[Pg 503]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0027integration,\u0027 \u0027synthesis,\u0027 or what not. But by direct introspection\r\nno analysis of them is ever made. A conspicuous\r\ncase will come to view when we treat of the emotions.\r\nEvery emotion has its \u0027expression,\u0027 of quick breathing,\r\npalpitating heart, flushed face, or the like. The expression\r\ngives rise to bodily feelings; and the emotion is thus necessarily\r\nand invariably accompanied by these bodily feelings.\r\nThe consequence is that it is impossible to apprehend it as\r\na spiritual state by itself, or to analyze it away from the\r\nlower feelings in question. It is in fact impossible to prove\r\nthat it exists as a distinct psychic fact. The present writer\r\nstrongly doubts that it does so exist. But those who are\r\nmost firmly persuaded of its existence must wait, to prove\r\ntheir point, until they can quote some as yet unfound pathological\r\ncase of an individual who shall have emotions in a\r\nbody in which either complete paralysis will have prevented\r\ntheir expression, or complete anæsthesia will have made\r\nthe latter unfelt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn general, then, if an object affects us simultaneously\r\nin a number of ways, \u003ci\u003eabcd\u003c/i\u003e, we get a peculiar integral impression,\r\nwhich thereafter characterizes to our mind the individuality\r\nof that object, and becomes the sign of its presence;\r\nand which is only resolved into \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d,\u003c/i\u003e respectively by\r\nthe aid of farther experiences. These we now may turn to\r\nconsider.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIf any single quality or constituent, a, of such an object, have\r\npreviously been known by us isolatedly,\u003c/i\u003e or have in any other\r\nmanner already become an object of separate acquaintance\r\non our part, so that we have an image of it, distinct or vague,\r\nin our mind, disconnected with \u003ci\u003ebcd, then that constituent a\r\nmay be analyzed out from the total impression\u003c/i\u003e. Analysis of\r\na thing means separate attention to each of its parts. In\r\n\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XI\u003c/a\u003e we saw that one condition of attending to a thing\r\nwas the formation from within of a separate image of that\r\nthing, which should, as it were, go out to meet the impression\r\nreceived. Attention being the condition of analysis,\r\nand separate imagination being the condition of attention,\r\nit follows also that separate imagination is the condition of\r\nanalysis. \u003ci\u003eOnly such elements as we are acquainted with, and\r\ncan imagine, separately, can be discriminated within a total\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_504\"\u003e[Pg 504]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003esense-impression\u003c/i\u003e. The image seems to welcome its own\r\nmate from out of the compound, and to heighten the feeling\r\nthereof; whereas it dampens and opposes the feeling of\r\nthe other constituents; and thus the compound becomes\r\nbroken for our consciousness into parts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll the facts cited in Chapter XI, to prove that attention\r\ninvolves inward reproduction, go to prove this point as\r\nwell. In looking for any object in a room, for a book in a\r\nlibrary, for example, we detect it the more readily if, in\r\naddition to merely knowing its name, etc., we carry in our\r\nmind a distinct image of its appearance. The assafœtida\r\nin \u0027Worcestershire sauce\u0027 is not obvious to anyone who\r\nhas not tasted assafœtida \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e. In a \u0027cold\u0027 color an\r\nartist would never be able to analyze out the pervasive\r\npresence of \u003ci\u003eblue\u003c/i\u003e, unless he had previously made acquaintance\r\nwith the color blue by itself. All the colors we actually\r\nexperience are mixtures. Even the purest primaries\r\nalways come to us with some white. Absolutely pure red\r\nor green or violet is never experienced, and so can never\r\nbe discerned in the so-called primaries with which we have\r\nto deal: the latter consequently pass for pure.—The reader\r\nwill remember how an overtone can only be attended to in\r\nthe midst of its consorts in the voice of a musical instrument,\r\nby sounding it previously alone. The imagination,\r\nbeing then full of it, hears the like of it in the compound\r\ntone. Helmholtz, whose account of this observation we\r\nformerly quoted, goes on to explain the difficulty of the\r\ncase in a way which beautifully corroborates the point I\r\nnow seek to prove. He says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The ultimate simple elements of the sensation of tone, simple tones\r\nthemselves, are rarely heard alone. Even those instruments by which\r\nthey can be produced (as tuning-forks before resonance-chambers),\r\nwhen strongly excited, give rise to weak harmonic upper partials, partly\r\nwithin and partly without the ear…. Hence the opportunities are\r\nvery scanty for impressing on our memory an exact and sure image of\r\nthese simple elementary tones. But if the constituents are only indefinitely\r\nand vaguely known, the analysis of their sum into them must\r\nbe correspondingly uncertain. If we do not know with certainty how\r\nmuch of the musical tone under consideration is to be attributed to its\r\nprime, we cannot but be uncertain as to what belongs to the partials.\r\nConsequently we must begin by making the individual elements which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_505\"\u003e[Pg 505]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave to be distinguished individually audible, so as to obtain an entirely\r\nfresh recollection of the corresponding sensation, and the whole\r\nbusiness requires undisturbed and concentrated attention. We are even\r\nwithout the ease that can be obtained by frequent repetitions of the\r\nexperiment, such as we possess in the analysis of musical chords into\r\ntheir individual notes. In that case we hear the individual notes sufficiently\r\noften by themselves, whereas we rarely hear simple tones, and\r\nmay almost be said never to hear the building up of a compound from\r\nits simple tones.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_421_421\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_421_421\"\u003e[421]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVery few elements of reality are experienced by us in\r\nabsolute isolation. The most that usually happens to a\r\nconstituent \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, of a compound phenomenon \u003ci\u003eabcd\u003c/i\u003e, is that\r\nits \u003ci\u003estrength\u003c/i\u003e relatively to \u003ci\u003ebcd\u003c/i\u003e varies from a maximum to a\r\nminimum; or that it appears linked with \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e qualities,\r\nin other compounds, as \u003ci\u003eaefg\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003eahik\u003c/i\u003e. Either of these\r\nvicissitudes in the mode of our experiencing \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e may, under\r\nfavorable circumstances, lead us to feel the difference between\r\nit and its concomitants, and to single it out—not\r\nabsolutely, it is true, but approximately—and so to analyze\r\nthe compound of which it is a part. The act of singling\r\nout is then called \u003ci\u003eabstraction\u003c/i\u003e, and the element disengaged\r\nis an \u003ci\u003eabstract\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsider the case of fluctuations of relative strength\r\nor intensity first. Let there be three grades of the compound,\r\nas \u003ci\u003eAbcd, abcd,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eabcD\u003c/i\u003e. In passing between these\r\ncompounds, the mind will feel shocks of difference. The\r\ndifferences, moreover, will serially increase, and their direction\r\nwill be felt as of a distinct sort. The increase from\r\n\u003ci\u003eabcd\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003eAbcd\u003c/i\u003e is on the \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e side; that to \u003ci\u003eabcD\u003c/i\u003e is on the \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e side.\r\nAnd these two differences of direction are differently\r\nfelt. I do not say that this discernment of the \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e-direction\r\nfrom the \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e-direction will give us an actual intuition\r\neither of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e or of \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e in the abstract. But it leads us to\r\n\u003ci\u003econceive\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003epostulate\u003c/i\u003e each of these qualities, and to define\r\nit as the \u003ci\u003eextreme\u003c/i\u003e of a certain direction. \u0027Dry\u0027 wines\r\nand \u0027sweet\u0027 wines, for example, differ, and form a series.\r\nIt happens that we have an experience of sweetness\r\npure and simple in the taste of sugar, and this we can\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_506\"\u003e[Pg 506]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanalyze out of the wine-taste. But no one knows what\r\n\u0027dryness\u0027 tastes like, all by itself. It must, however, be\r\nsomething extreme in the dry direction; and we should\r\nprobably not fail to recognize it as the original of our abstract\r\nconception, in case we ever did come across it. In\r\nsome such way we get to form notions of the flavor of meats,\r\napart from their feeling to the tongue, or of that of fruits\r\napart from their acidity, etc., and we abstract the touch of\r\nbodies as distinct from their temperature. We may even\r\napprehend the quality of a muscle\u0027s contraction as distinguished\r\nfrom its extent, or one muscle\u0027s contraction from\r\nanother\u0027s, as when, by practising with prismatic glasses,\r\nand varying our eyes\u0027 convergence whilst our accommodation\r\nremains the same, we learn the direction in which our\r\nfeeling of the convergence differs from that of the accommodation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the fluctuation in a quality\u0027s intensity is a less efficient\r\naid to our abstracting of it than the diversity of the\r\nother qualities in whose company it may appear. \u003ci\u003eWhat is\r\nassociated now with one thing and now with another tends to\r\nbecome dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract\r\ncontemplation by the mind.\u003c/i\u003e One might call this the\r\n\u003ci\u003elaw of dissociation by varying concomitants\u003c/i\u003e. The practical\r\nresult of it will be to allow the mind which has thus dissociated\r\nand abstracted a character to analyze it out of a\r\ntotal, whenever it meets with it again. The law has been\r\nfrequently recognized by psychologists, though I know of\r\nnone who has given it the emphatic prominence in our mental\r\nhistory which it deserves. Mr. Spencer says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If the property A occurs here along with the properties B, C, D,\r\nthere along with C, F, H, and again with E, G, B,… it must\r\nhappen that by multiplication of experiences the impressions produced\r\nby these properties on the organism will be disconnected and rendered\r\nso far independent in the organism as the properties are in the environment,\r\nwhence must eventually result a power to recognize attributes in\r\nthemselves, apart from particular bodies.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_422_422\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_422_422\"\u003e[422]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd still more to the point Dr. Martineau, in the passage\r\nI have already quoted, writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When a red ivory ball, seen for the first time, has been withdrawn,\r\nit will leave a mental representation of itself, in which all that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_507\"\u003e[Pg 507]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit simultaneously gave us will indistinguishably coexist. Let a white\r\nball succeed to it; now, and not before, will an attribute detach itself,\r\nand the \u003ci\u003ecolor\u003c/i\u003e, by force of contrast, be shaken out into the foreground.\r\nLet the white ball be replaced by an egg, and this new difference will\r\nbring the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e into notice from its previous slumber, and thus that\r\nwhich began by being simply an object cut out from the surrounding\r\nscene becomes for us first a \u003ci\u003ered\u003c/i\u003e object, then a \u003ci\u003ered round\u003c/i\u003e object, and\r\nso on.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWhy\u003c/i\u003e the repetition of the character in combination with\r\ndifferent wholes will cause it thus to break up its adhesion\r\nwith any one of them, and roll out, as it were, alone upon\r\nthe table of consciousness, is a little of a mystery. One\r\nmight suppose the nerve-processes of the various concomitants\r\nto neutralize or inhibit each other more or less and\r\nto leave the process of the common term alone distinctly\r\nactive. Mr. Spencer appears to think that the mere fact\r\nthat the common term is repeated more often than any one\r\nof its associates will, of itself, give it such a degree of intensity\r\nthat its abstraction must needs ensue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis has a plausible sound, but breaks down when examined\r\nclosely. For it is not always the often-repeated\r\ncharacter which is first noticed when its concomitants have\r\nvaried a certain number of times; it is even more likely to\r\nbe the most novel of all the concomitants, which will arrest\r\nthe attention. If a boy has seen nothing all his life but\r\nsloops and schooners, he will probably never distinctly\r\nhave singled out in his notion of \u0027sail\u0027 the character of being\r\nhung lengthwise. When for the first time he sees a\r\nsquare-rigged ship, the opportunity of extracting the lengthwise\r\nmode of hanging as a special accident, and of dissociating\r\nit from the general notion of sail, is offered. But\r\nthere are twenty chances to one that that will not be the\r\nform of the boy\u0027s consciousness. What he \u003ci\u003enotices\u003c/i\u003e will be\r\nthe new and exceptional character of being hung crosswise.\r\nHe will go home and speak of that, and perhaps never consciously\r\nformulate what the more familiar peculiarity consists\r\nin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis mode of abstraction is realized on a very wide\r\nscale, because the elements of the world in which we find\r\nourselves appear, as a matter of fact, here, there, and everywhere,\r\nand are changing their concomitants all the while.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_508\"\u003e[Pg 508]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut on the other hand the abstraction is, so to speak, never\r\ncomplete, the analysis of a compound never perfect, because\r\nno element is ever given to us absolutely alone, and\r\nwe can never therefore approach a compound with the\r\nimage in our mind of any one of its components in a perfectly\r\npure form. Colors, sounds, smells, are just as much entangled\r\nwith other matter as are more formal elements of\r\nexperience, such as extension, intensity, effort, pleasure,\r\ndifference, likeness, harmony, badness, strength, and even\r\nconsciousness itself. All are embedded in one world. But\r\nby the fluctuations and permutations of which we have\r\nspoken, we come to form a pretty good notion of the \u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin which each element differs from the rest, and so we\r\nframe the notion of it as a \u003ci\u003eterminus\u003c/i\u003e, and continue to mean\r\nit as an individual thing. In the case of many elements,\r\nthe simple sensibles, like heat, cold, the colors, smells, etc.,\r\nthe extremes of the directions are almost touched, and in\r\nthese instances we have a comparatively exact perception of\r\nwhat it is we mean to abstract. But even this is only an\r\napproximation; and in literal mathematical strictness \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e\r\nour abstracts must be confessed to be but imperfectly imaginable\r\nthings. At bottom the process is one of \u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand is everywhere, even in the sphere of simple sensible\r\nqualities, the same as that by which we are usually\r\nunderstood to attain to the notions of abstract goodness,\r\nperfect felicity, absolute power, and the like: the direct\r\nperception of a difference between compounds, and the\r\nimaginary prolongation of the direction of the difference to\r\nan ideal terminus, the notion of which we fix and keep as\r\none of our permanent subjects of discourse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is all that I can say usefully about abstraction, or\r\nabout analysis, to which it leads.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE IMPROVEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION BY PRACTICE.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all the cases considered hitherto I have supposed\r\nthe differences involved to be so large as to be flagrant, and\r\nthe discrimination, where successive, was treated as involuntary.\r\nBut, so far from being always involuntary, discriminations\r\nare often difficult in the extreme, and by most\r\nmen never performed. Professor de Morgan, thinking, it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_509\"\u003e[Pg 509]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis true, rather of conceptual than of perceptive discrimination,\r\nwrote, wittily enough:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The great bulk of the illogical part of the educated community—whether\r\nmajority or minority I know not; perhaps six of one and half\r\na dozen of the other—have not power to make a distinction, and of\r\ncourse cannot be made to take a distinction, and of course never attempt\r\nto shake a distinction. With them all such things are evasions,\r\nsubterfuges, come-offs, loop-holes, etc. They would hang a man for\r\nhorse-stealing under a statute against sheep-stealing; and would laugh\r\nat you if you quibbled about the distinction between a horse and a\r\nsheep.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_423_423\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_423_423\"\u003e[423]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny personal or practical interest, however, in the results\r\nto be obtained by distinguishing, makes one\u0027s wits\r\namazingly sharp to detect differences. The culprit himself\r\nis not likely to overlook the difference between a horse and\r\na sheep. And long training and practice in distinguishing\r\nhas the same effect as personal interest. Both of these\r\nagencies give to small amounts of objective difference the\r\nsame effectiveness upon the mind that, under other circumstances,\r\nonly large ones would have. Let us seek to penetrate\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of their influence—beginning with\r\nthat of practice and habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat \u0027practice makes perfect\u0027 is notorious in the field\r\nof motor accomplishments. But motor accomplishments\r\ndepend in part on sensory discrimination. Billiard-playing,\r\nrifle-shooting, tight-rope-dancing, demand the most\r\ndelicate appreciation of minute disparities of sensation, as\r\nwell as the power to make accurately graduated muscular\r\nresponse thereto. In the purely sensorial field we have\r\nthe well-known virtuosity displayed by the professional\r\nbuyers and testers of various kinds of goods. One man\r\nwill distinguish by taste between the upper and the lower\r\nhalf of a bottle of old Madeira. Another will recognize,\r\nby feeling the flour in a barrel, whether the wheat was\r\ngrown in Iowa or Tennessee. The blind deaf-mute, Laura\r\nBridgman, had so improved her touch as to recognize,\r\nafter a year\u0027s interval, the hand of a person who once had\r\nshaken hers; and her sister in misfortune, Julia Brace, is\r\nsaid to have been employed in the Hartford Asylum to sort\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_510\"\u003e[Pg 510]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe linen of its multitudinous inmates, after it came from\r\nthe wash, by her wonderfully educated sense of smell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fact is so familiar that few, if any, psychologists have\r\neven recognized it as needing explanation. They have\r\nseemed to think that practice must, in the nature of things,\r\nimprove the delicacy of discernment, and have let the\r\nmatter rest. At most they have said: \"Attention accounts\r\nfor it; we attend more to habitual things, and what we attend\r\nto we perceive more minutely.\" This answer is true,\r\nbut too general; it seems to me that we can be a little more\r\nprecise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThere are at least two distinct causes\u003c/i\u003e which we can see at\r\nwork whenever experience improves discrimination:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, the \u003ci\u003eterms\u003c/i\u003e whose difference comes to be felt contract\r\ndisparate associates and these help to drag them\r\napart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, the \u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e reminds us of larger differences\r\nof the same sort, and these help us to notice it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us study the first cause first, and begin by supposing\r\ntwo compounds, of ten elements apiece. Suppose no one\r\nelement of either compound to differ from the corresponding\r\nelement of the other compound enough to be distinguished\r\nfrom it if the two are compared alone, and let the\r\namount of this imperceptible difference be called equal to\r\n1. The compounds will differ from each other, however,\r\nin ten different ways; and, although each difference by itself\r\nmight pass unperceived, the total difference, equal to\r\n10, may very well be sufficient to strike the sense. In a\r\nword, \u003ci\u003eincreasing the number of \u0027points\u0027 involved in a difference\r\nmay excite our discrimination as effectually as increasing the\r\namount of difference at any one point\u003c/i\u003e. Two men whose mouth,\r\nnose, eyes, cheeks, chin, and hair, all differ slightly, will be\r\nas little confounded by us, as two appearances of the same\r\nman one with, and the other without, a false nose. The\r\nonly contrast in the cases is that we can easily name the\r\n\u003ci\u003epoint\u003c/i\u003e of difference in the one, whilst in the other we cannot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo things, then, B and C, indistinguishable when\r\ncompared together alone, may each contract adhesions\r\nwith different associates, and the compounds thus formed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_511\"\u003e[Pg 511]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay, as wholes, be judged very distinct. \u003ci\u003eThe effect of\r\npractice in increasing discrimination must then, in part be due\r\nto the reinforcing effect, upon an original slight difference between\r\nthe terms, of additional differences between the diverse associates\r\nwhich they severally affect.\u003c/i\u003e Let B and C be the terms: If\r\nA contract adhesions with B, and C with D, AB may appear\r\nvery distinct from CD, though B and C \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e might\r\nhave been almost identical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo illustrate, how does one learn to distinguish claret\r\nfrom burgundy? Probably they have been drunk on\r\ndifferent occasions. When we first drank claret we heard\r\nit called by that name, we were eating such and such a\r\ndinner, etc. Next time we drink it, a dim reminder of all\r\nthose things chimes through us as we get the taste of the\r\nwine. When we try burgundy our first impression is that\r\nit is a kind of claret; but something falls short of full identification,\r\nand presently we hear it called burgundy. During\r\nthe next few experiences, the discrimination may still\r\nbe uncertain—\"which,\" we ask ourselves, \"of the two wines\r\nis this present specimen?\" But at last the claret-flavor recalls\r\npretty distinctly its own name, \u0027claret,\u0027 \"that wine I\r\ndrank at So-and-so\u0027s table,\" etc.; and the burgundy-flavor\r\nrecalls the name burgundy and some one else\u0027s table. \u003ci\u003eAnd\r\nonly when this different\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003esetting\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ehas come to each is our discrimination\r\nbetween the two flavors solid and stable.\u003c/i\u003e After a\r\nwhile the tables and other parts of the setting, besides the\r\nname, grow so multifarious as not to come up distinctly into\r\nconsciousness; but \u003ci\u003epari passu\u003c/i\u003e with this, the adhesion of\r\neach wine with its own \u003ci\u003ename\u003c/i\u003e becomes more and more inveterate,\r\nand at last each flavor suggests instantly and certainly\r\nits own name and nothing else. The names differ far\r\nmore than the flavors, and help to stretch these latter farther\r\napart. Some such process as this must go on in all our\r\nexperience. Beef and mutton, strawberries and raspberries,\r\nodor of rose and odor of violet, contract different\r\nadhesions which reinforce the differences already felt in\r\nthe terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader may say that this has nothing to do with\r\nmaking us feel the \u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e between the two terms. It is\r\nmerely fixing, identifying, and so to speak substantializing,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_512\"\u003e[Pg 512]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eterms\u003c/i\u003e. But what we feel as their \u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e, we should\r\nfeel, even though we were unable to name or otherwise\r\nidentify the terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo which I reply that I believe that the difference is\r\nalways concreted and made to seem \u003ci\u003emore substantial\u003c/i\u003e by recognizing\r\nthe terms. I went out for instance the other day\r\nand found that the snow just fallen had a very odd look,\r\ndifferent from the common appearance of snow. I presently\r\ncalled it a \u0027micaceous\u0027 look; and it seemed to me as if, the\r\nmoment I did so, the difference grew more distinct and\r\nfixed than it was before. The other connotations of the\r\nword \u0027micaceous\u0027 dragged the snow farther away from\r\nordinary snow and seemed even to aggravate the peculiar\r\nlook in question. I think some such effect as this on our\r\nway of feeling a difference will be very generally admitted\r\nto follow from naming the terms between which it obtains;\r\nalthough I admit myself that it is difficult to show coercively\r\nthat naming or otherwise identifying any given pair of\r\nhardly distinguishable terms is essential to their being felt\r\nas different at \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_424_424\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_424_424\"\u003e[424]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_513\"\u003e[Pg 513]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI offer the explanation only as a partial one: it certainly\r\nis not complete. Take the way in which \u003ci\u003epractice refines\r\nour local discrimination on the skin\u003c/i\u003e, for example. Two\r\ncompass-points touching the palm of the hand must be\r\nkept, say, half an inch asunder in order not to be mistaken\r\nfor one point. But at the end of an hour or so of practice\r\nwith them we can distinguish them as two, even when less\r\nthan a quarter of an inch apart. If the same two regions\r\nof the skin were constantly touched, in this experience,\r\nthe explanation we have been considering would perfectly\r\napply. Suppose a line \u003ci\u003ea b c d e f\u003c/i\u003e of points upon the skin.\r\nSuppose the local difference of feeling between \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nbe so strong as to be instantly recognized when the points\r\nare simultaneously touched, but suppose that between \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e to be at first too small for this purpose. If we began by\r\nputting the compasses on \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e and gradually contracted\r\ntheir opening, the strong doubleness recognized at first\r\nwould still be \u003ci\u003esuggested\u003c/i\u003e, as the compass-points approached\r\nthe positions \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e; for the point \u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e would be so near \u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nso like it, as not to be aroused without \u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e also coming to mind.\r\nSimilarly \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e would recall \u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e and, more remotely, \u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e. In such\r\nwise \u003ci\u003ec—d\u003c/i\u003e would no longer be bare \u003ci\u003ec—d\u003c/i\u003e, but something more\r\nlike \u003ci\u003eabc—def\u003c/i\u003e,—palpably differing impressions. But in actual\r\nexperience the education can take place in a much less\r\nmethodical way, and we learn at last to discriminate \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwithout any constant adhesion being contracted between\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_514\"\u003e[Pg 514]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none of these spots and \u003ci\u003eab\u003c/i\u003e, and the other and \u003ci\u003eef\u003c/i\u003e. Volkmann\u0027s\r\nexperiments show this. He and Fechner, prompted by\r\nCzermak\u0027s observation that the skin of the blind was twice\r\nas discriminative as that of seeing folks, sought by experiment\r\nto show the effects of practice upon themselves. They\r\ndiscovered that even within the limits of a single sitting\r\nthe distances at which points were felt double might fall\r\nat the end to considerably less than half of their magnitude\r\nat the beginning; and that some, though not all, of this\r\nimproved sensibility was retained next day. But they\r\nalso found that exercising one part of the skin in this way\r\nimproved the discrimination not only of the corresponding\r\npart of the opposite side of the body, but of the neighboring\r\nparts as well. Thus, at the beginning of an experimental\r\nsitting, the compass-points had to be a Paris line asunder,\r\nin order to be distinguished by the little-finger-tip.\r\nBut after exercising the \u003ci\u003eother fingers\u003c/i\u003e, it was found that the\r\nlittle-finger-tip could discriminate points only half a line\r\napart.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_425_425\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_425_425\"\u003e[425]\u003c/a\u003e The same relation existed betwixt divers points of\r\nthe arm and hand.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_426_426\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_426_426\"\u003e[426]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere it is clear that the cause which I first suggested\r\nfails to apply, and that we must invoke another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat are the exact experimental phenomena? The\r\nspots, as such, are not distinctly located, and the difference,\r\nas such, between their feelings, is not distinctly felt, until\r\nthe interval is greater than the minimum required for the\r\nmere perception of their \u003ci\u003edoubleness\u003c/i\u003e. What we first feel is a\r\nbluntness, then a suspicion of doubleness, which presently\r\nbecomes a distinct doubleness, and at last two different-feeling\r\nand differently placed spots with a definite tract of\r\nspace between them. Some of the places we try give us\r\nthis latest stage of the perception immediately; some only\r\ngive us the earliest; and between them are intermediary\r\nplaces. But as soon as the \u003ci\u003eimage of the doubleness\u003c/i\u003e as it is\r\nfelt in the more discriminative places gets lodged in our\r\nmemory, it helps us to find its like in places where otherwise\r\nwe might have missed it, much as the recent hearing of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_515\"\u003e[Pg 515]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan \u0027overtone\u0027 helps us to detect the latter in a compound\r\nsound (\u003ci\u003esupra\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 439-40\u003c/a\u003e). A dim doubleness grows clearer\r\nby being assimilated to the image of a distincter doubleness\r\nfelt a moment before. It is interpreted by means of the\r\nlatter. And so is any difference, like any other sort of impression,\r\nmore easily perceived when we carry in our mind\r\nto meet it a distinct image of what sort of a thing we are to\r\nlook for, of what its nature is likely to be.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_427_427\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_427_427\"\u003e[427]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThese two processes\u003c/i\u003e, the reinforcement of the terms by\r\ndisparate associates, and the filling of the memory with\r\npast differences, of similar direction with the present one,\r\nbut of more conspicuous amount, \u003ci\u003eare the only explanations\r\nI can offer of the effects of education in this line\u003c/i\u003e. What is\r\naccomplished by both processes is essentially the same\r\nthing: they make small differences affect us as if they were\r\nlarge ones—that large differences should affect us as they do\r\nremains an inexplicable fact. In principle these two processes\r\nought to be sufficient to account for all possible\r\ncases. Whether in fact they are sufficient, whether there\r\nbe no residual factor which we have failed to detect and\r\nanalyze out, I will not presume to decide.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003ePRACTICAL INTERESTS LIMIT DISCRIMINATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be remembered that on \u003ca href=\"#Page_509\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 509\u003c/a\u003e personal interest\r\nwas named as a sharpener of discrimination alongside\r\nof practice. But personal interest probably acts through\r\nattention and not in any immediate or specific way. A\r\ndistinction in which we have a practical stake is one which\r\nwe concentrate our minds upon and which we are on the\r\nlook-out for. We draw it frequently, and we get all the\r\nbenefits of so doing, benefits which have just been explained.\r\nWhere, on the other hand, a distinction has no\r\npractical interest, where we gain nothing by analyzing a\r\nfeature from out of the compound total of which it forms a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_516\"\u003e[Pg 516]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npart, we contract a habit of leaving it unnoticed, and at last\r\ngrow callous to its presence. Helmholtz was the first psychologist\r\nwho dwelt on these facts as emphatically as they\r\ndeserve, and I can do no better than quote his very words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We are accustomed,\" he says, \"in a large number of cases where\r\nsensations of different kinds, or in different parts of the body, exist\r\nsimultaneously, to recognize that they are distinct as soon as they are\r\nperceived, and to direct our attention at will to any one of them separately.\r\nThus at any moment we can be separately conscious of what\r\nwe see, of what we hear, of what we feel; and distinguish what we feel\r\nin a finger or in the great toe, whether pressure, gentle touch, or\r\nwarmth. So also in the field of vision. Indeed, as I shall endeavor to\r\nshow in what follows, we readily distinguish our sensations from one\r\nanother \u003ci\u003ewhen we have a precise knowledge\u003c/i\u003e that they are composite, as,\r\nfor example, when we have become certain, by frequently repeated and\r\ninvariable experience, that our present sensation arises from the simultaneous\r\naction of many independent stimuli, each of which usually excites\r\nan equally well-known individual sensation.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis, it will be observed, is only another statement of our\r\nlaw, that the only individual components which we can\r\npick out of compounds are those of which we have independent\r\nknowledge in a separate form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This induces us to think that nothing can be easier, when a number\r\nof different sensations are simultaneously excited, than to distinguish\r\nthem individually from each other, and that this is an innate\r\nfaculty of our minds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Thus we find, among other things, that it is quite a matter of\r\ncourse to hear separately the different musical tones which come to our\r\nsenses collectively; and we expect that in every case when two of them\r\noccur together, we shall be able to do the like.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The matter becomes very different when we set to work to investigate\r\nthe more unusual cases of perception, and seek more completely to\r\nunderstand the conditions under which the above-mentioned distinction\r\ncan or cannot be made, as is the case in the physiology of the senses.\r\nWe then become aware that \u003ci\u003etwo different kinds or grades must be distinguished\r\nin our becoming conscious of a sensation\u003c/i\u003e. The lower grade\r\nof this consciousness is that in which the influence of the sensation in\r\nquestion makes itself felt only in the conceptions we form of external\r\nthings and processes, and assists in determining them. This can take\r\nplace without our needing, or indeed being able, to ascertain to what\r\nparticular part of our sensations we owe this or that circumstance in\r\nour perceptions. In this case we will say that the impression of the\r\nsensation in question is \u003ci\u003eperceived synthetically\u003c/i\u003e. The second higher\r\ngrade is when we immediately distinguish the sensation in question as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_517\"\u003e[Pg 517]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan existing part of the sum of the sensations excited in us. We will\r\nsay, then, that the sensation is \u003ci\u003eperceived analytically\u003c/i\u003e. The two cases\r\nmust be carefully distinguished from each other.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_428_428\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_428_428\"\u003e[428]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the sensation being perceived synthetically, Helmholtz\r\nmeans that it is not discriminated at all, but only felt\r\nin a mass with other simultaneous sensations. That it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nfelt there he thinks is proved by the fact that our \u003ci\u003ejudgment\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the total will change if anything occurs to alter\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eouter cause\u003c/i\u003e of the sensation.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_429_429\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_429_429\"\u003e[429]\u003c/a\u003e The following pages\r\nfrom an earlier edition show what the concrete cases of\r\nsynthetic perception and what those of analytic perception\r\nare wont to be:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In the use of our senses, practice and experience play a much larger\r\npart than we ordinarily suppose. Our sensations are in the first instance\r\nimportant only in so far as they enable us to judge rightly of\r\nthe world about us; and our practice in discriminating between them\r\nusually goes only just far enough to meet this end. We are, however,\r\ntoo much disposed to think that we must be immediately conscious of\r\nevery ingredient of our sensations. This natural prejudice is due to\r\nthe fact that we are indeed conscious, immediately and without effort,\r\nof everything in our sensations which has a bearing upon those practical\r\npurposes, for the sake of which we wish to know the outer world.\r\nDaily and hourly, during our whole life, we keep our senses in training\r\nfor this end exclusively, and for its sake our experiences are accumulated.\r\nBut even within the sphere of these sensations, which do correspond\r\nto outer things, training and practice make themselves felt. It is\r\nwell known how much finer and quicker the painter is in discriminating\r\ncolors and illuminations than one whose eye is not trained in these\r\nmatters; how the musician and the musical-instrument maker perceive\r\nwith ease and certainty differences of pitch and tone which for the ear\r\nof the layman do not exist; and how even in the inferior realms of\r\ncookery and wine-judging it takes a long habit of comparing to make a\r\nmaster. But more strikingly still is seen the effect of practice when\r\nwe pass to sensations which depend only on inner conditions of our\r\norgans, and which, not corresponding at all to outer things or to their\r\neffects upon us, are therefore of no value in giving us information about\r\nthe outer world. The physiology of the sense-organs has, in recent\r\ntimes, made us acquainted with a number of such phenomena, discovered\r\npartly in consequence of theoretic speculations and questionings,\r\npartly by individuals, like Goethe and Purkinje, specially endowed by\r\nnature with talent for this sort of observation. These so-called subjective\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_518\"\u003e[Pg 518]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nphenomena are extraordinarily hard to find; and when they are\r\nonce found, special aids for the attention are almost always required to\r\nobserve them. It is usually hard to notice the phenomenon again even\r\nwhen one knows already the description of the first observer. The\r\nreason is that we are not only unpractised in singling out these subjective\r\nsensations, but that we are, on the contrary, most thoroughly\r\ntrained in abstracting our attention from them, because they would\r\nonly hinder us in observing the outer world. Only when their intensity\r\nis so strong as actually to hinder us in observing the outer world\r\ndo we begin to notice them; or they may sometimes, in dreaming and\r\ndelirium, form the starting point of hallucinations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Let me give a few well-known cases, taken from physiological optics,\r\nas examples. Every eye probably contains \u003ci\u003emuscæ volitantes\u003c/i\u003e, so called;\r\nthese are fibres, granules, etc., floating in the vitreous humor, throwing\r\ntheir shadows on the retina, and appearing in the field of vision as\r\nlittle dark moving spots. They are most easily detected by looking attentively\r\nat a broad, bright, blank surface like the sky. Most persons\r\nwho have not had their attention expressly called to the existence of\r\nthese figures are apt to notice them for the first time when some ailment\r\nbefalls their eyes and attracts their attention to the subjective\r\nstate of these organs. The usual complaint then is that the \u003ci\u003emuscæ\r\nvolitantes\u003c/i\u003e came in with the malady; and this often makes the patients\r\nvery anxious about these harmless things, and attentive to all their\r\npeculiarities. It is then hard work to make them believe that these\r\nfigures have existed throughout all their previous life, and that all\r\nhealthy eyes contain them. I knew an old gentleman who once had\r\noccasion to cover one of his eyes which had accidentally become diseased,\r\nand who was then in no small degree shocked at finding that his\r\nother eye was totally blind; with a sort of blindness, moreover, which\r\nmust have lasted years, and yet he never was aware of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Who, besides, would believe without performing the appropriate experiments,\r\nthat when one of his eyes is closed there is a great gap, the so-called\r\n\u0027blind spot,\u0027 not far from the middle of the field of the open eye, in\r\nwhich he sees nothing at all, but which he fills out with his imagination?\r\nMariotte, who was led by theoretic speculations to discover this\r\nphenomenon, awakened no small surprise when he showed it at the\r\ncourt of Charles II. of England. The experiment was at that time\r\nrepeated with many variations, and became a fashionable amusement.\r\nThe gap is, in fact, so large that seven full moons alongside of each\r\nother would not cover its diameter, and that a man\u0027s face 6 or 7 feet\r\noff disappears within it. In our ordinary use of vision this great hole\r\nin the field fails utterly to be noticed; because our eyes are constantly\r\nwandering, and the moment an object interests us we turn them full\r\nupon it. So it follows that the object which at any actual moment\r\nexcites our attention never happens to fall upon this gap, and thus it\r\nis that we never grow conscious of the blind spot in the field. In order\r\nto notice it, we must first purposely rivet our gaze upon one object and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_519\"\u003e[Pg 519]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthen move about a second object in the neighborhood of the blind spot,\r\nstriving meanwhile to \u003ci\u003eattend\u003c/i\u003e to this latter without moving the direction\r\nof our gaze from the first object. This runs counter to all our habits, and\r\nis therefore a difficult thing to accomplish. With some people it is even\r\nan impossibility. But only when it is accomplished do we see the\r\nsecond object vanish and convince ourselves of the existence of this\r\ngap.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Finally, let me refer to the double images of ordinary binocular\r\nvision. Whenever we look at a point with both eyes, all objects on this\r\nside of it or beyond it appear double. It takes but a moderate effort of\r\nobservation to ascertain this fact; and from this we may conclude that\r\nwe have been seeing the far greater part of the external world double\r\nall our lives, although numbers of persons are unaware of it, and are\r\nin the highest degree astonished when it is brought to their attention.\r\nAs a matter of fact, we never \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e seen in this double fashion any\r\nparticular object upon which our attention was directed at the time;\r\nfor upon such objects we always converge both eyes. In the habitual\r\nuse of our eyes, our attention is always withdrawn from such objects\r\nas give us double images at the time; this is the reason why we so\r\nseldom learn that these images exist. In order to find them we must\r\nset our attention a new and unusual task; we must make it explore\r\nthe lateral parts of the field of vision, not, as usual, to find what objects\r\nare there, but to analyze our sensations. Then only do we notice this\r\nphenomenon.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_430_430\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_430_430\"\u003e[430]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The same difficulty which is found in the observation of subjective\r\nsensations to which no external object corresponds is found also in the\r\nanalysis of compound sensations which correspond to a single object.\r\nOf this sort are many of our sensations of sound. When the sound of\r\na violin, no matter how often we hear it, excites over and over again\r\nin our ear the same sum of partial tones, the result is that our feeling\r\nof this sum of tones ends by becoming for our mind a mere sign for the\r\nvoice of the violin. Another combination of partial tones becomes the\r\nsensible sign of the voice of a clarionet, etc. And the oftener any such\r\ncombination is heard, the more accustomed we grow to perceiving it as\r\nan integral total, and the harder it becomes to analyze it by immediate\r\nobservation. I believe that this is one of the principal reasons why\r\nthe analysis of the notes of the human voice in singing is relatively so\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_520\"\u003e[Pg 520]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifficult. Such fusions of many sensations into what, to conscious\r\nperception, seems a simple whole, abound in all our senses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Physiological optics affords other interesting examples. The perception\r\nof the bodily form of a near object comes about through the\r\ncombination of two diverse pictures which the eyes severally receive\r\nfrom it, and whose diversity is due to the different position of each eye,\r\naltering the perspective view of what is before it. Before the invention\r\nof the stereoscope this explanation could only be assumed hypothetically;\r\nbut it can now be proved at any moment by the use of the instrument.\r\nInto the stereoscope we insert two flat drawings, representing the two\r\nperspective views of the two eyes, in such a manner that each eye sees\r\nits own view in the proper place; and we obtain, in consequence, the\r\nperception of a single extended solid, as complete and vivid as if we\r\nhad the real object before us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now we can, it is true, by shutting one eye after the other and attending\r\nto the point, recognize the difference in the pictures—at least\r\nwhen it is not too small. But, for the stereoscopic perception of solidity,\r\npictures suffice whose difference is so extraordinarily slight as hardly\r\nto be recognized by the most careful comparison; and it is certain that,\r\nin our ordinary careless observing of bodily objects, we never dream\r\nthat the perception is due to two perspective views fused into one, because\r\nit is an entirely different kind of perception from that of either\r\nflat perspective view by itself. It is certain, therefore, that two different\r\nsensations of our two eyes fuse into a third perception entirely different\r\nfrom either. Just as partial tones fuse into the perception of a certain\r\ninstrument\u0027s voice; and just as we learn to separate the partial tones\r\nof a vibrating string by pinching a nodal point and letting them sound\r\nin isolation; so we learn to separate the images on the two eyes by\r\nopening and closing them alternately.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There are other much more complex instances of the way in which\r\nmany sensations may combine to serve as the basis of a quite simple\r\nperception. When, for example we perceive an object in a certain\r\n\u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e, we must somehow be impressed by the fact that certain of\r\nour optic nerve-fibres, and no others, are impressed by its light. Furthermore,\r\nwe must rightly judge the position of our eyes in our head,\r\nand of our head upon our body, by means of feelings in our eye-muscles\r\nand our neck-muscles respectively. If any of these processes is disturbed\r\nwe get a false perception of the object\u0027s position. The nerve-fibres\r\ncan be changed by a prism before the eye; or the eyeball\u0027s position\r\nchanged by pressing the organ towards one side; and such experiments\r\nshow that, for the simple seeing of the position of an object, sensations\r\nof these two sorts must concur. But it would be quite impossible to\r\ngather this directly from the sensible impression which the object\r\nmakes. Even when we have made experiments and convinced ourselves\r\nin every possible manner that such must be the fact, it still remains\r\nhidden from our immediate introspective observation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"These examples\" [of \u0027synthetic perception,\u0027 perception in which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_521\"\u003e[Pg 521]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neach contributory sensation is felt \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the whole, and is a co-determinant\r\nof what the whole shall be, but does not attract the attention to its\r\nseparate self] \"may suffice to show the vital part which the direction\r\nof attention and practice in observing play in sense-perception. To\r\napply this now to the ear. The ordinary task which our ear has to\r\nsolve when many sounds assail it at once is to discern the voices of the\r\nseveral sounding bodies or instruments engaged; beyond this it has no\r\nobjective interest in analyzing. We wish to know, when many men are\r\nspeaking together, what each one says, when many instruments and\r\nvoices combine, which melody is executed by each. Any deeper\r\nanalysis, such as that of each separate note into its partial tones\r\n(although it might be performed by the same means and faculty of\r\nhearing as the first analysis) would tell us nothing new about the\r\nsources of sound actually present, but might lead us astray as to their\r\nnumber. For this reason we confine our attention in analyzing a mass\r\nof sound to the several instruments\u0027 voices, and expressly abstain, as it\r\nwere, from discriminating the elementary components of the latter. In\r\nthis last sort of discrimination we are as unpractised as we are, on the\r\ncontrary, well trained in the former kind.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_431_431\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_431_431\"\u003e[431]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_522\"\u003e[Pg 522]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter all we have said, no comment seems called for\r\nupon these interesting and important facts and reflections\r\nof Helmholtz.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_523\"\u003e[Pg 523]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eREACTION-TIME AFTER DISCRIMINATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003etime required for discrimination\u003c/i\u003e has been made a\r\nsubject of experimental measurement. Wundt calls it \u003ci\u003eUnterscheidungszeit\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHis subjects (whose simple reaction-time—see\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 85\u003c/a\u003e ff.—had previously been determined) were required\r\nto make a movement, always the same, the instant\r\nthey discerned \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e of two or more signals they received.\r\nThe exact time of the signal and that of the movement\r\nwere automatically registered by a galvanic chronoscope.\r\nThe particular signal to be received was unknown in advance,\r\nand the excess of time occupied by those reactions\r\nin which its character had first to be discerned, over the\r\nsimple reaction-time, measured, according to Wundt, the\r\ntime required for the act of discrimination. It was found\r\nlonger when four different signals were irregularly used\r\nthan when only two were used. In the former case it\r\naveraged, for three observers respectively (the signals being\r\nthe sudden appearance of a black or of a white object),\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.050 sec;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.047 sec.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.079 sec.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_524\"\u003e[Pg 524]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the latter case, a red and a green signal being added to\r\nthe former ones, it became, for the same observers,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.157;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.073;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.132.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_432_432\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_432_432\"\u003e[432]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLater, in Wundt\u0027s Laboratory, Herr Tischer made many\r\ncareful experiments after the same method, where the facts\r\nto be discriminated were the different degrees of loudness\r\nin the sound which served as a signal. I subjoin Herr\r\nTischer\u0027s table of results, explaining that each vertical column\r\nafter the first gives the average results obtained from\r\na distinct individual, and that the figure in the first column\r\nstands for the number of possible loudnesses that might be\r\nexpected in the particular series of reactions made. The\r\ntimes are expressed in thousandths of a second.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e2 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e6 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e8.5 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e10.75 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e10.7 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e33 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e53\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e3\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e10\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e14.4 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e19.9\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e22.7\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e58.5 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e57.8\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e4\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e16.7 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e20.8\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e29\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e29.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e75\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e84\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e5\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e25.6\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e31\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e…\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e40.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e95.5 \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e138\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_433_433\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_433_433\"\u003e[433]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe interesting points here are the great individual variations,\r\nand the rapid way in which the time for discrimination\r\nincreases with the number of possible terms to discriminate.\r\nThe individual variations are largely due to\r\nwant of practice in the particular task set, but partly also\r\nto discrepancies in the psychic process. One gentleman\r\nsaid, for example, that in the experiments with three\r\nsounds, he kept the image of the middle one ready in his\r\nmind, and compared what he heard as either louder, lower,\r\nor the same. His discrimination among three possibilities\r\nbecame thus very similar to a discrimination between two.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_434_434\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_434_434\"\u003e[434]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. J. M. Cattell found he could get no results by this\r\nmethod,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_435_435\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_435_435\"\u003e[435]\u003c/a\u003e and reverted to one used by observers previous\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_525\"\u003e[Pg 525]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto Wundt and which Wundt had rejected. This is the\r\n\u003ci\u003eeinfache Wahlmethode\u003c/i\u003e, as Wundt calls it. The reacter\r\nawaits the signal and reacts if it is of one sort, but omits to\r\nact if it is of another sort. The reaction thus occurs after\r\ndiscrimination; the motor impulse cannot be sent to the\r\nhand until the subject knows what the signal is. The\r\nnervous impulse, as Mr. Cattell says, must probably travel\r\nto the cortex and excite changes there, causing in consciousness\r\nthe perception of the signal. These changes occupy\r\nthe time of discrimination (or perception-time, as it is called\r\nby Mr. C.) But \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e a nervous impulse must descend from\r\nthe cortex to the lower motor centre which stands primed\r\nand ready to discharge; and this, as Mr. C. says, gives a\r\nwill-time as well. The total reaction-time thus includes\r\nboth \u0027will-time\u0027 and \u0027discrimination-time.\u0027 But as the\r\ncentrifugal and centripetal processes occupying these two\r\ntimes respectively are probably about the same, and the\r\ntime used in the cortex is about equally divided between\r\nthe perception of the signal and the preparation of the\r\nmotor discharge, if we divide it equally between perception\r\n(discrimination) and volition, the error cannot be\r\ngreat.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_436_436\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_436_436\"\u003e[436]\u003c/a\u003e We can moreover change the nature of the perception\r\nwithout altering the will-time, and thus investigate\r\nwith considerable thoroughness the length of the perception-time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGuided by these principles, Prof. Cattell found the time\r\nrequired for distinguishing a white signal from no signal\r\nto be, in two observers:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.030 sec. and 0.050 sec;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ethat for distinguishing one color from another was similarly:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.100 and 0.110;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ethat for distinguishing a certain color from ten other colors:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.105 and 0.117;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ethat for distinguishing the letter A in ordinary print from\r\nthe letter Z:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.142 and 0.137;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_526\"\u003e[Pg 526]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ethat for distinguishing a given letter from all the rest of\r\nthe alphabet (not reacting until that letter appeared)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.119 and 0.116;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ethat for distinguishing a word from any of twenty-five other\r\nwords, from\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e0.118 sec. to 0.158 sec.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difference depending on the length of the words and\r\nthe familiarity of the language to which they belonged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProf. Cattell calls attention to the fact that the time for\r\ndistinguishing a word is often but little more than that for\r\ndistinguishing a letter:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We do not, therefore, distinguish separately the letters of which\r\na word is composed, but the word as a whole. The application of this in\r\nteaching children to read is evident.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe also finds a great difference in the time with which\r\nvarious letters are distinguished, E being particularly\r\nbad.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_437_437\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_437_437\"\u003e[437]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have, in describing these experiments, followed the example\r\nof previous writers and spoken as if the process by\r\nwhich the nature of the signal determines the reaction were\r\nidentical with the ordinary conscious process of discriminative\r\nperception and volition. I am convinced, however,\r\nthat this is not the case; and that although the results are the\r\nsame, the form of consciousness is quite different. The reader\r\nwill remember my contention (\u003ci\u003esupra\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 90\u003c/a\u003e ff.) that the simple\r\nreaction-time (usually supposed to include a conscious process\r\nof perceiving) really measures nothing but a reflex\r\nact. Anyone who will perform reactions with discrimination\r\nwill easily convince himself that the process here also\r\nis far more like a reflex, than like a deliberate, operation. I\r\nhave made, with myself and students, a large number of\r\nmeasurements where the signal expected was in one series\r\na touch \u003ci\u003esomewhere\u003c/i\u003e on the skin of the back and head, and\r\nin another series a spark \u003ci\u003esomewhere\u003c/i\u003e in the field of view.\r\nThe hand had to move as quickly as possible towards the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_527\"\u003e[Pg 527]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nplace of the touch or the spark. It did so infallibly, and\r\nsensibly instantly; whilst both place and movement seemed\r\nto be \u003ci\u003eperceived\u003c/i\u003e only a moment later, in memory. These experiments\r\nwere undertaken for the express purpose of ascertaining\r\nwhether the movement at the sight of the spark was\r\ndischarged \u003ci\u003eimmediately\u003c/i\u003e by the visual perception, or whether\r\na \u0027motor-idea\u0027 had to intervene between the perception of\r\nthe spark and the reaction.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_438_438\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_438_438\"\u003e[438]\u003c/a\u003e The first thing that was manifest\r\nto introspection was that no perception or idea of \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsort preceded the reaction. It jumped of itself, whenever\r\nthe signal came; and perception was retrospective. We\r\nmust suppose, then, that the state of eager expectancy of a\r\ncertain definite range of possible discharges, innervates a\r\nwhole set of paths in advance, so that when a particular\r\nsensation comes it is drafted into its appropriate motor\r\noutlet too quickly for the perceptive process to be aroused.\r\nIn the experiments I describe, the conditions were most\r\nfavorable for rapidity, for the connection between the\r\nsignals and their movements might almost be called innate.\r\nIt is instinctive to move the hand towards a thing\r\nseen or a skin-spot touched. But where the movement is\r\n\u003ci\u003econventionally\u003c/i\u003e attached to the signal, there would be more\r\nchance for delay, and the amount of practice would then\r\ndetermine the speed. This is well shown in Tischer\u0027s results,\r\nquoted on \u003ca href=\"#Page_524\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 524\u003c/a\u003e, where the most practised observer,\r\nTischer himself, reacted in one eighth of the time needed\r\nby one of the others.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_439_439\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_439_439\"\u003e[439]\u003c/a\u003e But what all investigators have\r\naimed to determine in these experiments is the \u003ci\u003eminimum\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntime. I trust I have said enough to convince the student\r\nthat this minimum time by no means measures what we\r\nconsciously know as discrimination. It only measures\r\nsomething which, under the experimental conditions, leads\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_528\"\u003e[Pg 528]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto a similar result. But it is the bane of psychology to\r\nsuppose that where results are similar, processes must be\r\nthe same. Psychologists are too apt to reason as geometers\r\nwould, if the latter were to say that the diameter of a circle\r\nis the same thing as its semi-circumference, because, forsooth,\r\nthey terminate in the same two points.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_440_440\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_440_440\"\u003e[440]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PERCEPTION OF LIKENESS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe perception of likeness is practically very much bound\r\nup with that of difference. That is to say, the only differences\r\nwe note \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e differences, and estimate quantitatively, and\r\narrange along a scale, are those comparatively limited differences\r\nwhich we find between members of a common\r\ngenus. The force of gravity and the color of this ink are\r\nthings it never occurred to me to compare until now that I\r\nam casting about for examples of the incomparable.\r\nSimilarly the elastic quality of this india-rubber band, the\r\ncomfort of last night\u0027s sleep, the good that can be done with\r\na legacy, these are things too discrepant to have ever been\r\ncompared ere now. Their relation to each other is less\r\nthat of difference than of mere logical negativity. To be found\r\n\u003ci\u003edifferent\u003c/i\u003e, things must as a rule have some commensurability,\r\nsome aspect in common, which suggests the possibility of\r\ntheir being treated in the same way. This is of course not\r\na theoretic necessity—for any distinction may be called a\r\n\u0027difference,\u0027 if one likes—but a practical and linguistic remark.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003esame things, then, which arouse the perception of difference\r\nusually arouse that of resemblance also\u003c/i\u003e. And the analysis of\r\nthem, so as to define wherein the difference and wherein the\r\nresemblance respectively consists, is called \u003ci\u003ecomparison\u003c/i\u003e. If\r\nwe start to deal with the things as simply the same or alike,\r\nwe are liable to be surprised by the difference. If we start to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_529\"\u003e[Pg 529]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntreat them as merely different, we are apt to discover how\r\nmuch they are alike. \u003ci\u003eDifference, commonly so called, is\r\nthus between species of a genus.\u003c/i\u003e And the faculty by which\r\nwe perceive the resemblance upon which the genus is based,\r\nis just as ultimate and inexplicable a mental endowment as\r\nthat by which we perceive the differences upon which the\r\nspecies depend. There is a shock of likeness when we pass\r\nfrom one thing to another which in the first instance we\r\nmerely discriminate numerically, but, at the moment of\r\nbringing our attention to bear, perceive to be \u003ci\u003esimilar\u003c/i\u003e to the\r\nfirst; just as there is a shock of difference when we pass between\r\ntwo dissimilars.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_441_441\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_441_441\"\u003e[441]\u003c/a\u003e The objective extent of the likeness,\r\njust like that of the difference, determines the magnitude\r\nof the shock. The likeness may be so evanescent, or\r\nthe basis of it so habitual and little liable to be attended\r\nto, that it will escape observation altogether. Where, however,\r\nwe find it, there we make a genus of the things compared;\r\nand their discrepancies and incommensurabilities in\r\nother respects can then figure as the \u003ci\u003edifferential\u003c/i\u003e of so many\r\nspecies. As \u0027thinkables\u0027 or \u0027existents\u0027 even the smoke of\r\na cigarette and the worth of a dollar-bill are comparable—still\r\nmore so as \u0027perishables,\u0027 or as \u0027enjoyables.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMuch, then, of what I have said of difference in the\r\ncourse of this chapter will apply, with a simple change of\r\nlanguage, to resemblance as well. We go through the\r\nworld, carrying on the two functions abreast, discovering\r\ndifferences in the like, and likenesses in the different. To\r\nabstract the \u003ci\u003eground\u003c/i\u003e of either difference or likeness (where\r\nit is not ultimate) demands an analysis of the given objects\r\ninto their parts. So that all that was said of the dependence\r\nof analysis upon a preliminary separate acquaintance\r\nwith the character to be abstracted, and upon its having\r\nvaried concomitants, finds a place in the psychology of resemblance\r\nas well as in that of difference.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut when all is said and done about the conditions\r\nwhich favor our perception of resemblance and our abstraction\r\nof its ground, the crude fact remains, that \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_530\"\u003e[Pg 530]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003epeople are far more sensitive to resemblances, and far more\r\nready to point out wherein they consist, than others are\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThey are the wits, the poets, the inventors, the scientific\r\nmen, the practical geniuses. \u003ci\u003eA native talent for perceiving\r\nanalogies\u003c/i\u003e is reckoned by Prof. Bain, and by others before\r\nand after him, as \u003ci\u003ethe leading fact in genius of every order\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nBut as this chapter is already long, and as the question of\r\ngenius had better wait till Chapter XXII, where its practical\r\nconsequences can be discussed at the same time, I will\r\nsay nothing more at present either about it or about the\r\nfaculty of noting resemblances. If the reader feels that\r\nthis faculty is having small justice done it at my hands,\r\nand that it ought to be wondered at and made much more of\r\nthan has been done in these last few pages, he will perhaps\r\nfind some compensation when that later chapter is\r\nreached. I think I emphasize it enough when I call it one\r\nof the ultimate foundation-pillars of the intellectual life,\r\nthe others being Discrimination, Retentiveness, and Association.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE MAGNITUDE OF DIFFERENCES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 489\u003c/a\u003e I spoke of differences being greater or less,\r\nand of certain groups of them being susceptible of a linear\r\narrangement exhibiting serial \u003ci\u003eincrease\u003c/i\u003e. A series whose\r\nterms grow more and more different from the starting point\r\nis one whose terms grow less and less like it. They grow\r\nmore and more like it if you read them the other way.\r\nSo that likeness and unlikeness to the starting point are\r\nfunctions inverse to each other, of the position of any term\r\nin such a series.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Stumpf introduces the word \u003ci\u003edistance\u003c/i\u003e to denote\r\nthe position of a term in any such series. The less\r\nlike is the term, the more distant it is from the starting\r\npoint. The ideally regular series of this sort would\r\nbe one in which the distances—the steps of resemblance\r\nor difference—between all pairs of adjacent terms were\r\nequal. This would be an evenly gradated series. And\r\nit is an interesting fact in psychology that we are able,\r\nin many departments of our sensibility, to arrange the\r\nterms without difficulty in this evenly gradated way. Differences,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_531\"\u003e[Pg 531]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin other words, between diverse pairs of terms,\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, for example, on the one hand, and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e on the\r\nother,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_442_442\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_442_442\"\u003e[442]\u003c/a\u003e can be judged equal or diverse in amount. The distances\r\nfrom one term to another in the series are equal.\r\nLinear magnitudes and musical notes are perhaps the impressions\r\nwhich we easiest arrange in this way. Next come\r\nshades of light or color, which we have little difficulty in\r\narranging by steps of difference of sensibly equal value.\r\nMessrs. Plateau and Delbœuf have found it fairly easy to\r\ndetermine what shade of gray will be judged by every one\r\nto hit the exact middle between a darker and a lighter\r\nshade.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_443_443\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_443_443\"\u003e[443]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow now do we so readily recognize the equality of two\r\ndifferences between different pairs of terms? or, more\r\nbriefly, how do we recognize the \u003ci\u003emagnitude\u003c/i\u003e of a difference\r\nat all? Prof. Stumpf discusses this question in an interesting\r\nway;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_444_444\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_444_444\"\u003e[444]\u003c/a\u003e and comes to the conclusion that our feeling\r\nfor the size of a difference, and our perception that the\r\nterms of two diverse pairs are equally or unequally distant\r\nfrom each other, can be explained by no simpler mental\r\nprocess, but, like the shock of difference itself, must be\r\nregarded as for the present an unanalyzable endowment\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_532\"\u003e[Pg 532]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the mind. This acute author rejects in particular the\r\nnotion which would make our judgment of the distance\r\nbetween two sensations depend upon our \u003ci\u003ementally traversing\r\nthe intermediary steps\u003c/i\u003e. We may of course do so, and\r\nmay often find it useful to do so, as in musical intervals, or\r\nfigured lines, But we need not do so; and nothing more\r\nis really \u003ci\u003erequired\u003c/i\u003e for a comparative judgment of the amount\r\nof a \u0027distance\u0027 than three or four impressions belonging to\r\na common kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe vanishing of all perceptible difference between two\r\nnumerically distinct things makes them \u003ci\u003equalitatively the\r\nsame\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eequal\u003c/i\u003e. Equality, or \u003ci\u003equalitative\u003c/i\u003e (as distinguished\r\nfrom numerical) \u003ci\u003eidentity\u003c/i\u003e, is thus nothing but the \u003ci\u003eextreme\r\ndegree of likeness\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_445_445\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_445_445\"\u003e[445]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe saw above (\u003ca href=\"#Page_492\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 492\u003c/a\u003e) that some persons consider that\r\nthe difference between two objects is constituted of two\r\nthings, viz., their absolute identity in certain respects, \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntheir absolute non-identity in others. We saw that this theory\r\nwould not apply to all cases (\u003ca href=\"#Page_493\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 493\u003c/a\u003e). So here any theory\r\nwhich would base likeness on identity, and not rather identity\r\non likeness, must fail. It is supposed perhaps, by most\r\npeople, that two resembling things owe their resemblance\r\nto their absolute identity in respect of some attribute or\r\nattributes, combined with the absolute non-identity of the\r\nrest of their being. This, which may be true of compound\r\nthings, breaks down when we come to simple impressions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When we compare a deep, a middle, and a high note, e.g. \u003ci\u003eC, f\u003c/i\u003e sharp,\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u0027\u0027\u0027\u003c/i\u003e, we remark immediately that the first is less like the third than the\r\nsecond is. The same would be true of \u003ci\u003ec d e\u003c/i\u003e in the same region of the\r\nscale. Our very calling one of the notes a \u0027middle\u0027 note is the expression\r\nof a judgment of this sort. But where here is the identical and\r\nwhere the non-identical part? We cannot think of the overtones; for\r\nthe first-named three notes have none in common, at least not on musical\r\ninstruments. Moreover, we might take simple tones, and still our\r\njudgment would be unhesitatingly the same, provided the tones were\r\nnot chosen too close together…. Neither can it be said that the\r\nidentity consists in their all being sounds, and not a sound, a smell, and\r\na color, respectively. For this identical attribute comes to each of them\r\nin equal measure, whereas the first, being less like the third than the\r\nsecond is, ought, on the terms of the theory we are criticising, to have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_533\"\u003e[Pg 533]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nless of the identical quality…. It thus appears impracticable to define\r\nall possible cases of likeness as partial identity \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e partial disparity;\r\nand it is vain to seek in all cases for identical elements.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_446_446\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_446_446\"\u003e[446]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd as all compound resemblances are based on simple\r\nones like these, it follows that likeness \u003ci\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/i\u003e must not\r\nbe conceived as a special complication of identity, but\r\nrather that identity must be conceived as a special degree\r\nof likeness, according to the proposition expressed at the\r\noutset of the paragraph that precedes. Likeness and difference\r\nare ultimate relations perceived. As a matter of\r\nfact, no two sensations, no two objects of all those we know,\r\nare in scientific rigor identical. We call those of them\r\nidentical whose difference is unperceived. Over and above\r\nthis we have a \u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e of absolute sameness, it is true,\r\nbut this, like so many of our conceptions (cf. \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 508\u003c/a\u003e), is an\r\nideal construction got by following a certain direction of\r\nserial increase to its maximum supposable extreme. It\r\nplays an important part, among other permanent meanings\r\npossessed by us, in our ideal intellectual constructions.\r\nBut it plays no part whatever in explaining psychologically\r\nhow we perceive likenesses between simple things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE MEASURE OF DISCRIMINATIVE SENSIBILITY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn 1860, Professor G. T. Fechner of Leipzig, a man of\r\ngreat learning and subtlety of mind, published two volumes\r\nentitled \u0027Psychophysik,\u0027 devoted to establishing and explaining\r\na law called by him the psychophysic law, which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_534\"\u003e[Pg 534]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe considered to express the deepest and most elementary\r\nrelation between the mental and the physical worlds. It is\r\na formula for the connection between the amount of our\r\nsensations and the amount of their outward causes. Its\r\nsimplest expression is, that when we pass from one sensation\r\nto a stronger one of the same kind, the sensations increase\r\nproportionally to the logarithms of their exciting\r\ncauses. Fechner\u0027s book was the starting point of a new\r\ndepartment of literature, which it would be perhaps impossible\r\nto match for the qualities of thoroughness and subtlety,\r\nbut of which, in the humble opinion of the present\r\nwriter, the proper psychological outcome is just \u003ci\u003enothing\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe psychophysic law controversy has prompted a good\r\nmany series of observations on sense-discrimination, and\r\nhas made discussion of them very rigorous. It has also\r\ncleared up our ideas about the best methods for getting\r\naverage results, when particular observations vary; and\r\nbeyond this it has done nothing; but as it is a chapter in\r\nthe history of our science, some account of it is here due to\r\nthe reader.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFechner\u0027s train of thought has been popularly expounded\r\na great many times. As I have nothing new to add, it is\r\nbut just that I should quote an existing account. I choose\r\nthe one given by Wundt in his Vorlesungen über Menschen\r\nund Thierseele, 1863, omitting a good deal:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"How much stronger or weaker one sensation is than another, we\r\nare never able to say. Whether the sun be a hundred or a thousand\r\ntimes brighter than the moon, a cannon a hundred or a thousand times\r\nlouder than a pistol, is beyond our power to estimate. The natural\r\nmeasure of sensation which we possess enables us to judge of the equality,\r\nof the \u0027more\u0027 and of the \u0027less,\u0027 but not of \u0027how many times more\r\nor less.\u0027 This natural measure is, therefore, as good as no measure at\r\nall, whenever it becomes a question of accurately ascertaining intensities\r\nin the sensational sphere. Even though it may teach us in a general\r\nway that with the strength of the outward physical stimulus the strength\r\nof the concomitant sensation waxes or wanes, still it leaves us without\r\nthe slightest knowledge of whether the sensation varies in exactly the\r\nsame proportion as the stimulus itself, or at a slower or a more rapid\r\nrate. In a word, we know by our natural sensibility nothing of the \u003ci\u003elaw\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthat connects the sensation and its outward cause together. To find\r\nthis law we must first find an exact measure for the sensation itself;\r\nwe must be able to say: A stimulus of strength \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e begets a sensation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_535\"\u003e[Pg 535]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof strength \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e; a stimulus of strength \u003ci\u003etwo\u003c/i\u003e begets a sensation of\r\nstrength \u003ci\u003etwo\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003ethree\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003efour\u003c/i\u003e, etc. But to do this we must first know\r\nwhat a sensation two, three, or four times greater than another\r\nsignifies….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Space magnitudes we soon learn to determine exactly because we\r\nonly measure one space against another. The measure of mental magnitudes\r\nis far more difficult…. But the problem of measuring the\r\nmagnitude of \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e is the first step in the bold enterprise of making\r\nmental magnitudes altogether subject to exact measurement….\r\nWere our whole knowledge limited to the fact that the sensation rises\r\nwhen the stimulus rises, and falls when the latter falls, much would not\r\nbe gained. But even immediate unaided observation teaches us certain\r\nfacts which, at least in a general way, suggest the law according to\r\nwhich the sensations vary with their outward cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Every one knows that in the stilly night we hear things unnoticed\r\nin the noise of day. The gentle ticking of the clock, the air circulating\r\nthrough the chimney, the cracking of the chairs in the room, and a\r\nthousand other slight noises, impress themselves upon our ear. It is\r\nequally well known that in the confused hubbub of the streets, or the\r\nclamor of a railway, we may lose not only what our neighbor says to us,\r\nbut even not hear the sound of our own voice. The stars which are\r\nbrightest at night are invisible by day; and although we see the moon\r\nthen, she is far paler than at night. Everyone who has had to deal\r\nwith weights knows that if to a pound in the hand a second pound be\r\nadded, the difference is immediately felt; whilst if it be added to a\r\nhundredweight, we are not aware of the difference at all….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The sound of the clock, the light of the stars, the pressure of the\r\npound, these are all \u003ci\u003estimuli\u003c/i\u003e to our senses, and stimuli whose outward\r\namount remains the same. What then do these experiences teach?\r\nEvidently nothing but this, that one and the same stimulus, according\r\nto the circumstances under which it operates, will be felt either more or\r\nless intensely, or not felt at all. Of what sort now is the alteration in\r\nthe circumstances, upon which this alteration in the feeling may depend?\r\nOn considering the matter closely we see that it is everywhere of one\r\nand the same kind. The tick of the clock is a feeble stimulus for our\r\nauditory nerve, which we hear plainly when it is alone, but not when it\r\nis added to the strong stimulus of the carriage-wheels and other noises\r\nof the day. The light of the stars is a stimulus to the eye. But if the\r\nstimulation which this light exerts be added to the strong stimulus of\r\ndaylight, we feel nothing of it, although we feel it distinctly when it\r\nunites itself with the feebler stimulation of the twilight. The pound-weight\r\nis a stimulus to our skin, which we feel when it joins itself to a\r\npreceding stimulus of equal strength, but which vanishes when it is\r\ncombined with a stimulus a thousand times greater in amount.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We may therefore lay it down as a general rule that a stimulus,\r\nin order to be felt, may be so much the smaller if the already pre-existing\r\nstimulation of the organ is small, but must be so much the larger,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_536\"\u003e[Pg 536]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe greater the pre-existing stimulation is. From this in a general way\r\nwe can perceive the connection between the stimulus and the feeling it\r\nexcites. At least thus much appears, that the law of dependence is\r\nnot as simple a one as might have been expected beforehand. The\r\nsimplest relation would obviously be that the sensation should increase\r\nin identically the same ratio as the stimulus, thus that if a stimulus of\r\nstrength \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e occasioned a sensation \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e, a stimulus of \u003ci\u003etwo\u003c/i\u003e should occasion\r\nsensation \u003ci\u003etwo\u003c/i\u003e, stimulus \u003ci\u003ethree\u003c/i\u003e, sensation \u003ci\u003ethree\u003c/i\u003e, etc. But if this\r\nsimplest of all relations prevailed, a stimulus added to a pre-existing\r\nstrong stimulus ought to provoke as great an increase of feeling as if\r\nit were added to a pre-existing weak stimulus; the light of the stars\r\ne.g., ought to make as great an addition to the daylight as it does to\r\nthe darkness of the nocturnal sky. This we know not to be the case:\r\nthe stars are invisible by day, the addition they make to our sensation\r\nthen is unnoticeable, whereas the same addition to our feeling of the twilight\r\nis very considerable indeed. So it is clear that the strength of the\r\nsensations does not increase in proportion to the amount of the stimuli,\r\nbut more slowly. And now comes the question, in what proportion\r\ndoes the increase of the sensation grow less as the increase of the\r\nstimulus grows greater. To answer this question, every-day experiences\r\ndo not suffice. We need exact measurements both of the amounts of\r\nthe various stimuli, and of the intensity of the sensations themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"How to execute these measurements, however, is something which\r\ndaily experience suggests. To measure the strength of sensations is, as\r\nwe saw, impossible; we can only measure the difference of sensations.\r\nExperience showed us what very unequal differences of sensation might\r\ncome from equal differences of outward stimulus. But all these experiences\r\nexpressed themselves in one kind of fact, that the same difference\r\nof stimulus could in one case be felt, and in another case not felt\r\nat all—a pound felt if added to another pound, but not if added to a\r\nhundred-weight…. We can quickest reach a result with our observations\r\nif we start with an arbitrary strength of stimulus, notice what\r\nsensation it gives us, and then \u003ci\u003esee how much we can increase the stimulus\r\nwithout making the sensation seem to change\u003c/i\u003e. If we carry out\r\nsuch observations with stimuli of varying absolute amounts, we shall be\r\nforced to choose in an equally varying way the amounts of addition to\r\nthe stimulus which are capable of giving us a just barely perceptible\r\nfeeling of \u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e. A light, to be just perceptible in the twilight need not\r\nbe near as bright as the starlight; it must be far brighter to be just perceived\r\nduring the day. If now we institute such observations for all\r\npossible strengths of the various stimuli, and note for each strength\r\nthe amount of addition of the latter required to produce a barely perceptible\r\nalteration of sensation, we shall have a series of figures in\r\nwhich is immediately expressed the law according to which the sensation\r\nalters when the stimulation is increased….\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObservations according to this method are particularly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_537\"\u003e[Pg 537]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neasy to make in the spheres of light-, sound-, and pressure-sensation….\r\nBeginning with the latter case,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We find a surprisingly simple result. The barely sensible addition\r\nto the original weight \u003ci\u003emust stand exactly in the same proportion\r\nto it\u003c/i\u003e, be the \u003ci\u003esame fraction\u003c/i\u003e of it, no matter what the absolute value\r\nmay be of the weights on which the experiment is made…. As the\r\naverage of a number of experiments, this fraction is found to be about\r\n1/3; that is, no matter what pressure there may already be made upon\r\nthe skin, an increase or a diminution of the pressure will be \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e, as\r\nsoon as the added or subtracted weight amounts to one third of the\r\nweight originally there.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt then describes how differences may be observed\r\nin the muscular feelings, in the feelings of heat, in those of\r\nlight, and in those of sound; and he concludes his seventh\r\nlecture (from which our extracts have been made) thus:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"So we have found that all the senses whose stimuli we are enabled\r\nto measure accurately, obey a uniform law. However various may be\r\ntheir several delicacies of discrimination, \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e holds true of all, that\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe increase of the stimulus necessary to produce an increase of the sensation\r\nbears a constant ratio to the total stimulus\u003c/i\u003e. The figures which\r\nexpress this ratio in the several senses may be shown thus in tabular\r\nform:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eSensation of light,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1/100\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMuscular sensation,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1/17\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFeeling of pressure, \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1/3\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFeeling of warmth,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1/3\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFeeling of sound,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1/3\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"These figures are far from giving as accurate a measure as might\r\nbe desired. But at least they are fit to convey a general notion of the\r\nrelative discriminative susceptibility of the different senses…. The\r\nimportant law which gives in so simple a form the relation of the sensation\r\nto the stimulus that calls it forth was first discovered by the\r\nphysiologist Ernst Heinrich Weber to obtain in special cases. Gustav\r\nTheodor Fechner first proved it to be a law for all departments of sensation.\r\nPsychology owes to him the first comprehensive investigation\r\nof sensations from a physical point of view, the first basis of an exact\r\nTheory of Sensibility.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for a general account of what Fechner calls\r\nWeber\u0027s law. The \u0027exactness\u0027 of the theory of sensibility to\r\nwhich it leads consists in the supposed fact that it gives\r\nthe means of representing sensations by numbers. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eunit\u003c/i\u003e of any kind of sensation will be that increment which,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_538\"\u003e[Pg 538]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhen the stimulus is increased, we can just barely perceive\r\nto be added. The total number of units which any given\r\nsensation contains will consist of the total number of such\r\nincrements which may be perceived in passing from no\r\nsensation of the kind to a sensation of the present amount.\r\nWe cannot get at this number directly, but we can, now\r\nthat we know Weber\u0027s law, get at it by means of the physical\r\nstimulus of which it is a function. For if we know how\r\nmuch of the stimulus it will take to give a barely perceptible\r\nsensation, and then what percentage of addition to\r\nthe stimulus will constantly give a barely perceptible increment\r\nto the sensation, it is at bottom only a question of\r\ncompound interest to compute, out of the total amount of\r\nstimulus which we may be employing at any moment, the\r\nnumber of such increments, or, in other words, of sensational\r\nunits to which it may give rise. This number bears\r\nthe same relation to the total stimulus which the time\r\nelapsed bears to the capital plus the compound interest\r\naccrued.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo take an example: If stimulus A just falls short of\r\nproducing a sensation, and if \u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e be the percentage of itself\r\nwhich must be added to it to get a sensation which is\r\nbarely perceptible—call this sensation 1—then we should\r\nhave the series of sensation-numbers corresponding to\r\ntheir several stimuli as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eSensation 0 = stimulus A;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eSensation 1 = stimulus A (1 + r);\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eSensation 2 = stimulus A (1 + r)\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eSensation 3 = stimulus A (1 + r)\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e…..\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eSensation \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e = stimulus A (1 + r)\u003csup\u003e\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sensations here form an arithmetical series, and\r\nthe stimuli a geometrical series, and the two series correspond\r\nterm for term. Now, of two series corresponding in\r\nthis way, the terms of the arithmetical one are called the\r\nlogarithms of the terms corresponding in rank to them in\r\nthe geometrical series. A conventional arithmetical series\r\nbeginning with zero has been formed in the ordinary logarithmic\r\ntables, so that we may truly say (assuming our\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_539\"\u003e[Pg 539]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfacts to be correct so far) that the \u003ci\u003esensations vary in the\r\nsame proportion as the logarithms of their respective stimuli\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAnd we can thereupon proceed to compute the number of\r\nunits in any given sensation (considering the unit of sensation\r\nto be equal to the just perceptible increment above\r\nzero, and the unit of stimulus to be equal to the increment\r\nof stimulus \u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e, which brings this about) by multiplying the\r\nlogarithm of the stimulus by a constant factor which must\r\nvary with the particular kind of sensation in question. If\r\nwe call the stimulus R, and the constant factor C, we get\r\nthe formula\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eS = C log R,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ewhich is what Fechner calls the \u003ci\u003epsychophysischer Maasformel\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThis, in brief, is Fechner\u0027s reasoning, as I understand\r\nit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eMaasformel\u003c/i\u003e admits of mathematical development\r\nin various directions, and has given rise to arduous discussions\r\ninto which I am glad to be exempted from entering\r\nhere, since their interest is mathematical and metaphysical\r\nand not primarily psychological at all.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_447_447\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_447_447\"\u003e[447]\u003c/a\u003e I must say a word\r\nabout them metaphysically a few pages later on. Meanwhile\r\nit should be understood that no human being, in any\r\ninvestigation into which sensations entered, has ever used\r\nthe numbers computed in this or any other way in order to\r\ntest a theory or to reach a new result. The whole notion\r\nof measuring sensations numerically, remains in short a\r\nmere mathematical speculation about possibilities, which\r\nhas never been applied to practice. Incidentally to the\r\ndiscussion of it, however, a great many particular facts\r\nhave been discovered about discrimination which merit a\r\nplace in this chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place it is found, when the difference of two\r\nsensations approaches the limit of discernibility, that at\r\none moment we discern it and at the next we do not. There\r\nare accidental fluctuations in our inner sensibility which\r\nmake it impossible to tell just what the least discernible\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_540\"\u003e[Pg 540]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nincrement of the sensation is without taking the average of\r\na large number of appreciations. These \u003ci\u003eaccidental errors\u003c/i\u003e\r\nare as likely to increase as to diminish our sensibility,\r\nand are eliminated in such an average, for those above\r\nand those below the line then neutralize each other in the\r\nsum, and the normal sensibility, if there be one (that is, the\r\nsensibility due to constant causes as distinguished from\r\nthese accidental ones), stands revealed. The best way of\r\ngetting at the average sensibility has been very minutely\r\nworked over. Fechner discussed three methods, as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) \u003ci\u003eThe Method of just-discernible Differences.\u003c/i\u003e Take a\r\nstandard sensation \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e, and add to it until you distinctly feel the\r\naddition \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e; then subtract from \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e until you distinctly\r\nfeel the effect of the subtraction;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_448_448\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_448_448\"\u003e[448]\u003c/a\u003e call the difference here\r\n\u003ci\u003ed\u0027\u003c/i\u003e. The least discernible difference sought is \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003ed\u0027\u003c/i\u003e/2; and\r\nthe ratio of this quantity to the original \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e (or rather to\r\n\u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e – \u003ci\u003ed\u0027\u003c/i\u003e) is what Fechner calls the difference-threshold.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThis difference-threshold should be a constant fraction\u003c/i\u003e (no\r\nmatter what is the size of \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003eif Weber\u0027s law holds universally\r\ntrue.\u003c/i\u003e The difficulty in applying this method is that we are\r\n\u003ci\u003eso often in doubt\u003c/i\u003e whether anything has been added to \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e or\r\nnot. Furthermore, if we simply take the smallest \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e about\r\nwhich we are \u003ci\u003enever\u003c/i\u003e in doubt or in error, we certainly get\r\nour least discernible difference larger than it ought theoretically\r\nto be.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_449_449\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_449_449\"\u003e[449]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course the \u003ci\u003esensibility\u003c/i\u003e is small when the least discernible\r\ndifference is large, and \u003ci\u003evice versâ\u003c/i\u003e; in other words,\r\nit and the difference-threshold are inversely related to each\r\nother.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) \u003ci\u003eThe Method of True and False Cases.\u003c/i\u003e A sensation\r\nwhich is barely greater than another will, on account of\r\naccidental errors in a long series of experiments, sometimes\r\nbe judged equal, and sometimes smaller; i.e., we shall\r\nmake a certain number of false and a certain number of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_541\"\u003e[Pg 541]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntrue judgments about the difference between the two sensations\r\nwhich we are comparing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But the larger this difference is, the more the number of the true\r\njudgments will increase at the expense of the false ones; or, otherwise\r\nexpressed, the nearer to unity will be the fraction whose denominator\r\nrepresents the whole number of judgments, and whose numerator represents\r\nthose which are true. If \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e is a ratio of this nature, obtained\r\nby comparison of two stimuli, \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, we may seek another couple\r\nof stimuli, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, which when compared will give the same ratio of\r\ntrue to false cases.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_450_450\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_450_450\"\u003e[450]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf this were done, and the ratio of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e then proved\r\nto be equal to that of \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, that would prove that pairs\r\nof small stimuli and pairs of large stimuli may affect our\r\ndiscriminative sensibility similarly so long as the ratio of\r\nthe components to each other within each pair is the same.\r\nIn other words, it would in so far forth prove the Weberian\r\nlaw. Fechner made use of this method to ascertain his\r\nown power of discriminating differences of weight, recording\r\nno less than 24,576 separate judgments, and computing\r\nas a result that his discrimination for the same relative\r\nincrease of weight was less good in the neighborhood of\r\n500 than of 300 grams, but that after 500 grams it improved\r\nup to 3000, which was the highest weight he experimented\r\nwith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) \u003ci\u003eThe Method of Average Errors\u003c/i\u003e consists in taking a\r\nstandard stimulus and then trying to make another one of\r\nthe same sort exactly equal to it. There will in general be\r\nan error whose amount is large when the discriminative\r\nsensibility called in play is small, and \u003ci\u003evice versâ\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nsum of the errors, no matter whether they be positive or\r\nnegative, divided by their number, gives the average error.\r\nThis, when certain corrections are made, is assumed by\r\nFechner to be the \u0027reciprocal\u0027 of the discriminative sensibility\r\nin question. It should bear a constant proportion\r\nto the stimulus, no matter what the absolute size of the\r\nlatter may be, if Weber\u0027s law hold true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese methods deal with just perceptible differences.\r\nDelbœuf and Wundt have experimented with larger differences\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_542\"\u003e[Pg 542]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby means of what Wundt calls the \u003ci\u003eMéthode der mittleren\r\nAbstufungen\u003c/i\u003e, and what we may call\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) \u003ci\u003eThe Method of Equal-appearing Intervals.\u003c/i\u003e This consists\r\nin so arranging three stimuli in a series that the intervals\r\nbetween the first and the second shall appear equal to\r\nthat between the second and the third. At first sight there\r\nseems to be no direct logical connection between this method\r\nand the preceding ones. By them we compare equally \u003ci\u003eperceptible\u003c/i\u003e\r\nincrements of stimulus in different regions of the\r\nlatter\u0027s scale; but by the fourth method we compare increments\r\nwhich strike us as equally \u003ci\u003ebig\u003c/i\u003e. But what we can but\r\njust notice as an increment need not appear always of the\r\nsame bigness after it is noticed. On the contrary, it will\r\nappear much bigger when we are dealing with stimuli that\r\nare already large.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) The method of doubling the \u003ci\u003estimulus\u003c/i\u003e has been\r\nemployed by Wundt\u0027s collaborator, Merkel, who tried to\r\nmake one stimulus seem just double the other, and then\r\nmeasured the objective relation of the two. The remarks\r\njust made apply also to this case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the methods. The results differ in the\r\nhands of different observers. I will add a few of them,\r\nand will take first the \u003ci\u003ediscriminative sensibility to light\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the first method, Volkmann, Aubert, Masson, Helmholtz,\r\nand Kräpelin find figures varying from 1/3 or 1/4 to 1/195\r\nof the original stimulus. The smaller fractional increments\r\nare discriminated when the light is already fairly strong, the\r\nlarger ones when it is weak or intense. That is, the discriminative\r\nsensibility is low when weak or overstrong\r\nlights are compared, and at its best with a certain medium\r\nillumination. It is thus a function of the light\u0027s intensity;\r\nbut throughout a certain range of the latter it keeps constant,\r\nand \u003ci\u003ein so far forth\u003c/i\u003e Weber\u0027s law is verified for light.\r\nAbsolute figures cannot be given, but Merkel, by method 1,\r\nfound that Weber\u0027s law held good for stimuli (measured by\r\nhis arbitrary unit) between 96 and 4096, beyond which intensity\r\nno experiments were made.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_451_451\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_451_451\"\u003e[451]\u003c/a\u003e König and Brodhun\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_543\"\u003e[Pg 543]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave given measurements by method 1 which cover the\r\nmost extensive series, and moreover apply to six different\r\ncolors of light. These experiments (performed in Helmholtz\u0027s\r\nlaboratory, apparently,) ran from an intensity called\r\n1 to one which was 100,000 times as great. From intensity\r\n2000 to 20,000 Weber\u0027s law held good; below and above\r\nthis range discriminative sensibility declined. The increment\r\ndiscriminated here was the same for all colors of\r\nlight, and lay (according to the tables) between 1 and 2 per\r\ncent of the stimulus.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_452_452\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_452_452\"\u003e[452]\u003c/a\u003e Delbœuf had verified Weber\u0027s law\r\nfor a certain range of luminous intensities by method 4;\r\nthat is, he had found that the objective intensity of a light\r\nwhich appeared midway between two others was really the\r\ngeometrical mean of the latter\u0027s intensities. But A. Lehmann\r\nand afterwards Neiglick, in Wundt\u0027s laboratory, found that\r\neffects of contrast played so large a part in experiments\r\nperformed in this way that Delbœuf\u0027s results could not be\r\nheld conclusive. Merkel, repeating the experiments still\r\nlater, found that the objective intensity of the light which\r\nwe judge to stand midway between two others neither\r\nstands midway nor is a geometric mean. The discrepancy\r\nfrom both figures is enormous, but is least large from the\r\nmidway figure or arithmetical mean of the two extreme intensities.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_453_453\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_453_453\"\u003e[453]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFinally, the stars have from time immemorial\r\nbeen arranged in \u0027magnitudes\u0027 supposed to differ by equal-seeming\r\nintervals. Lately their intensities have been\r\ngauged photometrically, and the comparison of the subjective\r\nwith the objective series has been made. Prof. J. Jastrow\r\nis the latest worker in this field. He finds, taking\r\nPickering\u0027s Harvard photometric tables as a basis, that the\r\nratio of the average intensity of each \u0027magnitude\u0027 to that\r\nbelow it decreases as we pass from lower to higher magnitudes,\r\nshowing a uniform departure from Weber\u0027s law, if\r\nthe method of equal-appearing intervals be held to have\r\nany direct relevance to the latter.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_454_454\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_454_454\"\u003e[454]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_544\"\u003e[Pg 544]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSounds\u003c/i\u003e are less delicately discriminated in intensity than\r\nlights. A certain difficulty has come from disputes as to\r\nthe measurement of the objective intensity of the stimulus.\r\nEarlier inquiries made the perceptible increase of the stimulus\r\nto be about 1/3 of the latter. Merkel\u0027s latest results of\r\nthe method of just perceptible differences make it about\r\n3/10 for that part of the scale of intensities during which\r\nWeber\u0027s law holds good, which is from 20 to 5000 of M.\u0027s\r\narbitrary unit.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_455_455\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_455_455\"\u003e[455]\u003c/a\u003e Below this the fractional increment must\r\nbe larger. Above it no measurements were made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor \u003ci\u003epressure and muscular sense\u003c/i\u003e we have rather divergent\r\nresults. Weber found by the method of just-perceptible\r\ndifferences that persons could distinguish an increase of\r\nweight of 1/40 when the two weights were successively lifted\r\nby the same hand. It took a much larger fraction to be\r\ndiscerned when the weights were laid on a hand which\r\nrested on the table. He seems to have verified his results\r\nfor only two pairs of differing weights,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_456_456\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_456_456\"\u003e[456]\u003c/a\u003e and on this founded\r\nhis \u0027law.\u0027 Experiments in Hering\u0027s laboratory on lifting\r\n11 weights, running from 250 to 2750 grams showed that\r\nthe least perceptible increment varied from 1/21 for 250 grams\r\nto 1/114 for 2500. For 2750 it rose to 1/98 again. Merkel\u0027s\r\nrecent and very careful experiments, in which the finger\r\npressed down the beam of a balance counterweighted\r\nby from 25 to 8020 grams, showed that between 200 and\r\n2000 grams a constant fractional increase of about 1/13 was\r\nfelt when there was no movement of the finger, and of about\r\n1/19 when there was movement. Above and below these\r\nlimits the discriminative power grew less. It was greater\r\nwhen the pressure was upon one square millimeter of surface\r\nthan when it was upon seven.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_457_457\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_457_457\"\u003e[457]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWarmth and taste\u003c/i\u003e have been made the subject of similar\r\ninvestigations with the result of verifying something like\r\nWeber\u0027s law. The determination of the unit of stimulus\r\nis, however, so hard here that I will give no figures.\r\nThe results may be found in Wundt\u0027s Physiologische Psychologie,\r\n3d Ed. i, 370-2.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_545\"\u003e[Pg 545]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe discrimination of lengths by the eye\u003c/i\u003e has been found\r\nalso to obey to a certain extent Weber\u0027s law. The figures\r\nwill all be found in G. E. Müller, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e part ii, chap. x,\r\nto which the reader is referred. Professor Jastrow has\r\npublished some experiments, made by what may be called\r\na modification of the method of equal-appearing differences,\r\non our estimation of the length of sticks, by which it\r\nwould seem that the estimated intervals and the real ones\r\nare directly and not logarithmically proportionate to each\r\nother. This resembles Merkel\u0027s results by that method\r\nfor weights, lights, and sounds, and differs from Jastrow\u0027s\r\nown finding about star-magnitudes.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_458_458\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_458_458\"\u003e[458]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we look back over these facts as a whole, we see that\r\nit is not any fixed amount added to an impression that\r\nmakes us notice an increase in the latter, but that the\r\namount depends on how large the impression already is.\r\nThe amount is expressible as a certain fraction of the entire\r\nimpression to which it is added; and it is found that the\r\nfraction is a well-nigh constant figure throughout an entire\r\nregion of the scale of intensities of the impression in question.\r\nAbove and below this region the fraction increases in\r\nvalue. This is \u003ci\u003eWeber\u0027s law\u003c/i\u003e, which in so far forth expresses\r\nan empirical generalization of practical importance, without\r\ninvolving any theory whatever or seeking any absolute\r\nmeasure of the sensations themselves. It is in the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eTheoretic Interpretation of Weber\u0027s Law\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ethat Fechner\u0027s originality exclusively consists, in his assumptions,\r\nnamely, 1) that the just-perceptible increment\r\nis the \u003ci\u003esensation-unit\u003c/i\u003e, and is in all parts of the scale the same\r\n(mathematically expressed, Δ\u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e= const.); 2) that all our\r\nsensations consist of sums of these units; and finally, 3) that\r\nthe reason why it takes a constant fractional increase of the\r\nstimulus to awaken this unit lies in an ultimate law of the\r\nconnection of mind with matter, whereby the quantities of\r\nour feelings are related logarithmically to the quantities\r\nof their objects. Fechner seems to find something inscrutably\r\nsublime in the existence of an ultimate \u0027psychophysic\u0027\r\nlaw of this form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_546\"\u003e[Pg 546]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese assumptions are all peculiarly fragile. To begin\r\nwith, the \u003ci\u003emental fact\u003c/i\u003e which in the experiments corresponds\r\nto the increase of the stimulus is not an \u003ci\u003eenlarged sensation\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbut a \u003ci\u003ejudgment that the sensation is enlarged\u003c/i\u003e. What Fechner\r\ncalls the \u0027sensation\u0027 is what appears to the mind as\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eobjective phenomenon\u003c/i\u003e of light, warmth, weight, sound,\r\nimpressed part of body, etc. Fechner tacitly if not openly\r\nassumes that such a \u003ci\u003ejudgment of increase\u003c/i\u003e consists in the\r\nsimple fact that an \u003ci\u003eincreased number\u003c/i\u003e of sensation-units\r\nare present to the mind; and that the judgment is thus\r\nitself a quantitatively bigger mental thing when it judges\r\nlarge differences, or differences between large terms, than\r\nwhen it judges small ones. But these ideas are really\r\nabsurd. The hardest sort of judgment, the judgment\r\nwhich strains the attention most (if \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e be any criterion\r\nof the judgment\u0027s \u0027size\u0027), is that about the \u003ci\u003esmallest\u003c/i\u003e things\r\nand differences. But really it has no meaning to talk\r\nabout one judgment being bigger than another. And\r\neven if we leave out judgments and talk of sensations\r\nonly, we have already found ourselves (in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter VI\u003c/a\u003e)\r\nquite unable to read any clear meaning into the notion that\r\nthey are masses of units combined. To introspection, our\r\nfeeling of pink is surely not a portion of our feeling of\r\nscarlet; nor does the light of an electric arc seem to contain\r\nthat of a tallow-candle in itself. Compound \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncontain parts; and one such thing may have twice or three\r\ntimes as many parts as another. But when we take a simple\r\nsensible quality like light or sound, and say that there\r\nis now twice or thrice as much of it present as there was\r\na moment ago, although we seem to mean the same thing\r\nas if we were talking of compound objects, we really mean\r\nsomething different. We mean that if we were to arrange\r\nthe various possible degrees of the quality in a scale of\r\nserial increase, the \u003ci\u003edistance, interval\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e between\r\nthe stronger and the weaker specimen before us would\r\nseem about as great as that between the weaker one and\r\nthe beginning of the scale. \u003ci\u003eIt is these\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003erelations,\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ethese\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003edistances\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhich we are measuring and not the composition of the\r\nqualities themselves\u003c/i\u003e, as Fechner thinks. Whilst if we turn\r\nto objects which \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e divisible, surely a big object may be\r\nknown in a little thought. Introspection shows moreover\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_547\"\u003e[Pg 547]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat in most sensations a new \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e of feeling invariably accompanies\r\nour judgment of an increased impression; and\r\nthis is a fact which Fechner\u0027s formula disregards.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_459_459\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_459_459\"\u003e[459]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut apart from these \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e difficulties, and even supposing\r\nthat sensations did consist of added units, Fechner\u0027s\r\nassumption that all \u003ci\u003eequally perceptible\u003c/i\u003e additions are \u003ci\u003eequally\r\ngreat\u003c/i\u003e additions is entirely arbitrary. Why might not a\r\nsmall addition to a small sensation be as \u003ci\u003eperceptible\u003c/i\u003e as a\r\nlarge addition to a large one? In this case Weber\u0027s law\r\nwould apply not to the additions themselves, but only to\r\ntheir perceptibility. Our \u003ci\u003enoticing\u003c/i\u003e of a difference of units in\r\ntwo sensations would depend on the latter being in a fixed\r\nratio. But the \u003ci\u003edifference itself\u003c/i\u003e would depend directly on\r\nthat between their respective stimuli. So many units added\r\nto the stimulus, so many added to the sensation, and if\r\nthe stimulus grew in a certain ratio, in exactly the same\r\nratio would the sensation also grow, though its \u003ci\u003eperceptibility\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngrew according to the logarithmic law.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_460_460\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_460_460\"\u003e[460]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e stand for the smallest difference which \u003ci\u003ewe perceive\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthen we should have, instead of the formula Δ\u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e = const.,\r\nwhich is Fechner\u0027s, the formula Δ\u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e/\u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e = const., a formula\r\nwhich interprets all the \u003ci\u003efacts\u003c/i\u003e of Weber\u0027s law, in an entirely\r\ndifferent theoretic way from that adopted by Fechner.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_461_461\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_461_461\"\u003e[461]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe entire superstructure which Fechner rears upon the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_548\"\u003e[Pg 548]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfacts is thus not only seen to be arbitrary and subjective,\r\nbut in the highest degree improbable as well. The departures\r\nfrom Weber\u0027s law in regions where it does not obtain,\r\nhe explains by the compounding with it of other unknown\r\nlaws which mask its effects. As if \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e law could not be\r\nfound in \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e set of phenomena, provided one have the wit to\r\ninvent enough other coexisting laws to overlap and neutralize\r\nit! The whole outcome of the discussion, so far as\r\nFechner\u0027s theories are concerned, is indeed \u003ci\u003enil. Weber\u0027s\r\nlaw alone remains true, as an empirical generalization of fair\r\nextent:\u003c/i\u003e What we add to a large stimulus we notice less\r\nthan what we add to a small one, unless it happen \u003ci\u003erelatively\r\nto the stimulus\u003c/i\u003e to be as great.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eWeber\u0027s law is probably purely physiological.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne can express this state of things otherwise by saying\r\nthat the whole of the stimulus does not seem to be effective\r\nin giving us the perception of \u0027more,\u0027 and the simplest interpretation\r\nof such a state of things would be \u003ci\u003ephysical\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe loss of effect would take place in the nervous system.\r\nIf our feelings resulted from a condition of the nerve-molecules\r\nwhich it grew ever more difficult for the stimulus\r\nto increase, our feelings would naturally grow at a slower\r\nrate than the stimulus itself. An ever larger part of the\r\nlatter\u0027s work would go to overcoming the resistances, and\r\nan ever smaller part to the realization of the feeling-bringing\r\nstate. Weber\u0027s law would thus be a sort of \u003ci\u003elaw of\r\nfriction\u003c/i\u003e in the neural machine.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_462_462\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_462_462\"\u003e[462]\u003c/a\u003e Just how these inner\r\nresistances and frictions are to be conceived is a speculative\r\nquestion. Delbœuf has formulated them as fatigue;\r\nBernstein and Ward, as irradiations. The latest,\r\nand probably the most \u0027real,\u0027 hypothesis is that of Ebbinghaus,\r\nwho supposes that the intensity of sensation depends\r\non the \u003ci\u003enumber\u003c/i\u003e of neural molecules which are disintegrated\r\nin the unit of time. There are only a certain number at\r\nany time which are \u003ci\u003ecapable\u003c/i\u003e of disintegrating; and whilst\r\nmost of these are in an average condition of instability,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_549\"\u003e[Pg 549]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome are almost stable and some already near to decomposition.\r\nThe smallest stimuli affect these latter molecules\r\nonly; and as they are but few, the sensational effect from\r\nadding a given quantity of stimulus \u003ci\u003eat first\u003c/i\u003e is relatively\r\nsmall. Medium stimuli affect the majority of the molecules,\r\nbut affect fewer and fewer in proportion as they have\r\nalready diminished their number. The latest additions to\r\nthe stimuli find all the medium molecules already disintegrated,\r\nand only affect the small relatively indecomposable\r\nremainder, thus giving rise to increments of feeling which\r\nare correspondingly small. (Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, 45, 113.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is surely in some such way as this that Weber\u0027s law\r\nis to be interpreted, if it ever is. The Fechnerian \u003ci\u003eMaasformel\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand the conception of it as an ultimate \u0027psychophysic\r\nlaw\u0027 will remain an \u0027idol of the den,\u0027 if ever there was one.\r\nFechner himself indeed was a German \u003ci\u003eGelehrter\u003c/i\u003e of the ideal\r\ntype, at once simple and shrewd, a mystic and an experimentalist,\r\nhomely and daring, and as loyal to facts as to his\r\ntheories. But it would be terrible if even such a dear old\r\nman as this could saddle our Science forever with his\r\npatient whimsies, and, in a world so full of more nutritious\r\nobjects of attention, compel all future students to plough\r\nthrough the difficulties, not only of his own works, but of\r\nthe still drier ones written in his refutation. Those who\r\ndesire this dreadful literature can find it; it has a \u0027disciplinary\r\nvalue;\u0027 but I will not even enumerate it in a foot-note.\r\nThe only amusing part of it is that Fechner\u0027s critics\r\nshould always feel bound, after smiting his theories hip\r\nand thigh and leaving not a stick of them standing, to\r\nwind up by saying that nevertheless to him belongs the\r\n\u003ci\u003eimperishable glory\u003c/i\u003e, of first formulating them and thereby\r\nturning psychology into an \u003ci\u003eexact science\u003c/i\u003e,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"\u0027And everybody praised the duke\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eWho this great fight did win.\u0027\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u0027But what good came of it at last?\u0027\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eQuoth little Peterkin.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u0027Why, that I cannot tell,\u0027 said he,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u0027But \u0027twas a famous victory!\u0027\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_406_406\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_406_406\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[406]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Human Understanding, ii, xi, 1, 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_407_407\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_407_407\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[407]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis, vol. i, p. 71.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_408_408\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_408_408\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[408]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Senses and the Intellect, page 411.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_409_409\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_409_409\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[409]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Essays Philosophical and Theological: First Series, pp. 268-273.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_410_410\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_410_410\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[410]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Montgomery in \u0027Mind,\u0027 x, 527. Cf. also Lipps: Grundtatsachen des\r\nSeelenlebens, p. 579 ff.; and see below, Chapter XIX.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_411_411\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_411_411\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[411]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Stumpf (Tonpsychologie, i, 116 ff.) tries to prove that the theory that\r\nall differences are differences of composition leads necessarily to an infinite\r\nregression when we try to determine the unit. It seems to me that in his\r\nparticular reasoning he forgets the ultimate units of the mind-stuff\r\ntheory. I cannot find the completed infinite to be one of the obstacles to\r\nbelief in this theory, although I fully accept Stumpf\u0027s general reasoning,\r\nand am only too happy to find myself on the same side with such an exceptionally\r\nclear thinker. The strictures by Wahle in the Vierteljsch. f.\r\nwiss. Phil. seem to me to have no force, since the writer does not discriminate\r\nbetween resemblance of things obviously compound and that of\r\nthings sensibly simple.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_412_412\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_412_412\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[412]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The \u003ci\u003ebelief that the causes\u003c/i\u003e of effects felt by us to differ qualitatively are\r\nfacts which differ only in quantity (e.g. that blue is caused by so many\r\nether-waves, and yellow by a smaller number) must not be confounded\r\nwith the feeling that the effects differ quantitatively themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_413_413\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_413_413\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[413]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Herr G. H. Schneider, in his youthful pamphlet (Die Unterscheidung,\r\n1877) has tried to show that there are no positively existent elements of\r\nsensibility, no substantive qualities between which differences obtain, but\r\nthat the terms we call such, the sensations, are but sums of differences,\r\nloci or starting points whence many directions of difference proceed.\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eUnterschiedsempfindungs-Complexe\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 are what he calls them. This absurd\r\ncarrying out of that \u0027principle of relativity\u0027 which we shall have to mention\r\nin Chapter XVII may serve as a counterpoise to the mind-stuff\r\ntheory, which says that there are nothing but substantive sensations, and\r\ndenies the existence of relations of difference between them at all.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_414_414\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_414_414\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[414]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, i, 121, and James Ward, Mind, i, 464.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_415_415\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_415_415\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[415]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The ordinary treatment of this is to call it the result of the \u003ci\u003efusion\u003c/i\u003e of\r\na lot of sensations, in themselves separate. This is pure mythology, as the\r\nsequel will abundantly show.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_416_416\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_416_416\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[416]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"We often begin to be dimly aware of a difference in a sensation or\r\ngroup of sensations, before we can assign any definite character to that\r\nwhich differs. Thus we detect a strange or foreign ingredient or flavor in\r\na familiar dish, or of tone in a familiar tune, and yet are wholly unable for\r\na while to say what the intruder is like. Hence perhaps discrimination\r\nmay be regarded as the earliest and most primordial mode of intellectual\r\nactivity.\" (Sully: Outlines of Psychology, p. 142. \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e also G. H.\r\nSchneider: Die Unterscheidung, pp. 9-10.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_417_417\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_417_417\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[417]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In cases where the difference is slight, we may need, as previously\r\nremarked, to get the dying phase of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e as well as of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e before \u003ci\u003en-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis distinctly felt. In that case the inevitably successive feelings\r\n(as far as we can sever what is so continuous) would be four, \u003ci\u003em, difference,\r\nn, n-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e. This slight additional complication alters not a whit\r\nthe essential features of the case.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_418_418\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_418_418\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[418]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis. J. S. Mill\u0027s ed., ii, 17. Cf. also pp. 12, 14.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_419_419\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_419_419\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[419]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There is only one obstacle, and that is our inveterate tendency to believe\r\nthat where two things or qualities are compared, it \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be that\r\nexact duplicates of both have got into the mind and have matched themselves\r\nagainst each other there. To which the first reply is the empirical\r\none of \"Look into the mind and see.\" When I recognize a weight which\r\nI now lift as \u003ci\u003einferior\u003c/i\u003e to the one I just lifted; when, with my tooth now\r\naching, I perceive the pain to be \u003ci\u003eless\u003c/i\u003e intense than it was a minute ago; the\r\ntwo things in the mind which are compared would, by the authors I criticise,\r\nbe admitted to be an actual sensation and an image in the memory.\r\nAn image in the memory, by general consent of these same authors, is admitted\r\nto be a weaker thing than a sensation. Nevertheless it is in these\r\ninstances judged stronger; that is, an object supposed to be known only in\r\nso far forth as this image represents it, is judged stronger. Ought not this\r\nto shake one\u0027s belief in the notion of separate representative \u0027ideas\u0027 weighing\r\nthemselves, or being weighed by the Ego, against each other in the\r\nmind? And let it not be said that what makes us judge the felt pain to be\r\nweaker than the imagined one of a moment since is our recollection of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003edownward nature of the shock of difference\u003c/i\u003e which we felt as we passed to\r\nthe present moment from the one before it. That shock does undoubtedly\r\nhave a different character according as it comes between terms of which\r\nthe second diminishes or increases; and it may be admitted that in cases\r\nWhere the past term is doubtfully remembered, the memory of the shock\r\nas \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eminus\u003c/i\u003e, might sometimes enable us to establish a relation which\r\notherwise we should not perceive. But one could hardly expect the memory\r\nof this shock to overpower our actual comparison of terms, both of\r\nwhich are \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e (as are the image and the sensation in the case supposed),\r\nand make us judge the weaker one to be the stronger.—And hereupon\r\ncomes the second reply: Suppose the mind does compare two realities by\r\ncomparing two ideas of its own which represent them—what is gained?\r\nThe same mystery is still there. The ideas must still be \u003ci\u003eknown\u003c/i\u003e; and, as\r\nthe attention in comparing oscillates from one to the other, past must be\r\nknown with present just as before. If you must end by simply saying\r\nthat your \u0027Ego,\u0027 whilst \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e neither the idea of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e nor the idea of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, yet\r\nknows and compares both, why not allow your pulse of thought, which \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nneither the thing \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e nor the thing \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, to know and compare both directly?\r\n\u0027Tis but a question of how to \u003ci\u003ename\u003c/i\u003e the facts least artificially. The egoist\r\n\u003ci\u003eexplains\u003c/i\u003e them, by naming them as an Ego \u0027combining\u0027 or \u0027synthetizing\u0027\r\ntwo ideas, no more than we do by naming them a pulse of thought knowing\r\ntwo facts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_420_420\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_420_420\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[420]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I fear that few will be converted by my words, so obstinately do\r\nthinkers of all schools refuse to admit the unmediated function of \u003ci\u003eknowing\r\na thing\u003c/i\u003e, and so incorrigibly do they substitute \u003ci\u003ebeing the thing\u003c/i\u003e for it. E.g., in\r\nthe latest utterance of the spiritualistic philosophy (Bowne\u0027s Introduction to\r\nPsychological Theory, 1887, published only three days before this writing)\r\none of the first sentences which catch my eye is this: \"What remembers?\r\nThe spiritualist says, the soul remembers; it abides across the years and\r\nthe flow of the body, and \u003ci\u003egathering up its past, carries it with it\u003c/i\u003e\" (p. 28).\r\nWhy, for heaven\u0027s sake, O Bowne, cannot you say \u0027\u003ci\u003eknows it\u003c/i\u003e\u0027? If there is\r\nanything our soul does \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e do to its past, it is to carry it with it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_421_421\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_421_421\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[421]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sensations of Tone, 2d English Ed., p. 65.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_422_422\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_422_422\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[422]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychology, i, 345.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_423_423\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_423_423\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[423]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A Budget of Paradoxes, p. 380.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_424_424\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_424_424\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[424]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The explanation I offer presupposes that a difference too faint to have\r\nany direct effect in the way of making the mind notice it \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e will nevertheless\r\nbe strong enough to keep its \u0027terms\u0027 from calling up identical\r\nassociates. It seems probable from many observations that this is the case.\r\nAll the facts of \u0027unconscious\u0027 inference are proofs of it. We say a\r\npainting \u0027looks\u0027 like the work of a certain artist, though we cannot name\r\nthe characteristic differentiæ. We see by a man\u0027s face that he is sincere,\r\nthough we can give no definite reason for our faith. The facts of sense-perception\r\nquoted from Helmholtz a few pages below will be additional\r\nexamples. Here is another good one, though it will perhaps be easier\r\nunderstood after reading the chapter on Space-perception than now.\r\nTake two stereoscopic slides and represent on each half-slide a pair of\r\nspots, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, but make their distances such that the \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s are equidistant\r\non both slides, whilst the \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s are nearer together on slide 1 than on slide 2.\r\nMake moreover the distance \u003ci\u003eab = ab\u0027\u0027\u0027\u003c/i\u003e and the distance \u003ci\u003eab\u0027 = ab\u0027\u0027\u003c/i\u003e. Then\r\nlook successively at the two slides stereoscopically, so that the \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s in both\r\nare directly fixated (that is fall on the two foveæ, or centres of distinctest\r\nvision). The \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s will then appear single, and so probably will the \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s.\r\nBut the now single-seeming \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e on slide 1 will look nearer, whilst that on\r\nslide 2 will look farther than the \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e. But, if the diagrams are rightly drawn,\r\n\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u0027\u0027\u0027\u003c/i\u003e must affect \u0027identical\u0027 spots, spots equally far to the right of\r\nthe fovea, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e in the left eye and \u003ci\u003eb\u0027\u0027\u0027\u003c/i\u003e in the right eye. The same is true\r\nof \u003ci\u003eb\u0027\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u0027\u0027\u003c/i\u003e. Identical spots are spots whose sensations cannot possibly be\r\ndiscriminated as such. Since in these two observations, however, they\r\ngive rise to such opposite perceptions of distance, and prompt such opposite\r\ntendencies to movement (since in slide 1 we \u003ci\u003econverge\u003c/i\u003e in looking from\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, whilst in slide 2 we \u003ci\u003ediverge\u003c/i\u003e), it follows that two processes which\r\noccasion feelings quite indistinguishable to direct consciousness may nevertheless\r\nbe each allied with disparate associates both of a sensorial and of a\r\nmotor kind. Cf. Donders, Archiv f. Ophthalmologie, Bd. 13 (1867). The\r\nbasis of his essay is that we cannot \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e on which eye any particular element\r\nof a compound picture falls, but its effects on our total perception\r\ndiffer in the two eyes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-512-fn.jpg\" style=\"width: 300px\" id=\"img_images_jame_512_fn.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_425_425\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_425_425\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[425]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A. W. Volkmann: Ueber den Einfluss der Uebung, etc., Leipzig Berichte,\r\nMath.-phys. Classe. x, 1858, p. 67.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_426_426\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_426_426\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[426]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e Tabelle 1, p. 43.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_427_427\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_427_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[427]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor Lipps accounts for the tactile discrimination of the blind\r\nin a way which (divested of its \u0027mythological\u0027 assumptions) seems to me\r\nessentially to agree with this. Stronger ideas are supposed to raise weaker\r\nones over the threshold of consciousness by fusing with them, the tendency\r\nto fuse being proportional to the similarity of the ideas \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e Grundtatsachen,\r\netc., pp. 232-3; also pp. 118, 492, 526-7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_428_428\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_428_428\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[428]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sensations of Tone, 2d. English Edition, p. 62.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_429_429\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_429_429\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[429]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare as to this, however, what I said above, Chapter V, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp.\r\n172-176\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_430_430\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_430_430\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[430]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e When a person squints, double images are formed in the centre of the\r\nfield. As a matter of fact, most squinters are found blind of one eye, or\r\nalmost so; and it has long been supposed amongst ophthalmologists that\r\nthe blindness is a secondary affection superinduced by the voluntary suppression\r\nof one of the sets of double images, in other words by the positive\r\nand persistent refusal to use one of the eyes. This explanation of the\r\nblindness has, however, been called in question of late years. See, for a\r\nbrief account of the matter, O. F. Wadsworth in Boston Med. and Surg.\r\nJourn., cxvi, 49 (Jan. 20, \u002787), and the replies by Derby and others a little\r\nlater.—W. J.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_431_431\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_431_431\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[431]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Tonempfindungen, Dritte Auflage, pp. 102-107.—The reader who\r\nhas assimilated the contents of our \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter V\u003c/a\u003e, above, will doubtless\r\nhave remarked that the illustrious physiologist has fallen, in these paragraphs,\r\ninto that sort of interpretation of the facts which we there\r\ntried to prove erroneous. Helmholtz, however, is no more careless than\r\nmost psychologists in confounding together the object perceived, the\r\norganic conditions of the perception, and the sensations which \u003ci\u003ewould\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbe excited by the several parts of the object, or by the several organic\r\nconditions, \u003ci\u003eprovided\u003c/i\u003e they came into action separately or were separately\r\nattended to, and in assuming that what is true of any one of these sorts of\r\nfact must be true of the other sorts also. If each organic condition or part\r\nof the object is there, its sensation, he thinks, must be there also, only in\r\na \u0027synthetic\u0027—which is indistinguishable from what the authors whom we\r\nformerly reviewed called an \u0027unconscious\u0027—state. I will not repeat arguments\r\nsufficiently detailed in the earlier chapter (see especially \u003ca href=\"#Page_170\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 170-176\u003c/a\u003e),\r\nbut simply say that what he calls the \u0027fusion of many \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e into one\u0027\r\nis really the production of one sensation by the co-operation of many \u003ci\u003eorganic\r\nconditions\u003c/i\u003e; and that what perception fails to discriminate (when it is\r\n\u0027synthetic\u0027) is not \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e already existent but not singled out, but new\r\nobjective \u003ci\u003efacts\u003c/i\u003e, judged truer than the facts already synthetically perceived—two\r\nviews of the solid body, many harmonic tones, instead of one view and\r\none tone, states of the eyeball-muscles thitherto unknown, and the like.\r\nThese new facts, when first discovered, are known in states of consciousness\r\nnever till that moment exactly realized before, states of consciousness\r\nwhich at the same time judge them to be determinations of the same\r\n\u003ci\u003ematter of fact\u003c/i\u003e which was previously realized. All that Helmholtz says of\r\nthe conditions which hinder and further analysis applies just as naturally\r\nto the analysis, through the advent of \u003ci\u003enew\u003c/i\u003e feelings, of \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e into their elements,\r\nas to the analysis of aggregate feelings into elementary feelings supposed\r\nto have been hidden in them all the while.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe reader can himself apply this criticism to the following passages from\r\nLotze and Stumpf respectively, which I quote because they are the ablest\r\nexpressions of the view opposed to my own. Both authors, it seems to me,\r\ncommit the psychologist\u0027s fallacy, and allow their later knowledge of the\r\nthings felt to be foisted into their account of the primitive way of feeling\r\nthem.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLotze says: \"It is indubitable that the simultaneous assault of a\r\nvariety of different stimuli on different senses, or even on the same sense,\r\nputs us into a state of confused general feeling in which we are certainly\r\nnot conscious of clearly distinguishing the different impressions. Still it\r\ndoes not follow that in such a case we have a positive perception of an\r\nactual unity of the contents of our ideas, arising from their mixture; our\r\nstate of mind seems rather to consist in (1) the consciousness of our inability\r\nto separate what really has remained diverse, and (2) in the general\r\nfeeling of the disturbance produced in the economy of our body by the\r\nsimultaneous assault of the stimuli…. Not that the sensations melt into\r\none another, but simply that the act of distinguishing them is absent; and\r\nthis again certainly not so far that the fact of the difference remains\r\nentirely unperceived, but only so far as to prevent us from determining the\r\namount of the difference, and from apprehending other relations between\r\nthe different impressions. Anyone who is annoyed at one and the same\r\ntime by glowing heat, dazzling light, deafening noise, and an offensive\r\nsmell, will certainly not fuse these disparate sensations into a single one\r\nwith a single content which could be sensuously perceived; they remain\r\nfor him in separation, and he merely finds it impossible to be conscious of\r\none of them apart from the others. But, further, he will have a feeling of\r\ndiscomfort—what I mentioned above as the \u003ci\u003esecond\u003c/i\u003e constituent of his whole\r\nstate. For every stimulus which produces in consciousness a definite content\r\nof sensation is also a definite degree of disturbance, and therefore\r\nmakes a call upon the forces of the nerves; and the sum of these little\r\nchanges, which in their character as disturbances are not so diverse as the\r\ncontents of consciousness they give rise to, produce the general feeling\r\nwhich, added to the inability to distinguish, deludes us into the belief in\r\nan actual absence of diversity in our sensations. It is only in some such\r\nway as this, again, that I can imagine that state which is sometimes described\r\nas the beginning of our whole education, a state which in itself is\r\nsupposed to be simple, and to be afterwards divided into different sensations\r\nby an activity of separation. No activity of separation in the world\r\ncould establish differences where no real diversity existed; for it would\r\nhave nothing to guide it to the places where it was to establish them, or to\r\nindicate the width it was to give them.\" (Metaphysic, § 260, English translation.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nStumpf writes as follows: \"Of coexistent sensations there are always\r\na large number undiscriminated in consciousness, or (if one prefer\r\nto call what is undiscriminated unconscious) in the soul. They are, however,\r\nnot fused into a simple quality. When, on entering a room, we\r\nreceive sensations of odor and warmth together, without expressly attending\r\nto either, the two qualities of sensation are not, as it were, an entirely\r\nnew simple quality, which first at the moment in which attention analytically\r\nsteps in \u003ci\u003echanges into\u003c/i\u003e smell and warmth…. In such cases we find\r\nourselves in presence of an indefinable, unnamable total of feeling. And\r\nwhen, after successfully analyzing this total, we call it back to memory, as\r\nit was in its unanalyzed state, and compare it with the elements we have\r\nfound, the latter (as it seems to me) may be recognized as real parts contained\r\nin the former, and the former seen to be their sum. So, for example,\r\nwhen we clearly perceive that the content of our sensation of oil of peppermint\r\nis partly a sensation of taste and partly one of temperature.\" (Tonpsychologie,\r\ni, 107.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI should prefer to say that we perceive that objective fact, known to us\r\nas the peppermint taste, to contain those other objective facts known as\r\naromatic or sapid quality, and coldness, respectively. No ground to suppose\r\nthat the vehicle of this last very complex perception has any identity\r\nwith the earlier psychosis—least of all is contained in it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_432_432\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_432_432\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[432]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 248.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_433_433\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_433_433\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[433]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Wundt\u0027s Philos. Studien, i, 527.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_434_434\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_434_434\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[434]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 530.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_435_435\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_435_435\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[435]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, xi, 377 ff. He says: \"I apparently either distinguished the\r\nimpression and made the motion simultaneously, or if I tried to avoid this\r\nby waiting until I had formed a distinct impression before I began to\r\nmake the motion, I added to the simple reaction, not only a perception,\r\nbut a volition.\"—Which remark may well confirm our doubts as to the\r\nstrict \u003ci\u003epsychologic\u003c/i\u003e worth of any of these measurements.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_436_436\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_436_436\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[436]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, xi, 379.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_437_437\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_437_437\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[437]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For other determinations of discrimination-time by this method cf.\r\nv. Kries and Auerbach, Archiv f. Physiologie, Bd. i, p. 297 ff. (these authors\r\nget much smaller figures); Friedrich, Psychologische Studien, i, 39.\r\nChapter ix of Buccola\u0027s book, Le Legge del tempo, etc., gives a full account\r\nof the subject.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_438_438\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_438_438\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[438]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If so, the reactions upon the spark would have to be slower than\r\nthose upon the touch. The investigation was abandoned because it was\r\nfound impossible to narrow down the difference between the conditions of\r\nthe sight-series and those of the touch-series, to nothing more than the\r\npossible presence in the latter of the intervening motor-idea. Other disparities\r\ncould not be excluded.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_439_439\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_439_439\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[439]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Tischer gives figures from quite unpractised individuals, which I have\r\nnot quoted. The discrimination-time of one of them is 22 times longer than\r\nTischer\u0027s own! (Psychol. Studien, i, 527.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_440_440\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_440_440\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[440]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare Lipps\u0027s excellent passage to the same critical effect in his\r\nGrundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 390-393.—I leave my text just as it\r\nwas written before the publication of Lange\u0027s and Münsterberg\u0027s results\r\ncited on \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 92\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e. Their \u0027shortened\u0027 or \u0027muscular\u0027 times, got\r\nwhen the expectant attention was addressed to the possible reactions rather\r\nthan to the stimulus, constitute the minimal reaction-time of which I speak,\r\nand all that I say in the text falls beautifully into line with their results.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_441_441\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_441_441\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[441]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Sully: Mind, x, 494-5; Bradley: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e xi, 83; Bosanquet: \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e xi,\r\n405.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_442_442\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_442_442\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[442]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The judgment becomes easier if the two couples of terms have one\r\nmember in common, if \u003ci\u003ea—b\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb—c\u003c/i\u003e, for example, are compared. This, as\r\nStumpf says (Tonpsychologie, i, 131), is probably because the introduction\r\nof the fourth term brings involuntary cross-comparisons with it, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith \u003ci\u003ed, b\u003c/i\u003e with \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, etc., which confuses us by withdrawing our attention\r\nfrom the relations we ought alone to be estimating.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_443_443\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_443_443\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[443]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Delbœuf: Éléments de Psychophysique (Paris, 1883), p. 64. Plateau\r\nin Stumpf, Tonpsych., i, 125. I have noticed a curious enlargement\r\nof certain \u0027distances\u0027 of difference under the influence of chloroform.\r\nThe jingling of the bells on the horses of a horse-car passing the door, for\r\nexample, and the rumbling of the vehicle itself, which to our ordinary\r\nhearing merge together very readily into a \u003ci\u003equasi\u003c/i\u003e-continuous body of\r\nsound, have seemed so far apart as to require a sort of mental facing in\r\nopposite directions to get from one to the other, as if they belonged in different\r\nworlds. I am inclined to suspect, from certain data, that the ultimate\r\nphilosophy of difference and likeness will have to be built upon\r\nexperiences of intoxication, especially by nitrous oxide gas, which lets us\r\ninto intuitions the subtlety whereof is denied to the waking state. Cf. B.\r\nP. Blood: The Anæsthetic Revelation, and the Gist of Philosophy (Amsterdam,\r\nN. Y., 1874). Cf. also Mind, vii, 200.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_444_444\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_444_444\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[444]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 126 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_445_445\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_445_445\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[445]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Stumpf, pp. 111-121.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_446_446\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_446_446\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[446]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Stumpf, pp. 116-7. I have omitted, so as not to make my text too intricate,\r\nan extremely acute and conclusive paragraph, which I reproduce here:\r\n\"We may generalize: Wherever a number of sensible impressions are\r\napprehended \u003ci\u003eas a series\u003c/i\u003e, there in the last instance must perceptions of simple\r\nlikeness be found. \u003ci\u003eProof:\u003c/i\u003e Assume that all the terms of a series, e.g.\r\nthe qualities of tone, \u003ci\u003ec d e f g\u003c/i\u003e, have something in common,—\u003ci\u003eno matter what\r\nit is\u003c/i\u003e, call it \u003ci\u003eX\u003c/i\u003e; then I say that the differing parts of each of these terms\r\nmust not only be differently constituted in each, but must \u003ci\u003ethemselves form\r\na series\u003c/i\u003e, whose existence is the ground for our apprehending the original\r\nterms in serial form. We thus get instead of the original series \u003ci\u003ea b c d e f\u003c/i\u003e\r\n… the equivalent series \u003ci\u003eXα, Xβ, Xγ\u003c/i\u003e,… etc. What is gained? The\r\nquestion immediately arises: How is \u003ci\u003eα β γ\u003c/i\u003e known as a series? According\r\nto the theory, these elements must themselves be made up of a part common\r\nto all, and of parts differing in each, which latter parts form a new series,\r\nand so on \u003ci\u003ead infinitum\u003c/i\u003e, which is absurd.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_447_447\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_447_447\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[447]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The most important ameliorations of Fechner\u0027s formula are Delbœuf\u0027s\r\nin his Recherches sur la Mesure des Sensations (1873), p. 35, and Elsas\u0027s in\r\nhis pamphlet Über die Psychophysik (1886) p. 16.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_448_448\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_448_448\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[448]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Reversing the order is for the sake of letting the opposite accidental\r\nerrors due to \u0027contrast\u0027 neutralize each other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_449_449\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_449_449\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[449]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Theoretically it would seem that it ought to be equal to the sum of\r\nall the additions which we judge to be increases divided by the total number\r\nof judgments made.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_450_450\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_450_450\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[450]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Delbœuf, Éléments de Psychophysique (1883), p. 9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_451_451\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_451_451\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[451]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philos. Studien, iv, 588.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_452_452\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_452_452\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[452]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Berlin Acad. Sitzungsberichte, 1888, p. 917. Other observers (Dobrowolsky,\r\nLamausky) found great differences in different colors.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_453_453\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_453_453\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[453]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Merkel\u0027s tables, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 568.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_454_454\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_454_454\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[454]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e American Journal of Psychology, i, 125. The rate of decrease is\r\nsmall but steady, and I cannot well understand what Professor J. means by\r\nsaying that his figures verify Weber\u0027s law.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_455_455\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_455_455\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[455]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, v, 514-5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_456_456\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_456_456\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[456]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. G. E. Müller: Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik, §§ 68-70.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_457_457\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_457_457\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[457]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, v, 287 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_458_458\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_458_458\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[458]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e American J. of Psychology, iii, 44-7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_459_459\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_459_459\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[459]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, pp. 397-9. \"One sensation cannot be a\r\nmultiple of another. If it could, we ought to be able to subtract the one\r\nfrom the other, and to feel the remainder by itself. Every sensation presents\r\nitself as an indivisible unit.\" Professor von Kries, in the Viertejahrschrift\r\nfür wiss. Philosophie, vi, 257 ff., shows very clearly the absurdity\r\nof supposing that our stronger sensations contain our weaker ones\r\nas parts. They differ as qualitative units. Compare also J. Tannery in\r\nDelbœuf\u0027s Éléments de Psychophysique (1883), p. 134 ff.; J. Ward in Mind,\r\ni, 464: Lotze, Metaphysik, § 258.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_460_460\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_460_460\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[460]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e F Brentano, Psychologie, i, 9, 88 ff.—Merkel thinks that his results\r\nwith the method of equal-appearing intervals show that we compare considerable\r\nintervals with each other by a different law from that by which\r\nwe notice barely perceptible intervals. The stimuli form an arithmetical\r\nseries (a pretty wild one according to his figures) in the former case, a\r\ngeometrical one in the latter—at least so I understand this valiant experimenter\r\nbut somewhat obscure if acute writer.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_461_461\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_461_461\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[461]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This is the formula which Merkel thinks he has verified (if I understand\r\nhim aright) by his experiments by method 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_462_462\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_462_462\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[462]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Elsas: Ueber die Psychophysik (1856), p. 41. When the pans of\r\na balance are already loaded, but in equilibrium, it takes a proportionally\r\nlarger weight added to one of them to incline the beam.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_550\"\u003e[Pg 550]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_XIV463\"\u003eCHAPTER XIV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_463_463\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_463_463\"\u003e[463]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eASSOCIATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter discrimination, association! Already in the last\r\nchapter I have had to invoke, in order to explain the improvement\r\nof certain discriminations by practice, the \u0027association\u0027\r\nof the objects to be distinguished, with other more\r\nwidely differing ones. It is obvious that the advance of our\r\nknowledge \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e consist of both operations; for objects at\r\nfirst appearing as wholes are analyzed into parts, and\r\nobjects appearing separately are brought together and appear\r\nas new compound wholes to the mind. Analysis and\r\nsynthesis are thus the incessantly alternating mental\r\nactivities, a stroke of the one preparing the way for a stroke\r\nof the other, much as, in walking, a man\u0027s two legs are\r\nalternately brought into use, both being indispensable for\r\nany orderly advance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe manner in which trains of imagery and consideration\r\nfollow each other through our thinking, the restless flight\r\nof one idea before the next, the transitions our minds make\r\nbetween things wide as the poles asunder, transitions which\r\nat first sight startle us by their abruptness, but which,\r\nwhen scrutinized closely, often reveal intermediating links\r\nof perfect naturalness and propriety—all this magical, imponderable\r\nstreaming has from time immemorial excited\r\nthe admiration of all whose attention happened to be caught\r\nby its omnipresent mystery. And it has furthermore\r\nchallenged the race of philosophers to banish something\r\nof the mystery by formulating the process in simpler\r\nterms. The problem which the philosophers have set\r\nthemselves is that of ascertaining \u003ci\u003eprinciples of connection\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbetween the thoughts which thus appear to sprout one out\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_551\"\u003e[Pg 551]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the other, whereby their peculiar succession or coexistence\r\nmay be explained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut immediately an ambiguity arises: which sort of\r\nconnection is meant? connection \u003ci\u003ethought-of\u003c/i\u003e, or connection\r\n\u003ci\u003ebetween thoughts\u003c/i\u003e? These are two entirely different things,\r\nand only in the case of one of them is there any hope of\r\nfinding \u0027principles.\u0027 The jungle of connections \u003ci\u003ethought of\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncan never be formulated simply. Every conceivable connection\r\nmay be thought of—of coexistence, succession, resemblance,\r\ncontrast, contradiction, cause and effect, means\r\nand end, genus and species, part and whole, substance\r\nand property, early and late, large and small, landlord\r\nand tenant, master and servant,—Heaven knows what, for\r\nthe list is literally inexhaustible. The only simplification\r\nwhich could possibly be aimed at would be the reduction\r\nof the relations to a smaller number of types, like those\r\nwhich such authors as Kant and Renouvier call the \u0027categories\u0027\r\nof the understanding.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_464_464\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_464_464\"\u003e[464]\u003c/a\u003e According as we followed\r\none category or another we should sweep, with our thought,\r\nthrough the world in this way or in that. And all the categories\r\nwould be logical, would be relations of reason. They\r\nwould fuse the items into a continuum. Were \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e the sort\r\nof connection sought between one moment of our thinking\r\nand another, our chapter might end here. For the only\r\nsummary description of these infinite possibilities of transition,\r\nis that they are all \u003ci\u003eacts of reason\u003c/i\u003e, and that the mind\r\nproceeds from one object to another by some rational path\r\nof connection. The trueness of this formula is only equalled\r\nby its sterility, for psychological purposes. Practically it\r\namounts to simply referring the inquirer to the relations\r\nbetween facts or things, and to telling him that his thinking\r\nfollows them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut as a matter of fact, his thinking only sometimes\r\nfollows them, and these so-called \u0027transitions of reason\u0027\r\nare far from being all alike reasonable. If pure thought\r\nruns all our trains, why should she run some so fast and\r\nsome so slow, some through dull flats and some through\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_552\"\u003e[Pg 552]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngorgeous scenery, some to mountain-heights and jewelled\r\nmines, others through dismal swamps and darkness?—and\r\nrun some off the track altogether, and into the wilderness\r\nof lunacy? Why do we spend years straining after a\r\ncertain scientific or practical problem, but all in vain—thought\r\nrefusing to evoke the solution we desire? And\r\nwhy, some day, walking in the street with our attention\r\nmiles away from that quest, does the answer saunter into\r\nour minds as carelessly as if it had never been called for—suggested,\r\npossibly, by the flowers on the bonnet of the\r\nlady in front of us, or possibly by nothing that we can discover?\r\nIf reason can give us relief then, why did she not\r\ndo so earlier?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth must be admitted that thought works under\r\nconditions imposed \u003ci\u003eab extra\u003c/i\u003e. The great law of habit itself—that\r\ntwenty experiences make us recall a thing better\r\nthan one, that long indulgence in error makes right thinking\r\nalmost impossible—seems to have no essential foundation\r\nin reason. The business of thought is with truth—the\r\nnumber of experiences ought to have nothing to do with\r\nher hold of it; and she ought by right to be able to hug it\r\nall the closer, after years wasted out of its presence. The\r\ncontrary arrangements seem quite fantastic and arbitrary,\r\nbut nevertheless are part of the very bone and marrow of\r\nour minds. Reason is only one out of a thousand possibilities\r\nin the thinking of each of us. Who can count all\r\nthe silly fancies, the grotesque suppositions, the utterly\r\nirrelevant reflections he makes in the course of a day? Who\r\ncan swear that his prejudices and irrational beliefs constitute\r\na less bulky part of his mental furniture than his\r\nclarified opinions? It is true that a presiding arbiter\r\nseems to sit aloft in the mind, and emphasize the better\r\nsuggestions into permanence, while it ends by dropping out\r\nand leaving unrecorded the confusion. But this is all the\r\ndifference. The \u003ci\u003emode of genesis\u003c/i\u003e of the worthy and\r\nthe worthless seems the same. The laws of our actual\r\nthinking, of the \u003ci\u003ecogitatum\u003c/i\u003e, must account alike for the bad\r\nand the good materials on which the arbiter has to decide,\r\nfor wisdom and for folly. The laws of the arbiter, of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ecogitandum\u003c/i\u003e, of what we \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to think, are to the former as the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_553\"\u003e[Pg 553]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlaws of ethics are to those of history. Who but an Hegelian\r\nhistorian ever pretended that reason in action was \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e a\r\nsufficient explanation of the political changes in Europe?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThere are, then, mechanical conditions on which thought\r\ndepends, and which,\u003c/i\u003e to say the least, \u003ci\u003edetermine the order in\r\nwhich is presented the content or material for her comparisons,\r\nselections, and decisions.\u003c/i\u003e It is a suggestive fact that\r\nLocke, and many more recent Continental psychologists,\r\nhave found themselves obliged to invoke a mechanical\r\nprocess to account for the \u003ci\u003eaberrations\u003c/i\u003e of thought, the obstructive\r\npreprocessions, the frustrations of reason. This\r\nthey found in the law of habit, or what we now call Association\r\nby Contiguity. But it never occurred to these\r\nwriters that a process which could go the length of actually\r\nproducing some ideas and sequences in the mind might\r\nsafely be trusted to produce others too; and that those\r\nhabitual associations which further thought may also come\r\nfrom the same mechanical source as those which hinder it.\r\nHartley accordingly suggested habit as a sufficient explanation\r\nof all connections of our thoughts, and in so doing\r\nplanted himself squarely upon the properly psychological\r\naspect of the problem of connection, and sought to treat\r\nboth rational and irrational connections from a single\r\npoint of view. The problem which he essayed, however\r\nlamely, to answer, was that of the connection between our\r\npsychic states considered purely as such, regardless of the\r\nobjective connections of which they might take cognizance.\r\nHow does a man come, after thinking of A, to think of\r\nB the next moment? or how does he come to think A\r\nand B always together? These were the phenomena which\r\nHartley undertook to explain by cerebral physiology. I\r\nbelieve that he was, in many essential respects, on the\r\nright track, and I propose simply to revise his conclusions\r\nby the aid of distinctions which he did not make.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the whole historic doctrine of psychological association\r\nis tainted with one huge error—that of the construction\r\nof our thoughts out of the confounding of themselves\r\ntogether of immutable and incessantly recurring \u0027simple\r\nideas.\u0027 It is the cohesion of these which the \u0027principles of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_554\"\u003e[Pg 554]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassociation\u0027 are considered to account for. In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapters VI\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eIX\u003c/a\u003e we saw abundant reasons for treating the doctrine\r\nof simple ideas or psychic atoms as mythological; and, in\r\nall that follows, our problem will be to keep whatever truths\r\nthe associationist doctrine has caught sight of without\r\nweighing it down with the untenable incumbrance that the\r\nassociation is between \u0027ideas.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAssociation\u003c/i\u003e, so far as the word stands for an \u003ci\u003eeffect, is\r\nbetween\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ethings thought of\u003c/span\u003e—\u003ci\u003eit is\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ethings,\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003enot ideas, which are\r\nassociated in the mind.\u003c/i\u003e We ought to talk of the association\r\nof \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e, not of the association of \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e. And so far as\r\nassociation stands for a \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e, it is between \u003ci\u003eprocesses in the\r\nbrain\u003c/i\u003e—it is these which, by being associated in certain\r\nways, determine what successive objects shall be thought.\r\nLet us proceed towards our final generalizations by surveying\r\nfirst a few familiar facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe laws of motor habit in the lower centres of the nervous\r\nsystem are disputed by no one. A series of movements\r\nrepeated in a certain order tend to unroll themselves\r\nwith peculiar ease in that order for ever afterward. Number\r\none awakens number two, and that awakens number\r\nthree, and so on, till the last is produced. A habit of this\r\nkind once become inveterate may go on automatically. And\r\nso it is with the objects with which our thinking is concerned.\r\nWith some persons each note of a melody, heard\r\nbut once, will accurately revive in its proper sequence.\r\nSmall boys at school learn the inflections of many a Greek\r\nnoun, adjective, or verb, from the reiterated recitations\r\nof the upper classes falling on their ear as they sit at their\r\ndesks. All this happens with no voluntary effort on their\r\npart and with no thought of the spelling of the words. The\r\ndoggerel rhymes which children use in their games, such as\r\nthe formula\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"Ana mana mona mike\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eBarcelona bona strike,\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eused for \u0027counting out,\u0027 form another familiar example of\r\nthings heard in sequence cohering in the same order in the\r\nmemory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_555\"\u003e[Pg 555]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn touch we have a smaller number of instances, though\r\nprobably every one who bathes himself in a certain fixed\r\nmanner is familiar with the fact that each part of his body\r\nover which the water is squeezed from the sponge awakens\r\na premonitory tingling consciousness in that portion of skin\r\nwhich is habitually the next to be deluged. Tastes and\r\nsmells form no very habitual series in our experience. But\r\neven if they did, it is doubtful whether habit would fix the\r\norder of their reproduction quite so well as it does that of\r\nother sensations. In vision, however, we have a sense in\r\nwhich the order of reproduced things is very nearly as\r\nmuch influenced by habit as is the order of remembered\r\nsounds. Rooms, landscapes, buildings, pictures, or persons\r\nwith whose look we are very familiar, surge up before the\r\nmind\u0027s eye with all the details of their appearance complete,\r\nso soon as we think of any one of their component parts.\r\nSome persons, in reciting printed matter by heart, will\r\nseem to see each successive word, before they utter it, appear\r\nin its order on an imaginary page. A certain chess-player,\r\none of those heroes who train themselves to play\r\nseveral games at once blindfold, is reported to say that in\r\nbed at night after a match the games are played all over\r\nagain before his mental eye, each board being pictured as\r\npassing in turn through each of its successive stages. In\r\nthis case, of course, the intense previous voluntary strain\r\nof the power of visual representation is what facilitated the\r\nfixed order of revival.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAssociation occurs as amply between impressions of\r\ndifferent senses as between homogeneous sensations. Seen\r\nthings and heard things cohere with each other, and with\r\nodors and tastes, in representation, in the same order in\r\nwhich they cohered as impressions of the outer world.\r\nFeelings of contact reproduce similarly the sights, sounds,\r\nand tastes with which experience has associated them. In\r\nfact, the \u0027objects\u0027 of our perception, as trees, men, houses,\r\nmicroscopes, of which the real world seems composed, are\r\nnothing but clusters of qualities which through simultaneous\r\nstimulation have so coalesced that the moment one\r\nis excited actually it serves as a sign or cue for the idea of\r\nthe others to arise. Let a person enter his room in the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_556\"\u003e[Pg 556]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndark and grope among the objects there. The touch of the\r\nmatches will instantaneously recall their appearance. If\r\nhis hand comes in contact with an orange on the table, the\r\ngolden yellow of the fruit, its savor and perfume will forthwith\r\nshoot through his mind. In passing the hand over\r\nthe sideboard or in jogging the coal-scuttle with the foot,\r\nthe large glossy dark shape of the one and the irregular\r\nblackness of the other awaken like a flash and constitute\r\nwhat we call the recognition of the objects. The voice of\r\nthe violin faintly echoes through the mind as the hand is\r\nlaid upon it in the dark, and the feeling of the garments or\r\ndraperies which may hang about the room is not \u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntill the look correlative to the feeling has in each case been\r\nresuscitated. Smells notoriously have the power of recalling\r\nthe other experiences in whose company they were wont\r\nto be felt, perhaps long years ago; and the voluminous\r\nemotional character assumed by the images which suddenly\r\npour into the mind at such a time forms one of the\r\nstaple topics of popular psychologic wonder—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"Lost and gone and lost and gone!\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eA breath, a whisper—some divine farewell—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eDesolate sweetness—far and far away.\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe cannot hear the din of a railroad tram or the yell\r\nof its whistle, without thinking of its long, jointed appearance\r\nand its headlong speed, nor catch a familiar voice in\r\na crowd without recalling, with the name of the speaker,\r\nalso his face. But the most notorious and important case\r\nof the mental combination of auditory with optical impressions\r\noriginally experienced together is furnished by language.\r\nThe child is offered a new and delicious fruit and\r\nis at the same time told that it is called a \u0027fig.\u0027 Or looking\r\nout of the window he exclaims, \"What a funny horse!\" and\r\nis told that it is a \u0027piebald\u0027 horse. When learning his letters,\r\nthe sound of each is repeated to him whilst its shape\r\nis before his eye. Thenceforward, long as he may live, he\r\nwill never see a fig, a piebald horse, or a letter of the alphabet\r\nwithout the name which he first heard in conjunction\r\nwith each clinging to it in his mind; and inversely he will\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_557\"\u003e[Pg 557]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnever hear the name without the faint arousal of the image\r\nof the object.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_465_465\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_465_465\"\u003e[465]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE RAPIDITY OF ASSOCIATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReading exemplifies this kind of cohesion even more\r\nbeautifully. It is an uninterrupted and protracted recall\r\nof sounds by sights which have always been coupled with\r\nthem in the past. I find that I can name six hundred letters\r\nin two minutes on a printed page. Five distinct acts\r\nof association between sight and sound (not to speak of all\r\nthe other processes concerned) must then have occurred in\r\neach second in my mind. In reading entire words the speed\r\nis much more rapid. Valentin relates in his Physiology\r\nthat the reading of a single page of the proof, containing\r\n2629 letters, took him 1 minute and 32 seconds. In this\r\nexperiment each letter was \u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e in 1/28 of a second,\r\nbut owing to the integration of letters into entire words,\r\nforming each a single aggregate impression directly associated\r\nwith a single acoustic image, we need not suppose as\r\nmany as 28 separate associations in a sound. The figures,\r\nhowever, suffice to show with what extreme rapidity an\r\nactual sensation recalls its customary associates. Both in\r\nfact seem to our ordinary attention to come into the mind\r\nat once.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe time-measuring psychologists of recent days have\r\ntried their hand at this problem by more elaborate methods.\r\nGalton, using a very simple apparatus, found that the sight\r\nof an unforeseen word would awaken an associated \u0027idea\u0027\r\nin about 5/6 of a second.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_466_466\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_466_466\"\u003e[466]\u003c/a\u003e Wundt next made determinations\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_558\"\u003e[Pg 558]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin which the \u0027cue\u0027 was given by single-syllabled words\r\ncalled out by an assistant. The person experimented on\r\nhad to press a key as soon as the sound of the word awakened\r\nan associated idea. Both word and reaction were\r\nchronographically registered, and the total time-interval\r\nbetween the two amounted, in four observers, to 1.009,\r\n0.896, 1.037, and 1.154 seconds respectively. From this the\r\nsimple physiological reaction-time and the time of merely\r\nidentifying the word\u0027s sound (the \u0027apperception-time,\u0027 as\r\nWundt calls it) must be subtracted, to get the exact time\r\nrequired for the associated idea to arise. These times were\r\nseparately determined and subtracted. The difference,\r\ncalled by Wundt the \u003ci\u003eassociation-time\u003c/i\u003e, amounted, in the same\r\nfour persons, to 706, 723, 752, and 874 thousandths of a\r\nsecond respectively.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_467_467\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_467_467\"\u003e[467]\u003c/a\u003e The length of the last figure is due\r\nto the fact that the person reacting (President G. S. Hall)\r\nwas an American, whose associations with German words\r\nwould naturally be slower than those of natives. The shortest\r\nassociation-time noted was when the word \u0027Sturm\u0027 suggested\r\nto Prof. Wundt the word \u0027Wind\u0027 in 0.341 second.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_468_468\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_468_468\"\u003e[468]\u003c/a\u003e—Finally,\r\nMr. Cattell made some interesting observations\r\nupon the association-time between the look of letters and\r\ntheir names. \"I pasted letters,\" he says, \"on a revolving\r\ndrum, and determined at what rate they could be read\r\naloud as they passed by a slit in a screen.\" He found it\r\nto vary according as one, or more than one letter, was visible\r\nat a time through the slit, and gives half a second as\r\nabout the time which it takes to see and name a single\r\nletter seen alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When two or more letters are always in view, not only do the processes\r\nof seeing and naming overlap, but while the subject is seeing one\r\nletter he begins to see the ones next following, and so can read them\r\nmore quickly. Of the nine persons experimented on, four could read\r\nthe letters faster when five were in view at once, but were not helped\r\nby a sixth letter; three were not helped by a fifth, and two not by a\r\nfourth letter. This shows that while one idea is in the centre, two,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_559\"\u003e[Pg 559]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthree, or four additional ideas may be in the background of consciousness.\r\nThe second letter in view shortens the time about 1/40, the third\r\n1/60, the fourth 1/100, the fifth 1/200 sec.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I find it takes about twice as long to read (aloud, as fast as possible)\r\nwords which have no connection as words which make sentences\r\nand letters which have no connection as letters which make words.\r\nWhen the words make sentences and the letters words, not only do the\r\nprocesses of seeing and naming overlap, but by one mental effort the\r\nsubject can recognize a whole group of words or letters, and by one\r\nwill-act choose the motions to be made in naming, so that the rate\r\nat which the words and letters are read is really only limited by the\r\nmaximum rapidity at which the speech-organs can be moved. As the\r\nresult of a large number of experiments, the writer found that he had\r\nread words not making sentences at the rate of 1/4 sec, words making\r\nsentences (a passage from Swift) at the rate of 1/8 sec., per word….\r\nThe rate at which a person reads a foreign language is proportional to\r\nhis familiarity with the language. For example, when reading as fast\r\nas possible the writer\u0027s rate was, English 138, French 167, German 250,\r\nItalian 327, Latin 434, and Greek 484; the figures giving the thousandths\r\nof a second taken to read each word. Experiments made on\r\nothers strikingly confirm these results. The subject does not know\r\nthat he is reading the foreign language more slowly than his own; this\r\nexplains why foreigners seem to talk so fast. This simple method of\r\ndetermining a person\u0027s familiarity with a language might be used in\r\nschool examinations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The time required to see and name colors and pictures of objects\r\nwas determined in the same way. The time was found to be about the\r\nsame (over 1/2 sec.) for colors as for pictures, and about twice as long as\r\nfor words and letters. Other experiments I have made show that we\r\ncan recognize a single color or picture in a slightly shorter time than a\r\nword or letter, but take longer to name it. This is because, in the case\r\nof words and letters, the association between the idea and name has\r\ntaken place so often that the process has become automatic, whereas in\r\nthe case of colors and pictures we must by a voluntary effort choose\r\nthe name.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_469_469\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_469_469\"\u003e[469]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn later experiments Mr. Cattell studied the time for\r\nvarious associations to be performed, the termini (i.e., cue\r\nand answer) being words. A word in one language was to\r\ncall up its equivalent in another, the name of an author the\r\ntongue in which he wrote, that of a city the country in\r\nwhich it lay, that of a writer one of his works, etc. The\r\nmean variation from the average is very great in all these\r\nexperiments; and the interesting feature which they show\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_560\"\u003e[Pg 560]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis the existence of certain constant differences between associations\r\nof different sorts. Thus:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eFrom \u003ci\u003ecountry\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003ecity\u003c/i\u003e, Mr. C.\u0027s time was 0.340 sec.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eFrom \u003ci\u003eseason\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003emonth\u003c/i\u003e, Mr. C.\u0027s time was 0.399\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eFrom \u003ci\u003elanguage\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003eauthor\u003c/i\u003e, Mr. C.\u0027s time was 0.523\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003eFrom \u003ci\u003eauthor\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003ework\u003c/i\u003e, Mr. C.\u0027s time was 0.596\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe average time of two observers, experimenting on\r\neight different types of association, was 0.420 and 0.436\r\nsec. respectively.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_470_470\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_470_470\"\u003e[470]\u003c/a\u003e The very wide range of variation is\r\nundoubtedly a consequence of the fact that the words used\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_561\"\u003e[Pg 561]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas cues, and the different types of association studied, differ\r\nmuch in their degree of familiarity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"For example, B is a teacher of mathematics; C has busied himself\r\nmore with literature. C knows quite as well as B that 7 + 5 = 12,\r\nyet he needs 1/10 a second longer to call it to mind; B knows quite as\r\nwell as C that Dante was a poet, but needs 1/20 of a second longer to\r\nthink of it. Such experiments lay bare the mental life in a way that\r\nis startling and not always gratifying.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_471_471\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_471_471\"\u003e[471]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE LAW OF CONTIGUITY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTime-determinations apart, the facts we have run over\r\ncan all be summed up in the simple statement that \u003ci\u003eobjects\r\nonce experienced together tend to become associated in the imagination,\r\nso that when any one of them is thought of, the others\r\nare likely to be thought of also, in the same order of sequence or\r\ncoexistence as before\u003c/i\u003e. This statement we may name the law\r\nof \u003ci\u003emental association by contiguity\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_472_472\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_472_472\"\u003e[472]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI preserve this name in order to depart as little as possible\r\nfrom tradition, although Mr. Ward\u0027s designation of\r\nthe process as that of association by \u003ci\u003econtinuity\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_473_473\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_473_473\"\u003e[473]\u003c/a\u003e or Wundt\u0027s\r\nas that of \u003ci\u003eexternal\u003c/i\u003e association (to distinguish it from the\r\n\u003ci\u003einternal\u003c/i\u003e association which we shall presently learn to know\r\nunder the name of association by similarity)\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_474_474\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_474_474\"\u003e[474]\u003c/a\u003e are perhaps\r\nbetter terms. Whatever we name the law, since it expresses\r\nmerely a phenomenon of mental \u003ci\u003ehabit, the most\r\nnatural way of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_562\"\u003e[Pg 562]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eof the laws of habit in the nervous system; in other words,\r\nit is to ascribe it to a physiological cause.\u003c/i\u003e If it be truly\r\na law of those nerve-centres which co-ordinate sensory\r\nand motor processes together that paths once used for\r\ncoupling any pair of them are thereby made more permeable,\r\nthere appears no reason why the same law should not\r\nhold good of ideational centres and their coupling-paths as\r\nwell.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_475_475\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_475_475\"\u003e[475]\u003c/a\u003e Parts of these centres which have once been in\r\naction together will thus grow so linked that excitement at\r\none point will irradiate through the system. The chances\r\nof complete irradiation will be strong in proportion as the\r\nprevious excitements have been frequent, and as the\r\npresent points excited afresh are numerous. If all points\r\nwere originally excited together, the irradiation may be\r\nsensibly simultaneous throughout the system, when any\r\nsingle point or group of points is touched off. But where\r\nthe original impressions were successive—the conjugation of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_563\"\u003e[Pg 563]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na Greek verb, for example—awakening nerve-tracts in a\r\ndefinite order, they will now, when one of them awakens,\r\ndischarge into each other in that definite order and in no\r\nother way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader will recollect all that has been said of increased\r\ntension in nerve-tracts and of the summation of\r\nstimuli (\u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 82\u003c/a\u003e ff.). We must therefore suppose that in these\r\nideational tracts as well as elsewhere, activity may be\r\nawakened, in any particular locality, by the summation\r\ntherein of a number of tensions, each incapable alone of\r\nprovoking an actual discharge. Suppose for example the\r\nlocality M to be in functional continuity with four other\r\nlocalities, K, L, N, and O. Suppose moreover that on\r\nfour previous occasions it has been separately combined\r\nwith each of these localities in a common activity. M may\r\nthen be indirectly awakened by any cause which tends to\r\nawaken either K, L, N, or O. But if the cause which\r\nawakens K, for instance, be so slight as only to increase\r\nits tension without arousing it to full discharge, K will\r\nonly succeed in slightly increasing the tension of M. But\r\nif at the same time the tensions of L, N, and O are similarly\r\nincreased, the combined effects of all four upon M may\r\nbe so great as to awaken an actual discharge in this latter\r\nlocality. In like manner if the paths between M and\r\nthe four other localities have been so slightly excavated by\r\nprevious experience as to require a very intense excitement\r\nin either of the localities before M can be awakened, a less\r\nstrong excitement than this in any one will fail to reach\r\nM. But if all four at once are mildly excited, their compound\r\neffect on M may be adequate to its full arousal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe psychological law of association\u003c/i\u003e of objects thought of\r\nthrough their previous contiguity in thought or experience\r\n\u003ci\u003ewould thus be an effect, within the mind, of the physical fact\r\nthat nerve-currents propagate themselves easiest through those\r\ntracts of conduction which have been already most in use.\u003c/i\u003e Descartes\r\nand Locke hit upon this explanation, which modern\r\nscience has not yet succeeded in improving.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Custom,\" says Locke, \"settles habits of thinking in the understanding,\r\nas well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the\r\nbody; all which seem to be but \u003ci\u003etrains of motion in the animal spirits\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_564\"\u003e[Pg 564]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n[by this Locke meant identically what we understand by \u003ci\u003eneural processes\u003c/i\u003e]\r\nwhich, once set agoing, continue in the same steps they have\r\nbeen used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path,\r\nand the motion in it becomes easy and, as it were, natural.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_476_476\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_476_476\"\u003e[476]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHartley was more thorough in his grasp of the principle.\r\nThe sensorial nerve-currents, produced when objects\r\nare fully present, were for him \u0027vibrations,\u0027 and those which\r\nproduce ideas of objects in their absence were \u0027miniature\r\nvibrations.\u0027 And he sums up the cause of mental association\r\nin a single formula by saying:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Any vibrations, A, B, C, etc., by being associated together a sufficient\r\nNumber of Times, get such a Power over \u003ci\u003ea, b, c,\u003c/i\u003e etc., the corresponding\r\nMiniature Vibrations, that any of the Vibrations A, when\r\nimpressed alone, shall be able to excite \u003ci\u003eb, c,\u003c/i\u003e etc., the Miniatures of the\r\nrest.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_477_477\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_477_477\"\u003e[477]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident that if there be any law of neural habit\r\nsimilar to this, the contiguities, coexistences, and successions,\r\nmet with in outer experience, must inevitably be\r\ncopied more or less perfectly in our thought. If A B C D E\r\nbe a sequence of outer impressions (they may be events\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_565\"\u003e[Pg 565]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor they may be successively experienced properties of an\r\nobject) which once gave rise to the successive \u0027ideas\u0027 \u003ci\u003ea b c d e\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthen no sooner will A impress us again and awaken the\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, than \u003ci\u003eb c d e\u003c/i\u003e will arise as ideas even before B C D E\r\nhave come in as impressions. In other words, the order of\r\nimpressions will the next time be \u003ci\u003eanticipated\u003c/i\u003e; and the mental\r\norder will so far forth copy the order of the outer\r\nworld. Any object when met again will make us expect its\r\nformer concomitants, through the overflowing of its brain-tract\r\ninto the paths which lead to theirs. And all these\r\nsuggestions will be effects of a material law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the associations are, as here, of successively appearing\r\nthings, the distinction I made at the outset of the\r\nchapter, between a connection \u003ci\u003ethought of\u003c/i\u003e and a connection \u003ci\u003eof\r\nthoughts\u003c/i\u003e, is unimportant. For the connection thought of is\r\nconcomitance or succession; and the connection between\r\nthe thoughts is just the same. The \u0027objects\u0027 and the\r\n\u0027ideas\u0027 fit into parallel schemes, and may be described in\r\nidentical language, as contiguous things tending to be\r\nthought again together, or contiguous ideas tending to recur\r\ntogether.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow were these cases fair samples of all association, the\r\ndistinction I drew might well be termed a \u003ci\u003eSpitzfindigkeit\u003c/i\u003e or\r\npiece of pedantic hair-splitting, and be dropped. But as a\r\nmatter of fact we cannot treat the subject so simply. The\r\nsame outer object may suggest \u003ci\u003eeither of many\u003c/i\u003e realities formerly\r\nassociated with it—for in the vicissitudes of our outer\r\nexperience we are constantly liable to meet the same thing\r\nin the midst of differing companions—and a philosophy of\r\nassociation that should merely say that it will suggest one\r\nof these, or even of that one of them which it has oftenest\r\naccompanied, would go but a very short way into the \u003ci\u003erationale\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the subject. This, however, is about as far as\r\nmost associationists have gone with their \u0027principle of contiguity.\u0027\r\nGranted an object, A, they never tell us beforehand\r\nwhich of its associates it \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e suggest; their wisdom is\r\nlimited to showing, after it \u003ci\u003ehas\u003c/i\u003e suggested a second object,\r\nthat that object was once an associate. They have had to\r\nsupplement their principle of Contiguity by other principles,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_566\"\u003e[Pg 566]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuch as those of Similarity and Contrast, before they\r\ncould begin to do justice to the richness of the facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE ELEMENTARY LAW OF ASSOCIATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI shall try to show, in the pages which immediately\r\nfollow, that there is no other \u003ci\u003eelementary\u003c/i\u003e causal law of association\r\nthan the law of neural habit. All the \u003ci\u003ematerials\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nour thought are due to the way in which one elementary\r\nprocess of the cerebral hemispheres tends to excite whatever\r\nother elementary process it may have excited at some\r\nformer time. The number of elementary processes at\r\nwork, however, and the nature of those which at any time\r\nare fully effective in rousing the others, determine the\r\ncharacter of the total brain-action, and, as a consequence\r\nof this, they determine the object thought of at the time.\r\nAccording as this resultant object is one thing or another,\r\nwe call it a product of association by contiguity or of association\r\nby similarity, or contrast, or whatever other sorts\r\nwe may have recognized as ultimate. Its production, however,\r\nis, in each one of these cases, to be explained by a\r\nmerely quantitative variation in the elementary brain-processes\r\nmomentarily at work under the law of habit, so that\r\n\u003ci\u003epsychic\u003c/i\u003e contiguity, similarity, etc., are derivatives of a single\r\nprofounder kind of fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy thesis, stated thus briefly, will soon become more\r\nclear; and at the same time certain disturbing factors,\r\nwhich co-operate with the law of neural habit, will come to\r\nview.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us then assume as the \u003ci\u003ebasis\u003c/i\u003e of all our subsequent\r\nreasoning this law: \u003ci\u003eWhen two elementary brain-processes\r\nhave been active together or in immediate succession, one of\r\nthem, on reoccurring, tends to propagate its excitement into the\r\nother.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, as a matter of fact, every elementary process has\r\nfound itself at different times excited in conjunction with\r\n\u003ci\u003emany\u003c/i\u003e other processes, and this by unavoidable outward\r\ncauses. Which of these others it shall awaken now becomes\r\na problem. Shall \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e be aroused next by the\r\npresent \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e? We must make a further postulate, based, however,\r\non the fact of \u003ci\u003etension\u003c/i\u003e in nerve-tissue, and on the fact\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_567\"\u003e[Pg 567]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof summation of excitements, each incomplete or latent in\r\nitself, into an open resultant.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_478_478\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_478_478\"\u003e[478]\u003c/a\u003e The process \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, rather than\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, will awake, if in addition to the vibrating tract \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e some\r\nother tract \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e is in a state of sub-excitement, and formerly\r\nwas excited with \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e alone and not with \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e. In short, we may\r\nsay:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe amount of activity at any given point in the brain-cortex\r\nis the sum of the tendencies of all other points to discharge\r\ninto it, such tendencies being proportionate\u003c/i\u003e (1) \u003ci\u003eto the number of\r\ntimes the excitement of each other point may have accompanied\r\nthat of the point in question\u003c/i\u003e; (2) \u003ci\u003eto the intensity of such excitements;\r\nand\u003c/i\u003e (3) \u003ci\u003eto the absence of any rival point functionally\r\ndisconnected with the first point, into which the discharges might\r\nbe diverted.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExpressing the fundamental law in this most complicated\r\nway leads to the greatest ultimate simplification.\r\nLet us, for the present, only treat of spontaneous trains of\r\nthought and ideation, such as occur in revery or musing.\r\nThe case of voluntary thinking toward a certain end shall\r\ncome up later.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake, to fix our ideas, the two verses from \u0027Locksley\r\nHall\u0027:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"I, the heir of all \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e in the foremost files of time,\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eand—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"For I doubt not through \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e one increasing purpose runs.\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy is it that when we recite from memory one of these\r\nlines, and get as far as \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e, that portion of the \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e\r\nline which follows, and, so to speak, sprouts out of \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ndoes not also sprout out of our memory, and confuse the\r\nsense of our words? Simply because the word that follows\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e has its brain-process awakened not simply by\r\nthe brain-process of \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e alone, but by it \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e the brain-processes\r\nof all the words preceding \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e. The word\r\n\u003ci\u003eages\u003c/i\u003e at its moment of strongest activity would, \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, indifferently\r\ndischarge into either \u0027in\u0027 or \u0027one.\u0027 So would\r\nthe previous words (whose tension is momentarily much\r\nless strong than that of \u003ci\u003eages\u003c/i\u003e) each of them indifferently discharge\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_568\"\u003e[Pg 568]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninto either of a large number of other words with\r\nwhich they have been at different times combined. But\r\nwhen the processes of \u0027\u003ci\u003eI, the heir of all the ages\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 simultaneously\r\nvibrate in the brain, the last one of them in a\r\nmaximal, the others in a fading phase of excitement; then\r\nthe strongest line of discharge will be that which they \u003ci\u003eall\r\nalike\u003c/i\u003e tend to take. \u0027\u003ci\u003eIn\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 and not \u0027\u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 or any other word\r\nwill be the next to awaken, for its brain-process has previously\r\nvibrated in unison not only with that of \u003ci\u003eages\u003c/i\u003e, but with\r\nthat of all those other words whose activity is dying away.\r\nIt is a good case of the effectiveness over thought of what\r\nwe called on \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 258\u003c/a\u003e a \u0027fringe.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if some one of these preceding words—\u0027heir,\u0027 for\r\nexample—had an intensely strong association with some\r\nbrain-tracts entirely disjoined in experience from the poem\r\nof \u0027Locksley Hall\u0027—if the reciter, for instance, were tremulously\r\nawaiting the opening of a will which might make\r\nhim a millionaire—it is probable that the path of discharge\r\nthrough the words of the poem would be suddenly interrupted\r\nat the word \u0027heir.\u0027 His \u003ci\u003eemotional interest in that\r\nword\u003c/i\u003e would be such that its \u003ci\u003eown special associations would\r\nprevail\u003c/i\u003e over the combined ones of the other words. He\r\nwould, as we say, be abruptly reminded of his personal\r\nsituation, and the poem would lapse altogether from his\r\nthoughts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe writer of these pages has every year to learn the\r\nnames of a large number of students who sit in alphabetical\r\norder in a lecture-room. He finally learns to call them\r\nby name, as they sit in their accustomed places. On meeting\r\none in the street, however, early in the year, the face\r\nhardly ever recalls the name, but it may recall the place of\r\nits owner in the lecture-room, his neighbors\u0027 faces, and consequently\r\nhis general alphabetical position; and then,\r\nusually as the common associate of all these combined\r\ndata, the student\u0027s name surges up in his mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA father wishes to show to some guests the progress of\r\nhis rather dull child in Kindergarten instruction. Holding\r\nthe knife upright on the table, he says, \"What do you call\r\nthat, my boy?\" \"I calls it a \u003ci\u003eknife\u003c/i\u003e, I does,\" is the sturdy reply,\r\nfrom which the child cannot be induced to swerve by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_569\"\u003e[Pg 569]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nany alteration in the form of question, until the father\r\nrecollecting that in the Kindergarten a pencil was used, and\r\nnot a knife, draws a long one from his pocket, holds it in\r\nthe same way, and then gets the wished-for answer, \"I calls\r\nit \u003ci\u003evertical\u003c/i\u003e.\" All the concomitants of the Kindergarten experience\r\nhad to recombine their effect before the word\r\n\u0027vertical\u0027 could be reawakened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Bain, in his chapters on \u0027Compound Association,\u0027\r\nhas treated in a minute and exhaustive way of this\r\ntype of mental sequence, and what he has done so well\r\nneed not be here repeated.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_479_479\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_479_479\"\u003e[479]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ci\u003eImpartial Redintegration.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ideal working of the law of compound association,\r\nwere it unmodified by any extraneous influence, would be\r\nsuch as to keep the mind in a perpetual treadmill of concrete\r\nreminiscences from which no detail could be omitted.\r\nSuppose, for example, we begin by thinking of a certain\r\ndinner-party. The only thing which all the components of\r\nthe dinner-party could combine to recall would be the first\r\nconcrete occurrence which ensued upon it. All the details\r\nof this occurrence could in turn only combine to awaken the\r\nnext following occurrence, and so on. If \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e,\u003c/i\u003e for instance,\r\nbe the elementary nerve-tracts excited by the last\r\nact of the dinner-party, call this act A, and \u003ci\u003el, m, n, o, p,\u003c/i\u003e be\r\nthose of walking home through the frosty night, which we\r\nmay call B, then the thought of A must awaken that of B,\r\nbecause \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e,\u003c/i\u003e will each and all discharge into \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthrough the paths by which their original discharge took\r\nplace. Similarly they will discharge into \u003ci\u003em, n, o,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand these latter tracts will also each reinforce the other\u0027s\r\naction because, in the experience B, they have already\r\nvibrated in unison. The lines in Fig. 40 symbolize\r\nthe summation of discharges into each of the components\r\nof B, and the consequent strength of the combination of\r\ninfluences by which B in its totality is awakened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHamilton first used the word \u0027redintegration\u0027 to designate\r\nall association. Such processes as we have just described\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_570\"\u003e[Pg 570]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmight in an emphatic sense be termed redintegrations,\r\nfor they would necessarily lead, if unobstructed, to\r\nthe reinstatement in thought of the \u003ci\u003eentire\u003c/i\u003e content of large\r\ntrains of past experience. From this complete redintegration\r\nthere could be no escape save through the irruption of\r\nsome new and strong present impression of the senses, or\r\nthrough the excessive tendency of some one of the elementary\r\nbrain-tracts to discharge independently into an aberrant\r\nquarter of the brain. Such was the tendency of the\r\nword \u0027heir\u0027 in the verse from \u0027Locksley Hall,\u0027 which was\r\nour first example. How such tendencies are constituted\r\nwe shall have soon to inquire with some care. Unless they\r\nare present, the panorama of the past, once opened, must\r\nunroll itself with fatal literality to the end, unless some\r\noutward sound, sight, or touch divert the current of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 400px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-570-0038.jpg\" style=\"width: 400px\" id=\"img_images_jame_570_0038.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 40.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us call this process \u003ci\u003eimpartial redintegration\u003c/i\u003e. Whether\r\nit ever occurs in an absolutely complete form is doubtful.\r\nWe all immediately recognize, however, that in some minds\r\nthere is a much greater tendency than in others for the\r\nflow of thought to take this form. Those insufferably garrulous\r\nold women, those dry and fanciless beings who spare\r\nyou no detail, however petty, of the facts they are recounting,\r\nand upon the thread of whose narrative all the irrelevant\r\nitems cluster as pertinaciously as the essential ones,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_571\"\u003e[Pg 571]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe slaves of literal fact, the stumblers over the smallest\r\nabrupt step in thought, are figures known to all of us.\r\nComic literature has made her profit out of them. Juliet\u0027s\r\nnurse is a classical example. George Eliot\u0027s village characters\r\nand some of Dickens\u0027s minor personages supply\r\nexcellent instances.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePerhaps as successful a rendering as any of this mental\r\ntype is the character of Miss Bates in Miss Austen\u0027s \u0027Emma.\u0027\r\nHear how she redintegrates:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u0027But where could \u003ci\u003eyou\u003c/i\u003e hear it?\u0027 cried Miss Bates. \u0027Where could you\r\npossibly hear it, Mr. Knightley? For it is not five minutes since I received\r\nMrs. Cole\u0027s note—no, it cannot be more than five—or at least ten—for\r\nI had got my bonnet and spencer on, just ready to come out—I was\r\nonly gone down to speak to Patty again about the pork—Jane was\r\nstanding in the passage—were not you, Jane?—for my mother was so\r\nafraid that we had not any salting-pan large enough. So I said I would\r\ngo down and see, and Jane said: \"Shall I go down instead? for I think\r\nyou have a little cold, and Patty has been washing the kitchen.\" \"Oh,\r\nmy dear,\" said I—well, and just then came the note. A Miss Hawkins—that\u0027s\r\nall I know—a Miss Hawkins, of Bath. But, Mr. Knightley,\r\nhow could you possibly have heard it? for the very moment Mr. Cole\r\ntold Mrs. Cole of it, she sat down and wrote to me. A Miss Hawkins—\u0027\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in every one of us there are moments when this\r\ncomplete reproduction of all the items of a past experience\r\noccurs. What are those moments? They are moments of\r\nemotional recall of the past as something which once was,\r\nbut is gone for ever—moments, the interest of which consists\r\nin the feeling that our self was once other than it now\r\nis. When this is the case, any detail, however minute,\r\nwhich will make the past picture more complete, will also\r\nhave its effect in swelling that total contrast between \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e which forms the central interest of our contemplation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eORDINARY OR MIXED ASSOCIATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis case helps us to understand why it is that the\r\nordinary spontaneous flow of our ideas does not follow the\r\nlaw of impartial redintegration. \u003ci\u003eIn no revival of a past experience\r\nare all the items of our thought equally operative in\r\ndetermining what the next thought shall be. Always some ingredient\r\nis prepotent over the rest.\u003c/i\u003e Its special suggestions or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_572\"\u003e[Pg 572]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassociations in this case will often be different from those\r\nwhich it has in common with the whole group of items;\r\nand its tendency to awaken these outlying associates will\r\ndeflect the path of our revery. Just as in the original\r\nsensible experience our attention focalized itself upon a\r\nfew of the impressions of the scene before us, so here in\r\nthe reproduction of those impressions an equal partiality\r\nis shown, and some items are emphasized above the rest.\r\nWhat these items shall be is, in most cases of spontaneous\r\nrevery, hard to determine beforehand. In subjective terms\r\nwe say that \u003ci\u003ethe prepotent items are those which appeal most\r\nto our\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003einterest\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExpressed in brain-terms, the law of interest will be:\r\n\u003ci\u003esome one brain-process is always prepotent above its concomitants\r\nin arousing action elsewhere.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Two processes,\" says Mr. Hodgson,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_480_480\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_480_480\"\u003e[480]\u003c/a\u003e \"are constantly going on in\r\nredintegration. The one a process of corrosion, melting, decay; the\r\nother a process of renewing, arising, becoming…. No object of representation\r\nremains long before consciousness in the same state, but\r\nfades, decays, and becomes indistinct. Those parts of the object, however,\r\nwhich possess an interest resist this tendency to gradual decay of\r\nthe whole object…. This inequality in the object—some parts, the uninteresting,\r\nsubmitting to decay; others, the interesting parts, resisting\r\nit—when it has continued for a certain time, ends in becoming a new\r\nobject.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly where the interest is diffused equally over all the\r\nparts (as in the emotional memory just referred to, where,\r\nas all \u003ci\u003epast\u003c/i\u003e, they all interest us alike) is this law departed\r\nfrom. It will be least obeyed by those minds which have\r\nthe smallest variety and intensity of interests—those who,\r\nby the general flatness and poverty of their æsthetic nature,\r\nare kept for ever rotating among the literal sequences of\r\ntheir local and personal history.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost of us, however, are better organized than this, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_573\"\u003e[Pg 573]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour musings pursue an erratic course, swerving continually\r\ninto some new direction traced by the shifting play\r\nof interest as it ever falls on some partial item in each\r\ncomplex representation that is evoked. Thus it so often\r\ncomes about that we find ourselves thinking at two nearly\r\nadjacent moments of things separated by the whole diameter\r\nof space and time. Not till we carefully recall each\r\nstep of our cogitation do we see how naturally we came by\r\nHodgson\u0027s law to pass from one to the other. Thus, for\r\ninstance, after looking at my clock just now (1879), I found\r\nmyself thinking of a recent resolution in the Senate about\r\nour legal-tender notes. The clock called up the image of\r\nthe man who had repaired its gong. He suggested the\r\njeweller\u0027s shop where I had last seen him; that shop, some\r\nshirt-studs which I had bought there; they, the value of\r\ngold and its recent decline; the latter, the equal value of\r\ngreenbacks, and this, naturally, the question of how long\r\nthey were to last, and of the Bayard proposition. Each of\r\nthese images offered various points of interest. Those\r\nwhich formed the turning-points of my thought are easily\r\nassigned. The gong was momentarily the most interesting\r\npart of the clock, because, from having begun with a beautiful\r\ntone, it had become discordant and aroused disappointment.\r\nBut for this the clock might have suggested\r\nthe friend who gave it to me, or any one of a thousand circumstances\r\nconnected with clocks. The jeweller\u0027s shop\r\nsuggested the studs, because they alone of all its contents\r\nwere tinged with the egoistic interest of possession. This\r\ninterest in the studs, their value, made me single out the\r\nmaterial as its chief source, etc., to the end. Every reader\r\nwho will arrest himself at any moment and say, \"How\r\ncame I to be thinking of just this?\" will be sure to trace a\r\ntrain of representations linked together by lines of contiguity\r\nand points of interest inextricably combined. This\r\nis the ordinary process of the association of ideas as it\r\nspontaneously goes on in average minds. \u003ci\u003eWe may call it\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eordinary,\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eor\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003emixed, association\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother example of it is given by Hobbes in a passage\r\nwhich has been quoted so often as to be classical:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_574\"\u003e[Pg 574]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent\r\nthan to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman\r\npenny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the\r\nthought of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the\r\nKing to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the\r\ndelivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty\r\npence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed\r\nthat malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for thought\r\nis quick.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_481_481\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_481_481\"\u003e[481]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCan we determine, now, when a certain portion of the\r\ngoing thought has, by dint of its interest, become so prepotent\r\nas to make its own exclusive associates the dominant\r\nfeatures of the coming thought—can we, I say, determine\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e of its own associates shall be evoked? For they are\r\nmany. As Hodgson says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The interesting parts of the decaying object are free to combine\r\nagain with any objects or parts of objects with which at any time they\r\nhave been combined before. All the former combinations of these\r\nparts may come back into consciousness; one must; but which will?\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Hodgson replies:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There can be but one answer: that which has been most \u003ci\u003ehabitually\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncombined with them before. This new object begins at once to form\r\nitself in consciousness, and to group its parts round the part still remaining\r\nfrom the former object; part after part comes out and arranges\r\nitself in its old position; but scarcely has the process begun, when the\r\noriginal law of interest begins to operate on this new formation, seizes\r\non the interesting parts and impresses them on the attention to the exclusion\r\nof the rest, and the whole process is repeated again with endless\r\nvariety. I venture to propose this as a complete and true account\r\nof the whole process of redintegration.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn restricting the discharge from the interesting item\r\ninto that channel which is simply most \u003ci\u003ehabitual\u003c/i\u003e in the sense\r\nof most frequent, Hodgson\u0027s account is assuredly imperfect.\r\nAn image by no means always revives its most frequent\r\nassociate, although frequency is certainly one of the most\r\npotent determinants of revival. If I abruptly utter the\r\nword \u003ci\u003eswallow\u003c/i\u003e, the reader, if by habit an ornithologist, will\r\nthink of a bird; if a physiologist or a medical specialist in\r\nthroat diseases, he will think of deglutition. If I say \u003ci\u003edate\u003c/i\u003e,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_575\"\u003e[Pg 575]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe will, if a fruit-merchant or an Arabian traveller, think of\r\nthe produce of the palm; if an habitual student of history,\r\nfigures with \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ea.d.\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eb.c.\u003c/span\u003e before them will rise in his mind.\r\nIf I say \u003ci\u003ebed, bath, morning,\u003c/i\u003e his own daily toilet will be invincibly\r\nsuggested by the combined names of three of its\r\nhabitual associates. But frequent lines of transition are\r\noften set at naught. The sight of C. Goring\u0027s \u0027System der\r\nkritischen Philosophie\u0027 has most frequently awakened in\r\nme thoughts of the opinions therein propounded. The\r\nidea of suicide has never been connected with the volumes.\r\nBut a moment since, as my eye fell upon them, suicide was\r\nthe thought that flashed into my mind. Why? Because\r\nbut yesterday I received a letter from Leipzig informing me\r\nthat this philosopher\u0027s recent death by drowning was an\r\nact of self-destruction. Thoughts tend, then, to awaken\r\ntheir most recent as well as their most habitual associates.\r\nThis is a matter of notorious experience, too notorious, in\r\nfact, to need illustration. If we have seen our friend this\r\nmorning, the mention of his name now recalls the circumstances\r\nof that interview, rather than any more remote\r\ndetails concerning him. If Shakespeare\u0027s plays are mentioned,\r\nand we were last night reading \u0027Richard II.,\u0027 vestiges\r\nof that play rather than of \u0027Hamlet\u0027 or \u0027Othello\u0027\r\nfloat through our mind. Excitement of peculiar tracts, or\r\npeculiar modes of general excitement in the brain, leave a\r\nsort of tenderness or exalted sensibility behind them which\r\ntakes days to die away. As long as it lasts, those tracts or\r\nthose modes are liable to have their activities awakened by\r\ncauses which at other times might leave them in repose.\r\nHence, \u003ci\u003erecency\u003c/i\u003e in experience is a prime factor in determining\r\nrevival in thought.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_482_482\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_482_482\"\u003e[482]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVividness\u003c/i\u003e in an original experience may also have the\r\nsame effect as habit or recency in bringing about likelihood\r\nof revival. If we have once witnessed an execution, any\r\nsubsequent conversation or reading about capital punishment\r\nwill almost certainly suggest images of that particular\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_576\"\u003e[Pg 576]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nscene. Thus it is that events lived through only once, and\r\nin youth, may come in after-years, by reason of their exciting\r\nquality or emotional intensity, to serve as types or\r\ninstances used by our mind to illustrate any and every\r\noccurring topic whose interest is most remotely pertinent\r\nto theirs. If a man in his boyhood once talked with Napoleon,\r\nany mention of great men or historical events, battles\r\nor thrones, or the whirligig of fortune, or islands in the\r\nocean, will be apt to draw to his lips the incidents of that\r\none memorable interview. If the word \u003ci\u003etooth\u003c/i\u003e now suddenly\r\nappears on the page before the reader\u0027s eye, there are fifty\r\nchances out of a hundred that, if he gives it time to awaken\r\nany image, it will be an image of some operation of dentistry\r\nin which he has been the sufferer. Daily he has\r\ntouched his teeth and masticated with them; this very\r\nmorning he brushed them, chewed his breakfast and picked\r\nthem; but the rarer and remoter associations arise more\r\npromptly because they were so much more intense.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_483_483\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_483_483\"\u003e[483]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA fourth factor in tracing the course of reproduction is\r\n\u003ci\u003econgruity in emotional tone\u003c/i\u003e between the reproduced idea and\r\nour mood. The same objects do not recall the same associates\r\nwhen we are cheerful as when we are melancholy.\r\nNothing, in fact, is more striking than our utter inability\r\nto keep up trains of joyous imagery when we are depressed\r\nin spirits. Storm, darkness, war, images of disease, poverty,\r\nand perishing afflict unremittingly the imaginations of melancholiacs.\r\nAnd those of sanguine temperament, when their\r\nspirits are high, find it impossible to give any permanence\r\nto evil forebodings or to gloomy thoughts. In an instant\r\nthe train of association dances off to flowers and sunshine,\r\nand images of spring and hope. The records of Arctic or\r\nAfrican travel perused in one mood awaken no thoughts\r\nbut those of horror at the malignity of Nature; read at\r\nanother time they suggest only enthusiastic reflections on\r\nthe indomitable power and pluck of man. Few novels so\r\noverflow with joyous animal spirits as \u0027The Three Guardsmen\u0027\r\nof Dumas. Yet it may awaken in the mind of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_577\"\u003e[Pg 577]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreader depressed with sea-sickness (as the writer can personally\r\ntestify) a most dismal and woeful consciousness of\r\nthe cruelty and carnage of which heroes like Athos, Porthos,\r\nand Aramis make themselves guilty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eHabit, recency, vividness, and emotional congruity\u003c/i\u003e are, then,\r\nall reasons why one representation rather than another\r\nshould be awakened by the interesting portion of a departing\r\nthought. We may say with truth that \u003ci\u003ein the majority\r\nof cases the coming representation will have been either\r\nhabitual, recent, or vivid, and will be congruous.\u003c/i\u003e If all\r\nthese qualities unite in any one absent associate, we may\r\npredict almost infallibly that that associate of the going\r\nthought will form an important ingredient in the coming\r\nthought. In spite of the fact, however, that the succession\r\nof representations is thus redeemed from perfect indeterminism\r\nand limited to a few classes whose characteristic\r\nquality is fixed by the nature of our past experience, it\r\nmust still be confessed that an immense number of terms\r\nin the linked chain of our representations fall outside of all\r\nassignable rule. To take the instance of the clock given\r\non \u003ca href=\"#Page_586\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 586\u003c/a\u003e. Why did the jeweller\u0027s shop suggest the shirt-studs\r\nrather than a chain which I had bought there more\r\nrecently, which had cost more, and whose sentimental associations\r\nwere much more interesting? Both chain and\r\nstuds had excited brain-tracts simultaneously with the shop.\r\nThe only reason why the nerve-stream from the shop-tract\r\nswitched off into the stud-tract rather than into the chain-tract\r\nmust be that the stud-tract happened at that moment to\r\nlie more open, either because of some accidental alteration in\r\nits nutrition or because the incipient sub-conscious tensions\r\nof the brain as a whole had so distributed their equilibrium,\r\nthat it was more unstable here than in the chain-tract.\r\nAny reader\u0027s introspection will easily furnish similar instances.\r\nIt thus remains true that to a certain extent, even\r\nin those forms of ordinary mixed association which lie\r\nnearest to impartial redintegration, \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e associate of the\r\ninteresting item shall emerge must be called largely a matter\r\nof accident—accident, that is, for our intelligence. No\r\ndoubt it is determined by cerebral causes, but they are too\r\nsubtile and shifting for our analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_578\"\u003e[Pg 578]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eASSOCIATION BY SIMILARITY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn partial or mixed association we have all along supposed\r\nthe interesting portion of the disappearing thought\r\nto be of considerable extent, and to be sufficiently complex\r\nto constitute by itself a concrete object. Sir William\r\nHamilton relates, for instance, that after thinking of\r\nBen Lomond he found himself thinking of the Prussian\r\nsystem of education, and discovered that the links of association\r\nwere a German gentleman whom he had met on Ben\r\nLomond, Germany, etc. The interesting part of Ben\r\nLomond, as he had experienced it, the part operative in\r\ndetermining the train of his ideas was the complex image\r\nof a particular man. But now let us suppose that that\r\nselective agency of interested attention, which may thus\r\nconvert impartial redintegration into partial association—let\r\nus suppose that it refines itself still further and accentuates\r\na portion of the passing thought, so small as to be\r\nno longer the image of a concrete thing, but only of an\r\nabstract quality or property. Let us moreover suppose\r\nthat the part thus accentuated persists in consciousness (or,\r\nin cerebral terms, has its brain-process continue) after the\r\nother portions of the thought have faded. \u003ci\u003eThis small surviving\r\nportion will then surround itself with its own associates\u003c/i\u003e\r\nafter the fashion we have already seen, and the relation\r\nbetween the new thought\u0027s object and the object of the\r\nfaded thought will be a \u003ci\u003erelation of similarity\u003c/i\u003e. The pair of\r\nthoughts will form an instance of what is called \u0027\u003ci\u003eAssociation\r\nby Similarity\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_484_484\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_484_484\"\u003e[484]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe similars which are here associated, or of which the\r\nfirst is followed by the second in the mind, are seen to be\r\n\u003ci\u003ecompounds\u003c/i\u003e. Experience proves that this is always the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_579\"\u003e[Pg 579]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncase. \u003ci\u003eThere is no tendency on the part of\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003esimple\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003e\u0027ideas,\u0027 attributes,\r\nor qualities to remind us of their like.\u003c/i\u003e The thought of\r\none shade of blue does not remind us of that of another\r\nshade of blue, etc., unless indeed we have in mind some\r\ngeneral purpose like naming the tint, when we should\r\nnaturally think of other blues of the scale, through \u0027mixed\r\nassociation\u0027 of purpose, names, and tints, together. But\r\nthere is no elementary tendency of pure qualities to awaken\r\ntheir similars in the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe saw in the chapter on Discrimination that two compound\r\nthings are similar when some one quality or group\r\nof qualities is shared alike by both, although as regards\r\ntheir other qualities they may have nothing in common.\r\nThe moon is similar to a gas-jet, it is also similar to a foot-ball;\r\nbut a gas-jet and a foot-ball are not similar to each\r\nother. When we affirm the similarity of two compound\r\nthings, we should always say \u003ci\u003ein what respect it obtains\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nMoon and gas-jet are similar in respect of luminosity,\r\nand nothing else; moon and foot-ball in respect of rotundity,\r\nand nothing else. Foot-ball and gas-jet are\r\nin no respect similar—that is, they possess no common\r\npoint, no identical attribute. Similarity, in compounds, is\r\npartial identity. When the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e attribute appears in two\r\nphenomena, though it be their only common property, the\r\ntwo phenomena are similar in so far forth. To return now\r\nto our associated representations. If the thought of the\r\nmoon is succeeded by the thought of a foot-ball, and that\r\nby the thought of one of Mr. X\u0027s railroads, it is because\r\nthe attribute rotundity in the moon broke away from all the\r\nrest and surrounded itself with an entirely new set of companions—elasticity,\r\nleathery integument, swift mobility in\r\nobedience to human caprice, etc.; and because the last-named\r\nattribute in the foot-ball in turn broke away from its\r\ncompanions, and, itself persisting, surrounded itself with\r\nsuch new attributes as make up the notions of a \u0027railroad\r\nking,\u0027 of a rising and falling stock-market, and the like.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe gradual passage from impartial redintegration to\r\nsimilar association through what we have called ordinary\r\nmixed association may be symbolized by diagrams. Fig.\r\n41 is impartial redintegration, Fig. 42 is mixed, and Fig. 43\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_580\"\u003e[Pg 580]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimilar association. A in each is the passing, B the coming\r\nthought. In \u0027impartial,\u0027 all parts of A are equally operative\r\nin calling up B. In \u0027mixed,\u0027 most parts of A are inert.\r\nThe part M alone breaks out and awakens B. In \u0027similar,\u0027\r\nthe focalized part M is much smaller than in the previous\r\ncase, and after awakening its new set of associates, instead\r\nof fading out itself, it continues persistently active along\r\nwith them, forming an identical part in the two ideas, and\r\nmaking these, \u003ci\u003epro tanto\u003c/i\u003e, resemble each other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 290px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-580-0039-01.jpg\" style=\"width: 290px\" id=\"img_images_jame_580_0039_01.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 41.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 230px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-580-0039-02.jpg\" style=\"width: 230px\" id=\"img_images_jame_580_0039_02.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 42.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 275px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-580-0039-03.jpg\" style=\"width: 275px\" id=\"img_images_jame_580_0039_03.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 43.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy a single portion of the passing thought should\r\nbreak out from its concert with the rest and act, as we say,\r\non its own hook, why the other parts should become inert,\r\nare mysteries which we can ascertain but not explain. Possibly\r\na minuter insight into the laws of neural action will\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_581\"\u003e[Pg 581]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome day clear the matter up; possibly neural laws will\r\nnot suffice, and we shall need to invoke a dynamic reaction\r\nof the form of consciousness upon its content. But into\r\nthis we cannot enter now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo sum up, then, we see that \u003ci\u003ethe difference between the\r\nthree kinds of association reduces itself to a simple difference in\r\nthe amount of that portion of the nerve-tract supporting the\r\ngoing thought which is operative in calling up the thought which\r\ncomes.\u003c/i\u003e But the \u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of this active part is the\r\nsame, be it large or be it small. The items constituting\r\nthe coming object waken in every instance because their\r\nnerve-tracts once were excited continuously with those of\r\nthe going object or its operative part. This ultimate physiological\r\nlaw of habit among the neural elements is what \u003ci\u003eruns\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe train. The direction of its course and the form of its\r\ntransitions, whether redintegrative, associative, or similar,\r\nare due to unknown regulative or determinative conditions\r\nwhich accomplish their effect by opening this switch and\r\nclosing that, setting the engine sometimes at half-speed,\r\nand coupling or uncoupling cars.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis last figure of speech, into which I have glided unwittingly,\r\naffords itself an excellent instance of association\r\nby similarity. I was thinking of the deflections of the\r\ncourse of ideas. Now, from Hobbes\u0027s time downward,\r\nEnglish writers have been fond of speaking of the \u003ci\u003etrain\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nour representations. This word happened to stand out in\r\nthe midst of my complex thought with peculiarly sharp\r\naccentuation, and to surround itself with numerous details\r\nof railroad imagery. Only such details became clear, however,\r\nas had their nerve-tracts besieged by a double set of\r\ninfluences—those from \u003ci\u003etrain\u003c/i\u003e on the one hand, and those from\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emovement of thought\u003c/i\u003e on the other. It may possibly be\r\nthat the prepotency of the suggestions of the word \u003ci\u003etrain\u003c/i\u003e at\r\nthis moment were due to the recent excitation of the railroad\r\nbrain-tract by the instance chosen a few pages back of\r\nii railroad king playing foot-ball with the stock-market.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is apparent from such an example how inextricably\r\ncomplex are all the contributory factors whose resultant is\r\nthe line of our reverie. It would be folly in most cases to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_582\"\u003e[Pg 582]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nattempt to trace them out. From an instance like the above,\r\nwhere the pivot of the Similar Association was formed by\r\na definite concrete word, \u003ci\u003etrain\u003c/i\u003e, to those where it is so subtile\r\nas utterly to elude our analysis, the passage is unbroken.\r\nWe can form a series of examples. When Mr. Bagehot says\r\nthat the mind of the savage, so far from being in a state of\r\nnature, is \u003ci\u003etattooed\u003c/i\u003e all over with monstrous superstitions,\r\nthe case is very like the one we have just been considering.\r\nWhen Sir James Stephen compares our belief in the uniformity\r\nof nature, the congruity of the future with the past,\r\nto a man rowing one way and looking another, and steering\r\nhis boat by keeping her stern in a line with an object behind\r\nhim, the operative link becomes harder to dissect out. It\r\nis subtler still in Dr. Holmes\u0027s phrase, that stories in passing\r\nfrom mouth to mouth make a great deal of lee-way in\r\nproportion to their headway; or in Mr. Lowell\u0027s description\r\nof German sentences, that they have a way of yawing\r\nand going stern-foremost and not minding the helm for several\r\nminutes after it has been put down. And finally, it is\r\na real puzzle when the color pale-blue is said to have feminine\r\nand blood-red masculine affinities. And if I hear a\r\nfriend describe a certain family as having \u003ci\u003eblotting-paper\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvoices, the image, though immediately felt to be apposite,\r\nbaffles the utmost powers of analysis. The higher\r\npoets all use abrupt epithets, which are alike intimate and\r\nremote, and, as Emerson says, sweetly torment us with invitations\r\nto their inaccessible homes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn these latter instances we must suppose that there is\r\nan identical portion in the similar objects, and that its brain-tract\r\nis energetically operative, without, however, being sufficiently\r\nisolable in its activity as to stand out \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, and form\r\nthe condition of a distinctly discriminated \u0027abstract idea.\u0027\r\nWe cannot even by careful search see the bridge over which\r\nwe passed from the heart of one representation to that of\r\nthe next. In some brains, however, this mode of transition\r\nis extremely common. It would be one of the most important\r\nof physiological discoveries could we assign the mechanical\r\nor chemical difference which makes the thoughts\r\nof one brain cling close to impartial redintegration, while\r\nthose of another shoot about in all the lawless revelry of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_583\"\u003e[Pg 583]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimilarity. Why, in these latter brains, action should tend\r\nto focalize itself in small spots, while in the others it fills\r\npatiently its broad bed, it seems impossible to guess.\r\nWhatever the difference may be, it is what separates the\r\nman of genius from the prosaic creature of habit and routine\r\nthinking. In Chapter XXII we shall need to recur\r\nagain to this point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eASSOCIATION IN VOLUNTARY THOUGHT.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHitherto we have assumed the process of suggestion of\r\none object by another to be spontaneous. The train of\r\nimagery wanders at its own sweet will, now trudging in sober\r\ngrooves of habit, now with a hop, skip, and jump darting\r\nacross the whole field of time and space. This is revery,\r\nor musing; but great segments of the flux of our ideas\r\nconsist of something very different from this. They are\r\nguided by a distinct purpose or conscious interest. As\r\nthe Germans say, we \u003ci\u003enachdenken\u003c/i\u003e, or think towards a certain\r\nend. It is now necessary to examine what modification is\r\nmade in the trains of our imagery by the having of an end\r\nin view. The course of our ideas is then called \u003ci\u003evoluntary\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhysiologically considered, we must suppose that a\r\npurpose means the persistent activity of certain rather\r\ndefinite brain-processes throughout the whole course of\r\nthought. Our most usual cogitations are not pure reveries,\r\nabsolute driftings, but revolve about some central interest\r\nor topic to which most of the images are relevant, and towards\r\nwhich we return promptly after occasional digressions.\r\nThis interest is subserved by the persistently active\r\nbrain-tracts we have supposed. In the mixed associations\r\nwhich we have hitherto studied, the parts of each object\r\nwhich form the pivots on which our thoughts successively\r\nturn have their interest largely determined by their connection\r\nwith some \u003ci\u003egeneral interest\u003c/i\u003e which for the time has\r\nseized upon the mind. If we call Z the brain-tract of general\r\ninterest, then, if the object \u003ci\u003eabc\u003c/i\u003e turns up, and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e has\r\nmore associations with Z than have either \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec, b\u003c/i\u003e will become\r\nthe object\u0027s interesting, pivotal portion, and will call up\r\nits own associates exclusively. For the energy of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s brain-tract\r\nwill be augmented by Z\u0027s activity,—an activity which,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_584\"\u003e[Pg 584]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom lack of previous connection between Z and \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ndoes not influence \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e. If, for instance, I think of Paris\r\nwhilst I am \u003ci\u003ehungry\u003c/i\u003e, I shall not improbably find that its\r\n\u003ci\u003erestaurants\u003c/i\u003e have become the pivot of my thought, etc., etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in the theoretic as well as in the practical life there\r\nare interests of a more acute sort, taking the form of definite\r\nimages of some achievement, be it action or acquisition,\r\nwhich we desire to effect. The train of ideas arising under\r\nthe influence of such an interest constitutes usually the\r\nthought of the \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e by which the end shall be attained.\r\nIf the end by its simple presence does not instantaneously\r\nsuggest the means, the search for the latter becomes an intellectual\r\n\u003ci\u003eproblem\u003c/i\u003e. The solution of problems is the most\r\ncharacteristic and peculiar sort of voluntary thinking.\r\nWhere the end thought of is some outward deed or gain,\r\nthe solution is largely composed of the actual motor processes,\r\nwalking, speaking, writing, etc., which lead up to it.\r\nWhere the end is in the first instance only ideal, as in laying\r\nout a place of operations, the steps are purely imaginary.\r\nIn both of these cases the discovery of the means\r\nmay form a new sort of end, of an entirely peculiar nature,\r\nan end, namely, which we intensely desire before we have\r\nattained it, but of the nature of which, even whilst most\r\nstrongly craving it, we have no distinct imagination whatever.\r\nSuch an end is a problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same state of things occurs whenever we seek to\r\nrecall something forgotten, or to state the reason for a\r\njudgment which we have made intuitively. The desire\r\nstrains and presses in a direction which it feels to be right\r\nbut towards a point which it is unable to see. In short,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eabsence of an item\u003c/i\u003e is a determinant of our representations\r\nquite as positive as its presence can ever be. The\r\ngap becomes no mere void, but what is called an \u003ci\u003eaching\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvoid. If we try to explain in terms of brain-action how a\r\nthought which only potentially exists can yet be effective,\r\nwe seem driven to believe that the brain-tract thereof must\r\nactually be excited, but only in a minimal and sub-conscious\r\nway. Try, for instance, to symbolize what goes on\r\nin a man who is racking his brains to remember a thought\r\nwhich occurred to him last week. The associates of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_585\"\u003e[Pg 585]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthought are there, many of them at least, but they refuse\r\nto awaken the thought itself. We cannot suppose that they\r\ndo not irradiate \u003ci\u003eat all\u003c/i\u003e into its brain-tract, because his mind\r\nquivers on the very edge of its recovery. Its actual rhythm\r\nsounds in his ears; the words seem on the imminent point\r\nof following, but fail. What it is that blocks the discharge\r\nand keeps the brain-excitement here from passing beyond\r\nthe nascent into the vivid state cannot be guessed. But we\r\nsee in the philosophy of desire and pleasure, that such nascent\r\nexcitements, spontaneously tending to a crescendo,\r\nbut inhibited or checked by other causes, may become\r\npotent mental stimuli and determinants of desire. All\r\nquestioning, wonder, emotion of curiosity, must be referred\r\nto cerebral causes of some such form as this. The great\r\ndifference between the effort to recall things forgotten and\r\nthe search after the means to a given end, is that the latter\r\nhave not, whilst the former have, already formed a part of\r\nour experience. If we first study \u003ci\u003ethe mode of recalling a\r\nthing forgotten\u003c/i\u003e, we can take up with better understanding\r\nthe voluntary quest of the unknown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe forgotten thing is felt by us as a gap in the midst of\r\ncertain other things. If it is a thought, we possess a dim\r\nidea of where we were and what we were about when it occurred\r\nto us. We recollect the general subject to which it\r\nrelates. But all these details refuse to shoot together into\r\na solid whole, for the lack of the vivid traits of this missing\r\nthought, the relation whereof to each detail forms now the\r\nmain interest of the latter. We keep running over the details\r\nin our mind, dissatisfied, craving something more.\r\nFrom each detail there radiate lines of association forming\r\nso many tentative guesses. Many of these are immediately\r\nseen to be irrelevant, are therefore void of interest, and\r\nlapse immediately from consciousness. Others are associated\r\nwith the other details present, and with the missing\r\nthought as well. When \u003ci\u003ethese\u003c/i\u003e surge up, we have a peculiar\r\nfeeling that we are \u0027warm,\u0027 as the children say when they\r\nplay hide and seek; and such associates as these we clutch\r\nat and keep before the attention. Thus we recollect successively\r\nthat when we had the thought in question we\r\nwere at the dinner-table; then that our friend J. D. was\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_586\"\u003e[Pg 586]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthere; then that the subject talked about was so and so;\r\nfinally, that the thought came \u003ci\u003eà propos\u003c/i\u003e of a certain anecdote,\r\nand then that it had something to do with a French quotation.\r\nNow all these added associations \u003ci\u003earise independently\r\nof the will\u003c/i\u003e, by the spontaneous process we know so well. \u003ci\u003eAll\r\nthat the will does is to emphasize and linger over those which\r\nseem pertinent, and ignore the rest.\u003c/i\u003e Through this hovering of\r\nthe attention in the neighborhood of the desired object, the\r\naccumulation of associates becomes so great that the combined\r\ntensions of their neural processes break through the\r\nbar, and the nervous wave pours into the tract which has\r\nso long been awaiting its advent. And as the expectant,\r\nsub-conscious itching there, bursts into the fulness of vivid\r\nfeeling, the mind finds an inexpressible relief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe whole process can be rudely symbolized in a diagram.\r\nCall the forgotten thing Z, the first facts with which\r\nwe felt it was related, \u003ci\u003ea, b,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, and the details finally\r\noperative in calling it up, \u003ci\u003el, m,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e. Each circle will\r\nthen stand for the brain-process underlying the thought of\r\nthe object denoted by the letter contained within it. The\r\nactivity in Z will at first be a mere tension; but as the activities\r\nin \u003ci\u003ea, b,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e little by little irradiate into \u003ci\u003el, m,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003en,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand as \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e these processes are somehow connected with Z,\r\ntheir combined irradiations upon Z, represented by the centripetal\r\narrows, succeed in helping the tension there to\r\novercome the resistance, and in rousing Z also to full activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 200px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-586-0040.jpg\" style=\"width: 200px\" id=\"img_images_jame_586_0040.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 44.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_587\"\u003e[Pg 587]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe tension present from the first in Z, even though it\r\nkeep below the threshold of discharge, is probably to some\r\ndegree co-operative with \u003ci\u003ea, b, c\u003c/i\u003e in determining that \u003ci\u003el, m, n\u003c/i\u003e\r\nshall awake. Without Z\u0027s tension there might be a slower\r\naccumulation of objects connected with it. But, as aforesaid,\r\nthe objects come before us through the brain\u0027s own laws,\r\nand the Ego of the thinker can only remain on hand, as it\r\nwere, to recognize their relative values and brood over\r\nsome of them, whilst others are let drop. As when we have\r\nlost a material object we cannot recover it by a direct effort,\r\nbut only through moving about such neighborhoods\r\nwherein it is likely to lie, and trusting that it will then\r\nstrike our eye; so here, by not letting our attention leave\r\nthe neighborhood of what we seek, we trust that it will end\r\nby speaking to us of its own accord.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_485_485\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_485_485\"\u003e[485]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTurn now to the case of finding the unknown means to\r\na distinctly conceived end.\u003c/i\u003e The end here stands in the\r\nplace of \u003ci\u003ea, b, c,\u003c/i\u003e in the diagram. It is the starting-point of\r\nthe irradiations of suggestion; and here, as in that case,\r\nwhat the voluntary attention does is only to dismiss some\r\nof the suggestions as irrelevant, and hold fast to others\r\nwhich are felt to be more pertinent—let these be symbolized\r\nby \u003ci\u003el, m, n\u003c/i\u003e. These latter at last accumulate sufficiently to\r\ndischarge all together into Z, the excitement of which process\r\nis, in the mental sphere, equivalent to the solution of\r\nour problem. The only difference between this case and\r\nthe last, is that in this one there need be no original sub-excitement\r\nin Z, co-operating from the very first. When\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_588\"\u003e[Pg 588]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe seek a forgotten name, we must suppose the name\u0027s\r\ncentre to be in a state of active tension from the very outset,\r\nbecause of that peculiar feeling of \u003ci\u003erecognition\u003c/i\u003e which we\r\nget at the moment of recall. The plenitude of the thought\r\nseems here but a maximum degree of something which our\r\nmind divined in advance. It instantaneously fills a socket\r\ncompletely moulded to its shape; and it seems most natural\r\nto ascribe the identity of quality in our feeling of the gaping\r\nsocket and our feeling of what comes to fill it, to the\r\nsameness of a nerve-tract excited in different degrees. In\r\nthe solving of a problem, on the contrary, the recognition\r\nthat we have found the means is much less immediate.\r\nHere, what we are aware of in advance seems to be its\r\nrelations with the items we already know. It must bear a\r\ncausal relation, or it must be an effect, or it must contain\r\nan attribute common to two items, or it must be a uniform\r\nconcomitant, or what not. We know, in short, a lot \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit, whilst as yet we have no knowledge of \u003ci\u003eacquaintance\u003c/i\u003e with\r\nit (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 221\u003c/a\u003e), or in Mr. Hodgson\u0027s language, \"we know\r\nwhat we want to find beforehand, in a certain sense, in its\r\nsecond intention, and do not know it, in another sense, in\r\nits first intention.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_486_486\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_486_486\"\u003e[486]\u003c/a\u003e Our intuition that one of the ideas\r\nwhich turn up is, at last, our \u003ci\u003equæsitum\u003c/i\u003e, is due to our recognition\r\nthat its relations are identical with those we had\r\nin mind, and this may be a rather slow act of judgment.\r\nIn fact, every one knows that an object may be for some\r\ntime present to his mind before its relations to other matters\r\nare perceived. To quote Hodgson again:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The mode of operation is common to voluntary memory and\r\nreason…. But reasoning adds to memory the function of comparing\r\nor judging the images which arise…. Memory aims at filling the gap\r\nwith an image which has at some particular time filled it before, reasoning\r\nwith one which bears certain time-and space-relations to the\r\nimages before and after\"—\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eor, to use perhaps clearer language, one which stands in\r\ndeterminate logical relations to those data round about the\r\ngap which filled our mind at the start. This feeling of the\r\nblank form of relationship before we get the material quality\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_589\"\u003e[Pg 589]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the thing related will surprise no one who has read\r\n\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the guessing of newspaper enigmas to the plotting\r\nof the policy of an empire there is no other process\r\nthan this. We trust to the laws of cerebral nature to present\r\nus spontaneously with the appropriate idea:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Our only command over it is by the effort we make to keep the\r\npainful unfilled gap in consciousness.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_487_487\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_487_487\"\u003e[487]\u003c/a\u003e… Two circumstances are\r\nimportant to notice: the first is, that volition has no power of calling\r\nup images, but only of rejecting and selecting from those offered by\r\nspontaneous redintegration.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_488_488\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_488_488\"\u003e[488]\u003c/a\u003e But the rapidity with which this selection\r\nis made, owing to the familiarity of the ways in which spontaneous\r\nredintegration runs, gives the process of reasoning the appearance of\r\nevoking images that are foreseen to be conformable to the purpose.\r\nThere is no seeing them before they are offered; there is no summoning\r\nthem before they are seen. The other circumstance is, that every kind\r\nof reasoning is nothing, in its simplest form, but attention.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_489_489\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_489_489\"\u003e[489]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is foreign to our purpose here to enter into any\r\ndetailed analysis of the different classes of mental pursuit.\r\nIn a scientific research we get perhaps as rich an example\r\nas can be found. The inquirer starts with a fact of which\r\nhe seeks the reason, or with an hypothesis of which he\r\nseeks the proof. In either case he keeps turning the\r\nmatter incessantly in his mind until, by the arousal of associate\r\nupon associate, some habitual, some similar, one arises\r\nwhich he recognizes to suit his need. This, however, may\r\ntake years. No rules can be given by which the investigator\r\nmay proceed straight to his result; but both here\r\nand in the case of reminiscence the accumulation of helps\r\nin the way of associations may advance more rapidly by\r\nthe use of certain routine methods. In striving to recall a\r\nthought, for example, we may of set purpose run through\r\nthe successive classes of circumstance with which it may\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_590\"\u003e[Pg 590]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npossibly have been connected, trusting that when the right\r\nmember of the class has turned up it will help the thought\u0027s\r\nrevival. Thus we may run through all the \u003ci\u003eplaces\u003c/i\u003e in which\r\nwe may have had it. We may run through the \u003ci\u003epersons\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhom we remember to have conversed with, or we may call\r\nup successively all the \u003ci\u003ebooks\u003c/i\u003e we have lately been reading.\r\nIf we are trying to remember a person we may run through\r\na list of streets or of professions. Some item out of the\r\nlists thus methodically gone over will very likely be associated\r\nwith the fact we are in need of, and may suggest it\r\nor help to do so. And yet the item might never have arisen\r\nwithout such systematic procedure. In scientific research\r\nthis accumulation of associates has been methodized by\r\nMill under the title of \u0027The Four Methods of Experimental\r\nInquiry.\u0027 By the \u0027method of agreement,\u0027 by that\r\nof \u0027difference,\u0027 by those of \u0027residues\u0027 and \u0027concomitant\r\nvariations\u0027(which cannot here be more nearly defined), we\r\nmake certain lists of cases; and by ruminating these lists\r\nin our minds the cause we seek will be more likely to\r\nemerge. But the final stroke of discovery is only prepared,\r\nnot effected, by them. The brain-tracts must, of their own\r\naccord, shoot the right way at last, or we shall still grope\r\nin darkness. That in some brains the tracts \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e shoot the\r\nright way much oftener than in others, and that we cannot\r\ntell why,—these are ultimate facts to which we must never\r\nclose our eyes. Even in forming our lists of instances\r\naccording to Mill\u0027s methods, we are at the mercy of the\r\nspontaneous workings of Similarity in our brain. How\r\nare a number of facts, resembling the one whose cause we\r\nseek, to be brought together in a list unless the one will\r\nrapidly suggest the other through association by similarity?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSIMILARITY NO ELEMENTARY LAW.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch is the analysis I propose, first of the three main\r\ntypes of spontaneous association, and then of voluntary\r\nassociation. It will be observed that the \u003ci\u003eobject called up\r\nmay bear any logical relation whatever to the one which suggested\r\nit\u003c/i\u003e. The law requires only that one condition should\r\nbe fulfilled. The fading object must be due to a brain-process\r\nsome of whose elements awaken through habit\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_591\"\u003e[Pg 591]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome of the elements of the brain-process of the object\r\nwhich comes to view. This awakening is the operative\r\nmachinery, the causal agency, throughout, quite as\r\nmuch so in the kind of association I have called by the\r\nname of Similarity, as in any other sort. The similarity\r\nbetween the objects, or between the thoughts (if similarity\r\nthere be between these latter), has no causal agency in\r\ncarrying us from one to the other. It is but a result—the\r\neffect of the usual causal agent when this happens to work\r\nin a certain particular and assignable way. But ordinary\r\nwriters talk as if the similarity of the objects were itself an\r\nagent, co-ordinate with habit, and independent of it, and\r\nlike it able to push objects before the mind. This is quite\r\nunintelligible. The similarity of two things does not exist\r\ntill both things are there—it is meaningless to talk of it as\r\nan \u003ci\u003eagent of production\u003c/i\u003e of anything, whether in the physical\r\nor the psychical realms.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_490_490\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_490_490\"\u003e[490]\u003c/a\u003e It is a relation which the mind\r\nperceives after the fact, just as it may perceive the relations\r\nof superiority, of distance, of causality, of container and\r\ncontent, of substance and accident, or of contrast, between\r\nan object and some second object which the associative\r\nmachinery calls up.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_491_491\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_491_491\"\u003e[491]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are, nevertheless, able writers who not only insist\r\non preserving association by similarity as a distinct elementary\r\nlaw, but who make it the most elementary law,\r\nand seek to derive contiguous association from it. Their\r\nreasoning is as follows: When the present impression A\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_592\"\u003e[Pg 592]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nawakens the idea \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e of its past contiguous associate B, how\r\ncan this occur except through first reviving an image \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nits own past occurrence. \u003ci\u003eThis\u003c/i\u003e is the term directly connected\r\nwith \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e; so that the process instead of being simply\r\nA—\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e is A—\u003ci\u003ea—b\u003c/i\u003e. Now A and \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e are similars; therefore no\r\nassociation by contiguity can occur except through a previous\r\nassociation by similarity. The most important supposition\r\nhere made is that every impression on entering the\r\nmind must needs awaken an image of its past self, in the\r\nlight of which it is \u0027apperceived\u0027 or understood, and through\r\nthe intermediation of which it enters into relation with the\r\nmind\u0027s other objects. This assumption is almost universally\r\nmade; and yet it is hard to find any good reason for it.\r\nIt first came before us when we were reviewing the facts of\r\naphasia and mental blindness (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 50\u003c/a\u003e ff.). But we then\r\nsaw no need of optical and auditory images to interpret optical\r\nand auditory sensations by. On the contrary, we agreed\r\nthat auditory sensations were understood by us only so far\r\nas they awakened \u003ci\u003enon\u003c/i\u003e-auditory images, and optical sensations\r\nonly so far as they awakened \u003ci\u003enon\u003c/i\u003e-optical images. In\r\nthe chapters on Memory, on Reasoning, and on Perception\r\nthe same assumption will meet us again, and again\r\nwill have to be rejected as groundless. The sensational\r\nprocess A and the ideational process \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e probably occupy\r\nessentially the same tracts. When the outer stimulus\r\ncomes and those tracts vibrate with the sensation A, they\r\ndischarge as directly into the paths which lead to B as\r\nwhen there is no outer stimulus and they only vibrate with\r\nthe idea \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e. To say that the process A can only reach these\r\npaths by the help of the weaker process \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e is like saying\r\nthat we need a candle to see the sun by. A replaces \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ndoes all that \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e does and more; and there is no intelligible\r\nmeaning, to my mind, in saying that the weaker process\r\ncoexists with the stronger. I therefore consider that these\r\nwriters are altogether wrong. The only plausible proof\r\nthey give of the coexistence of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e with A is when A gives us\r\na \u003ci\u003esense of familiarity\u003c/i\u003e but fails to awaken any distinct\r\nthought of past contiguous associates. In a later chapter\r\nI shall consider this case. Here I content myself with saying\r\nthat it does not seem conclusive as to the point at issue;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_593\"\u003e[Pg 593]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand that I still believe association of coexistent or sequent\r\nimpressions to be the one \u003ci\u003eelementary\u003c/i\u003e law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContrast\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ehas also been held to be an independent agent in\r\nassociation.\u003c/i\u003e But the reproduction of an object contrasting\r\nwith one already in the mind is easily explained on our\r\nprinciples. Recent writers, in fact, all reduce it either\r\nto similarity or contiguity. Contrast always presupposes\r\ngeneric similarity; it is only the \u003ci\u003eextremes of a class\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nare contrasted, black and white, not black and sour, or\r\nwhite and prickly. A machinery which reproduces a similar\r\nat all, may reproduce the \u003ci\u003eopposite\u003c/i\u003e similar, as well as\r\nany intermediate term. Moreover, the greater number of\r\ncontrasts are habitually coupled in speech, young and old,\r\nlife and death, rich and poor, etc., and are, as Dr. Bain\r\nsays, in everybody\u0027s memory.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_492_492\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_492_492\"\u003e[492]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI trust that the student will now feel that the way to a\r\ndeeper understanding of the order of our ideas lies in the\r\ndirection of cerebral physiology. The \u003ci\u003eelementary\u003c/i\u003e process\r\nof revival can be nothing but the law of habit. Truly the\r\nday is distant when physiologists shall actually trace from\r\ncell-group to cell-group the irradiations which we have hypothetically\r\ninvoked. Probably it will never arrive. The\r\nschematism we have used is, moreover, taken immediately\r\nfrom the analysis of objects into their elementary parts,\r\nand only extended by analogy to the brain. And yet it is\r\nonly as incorporated in the brain that such a schematism\r\ncan represent anything \u003ci\u003ecausal\u003c/i\u003e. This is, to my mind, the conclusive\r\nreason for saying that the order of \u003ci\u003epresentation of\r\nthe mind\u0027s materials\u003c/i\u003e is due to cerebral physiology alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe law of accidental prepotency of certain processes\r\nover others falls also within the sphere of cerebral probabilities.\r\nGranting such instability as the brain-tissue requires,\r\ncertain points must always discharge more quickly\r\nand strongly than others; and this prepotency would shift\r\nits place from moment to moment by accidental causes,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_594\"\u003e[Pg 594]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngiving us a perfect mechanical diagram of the capricious\r\nplay of similar association in the most gifted mind. The\r\nstudy of dreams confirms this view. The usual abundance\r\nof paths of irradiation seems, in the dormant brain, reduced.\r\nA few only are pervious, and the most fantastic sequences\r\noccur because the currents run—\u0027like sparks in burnt-up\r\npaper\u0027—wherever the nutrition of the moment creates an\r\nopening, but nowhere else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eeffects of interested attention and volition\u003c/i\u003e remain.\r\nThese activities seem to hold fast to certain elements, and\r\nby emphasizing them and dwelling on them, to make their\r\nassociates the only ones which are evoked. \u003ci\u003eThis\u003c/i\u003e is the\r\npoint at which an anti-mechanical psychology must, if anywhere,\r\nmake it stand in dealing with association. Everything\r\nelse is pretty certainly due to cerebral laws. My\r\nown opinion on the question of active attention and spiritual\r\nspontaneity is expressed elsewhere. But even though\r\nthere be a mental spontaneity, it can certainly not create\r\nideas or summon them \u003ci\u003eex abrupto\u003c/i\u003e. Its power is limited to\r\n\u003ci\u003eselecting\u003c/i\u003e amongst those which the associative machinery\r\nhas already introduced or tends to introduce. If it can\r\nemphasize, reinforce, or protract for a second either one of\r\nthese, it can do all that the most eager advocate of free will\r\nneed demand; for it then decides the direction of the next\r\nassociations by making them hinge upon the emphasized\r\nterm; and determining in this wise the course of the man\u0027s\r\nthinking, it also determines his acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE HISTORY OF OPINION CONCERNING ASSOCIATION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003emay be briefly glanced at ere we end the chapter.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_493_493\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_493_493\"\u003e[493]\u003c/a\u003e Aristotle\r\nseems to have caught both the facts and the principle\r\nof explanation; but he did not expand his views, and it was\r\nnot till the time of Hobbes that the matter was again touched\r\non in a definite way. Hobbes first formulated the problem\r\nof the succession of our thoughts. He writes in Leviathan,\r\nchapter iii, as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_595\"\u003e[Pg 595]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"By consequence, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession\r\nof one thought to another which is called, to distinguish it from discourse\r\nin words, \u003ci\u003emental discourse\u003c/i\u003e. When a man thinketh on anything\r\nwhatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it\r\nseems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently.\r\nBut as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly\r\nhad sense, in whole or in parts; so we have no transition from one\r\nimagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our\r\nsenses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us,\r\nrelics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately\r\nsucceeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense:\r\ninsomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant,\r\nthe latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such\r\nmanner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part\r\nof it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same\r\nthing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it\r\ncomes to pass in time that, in the imagining of anything, there is no\r\ncertainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be\r\nsomething that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.\r\nThis train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is\r\n\u003ci\u003eunguided, without design,\u003c/i\u003e and inconstant; wherein there is no passionate\r\nthought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as\r\nthe end and scope of some desire, or other passion…. The second\r\nis more constant; as being \u003ci\u003eregulated\u003c/i\u003e by some desire and design. For\r\nthe impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong and\r\npermanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return: so strong is it,\r\nsometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire ariseth the\r\nthought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we\r\naim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that\r\nmean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our\r\nown power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression,\r\ncomes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are\r\nquickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the\r\nseven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn\r\nout, \u003ci\u003eRespite finem\u003c/i\u003e; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon\r\nwhat you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the\r\nway to attain it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of\r\nan effect imagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and\r\nthis is common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining anything\r\nwhatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced;\r\nthat is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we\r\nhave it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man\r\nonly; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living\r\ncreature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger,\r\nthirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is\r\ngoverned by design, is nothing but \u003ci\u003eseeking\u003c/i\u003e or the faculty of invention,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_596\"\u003e[Pg 596]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich the Latins called \u003ci\u003esagacitas\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003esollertia\u003c/i\u003e; a hunting out of the\r\ncauses, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present\r\nor past cause.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most important passage after this of Hobbes is\r\nHume\u0027s:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and\r\nmay be united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more\r\nunaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided\r\nby some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform\r\nwith itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected,\r\nchance alone would join them; and \u0027tis impossible the same\r\nsimple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly\r\ndo) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality,\r\nby which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle\r\namong ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connection;\r\nfor that has been already excluded from the imagination. Nor yet are\r\nwe to conclude that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for\r\nnothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as\r\na gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among\r\nother things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in\r\na manner pointing to every one those simple ideas which are most\r\nproper to be united in a complex one. The qualities from which this\r\nassociation arises, and by which the mind is after this manner conveyed\r\nfrom one idea to another, are three, viz., \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eResemblance, Contiguity\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin time or place, and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCause\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEffect\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I believe it will not be very necessary to prove that these qualities\r\nproduce an association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one\r\nidea naturally introduce another. \u0027Tis plain that in the course of our\r\nthinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination\r\nruns easily from one idea to any other that \u003ci\u003eresembles\u003c/i\u003e it, and that this\r\nquality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. \u0027Tis\r\nlikewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are\r\nnecessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie \u003ci\u003econtiguous\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire\r\nthe same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and\r\ntime in conceiving its objects. As to the connection that is made by\r\nthe relation of \u003ci\u003ecause and effect\u003c/i\u003e, we shall have occasion afterwards to\r\nexamine it to the bottom, and therefore shall not at present insist upon\r\nit. \u0027Tis sufficient to observe that there is no relation which produces\r\na stronger connection in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily\r\nrecall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects….\r\nThese are therefore the principles of union or cohesion\r\namong our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of\r\nthat inseparable connection by which they are united in our memory.\r\nHere is a kind of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAttraction\u003c/span\u003e, which in the mental world will be found\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_597\"\u003e[Pg 597]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in\r\nas many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous;\r\nbut as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved\r\ninto \u003ci\u003eoriginal\u003c/i\u003e qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to\r\nexplain.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_494_494\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_494_494\"\u003e[494]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHume did not, however, any more than Hobbes, follow\r\nout the effects of which he speaks, and the task of popularizing\r\nthe notion of association and making an effective school\r\nbased on association of ideas alone was reserved for Hartley\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_495_495\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_495_495\"\u003e[495]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand James Mill.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_496_496\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_496_496\"\u003e[496]\u003c/a\u003e These authors traced minutely the\r\npresence of association in all the cardinal notions and operations\r\nof the mind. The several \u0027faculties\u0027 of the Mind\r\nwere dispossessed; the one principle of association between\r\nideas did all their work. As Priestley says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Nothing is requisite to make any man whatever he is, but a\r\nsentient principle with this single law…. Not only all our intellectual\r\npleasures and pains but all the phenomena of memory, imagination,\r\nvolition, reasoning and every other mental affection and operation,\r\nare but different modes or cases of the association of ideas.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_497_497\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_497_497\"\u003e[497]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn eminent French psychologist, M. Ribot, repeats\r\nHume\u0027s comparison of the law of association with that of\r\ngravitation, and goes on to say:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is remarkable that this discovery was made so late. Nothing is\r\nsimpler, apparently, than to notice that this law of association is the\r\ntruly fundamental, irreducible phenomenon of our mental life; that it\r\nis at the bottom of all our acts; that it permits of no exception; that\r\nneither dream, revery, mystic ecstasy, nor the most abstract reasoning\r\ncan exist without it; that its suppression would be equivalent to that of\r\nthought itself. Nevertheless no ancient author understood it, for one\r\ncannot seriously maintain that a few scattered lines in Aristotle and\r\nthe Stoics constitute a theory and clear view of the subject. It is to\r\nHobbes, Hume, and Hartley that we must attribute the origin of these\r\nstudies on the connection of our ideas. The discovery of the ultimate\r\nlaw of our psychologic acts has this, then, in common with many other\r\ndiscoveries: it came late and seems so simple that it may justly astonish\r\nus.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Perhaps it is not superfluous to ask in what this manner of explanation\r\nis superior to the current theory of Faculties.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_498_498\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_498_498\"\u003e[498]\u003c/a\u003e The most\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_598\"\u003e[Pg 598]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nextended usage consists, as we know, in dividing intellectual phenomena\r\ninto classes, in separating those which differ, in grouping together\r\nthose of the same nature and in giving to these a common name and in\r\nattributing them to the same cause; it is thus that we have come to distinguish\r\nthose diverse aspects of intelligence which are called judgment,\r\nreasoning, abstraction, perception, etc. This method is precisely the\r\none followed in Physics, where the words caloric, electricity, gravity,\r\ndesignate the unknown causes of certain groups of phenomena. If one\r\nthus never forgets that the diverse faculties are only the unknown\r\ncauses of known phenomena, that they are simply a convenient means\r\nof classifying the facts and speaking of them, if one does not fall into\r\nthe common fault of making out of them substantial entities, creations\r\nwhich now agree, now disagree, so forming in the intelligence a little\r\nrepublic; then, we can see nothing reprehensible in this distribution\r\ninto faculties, conformable as it is to the rules of a sound method and\r\nof a good natural classification. In what then is Mr. Bain\u0027s procedure\r\nsuperior to the method of the faculties? It is that the latter is simply\r\na \u003ci\u003eclassification\u003c/i\u003e while his is an \u003ci\u003eexplanation\u003c/i\u003e. Between the psychology\r\nwhich traces intellectual facts back to certain faculties, and that which\r\nreduces them to the single law of association, there is, according to our\r\nway of thinking, the same difference that we find in Physics between\r\nthose who attribute its phenomena to five or six causes, and those who\r\nderive gravity caloric, light, etc., from motion. The system of the\r\nfaculties explains nothing because each one of them is only a \u003ci\u003eflatus vocis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich is of value merely through the phenomena which it contains, and\r\nsignifies nothing more than these phenomena. The new theory, on the\r\ncontrary, shows that the different processes of intelligence are only\r\ndiverse cases of a single law; that imagination, deduction, induction,\r\nperception, etc., are but so many determinate ways in which ideas may\r\ncombine with each other; and that the differences of faculties are only\r\ndifferences of association. It \u003ci\u003eexplains\u003c/i\u003e all intellectual facts, certainly\r\nnot after the manner of Metaphysics which demands the ultimate and\r\nabsolute reason of things; but after the manner of Physics which seeks\r\nonly their secondary and immediate cause.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_499_499\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_499_499\"\u003e[499]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe inexperienced reader may be glad of a brief indication\r\nof the manner in which all the different mental operations\r\nmay be conceived to consist of images of sensation\r\nassociated together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMemory\u003c/i\u003e is the association of a present image with others\r\nknown to belong to the past. \u003ci\u003eExpectation\u003c/i\u003e the same, with\r\nfuture substituted for past. \u003ci\u003eFancy\u003c/i\u003e, the association of\r\nimages without temporal order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBelief\u003c/i\u003e in anything \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e present to sense is the very lively,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_599\"\u003e[Pg 599]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstrong, and steadfast association of the image of that thing\r\nwith some present sensation, so that as long as the sensation\r\npersists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eJudgment\u003c/i\u003e is \u0027transferring the idea of \u003ci\u003etruth\u003c/i\u003e by association\r\nfrom one proposition to another that resembles it.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_500_500\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_500_500\"\u003e[500]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eReasoning\u003c/i\u003e is the perception that \"whatever has any mark\r\nhas that which it is a mark of\"; in the concrete case the\r\nmark or middle term being always \u003ci\u003eassociated\u003c/i\u003e with each of\r\nthe other terms and so serving as a link by which they are\r\nthemselves indirectly associated together. This same kind\r\nof transfer of a sensible experience associated with another\r\nto a third also associated with that other, serves to explain\r\nemotional facts. When we are pleased or hurt we express\r\nit, and the expression associates itself with the feeling.\r\nHearing the same expression from another revives the associated\r\nfeeling, and we \u003ci\u003esympathize\u003c/i\u003e, i.e. grieve or are glad\r\nwith him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other social affections, \u003ci\u003eBenevolence, Conscientiousness,\r\nAmbition,\u003c/i\u003e etc., arise in like manner by the transfer of the\r\nbodily pleasure experienced as a reward for social service,\r\nand hence associated with it, to the act of service itself, the\r\nlink of reward being dropped out. Just so \u003ci\u003eAvarice\u003c/i\u003e when\r\nthe miser transfers the bodily pleasures associated with\r\nthe spending of money to the money itself, dropping the\r\nlink of spending.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFear\u003c/i\u003e is a transfer of the bodily hurt associated by experience\r\nwith the thing feared, to the thought of the thing,\r\nwith the precise features of the hurt left out. Thus we fear\r\na dog without distinctly imagining his bite.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eLove\u003c/i\u003e is the association of the agreeableness of certain\r\nsensible experiences with the idea of the object capable of\r\naffording them. The experiences themselves may cease to\r\nbe distinctly imagined after the notion of their pleasure has\r\nbeen transferred to the object, constituting our love therefor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVolition\u003c/i\u003e is the association of ideas of muscular motion\r\nwith the ideas of those pleasures which the motion produces.\r\nThe motion at first occurs automatically and results\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_600\"\u003e[Pg 600]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin a pleasure unforeseen. The latter becomes so associated\r\nwith the motion that whenever we think of it the idea of the\r\nmotion arises; and the idea of the motion when vivid causes\r\nthe motion to occur. This is an act of will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing is easier than for a philosopher of this school\r\nto explain from experience such a notion as that of infinitude.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"He sees in it an ordinary manifestation of one of the laws of the\r\nassociation of ideas,—the law that the idea of a thing irresistibly suggests\r\nthe idea of any other thing which has been often experienced in\r\nclose conjunction with it, and not otherwise. As we have never had\r\nexperience of any point of space without other points beyond it, nor of\r\nany point of time without others following it, the law of indissoluble\r\nassociation makes it impossible for us to think of any point of space or\r\ntime, however distant, without having the idea irresistibly realized, in\r\nimagination, of other points still more remote. And thus the supposed\r\noriginal and inherent property of these two ideas is completely explained\r\nand accounted for by the law of association; and we are enabled to see\r\nthat if Space or Time were really susceptible of termination, we should\r\nbe just as unable as we now are to conceive the idea.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_501_501\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_501_501\"\u003e[501]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese examples of the Associationist Psychology are with\r\nthe exception of the last, very crudely expressed, but they\r\nsuffice for our temporary need. Hartley and James Mill\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_502_502\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_502_502\"\u003e[502]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nimproved upon Hume so far as to employ but a single principle\r\nof association, that of contiguity or habit. Hartley\r\nignores resemblance, James Mill expressly repudiates it in\r\na passage which is assuredly one of the curiosities of literature:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I believe it will be found that we are accustomed to see like things\r\ntogether. When we see a tree, we generally see more trees than one;\r\na sheep, more sheep than one; a man, more men than one. From this\r\nobservation, I think, we may refer resemblance to the law of frequency\r\n[i.e., contiguity], of which it seems to form only a particular case.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Herbert Spencer has still more recently tried to construct\r\na Psychology which ignores Association by Similarity,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_503_503\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_503_503\"\u003e[503]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand in a chapter, which also is a curiosity, he tries\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_601\"\u003e[Pg 601]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto explain the association of two ideas by a conscious reference\r\nof the first to the point of time when its sensation was\r\nexperienced, which point of time is no sooner thought of\r\nthan its content, namely, the second idea, arises. Messrs.\r\nBain and Mill, however, and the immense majority of contemporary\r\npsychologists retain both Resemblance and Contiguity\r\nas irreducible principles of Association.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Bain\u0027s exposition of association is by common\r\nconsent looked upon as the best expression of the English\r\nschool. Perception of agreement and difference, retentiveness, and\r\nthe two sorts of association, contiguity and similarity,\r\nare by him regarded as constituting all that is meant by\r\nintellect proper. His pages are painstaking and instructive\r\nfrom a descriptive point of view; though, after my own attempt\r\nto deal with the subject causally, I can hardly\r\naward to them any profound \u003ci\u003eexplanatory\u003c/i\u003e value. Association\r\nby Similarity, too much neglected by the British school\r\nbefore Bain, receives from him the most generous exemplification.\r\nAs an instructive passage, the following, out of\r\nmany equally good, may be chosen to quote:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We may have similarity in form with diversity of use, and similarity\r\nof use with diversity of form. A rope suggests other ropes and\r\ncords, if we look to the appearance; but looking to the \u003ci\u003euse\u003c/i\u003e, it may suggest\r\nan iron cable, a wooden prop, an iron girding, a leather band, or\r\nbevelled gear. In spite of diversity of appearance, the suggestion turns\r\non what answers a common end. If we are very much attracted by\r\nsensible appearances, there will be the more difficulty in recalling\r\nthings that agree only in the use; if, on the other hand, we are profoundly\r\nsensitive to the one point of practical efficiency as a tool, the\r\npeculiarities not essential to this will be little noticed, and we shall be\r\never ready to revive past objects corresponding in use to some one present,\r\nalthough diverse in all other circumstances. We become oblivious\r\nto the difference between a horse, a steam-engine, and a waterfall,\r\nwhen our minds are engrossed with the one circumstance of moving\r\npower. The diversity in these had no doubt for a long time the effect\r\nof keeping back their first identification; and to obtuse intellects, this\r\nidentification might have been for ever impossible. A strong concentration\r\nof mind upon the single peculiarity of mechanical force, and a\r\ndegree of indifference to the general aspect of the things themselves,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_602\"\u003e[Pg 602]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust conspire with the intellectual energy of resuscitation by similars,\r\nin order to summon together in the view three structures so different.\r\nWe can see, by an instance like this, how new adaptations of existing\r\nmachinery might arise in the mind of a mechanical inventor. When it\r\nfirst occurred to a reflecting mind that moving water had a property\r\nidentical with human or brute force, namely, the property of setting\r\nother masses in motion, overcoming inertia and resistance,—when the\r\nsight of the stream suggested through this point of likeness the power\r\nof the animal,—a new addition was made to the class of prime movers,\r\nand when circumstances permitted, this power could become a substitute\r\nfor the others. It may seem to the modern understanding, familiar\r\nwith water-wheels and drifting rafts, that the similarity here was an\r\nextremely obvious one. But if we put ourselves back into an early\r\nstate of mind, when running water affected the mind by its brilliancy,\r\nits roar, and irregular devastation, we may easily suppose that to identify\r\nthis with animal muscular energy was by no means an obvious\r\neffect. Doubtless when a mind arose, insensible by natural constitution\r\nto the superficial aspects of things, and having withal a great stretch of\r\nidentifying intellect, such a comparison would then be possible. We\r\nmay pursue the same example one stage further, and come to the discovery\r\nof steam power, or the identification of expanding vapor with\r\nthe previously known sources of mechanical force. To the common eye,\r\nfor ages, vapor presented itself as clouds in the sky; or as a hissing\r\nnoise at the spout of a kettle, with the formation of a foggy curling\r\ncloud at a few inches\u0027 distance. The forcing up of the lid of a kettle\r\nmay also have been occasionally observed. But how long was it ere\r\nany one was struck with the parallelism of this appearance with a blast\r\nof wind, a rush of water, or an exertion of animal muscle? The discordance\r\nwas too great to be broken through by such a faint and limited\r\namount of likeness. In one mind, however, the identification did take\r\nplace, and was followed out into its consequences. The likeness had\r\noccurred to other minds previously, but not with the same results.\r\nSuch minds must have been in some way or other distinguished above\r\nthe millions of mankind; and we are now endeavoring to give the explanation\r\nof their superiority. The intellectual character of Watt contained\r\nall the elements preparatory to a great stroke of similarity in\r\nsuch a case;—a high susceptibility, both by nature and by education,\r\nto the mechanical properties of bodies; ample previous knowledge or\r\nfamiliarity; and indifference to the superficial and sensational effects\r\nof things. It is not only possible, however, but exceedingly probable,\r\nthat many men possessed all these accomplishments; they are of a kind\r\nnot transcending common abilities. They would in some degree attach\r\nto a mechanical education almost as a matter of course. That the discovery\r\nwas not sooner made supposes that something farther, and not\r\nof common occurrence, was necessary; and this additional endowment\r\nappears to be the identifying power of Similarity in general; the tendency\r\nto detect likeness in the midst of disparity and disguise. This\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_603\"\u003e[Pg 603]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsupposition accounts for the fact, and is consistent with the known intellectual\r\ncharacter of the inventor of the steam-engine.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_504_504\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_504_504\"\u003e[504]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Hodgson\u0027s account of association is by all odds the\r\nbest yet propounded in English.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_505_505\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_505_505\"\u003e[505]\u003c/a\u003e All these writers hold\r\nmore or less explicitly to the notion of atomistic \u0027ideas\u0027\r\nwhich recur. In Germany, the same mythological supposition\r\nhas been more radically grasped, and carried out to\r\na still more logical, if more repulsive, extreme, by Herbart\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_506_506\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_506_506\"\u003e[506]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand his followers, who until recently may be said to\r\nhave reigned almost supreme in their native country.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_507_507\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_507_507\"\u003e[507]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFor Herbart each idea is a permanently existing entity, the\r\nentrance whereof into consciousness is but an accidental\r\ndetermination of its being. So far as it succeeds in occupying\r\nthe theatre of consciousness, it crowds out another\r\nidea previously there. This act of inhibition gives it, however,\r\na sort of hold on the other representation which on\r\nall later occasions facilitates its following the other into the\r\nmind. The ingenuity with which most special cases of association\r\nare formulated in this mechanical language of\r\nstruggle and inhibition, is great, and surpasses in analytic\r\nthoroughness anything that has been done by the British\r\nschool. This, however, is a doubtful merit, in a case where\r\nthe elements dealt with are artificial; and I must confess\r\nthat to my mind there is something almost hideous in the\r\nglib Herbartian jargon about \u003ci\u003eVorstellungsmassen\u003c/i\u003e and their\r\n\u003ci\u003eHemmungen\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eHemmungssummen\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003esinken\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eerheben\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003eschweben\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eVerschmelzungen\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eComplexionen\u003c/i\u003e. Herr\r\nLipps, the most recent systematic German Psychologist,\r\nhas, I regret to say, carried out the theory of ideas in a\r\nway which the great originality, learning, and acuteness he\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_604\"\u003e[Pg 604]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshows make only the more regrettable.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_508_508\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_508_508\"\u003e[508]\u003c/a\u003e Such elaborately\r\nartificial constructions are, it seems to me, only a burden\r\nand a hindrance, not a help, to our science.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_509_509\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_509_509\"\u003e[509]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn French, M. Rabier in his chapter on Association,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_510_510\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_510_510\"\u003e[510]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhandles the subject more vigorously and acutely than any\r\none. His treatment of it, though short, seems to me for\r\ngeneral soundness to rank second only to Hodgson\u0027s.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the last chapter we already invoked association to\r\naccount for the effects of use in improving discrimination.\r\nIn later chapters we shall see abundant proof of the immense\r\npart which it plays in other processes, and shall\r\nthen readily admit that few principles of analysis, in any\r\nscience, have proved more fertile than this one, however\r\nvaguely formulated it often may have been. Our own attempt\r\nto formulate it more definitely, and to escape the usual confusion\r\nbetween causal agencies and relations merely known,\r\nmust not blind us to the immense services of those by\r\nwhom the confusion was unfelt. From this practical point\r\nof view it would be a true \u003ci\u003eignoratio elenchi\u003c/i\u003e to flatter one\u0027s\r\nself that one has dealt a heavy blow at the psychology of\r\nassociation, when one has exploded the theory of atomistic\r\nideas, or shown that contiguity and similarity between\r\nideas can only be there after association is done.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_511_511\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_511_511\"\u003e[511]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nwhole body of the associationist psychology remains standing\r\nafter you have translated \u0027ideas\u0027 into \u0027objects,\u0027 on the\r\none hand, and \u0027brain-processes\u0027 on the other; and the\r\nanalysis of faculties and operations is as conclusive in these\r\nterms as in those traditionally used.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_463_463\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_463_463\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[463]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The theory propounded in this chapter, and a good many pages of\r\nthe text, were originally published in the Popular Science Monthly for\r\nMarch, 1880.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_464_464\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_464_464\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[464]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare Renouvier\u0027s criticism of associationism in his Essais de\r\nCritique générale, Logique, ii, p. 493 foll.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_465_465\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_465_465\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[465]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Unless the name belong to a rapidly uttered sentence, when no substantive\r\nimage may have time to arise.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_466_466\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_466_466\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[466]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In his observations he says that time was lost in mentally taking in\r\nthe word which was the cue, \"owing to the quiet unobtrusive way in\r\nwhich I found it necessary to bring it into view, so as not to distract the\r\nthoughts. Moreover, a substantive standing by itself is usually the equivalent\r\nof too abstract an idea for us to conceive properly without delay.\r\nThus it is very difficult to get a quick conception of the word \u0027carriage,\u0027\r\nbecause there are so many different kinds—two-wheeled, four-wheeled,\r\nopen and closed, and in so many different possible positions, that the mind\r\npossibly hesitates amidst an obscure sense of many alternations that cannot\r\nblend together. But limit the idea to say a landau, and the mental association\r\ndeclares itself more quickly.\" (Inquiries, etc., p. 190.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_467_467\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_467_467\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[467]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 280 fol.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_468_468\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_468_468\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[468]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For interesting remarks on the sorts of things associated, in these experiments,\r\nwith the prompting word, see Galton, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 185-203, and\r\nTrautscholdt in Wundt\u0027s Psychologische Studien, i, 213.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_469_469\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_469_469\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[469]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, xi, 64-5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_470_470\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_470_470\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[470]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This value is much smaller than that got by Wundt as above. No\r\nreason for the difference is suggested by Mr. Cattell. Wundt calls attention\r\nto the fact that the figures found by him give an average, 0.720\u0027\u0027, exactly\r\nequal to the \u003ci\u003etime interval\u003c/i\u003e which in his experiments (\u003ci\u003evide infra\u003c/i\u003e, chapter\r\non Time) was reproduced without error either way, and to that required,\r\naccording to the Webers, for the legs to swing in rapid locomotion. \"It is\r\nnot improbable,\" he adds, \"that this psychic constant, of the mean association-time\r\nand of the most correct appreciation of a time-interval, may\r\nhave been developed under the influence of the most usual bodily movements,\r\nwhich also have determined the manner in which we tend to subdivide\r\nrhythmically longer periods of time.\" (Physiol. Psych., ii, 286).\r\nThe \u003ci\u003erapprochement\u003c/i\u003e is of that tentative sort which it is no harm for psychologists\r\nto make, provided they recollect how very fictitious and incomparable\r\nmutually all these averages derived from different observers, working\r\nunder different conditions, are. Mr. Cattell\u0027s figure throws Wundt\u0027s\r\ningenious parallel entirely out of line.—The only measurements of association-time\r\nwhich so far seem likely to have much theoretic importance\r\nare a few made on insane patients by Von Tschisch (Mendel\u0027s Neurologisches\r\nCentralblatt, 15 Mai, 1885, 3 Jhrg., p. 217). The simple reaction\r\ntime was found about normal in three patients, one with progressive\r\nparalysis, one with inveterate mania of persecution, one recovering from\r\nordinary mania. In the convalescent maniac and the paralytic, however,\r\nthe association-time was hardly half as much as Wundt\u0027s normal figure\r\n(0.28\u0027\u0027 and 0.23\u0027\u0027 instead of 0.7\u0027—smaller also than Cattell\u0027s), whilst in the\r\nsufferer from delusions of persecution and hallucinations it was twice as\r\ngreat as normal (1.39\u0027\u0027 instead of 0.7\u0027\u0027). This latter patient\u0027s time was sixfold\r\nthat of the paralytic. Herr von Tschisch remarks on the connection\r\nof the short times with diminished power for clear and consistent processes\r\nof thought, and on that of the long times with the persistent fixation of the\r\nattention upon monotonous objects (delusions). Miss Marie Walitzky\r\n(Revue Philosophique, xxviii, 583) has carried Von Tschisch\u0027s observations\r\nstill farther, making 18,000 measurements in all. She found association-time\r\nincreased in paralytic dementia and diminished inmania. Choice\r\ntime, on the contrary, is increased in mania.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_471_471\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_471_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[471]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, xii, 67-74.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_472_472\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_472_472\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[472]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare Bain\u0027s law of Association by Contiguity: \"Actions, Sensations,\r\nand States of Feeling, occurring together or in close succession,\r\ntend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of\r\nthem is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought\r\nup in idea\" (Senses and Intellect, p. 327). Compare also Hartley\u0027s formulation:\r\n\"Any sensations A, B, C, etc., by being associated with one another\r\na sufficient Number of Times, get such a power over the corresponding\r\nIdeas \u003ci\u003ea, b, c,\u003c/i\u003e etc., that anyone of the sensations A, when impressed alone,\r\nshall be able to excite in the Mind \u003ci\u003eb, c,\u003c/i\u003e etc., the ideas of the rest.\" (Observations\r\non Man, part i, chap. i, § 2, Prop. x.) The statement in the\r\ntext differs from these in holding fast to the objective point of view. It is\r\n\u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e, and objective \u003ci\u003eproperties in things\u003c/i\u003e, which are associated in our\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_473_473\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_473_473\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[473]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Ed., article Psychology, p. 60. col. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_474_474\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_474_474\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[474]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 300.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_475_475\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_475_475\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[475]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The difficulty here as with habit \u003ci\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/i\u003e is in seeing how new\r\npaths come \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e to be formed (cf. above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 109\u003c/a\u003e). Experience shows that a\r\nnew path \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e formed between centres for sensible impressions whenever\r\nthese vibrate together or in rapid succession. A child sees a certain bottle\r\nand hears it called \u0027milk,\u0027 and thenceforward thinks the name when he again\r\nsees the bottle. But why the successive or simultaneous excitement of two\r\ncentres independently stimulated from without, one by sight and the\r\nother by hearing, \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e result in a path between them, one does not immediately\r\nsee. We can only make hypotheses. Any hypothesis of the\r\nspecific mode of their formation which tallies well with the observed facts\r\nof association will be in so far forth credible, in spite of possible obscurity.\r\nHerr Münsterberg thinks (Beiträge zur exp. Psychologie, Heft i, p. 132)\r\nthat between centres excited successively from without no path ought to\r\nbe formed, and that consequently all contiguous association is between\r\n\u003ci\u003esimultaneous\u003c/i\u003e experiences. Mr. Ward (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e) thinks, on the contrary, that\r\nit can only be between \u003ci\u003esuccessive\u003c/i\u003e experiences: \"The association of objects\r\nsimultaneously presented can be resolved into an association of objects\r\nsuccessively attended to…. It seems hardly possible to mention a case\r\nin which attention to the associated objects could not have been successive.\r\nIn fact, an aggregate of objects on which attention could be focussed at\r\nonce would be already associated.\" Between these extreme possibilities,\r\nI have refrained from deciding in the text, and have described contiguous\r\nassociation as holding between both successively and coexistently presented\r\nobjects. The physiological question as to how we may conceive\r\nthe paths to originate had better be postponed till it comes to us again in\r\nthe chapter on the Will, where we can treat it in a broader way. It is\r\nenough here to have called attention to it as a serious problem.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_476_476\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_476_476\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[476]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Essay, bk. ii, chap. xxxiii, § 6. Compare Hume, who, like Locke,\r\nonly uses the principle to account for unreasonable and obstructive mental\r\nassociations:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"\u0027Twould have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the\r\nbrain, and have shown why, upon our conception of any idea, the animal\r\nspirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouse up the other ideas that\r\nare related to it. But though I have neglected any advantage which I\r\nmight have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am\r\nafraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes\r\nthat arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind\r\nis endowed with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches\r\nthe spirits into that region of the brain in which the idea is placed,\r\nthese spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper\r\ntraces, and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as their motion\r\nis seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other:\r\nfor this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present\r\nother related ideas in lieu of that which the mind desired at first to\r\nsurvey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still\r\nthe same train of thought, make use of the related idea which is presented\r\nto us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we\r\ndemanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy;\r\nas will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy to show, if there\r\nwas occasion.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_477_477\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_477_477\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[477]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e prop. xi.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_478_478\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_478_478\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[478]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Chapter III, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 82-5\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_479_479\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_479_479\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[479]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I strongly advise the student to read his Senses and Intellect, pp. 544-556.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_480_480\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_480_480\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[480]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Time and Space, p. 266. Compare Coleridge: \"The true practical\r\ngeneral law of association is this: that whatever makes certain parts of a\r\ntotal impression more vivid or distinct than the rest will determine the mind\r\nto recall these, in preference to others equally linked together by the common\r\ncondition of contemporaeity or of \u003ci\u003econtiguity\u003c/i\u003e. But the will itself, by\r\nconfining and intensifying the attention, may arbitrarily give vividness or\r\ndistinctness to any object whatsoever.\" (Biographia Litteraria, Chap. v.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_481_481\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_481_481\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[481]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Leviathan, pt. i, chap. iii, \u003ci\u003einit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_482_482\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_482_482\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[482]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I refer to a recency of a few hours. Mr. Galton found that experiences\r\nfrom boyhood and youth were more likely to be suggested by words\r\nseen at random than experiences of later years. See his highly interesting\r\naccount of experiments in his Inquiries into Human Faculty, pp. 191-203.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_483_483\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_483_483\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[483]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For other instances see Wahle, in Vierteljsch. f. Wiss. Phil., ix, 144-417\r\n(1885).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_484_484\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_484_484\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[484]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I retain the title of association by similarity in order not to depart\r\nfrom common usage. The reader will observe, however, that my nomenclature\r\nis not based on the same principle throughout. Impartial redintegration\r\nconnotes neural processes; similarity is an objective relation perceived\r\nby the mind; ordinary or mixed association is a merely denotative\r\nword. \u003ci\u003eTotal recall, partial recall,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003efocalized recall,\u003c/i\u003e of associates, would be\r\nbetter terms. But as the \u003ci\u003edenotation\u003c/i\u003e of the latter word is almost identical\r\nwith that of association by similarity, I think it better to sacrifice propriety\r\nto popularity, and to keep the latter well-worn phrase.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_485_485\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_485_485\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[485]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e No one has described this process better than Hobbes: \"Sometimes\r\na man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place and time wherein\r\nhe misses it, his mind runs back from place to place and time to time to\r\nand where and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain and\r\nlimited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again,\r\nfrom thence his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what\r\naction or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call \u003ci\u003eRemembrance\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nor calling to mind. Sometimes a man knows a place determinate,\r\nwithin the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over\r\nall the parts thereof, in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find\r\na jewel, or as a spaniel ranges the field till he find a scent, or as a man\r\nshould run over the alphabet to start a rhyme.\" (Leviathan, 165, p. 10.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_486_486\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_486_486\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[486]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 394.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_487_487\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_487_487\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[487]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 394.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_488_488\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_488_488\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[488]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e All association is called redintegration by Hodgson.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_489_489\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_489_489\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[489]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 400. Compare Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 377. \"The outgoings\r\nof the mind are necessarily random; the end alone is the thing that\r\nis clear to the view, and with that there is a perception of the fitness of\r\nevery passing suggestion. The volitional energy keeps up the attention on\r\nthe active search; and the moment that anything in point rises before\r\nthe mind, it springs upon that like a wild beast upon its prey.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_490_490\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_490_490\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[490]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare what is said of the principle of Similarity by F. H. Bradley,\r\nPrinciples of Logic, pp. 294 ff.; E. Rabier, Psychologie, 187 ff.;\r\nPaulhan, Critique Philosophique, 2me Série, i, 458; Rabier, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e 460;\r\nPillon, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e ii, 55; B. P. Bowne, Introduction to Psych. Theory, 92;\r\nWard, Encyclop. Britt. art. Psychology, p. 60; Wahle, Vierteljahrsch. f.\r\nwiss. Philos., ix, 426-431.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_491_491\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_491_491\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[491]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Dr. McCosh is accordingly only logical when he sinks similarity in\r\nwhat he calls the \u003ci\u003eLaw of Correlation\u003c/i\u003e, according to which, when we have\r\ndiscovered \u003ci\u003ea relation between things\u003c/i\u003e, the idea of one tends to bring up the\r\nothers, (Psychology, the Cognitive Powers, p. 130). The relations mentioned\r\nby this author are Identity, Whole and Parts, Resemblance, Space,\r\nTime, Quantity, Active Property, and Cause and Effect. If perceived\r\nrelations among objects are to be treated as grounds for their appearance\r\nbefore the mind, similarity has of course no right to an exclusive, or even\r\nto a predominant, place.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_492_492\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_492_492\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[492]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Bain, Senses and Intellect, 504 ff.; J. S. Mill, Note 39 to J. Mill\u0027s\r\nAnalysis; Lipps, Grundtatsachen, 97.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_493_493\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_493_493\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[493]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for farther details, Hamilton\u0027s Reid, Appendices D** and D***;\r\nand L. Ferri, La Psychologie de l\u0027Association (Paris, 1883). Also Robertson,\r\nart. Association in Encyclop. Britannica.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_494_494\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_494_494\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[494]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Treatise of Human nature, part i,. § iv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_495_495\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_495_495\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[495]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Observations on Man (London, 1749).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_496_496\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_496_496\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[496]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_497_497\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_497_497\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[497]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hartley\u0027s Theory, 2d ed. (1790) p. xxvii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_498_498\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_498_498\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[498]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Current, that is, in France.—W. J.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_499_499\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_499_499\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[499]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e La Psychologie Angloise, p. 242.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_500_500\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_500_500\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[500]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Priestley, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. xxx.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_501_501\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_501_501\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[501]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Review of Bains\u0027s Psychology, by J.S. Mill, in Edinb. Review, Oct. 1,\r\n1859, p. 293.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_502_502\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_502_502\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[502]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, J.S. Mill\u0027s edition,\r\nvol. i, p. 111.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_503_503\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_503_503\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[503]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On the Associability of Relations between Feelings, in Principles of\r\nPsychology, vol. i, p. 259. It is impossible to regard the \"cohering of each\r\nfeeling with previously-experienced feelings of the same class, order,\r\ngenus, species, and, so far as may be, the same variety,\" which Spencer calls\r\n(p. 257) \u0027the sole process of association of feelings,\u0027 as any equivalent for\r\nwhat is commonly known as Association by similarity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_504_504\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_504_504\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[504]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 491-3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_505_505\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_505_505\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[505]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See his Time and Space, chapter v, and his Theory of Practice, §§ 53\r\nto 57.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_506_506\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_506_506\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[506]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologie als Wissenschaft (1824), 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_507_507\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_507_507\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[507]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Prof. Ribot, in chapter i of his \u0027Contemporary German Psychology,\u0027\r\nhas given a good account of Herbart and his school, and of Beneke,\r\nhis rival and partial analogue. See also two articles on the Herbartian\r\nPsychology, by G. F. Stout, in Mind for 1888. J. D. Morrell\u0027s Outlines of\r\nMental Philosophy (2d ed., London, 1862) largely follows Herbart and\r\nBeneke. I know of no other English book which does so.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_508_508\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_508_508\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[508]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See his Grundtatsachen des Bewusstseins (1883), chap. vi \u003ci\u003eet passim\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nespecially pp. 106 ff., 364.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_509_509\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_509_509\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[509]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The most burdensome and utterly gratuitous of them are perhaps\r\nSteinthal\u0027s, in his Einleitung in die Psychologie, 2te Aufl. (1881). Cf. also\r\nG. Glogau: Steinthal\u0027s Psychologische Formeln (1886).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_510_510\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_510_510\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[510]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Leçons de Philosophie, i. Psychologie, chap. xvi (1884).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_511_511\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_511_511\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[511]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mr. F. H. Bradley seems to me to have been guilty of something very\r\nlike this \u003ci\u003eignoratio elenchi\u003c/i\u003e in the, of course, subtle and witty but decidedly\r\nlong-winded critique of the association of ideas, contained in book ii,\r\npart ii, chap. i, of his Principles of Logic.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_605\"\u003e[Pg 605]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_XV512\"\u003eCHAPTER XV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_512_512\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_512_512\"\u003e[512]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE PERCEPTION OF TIME.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the next two chapters I shall deal with what is sometimes\r\ncalled internal perception, or the perception of \u003ci\u003etime\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand of events as occupying a date therein, especially when\r\nthe date is a past one, in which case the perception in\r\nquestion goes by the name of \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e. To remember a\r\nthing as past, it is necessary that the notion of \u0027past\u0027 should\r\nbe one of our \u0027ideas.\u0027 We shall see in the chapter on Memory\r\nthat many things come to be thought by us as past,\r\nnot because of any intrinsic quality of their own, but rather\r\nbecause they are associated with other things which for us\r\nsignify pastness. But how do these things get \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e pastness?\r\nWhat is the \u003ci\u003eoriginal\u003c/i\u003e of our experience of pastness,\r\nfrom whence we get the meaning of the term? It is this\r\nquestion which the reader is invited to consider in the present\r\nchapter. We shall see that we have a constant feeling\r\n\u003ci\u003esui generis\u003c/i\u003e of pastness, to which every one of our experiences\r\nin turn falls a prey. To think a thing as past is to\r\nthink it amongst the objects or in the direction of the objects\r\nwhich at the present moment appear affected by this\r\nquality. This is the original of our notion of past time,\r\nupon which memory and history build their systems. And\r\nin this chapter we shall consider this immediate sense\r\nof time alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the constitution of consciousness were that of a string\r\nof bead-like sensations and images, all separate,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"we never could have any knowledge except that of the present instant.\r\nThe moment each of our sensations ceased it would be gone for ever;\r\nand we should be as if we had never been…. We should be wholly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_606\"\u003e[Pg 606]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nincapable of acquiring experience…. Even if our ideas were associated\r\nin trains, but only as they are in imagination, we should still be\r\nwithout the capacity of acquiring knowledge. One idea, upon this\r\nsupposition, would follow another. But that would be all. Each of\r\nour successive states of consciousness, the moment it ceased, would be\r\ngone forever. Each of those momentary states would be our whole\r\nbeing.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_513_513\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_513_513\"\u003e[513]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe might, nevertheless, under these circumstances, \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin a rational way, provided the mechanism which produced\r\nour trains of images produced them in a rational order.\r\nWe should make appropriate speeches, though unaware of\r\nany word except the one just on our lips; we should decide\r\nupon the right policy without ever a glimpse of the total\r\ngrounds of our choice. Our consciousness would be like a\r\nglow-worm spark, illuminating the point it immediately\r\ncovered, but leaving all beyond in total darkness. Whether\r\na very highly developed practical life be possible under\r\nsuch conditions as these is more than doubtful; it is, however,\r\nconceivable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI make the fanciful hypothesis merely to set off our\r\nreal nature by the contrast. Our feelings are not thus contracted,\r\nand our consciousness never shrinks to the dimensions\r\nof a glow-worm spark. \u003ci\u003eThe knowledge of some other\r\npart of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always\r\nmixed in with our knowledge of the present thing.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA simple sensation, as we shall hereafter see, is an abstraction,\r\nand all our concrete states of mind are representations\r\nof objects with some amount of complexity. Part of the complexity\r\nis the echo of the objects just past, and, in a less\r\ndegree, perhaps, the foretaste of those just to arrive. Objects\r\nfade out of consciousness slowly. If the present\r\nthought is of ABCDEFG, the next one will be of\r\nBCDEFGH, and the one after that of CDEFGHI—the\r\nlingerings of the past dropping successively away, and\r\nthe incomings of the future making up the loss. These\r\nlingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the\r\ngerms of memory and expectation, the retrospective and the\r\nprospective sense of time. They give that continuity to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_607\"\u003e[Pg 607]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsciousness without which it could not be called a\r\nstream.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_514_514\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_514_514\"\u003e[514]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_608\"\u003e[Pg 608]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE SENSIBLE PRESENT HAS DURATION.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet any one try, I will not say to arrest, but to notice or\r\nattend to, the \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e moment of time. One of the most\r\nbaffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It\r\nhas melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in\r\nthe instant of becoming. As a poet, quoted by Mr. Hodgson,\r\nsays,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\"Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eand it is only as entering into the living and moving organization\r\nof a much wider tract of time that the strict present\r\nis apprehended at all. It is, in fact, an altogether ideal\r\nabstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably\r\nnever even conceived of by those unaccustomed to philosophic\r\nmeditation. Reflection leads us to the conclusion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_609\"\u003e[Pg 609]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat it \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e exist, but that it \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e exist can never be a fact\r\nof our immediate experience. The only fact of our immediate\r\nexperience is what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called \u0027the\r\n\u003ci\u003especious\u003c/i\u003e present.\u0027 His words deserve to be quoted in full:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_515_515\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_515_515\"\u003e[515]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied.\r\nIts objects are given as being of the present, but the part of time referred\r\nto by the datum is a very different thing from the conterminous\r\nof the past and future which philosophy denotes by the name Present.\r\nThe present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past—a\r\nrecent past—delusively given as being a time that intervenes between\r\nthe past and the future. Let it be named the specious present, and let\r\nthe past, that is given as being the past, be known as the obvious past.\r\nAll the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the\r\npresent. All the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be\r\ncontained in the present. At the instant of the termination of such series,\r\nno part of the time measured by them seems to be a past. Time, then,\r\nconsidered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz.,\r\nthe obvious past, the specious present, the real present, and the future.\r\nOmitting the specious present, it consists of three … nonentities—the\r\npast, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, and their\r\nconterminous, the present; the faculty from which it proceeds lies to\r\nus in the fiction of the specious present.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge,\r\nbut a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own\r\non which we sit perched, and from which we look in two\r\ndirections into time. The unit of composition of our perception\r\nof time is a \u003ci\u003eduration\u003c/i\u003e, with a bow and a stern, as it\r\nwere—a rearward- and a forward-looking end.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_516_516\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_516_516\"\u003e[516]\u003c/a\u003e It is only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_610\"\u003e[Pg 610]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas parts of this \u003ci\u003eduration-block\u003c/i\u003e that the relation of \u003ci\u003esuccession\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof one end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel\r\none end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception\r\nof the succession infer an interval of time between,\r\nbut we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its\r\ntwo ends embedded in it. The experience is from the outset\r\na synthetic datum, not a simple one; and to sensible\r\nperception its elements are inseparable, although attention\r\nlooking back may easily decompose the experience, and\r\ndistinguish its beginning from its end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we come to study the perception of Space, we\r\nshall find it quite analogous to time in this regard. Date\r\nin time corresponds to position in space; and although we\r\nnow mentally construct large spaces by mentally imagining\r\nremoter and remoter positions, just as we now construct\r\ngreat durations by mentally prolonging a series of successive\r\ndates, yet the original experience of both space and\r\ntime is always of something already given as a unit, inside\r\nof which attention afterward discriminates parts in relation\r\nto each other. Without the parts already given as \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e a time\r\nand \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e a space, subsequent discrimination of them could\r\nhardly do more than perceive them as \u003ci\u003edifferent\u003c/i\u003e from each\r\nother; it would have no motive for calling the difference\r\ntemporal order in this instance and spatial position in that.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd just as in certain experiences we may be conscious\r\nof an extensive space full of objects, without locating each\r\nof them distinctly therein; so, when many impressions follow\r\nin excessively rapid succession in time, although we\r\nmay be distinctly aware that they occupy some duration,\r\nand are not simultaneous, we may be quite at a loss to tell\r\nwhich comes first and which last; or we may even invert\r\ntheir real order in our judgment. In complicated reaction-time\r\nexperiments, where signals and motions, and clicks\r\nof the apparatus come in exceedingly rapid order, one is\r\nat first much perplexed in deciding what the order is, yet\r\nof the fact of its occupancy of time we are never in doubt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_611\"\u003e[Pg 611]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eACCURACY OF OUR ESTIMATE OF SHORT DURATIONS.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe must now proceed to an account of the \u003ci\u003efacts\u003c/i\u003e of time-perception\r\nin detail as preliminary to our speculative conclusion.\r\nMany of the facts are matters of patient experimentation,\r\nothers of common experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, we note a marked \u003ci\u003edifference between the elementary\r\nsensations of duration and those of space\u003c/i\u003e. The former\r\nhave a much narrower range; the time-sense may be called\r\na myopic organ, in comparison with the eye, for example.\r\nThe eye sees rods, acres, even miles, at a single glance, and\r\nthese totals it can afterward subdivide into an almost infinite\r\nnumber of distinctly identified parts. The units of\r\nduration, on the other hand, which the time-sense is able\r\nto take in at a single stroke, are groups of a few seconds,\r\nand within these units very few subdivisions—perhaps\r\nforty at most, as we shall presently see—can be clearly\r\ndiscerned. The durations we have practically most to deal\r\nwith—minutes, hours, and days—have to be symbolically\r\nconceived, and constructed by mental addition, after the\r\nfashion of those extents of hundreds of miles and upward,\r\nwhich in the field of space are beyond the range of\r\nmost men\u0027s practical interests altogether. To \u0027realize\u0027 a\r\nquarter of a mile we need only look out of the window and\r\n\u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e its length by an act which, though it may in part result\r\nfrom organized associations, yet seems immediately performed.\r\nTo realize an hour, we must count \u0027now!—now!—now!—now!—\u0027\r\nindefinitely. Each \u0027now\u0027 is the feeling\r\nof a separate \u003ci\u003ebit\u003c/i\u003e of time, and the exact sum of the bits\r\nnever makes a very clear impression on our mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow many bits can we clearly apprehend at once?\r\nVery few if they are long bits, more if they are extremely\r\nshort, most if they come to us in compound groups, each\r\nincluding smaller bits of its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHearing is the sense by which the subdivision of durations\r\nis most sharply made. Almost all the experimental\r\nwork on the time-sense has been done by means of strokes\r\nof sound. How long a series of sounds, then, can we group\r\nin the mind so as not to confound it with a longer or a\r\nshorter series?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_612\"\u003e[Pg 612]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur spontaneous tendency is to break up any monotonously\r\ngiven series of sounds into some sort of a rhythm.\r\nWe involuntarily accentuate every second, or third, or\r\nfourth beat, or we break the series in still more intricate\r\nways. Whenever we thus grasp the impressions in rhythmic\r\nform, we can identify a longer string of them without confusion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach variety of verse, for example, has its \u0027law\u0027; and\r\nthe recurrent stresses and sinkings make us feel with peculiar\r\nreadiness the lack of a syllable or the presence of\r\none too much. Divers verses may again be bound together\r\nin the form of a stanza, and we may then say of another\r\nstanza, \"Its second verse differs by so much from that of\r\nthe first stanza,\" when but for the felt stanza-form the two\r\ndiffering verses would have come to us too separately to be\r\ncompared at all. But these superposed systems of rhythm\r\nsoon reach their limit. In music, as Wundt\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_517_517\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_517_517\"\u003e[517]\u003c/a\u003e says, \"while\r\nthe measure may easily contain 12 changes of intensity of\r\nsound (as in 12/8 time), the rhythmical group may embrace\r\n6 measures, and the period consist of 4, exceptionally of 5\r\n[8?] groups.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt and his pupil Dietze have both tried to determine\r\nexperimentally the \u003ci\u003emaximal extent of our immediate\r\ndistinct consciousness for successive impressions.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt found\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_518_518\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_518_518\"\u003e[518]\u003c/a\u003e that twelve impressions could be distinguished\r\nclearly as a united cluster, provided they were\r\ncaught in a certain rhythm by the mind, and succeeded each\r\nother at intervals not smaller than 0.3 and not larger than\r\n0.5 of a second. This makes the total time distinctly apprehended\r\nto be equal to from 3.6 to 6 seconds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDietze\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_519_519\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_519_519\"\u003e[519]\u003c/a\u003e gives larger figures. The most favorable intervals\r\nfor clearly catching the strokes were when they came at\r\nfrom 0.3 second to 0.18 second apart. \u003ci\u003eForty\u003c/i\u003e strokes might\r\nthen be remembered as a whole, and identified without error\r\nwhen repeated, provided the mind grasped them in five sub-groups\r\nof eight, or in eight sub-groups of five strokes each.\r\nWhen no grouping of the strokes beyond making \u003ci\u003ecouples\u003c/i\u003e of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_613\"\u003e[Pg 613]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem by the attention was allowed—and practically it was\r\nfound impossible not to group them in at least this simplest\r\nof all ways—16 was the largest number that could be clearly\r\napprehended as a whole.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_520_520\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_520_520\"\u003e[520]\u003c/a\u003e This would make 40 times 0.8\r\nsecond, or 12 seconds, to be the \u003ci\u003emaximum filled duration\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nwhich we can be both \u003ci\u003edistinctly and immediately\u003c/i\u003e aware.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe maximum unfilled, or \u003ci\u003evacant duration\u003c/i\u003e, seems to lie\r\nwithin the same objective range. Estel and Mehner, also\r\nworking in Wundt\u0027s laboratory, found it to vary from 5 or\r\n6 to 12 seconds, and perhaps more. The differences seemed\r\ndue to practice rather than to idiosyncrasy.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_521_521\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_521_521\"\u003e[521]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese figures may be roughly taken to stand for the most\r\nimportant part of what, with Mr. Clay, we called, a few\r\npages back, the \u003ci\u003especious present\u003c/i\u003e. The specious present has,\r\nin addition, a vaguely vanishing backward and forward\r\nfringe; but its nucleus is probably the dozen seconds or\r\nless that have just elapsed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf these are the maximum, what, then, is the \u003ci\u003eminimum\u003c/i\u003e\r\namount of duration which we can distinctly feel?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe smallest figure experimentally ascertained was by\r\nExner, who distinctly heard the doubleness of two successive\r\nclicks of a Savart\u0027s wheel, and of two successive snaps\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_614\"\u003e[Pg 614]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof an electric spark, when their interval was made as small\r\nas about 1/500 of a second.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_522_522\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_522_522\"\u003e[522]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the eye, perception is less delicate. Two sparks,\r\nmade to fall beside each other in rapid succession on the\r\ncentre of the retina, ceased to be recognized as successive by\r\nExner when their interval fell below 0.044\u0027\u0027.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_523_523\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_523_523\"\u003e[523]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere, as here, the succeeding impressions are only two\r\nin number, we can easiest perceive the interval between\r\nthem. President Hall, who experimented with a modified\r\nSavart\u0027s wheel, which gave clicks in varying number and at\r\nvarying intervals, says:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_524_524\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_524_524\"\u003e[524]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In order that their discontinuity may be clearly perceived, four or\r\neven three clicks or beats must be farther apart than two need to be.\r\nWhen two are easily distinguished, three or four separated by the same\r\ninterval … are often confidently pronounced to be two or three\r\nrespectively. It would be well if observations were so directed as to\r\nascertain, at least up to ten or twenty, the increase [of interval] required\r\nby each additional click in a series for the sense of discontinuity\r\nto remain constant throughout.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_525_525\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_525_525\"\u003e[525]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_615\"\u003e[Pg 615]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the first impression falls on one sense, and the\r\nsecond on another, the perception of the intervening time\r\ntends to be less certain and delicate, and it makes a difference\r\nwhich impression comes first. Thus, Exner found\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_526_526\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_526_526\"\u003e[526]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe smallest perceptible interval to be, in seconds:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFrom sight to touch\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.071\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFrom touch to sight\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.053\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFrom sight to hearing\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.16\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFrom hearing to sight\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.06\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eFrom one ear to another \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.064\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTo be conscious of a time interval at all is one thing; to\r\ntell whether it be shorter or longer than another interval is a\r\ndifferent thing.\u003c/i\u003e A number of experimental data are on hand\r\nwhich give us a measure of the delicacy of this latter perception.\r\nThe problem is that of the \u003ci\u003esmallest difference\r\nbetween two times\u003c/i\u003e which we can perceive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difference is at its minimum when the times themselves\r\nare very short. Exner,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_527_527\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_527_527\"\u003e[527]\u003c/a\u003e reacting as rapidly as possible\r\nwith his foot, upon a signal seen by the eye (spark),\r\nnoted all the reactions which seemed to him either slow or\r\nfast in the making. He thought thus that deviations of\r\nabout 1/100 of a second either way from the average were\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_616\"\u003e[Pg 616]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncorrectly noticed by him at the time. The average was\r\nhere 0.1840\u0027\u0027. Hall and Jastrow listened to the intervals\r\nbetween the clicks of their apparatus. Between two such\r\nequal intervals of 4.27\u0027\u0027 each, a middle interval was included,\r\nwhich might be made either shorter or longer than the\r\nextremes. \"After the series had been heard two or even\r\nthree times, no impression of the relative length of the\r\nmiddle interval would often exist, and only after hearing\r\nthe fourth and last [repetition of the series] would the\r\njudgment incline to the \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eminus\u003c/i\u003e side. Inserting the\r\nvariable between two invariable and like intervals greatly\r\nfacilitated judgment, which between two unlike terms is far\r\nless accurate.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_528_528\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_528_528\"\u003e[528]\u003c/a\u003e Three observers in these experiments\r\nmade no error when the middle interval varied 1/60 from the\r\nextremes. When it varied 1/120, errors occurred, but were\r\nfew. This would make the minimum \u003ci\u003eabsolute\u003c/i\u003e difference\r\nperceived as large as 0.355\u0027\u0027.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis minimum absolute difference, of course, increases\r\nas the times compared grow long. Attempts have been\r\nmade to ascertain what \u003ci\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e it bears to the times themselves.\r\nAccording to Fechner\u0027s \u0027Psychophysic Law\u0027 it\r\nought always to bear the same ratio. Various observers,\r\nhowever, have found this not to be the case.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_529_529\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_529_529\"\u003e[529]\u003c/a\u003e On the contrary,\r\nvery interesting \u003ci\u003eoscillations\u003c/i\u003e in the accuracy of judgment\r\nand in the direction of the error—oscillations dependent\r\nupon the absolute amount of the times compared—have\r\nbeen noticed by all who have experimented with the\r\nquestion. Of these a brief account may be given.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, \u003ci\u003ein every list of intervals experimented\r\nwith there will be found what Vierordt calls an\u003c/i\u003e \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eindifference-point\u003c/span\u003e;\u0027\r\nthat is to say, an interval which we judge with maximum\r\naccuracy, a time which we tend to estimate as neither\r\nlonger or shorter than it really is, and away from which,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_617\"\u003e[Pg 617]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin both directions, errors increase their size.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_530_530\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_530_530\"\u003e[530]\u003c/a\u003e This time\r\nvaries from one observer to another, but its average is remarkably\r\nconstant, as the following table shows.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_531_531\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_531_531\"\u003e[531]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe times, noted by the ear, and the average indifference-points\r\n(given in seconds) were, for—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eWundt\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_532_532\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_532_532\"\u003e[532]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.72\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eKollert\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_533_533\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_533_533\"\u003e[533]\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.75\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eEstel (probably)\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.75\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMehner \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.71\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eStevens\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_534_534\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_534_534\"\u003e[534]\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.71\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eMach\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_535_535\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_535_535\"\u003e[535]\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.35\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eBuccola (about)\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_536_536\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_536_536\"\u003e[536]\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.40\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe odd thing about these figures is the recurrence they\r\nshow in so many men of about three fourths of a second,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_618\"\u003e[Pg 618]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas the interval of time most easy to catch and reproduce,\r\nOdder still, both Estel and Mehner found that \u003ci\u003emultiples\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthis time were more accurately reproduced than the time-intervals\r\nof intermediary length;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_537_537\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_537_537\"\u003e[537]\u003c/a\u003e and Glass found a certain\r\nperiodicity, with the constant increment of 1.25 sec., in his\r\nobservations. There would seem thus to exist something\r\nlike a periodic or rhythmic sharpening of our time-sense, of\r\nwhich the period differs somewhat from one observer to\r\nthe next.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eOur sense of time\u003c/i\u003e, like other senses, \u003ci\u003eseems subject to\r\nthe law of contrast\u003c/i\u003e. It appeared pretty plainly in Estel\u0027s\r\nobservations that an interval sounded shorter if a long one\r\nhad immediately preceded it, and longer when the opposite\r\nwas the case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLike other senses, too, \u003ci\u003eour sense of time is sharpened\r\nby practice\u003c/i\u003e. Mehner ascribes almost all the discrepancies\r\nbetween other observers and himself to this cause alone.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_538_538\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_538_538\"\u003e[538]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTracts of time filled\u003c/i\u003e (with clicks of sound) \u003ci\u003eseem longer\r\nthan vacant ones\u003c/i\u003e of the same duration, when the latter\r\ndoes not exceed a second or two.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_539_539\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_539_539\"\u003e[539]\u003c/a\u003e This, which reminds\r\none of what happens with spaces seen by the eye, becomes\r\nreversed when longer times are taken. It is, perhaps, in\r\naccordance with this law that a \u003ci\u003eloud\u003c/i\u003e sound, limiting a short\r\ninterval of time, makes it appear longer, a \u003ci\u003eslight\u003c/i\u003e sound\r\nshorter. In comparing intervals marked out by sounds,\r\nwe must take care to keep the sounds uniform.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_540_540\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_540_540\"\u003e[540]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a certain emotional \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e accompanying the\r\nintervals of time, as is well known in music. \u003ci\u003eThe sense of\r\nhaste goes with one measure of rapidity, that of delay with\r\nanother;\u003c/i\u003e and these two feelings harmonize with different\r\nmental moods. Vierordt listened to series of strokes performed\r\nby a metronome at rates varying from 40 to 200 a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_619\"\u003e[Pg 619]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nminute, and found that they very naturally fell into seven\r\ncategories, from \u0027very slow\u0027 to \u0027very fast.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_541_541\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_541_541\"\u003e[541]\u003c/a\u003e Each category\r\nof feeling included the intervals following each other within\r\na certain range of speed, and no others. This is a qualitative,\r\nnot a quantitative judgment—an æsthetic judgment,\r\nin fact. The middle category, of speed that was neutral,\r\nor, as he calls it, \u0027adequate,\u0027 contained intervals that were\r\ngrouped about 0.62 second, and Vierordt says that this\r\nmade what one might almost call an \u003ci\u003eagreeable\u003c/i\u003e time.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_542_542\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_542_542\"\u003e[542]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe feeling of time and accent in music, of rhythm, is\r\nquite independent of that of melody. Tunes with marked\r\nrhythm can be readily recognized when simply drummed\r\non the table with the finger-tips.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eWE HAVE NO SENSE FOR EMPTY TIME.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough subdividing the time by beats of sensation\r\naids our accurate knowledge of the amount of it that\r\nelapses, such subdivision does not seem at the first glance\r\nessential to our perception of its flow. Let one sit with\r\nclosed eyes and, abstracting entirely from the outer world,\r\nattend exclusively to the passage of time, like one who\r\nwakes, as the poet says, \"to hear time flowing in the middle\r\nof the night, and all things moving to a day of doom.\"\r\nThere seems under such circumstances as these no variety\r\nin the material content of our thought, and what we notice\r\nappears, if anything, to be the pure series of durations\r\nbudding, as it were, and growing beneath our indrawn gaze.\r\nIs this really so or not? The question is important, for,\r\nif the experience be what it roughly seems, we have a sort\r\nof special sense for pure time—a sense to which empty\r\nduration is an adequate stimulus; while if it be an illusion,\r\nit must be that our perception of time\u0027s flight, in the experiences\r\nquoted, is due to the \u003ci\u003efilling\u003c/i\u003e of the time, and to our\r\n\u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e of a content which it had a moment previous, and\r\nwhich we feel to agree or disagree with its content now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt takes but a small exertion of introspection to show\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_620\"\u003e[Pg 620]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat the latter alternative is the true one, and that \u003ci\u003ewe can\r\nno more intuit a duration than we can intuit an extension,\r\ndevoid of all sensible content\u003c/i\u003e. Just as with closed eyes we\r\nperceive a dark visual field in which a curdling play of obscurest\r\nluminosity is always going on; so, be we never so\r\nabstracted from distinct outward impressions, we are always\r\ninwardly immersed in what Wundt has somewhere called\r\nthe twilight of our general consciousness. Our heart-beats,\r\nour breathing, the pulses of our attention, fragments of\r\nwords or sentences that pass through our imagination, are\r\nwhat people this dim habitat. Now, all these processes are\r\nrhythmical, and are apprehended by us, as they occur, in\r\ntheir totality; the breathing and pulses of attention, as\r\ncoherent successions, each with its rise and fall; the heart-beats\r\nsimilarly, only relatively far more brief; the words not\r\nseparately, but in connected groups. In short, empty our\r\nminds as we may, some form of \u003ci\u003echanging process\u003c/i\u003e remains for\r\nus to feel, and cannot be expelled. And along with the sense\r\nof the process and its rhythm goes the sense of the length\r\nof time it lasts. Awareness of \u003ci\u003echange\u003c/i\u003e is thus the condition\r\non which our perception of time\u0027s flow depends; but there\r\nexists no reason to suppose that empty time\u0027s own changes\r\nare sufficient for the awareness of change to be aroused.\r\nThe change must be of some concrete sort—an outward\r\nor inward sensible series, or a process of attention or volition.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_543_543\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_543_543\"\u003e[543]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_621\"\u003e[Pg 621]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd here again we have an analogy with space. The\r\nearliest form of distinct space-perception is undoubtedly\r\nthat of a movement over some one of our sensitive surfaces,\r\nand this movement is originally given as a simple whole of\r\nfeeling, and is only decomposed into its elements—successive\r\npositions successively occupied by the moving body—when\r\nour education in discrimination is much advanced.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_622\"\u003e[Pg 622]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut a movement is a change, a process; so we see that in\r\nthe time-world and the space-world alike the first known\r\nthings are not elements, but combinations, not separate\r\nunits, but wholes already formed. The condition of \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the wholes may be the elements; but the condition of\r\nour \u003ci\u003eknowing\u003c/i\u003e the elements is our having already felt the\r\nwholes as wholes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the experience of watching empty time flow—\u0027empty\u0027\r\nto be taken hereafter in the relative sense just set forth—we\r\ntell it off in pulses. We say \u0027now! now! now!\u0027 or we\r\ncount \u0027more! more! more!\u0027 as we feel it bud. This composition\r\nout of units of duration is called the law of time\u0027s\r\n\u003ci\u003ediscrete flow\u003c/i\u003e. The discreteness is, however, merely due to\r\nthe fact that our successive acts of \u003ci\u003erecognition\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eapperception\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e it is are discrete. The sensation is as continuous\r\nas any sensation can be. All continuous sensations are\r\n\u003ci\u003enamed\u003c/i\u003e in beats. We notice that a certain finite \u0027more\u0027 of\r\nthem is passing or already past. To adopt Hodgson\u0027s\r\nimage, the sensation is the measuring-tape, the perception\r\nthe dividing-engine which stamps its length. As we listen\r\nto a steady sound, we \u003ci\u003etake it in\u003c/i\u003e in discrete pulses of recognition,\r\ncalling it successively \u0027the same! the same! the\r\nsame!\u0027 The case stands no otherwise with time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter a small number of beats our impression of the\r\namount we have told off becomes quite vague. Our only\r\nway of knowing it accurately is by counting, or noticing the\r\nclock, or through some other symbolic conception.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_544_544\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_544_544\"\u003e[544]\u003c/a\u003e When\r\nthe times exceed hours or days, the conception is absolutely\r\nsymbolic. We think of the amount we mean either solely\r\nas a \u003ci\u003ename\u003c/i\u003e, or by running over a few salient \u003ci\u003edates\u003c/i\u003e therein,\r\nwith no pretence of imagining the full durations that lie\r\nbetween them. No one has anything like a \u003ci\u003eperception\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\ngreater length of the time between now and the first century\r\nthan of that between now and the tenth. To an historian,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_623\"\u003e[Pg 623]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit is true, the longer interval will suggest a host of additional\r\ndates and events, and so appear a more \u003ci\u003emultitudinous\u003c/i\u003e thing.\r\nAnd for the same reason most people will think they directly\r\nperceive the length of the past fortnight to exceed that of\r\nthe past week. But there is properly no comparative time\r\n\u003ci\u003eintuition\u003c/i\u003e in these cases at all. It is but dates and events.\r\n\u003ci\u003erepresenting\u003c/i\u003e time; their abundance \u003ci\u003esymbolizing\u003c/i\u003e its length.\r\nI am sure that this is so, even where the times compared\r\nare no more than an hour or so in length. It is the same\r\nwith Spaces of many miles, which we always compare with\r\neach other by the numbers which measure them.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_545_545\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_545_545\"\u003e[545]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_624\"\u003e[Pg 624]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this we pass naturally to speak of certain familial\r\nvariations in our estimation of lengths of time. \u003ci\u003eIn general,\r\na time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems\r\nshort in passing, but long as we look back. On the other hand,\r\na tract of time empty of experiences seems long in passing,\r\nbut in retrospect short.\u003c/i\u003e A week of travel and sight-seeing\r\nmay subtend an angle more like three weeks in the memory;\r\nand a month of sickness hardly yields more memories than\r\na day. The length in retrospect depends obviously on the\r\nmultitudinousness of the memories which the time affords.\r\nMany objects, events, changes, many subdivisions, immediately\r\nwiden the view as we look back. Emptiness, monotony,\r\nfamiliarity, make it shrivel up. In Von Holtei\u0027s\r\n\u0027Vagabonds\u0027 one Anton is described as revisiting his native\r\nvillage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Seven years,\" he exclaims, \"seven years since I ran away! More\r\nlike seventy it seems, so much has happened. I cannot think of it all\r\nwithout becoming dizzy—at any rate not now. And yet again, when I\r\nlook at the village, at the church-tower, it seems as if I could hardly\r\nhave been seven days away.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProf. Lazarus\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_546_546\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_546_546\"\u003e[546]\u003c/a\u003e (from whom I borrow this quotation),\r\nthus explains both of these contrasted illusions by our\r\nprinciple of the awakened memories being multitudinous\r\nor few:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The circle of experiences, widely extended, rich in variety, which\r\nhe had in view on the day of his leaving the village rises now in his\r\nmind as its image lies before him. And with it—in rapid succession\r\nand violent motion, not in chronologic order, or from chronologic\r\nmotives, but suggesting each other by all sorts of connections—arise\r\nmassive images of all his rich vagabondage and roving life. They roll\r\nand wave confusedly together, first perhaps one from the first year,\r\nthen from the sixth, soon from the second, again from the fifth, the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_625\"\u003e[Pg 625]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirst, etc., until it seems as if seventy years must have been there, and\r\nhe reels with the fulness of his vision…. Then the inner eye turns\r\naway from all this past. The outer one turns to the village, especially\r\nto the church-tower. The sight of it calls back the old sight of it, so\r\nthat the consciousness is filled with that alone, or almost alone. The\r\none vision compares itself with the other, and looks so near, so unchanged,\r\nthat it seems as if only a week of time could have come between.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe same space of time seems shorter as we grow older\u003c/i\u003e—that\r\nis, the days, the months, and the years do so; whether\r\nthe hours do so is doubtful, and the minutes and seconds to\r\nall appearance remain about the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Whoever counts many lustra in his memory need only question\r\nhimself to find that the last of these, the past five years, have sped\r\nmuch more quickly than the preceding periods of equal amount. Let\r\nany one remember his last eight or ten school years: it is the space of a\r\ncentury. Compare with them the last eight or ten years of life: it is\r\nthe space of an hour.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo writes Prof. Paul Janet,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_547_547\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_547_547\"\u003e[547]\u003c/a\u003e and gives a solution which can\r\nhardly be said to diminish the mystery. There is a law, he\r\nsays, by which the apparent length of an interval at a given\r\nepoch of a man\u0027s life is proportional to the total length of\r\nthe life itself. A child of 10 feels a year as 1/10 of his whole\r\nlife—a man of 50 as 1/50, the whole life meanwhile apparently\r\npreserving a constant length. This formula roughly expresses\r\nthe phenomena, it is true, but cannot possibly be\r\nan elementary psychic law; and it is certain that, in great\r\npart at least, the foreshortening of the years as we grow\r\nolder is due to the monotony of memory\u0027s content, and the\r\nconsequent simplification of the backward-glancing view.\r\nIn youth we may have an absolutely new experience, subjective\r\nor objective, every hour of the day. Apprehension\r\nis vivid, retentiveness strong, and our recollections of that\r\ntime, like those of a time spent in rapid and interesting\r\ntravel, are of something intricate, multitudinous, and long-drawn-out.\r\nBut as each passing year converts some of this\r\nexperience into automatic routine which we hardly note at\r\nall, the days and the weeks smooth themselves out in recollection\r\nto contentless units, and the years grow hollow and\r\ncollapse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_626\"\u003e[Pg 626]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the apparent shortening of tracts of time in\r\n\u003ci\u003eretrospect\u003c/i\u003e. They shorten \u003ci\u003ein passing\u003c/i\u003e whenever we are so\r\nfully occupied with their content as not to note the actual\r\ntime itself. A day full of excitement, with no pause, is said\r\nto pass \u0027ere we know it.\u0027 On the contrary, a day full of\r\nwaiting, of unsatisfied desire for change, will seem a small\r\neternity. \u003ci\u003eTædium, ennui, Langweile, boredom,\u003c/i\u003e are words for\r\nwhich, probably, every language known to man has its\r\nequivalent. It comes about whenever, from the relative\r\nemptiness of content of a tract of time, we grow attentive\r\nto the passage of the time itself. Expecting, and being\r\nready for, a new impression to succeed; when it fails to\r\ncome, we get an empty time instead of it; and such experiences,\r\nceaselessly renewed, make us most formidably aware\r\nof the extent of the mere time itself.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_548_548\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_548_548\"\u003e[548]\u003c/a\u003e Close your eyes and\r\nsimply wait to hear somebody tell you that a minute has\r\nelapsed. The full length of your leisure with it seems incredible.\r\nYou engulf yourself into its bowels as into those\r\nof that interminable first week of an ocean voyage, and find\r\nyourself wondering that history can have overcome many\r\nsuch periods in its course. All because you attend so\r\nclosely to the mere feeling of the time \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, and because\r\nyour attention to that is susceptible of such fine-grained\r\nsuccessive subdivision. The \u003ci\u003eodiousness\u003c/i\u003e of the whole experience\r\ncomes from its insipidity; for \u003ci\u003estimulation\u003c/i\u003e is the indispensable\r\nrequisite for pleasure in an experience, and the\r\nfeeling of bare time is the least stimulating experience we\r\ncan have.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_549_549\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_549_549\"\u003e[549]\u003c/a\u003e The sensation of tæedium is a \u003ci\u003eprotest\u003c/i\u003e, says\r\nVolkmann, against the entire present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_627\"\u003e[Pg 627]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eExactly parallel variations occur in our consciousness\r\nof space. A road we walk back over, hoping to find at each\r\nstep an object we have dropped, seems to us longer than\r\nwhen we walked over it the other way. A space we measure\r\nby pacing appears longer than one we traverse with no\r\nthought of its length. And in general an amount of space\r\nattended to in itself leaves with us more impression of spaciousness\r\nthan one of which we only note the content.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_550_550\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_550_550\"\u003e[550]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not say that \u003ci\u003eeverything\u003c/i\u003e in these fluctuations of estimate\r\ncan be accounted for by the time\u0027s content being\r\ncrowded and interesting, or simple and tame. Both in the\r\nshortening of time by old age and in its lengthening by\r\n\u003ci\u003eennui\u003c/i\u003e some deeper cause \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be at work. This cause can\r\nonly be ascertained, if it exist, by finding out \u003ci\u003ewhy we perceive\r\ntime at all\u003c/i\u003e. To this inquiry let us, though without\r\nmuch hope, proceed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE FEELING OF PAST TIME IS A PRESENT FEELING.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf asked why we perceive the light of the sun, or the\r\nsound of an explosion, we reply, \"Because certain outer\r\nforces, ether-waves or air-waves, smite upon the brain,\r\nawakening therein changes, to which the conscious perceptions,\r\nlight and sound, respond.\" But we hasten to add\r\nthat neither light nor sound \u003ci\u003ecopy\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003emirror\u003c/i\u003e the ether- or\r\nair-waves; they represent them only symbolically. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eonly\u003c/i\u003e case, says Helmholtz, in which such copying occurs,\r\nand in which\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_628\"\u003e[Pg 628]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"our perceptions can truly correspond with outer reality, is that of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003etune-succession\u003c/i\u003e of phenomena. Simultaneity, succession, and the\r\nregular return of simultaneity or succession, can obtain as well in sensations\r\nas in outer events. Events, like our perceptions of them, take\r\nplace in time, so that the time-relations of the latter can furnish a true\r\ncopy of those of the former. The sensation of the thunder follows the\r\nsensation of the lightning just as the sonorous convulsing of the air by\r\nthe electric discharge reaches the observer\u0027s place later than that of the\r\nluminiferous ether.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_551_551\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_551_551\"\u003e[551]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne experiences an almost instinctive impulse, in pursuing\r\nsuch reflections as these, to follow them to a sort of\r\ncrude speculative conclusion, and to think that he has at\r\nlast got the mystery of cognition where, to use a vulgar\r\nphrase, \u0027the wool is short.\u0027 What more natural, we say,\r\nthan that the sequences and durations of things \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e become\r\nknown? The succession of the outer forces stamps\r\nitself as a like succession upon the brain. The brain\u0027s\r\nsuccessive changes are copied exactly by correspondingly\r\nsuccessive pulses of the mental stream. The mental stream,\r\nfeeling itself, must feel the time-relations of its own states.\r\nBut as these are copies of the outward time-relations, so\r\nmust it know them too. That is to say, these latter time-relations\r\narouse their own cognition; or, in other words,\r\nthe mere existence of time in those changes out of the mind\r\nwhich affect the mind is a sufficient cause why time is perceived\r\nby the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis philosophy is unfortunately too crude. Even\r\nthough we \u003ci\u003ewere\u003c/i\u003e to conceive the outer successions as forces\r\nstamping their image on the brain, and the brain\u0027s successions\r\nas forces stamping their image on the mind,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_552_552\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_552_552\"\u003e[552]\u003c/a\u003e still,\r\nbetween the mind\u0027s own changes \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e successive, and\r\n\u003ci\u003eknowing their own succession\u003c/i\u003e, lies as broad a chasm as between\r\nthe object and subject of any case of cognition in the\r\nworld. \u003ci\u003eA succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling\r\nof succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a feeling\r\nof their own succession is added, that must be treated as an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_629\"\u003e[Pg 629]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadditional fact requiring its own special elucidation,\u003c/i\u003e which this\r\ntalk about outer time-relations stamping copies of themselves\r\nwithin, leaves all untouched.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have shown, at the outset of the article, that what is\r\npast, to be known as past, must be known \u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e what is\r\npresent, and \u003ci\u003eduring\u003c/i\u003e the \u0027present\u0027 spot of time. As the\r\nclear understanding of this point has some importance, let\r\nme, at the risk of repetition, recur to it again. Volkmann\r\nhas expressed the matter admirably, as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"One might be tempted to answer the question of the origin of the\r\ntime-idea by simply pointing to the train of ideas, whose various members,\r\nstarting from the first, successively attain to full clearness. But\r\nagainst this it must be objected that the successive ideas are not yet\r\nthe idea of succession, because succession \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e thought is not the thought\r\n\u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e succession. If idea A follows idea B, consciousness simply exchanges\r\none for another. That B \u003ci\u003ecomes after\u003c/i\u003e A is for our consciousness a non-existent\r\nfact; for this \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e is given neither in B nor in A; and no\r\nthird idea has been supposed. The thinking of the sequence of B upon\r\nA is another kind of thinking from that which brought forth A and\r\nthen brought forth B; and this first kind of thinking is absent so long\r\nas merely the thinking of A and the thinking of B are there. In short,\r\nwhen we look at the matter sharply, we come to this antithesis, that if\r\n\u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and B are to be represented \u003ci\u003eas occurring in succession\u003c/i\u003e they must be\r\n\u003ci\u003esimultaneously represented\u003c/i\u003e; if we are to think \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e them as one after the\r\nother, we must \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e them both at once.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_553_553\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_553_553\"\u003e[553]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we represent the actual time-stream of our thinking\r\nby an horizontal line, the thought \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e the stream or of any\r\nsegment of its length, past, present, or to come, might be\r\nfigured in a perpendicular raised upon the horizontal at a\r\ncertain point. The length of this perpendicular stands for\r\na certain object or content, which in this case is the time\r\nthought of, and all of which is thought of together at the\r\nactual moment of the stream upon which the perpendicular\r\nis raised. Mr. James Ward puts the matter very well in\r\nhis masterly article \u0027Psychology\u0027 in the ninth edition of\r\nthe Encyclopædia Britannica, page 64. He says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We may, if we represent succession as a line, represent simultaneity\r\nas a second line at right angles to the first; empty time—or\r\ntime-length without time-breadth, we may say—is a mere abstraction.\r\nNow, it is with the former line that we have to do in treating of time\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_630\"\u003e[Pg 630]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas it is, and with the latter in treating of our intuition of time, where,\r\njust as in a perspective representation of distance, we are confined to\r\nlines in a plane at right angles to the actual line of depth. In a succession\r\nof events, say of sense-impressions, A B C D E…, the presence\r\nof B means the absence of A and C, but the presentation of this succession\r\ninvolves the simultaneous presence in some mode or other of two\r\nor more of the presentations A B C D. In reality, past, present, and\r\nfuture are differences in time, but in presentation all that corresponds\r\nto these differences is in consciousness simultaneously.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is thus a sort of \u003ci\u003eperspective projection\u003c/i\u003e of past objects\r\nupon present consciousness, similar to that of wide\r\nlandscapes upon a camera-screen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd since we saw a while ago that our maximum distinct\r\n\u003ci\u003eintuition\u003c/i\u003e of duration hardly covers more than a dozen\r\nseconds (while our maximum vague intuition is probably\r\nnot more than that of a minute or so), we must suppose that\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis amount of duration is pictured fairly steadily in each\r\npassing instant of consciousness\u003c/i\u003e by virtue of some fairly constant\r\nfeature in the brain-process to which the consciousness\r\nis tied. \u003ci\u003eThis feature of the brain-process, whatever it be,\r\nmust be the cause of our perceiving the fact of time at all.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_554_554\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_554_554\"\u003e[554]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nduration thus steadily perceived is hardly more than the\r\n\u0027specious present,\u0027 as it was called a few pages back. Its\r\n\u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e is in a constant flux, events dawning into its forward\r\nend as fast as they fade out of its rearward one, and each\r\nof them changing its time-coefficient from \u0027not yet,\u0027 or \u0027not\r\nquite yet,\u0027 to \u0027just gone\u0027 or \u0027gone,\u0027 as it passes by. Meanwhile,\r\nthe specious present, the intuited duration, stands\r\npermanent, like the rainbow on the waterfall, with its own\r\nquality unchanged by the events that stream through it.\r\nEach of these, as it slips out, retains the power of being\r\nreproduced; and when reproduced, is reproduced with the\r\nduration and neighbors which it originally had. Please\r\nobserve, however, that the reproduction of an event, \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit has once completely dropped out of the rearward end of\r\nthe specious present, is an entirely different psychic fact\r\nfrom its direct perception in the specious present as a thing\r\nimmediately past. A creature might be entirely devoid of\r\n\u003ci\u003ereproductive\u003c/i\u003e memory, and yet have the time-sense; but the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_631\"\u003e[Pg 631]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlatter would be limited, in his case, to the few seconds immediately\r\npassing by. Time older than that he would never\r\nrecall. I assume reproduction in the text, because I am\r\nspeaking of human beings who notoriously possess it. Thus\r\nmemory gets strewn with \u003ci\u003edated\u003c/i\u003e things—dated in the sense\r\nof being before or after each other.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_555_555\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_555_555\"\u003e[555]\u003c/a\u003e The date of a thing\r\nis a mere relation of \u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e the present thing or some\r\npast or future thing. Some things we date simply by mentally\r\ntossing them into the past or future \u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e. So in\r\nspace we think of England as simply to the eastward, of\r\nCharleston as lying south. But, again, we may date an event\r\nexactly, by fitting it between two terms of a past or future\r\nseries explicitly conceived, just as we may accurately think\r\nof England or Charleston being just so many miles away.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_556_556\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_556_556\"\u003e[556]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe things and events thus vaguely or exactly dated\r\nbecome thenceforward those signs and symbols of longer\r\ntime-spaces, of which we previously spoke. According as\r\nwe think of a multitude of them, or of few, so we imagine\r\nthe time they represent to be long or short. But \u003ci\u003ethe original\r\nparagon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious\r\npresent, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly\r\nsensible.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_632\"\u003e[Pg 632]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTO WHAT CEREBRAL PROCESS IS THE SENSE OF TIME DUE?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eNow, to what element in the brain-process may this sensibility\r\nbe due?\u003c/i\u003e It cannot, as we have seen, be due to the mere\r\nduration itself of the process; it must be due to an element\r\npresent at every moment of the process, and this element\r\nmust bear the same inscrutable \u003ci\u003esort\u003c/i\u003e of relation to its correlative\r\nfeeling which all other elements of neural activity\r\nbear to their psychic products, be the latter what they\r\nmay. Several suggestions have been made as to what the\r\nelement is in the case of time. Treating of them in a\r\nnote,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_557_557\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_557_557\"\u003e[557]\u003c/a\u003e I will try to express briefly the only conclusion which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_633\"\u003e[Pg 633]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nseems to emerge from a study of them and of the facts—unripe\r\nthough that conclusion be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_634\"\u003e[Pg 634]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phenomena of \u0027summation of stimuli\u0027 in the nervous\r\nsystem prove that each stimulus leaves some latent activity\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_635\"\u003e[Pg 635]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbehind it which only gradually passes away. (See above,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 82-85\u003c/a\u003e.) Psychological proof of the same fact is\r\nafforded by those \u0027after-images\u0027 which we perceive when a\r\nsensorial stimulus is gone. We may read off peculiarities\r\nin an after-image, left by an object on the eye, which we\r\nfailed to note in the original. We may \u0027hark back\u0027 and\r\ntake in the meaning of a sound several seconds after it has\r\nceased. Delay for a minute, however, and the echo itself\r\nof the clock or the question is mute; present sensations\r\nhave banished it beyond recall. With the feeling of the\r\npresent thing there must at all times mingle the fading echo\r\nof all those other things which the previous few seconds\r\nhave supplied. Or, to state it in neural terms, \u003ci\u003ethere is at\r\nevery moment a cumulation of brain-processes overlapping each\r\nother, of which the fainter ones are the dying phases of processes\r\nwhich but shortly previous were active in a maximal degree.\r\nThe\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eamount of the overlapping\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003edetermines the feeling of the\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eduration occupied. What events\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eshall appear to occupy the\r\nduration depends on just\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ewhat processes\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ethe overlapping processes\r\nare.\u003c/i\u003e We know so little of the intimate nature of the\r\nbrain\u0027s activity that even where a sensation monotonously\r\nendures, we cannot say that the earlier moments of it do\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_636\"\u003e[Pg 636]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot leave fading processes behind which coexist with those\r\nof the present moment. \u003ci\u003eDuration and events together form\r\nour intuition of the specious present with its content.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_558_558\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_558_558\"\u003e[558]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eWhy\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsuch an intuition should result from such a combination of\r\nbrain-processes I do not pretend to say. All I aim at is to\r\nstate the most \u003ci\u003eelemental\u003c/i\u003e form of the psycho-physical conjunction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have assumed that the brain-processes are sensational\r\nones. Processes of active attention (see Mr. Ward\u0027s account\r\nin \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_556_556\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eFootnote 556\u003c/a\u003e) will leave similar fading brain-processes\r\nbehind. If the mental processes are conceptual, a\r\ncomplication is introduced of which I will in a moment\r\nspeak. Meanwhile, still speaking of sensational processes, a\r\nremark of Wundt\u0027s will throw additional light on the\r\naccount I give. As is known, Wundt and others have\r\nproved that every act of perception of a sensorial stimulus\r\ntakes an appreciable time. When two different stimuli—e.g.\r\na sight and a sound—are given at once or nearly at\r\nonce, we have difficulty in attending to both, and may\r\nwrongly judge their interval, or even invert their order.\r\nNow, as the result of his experiments on such stimuli.\r\nWundt lays down this law:\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_559_559\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_559_559\"\u003e[559]\u003c/a\u003e that of the three possible determinations\r\nwe may make of their order—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"namely, simultaneity, continuous transition, and discontinuous transition—only\r\nthe first and last are realized, \u003ci\u003enever the second\u003c/i\u003e. Invariably,\r\nwhen we fail to perceive the impressions as simultaneous, we\r\nnotice a shorter or longer empty time between them, \u003ci\u003ewhich seems to\r\ncorrespond to the sinking of one of the ideas and to the rise of the\r\nother\u003c/i\u003e…. For our attention may share itself equally between the\r\ntwo impressions, which will then compose one total percept [and be\r\nsimultaneously felt]; or it may be so adapted to one event as to cause\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_637\"\u003e[Pg 637]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit to be perceived immediately, and then the second event can be perceived\r\nonly after a certain time of latency, during which the attention\r\nreaches its effective maximum for it and diminishes for the first event.\r\nIn this case the events are perceived as \u003ci\u003etwo\u003c/i\u003e, and in successive order—that\r\nis, as separated by a time-interval in which attention is not sufficiently\r\naccommodated to either to bring a distinct perception about….\r\nWhile we are hurrying from one to the other, everything between them\r\nvanishes in the twilight of general consciousness.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_560_560\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_560_560\"\u003e[560]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne might call this the \u003ci\u003elaw of discontinuous succession in\r\ntime, of percepts to which we cannot easily attend at once.\u003c/i\u003e Each\r\npercept then requires a separate brain-process; and when\r\none brain-process is at its maximum, the other would appear\r\nperforce to be in either a waning or a waxing phase.\r\nIf our theory of the time-feeling be true, empty time \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthen subjectively appear to separate the two percepts, no\r\nmatter how close together they may objectively be; for,\r\naccording to that theory, the feeling of a time-duration is\r\nthe immediate effect of such an overlapping of brain-processes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_638\"\u003e[Pg 638]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof different phase—wherever and from whatever\r\ncause it may occur.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo pass, now, to conceptual processes: Suppose I think\r\nof the Creation, then of the Christian era, then of the battle\r\nof Waterloo, all within a few seconds. These matters have\r\ntheir dates far outside the specious present. The processes\r\nby which I think them, however, all overlap. What\r\nevents, then, does the specious present seem to contain?\r\nSimply my successive \u003ci\u003eacts of thinking\u003c/i\u003e these long-past\r\nthings, not the long-past things themselves. As the instantly-present\r\nthought may be of a long-past thing, so the\r\njust-past thought may be of another long-past thing. When\r\na long-past event is reproduced in memory and conceived\r\nwith its date, the reproduction and conceiving traverse the\r\nspecious present. The immediate content of the latter is\r\nthus all my \u003ci\u003edirect experiences\u003c/i\u003e, whether subjective or objective.\r\nSome of these meanwhile may be \u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nother experiences indefinitely remote.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe number of these direct experiences which the\r\nspecious present and immediately-intuited past may embrace\r\nmeasures the extent of our \u0027primary,\u0027 as Exner calls\r\nit, or, as Richet calls it, of our \u0027elementary\u0027 memory.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_561_561\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_561_561\"\u003e[561]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nsensation resultant from the overlapping is that of the\r\nduration which the experiences seem to fill. As is the number\r\nof any larger set of events to that of these experiences,\r\nso we suppose is the length of that duration to this duration.\r\nBut of the longer duration we have no direct \u0027realizing\r\nsense.\u0027 The variations in our appreciation of the same\r\namount of real time may possibly be explained by alterations\r\nin the rate of fading in the images, producing changes\r\nin the complication of superposed processes, to which\r\nchanges changed states of consciousness may correspond.\r\nBut however \u003ci\u003elong we may conceive\u003c/i\u003e a space of time to be, the\r\nobjective amount of it which is \u003ci\u003edirectly perceived\u003c/i\u003e at any one\r\nmoment by us can never exceed the scope of our \u0027primary\r\nmemory\u0027 at the moment in question.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_562_562\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_562_562\"\u003e[562]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_639\"\u003e[Pg 639]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have every reason to think that creatures may possibly\r\ndiffer enormously in the amounts of duration which they\r\nintuitively feel, and in the fineness of the events that may\r\nfill it. Von Bær has indulged\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_563_563\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_563_563\"\u003e[563]\u003c/a\u003e in some interesting computations\r\nof the effect of such differences in changing the\r\naspect of Nature. Suppose we were able, within the length\r\nof a second, to note 10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely\r\n10, as now; if our life were then destined to hold the same\r\nnumber of impressions, it might be 1000 times as short. We\r\nshould live less than a month, and personally know nothing\r\nof the change of seasons. If born in winter, we should believe\r\nin summer as we now believe in the heats of the Carboniferous\r\nera. The motions of organic beings would be so slow\r\nto our senses as to be inferred, not seen. The sun would\r\nstand still in the sky, the moon be almost free from change,\r\nand so on. But now reverse the hypothesis and suppose a\r\nbeing to get only one 1000th part of the sensations that\r\nwe get in a given time, and consequently to live 1000 times\r\nas long. Winters and summers will be to him like quarters\r\nof an hour. Mushrooms and the swifter-growing plants will\r\nshoot into being so rapidly as to appear instantaneous\r\ncreations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from the earth\r\nlike restlessly boiling-water springs; the motions of animals\r\nwill be as invisible as are to us the movements of bullets\r\nand cannon-balls; the sun will scour through the sky like\r\na meteor, leaving a fiery trail behind him, etc. That such\r\nimaginary cases (barring the superhuman longevity) may\r\nbe realized somewhere in the animal kingdom, it would be\r\nrash to deny.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A gnat\u0027s wings,\" says Mr Spencer,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_564_564\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_564_564\"\u003e[564]\u003c/a\u003e \"make ten or fifteen thousand\r\nstrokes a second. Each stroke implies a separate nervous action. Each\r\nsuch nervous action or change in a nervous centre is probably as appreciable\r\nby the gnat as is a quick movement of his arm by a man.\r\nAnd if this, or anything like this, is the fact, then the time occupied by\r\na given external change, measured by many movements in the one\r\ncase, must seem much longer than in the other case, when measured\r\nby one movement.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn hashish-intoxication there is a curious increase in the\r\napparent time-perspective. We utter a sentence, and ere\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_640\"\u003e[Pg 640]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe end is reached the beginning seems already to date from\r\nindefinitely long ago. We enter a short street, and it is as\r\nif we should never get to the end of it. This alteration\r\nmight conceivably result from an approach to the condition\r\nof Von Bær\u0027s and Spencer\u0027s short-lived beings. If our discrimination\r\nof successions became finer-grained, so that we\r\nnoted ten stages in a process where previously we only\r\nnoted one; and if at the same time the processes faded ten\r\ntimes as fast as before; we might have a specious present\r\nof the same subjective length as now, giving us the same\r\ntime-feeling and containing as many distinguishable successive\r\nevents, but out from the earlier end of it would\r\nhave dropped nine tenths of the real events it now contains.\r\nThey would have fallen into the general reservoir of merely\r\ndated memories, reproducible at will. The beginning of\r\nour sentences would have to be expressly recalled; each\r\nword would appear to pass through consciousness at a tenth\r\nof its usual speed. The condition would, in short, be exactly\r\nanalogous to the enlargement of space by a microscope;\r\nfewer real things at once in the immediate field of\r\nview, but each of them taking up more than its normal\r\nroom, and making the excluded ones seem unnaturally far\r\naway.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder other conditions, processes seem to fade rapidly\r\nwithout the compensating increase in the subdivisibility of\r\nsuccessions. Here the apparent length of the specious\r\npresent contracts. Consciousness dwindles to a point, and\r\nloses all intuitive sense of the whence and whither of its\r\npath. Express acts of memory replace rapid bird\u0027s-eye\r\nviews. In my own case, something like this occurs in extreme\r\nfatigue. Long illnesses produce it. Occasionally, it\r\nappears to accompany aphasia.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_565_565\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_565_565\"\u003e[565]\u003c/a\u003e It would be vain to seek\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_641\"\u003e[Pg 641]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto imagine the exact brain-change in any of these cases\r\nBut we must admit the possibility that to some extent the\r\nvariations of time-estimate between youth and age, and excitement\r\nand \u003ci\u003eennui\u003c/i\u003e, are due to such causes, more immediate\r\nthan to the one we assigned some time ago.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBut whether our feeling of the time which immediately-past\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_566_566\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_566_566\"\u003e[566]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eevents have filled be of something long or of something short, it\r\nis not what it is because those events are past,\u003c/i\u003e but \u003ci\u003ebecause they\r\nhave left behind them processes which are present. To those processes,\r\nhowever caused, the mind would still respond by feeling a\r\nspecious present, with one part of it just vanishing or vanished\r\ninto the past.\u003c/i\u003e As the Creator is supposed to have made\r\nAdam with a navel—sign of a birth which never occurred—so\r\nHe might instantaneously make a man with a brain in\r\nwhich were processes just like the \u0027fading\u0027 ones of an ordinary\r\nbrain. The first real stimulus after creation would set\r\nup a process additional to these. The processes would overlap;\r\nand the new-created man would unquestionably have\r\nthe feeling, at the very primal instant of his life, of having\r\nbeen in existence already some little space of time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_642\"\u003e[Pg 642]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet me sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious\r\nof a certain duration—the specious present—varying\r\nin length from a few seconds to probably not more than a\r\nminute, and that this duration (with its content perceived\r\nas having one part earlier and the other part later) is the\r\noriginal intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by\r\nadding, shorter ones by dividing, portions of this vaguely\r\nbounded unit, and are habitually thought by us symbolically.\r\nKant\u0027s notion of an \u003ci\u003eintuition\u003c/i\u003e of objective time as an\r\ninfinite necessary continuum has nothing to support it.\r\nThe \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e of the intuition which we really have cannot be\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eduration\u003c/i\u003e of our brain-processes or our mental changes.\r\nThat duration is rather the \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of the intuition which,\r\nbeing realized at every moment of such duration, must be\r\ndue to a permanently present cause. This cause—probably\r\nthe simultaneous presence of brain-processes of different\r\nphase—fluctuates; and hence a certain range of variation\r\nin the amount of the intuition, and in its subdivisibility,\r\naccrues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_512_512\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_512_512\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[512]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This chapter is reprinted almost verbatim from the Journal of Speculative\r\nPhilosophy, vol. xx, p. 374.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_513_513\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_513_513\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[513]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e James Mill, Analysis, vol. x, p. 319 (J. S. Mill\u0027s edition).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_514_514\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_514_514\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[514]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"What I find, when I look at consciousness at all, is, that what I cannot\r\ndivest myself of, or not have in consciousness, if I have consciousness\r\nat all, is a sequence of different feelings…. The simultaneous perception\r\nof both sub-feelings, whether as parts of a coexistence or of a sequence,\r\nis the total feeling—the minimum of consciousness—and this minimum has\r\nduration…. Time-duration, however, is inseparable from the minimum,\r\nnotwithstanding that, in an isolated moment, we could not tell which part\r\nof it came first, which last…. We do not require to know that the sub-feelings\r\ncome in sequence, first one, then the other; nor to know what\r\ncoming in sequence means. But we have, in any artificially isolated minimum\r\nof consciousness, the \u003ci\u003erudiments\u003c/i\u003e of the perception of former and latter\r\nin time, in the sub-feeling that grows fainter, and the sub-feeling that\r\ngrows stronger, and the change between them….\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"In the next place, I remark that the rudiments of memory are involved\r\nin the minimum of consciousness. The first beginnings of it appear in that\r\nminimum, just as the first beginnings of perception do. As each member\r\nof the change or difference which goes to compose that minimum is the\r\nrudiment of a single perception, so the priority of one member to the other,\r\nalthough both are given to consciousness in one empirical present moment,\r\nis the rudiment of memory. The fact that the minimum of consciousness\r\nis difference or change in feelings, is the ultimate explanation of memory\r\nas well as of single perceptions. A former and a latter are included in the\r\nminimum of consciousness; and this is what is meant by saying that all\r\nconsciousness is in the form of \u003ci\u003etime\u003c/i\u003e, or that time is the form of feeling, the\r\nform of sensibility. Crudely and popularly we divide the course of time\r\ninto past, present, and future; but, strictly speaking, there is no present;\r\nit is composed of past and future divided by an indivisible point or instant.\r\nThat instant, or time-point, is the strict \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e. What we call, loosely,\r\nthe present, is an empirical portion of the course of time, containing at\r\nleast a minimum of consciousness, in which the instant of change is the\r\npresent time-point…. If we take this as the present time-point, it is clear\r\nthat the minimum of feeling contains two portions—a sub-feeling that goes\r\nand a sub-feeling that comes. One is remembered, the other imagined.\r\nThe limits of both are indefinite at beginning and end of the minimum, and\r\nready to melt into other minima, proceeding from other stimuli.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Time and consciousness do not come to us ready marked out into\r\nminima; we have to do that by reflection, asking ourselves, What is the\r\nleast empirical moment of consciousness? That least empirical moment is\r\nwhat we usually call the present moment; and even this is too minute for\r\nordinary use; the present moment is often extended practically to a few\r\nseconds, or even minutes, beyond which we specify what length of time we\r\nmean, as the present hour, or day, or year, or century.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"But this popular way of thinking imposes itself on great numbers even\r\nof philosophically-minded people, and they talk about the \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e as if it\r\nwas a \u003ci\u003edatum\u003c/i\u003e—as if time came to us marked into present periods like a\r\nmeasuring-tape.\" (S. H. Hodgson: Philosophy of Reflection, vol. i, pp.\r\n248-254.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"The representation of time agrees with that of space in that a certain\r\namount of it must be presented together—included between its initial and\r\nterminal limit. A continuous ideation, flowing from one point to another,\r\nwould indeed \u003ci\u003eoccupy\u003c/i\u003e time, but not \u003ci\u003erepresent\u003c/i\u003e it, for it would exchange one\r\nelement of succession for another instead of grasping the whole succession\r\nat once. Both points—the beginning and the end—are equally essential to\r\nthe conception of time, and must be present with equal clearness together.\"\r\n(Herbart: Psychol. als W., § 115.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"Assume that … similar pendulum-strokes follow each other at regular\r\nintervals in a consciousness otherwise void. When the first one is\r\nover, an image of it remains in the fancy until the second succeeds. This,\r\nthen, reproduces the first by virtue of the law of association by similarity,\r\nbut at the same time meets with the aforesaid persisting image…. Thus\r\ndoes the simple repetition of the sound provide all the elements of time-perception.\r\nThe first sound [as it is recalled by association] gives the\r\nbeginning, the second the end, and the persistent image in the fancy represents\r\nthe length of the interval. At the moment of the second impression,\r\nthe entire time-perception exists at once, for then all its elements are\r\npresented together, the second sound and the image in the fancy immediately,\r\nand the first impression by reproduction. But, in the same act, we\r\nare aware of a state in which only the first sound existed, and of another\r\nin which only its image existed in the fancy. Such a consciousness as this\r\n\u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e that of time…. \u003ci\u003eIn it no succession of ideas takes place.\u003c/i\u003e\" (Wundt:\r\nPhysiol. Psych., 1st ed. pp. 681-2.) Note here the assumption that the\r\n\u003ci\u003epersistence\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003ereproduction\u003c/i\u003e of an impression are two processes which\r\nmay go on simultaneously. Also that Wundt\u0027s description is merely an\r\n\u003ci\u003eattempt to analyze the \u0027deliverance\u0027\u003c/i\u003e of a time-perception, and no \u003ci\u003eexplanation\r\nof the manner in which it comes about\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_515_515\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_515_515\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[515]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Alternative, p. 167.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_516_516\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_516_516\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[516]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Locke, in his dim way, derived the sense of duration from reflection\r\non the succession of our ideas (Essay, book ii, chap. xiv, § 3; chap.\r\nxv, § 12). Reid justly remarks that if ten successive elements are to make\r\nduration, \"then one must make duration, otherwise duration must be\r\nmade up of parts that have no duration, which is impossible…. I conclude,\r\ntherefore, that there must be duration in every single interval or\r\nelement of which the whole duration is made up. Nothing, indeed, is\r\nmore certain than that every elementary part of extension must have extension. Now, it\r\nmust be observed that in these elements of duration, or single intervals of\r\nsuccessive ideas, there is no succession of ideas, yet we must conceive them\r\nto have duration; whence we may conclude with certainty that \u003ci\u003ethere is a\r\nconception of duration where there is no succession of ideas in the mind.\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n(Intellectual Powers, essay iii, chap. v.) \"Qu\u0027on ne cherche point,\" says\r\nRoyer-Collard in the Fragments added to Jouffroy\u0027s Translation of Reid,\r\n\"la durée dans la succession; on ne l\u0027y trouvera jamais; la durée a précédé\r\nla succession; la notion de la durée a précédé la notion de la succession.\r\nElle en est donc tout-à-fait indépendante, dira-t-on? Oui, elle en est tout-à-fait\r\nindépendante.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_517_517\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_517_517\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[517]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 54, 55.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_518_518\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_518_518\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[518]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e ii, 213.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_519_519\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_519_519\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[519]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, ii, 362.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_520_520\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_520_520\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[520]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCounting\u003c/i\u003e was of course not permitted. It would have given a symbolic\r\nconcept and no intuitive or immediate perception of the totality of\r\nthe series. With counting we may of course compare together series of\r\nany length—series whose beginnings have faded from our mind, and of\r\nwhose totality we retain no sensible impression at all. To count a series of\r\nclicks is an altogether different thing from merely perceiving them as discontinuous.\r\nIn the latter case we need only be conscious of the bits of\r\nempty duration between them; in the former we must perform rapid acts\r\nof association between them and as many names of numbers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_521_521\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_521_521\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[521]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Estel in Wundt\u0027s Philosophische Studien, ii, 50. Mehner, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e ii,\r\n571. In Dietze\u0027s experiments even numbers of strokes were better caught\r\nthan odd ones, by the ear. The \u003ci\u003erapidity of their sequence\u003c/i\u003e had a great influence\r\non the result. At more than 4 seconds apart it was impossible to perceive\r\nseries of them as units in all (cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., ii, 214).\r\nThey were simply counted as so many individual strokes. Below 0.21 to\r\n0.11 second, according to the observer, judgment again became confused.\r\nIt was found that the rate of succession most favorable for grasping long\r\nseries was when the strokes were sounded at intervals of from 0.3\u0027\u0027 to 0.18\u0027\r\napart. Series of 4, 6, 8, 16 were more easily identified than series of 10, 12,\r\n14, 18. The latter could hardly be clearly grasped at all. Among odd\r\nnumbers 3, 5, 7 were the series easiest caught; next, 9, 15; hardest of all,\r\n11 and 13; and 17 was impossible to apprehend.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_522_522\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_522_522\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[522]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The exact interval of the sparks was 0.00205\u0027\u0027. The doubleness of\r\ntheir snap was usually replaced by a single-seeming sound when it fell to\r\n0.00198\u0027\u0027, the sound becoming \u003ci\u003elouder\u003c/i\u003e when the sparks seemed simultaneous.\r\nThe \u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e between these two intervals is only 7/100000 of a second; and,\r\nas Exner remarks, our ear and brain must be wonderfully efficient organs\r\nto get distinct feelings from so slight an objective difference as this. See\r\nPflüger\u0027s Archiv, Bd. xi.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_523_523\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_523_523\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[523]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 407. When the sparks fell so close together that their irradiation-circles\r\noverlapped, they appeared like \u003ci\u003eone spark moving\u003c/i\u003e from the position\r\nof the first to that of the second; and they might then follow each\r\nother as close as 0.015\u0027\u0027 without the \u003ci\u003edirection of the movement\u003c/i\u003e ceasing to be\r\nclear. When one spark fell on the centre, the other on the margin, of the\r\nretina, the time-interval for successive apprehension had to be raised to\r\n0.076\u0027\u0027.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_524_524\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_524_524\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[524]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hall and Jastrow: Studies of Rhythm. Mind, xi, 58.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_525_525\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_525_525\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[525]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nevertheless, multitudinous impressions may be felt as discontinuous,\r\nthough separated by excessively minute intervals of time. Grünhagen\r\nsays (Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vi, 175) that 10,000 electric shocks a second are felt\r\nas interrupted, by the tongue (!). Von Wittich (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e ii, 329), that between\r\n1000 and 2000 strokes a second are felt as discrete by the finger. W.\r\nPreyer, on the other hand (Die Grenzen des Empfindungsvermögens, etc.,\r\n1868, p. 15), makes contacts appear continuous to the finger when 36.8 of\r\nthem follow in a second. Similarly, Mach (Wiener Sitzgsb., li, 2, 142)\r\ngives about 26. Lalanne (Comptes Rendus, i/xxxii, p. 1314) found summation\r\nof finger contacts after 22 repetitions in a second. Such discrepant\r\nfigures are of doubtful worth. On the retina 20 to 30 impressions a second\r\nat the very utmost can be felt as discrete when they fail on the same spot.\r\nThe ear, which begins to fuse stimuli together into a musical tone when they\r\nfollow at the rate of a little over 30 a second, can still feel 132 of them a\r\nsecond as discontinuous when they take the shape of \u0027beats\u0027 (Helmholtz,\r\nTonempfindungen, 3d ed. p. 270).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_526_526\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_526_526\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[526]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, xi, 428. Also in Herrmann\u0027s Hdbh. d. Physiol., 2\r\nBd. i, Thl. pp. 260-2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_527_527\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_527_527\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[527]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pflüger\u0027s Archiv, vii, 639. Tigerstedt (Bihang till Kongl. Svenska\r\nVetenskaps Akad, Handl., Bd. 8, Häfte 2, Stockholm, 1884) revises Exner\u0027s\r\nfigures, and shows that his conclusions are exaggerated. According to\r\nTigerstedt, two observers almost always rightly appreciated 0.05 or 0.06\u0027\u0027\r\nof reaction-time difference. Half the time they did it rightly when the\r\ndifference sank to 0.03\u0027\u0027, though from 0.03\u0027\u0027 and 0.06\u0027\u0027 differences were\r\noften not noticed at all. Buccola found (La Legge del Tempo nei Fenomeni\r\ndei Pensiero, Milano, 1883, p. 371) that, after much practice in making\r\nrapid reactions upon a signal, he estimated directly, in figures, his own\r\nreaction-time, in 10 experiments, with an error of from 0.016\u0027\u0027 to 0.018\u0027\u0027;\r\nin 6, with one of 0.005\u0027\u0027 to 0.069\u0027\u0027; in one, with one of 0.002\u0027\u0027; and in 3,\r\nwith one of 0.003\u0027\u0027.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_528_528\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_528_528\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[528]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, xi, 61 (1886).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_529_529\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_529_529\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[529]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mach, Wiener Sitzungsb., li, 2. 133 (1865); Estel, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 65;\r\nMehner, \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 586; Buccola, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 378. Fechner labors to prove\r\nthat his law is only overlaid by other interfering laws in the figures recorded\r\nby these experimenters; but his case seems to me to be one of desperate\r\ninfatuation with a hobby. (See Wundt\u0027s Philosphische Studien\r\niii, 1.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_530_530\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_530_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[530]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Curious discrepancies exist between the German and the American observers\r\nwith respect to the \u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e of the error below and above the point\r\nof indifference—differences perhaps due the \u003ci\u003efatigue\u003c/i\u003e involved in the\r\nAmerican method. The Germans lengthened intervals below it and shortened\r\nthose above. With seven Americans experimented on by Stevens\r\nthis was exactly reversed. The German method was to passively listen to\r\nthe intervals, then judge; the American was to reproduce them actively\r\nby movements of the hand. In Mehner\u0027s experiments there was found a\r\nsecond indifference point at about 5 seconds, beyond which times were\r\njudged again too long. Glass, whose work on the subject is the latest\r\n(Philos. Studien, iv, 423) found (when corrections were allowed for) that\r\nall times except 0.8 sec. were estimated too short. He found a series of\r\npoints of greatest relative accuracy, viz. at 1.5, 2.5, 3.75, 5, 6.25, etc.,\r\nseconds respectively, and thought that his observations roughly corroborated\r\nWeber\u0027s law. As \u0027maximum\u0027 and \u0027minimum\u0027 are printed interchangeably\r\nin Glass\u0027s article it is hard to follow.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_531_531\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_531_531\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[531]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e With Vierordt and his pupils the indifference point lay as high as\r\nfrom 1.5 sec to 4.9 sec, according to the observer (cf. Der Zeitsinn, 1868,\r\np. 112). In most of these experiments the time heard was actively reproduced,\r\nafter a short pause, by movements of the hand, which were recorded.\r\nWundt gives good reasons (Physiol. Psych., ii, 289, 290) for rejecting\r\nVierordt\u0027s figures as erroneous. Vierordt\u0027s book, it should be said,\r\nis full of important matter, nevertheless.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_532_532\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_532_532\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[532]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych., ii, 286, 290.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_533_533\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_533_533\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[533]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Philosophische Studien, i, 86.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_534_534\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_534_534\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[534]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, xi, 400.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_535_535\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_535_535\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[535]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLoc cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 144.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_536_536\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_536_536\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[536]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 376. Mach\u0027s and Buccola\u0027s figures, it will be observed,\r\nare about \u003ci\u003eone half\u003c/i\u003e of the rest—sub-multiples, therefore. It ought to be\r\nobserved, however, that Buccola\u0027s figure has little value, his observations\r\nnot being well fitted to show this particular point.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_537_537\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_537_537\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[537]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Estel\u0027s figures led him to think that \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e the multiples enjoyed this privilege;\r\nwith Mehner, on the other hand, only the \u003ci\u003eodd\u003c/i\u003e multiples showed\r\ndiminution of the average error; thus, 0.71, 2.15, 3.55, 5, 6.4, 7.8, 9.3, and\r\n10.65 second were respectively registered with the least error. Cf. Phil.\r\nStudien, ii, pp. 57, 562-5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_538_538\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_538_538\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[538]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. especially pp. 558-561.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_539_539\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_539_539\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[539]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Wundt: Physiol. Psych., ii, 287. Hall and Jastrow: Mind, xi, 62.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_540_540\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_540_540\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[540]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mehner: \u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 553.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_541_541\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_541_541\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[541]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The number of distinguishable \u003ci\u003edifferences\u003c/i\u003e of speed between these limits\r\nis, as he takes care to remark, very much larger that 7. (Der Zeitsinn, p.\r\n137).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_542_542\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_542_542\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[542]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 19, § 18, p. 112.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_543_543\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_543_543\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[543]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I leave the text just as it was printed in the Journal of Speculative\r\nPhilosophy (for \u0027Oct. 1886\u0027) in 1887. Since then Münsterberg in his\r\nmasterly Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie (Heft 2, 1889) seems to\r\nhave made it clear what the sensible changes are by which we measure the\r\nlapse of time. When the time which separates two sensible impressions is\r\nless than one third of a second, he thinks it is almost entirely the amount to\r\nwhich the memory-image of the first impression has faded when the second one\r\novertakes it, which makes us feel how wide they are apart (p. 29). When the\r\ntime is longer than this, we rely, he thinks, exclusively upon the feelings\r\nof muscular tension and relaxation, which we are constantly receiving\r\nalthough we give to them so little of our direct attention. These feelings\r\nare primarily in the muscles by which we adopt our sense-organs in attending\r\nto the signals used, some of the muscles being in the eye and ear themselves,\r\nsome of them in the head, neck, etc. We here judge two time-intervals\r\nto be equal when between the beginning and end of each we feel\r\nexactly similar relaxations and subsequent expectant tensions of these\r\nmuscles to have occurred. In reproducing intervals ourselves we try to\r\nmake our feelings of this sort just what they were when we passively heard\r\nthe interval. These feelings by themselves, however, can only be used\r\nwhen the intervals are very short, for the tension anticipatory of the terminal\r\nstimulus naturally reaches its maximum very soon. With longer intervals\r\nwe \u003ci\u003etake the feeling of our inspirations and expirations into account\u003c/i\u003e. With our\r\nexpirations all the other muscular tensions in our body undergo a rhythmical\r\ndecrease; with our inspirations the reverse takes place. When, therefore,\r\nwe note a time-interval of several seconds with intent to reproduce it,\r\nwhat we seek is to make the earlier and later interval agree in the number\r\nand amount of these respiratory changes combined with sense-organ\r\nadjustments with which they are filled. Münsterberg has studied carefully\r\nin his own ease the variations of the respiratory factor. They are\r\nmany; but he sums up his experience by saying that whether he measured\r\nby inspirations that were divided by momentary pauses into six parts,\r\nor by inspirations that were continuous; whether with sensory tension during\r\ninspiration and relaxation during expiration, or by tension during both\r\ninspiration and expiration, separated by a sudden interpolated relaxation;\r\nwhether with special notice taken of the cephalic tensions, or of those in\r\nthe trunk and shoulders, in all cases alike and without exception he involuntarily\r\nendeavored, whenever he compared two times or tried to make\r\none the same as the other, to get exactly the same respiratory conditions\r\nand conditions of tension, \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e the subjective conditions, in short, \u003ci\u003eexactly\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nsame during the second interval as they were during the first. Münsterberg\r\ncorroborated his subjective observations by experiments. The observer of\r\nthe time had to reproduce as exactly as possible an interval between two\r\nsharp sounds given him by an assistant. The only condition imposed upon\r\nhim was that he should not modify his breathing for the purposes of\r\nmeasurement. It was then found that when the assistant broke in at\r\nrandom with his signals, the judgment of the observer was vastly less\r\naccurate than when the assistant carefully watched the observer\u0027s breathing\r\nand made both the beginning of the time given him and that of the time\r\nwhich he was to give coincide with identical phases thereof.—Finally,\r\nMünsterberg with great plausibility tries to explain the discrepancies between\r\nthe results of Vierordt, Estel, Mehner, Glass, etc., as due to the fact\r\nthat they \u003ci\u003edid not all use the same measure\u003c/i\u003e. Some breathe a little faster,\r\nsome a little slower. Some break their inspirations into two parts, some\r\ndo not, etc. The coincidence of the objective times measured with definite\r\nnatural phases of breathing would very easily give periodical maxima of\r\nfacility in measuring accurately.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_544_544\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_544_544\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[544]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Any one wishing yet further examples of this mental substitution\r\nwill find one on observing how habitually he thinks of the spaces on the\r\nclock-face instead of the periods they stand for; how, on discovering it to\r\nbe half an hour later than be supposed, he does not represent the half hour\r\nin its duration, but scarcely passes beyond the sign of it marked by the\r\nfinger.\" (H. Spencer: Psychology, § 336.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_545_545\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_545_545\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[545]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The only objections to this which I can think of are: (1) The accuracy\r\nwith which some men judge of the hour of day or night without looking\r\nat the clock; (2) the faculty some have of waking at a preappointed hour;\r\n(3) the accuracy of time-perception reported to exist in certain trance-subjects.\r\nIt might seem that in these persons some sort of a sub-conscious record was\r\nkept of the lapse of time \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e. But this cannot be admitted until it is\r\nproved that there are no physiological processes, the feeling of whose course\r\nmay serve as a \u003ci\u003esign\u003c/i\u003e of how much time has sped, and so lead us to infer the\r\nhour. That there are such processes it is hardly possible to doubt. An\r\ningenious friend of mine was long puzzled to know why each day of\r\nthe week had such a characteristic physiognomy to him. That of Sunday\r\nwas soon noticed to be due to the cessation of the city\u0027s rumbling, and the\r\nsound of people\u0027s feet shuffling on the sidewalk; of Monday, to come from\r\nthe clothes drying in the yard and casting a white reflection on the ceiling;\r\nof Tuesday, to a cause which I forget; and I think my friend did not get\r\nbeyond Wednesday. Probably each hour in the day has for most of us\r\nsome outer or inner sign associated with it as closely as these signs with the\r\ndays of the week. It must be admitted, after all, however, that the great\r\nimprovement of the time-perception during sleep and trance is a mystery\r\nnot as yet cleared up. All my life I have been struck by the accuracy with\r\nwhich I will wake at the same exact minute night after night and morning\r\nafter morning, if only the habit fortuitously begins. The organic registration\r\nin me is independent of sleep. After lying in bed a long time awake\r\nI suddenly rise without knowing the time, and for days and weeks together\r\nwill do so at an identical minute by the clock, as if some inward physiological\r\nprocess caused the act by punctually running down.—Idiots are\r\nsaid sometimes to possess the time-measuring faculty in a marked degree.\r\nI have an interesting manuscript account of an idiot girl which says: \"She\r\nwas punctual almost to a minute in her demand for food and other regular\r\nattentions. Her dinner was generally furnished her at 12.30 p. m., and at\r\nthat hour she would begin to scream if it were not forthcoming. If on\r\nFast-day or Thanksgiving it were delayed, in accordance with the New\r\nEngland custom, she screamed from her usual dinner-hour until the food\r\nwas carried to her. On the next day, however, she again made known her\r\nwants promptly at 12.30. Any slight attention shown her on one day was\r\ndemanded on the next at the corresponding hour. If an orange were given\r\nher at 4 p. m. on Wednesday, at the same hour on Thursday she made\r\nknown her expectation, and if the fruit were not given her she continued\r\nto call for it at intervals for two or three hours. At four on Friday the\r\nprocess would be repeated but would last less long; and so on for two or\r\nthree days. If one of her sisters visited her accidentally at a certain hour,\r\nthe sharp piercing scream was sure to summon her at the same hour the\r\nnext day,\" etc., etc.—For these obscure matters consult C. Du Prel: The\r\nPhilosophy of Mysticism, chap. iii, § 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_546_546\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_546_546\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[546]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ideale Fragen (1878). p. 219 (Essay, \u0027Zeit und Weile\u0027).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_547_547\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_547_547\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[547]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 496.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_548_548\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_548_548\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[548]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Empty time is most strongly perceived when it comes as a \u003ci\u003epause\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nmusic or in speech. Suppose a preacher in the pulpit, a professor at his\r\ndesk, to stick still in the midst of his discourse; or let a composer (as is\r\nsometimes purposely done) make all his instruments stop at once; we await\r\nevery instant the resumption of the performance, and, in this awaiting, perceive,\r\nmore than in any other possible way, the empty time. To change\r\nthe example, let, in a piece of polyphonic music—a figure, for instance, in\r\nwhich a tangle of melodies are under way—suddenly a single voice be\r\nheard, which sustains a long note, while all else is hushed…. This one\r\nnote will appear very protracted—why? Because we \u003ci\u003eexpect\u003c/i\u003e to hear accompanying\r\nit the notes of the other instruments, but they fail to come.\"\r\n(Herbart: Psychol. als W., § 115.)—Compare also Münsterberg, Beiträge,\r\nHeft 2, p. 41.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_549_549\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_549_549\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[549]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A night of pain will seem terribly long: we keep looking forward to\r\na moment which never comes—the moment when it shall cease. But the\r\nodiousness of this experience is not named \u003ci\u003eennui\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eLangweile\u003c/i\u003e, like the\r\nodiousness of time that seems long from its emptiness. The more positive\r\nodiousness of the pain, rather, is what tinges our memory of the night.\r\nWhat we feel, as Prof. Lazarus says (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 202), is the long time of the\r\nsuffering, not the suffering of the long time \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_550_550\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_550_550\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[550]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On these variations of time-estimate, cf. Romanes, Consciousness of\r\nTime, in Mind, vol. iii, p. 297; J. Sully, Illusions, pp. 245-261, 302-305;\r\nW. Wundt. Physiol. Psych., ii, 287, 288; besides the essays quoted from\r\nLazarus and Janet. In German, the successors of Herbart have treated of\r\nthis subject: compare Volkmann\u0027s Lehrbuch d. Psych., § 89, and for references\r\nto other authors his note 3 to this section. Lindner (Lbh. d. empir.\r\nPsych.), as a parallel effect, instances Alexander the Great\u0027s life (thirty-three\r\nyears), which seems to us as if it must be long, because it was so\r\neventful. Similarly the English Commonwealth, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_551_551\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_551_551\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[551]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Optik, p. 445.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_552_552\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_552_552\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[552]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Succession, time \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, is no force. Our talk about its devouring\r\ntooth, etc., is all elliptical. Its contents are what devour. The law of inertia\r\nis incompatible with time\u0027s being assumed as an efficient cause of anything.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_553_553\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_553_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[553]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lehrbuch d. Psych., § 87. Compare also H. Lotze, Metaphysik, § 154.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_554_554\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_554_554\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[554]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The cause of the perceiving, not the object perceived!\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_555_555\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_555_555\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[555]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"\u0027No more\u0027 and \u0027not yet\u0027 are the proper time-feelings, and we are\r\naware of time in no other way than through these feelings,\" says Volkmann\r\n(Psychol., § 87). This, which is not strictly true of our feeling of\r\n\u003ci\u003etime per se\u003c/i\u003e, as an elementary bit of duration, is true of our feeling of \u003ci\u003edate\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin its events.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_556_556\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_556_556\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[556]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We construct the miles just as we construct the years. Travelling in\r\nthe cars makes a succession of different fields of view pass before our eyes.\r\nWhen those that have passed from present sight revive in memory, they\r\nmaintain their mutual order because their contents overlap. We think\r\nthem as having been before or behind each other; and, from the multitude\r\nof the views we can recall behind the one now presented, we compute the\r\ntotal space we have passed through.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is often said that the perception of time develops later than that of\r\nspace, because children have so vague an idea of all dates before yesterday\r\nand after to-morrow. But no vaguer than they have of extensions that\r\nexceed as greatly their unit of space-intuition. Recently I heard my child\r\nof four tell a visitor that he had been \u0027as much as one week\u0027 in the country.\r\nAs he had been there three months, the visitor expressed surprise; whereupon\r\nthe child corrected himself by saying he had been there \u0027twelve\r\nyears.\u0027 But the child made exactly the same kind of mistake when he\r\nasked if Boston was not one hundred miles from Cambridge, the distance\r\nbeing three miles.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_557_557\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_557_557\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[557]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Most of these explanations simply give the \u003ci\u003esigns\u003c/i\u003e which, adhering to\r\nimpressions, lead us to date them within a duration, or, in other words, to\r\nassign to them their order. Why it should be a \u003ci\u003etime\u003c/i\u003e-order, however, is\r\nnot explained. Herbart\u0027s would-be explanation is a simple description of\r\ntime-perception. He says it comes when, with the last member of a series\r\npresent to our consciousness, we also think of the first; and then the whole\r\nseries revives in our thought at once, but with strength diminishing in the\r\nbackward direction (Psychol. als Wiss., § 115; Lehrb. zur Psychol., §§ 171,\r\n172, 175). Similarly Drobisch, who adds that the series must appear as one\r\nalready \u003ci\u003eelapsed\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003edurchlaufene\u003c/i\u003e), a word which shows even more clearly the\r\nquestion-begging nature of this sort of account (Empirische Psychol., § 59).\r\nTh. Waitz is guilty of similar question-begging when he explains our time-consciousness\r\nto be engendered by a set of unsuccessful attempts to make\r\nour percepts agree with our \u003ci\u003eexpectations\u003c/i\u003e (Lehrb. d. Psychol., § 52). Volkmann\u0027s\r\nmythological account of past representations striving to drive present\r\nones out of the seat of consciousness, being driven \u003ci\u003eback\u003c/i\u003e by them, etc.,\r\nsuffers from the same fallacy (Psychol., § 87). But all such accounts agree\r\nin implying one fact—viz., that the brain-processes of various events must\r\nbe active simultaneously, and in varying strength, for a time-perception to\r\nbe possible. Later authors have made this idea more precise. Thus, Lipps:\r\n\"Sensations arise, occupy consciousness, fade into images, and vanish.\r\nAccording as two of them, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, go through this process simultaneously,\r\nor as one precedes or follows the other, the \u003ci\u003ephases of their fading\u003c/i\u003e will agree\r\nor differ; and the difference will be proportional to the time-difference\r\nbetween their several moments of beginning. Thus there are differences\r\nof \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e in the images, which the mind may \u003ci\u003etranslate\u003c/i\u003e into corresponding\r\ndifferences of their temporal order. There is no other possible middle\r\nterm between the objective time-relations and those in the mind than these\r\ndifferences of phase.\" (Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, p. 588.) Lipps\r\naccordingly calls them \u0027temporal signs,\u0027 and hastens explicitly to add that\r\nthe soul\u0027s translation of their order of strength into a time-order is entirely\r\ninexplicable (p. 591). M. Guyau\u0027s account (Revue Philosophique, xix, 353)\r\nhardly differs from that of his predecessors, except in picturesqueness of\r\nstyle. Every change leaves a series of \u003ci\u003etrainées lumineuses\u003c/i\u003e in the mind like\r\nthe passage of shooting stars. Each image is in a more fading phase,\r\naccording as its original was more remote. This group of images gives\r\nduration, the mere time-form, the \u0027bed\u0027 of time. The distinction of past,\r\npresent, and future within the bed comes from our active nature. The\r\nfuture (as with Waitz) is what I want, but have not yet got, and must wait\r\nfor. All this is doubtless true, but is no \u003ci\u003eexplanation\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMr. Ward gives, in his Encyclopædia Britannica article (Psychology,\r\np. 65, col. 1), a still more refined attempt to specify the \u0027temporal sign.\u0027\r\nThe problem being, among a number of other things thought as successive,\r\nbut simultaneously thought, to determine which is first and which last,\r\nhe says: \"After each distinct representation, \u003ci\u003ea b c d,\u003c/i\u003e there may intervene\r\nthe representation of that \u003ci\u003emovement of attention\u003c/i\u003e of which we are aware\r\nin passing from one object to another. In our present reminiscence we\r\nhave, it must be allowed, little direct proof of this intervention; though\r\nthere is, I think, indirect evidence of it in the tendency of the flow of ideas\r\nto follow the order in which the presentations were at first attended to.\r\nWith the movement itself when the direction of attention changes, we are\r\nfamiliar enough, though the residua of such movements are not ordinarily\r\nconspicuous. These residua, then, are our temporal signs…. But temporal\r\nsigns alone will not furnish all the pictorial exactness of the time-perspective.\r\nThese give us only a fixed series; but the law of obliviscence, by\r\ninsuring a progressive variation in intensity as we pass from one member of\r\nthe series to the other, yields the effect which we call time-distance. By\r\nthemselves such variations in intensity would leave us liable to confound\r\nmore vivid representations in the distance with fainter ones nearer the\r\npresent, but from this mistake the temporal signs save us; where the\r\nmemory-continuum is imperfect such mistakes continually occur. On\r\nthe other hand, where these variations are slight and imperceptible, though\r\nthe memory-continuum preserves the order of events intact, we have still no\r\nsuch distinct appreciation of comparative distance in time as we have nearer\r\nto the present, where these perceptive effects are considerable…. Locke\r\nspeaks of our ideas succeeding each other \u0027at certain distances not much\r\nunlike the images in the inside of a lantern turned round by the heat of a\r\ncandle,\u0027 and \u0027guesses\u0027 that \u0027this appearance of theirs in train varies not\r\nvery much in a waking man.\u0027 \u003ci\u003eNow what is this \u0027distance\u0027 that separates\r\na from b, b from c, and so on;\u003c/i\u003e and what means have we of knowing that it\r\nis tolerably constant in waking life? \u003ci\u003eIt is, probably, that, the residuum of\r\nwhich I have called a temporal sign; or, in other words, it is the movement of\r\nattention from a to b.\u003c/i\u003e\" Nevertheless, Mr. Ward does not call our feeling\r\nof this movement of attention the \u003ci\u003eoriginal\u003c/i\u003e of our feeling of time, or its\r\nbrain-process the brain-process which directly causes us to perceive time.\r\nHe says, a moment later, that \"though the fixation of attention does of\r\ncourse really occupy time, it is probably not in the first instance perceived\r\nas time—i.e. as continuous \u0027protensity,\u0027 to use a term of Hamilton\u0027s—but\r\nas intensity. Thus, if this supposition be true, there is an element in our\r\nconcrete time perceptions which has no place in our abstract conception of\r\nTime. In Time physically conceived there is no trace of intensity; in time\r\npsychically experienced, duration is primarily an intensive magnitude, and\r\nso far literally a perception.\" Its \u0027original\u0027 is, then, if I understand Mr\r\nWard, something like a \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e which accompanies, as pleasure and pain\r\nmay accompany, the movements of attention. Its brain-process must, it\r\nwould seem, be assimilated in general type to the brain-processes of pleasure\r\nand pain. Such would seem more or less consciously to be Mr. Ward\u0027s\r\nown view, for he says: \"Everybody knows what it is to be distracted by a\r\nrapid succession of varied impressions, and equally what it is to be wearied\r\nby the slow and monotonous recurrence of the same impressions. Now\r\nthese \u0027feelings\u0027 of distraction and tedium owe their characteristic qualities\r\nto movements of attention. In the first, attention is kept incessantly on\r\nthe move; before it is accommodated to \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, it is disturbed by the suddenness,\r\nintensity, and novelty of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e; in the second, it is kept all but stationary\r\nby the repeated presentation of the same impression. Such excess and\r\ndefect of surprises make one realize a fact which in ordinary life is so\r\nobscure as to escape notice. But recent experiments have set this fact in a\r\nmore striking light, and made clear what Locke had dimly before his mind\r\nin talking of a certain distance between the presentations of a waking man.\r\nIn estimating very short periods of time of a second or less, indicated, say,\r\nby the beats of a metronome, it is found that there is a certain period for\r\nwhich the mean of a number of estimates is correct, while shorter periods\r\nare on the whole over-, and longer periods under-estimated. I take this to\r\nbe evidence of the time occupied in accommodating or fixing attention.\"\r\nAlluding to the fact that a series of experiences, \u003ci\u003ea b c d e,\u003c/i\u003e may seem\r\nshort in retrospect, which seemed everlasting in passing, he says: \"What\r\ntells in retrospect is the series \u003ci\u003ea b c d e\u003c/i\u003e, etc.; what tells in the present is the\r\nintervening \u003ci\u003et\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e t\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e t\u003csub\u003e3\u003c/sub\u003e,\u003c/i\u003e etc., or rather the original accommodation of which\r\nthese temporal signs are the residuum.\" And he concludes thus: \"We\r\nseem to have proof that our perception of duration rests ultimately upon\r\nquasi-motor objects of varying intensity, the duration of which we do not\r\ndirectly experience as duration at all.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWundt also thinks that the interval of about three-fourths of a second,\r\nwhich is estimated with the minimum of error, points to a connection\r\nbetween the time-feeling and the succession of distinctly \u0027apperceived\u0027\r\nobjects before the mind. The \u0027association-time\u0027 is also equal to about\r\nthree fourths of a second. This association-time he regards as a sort of\r\ninternal standard of duration to which we involuntarily assimilate all intervals\r\nwhich we try to reproduce, bringing shorter ones up to it and longer\r\nones down. [In the Stevens result we should have to say \u003ci\u003econtrast\u003c/i\u003e instead\r\nof assimilate, for the longer intervals there seem longer, and the shorter\r\nones shorter still.] \"Singularly enough,\" he adds (Physiol. Psych., ii,\r\n286), \"this time is about that in which in rapid walking, according to the\r\nWebers, our legs perform their swing. It seems thus not unlikely that\r\nboth psychical constants, that of the average speed of reproduction and that\r\nof the surest estimation of time, have formed themselves under the influence\r\nof those most habitual movements of the body which we also use when\r\nwe try to subdivide rhythmically longer tracts of time.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFinally, Prof. Mach makes a suggestion more specific still. After saying\r\nvery rightly that we have a real \u003ci\u003esensation\u003c/i\u003e of time—how otherwise should\r\nwe identify two entirely different airs as being played in the same \u0027time\u0027?\r\nhow distinguish in memory the first stroke of the clock from the second,\r\nunless to each there clove its special time-sensation, which revived with it?—he\r\nsays \"it is probable that this feeling is connected with that organic\r\n\u003ci\u003econsumption\u003c/i\u003e which is necessarily linked with the production of consciousness,\r\nand that the time which we feel is probably due to the [mechanical?]\r\n\u003ci\u003ework of\u003c/i\u003e [the process of?] \u003ci\u003eattention\u003c/i\u003e. When attention is strained, time seems\r\nlong; during easy occupation, short, etc…. The fatigue of the organ of\r\nconsciousness, as long as we wake, continually increases, and the work of\r\nattention augments as continually. Those impressions which are conjoined\r\nwith a \u003ci\u003egreater amount\u003c/i\u003e of work of attention appear to us as the \u003ci\u003elater\u003c/i\u003e.\" The\r\napparent relative displacement of certain simultaneous events and certain\r\nanachronisms of dreams are held by Mach to be easily explicable as effects\r\nof a splitting of the attention between two objects, one of which consumes\r\nmost of it (Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 103 foll.). Mach\u0027s\r\ntheory seems worthy of being better worked out. It is hard to say now\r\nwhether he, Ward, and Wundt mean at bottom the same thing or not. The\r\ntheory advanced in my own text, it will be remarked, does not pretend to\r\nbe an \u003ci\u003eexplanation\u003c/i\u003e, but only an elementary statement of the \u0027law\u0027 which\r\nmakes us aware of time. The Herbartian mythology purports to \u003ci\u003eexplain\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_558_558\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_558_558\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[558]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It would be rash to say definitely just how many seconds long this\r\nspecious present must needs be, for processes fade \u0027asymptotically,\u0027 and\r\nthe distinctly intuited present merges into a penumbra of mere dim \u003ci\u003erecency\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbefore it turns into the past which is simply reproduced and conceived.\r\nMany a thing which we do not distinctly date by intercalating it in a place\r\nbetween two other things will, nevertheless, come to us with this feeling of\r\nbelonging to a \u003ci\u003enear\u003c/i\u003e past. This sense of recency is a feeling \u003ci\u003esui generis\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nmay affect things that happened hours ago. It would seem to show that\r\ntheir brain-processes are still in a state modified by the foregoing excitement,\r\nstill in a \u0027fading\u0027 phase, in spite of the long interval.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_559_559\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_559_559\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[559]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Psych, ii, 263.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_560_560\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_560_560\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[560]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I leave my text as it was printed before Münsterberg\u0027s essay appeared\r\n(see \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_542_542\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eFootnote 542\u003c/a\u003e, above). He denies that we measure any but minimal\r\ndurations by the amount of fading in the ideational processes, and talks\r\nalmost exclusively of our feelings of muscular tension in his account,\r\nwhereas I have made no mention of such things in mine. I cannot, however,\r\nsee that there is any conflict between what he and I suggest. I am\r\nmainly concerned with the consciousness of duration regarded as a specific\r\nsort of object, he is concerned with this object\u0027s measurement exclusively.\r\nFeelings of tension might be the means of the measurement, whilst overlapping\r\nprocesses of any and every kind gave the object to be measured. The\r\naccommodative and respiratory movements from which the feelings of\r\ntension come form regularly recurring sensations divided by their \u0027phases\u0027\r\ninto intervals as definite as those by which a yardstick is divided by the\r\nmarks upon its length.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet \u003ci\u003ea\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e, a\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e, a\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e, a\u003csup\u003e4\u003c/sup\u003e,\u003c/i\u003e be homologous phases in four successive movements\r\nof this kind. If four outer stimuli 1, 2, 3, 4, coincide each with one of\r\nthese successive phases, then their \u0027distances apart\u0027 are felt as \u003ci\u003eequal\u003c/i\u003e, otherwise\r\nnot. But there is no reason whatever to suppose that the mere overlapping\r\nof the brain-process of 2 by the fading process of 1, or that of 3 by\r\nthat of 2, etc., does not give the \u003ci\u003echaracteristic quality of content\u003c/i\u003e which we\r\ncall \u0027distance apart\u0027 in this experience, and which by aid of the muscular\r\nfeelings gets judged to be equal. Doubtless the muscular feelings can\r\ngive us the object \u0027time\u0027 as well as its measure, because their earlier\r\nphases leave fading sensations which constantly overlap the vivid sensation\r\nof the present phase. But it would be contrary to analogy to suppose that\r\nthey should be the only experiences which give this object. I do not\r\nunderstand Herr Münsterberg to claim this for them. He takes our\r\nsense of time for granted, and only discusses its measurement.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_561_561\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_561_561\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[561]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Exner in Hermann\u0027s Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. ii, Thl. ii, p. 281.\r\nRichet in Revue Philosophique, xxi, 568 (juin, 1886). See the next chapter,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_642\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 642-646\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_562_562\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_562_562\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[562]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have spoken of \u003ci\u003efading\u003c/i\u003e brain-processes alone, but only for simplicity\u0027s\r\nsake. \u003ci\u003eDawning\u003c/i\u003e processes probably play as important a part in giving the\r\nfeeling of duration to the specious present.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_563_563\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_563_563\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[563]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Reden (St. Petersburg, 1864), vol. i, pp. 255-268.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_564_564\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_564_564\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[564]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychology, § 91.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_565_565\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_565_565\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[565]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"The patient cannot retain the image of an object more than a\r\nmoment. His memory is as short for sounds, letters, figures, and printed\r\nwords. If we cover a written or printed word with a sheet of paper in\r\nwhich a little window has been cut, so that only the first letter is visible\r\nthrough the window, he pronounces this letter. If, then, the sheet is\r\nmoved so as to cover the first letter and make the second one visible, he pronounces\r\nthe second, but forgets the first, and cannot pronounce the first\r\nand second together.\" And so forth to the end. \"If he closes his eyes and\r\ndraws his finger exploringly over a well-known object like a knife or key,\r\nhe cannot combine the separate impressions and recognize the object. But\r\nif it is put into his hand so that he can simultaneously touch it with several\r\nfingers, he names it without difficulty. This patient has thus lost the capacity\r\nfor grouping successive … impressions … into a whole and perceiving\r\nthem as a whole.\" (Grashey, in Archiv für Psychiatrie, Bd. xvi,\r\npp. 672-673.) It is hard to believe that in such a patient the time intuited\r\nwas not clipped off like the impressions it held, though perhaps not so much\r\nof it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI have myself often noted a curious exaggeration of time-perspective at\r\nthe moment of a falling asleep. A person will be moving or doing something\r\nin the room, and a certain stage of his act (whatever it may be) will be\r\nmy last waking perception. Then a subsequent stage will wake me to a new\r\nperception. The two stages of the act will not be more than a few seconds\r\napart; and yet it always seems to me as if, between the earlier and the later\r\none, a long interval has passed away. I conjecturally account for the\r\nphenomenon thus, calling the two stages of the act \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e respectively:\r\nWere I awake, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e would leave a fading process in my sensorium which\r\nwould overlap the process of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e when the latter came, and both would then\r\nappear in the same specious present, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e belonging to its earlier end. But\r\nthe sudden advent of the brain-change called sleep extinguishes \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s fading\r\nprocess abruptly. When \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e then comes and wakes me, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e comes back, it is\r\ntrue, but not as belonging to the specious present. It has to be specially\r\n\u003ci\u003erevoked\u003c/i\u003e in memory. This mode of revocation usually characterizes long-past\r\nthings—whence the illusion.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_566_566\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_566_566\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[566]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Again I omit the future, merely for simplicity\u0027s sake.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_643\"\u003e[Pg 643]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003e \u003ca id=\"CHAPTER_XVI\"\u003eCHAPTER XVI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eMEMORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the last chapter what concerned us was the direct\r\n\u003ci\u003eintuition\u003c/i\u003e of time. We found it limited to intervals of considerably\r\nless than a minute. Beyond its borders extends\r\nthe immense region of \u003ci\u003econceived\u003c/i\u003e time, past and future, into\r\none direction or another of which we mentally project all\r\nthe events which we think of as real, and form a systematic\r\norder of them by giving to each a date. The relation of conceived\r\nto intuited time is just like that of the fictitious space\r\npictured on the flat back-scene of a theatre to the actual\r\nspace of the stage. The objects painted on the former (trees,\r\ncolumns, houses in a receding street, etc.) carry back the\r\nseries of similar objects solidly placed upon the latter, and\r\nwe think we see things in a continuous perspective, when\r\nwe really see thus only a few of them and imagine that we\r\nsee the rest. The chapter which lies before us deals with\r\nthe way in which we paint the remote past, as it were, upon\r\na canvas in our memory, and yet often imagine that we\r\nhave direct vision of its depths.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe stream of thought flows on; but most of its segments\r\nfall into the bottomless abyss of oblivion. Of some,\r\nno memory survives the instant of their passage. Of others,\r\nit is confined to a few moments, hours, or days. Others,\r\nagain, leave vestiges which are indestructible, and by means\r\nof which they may be recalled as long as life endures. Can\r\nwe explain these differences?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003ePRIMARY MEMORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first point to be noticed is that \u003ci\u003efor a state of mind\r\nto survive in memory it must have endured, for a certain length\r\nof time\u003c/i\u003e. In other words, it must be what I call a substantive\r\nstate. Prepositional and conjunctival states of mind\r\nare not remembered as independent facts—we cannot recall\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_644\"\u003e[Pg 644]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njust how we felt when we said \u0027how\u0027 or \u0027notwithstanding.\u0027\r\nOur consciousness of these transitive states is shut up to\r\ntheir own moment—hence one difficulty in introspective\r\npsychologizing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny state of mind which is shut up to its own moment\r\nand fails to become an object for succeeding states of\r\nmind, is as if it belonged to another stream of thought. Or\r\nrather, it belongs only physically, not intellectually, to its\r\nown stream, forming a bridge from one segment of it to\r\nanother, but not being appropriated inwardly by former segments\r\nor appearing as part of the empirical self, in the\r\nmanner explained in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter X\u003c/a\u003e. All the intellectual value\r\nfor us of a state of mind depends on our after-memory of it.\r\nOnly then is it combined in a system and knowingly made\r\nto contribute to a result. Only then does it \u003ci\u003ecount\u003c/i\u003e for us.\r\nSo that \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eeffective\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003econsciousness we have of our states is the\r\nafter-consciousness\u003c/i\u003e; and the more of this there is, the more\r\ninfluence does the original state have, and the more permanent\r\na factor is it of our world. An indelibly-imprinted\r\npain may color a life; but, as Professor Richet says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To suffer for only a hundredth of a second is not to suffer at all;\r\nand for my part I would readily agree to undergo a pain, however acute\r\nand intense it might be, provided it should last only a hundredth of a\r\nsecond, and leave after it neither reverberation nor recall.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_567_567\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_567_567\"\u003e[567]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot that a momentary state of consciousness need be\r\npractically resultless. Far from it: such a state, though\r\nabsolutely unremembered, might at its own moment determine\r\nthe transition of our thinking in a vital way, and decide\r\nour action irrevocably.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_568_568\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_568_568\"\u003e[568]\u003c/a\u003e But the \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of it could not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_645\"\u003e[Pg 645]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eafterwards\u003c/i\u003e determine transition and action, its content\r\ncould not be conceived as one of the mind\u0027s permanent\r\nmeanings: that is all I mean by saying that its intellectual\r\nvalue lies in after-memory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a rule sensations outlast for some little time the objective\r\nstimulus which occasioned them. This phenomenon\r\nis the ground of those \u0027after-images\u0027 which are familiar in\r\nthe physiology of the sense-organs. If we open our eyes\r\ninstantaneously upon a scene, and then shroud them in\r\ncomplete darkness, it will be as if we saw the scene in ghostly\r\nlight through the dark screen. We can read off details in\r\nit which were unnoticed whilst the eyes were open.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_569_569\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_569_569\"\u003e[569]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn every sphere of sense, an intermittent stimulus, often\r\nenough repeated, produces a continuous sensation. This\r\nis because the after-image of the impression just gone by\r\nblends with the new impression coming in. The effects of\r\nstimuli may thus be superposed upon each other many\r\nstages deep, the total result in consciousness being an increase\r\nin the feeling\u0027s intensity, and in all probability, as\r\nwe saw in the last chapter, an elementary sense of the lapse\r\nof time (see \u003ca href=\"#Page_635\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 635\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_646\"\u003e[Pg 646]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eExner writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Impressions to which we are inattentive leave so brief an image in\r\nthe memory that it is usually overlooked. When deeply absorbed, we\r\ndo not hear the clock strike. But our attention may awake after the\r\nstriking has ceased, and we may then count off the strokes. Such examples\r\nare often found in daily life. We can also prove the existence\r\nof this \u003ci\u003eprimary memory-image\u003c/i\u003e, as it may be called, in another person,\r\neven when his attention is completely absorbed elsewhere. Ask someone,\r\ne.g., to count the lines of a printed page as fast as he can, and\r\nwhilst this is going on walk a few steps about the room. Then, when\r\nthe person has done counting, ask him where you stood. He will\r\nalways reply quite definitely that you have walked. Analogous experiments\r\nmay be made with vision. This primary memory-image is,\r\nwhether attention have been turned to the impression or not, an extremely\r\nlively one, but is subjectively quite distinct from every sort of\r\nafter-image or hallucination…. It vanishes, if not caught by attention,\r\nin the course of a few seconds. Even when the original impression\r\nis attended to, the liveliness of its image in memory fades fast.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_570_570\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_570_570\"\u003e[570]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe physical condition in the nerve-tissue of this primary\r\nmemory is called by Richet \u0027elementary memory.\u0027\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_571_571\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_571_571\"\u003e[571]\u003c/a\u003e I\r\nmuch prefer to reserve the word memory for the conscious\r\nphenomenon. What happens in the nerve-tissue is but an\r\nexample of that plasticity or of semi-inertness, yielding\r\nto change, but not yielding instantly or wholly, and never\r\nquite recovering the original form, which, in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter V\u003c/a\u003e, we\r\nsaw to be the groundwork of habit. Elementary \u003ci\u003ehabit\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwould be the better name for what Professor Richet means.\r\nWell, the first manifestation of elementary habit is the\r\nslow dying away of an impressed movement on the neural\r\nmatter, and its first effect in consciousness is this so-called\r\nelementary memory. But what elementary memory makes\r\nus aware of is the \u003ci\u003ejust\u003c/i\u003e past. The objects we feel in this\r\ndirectly intuited past differ from properly recollected objects.\r\nAn object which is recollected, in the proper sense\r\nof that term, is one which has been absent from consciousness\r\naltogether, and now revives anew. It is brought back,\r\nrecalled, fished up, so to speak, from a reservoir in which,\r\nwith countless other objects, it lay buried and lost from\r\nview. But an object of primary memory is not thus\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_647\"\u003e[Pg 647]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbrought back; it never was lost; its date was never cut\r\noff in consciousness from that of the immediately present\r\nmoment. In fact it comes to us as belonging to the rearward\r\nportion of the present space of time, and not to the\r\ngenuine past. In the last chapter we saw that the portion\r\nof time which we directly intuit has a breadth of\r\nseveral seconds, a rearward and a forward end, and may be\r\ncalled the specious present. All stimuli whose first nerve-vibrations\r\nhave not yet ceased seem to be conditions of\r\nour getting this feeling of the specious present. They give\r\nrise to objects which appear to the mind as events just\r\npast.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_572_572\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_572_572\"\u003e[572]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we have been exposed to an unusual stimulus for\r\nmany minutes or hours, a nervous process is set up which\r\nresults in the haunting of consciousness by the impression\r\nfor a long time afterwards. The tactile and muscular feelings\r\nof a day of skating or riding, after long disuse of\r\nthe exercise, will come back to us all through the night.\r\nImages of the field of view of the microscope will annoy\r\nthe observer for hours after an unusually long sitting at the\r\ninstrument. A thread tied around the finger, an unusual\r\nconstriction in the clothing, will feel as if still there, long\r\nafter they have been removed. These revivals (called phenomena\r\nof \u003ci\u003eSinnesgedächtniss\u003c/i\u003e by the Germans) have something\r\nperiodical in their nature.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_573_573\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_573_573\"\u003e[573]\u003c/a\u003e They show that profound\r\nrearrangements and slow settlings into a new equilibrium\r\nare going on in the neural substance, and they form the\r\ntransition to that more peculiar and proper phenomenon of\r\nmemory, of which the rest of this chapter must treat. The\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_648\"\u003e[Pg 648]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirst condition which makes a thing susceptible of recall\r\nafter it has been forgotten is that the original impression\r\nof it should have been prolonged enough to give rise to a\r\n\u003ci\u003erecurrent\u003c/i\u003e image of it, as distinguished from one of those primary\r\nafter-images which very fleeting impressions may\r\nleave behind, and which contain in themselves no guarantee\r\nthat they will ever come back after having once faded away.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_574_574\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_574_574\"\u003e[574]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nA certain length of stimulation seems demanded by the\r\ninertia of the nerve-substance. Exposed to a shorter influence,\r\nits modification fails to \u0027set,\u0027 and it retains no\r\neffective tendency to fall again into the same form of vibration\r\nat which the original feeling was due. This, as I\r\nsaid at the outset, may be the reason why only \u0027substantive\u0027\r\nand not \u0027transitive\u0027 states of mind are as a rule recollected,\r\nat least as independent things. The transitive states\r\npass by too quickly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENON OF MEMORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMemory proper, or secondary memory as it might be\r\nstyled, is the knowledge of a former state of mind after it\r\nhas already once dropped from consciousness; or rather \u003ci\u003eit\r\nis the knowledge of an event, or fact,\u003c/i\u003e of which meantime we\r\nhave not been thinking, \u003ci\u003ewith the additional consciousness that\r\nwe have thought or experienced it before.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_649\"\u003e[Pg 649]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first element which such a knowledge involves would\r\nseem to be the revival in the mind of an image or copy of\r\nthe original event.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_575_575\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_575_575\"\u003e[575]\u003c/a\u003e And it is an assumption made by\r\nmany writers\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_576_576\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_576_576\"\u003e[576]\u003c/a\u003e that the revival of an image is all that is\r\nneeded to constitute the memory of the original occurrence.\r\nBut such a revival is obviously not a \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e, whatever else\r\nit may be; it is simply a duplicate, a second event, having\r\nabsolutely no connection with the first event except that it\r\nhappens to resemble it. The clock strikes to-day; it struck\r\nyesterday; and may strike a million times ere it wears out.\r\nThe rain pours through the gutter this week; it did so last\r\nweek; and will do so \u003ci\u003ein sæcula sæculorum\u003c/i\u003e. But does the\r\npresent clock-stroke become aware of the past ones, or the\r\npresent stream recollect the past stream, because they repeat\r\nand resemble them? Assuredly not. And let it not be said\r\nthat this is because clock-strokes and gutters are physical\r\nand not psychical objects; for psychical objects (sensations\r\nfor example) simply recurring in successive editions will\r\nremember each other \u003ci\u003eon that account\u003c/i\u003e no more than clock-strokes\r\ndo. No memory is involved in the mere fact of recurrence.\r\nThe successive editions of a feeling are so many\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_650\"\u003e[Pg 650]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindependent events, each snug in its own skin. Yesterday\u0027s\r\nfeeling is dead and buried; and the presence of to-day\u0027s is\r\nno reason why it should resuscitate. A farther condition\r\nis required before the present image can be held to stand\r\nfor a \u003ci\u003epast original\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat condition is that the fact imaged be \u003ci\u003eexpressly referred\r\nto the past\u003c/i\u003e, thought as \u003ci\u003ein the past\u003c/i\u003e. But how can we think\r\na thing as in the past, except by thinking of the past together\r\nwith the thing, and of the relation of the two? And\r\nhow can we think of the past? In the chapter on Time-perception\r\nwe have seen that our intuitive or immediate consciousness\r\nof pastness hardly carries us more than a few\r\nseconds backward of the present instant of time. Remoter\r\ndates are conceived, not perceived; known symbolically by\r\nnames, such as \u0027last week,\u0027 \u00271850;\u0027 or thought of by events\r\nwhich happened in them, as the year in which we attended\r\nsuch a school, or met with such a loss.—So that if we wish\r\nto think of a particular past epoch, we must think of a name\r\nor other symbol, or else of certain concrete events, associated\r\ntherewithal. Both must be thought of, to think the past\r\nepoch adequately. And to \u0027refer\u0027 any special fact to the\r\npast epoch is to think that fact \u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e the names and events\r\nwhich characterize its date, to think it, in short, with a lot\r\nof contiguous associates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even this would not be memory. Memory requires\r\nmore than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be\r\ndated in \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e past. In other words, I must think that I directly\r\nexperienced its occurrence. It must have that\r\n\u0027warmth and intimacy\u0027 which were so often spoken of in\r\nthe chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences\r\n\u0027appropriated\u0027 by the thinker as his own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA general feeling of the past direction in time, then, a\r\nparticular date conceived as lying along that direction, and\r\nI defined by its name or phenomenal contents, an event imagined\r\nas located therein, and owned as part of my experience,—such\r\nare the elements of every act of memory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt follows that what we began by calling the \u0027image,\u0027 or\r\n\u0027copy,\u0027 of the fact in the mind, is really not there at all in\r\nthat simple shape, as a separate \u0027idea.\u0027 Or at least, if it be\r\nthere as a separate idea, no memory will go with it. What\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_651\"\u003e[Pg 651]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmemory goes with is, on the contrary, a very complex representation,\r\nthat of the fact to be recalled \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e its associates,\r\nthe whole forming one \u0027object\u0027 (as explained on \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epage 275\u003c/a\u003e,\r\nChapter IX), known in one integral pulse of consciousness\r\n(as set forth on \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 276\u003c/a\u003e ff.) and demanding probably a\r\nvastly more intricate brain-process than that on which any\r\nsimple sensorial image depends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost psychologists have given a perfectly clear analysis\r\nof the phenomenon we describe. Christian Wolff, for example,\r\nwrites:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Suppose you have seen Mevius in the temple, but now afresh in\r\nTitus\u0027 house. I say you \u003ci\u003erecognize\u003c/i\u003e Mevius, that is, are conscious of having\r\nseen him before because, although now you perceive him with your\r\nsenses along with Titus\u0027 house, your imagination produces an image of him\r\nalong with one of the temple, and of the acts of your own mind reflecting\r\non Mevius in the temple. Hence the idea of Mevius which is reproduced in\r\nsense is contained in another series of perceptions than that which\r\nformerly contained it, and this difference is the reason why we are conscious\r\nof having had it before…. For whilst now you see Mevius in\r\nthe house of Titus, your imagination places him in the temple, and\r\nrenders you conscious of the state of mind which you found in yourself\r\nwhen you beheld him there. By this you know that you have seen him\r\nbefore, that is, you recognize him. But you recognize him because his\r\nidea is now contained in another series of perceptions from that in which\r\nyou first saw him.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_577_577\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_577_577\"\u003e[577]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSimilarly James Mill writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In my remembrance of George III., addressing the two houses of\r\nparliament, there is, first of all, the mere idea, or simple apprehension,\r\nthe conception, as it is sometimes called, of the objects. There is combined\r\nwith this, to make it memory, my idea of my having seen and\r\nheard those objects. And this combination is so close that it is not in\r\nmy power to separate them. I cannot have the idea of George III.:\r\nhis person and attitude, the paper he held in his hand, the sound of his\r\nvoice while reading from it; without having the other idea along with\r\nit, that of my having been a witness of the scene…. If this explanation\r\nof the case in which we remember sensations is understood,\r\nthe explanation of the case in which we remember ideas cannot occasion\r\nmuch of difficulty. I have a lively recollection of Polyphemus\u0027s cave,\r\nand the actions of Ulysses and the Cyclops, as described by Homer. In\r\nthis recollection there is, first of all, the ideas, or simple conceptions of\r\nthe objects and acts; and along with these ideas, and so closely combined\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_652\"\u003e[Pg 652]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas not to be separable, the idea of my having formerly had those\r\nsame ideas. And this idea of my having formerly had those ideas is a\r\nvery complicated idea; including the idea of myself of the present moment\r\nremembering, and that of myself of the past moment conceiving;\r\nand the whole series of the states of consciousness, which intervened\r\nbetween myself remembering, and myself conceiving.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_578_578\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_578_578\"\u003e[578]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMemory is then the feeling of belief in a peculiar complex\r\nobject; but all the elements of this object may be\r\nknown to other states of belief; nor is there in the particular\r\ncombination of them as they appear in memory anything\r\nso peculiar as to lead us to oppose the latter to other sorts\r\nof thought as something altogether \u003ci\u003esui generis\u003c/i\u003e, needing a\r\nspecial faculty to account for it. When later we come to\r\nour chapter on Belief we shall see that any represented\r\nobject which is connected either mediately or immediately\r\nwith our present sensations or emotional activities tends\r\nto be believed in as a reality. The sense of a peculiar\r\nactive relation in it to ourselves is what gives to an\r\nobject the characteristic quality of reality, and a merely\r\nimagined past event differs from a recollected one only in\r\nthe absence of this peculiar-feeling relation. The electric\r\ncurrent, so to speak, between it and our present self\r\ndoes not close. But in their other determinations the re-recollected\r\npast and the imaginary past may be much the\r\nsame. In other words, there is nothing unique in the \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof memory, and no special faculty is needed to account for\r\nits formation. It is a synthesis of parts thought of as related\r\ntogether, perception, imagination, comparison and\r\nreasoning being analogous syntheses of parts into complex\r\nobjects. The objects of any of these faculties may awaken\r\nbelief or fail to awaken it; \u003ci\u003ethe object of memory is only an\r\nobject imagined in the past\u003c/i\u003e (usually very completely imagined\r\nthere) \u003ci\u003eto which the emotion of belief adheres.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_653\"\u003e[Pg 653]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eMEMORY\u0027S CAUSES.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch being the \u003ci\u003ephenomenon\u003c/i\u003e of memory, or the analysis\r\nof its object, can we see how it comes to pass? can we\r\nlay bare its causes?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIts complete exercise presupposes two things:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) The \u003ci\u003eretention\u003c/i\u003e of the remembered fact;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) Its \u003ci\u003ereminiscence, recollection, reproduction,\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003erecall\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow \u003ci\u003ethe cause both of retention and of recollection is the law\r\nof habit in the nervous system, working as it does in the \u0027association\r\nof ideas.\u0027\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAssociationists have long explained \u003ci\u003erecollection\u003c/i\u003e by association.\r\nJames Mill gives an account of it which I am unable\r\nto improve upon, unless it might be by translating his word\r\n\u0027idea\u0027 into \u0027thing thought of,\u0027 or \u0027object,\u0027 as explained so\r\noften before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There is,\" he says, \"a state of mind familiar to all men, in which\r\nwe are said to remember. In this state it is certain we have not in the\r\nmind the idea which we are trying to have in it.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_579_579\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_579_579\"\u003e[579]\u003c/a\u003e How is it, then, that\r\nwe proceed in the course of our endeavor, to procure its introduction\r\ninto the mind? If we have not the idea itself, we have certain ideas\r\nconnected with it. We run over those ideas, one after another, in hopes\r\nthat some one of them will suggest the idea we are in quest of;\r\nand if any one of them does, it is always one so connected with it as\r\nto call it up in the way of association. I meet an old acquaintance,\r\nwhose name I do not remember, and wish to recollect. I run over a\r\nnumber of names, in hopes that some of them may be associated with the\r\nidea of the individual. I think of all the circumstances in which I have\r\nseen him engaged; the time when I knew him, the persons along with\r\nwhom I knew him, the things he did, or the things he suffered; and,\r\nif I chance upon any idea with which the name is associated, then immediately\r\nI have the recollection; if not, my pursuit of it is vain.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_580_580\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_580_580\"\u003e[580]\u003c/a\u003e There\r\nis another set of cases, very familiar, but affording very important evidence\r\non the subject. It frequently happens that there are matters\r\nwhich we desire not to forget. What is the contrivance to which we\r\nhave recourse for preserving the memory—that is, for making sure that\r\nit will be called into existence, when it is our wish that it should? All\r\nmen invariably employ the same expedient. They endeavor to form\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_654\"\u003e[Pg 654]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan association between the idea of the thing to be remembered, and\r\nsome sensation, or some idea, which they know beforehand will occur at\r\nor near the time when they wish the remembrance to be in their minds.\r\nIf this association is formed, and the association or idea with which it has\r\nbeen formed occurs; the sensation, or idea, calls up the remembrance;\r\nand the object of him who formed the association is attained. To use a\r\nvulgar instance: a man receives a commission from his friend, and, that\r\nhe may not forget it, ties a knot in his handkerchief. How is this fact to\r\nbe explained? First of all, the idea of the commission is associated with\r\nthe making of the knot. Next, the handkerchief is a thing which it is\r\nknown beforehand will be frequently seen, and of course at no great\r\ndistance of time from the occasion on which the memory is desired.\r\nThe handkerchief being seen, the knot is seen, and this sensation recalls\r\nthe idea of the commission, between which and itself the association\r\nhad been purposely formed.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_581_581\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_581_581\"\u003e[581]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, we make search in our memory for a forgotten\r\nidea, just as we rummage our house for a lost object. In\r\nboth cases we visit what seems to us the probable \u003ci\u003eneighborhood\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof that which we miss. We turn over the things under\r\nwhich, or within which, or alongside of which, it may\r\npossibly be; and if it lies near them, it soon comes to view.\r\nBut these matters, in the case of a mental object sought,\r\nare nothing but its \u003ci\u003eassociates\u003c/i\u003e. The machinery of recall is\r\nthus the same as the machinery of association, and the\r\nmachinery of association, as we know, is nothing but the\r\nelementary law of habit in the nerve-centres.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd this same law of habit is the machinery of retention\r\nalso. Retention means \u003ci\u003eliability\u003c/i\u003e to recall, and it means nothing\r\nmore than such liability. The only proof of there being\r\nretention is that recall actually takes place. The retention\r\nof an experience is, in short, but another name for the \u003ci\u003epossibility\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof thinking it again, or the \u003ci\u003etendency\u003c/i\u003e to think it again,\r\nwith its past surroundings. Whatever accidental cue may\r\nturn this tendency into an actuality, the permanent \u003ci\u003eground\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the tendency itself lies in the organized neural paths by\r\nwhich the cue calls up the experience on the proper occasion,\r\ntogether with its past associates, the sense that the\r\nself was there, the belief that it really happened, etc., etc.,\r\njust as previously described. When the recollection is of\r\nthe \u0027ready\u0027 sort, the resuscitation takes place the instant\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_655\"\u003e[Pg 655]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe occasion arises; when it is slow, resuscitation comes\r\nafter delay. But be the recall prompt or slow, the condition\r\nwhich makes it possible at all (or in other words, the\r\n\u0027retention\u0027 of the experience) is neither more nor less than\r\nthe brain-paths which \u003ci\u003eassociate\u003c/i\u003e the experience with the\r\noccasion and cue of the recall. \u003ci\u003eWhen slumbering, these paths\r\nare the condition of retention; when active, they are the condition\r\nof recall.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 200px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-655-0041.jpg\" style=\"width: 200px\" id=\"img_images_jame_655_0041.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 45.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA simple scheme will now make the whole cause of\r\nmemory plain. Let \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e be a past\r\nevent; \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e its \u0027setting\u0027 (concomitants,\r\ndate, self present, warmth\r\nand intimacy, etc., etc., as already\r\nset forth); and \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e some present\r\nthought or fact which may appropriately\r\nbecome the occasion of its\r\nrecall. Let the nerve-centres, active\r\nin the thought of \u003ci\u003em, n,\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eo,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbe represented by M, N, and O, respectively;\r\nthen the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of the paths M—N and N—O\r\nwill be the fact indicated by the phrase \u0027retention of the\r\nevent \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e in the memory,\u0027 and the \u003ci\u003eexcitement\u003c/i\u003e of the brain along\r\nthese paths will be the condition of the event \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s actual recall.\r\nThe \u003ci\u003eretention\u003c/i\u003e of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, it will be observed, is no mysterious\r\nstoring up of an \u0027idea\u0027 in an unconscious state. It is not a\r\nfact of the mental order at all. It is a purely physical phenomenon,\r\na morphological feature, the presence of these\r\n\u0027paths,\u0027 namely, in the finest recesses of the brain\u0027s tissue.\r\nThe recall or recollection, on the other hand, is a \u003ci\u003epsycho-physical\u003c/i\u003e\r\nphenomenon, with both a bodily and a mental side.\r\nThe bodily side is the functional excitement of the tracts\r\nand paths in question; the mental side is the conscious\r\nvision of the past occurrence, and the belief that we experienced\r\nit before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese habit-worn paths of association are a clear rendering\r\nof what authors mean by \u0027predispositions,\u0027 \u0027vestiges,\u0027\r\n\u0027traces,\u0027 etc., left in the brain by past experience. Most\r\nwriters leave the nature of these vestiges vague; few think\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_656\"\u003e[Pg 656]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof explicitly assimilating them to channels of association.\r\nDr. Maudsley, for example, writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When an idea which we have once had is excited again, there is a\r\nreproduction of the same nervous current, with the conscious addition\r\nthat it is a reproduction—it is the same idea \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e the consciousness that\r\nit is the same. The question then suggests itself, What is the physical\r\ncondition of this consciousness? What is the modification of the anatomical\r\nsubstrata of fibres and cells, or of their physiological activity, which\r\nis the occasion of this \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e element in the reproduced idea? It may be\r\nsupposed that the first activity did leave behind it, when it subsided,\r\nsome after-effect, some modification of the nerve-element, whereby the\r\nnerve-circuit was disposed to fall again readily into the same action;\r\nsuch disposition appearing in consciousness as recognition or memory.\r\nMemory is, in fact, the conscious phase of this physiological disposition\r\nwhen it becomes active or discharges its functions on the recurrence of\r\nthe particular mental experience. To assist our conception of what\r\nmay happen, let us suppose the individual nerve-elements to be endowed\r\nwith their own consciousness, and let us assume them to be, as\r\nI have supposed, modified in a certain way by the first experience; it\r\nis hard to conceive that when they fall into the same action on another\r\noccasion they should not recognize or remember it; for the second\r\naction is a reproduction of the first, with the addition of what it contains\r\nfrom the after-effects of the first. As we have assumed the process\r\nto be conscious, this reproduction with its addition would be a memory\r\nor remembrance.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_582_582\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_582_582\"\u003e[582]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this passage Dr. Maudsley seems to mean by the\r\n\u0027nerve-element,\u0027 or \u0027anatomical substratum of fibres and\r\ncells,\u0027 something that corresponds to the N of our diagram.\r\nAnd the \u0027modification\u0027 he speaks of seems intended to be\r\nunderstood as an internal modification of this same particular\r\ngroup of elements. Now the slightest reflection will convince\r\nanyone that there is no conceivable ground for supposing\r\nthat with the mere re-excitation of N there should arise\r\nthe \u0027conscious addition\u0027 that it is a re-excitation. The two\r\nexcitations are simply two excitations, their consciousnesses\r\nare two consciousnesses, they have nothing to do with each\r\nother. And a vague \u0027modification,\u0027 supposed to be left\r\nbehind by the first excitation, helps us not a whit. For,\r\naccording to all analogy, such a modification can only result\r\nin making the next excitation more smooth and rapid. This\r\nmight make it less \u003ci\u003econscious\u003c/i\u003e, perhaps, but could not endow\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_657\"\u003e[Pg 657]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit with any reference to the past. The gutter is worn\r\ndeeper by each successive shower, but not for that reason\r\nbrought into contact with previous showers. Psychology\r\n(which Dr. Maudsley in his next sentence says \"affords us\r\nnot the least help in this matter\") puts us on the track of\r\nan at least possible brain-explanation. As it is the \u003ci\u003esetting\r\no\u003c/i\u003e of the idea, when it recurs, which makes us conscious\r\nof it as past, so it can be no \u003ci\u003eintrinsic\u003c/i\u003e modification of the\r\n\u0027nerve-element\u0027 N which is the organic condition of memory,\r\nbut something extrinsic to it altogether, namely, its connections\r\nwith those other nerve-elements which we called\r\nO—that letter standing in the scheme for the cerebral substratum\r\nof a great plexus of things other than the principal\r\nevent remembered, dates, names, concrete surroundings,\r\nrealized intervals, and what not. The \u0027modification\u0027 is the\r\nformation in the plastic nerve-substance of the system of\r\nassociative paths between N and O.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only hypothesis, in short, to which the facts of\r\ninward experience give countenance is that \u003ci\u003ethe brain-tracts\r\nexcited by the event proper, and those excited in its recall, are\r\nin part different from each other\u003c/i\u003e. If we could revive the\r\npast event without any associates we should exclude the\r\npossibility of memory, and simply dream that we were undergoing\r\nthe experience as if for the first time.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_583_583\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_583_583\"\u003e[583]\u003c/a\u003e Wherever,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_658\"\u003e[Pg 658]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin fact, the recalled event does appear without a definite\r\nsetting, it is hard to distinguish it from a mere creation of\r\nfancy. But in proportion as its image lingers and recalls associates\r\nwhich gradually become more definite, it grows more\r\nand more distinctly into a remembered thing. For example,\r\nI enter a friend\u0027s room and see on the wall a painting. At\r\nfirst I have the strange, wondering consciousness, \u0027surely\r\nI have seen that before,\u0027 but when or how does not become\r\nclear. There only clings to the picture a sort of penumbra\r\nof familiarity,—when suddenly I exclaim: \"I have it, it is\r\na copy of part of one of the Fra Angelicos in the Florentine\r\nAcademy—I recollect it there!\" But the motive to\r\nthe recall does \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e lie in the fact that the brain-tract now\r\nexcited by the painting was once before excited in a similar\r\nway; it lies simply and solely in the fact that with that\r\nbrain-tract other tracts also are excited: those which sustain\r\nmy friend\u0027s room with all its peculiarities, on the one\r\nhand; those which sustain the mental image of the Florence\r\nAcademy, on the other hand, with the circumstances of my\r\nvisit there; and finally those which make me (more dimly)\r\nthink of the years I have lived through between these two\r\ntimes. The result of this total brain-disturbance is a\r\nthought with a peculiar object, namely, that I who now\r\nstand here with this picture before me, stood so many years\r\nago in the Florentine Academy looking at its original.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Taine has described the gradual way in which a\r\nmental image develops into an object of memory, in his\r\nusual vivid fashion. He says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I meet casually in the street a person whose appearance I am\r\nacquainted with, and say to myself at once that I have seen him before.\r\nInstantly the figure recedes into the past, and wavers about there\r\nvaguely, without at once fixing itself in any spot. It persists in me for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_659\"\u003e[Pg 659]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome time, and surrounds itself with new details. \u0027When I saw him he\r\nwas bare-headed, with a working-jacket on, painting in a studio; he is\r\nso-and-so, of such-and-such a street. But when was it? It was not\r\nyesterday, nor this week, nor recently. I have it: he told me that he\r\nwas waiting for the first leaves to come out to go into the country. It\r\nwas before the spring. But at what exact date? I saw, the same day,\r\npeople carrying branches in the streets and omnibuses: it was Palm\r\nSunday!\u0027 Observe the travels of the internal figure, its various shiftings\r\nto front and rear along the line of the past; each of these mental\r\nsentences has been a swing of the balance. When confronted with\r\nthe present sensation and with the latent swarm of indistinct images\r\nwhich repeat our recent life, the figure first recoiled suddenly to an\r\nindeterminate distance. Then, completed by precise details, and confronted\r\nwith all the shortened images by which we sum up the proceedings\r\nof a day or a week, it again receded beyond the present day, beyond\r\nyesterday, the day before, the week, still farther, beyond the\r\nill-defined mass constituted by our recent recollections. Then something\r\nsaid by the painter was recalled, and it at once receded again\r\nbeyond an almost precise limit, which is marked by the image of the\r\ngreen leaves and denoted by the word spring. A moment afterwards,\r\nthanks to a new detail, the recollection of the branches, it has shifted\r\nagain, but forward this time, not backward; and, by a reference to the\r\ncalendar, is situated at a precise point, a week further back than Easter,\r\nand five weeks nearer than the carnival, by the double effect of the\r\ncontrary impulsions, pushing it, one forward and the other backward,\r\nand which are, at a particular moment, annulled by one another.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_584_584\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_584_584\"\u003e[584]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE CONDITIONS OF GOODNESS IN MEMORY.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe remembered fact being \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, then, the path N—O is\r\nwhat arouses for \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e its setting when it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e recalled, and makes\r\nit other than a mere imagination. The path M—N, on the\r\nother hand, gives the cue or occasion of its being recalled\r\nat all. \u003ci\u003eMemory being this altogether conditioned on brain-paths,\r\nits excellence in a given individual will depend partly on\r\nthe number and partly on the persistence of these paths.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe persistence or permanence of the paths is a physiological\r\nproperty of the brain-tissue of the individual, whilst\r\ntheir number is altogether due to the facts of his mental\r\nexperience. Let the quality of permanence in the paths be\r\ncalled the native tenacity, or physiological retentiveness.\r\nThis tenacity differs enormously from infancy to old age,\r\nand from one person to another. Some minds are like wax\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_660\"\u003e[Pg 660]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunder a seal—no impression, however disconnected with\r\nothers, is wiped out. Others, like a jelly, vibrate to every\r\ntouch, but under usual conditions retain no permanent\r\nmark. These latter minds, before they can recollect a fact,\r\nmust weave it into their permanent stores of knowledge.\r\nThey have no \u003ci\u003edesultory\u003c/i\u003e memory. Those persons, on the\r\ncontrary, who retain names, dates and addresses, anecdotes,\r\ngossip, poetry, quotations, and all sorts of miscellaneous\r\nfacts, without an effort, have desultory memory in a high\r\ndegree, and certainly owe it to the unusual tenacity of their\r\nbrain-substance for any path once formed therein. No\r\none probably was ever effective on a voluminous scale without\r\na high degree of this physiological retentiveness. In\r\nthe practical as in the theoretic life, the man whose acquisitions\r\n\u003ci\u003estick\u003c/i\u003e is the man who is always achieving and advancing,\r\nwhilst his neighbors, spending most of their time in relearning\r\nwhat they once knew but have forgotten, simply hold\r\ntheir own. A Charlemagne, a Luther, a Leibnitz, a Walter\r\nScott, any example, in short, of your quarto or folio editions\r\nof mankind, must needs have amazing retentiveness of the\r\npurely physiological sort. Men without this retentiveness\r\nmay excel in the \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e of their work at this point or at\r\nthat, but will never do such mighty sums of it, or be influential\r\ncontemporaneously on such a scale.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_585_585\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_585_585\"\u003e[585]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_661\"\u003e[Pg 661]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there comes a time of life for all of us when we can\r\ndo no more than hold our own in the way of acquisitions,\r\nwhen the old paths fade as fast as the new ones form in our\r\nbrain, and when we forget in a week quite as much as we\r\ncan learn in the same space of time. This equilibrium may\r\nlast many, many years. In extreme old age it is upset in the\r\nreverse direction, and forgetting prevails over acquisition\r\nor rather there is no acquisition. Brain-paths are so transient\r\nthat in the course of a few minutes of conversation the\r\nsame question is asked and its answer forgotten half a dozen\r\ntimes. Then the superior tenacity of the paths formed in\r\nchildhood becomes manifest: the dotard will retrace the\r\nfacts of his earlier years after he has lost all those of later\r\ndate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the permanence of the paths. Now for\r\ntheir number.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is obvious that the more there are of such paths as\r\nM—N in the brain, and the more of such possible cues or\r\noccasions for the recall of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e in the mind, the prompter and\r\nsurer, on the whole, the memory of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e will be, the more\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_662\"\u003e[Pg 662]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrequently one will be reminded of it, the more avenues of\r\napproach to it one will possess. In mental terms, \u003ci\u003ethe more\r\nother facts a fact is associated with in the mind, the better possession\r\nof it our memory retains.\u003c/i\u003e Each of its associates becomes\r\na hook to which it hangs, a means to fish it up by\r\nwhen sunk beneath the surface. Together, they form a\r\nnetwork of attachments by which it is woven into the\r\nentire tissue of our thought. The \u0027secret of a good memory\u0027\r\nis thus the secret of forming diverse and multiple\r\nassociations with every fact we care to retain. But this\r\nforming of associations with a fact, what is it but \u003ci\u003ethinking\r\nabout\u003c/i\u003e the fact as much as possible? Briefly, then, of two\r\nmen with the same outward experiences and the same\r\namount of mere native tenacity, \u003ci\u003ethe one who\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ethinks\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eover his\r\nexperiences most,\u003c/i\u003e and weaves them into systematic relations\r\nwith each other, \u003ci\u003ewill be the one with the best memory\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nWe see examples of this on every hand. Most men\r\nhave a good memory for facts connected with their own\r\npursuits. The college athlete who remains a dunce at his\r\nbooks will astonish you by his knowledge of men\u0027s \u0027records\u0027\r\nin various feats and games, and will be a walking dictionary\r\nof sporting statistics. The reason is that he is constantly\r\ngoing over these things in his mind, and comparing\r\nand making series of them. They form for him not so\r\nmany odd facts, but a concept-system—so they stick. So the\r\nmerchant remembers prices, the politician other politicians\u0027\r\nspeeches and votes, with a copiousness which amazes outsiders,\r\nbut which the amount of thinking they bestow on\r\nthese subjects easily explains. The great memory for facts\r\nwhich a Darwin and a Spencer reveal in their books is not\r\nincompatible with the possession on their part of a brain\r\nwith only a middling degree of physiological retentiveness.\r\nLet a man early in life set himself the task of verifying\r\nsuch a theory as that of evolution, and facts will soon\r\ncluster and cling to him like grapes to their stem. Their\r\nrelations to the theory will hold them fast; and the more\r\nof these the mind is able to discern, the greater the erudition\r\nwill become. Meanwhile the theorist may have little, if\r\nany, desultory memory. Unutilizable facts may be unnoted\r\nby him and forgotten as soon as heard. An ignorance\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_663\"\u003e[Pg 663]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalmost as encyclopædic as his erudition may coexist with\r\nthe latter, and hide, as it were, in the interstices of its web.\r\nThose who have had much to do with scholars and \u003ci\u003esavants\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwill readily think of examples of the class of mind I mean.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a system, every fact is connected with every other by\r\nsome thought-relation. The consequence is that every fact\r\nis retained by the combined suggestive power of all the\r\nother facts in the system, and forgetfulness is well-nigh\r\nimpossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reason why \u003ci\u003ecramming\u003c/i\u003e is such a bad mode of study\r\nis now made clear. I mean by cramming that way of preparing\r\nfor examinations by committing \u0027points\u0027 to memory\r\nduring a few hours or days of intense application immediately\r\npreceding the final ordeal, little or no work having\r\nbeen performed during the previous course of the term.\r\nThings learned thus in a few hours, on one occasion, for\r\none purpose, cannot possibly have formed many associations\r\nwith other things in the mind. Their brain-processes are\r\nled into by few paths, and are relatively little liable to be\r\nawakened again. Speedy oblivion is the almost inevitable\r\nfate of all that is committed to memory in this simple way.\r\nWhereas, on the contrary, the same materials taken in\r\ngradually, day after day, recurring in different contexts,\r\nconsidered in various relations, associated with other external\r\nincidents, and repeatedly reflected on, grow into such a\r\nsystem, form such connections with the rest of the mind\u0027s\r\nfabric, lie open to so many paths of approach, that they\r\nremain permanent possessions. This is the \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e reason\r\nwhy habits of continuous application should be enforced\r\nin educational establishments. Of course there is no moral\r\nturpitude in cramming. If it led to the desired end of\r\nsecure learning it would be infinitely the best method of\r\nstudy. But it does not; and students themselves should\r\nunderstand the reason why.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eONE\u0027S NATIVE RETENTIVENESS IS UNCHANGEABLE.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will now appear clear that \u003ci\u003eall improvement of the\r\nmemory lies in the line of\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eelaborating the associates\u003c/span\u003e of\r\neach of the several things to be remembered. \u003ci\u003eNo amount\r\nof culture would seem capable of modifying a man\u0027s\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_664\"\u003e[Pg 664]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eretentiveness\u003c/i\u003e. This is a physiological quality, given once\r\nfor all with his organization, and which he can never hope\r\nto change. It differs no doubt in disease and health; and\r\nit is a fact of observation that it is better in fresh and\r\nvigorous hours than when we are fagged or ill. We may\r\nsay, then, that a man\u0027s native tenacity will fluctuate somewhat\r\nwith his hygiene, and that whatever is good for his\r\ntone of health will also be good for his memory. We may\r\neven say that whatever amount of intellectual exercise is\r\nbracing to the general tone and nutrition of the brain will\r\nalso be profitable to the general retentiveness. But more\r\nthan this we cannot say; and this, it is obvious, is far less\r\nthan most people believe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, in fact, commonly thought that certain exercises,\r\nsystematically repeated, will strengthen, not only a man\u0027s\r\nremembrance of the particular facts used in the exercises,\r\nbut his faculty for remembering facts at large. And a\r\nplausible case is always made out by saying that practice\r\nin learning words by heart makes it easier to learn new\r\nwords in the same way.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_586_586\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_586_586\"\u003e[586]\u003c/a\u003e If this be true, then what\r\nI have just said is false, and the whole doctrine of memory\r\nas due to \u0027paths\u0027 must be revised. But I am disposed\r\nto think the alleged fact untrue. I have carefully\r\nquestioned several mature actors on the point, and all have\r\ndenied that the practice of learning parts has made any\r\nsuch difference as is alleged. What it has done for them\r\nis to improve their power of \u003ci\u003estudying\u003c/i\u003e a part systematically.\r\nTheir mind is now full of precedents in the way of intonation,\r\nemphasis, gesticulation; the new words awaken distinct\r\nsuggestions and decisions; are caught up, in fact, into\r\na pre-existing net-work, like the merchant\u0027s prices, or the\r\nathlete\u0027s store of \u0027records,\u0027 and are recollected easier, although\r\nthe mere native tenacity is not a whit improved,\r\nand is usually, in fact, impaired by age. It is a case of better\r\nremembering by better \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e. Similarly when schoolboys\r\nimprove by practice in ease of learning by heart, the\r\nimprovement will, I am sure, be always found to reside in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_665\"\u003e[Pg 665]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emode of study of the particular piece\u003c/i\u003e (due to the greater\r\ninterest, the greater suggestiveness, the generic similarity\r\nwith other pieces, the more sustained attention, etc., etc.),\r\nand not at all to any enhancement of the brute retentive\r\npower.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe error I speak of pervades an otherwise useful and\r\njudicious book, \u0027How to Strengthen the Memory,\u0027 by Dr.\r\nHolbrook of New York.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_587_587\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_587_587\"\u003e[587]\u003c/a\u003e The author fails to distinguish\r\nbetween the general physiological retentiveness and the retention\r\nof particular things, and talks as if both must be\r\nbenefited by the same means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I am now treating,\" he says, \"a case of loss of memory in a person\r\nadvanced in years, who did not know that his memory had failed\r\nmost remarkably till I told him of it. He is making vigorous efforts\r\nto bring it back again, and with partial success. The method pursued\r\nis to spend two hours daily, one in the morning and one in the evening,\r\nin exercising this faculty. The patient is instructed to give the closest\r\nattention to all that he learns, so that it shall be impressed on his mind\r\nclearly. He is asked to recall every evening all the facts and experiences\r\nof the day, and again the next morning. Every name heard is\r\nwritten down and impressed on his mind clearly, and an effort made\r\nto recall it at intervals. Ten names from among public men are ordered\r\nto be committed to memory every week. A verse of poetry is to\r\nbe learned, also a verse from the Bible, daily. He is asked to remember\r\nthe number of the page in any book where any interesting fact is\r\nrecorded. These and other methods are slowly resuscitating a failing\r\nmemory.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_588_588\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_588_588\"\u003e[588]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI find it very hard to believe that the memory of the\r\npoor old gentleman is a bit the better for all this torture\r\nexcept in respect of the particular facts thus wrought into\r\nit, the occurrences attended to and repeated on those days,\r\nthe names of those politicians, those Bible verses, etc., etc.\r\nIn another place Dr. Holbrook quotes the account given by\r\nthe late Thurlow Weed, journalist and politician, of his\r\nmethod of strengthening his memory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"My memory was a sieve. I could remember nothing. Dates,\r\nnames, appointments, faces—everything escaped me. I said to my\r\nwife, \u0027Catherine, I shall never make a successful politician, for I cannot\r\nremember, and that is a prime necessity of politicians.\u0027 My wife\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_666\"\u003e[Pg 666]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntold me I must train my memory. So when I came home that night, I\r\nsat down alone and spent fifteen minutes trying silently to recall with\r\naccuracy the principal events of the day. I could remember but little\r\nat first; now I remember that I could not then recall what I had for\r\nbreakfast. After a few days\u0027 practice I found I could recall more.\r\nEvents came back to me more minutely, more accurately, and more\r\nvividly than at first. After a fortnight or so of this, Catherine said,\r\n\u0027Why don\u0027t you relate to me the events of the day, instead of recalling\r\nthem to yourself? It would be interesting, and my interest in it would\r\nbe a stimulus to you.\u0027 Having great respect for my wife\u0027s opinion, I\r\nbegan a habit of oral confession, as it were, which was continued for\r\nalmost fifty years. Every night, the last thing before retiring, I told\r\nher everything I could remember that had happened to me or about me\r\nduring the day. I generally recalled the dishes I had had for breakfast,\r\ndinner, and tea; the people I had seen and what they had said;\r\nthe editorials I had written for my paper, giving her a brief abstract of\r\nthem. I mentioned all the letters I had sent and received, and the very\r\nlanguage used, as nearly as possible; when I had walked or ridden—I\r\ntold her everything that had come within my observation. I found I\r\ncould say my lessons better and better every year, and instead of the\r\npractice growing irksome, it became a pleasure to go over again the\r\nevents of the day. I am indebted to this discipline for a memory of\r\nsomewhat unusual tenacity, and I recommend the practice to all who wish\r\nto store up facts, or expect to have much to do with influencing men.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_589_589\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_589_589\"\u003e[589]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not doubt that Mr. Weed\u0027s practical command\r\nof his past experiences was much greater after fifty years\r\nof this heroic drill than it would have been without it.\r\nExpecting to give his account in the evening, he attended\r\nbetter to each incident of the day, named and conceived it\r\ndifferently, set his mind upon it, and in the evening went\r\nover it again. He did \u003ci\u003emore thinking\u003c/i\u003e about it, and it stayed\r\nwith him in consequence. But I venture to affirm pretty\r\nconfidently (although I know how foolish it often is to deny\r\na fact on the strength of a theory) that the same matter,\r\n\u003ci\u003ecasually attended to and not thought about,\u003c/i\u003e would have stuck\r\nin his memory no better at the end than at the beginning\r\nof his years of heroic self-discipline. He had acquired a\r\nbetter method of noting and recording his experiences, but\r\nhis physiological retentiveness was probably not a bit improved.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_590_590\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_590_590\"\u003e[590]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_667\"\u003e[Pg 667]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAll improvement of memory consists, then, in the improvement\r\nof one\u0027s habitual methods of recording facts.\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_668\"\u003e[Pg 668]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn the traditional terminology methods are divided into\r\nthe mechanical, the ingenious, and the judicious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003emechanical methods\u003c/i\u003e consist in the intensification, prolongation,\r\nand \u003ci\u003erepetition\u003c/i\u003e of the impression to be remembered.\r\nThe modern method of teaching children to read by blackboard\r\nwork, in which each word is impressed by the four-fold\r\nchannel of eye, ear, voice, and hand, is an example of\r\nan improved mechanical method of memorizing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eJudicious methods\u003c/i\u003e of remembering things are nothing but\r\nlogical ways of conceiving them and working them into\r\nrational systems, classifying them, analyzing them into\r\nparts, etc., etc. All the sciences are such methods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf \u003ci\u003eingenious methods\u003c/i\u003e, many have been invented, under the\r\nname of technical memories. By means of these systems\r\nit is often possible to retain entirely disconnected facts,\r\nlists of names, numbers, and so forth, so multitudinous as\r\nto be entirely unrememberable in a natural way. The\r\nmethod consists usually in a framework learned mechanically,\r\nof which the mind is supposed to remain in secure\r\nand permanent possession. Then, whatever is to be remembered\r\nis deliberately associated by some fanciful\r\nanalogy or connection with some part of this framework,\r\nand this connection thenceforward helps its recall. The\r\nbest known and most used of these devices is the figure-alphabet.\r\nTo remember numbers, e.g., a figure-alphabet\r\nis first formed, in which each numerical digit is represented\r\nby one or more letters. The number is then translated into\r\nsuch letters as will best make a word, if possible a word\r\nsuggestive of the object to which the number belongs.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_669\"\u003e[Pg 669]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe word will then be remembered when the numbers\r\nalone might be forgotten.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The most common figure-alphabet is this:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e1, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e2, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e3, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e4, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e5, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e6, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e7, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e8, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e9, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e0.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003et,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003en,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003em,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003er,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003el,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003esh, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eg,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ef,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eb,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003es,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ed,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ej,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ek,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ev,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ep,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ec,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ech, \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ec,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003ez,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003eg,\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003equ. \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd style=\"text-align: left;\"\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To briefly show its use, suppose it is desired to fix 1142 feet in a\r\nsecond as the velocity of sound: t, t, r, n, are the letters and order\r\nrequired. Fill up with vowels forming a phrase, like \u0027tight run\u0027 and\r\nconnect it by some such flight of the imagination as that if a man tried\r\nto keep up with the velocity of sound, he would have a tight run.\r\nWhen you recall this a few days later great care must be taken not to\r\nget confused with the velocity of light, nor to think he had a \u003ci\u003ehard\u003c/i\u003e run\r\nwhich would be 3000 feet too fast.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_591_591\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_591_591\"\u003e[591]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Pick and others use a system which consists in\r\nlinking together any two ideas to be remembered by means\r\nof an intermediate idea which will be suggested by the\r\nfirst and suggest the second, and so on through the list.\r\nThus,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Let us suppose that we are to retain the following series of ideas:\r\ngarden, hair, watchman, philosophy, copper, etc…. We can combine\r\nthe ideas in this manner: \u003ci\u003egarden,\u003c/i\u003e plant, hair of plant—\u003ci\u003ehair; hair,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbonnet, \u003ci\u003ewatchman;—watchman,\u003c/i\u003e wake, study, \u003ci\u003ephilosophy; philosophy,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nchemistry, \u003ci\u003ecopper\u003c/i\u003e; etc. etc.\" (Pick.)\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_592_592\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_592_592\"\u003e[592]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is matter of popular knowledge that an impression\r\nis remembered the better in proportion as it is\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) More recent;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) More attended to; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) More often repeated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe effect of recency is all but absolutely constant. Of\r\ntwo events of equal significance the remoter one will be\r\nthe one more likely to be forgotten. The memories of\r\nchildhood which persist in old age can hardly be compared\r\nwith the events of the day or hour which are forgotten, for\r\nthese latter are trivial once-repeated things, whilst the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_670\"\u003e[Pg 670]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchildish reminiscences have been wrought into us during\r\nthe retrospective hours of our entire intervening life. \u003ci\u003eOther\r\nthings equal\u003c/i\u003e, at all times of life recency promotes memory.\r\nThe only exception I can think of is the unaccountable\r\nmemory of certain moments of our childhood, apparently\r\nnot fitted by their intrinsic interest to survive, but which are\r\nperhaps the only incidents we can remember out of the\r\nyear in which they occurred. Everybody probably has\r\nisolated glimpses of certain hours of his nursery life, the\r\nposition in which he stood or sat, the light of the room,\r\nwhat his father or mother said, etc. These moments so\r\noddly selected for immunity from the tooth of time probably\r\nowe their good fortune to historical peculiarities which\r\nit is now impossible to trace. Very likely we were reminded\r\nof them again soon after they occurred; that became\r\na reason why we should again recollect them, etc.,\r\nso that at last they became ingrained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eattention\u003c/i\u003e which we lend to an experience is proportional\r\nto its vivid or interesting character; and it is a notorious\r\nfact that what interests us most vividly at the time\r\nis, other things equal, what we remember best. An impression\r\nmay be so exciting emotionally as almost to leave a\r\n\u003ci\u003escar\u003c/i\u003e upon the cerebral tissues; and thus originates a pathological\r\ndelusion. \"A woman attacked by robbers takes\r\nall the men whom she sees, even her own son, for brigands\r\nbent on killing her. Another woman sees her child run\r\nover by a horse; no amount of reasoning, not even the sight\r\nof the living child, will persuade her that he is not killed.\r\nA woman called \u0027thief\u0027 in a dispute remains convinced that\r\nevery one accuses her of stealing (Esquirol). Another, attacked\r\nwith mania at the sight of the fires in her street\r\nduring the Commune, still after six months sees in her delirium\r\nflames on every side about her (Luys), etc., etc.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_593_593\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_593_593\"\u003e[593]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the general effectiveness of both attention and repetition\r\nI cannot do better than copy what M. Taine has\r\nwritten:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If we compare different sensations, images, or ideas, we find that\r\ntheir aptitudes for revival are not equal. A large number of them are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_671\"\u003e[Pg 671]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobliterated, and never reappear through life; for instance, I drove\r\nthrough Paris a day or two ago, and though I saw plainly some sixty\r\nor eighty new faces, I cannot now recall any one of them; some extraordinary\r\ncircumstance, a fit of delirium, or the excitement of haschish\r\nwould be necessary to give them a chance of revival. On the other\r\nhand, there are sensations with a force of revival which nothing destroys\r\nor decreases. Though, as a rule, time weakens and impairs our\r\nstrongest sensations, these reappear entire and intense, without having\r\nlost a particle of their detail, or any degree of their force. M. Brierre\r\nde Boismont, having suffered when a child from a disease of the scalp,\r\nasserts that \u0027after fifty-five years have elapsed he can still feel his hair\r\npulled out under the treatment of the \u003ci\u003eskull-cap\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027—For my own part,\r\nafter thirty years, I remember feature for feature the appearance of the\r\ntheatre to which I was taken for the first time. From the third row of\r\nboxes, the body of the theatre appeared to me an immense well, red\r\nand flaming, swarming with heads; below, on the right, on a narrow\r\nfloor, two men and a woman entered, went out, and re-entered, made\r\ngestures, and seemed to me like lively dwarfs: to my great surprise,\r\none of these dwarfs fell on his knees, kissed the lady\u0027s hand, then hid\r\nbehind a screen; the other, who was coming in, seemed angry, and\r\nraised his arm. I was then seven, I could understand nothing of what\r\nwas going on; but the well of crimson velvet was so crowded, gilded,\r\nand bright, that after a quarter of an hour I was, as it were, intoxicated,\r\nand fell asleep.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Every one of us may find similar recollections in his memory, and\r\nmay distinguish in them a common character. The primitive impression\r\nhas been accompanied \u003ci\u003eby an extraordinary degree of attention\u003c/i\u003e,\r\neither as being horrible or delightful, or as being new, surprising, and\r\nout of proportion to the ordinary run of our life; this it is we express\r\nby saying that we have been strongly impressed; that we were absorbed,\r\nthat we could not think of anything else; that our other sensations\r\nwere effaced; that we were pursued all the next day by the resulting\r\nimage; that it beset us, that we could not drive it away; that\r\nall distractions were feeble beside it. It is by force of this disproportion\r\nthat impressions of childhood are so persistent; the mind being\r\nquite fresh, ordinary objects and events are surprising. At present,\r\nafter seeing so many large halls and full theatres, it is impossible for\r\nme, when I enter one, to feel swallowed up, engulfed, and, as it were,\r\nlost in a huge dazzling well. The medical man of sixty, who has experienced\r\nmuch suffering, both personally and in imagination, would be\r\nless upset now by a surgical operation than when he was a child.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Whatever may be the kind of attention, voluntary or involuntary,\r\nit always acts alike; the image of an object or event is capable of revival,\r\nand of complete revival, in proportion to the degree of attention\r\nwith which we have considered the object or event. We put this\r\nrule in practice at every moment in ordinary life. If we are applying\r\nourselves to a book or are in lively conversation, while an air\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_672\"\u003e[Pg 672]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis being sung in the adjoining room, we do not retain it; we know\r\nvaguely that there is singing going on, and that is all. We then\r\nstop our reading or conversation, we lay aside all internal preoccupations\r\nand external sensations which our mind or the outer world can\r\nthrow in our way; we close our eyes, we cause a silence within and\r\nabout us, and, if the air is repeated, we listen. We say then that we\r\nhave listened with all our ears, that we have applied our whole minds.\r\nIf the air is a fine one, and has touched us deeply, we add that we have\r\nbeen transported, uplifted, ravished, that we have forgotten the world\r\nand ourselves; that for some minutes our soul was dead to all but\r\nsounds….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This exclusive momentary ascendency of one of our states of mind\r\nexplains the greater durability of its aptitude for revival and for more\r\ncomplete revival. As the sensation revives in the image, the image\r\nreappears with a force proportioned to that of the sensation. What we\r\nmeet with in the first state is also to be met with in the second, since\r\nthe second is but a revival of the first. So, in the struggle for life, in\r\nwhich all our images are constantly engaged, the one furnished at the\r\noutset with most force retains in each conflict, by the very law of repetition\r\nwhich gives it being, the capacity of treading down its adversaries;\r\nthis is why it revives, incessantly at first, then frequently, until\r\nat last the laws of progressive decay, and the continual accession of\r\nnew impressions take away its preponderance, and its competitors,\r\nfinding a clear field, are able to develop in their turn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A second cause of prolonged revivals is repetition itself. Every\r\none knows that to learn a thing we must not only consider it attentively,\r\nbut consider it repeatedly. We say as to this in ordinary language,\r\nthat an impression many times renewed is imprinted more deeply and\r\nexactly on the memory. This is how we contrive to retain a language,\r\nairs of music, passages of verse or prose, the technical terms and propositions\r\nof a science, and still more so the ordinary facts by which our\r\nconduct is regulated. When, from the form and color of a currant-jelly,\r\nwe think of its taste, or, when tasting it with our eyes shut, we\r\nimagine its red tint and the brilliancy of a quivering slice, the images\r\nin our mind are brightened by repetition. Whenever we eat, or drink,\r\nor walk, or avail ourselves of any of our senses, or commence or continue\r\nany action whatever, the same thing happens. Every man and\r\nevery animal thus possesses at every moment of life a certain stock of\r\nclear and easily reviving images, which had their source in the past in\r\na confluence of numerous experiences, and are now fed by a flow of renewed\r\nexperiences. When I want to go from the Tuileries to the Panthéon,\r\nor from my study to the dining-room, I foresee at every turn\r\nthe colored forms which will present themselves to my sight; it is otherwise\r\nin the case of a house where I have spent two hours, or of a\r\ntown where I have stayed three days; after ten years have elapsed the\r\nimages will be vague, full of blanks, sometimes they will not exist, and\r\nI shall have to seek my way or shall lose myself.—This new property of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_673\"\u003e[Pg 673]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimages is also derived from the first. As every sensation tends to revive\r\nin its image, the sensation twice repeated will leave after it a double\r\ntendency, that is, provided the attention be as great the second time as\r\nthe first; usually this is not the case, for, the novelty diminishing, the\r\ninterest diminishes; but if other circumstances renew the interest, or if\r\nthe will renovates the attention, the incessantly increasing tendency\r\nwill incessantly increase the chances of the resurrection and integrity\r\nof the image.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_594_594\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_594_594\"\u003e[594]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf a phenomenon is met with, however, too often, and\r\nwith too great a variety of contexts, although its image is\r\nretained and reproduced with correspondingly great facility,\r\nit fails to come up with any one particular setting, and\r\nthe projection of it backwards to a particular past date\r\nconsequently does not come about. We \u003ci\u003erecognize\u003c/i\u003e but do\r\nnot \u003ci\u003eremember\u003c/i\u003e it—its associates form too confused a cloud.\r\nNo one is said to remember, says Mr. Spencer,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"that the object at which he looks has an opposite side; or that a certain\r\nmodification of the visual impression implies a certain distance;\r\nor that the thing he sees moving about is a live animal. To ask a man\r\nwhether he remembers that the sun shines, that fire burns, that iron is\r\nhard, would be a misuse of language. Even the almost fortuitous connections\r\namong our experiences cease to be classed as memories when\r\nthey have become thoroughly familiar. Though, on hearing the voice\r\ncf some unseen person slightly known to us, we say we recollect to\r\nwhom the voice belongs, we do not use the same expression respecting\r\nthe voices of those with whom we live. The meanings of words which\r\nin childhood have to be consciously recalled seem in adult life to be\r\nimmediately present.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_595_595\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_595_595\"\u003e[595]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese are cases where too many paths, leading to too\r\ndiverse associates, block each other\u0027s way, and all that the\r\nmind gets along with its object is a fringe of felt familiarity\r\nor sense that there \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e associates. A similar result comes\r\nabout when a definite setting is only nascently aroused. We\r\nthen feel that we have seen the object already, but when or\r\nwhere we cannot say, though we may seem to ourselves to\r\nbe on the brink of saying it. That nascent cerebral excitations\r\ncan effect consciousness with a sort of sense of the\r\nimminence of that which stronger excitations would make\r\nus definitely feel, is obvious from what happens when we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_674\"\u003e[Pg 674]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nseek to remember a name. It tingles, it trembles on the\r\nverge, but does not come. Just such a tingling and trembling\r\nof unrecovered associates is the penumbra of recognition\r\nthat may surround any experience and make it\r\nseem familiar, though we know not why.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_596_596\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_596_596\"\u003e[596]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_675\"\u003e[Pg 675]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a curious experience which everyone seems to\r\nhave had—the feeling that the present moment in its completeness\r\nhas been experienced before—we were saying just\r\nthis thing, in just this place, to just these people, etc. This\r\n\u0027sense of pre-existence\u0027 has been treated as a great mystery\r\nand occasioned much speculation. Dr. Wigan considered\r\nit due to a dissociation of the action of the two hemispheres,\r\none of them becoming conscious a little later than\r\nthe other, but both of the same fact.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_597_597\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_597_597\"\u003e[597]\u003c/a\u003e I must confess that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_676\"\u003e[Pg 676]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe quality of mystery seems to me a little strained. I have\r\nover and over again in my own case succeeded in resolving\r\nthe phenomenon into a case of memory, so indistinct that\r\nwhilst some past circumstances are presented again,\r\nthe others are not. The dissimilar portions of the past do\r\nnot arise completely enough at first for the date to be identified,\r\nAll we get is the present scene with a general suggestion\r\nof pastness about it. That faithful observer, Prof.\r\nLazarus, interprets the phenomenon in the same way;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_598_598\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_598_598\"\u003e[598]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nit is noteworthy that just as soon as the past context grows\r\ncomplete and distinct the emotion of weirdness fades from\r\nthe experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eEXACT MEASUREMENTS OF MEMORY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ehave recently been made in Germany. Professor Ebbinghaus,\r\nin a really heroic series of daily observations\r\nof more than two years\u0027 duration, examined the powers of\r\nretention and reproduction. He learned lists of meaningless\r\nsyllables by heart, and tested his recollection of them\r\nfrom day to day. He could not remember more than 7\r\nafter a single reading. It took, however, 16 readings to remember\r\n12, 44 readings to remember 24, and 55 readings\r\nto remember 26 syllables, the moment of \u0027remembering\u0027\r\nbeing here reckoned as the first moment when the list could\r\nbe recited without a fault.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_599_599\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_599_599\"\u003e[599]\u003c/a\u003e When a 16-syllable list was\r\nread over a certain number of times on one day, and then\r\nstudied on the day following until remembered, it was\r\nfound that the number of seconds saved in the study on\r\nthe second day was proportional to the number of readings\r\non the first—proportional, that is, within certain rather\r\nnarrow limits, for which see the text.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_600_600\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_600_600\"\u003e[600]\u003c/a\u003e No amount of repetition\r\nspent on nonsense-verses over a certain length enabled\r\nDr. Ebbinghaus to retain them without error for 24\r\nhours. In forgetting such things as these lists of syllables,\r\nthe loss goos on very much more rapidly at first than later\r\non. He measured the loss by the number of seconds required\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_677\"\u003e[Pg 677]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto \u003ci\u003erelearn\u003c/i\u003e the list after it had been once learned.\r\nRoughly speaking, if it took a thousand seconds to learn\r\nthe list, and five hundred to relearn it, the loss between the\r\ntwo learnings would have been one half. Measured in this\r\nway, full half of the forgetting seems to occur within the\r\nfirst half-hour, whilst only four fifths is forgotten at the\r\nend of a month. The nature of this result might have\r\nbeen anticipated, but hardly its numerical proportions.\r\nDr. Ebbinghaus says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The initial rapidity, as well as the final slowness, as these were ascertained\r\nunder certain experimental conditions and for a particular\r\nindividual,… may well surprise us. An hour after the work of learning\r\nhad ceased, forgetting was so far advanced that more than half of\r\nthe original work had to be applied again before the series of syllables\r\ncould once more be reproduced. Eight hours later two thirds of the\r\noriginal labor had to be applied. Gradually, however, the process of\r\noblivion grew slower, so that even for considerable stretches of time\r\nthe losses were but barely ascertainable. After 24 hours a third, after\r\n6 days a fourth, and after a whole month a good fifth of the original\r\nlabor remain in the shape of its after-effects, and made the relearning\r\nby so much the more speedy.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_601_601\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_601_601\"\u003e[601]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the most interesting result of all those reached by\r\nthis author relates to the question whether ideas are recalled\r\nonly by those that previously came immediately before\r\nthem, or whether an idea can possibly recall another\r\nidea with which it was never in \u003ci\u003eimmediate\u003c/i\u003e contact, without\r\npassing through the intermediate mental links. The question\r\nis of theoretic importance with regard to the way in\r\nwhich the process of \u0027association of ideas\u0027 must be conceived;\r\nand Dr. Ebbinghaus\u0027s attempt is as successful as\r\nit is original, in bringing two views, which seem at first\r\nsight inaccessible to proof, to a direct practical test, and\r\ngiving the victory to one of them. His experiments conclusively\r\nshow that an idea is not only \u0027associated\u0027 directly\r\nwith the one that follows it, and with the rest \u003ci\u003ethrough that\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbut that it is \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e associated with \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e that are near it,\r\nthough in unequal degrees. He first measured the time\r\nneeded to impress on the memory certain lists of syllables,\r\nand then the time needed to impress lists of the same\r\nsyllables with gaps between them. Thus, representing the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_678\"\u003e[Pg 678]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsyllables by numbers, if the first list were 1, 2, 3, 4,… 13,\r\n14, 15, 16, the second would be 1, 3, 5,… 15, 2, 4, 6,…\r\n16, and so forth, with many variations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if 1 and 3 in the first list were learned in that order\r\nmerely by 1 calling up 2, and by 2 calling up 3, leaving out\r\nthe 2 ought to leave 1 and 3 with no tie in the mind; and\r\nthe second list ought to take as much time in the learning\r\nas if the first list had never been heard of. If, on the other\r\nhand, 1 has a \u003ci\u003edirect\u003c/i\u003e influence on 3 as well as on 2, that influence\r\nshould be exerted even when 2 is dropped out; and\r\na person familiar with the first list ought to learn the\r\nsecond one more rapidly than otherwise he could. This\r\nlatter case is what actually occurs; and Dr. Ebbinghaus\r\nhas found that syllables originally separated by as many as\r\nseven intermediaries still reveal, by the increased rapidity\r\nwith which they are learned in order, the strength of the\r\ntie that the original learning established between them,\r\nover the heads, so to speak, of all the rest. These last results\r\nought to make us careful, when we speak of nervous\r\n\u0027paths,\u0027 to use the word in no restricted sense. They add\r\none more fact to the set of facts which prove that association\r\nis subtler than consciousness, and that a nerve-process\r\nmay, without producing consciousness, be effective in the\r\nsame way in which consciousness would have seemed to be\r\neffective if it had been there.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_602_602\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_602_602\"\u003e[602]\u003c/a\u003e Evidently the path from 1\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_679\"\u003e[Pg 679]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto 3 (omitting 2 from consciousness) is facilitated, broadened\r\nperhaps, by the old path from 1 to 3 through 2—only\r\nthe component which shoots round through this latter way\r\nis too feeble to let 2 be thought as a distinct object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Wolfe, in his experiments on recognition, used vibrating\r\nmetal tongues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"These tongues gave tones differing by 2 vibrations only in the two\r\nlower octaves, and by 4 vibrations in the three higher octaves. In the\r\nfirst series of experiments a tone was selected, and, after sounding it\r\nfor one second, a second tone was sounded, which was either the same\r\nas the first, or different from it by 4, 8, or 12 vibrations in different\r\nseries. The person experimented upon was to answer whether the\r\nsecond tone was the same as the first, thus showing that he recognized\r\nit, or whether it was different, and, if so, whether it was higher or\r\nlower. Of course, the interval of time between the two tones was an\r\nimportant factor. The proportionate number of correct judgments,\r\nand the smallness of the difference of the vibration-rates of the two\r\ntones, would measure the accuracy of the tone-memory. It appeared\r\nthat one could tell more readily when the two tones were alike than\r\nwhen they were different, although in both cases the accuracy of the\r\nmemory was remarkably good…. The main point is the effect of the\r\ntime-interval between the tone and its reproduction. This was varied\r\nfrom 1 second to 30 seconds, or even to 60 seconds or 120 seconds in\r\nsome experiments. The general result is, that the longer the interval,\r\nthe smaller are the chances that the tone will be recognized; and this\r\nprocess of forgetting takes place at first very rapidly, and then more\r\nslowly…. This law is subject to considerable variations, one of which\r\nseems to be constant and is peculiar; namely, there seems to be a\r\nrhythm in the memory itself, which, after falling, recovers slightly, and\r\nthen fades out again.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_603_603\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_603_603\"\u003e[603]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis periodical renewal of acoustic memory would seem\r\nto be an important element in the production of the agreeableness\r\nof certain rates of recurrence in sound.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eFORGETTING.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as important\r\na function as recollecting.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke says, in a memorable page of his dear old book:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The memory of some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a\r\nmiracle; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_680\"\u003e[Pg 680]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neven of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive:\r\nso that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the\r\nsenses, or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned\r\nthem, the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen.\r\nThus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often die before us; and\r\nour minds represent to us those tombs to which we are fast approaching;\r\nwhere, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions\r\nare effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures\r\ndrawn in our minds are laid in fading colors; and, if not sometimes\r\nrefreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our\r\nbodies, and the make of our animal spirits, are concerned in this;\r\nand whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in some\r\nit retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone,\r\nand in others little better than sand, I shall not here inquire,\r\nthough it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does\r\nsometimes influence the memory; since we oftentimes find a disease\r\nquite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few\r\ndays calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seemed to\r\nbe as lasting as if graven in marble.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_604_604\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_604_604\"\u003e[604]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis peculiar mixture of forgetting with our remembering\r\nis but one instance of our mind\u0027s selective activity.\r\nSelection is the very keel on which our mental ship is built.\r\nAnd in this case of memory its utility is obvious. If we\r\nremembered everything, we should on most occasions be\r\nas ill off as if we remembered nothing. It would take as\r\nlong for us to recall a space of time as it took the original\r\ntime to elapse, and we should never get ahead with our\r\nthinking. All recollected times undergo, accordingly, what\r\nM. Ribot calls foreshortening; and this foreshortening is\r\ndue to the omission of an enormous number of the facts\r\nwhich filled them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"As fast as the present enters into the past, our states of consciousness\r\ndisappear and are obliterated. Passed in review at a few days\u0027 distance,\r\nnothing or little of them remains: most of them have made shipwreck\r\nin that great nonentity from which they never more will emerge, and\r\nthey have carried with them the quantity of duration which was inherent\r\nin their being. This deficit of surviving conscious states is thus a\r\ndeficit in the amount of represented time. The process of abridgment,\r\nof foreshortening, of which we have spoken, presupposes this deficit.\r\nIf, in order to reach a distant reminiscence, we had to go through the\r\nentire series of terms which separate it from our present selves, memory\r\nwould become impossible on account of the length of the operation. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_681\"\u003e[Pg 681]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthus reach the paradoxical result that one condition of remembering is\r\nthat we should forget. Without totally forgetting a prodigious number\r\nof states of consciousness, and momentarily forgetting a large number,\r\nwe could not remember at all. Oblivion, except in certain cases, is\r\nthus no malady of memory, but a condition of its health and its\r\nlife.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_605_605\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_605_605\"\u003e[605]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are many irregularities in the process of forgetting\r\nwhich are as yet unaccounted for. A thing forgotten\r\non one day will be remembered on the next. Something\r\nwe have made the most strenuous efforts to recall, but all\r\nin vain, will, soon after we have given up the attempt,\r\nsaunter into the mind, as Emerson somewhere says, as innocently\r\nas if it had never been sent for. Experiences of\r\nbygone date will revive after years of absolute oblivion,\r\noften as the result of some cerebral disease or accident\r\nwhich seems to develop latent paths of association, as the\r\nphotographer\u0027s fluid develops the picture sleeping in the\r\ncollodion film. The oftenest quoted of these cases is Coleridge\u0027s:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In a Roman Catholic town in Germany, a young woman, who\r\ncould neither read nor write, was seized with a fever, and was said\r\nby the priests to be possessed of a devil, because she was heard talking\r\nLatin, Greek, and Hebrew. Whole sheets of her ravings were written\r\nout, and found to consist of sentences intelligible in themselves, but\r\nhaving slight connection with each other. Of her Hebrew sayings, only\r\na few could be traced to the Bible, and most seemed to be in the Rabbinical\r\ndialect. All trick was out of the question; the woman was a\r\nsimple creature; there was no doubt as to the fever. It was long before\r\nany explanation, save that of demoniacal possession, could be obtained.\r\nAt last the mystery was unveiled by a physician, who determined\r\nto trace back the girl\u0027s history, and who, after much trouble,\r\ndiscovered that at the age of nine she had been charitably taken by an\r\nold Protestant pastor, a great Hebrew scholar, in whose house she lived\r\ntill his death. On further inquiry it appeared to have been the old man\u0027s\r\ncustom for years to walk up and down a passage of his house into which\r\nthe kitchen opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice out of his\r\nbooks. The books were ransacked, and among them were found several\r\nof the Greek and Latin Fathers, together with a collection of Rabbinical\r\nwritings. In these works so many of the passages taken down\r\nat the young woman\u0027s bedside were identified that there could be no\r\nreasonable doubt as to their source.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_606_606\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_606_606\"\u003e[606]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_682\"\u003e[Pg 682]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHypnotic subjects as a rule forget all that has happened\r\nin their trance. But in a succeeding trance they will often\r\nremember the events of a past one. This is like what\r\nhappens in those cases of \u0027double personality\u0027 in which\r\nno recollection of one of the lives is to be found in\r\nthe other. We have already seen in an earlier chapter\r\nthat the sensibility often differs from one of the alternate\r\npersonalities to another, and we have heard M. Pierre Janet\u0027s\r\ntheory that anæsthesias carry amnesias with them (see\r\nabove, \u003ca href=\"#Page_385\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 385\u003c/a\u003e ff.). In certain cases this is evidently so;\r\nthe throwing of certain functional brain-tracts out of gear\r\nwith others, so as to dissociate their consciousness from\r\nthat of the remaining brain, throws them out for both sensorial\r\nand ideational service. M. Janet proved in various\r\nways that what his patients forgot when anæsthetic they\r\nremembered when the sensibility returned. For instance,\r\nhe restored their tactile sense temporarily by means of\r\nelectric currents, passes, etc., and then made them handle\r\nvarious objects, such as keys and pencils, or make particular\r\nmovements, like the sign of the cross. The moment the\r\nanæsthesia returned they found it impossible to recollect\r\nthe objects or the acts. \u0027They had had nothing in their\r\nhands, they had done nothing,\u0027 etc. The next day, however,\r\nsensibility being again restored by similar processes, they\r\nremembered perfectly the circumstance, and told what\r\nthey had handled or had done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll these pathological facts are showing us that the\r\nsphere of possible recollection may be wider than we think,\r\nand that in certain matters apparent oblivion is no proof\r\nagainst possible recall under other conditions. They give\r\nno countenance, however, to the extravagant opinion that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_683\"\u003e[Pg 683]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnothing we experience can be absolutely forgotten. In\r\nreal life, in spite of occasional surprises, most of what happens\r\nactually is forgotten. The only reasons for supposing\r\nthat if the conditions were forthcoming everything would\r\nrevive are of a transcendental sort. Sir Wm. Hamilton\r\nquotes and adopts them from the German writer Schmid.\r\nKnowledge being a \u0027spontaneous self-energy\u0027 on the part of\r\nthe mind,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"this energy being once determined, it is natural that it should persist,\r\nuntil again annihilated by other causes. This [annihilation] would be\r\nthe case, were the mind merely passive…. But the mental activity,\r\nthe act of knowledge, of which I now speak, is more than this; it is an\r\nenergy of the self-active power of a subject one and indivisible: consequently\r\na part of the ego must be detached or annihilated, if a cognition\r\nonce existent be again extinguished. Hence it is that the problem\r\nmost difficult of solution is not, how a mental activity endures, but how\r\nit ever vanishes.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_607_607\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_607_607\"\u003e[607]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThose whom such an argument persuades may be left\r\nhappy with their belief. Other positive argument there is\r\nnone, none certainly of a physiological sort.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_608_608\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_608_608\"\u003e[608]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen memory begins to decay, proper names are what\r\ngo first, and at all times proper names are harder to recollect\r\nthan those of general properties and classes of things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis seems due to the fact that common qualities and\r\nnames have contracted an infinitely greater number of associations\r\nin our mind than the names of most of the persons\r\nwhom we know. Their memory is better organized. Proper\r\nnames as well organized as those of our family and friends are\r\nrecollected as well as those of any other objects.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_609_609\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_609_609\"\u003e[609]\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Organization\u0027\r\nmeans numerous associations; and the more numerous\r\nthe associations, the greater the number of paths of recall.\r\nFor the same reason adjectives, conjunctions, prepositions,\r\nand the cardinal verbs, those words, in short, which\r\nform the grammatical framework of all our speech, are the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_684\"\u003e[Pg 684]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvery last to decay. Kussmaul\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_610_610\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_610_610\"\u003e[610]\u003c/a\u003e makes the following acute\r\nremark on this subject:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The concreter a conception is, the sooner is its name forgotten.\r\nThis is because our ideas of persons and things are less strongly bound\r\nup with their names than with such abstractions as their business, their\r\ncircumstances, their qualities. We easily can imagine persons and\r\nthings without their names, the sensorial image of them being more\r\nimportant than that other symbolic image, their name. Abstract conceptions,\r\non the other hand, are only acquired by means of the words\r\nwhich alone serve to confer stability upon them. This is why verbs,\r\nadjectives, pronouns, and still more adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions\r\nare more intimately connected with our thinking than are\r\nsubstantives.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe disease called Aphasia, of which a little was said\r\nin \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_II\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter II\u003c/a\u003e, has let in a flood of light on the phenomenon\r\nof Memory, by showing the number of ways in which\r\nthe use of a given object, like a word, may be lost by the\r\nmind. We may lose our acoustic idea or our articulatory\r\nidea of it; neither without the other will give us proper\r\ncommand of the word. And if we have both, but have lost the\r\npaths of association between the brain-centres which support\r\nthe two, we are in as bad a plight. \u0027Ataxic\u0027 and \u0027amnesic\u0027\r\naphasia, \u0027word-deafness,\u0027 and \u0027associative aphasia\u0027\r\nare all practical losses of word-memory. We have thus, as\r\nM. Ribot says, not memory so much as memories.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_611_611\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_611_611\"\u003e[611]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nvisual, the tactile, the muscular, the auditory memory may\r\nall vary independently of each other in the same individual;\r\nand different individuals may have them developed in different\r\ndegrees. As a rule, a man\u0027s memory is good in the\r\ndepartments in which his interest is strong; but those departments\r\nare apt to be those in which his discriminative\r\nsensibility is high. A man with a bad ear is not likely to\r\nhave practically a good musical memory, or a purblind person\r\nto remember visual appearances well. In a later chapter\r\nwe shall see illustrations of the differences in men\u0027s\r\nimagining power.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_612_612\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_612_612\"\u003e[612]\u003c/a\u003e It is obvious that the machinery of\r\nmemory must be largely determined thereby.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_685\"\u003e[Pg 685]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Galton, in his work on English Men of Science,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_613_613\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_613_613\"\u003e[613]\u003c/a\u003e has\r\ngiven a very interesting collation of cases showing individual\r\nvariations in the type of memory, where it is strong.\r\nSome have it verbal. Others have it good for facts and\r\nfigures, others for form. Most say that what is to be remembered\r\nmust first be rationally conceived and assimilated.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_614_614\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_614_614\"\u003e[614]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is an interesting fact connected with remembering,\r\nwhich, so far as I know, Mr. R. Verdon was the first\r\nwriter expressly to call attention to. We can \u003ci\u003eset\u003c/i\u003e our memory\r\nas it were to retain things for a certain time, and then\r\nlet them depart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Individuals often remember clearly and well up to the time when\r\nthey have to use their knowledge, and then, when it is no longer required,\r\nthere follows a rapid and extensive decay of the traces. Many\r\nschoolboys forget their lessons after they have said them, many barristers\r\nforget details got up for a particular case. Thus a boy learns thirty\r\nlines of Homer, says them perfectly, and then forgets them so that\r\nhe could not say five consecutive lines the next morning, and a barrister\r\nmay be one week learned in the mysteries of making cog-wheels,\r\nbut in the next he may be well acquainted with the anatomy of the ribs\r\ninstead.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_615_615\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_615_615\"\u003e[615]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe rationale of this fact is obscure; and the existence\r\nof it ought to make us feel how truly subtle are the nervous\r\nprocesses which memory involves. Mr. Verdon adds that\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When the use of a record is withdrawn, and attention withdrawn\r\nfrom it, and we think no more about it, we know that we experience a\r\nfeeling of relief, and we may thus conclude that energy is in some way\r\nliberated. If the … attention is not withdrawn, so that we keep\r\nthe record in mind, we know that this feeling of relief does not take\r\nplace…. Also we are well aware, not only that after this feeling of\r\nrelief takes place, the record does not seem so well conserved as before,\r\nbut that we have real difficulty in attempting to remember it.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis shows that we are not as entirely unconscious of a\r\ntopic as we think, during the time in which we seem to be\r\nmerely retaining it subject to recall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_686\"\u003e[Pg 686]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Practically,\" says Mr. Verdon, \"we sometimes keep a matter in\r\nhand not exactly by attending to it, but by keeping our attention referred\r\nto something connected with it from time to time. Translating\r\nthis into the language of physiology, we mean that by referring attention\r\nto a part within, or closely connected with, the system of traces\r\n[paths] required to be remembered, we keep it well fed, so that the\r\ntraces are preserved with the utmost delicacy.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is perhaps as near as we can get to an explanation.\r\nSetting the mind to remember a thing involves a continual\r\nminimal irradiation of excitement into paths which lead\r\nthereto, involves the continued presence of the thing in the\r\n\u0027fringe\u0027 of our consciousness. Letting the thing go involves\r\nwithdrawal of the irradiation, unconsciousness of the thing,\r\nand, after a time, obliteration of the paths.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA curious peculiarity of our memory is that things are\r\nimpressed better by active than by passive repetition. I\r\nmean that in learning by heart (for example), when we almost\r\nknow the piece, it pays better to wait and recollect by an\r\neffort from within, than to look at the book again. If we recover\r\nthe words in the former way, we shall probably know\r\nthem the next time; if in the latter way, we shall very likely\r\nneed the book once more.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-principles-of-psychology-jame-686-0042.jpg\" style=\"width: 150px\" id=\"img_images_jame_686_0042.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"capt02\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 46.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe learning by heart means the\r\nformation of paths from a former set to a later set of cerebral\r\nword-processes: call 1 and 2 in the diagram the processes\r\nin question; then when we remember by inward effort, the\r\npath is formed by discharge from 1 to 2, just as it will afterwards\r\nbe used. But when\r\nwe excite 2 by the eye, although\r\nthe path 1—2 doubtless is then\r\nshot through also, the phenomenon\r\nwhich we are discussing\r\nshows that the direct discharge\r\nfrom 1 into 2, unaided by the\r\neyes, ploughs the deeper and\r\nmore permanent groove. There\r\nis, moreover, a greater amount\r\nof tension accumulated in the\r\nbrain before the discharge from 1 to 2, when the latter\r\ntakes place unaided by the eye. This is proved by the general\r\nfeeling of strain in the effort to remember 2; and this\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_687\"\u003e[Pg 687]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalso ought to make the discharge more violent and the\r\npath more deep. A similar reason doubtless accounts for\r\nthe familiar fact that we remember our own theories, our\r\nown discoveries, combinations, inventions, in short whatever\r\n\u0027ideas\u0027 originate in our own brain, a thousand times better\r\nthan exactly similar things which are communicated to\r\nus from without.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA word, in closing, about the metaphysics involved\r\nin remembering. According to the assumptions of this\r\nbook, thoughts accompany the brain\u0027s workings, and those\r\nthoughts are cognitive of realities. The whole relation is\r\none which we can only write down empirically, confessing\r\nthat no glimmer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That\r\nbrains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this\r\nis the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort\r\nthe consciousness and of what sort the knowledge may be.\r\nSensations, aware of mere qualities, involve the mystery as\r\nmuch as thoughts, aware of complex systems, involve it. To\r\nthe platonizing tradition in philosophy, however, this is\r\nnot so. Sensational consciousness is something \u003ci\u003equasi-material\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nhardly cognitive, which one need not much wonder\r\nat. \u003ci\u003eRelating\u003c/i\u003e consciousness is quite the reverse, and the\r\nmystery of it is unspeakable. Professor Ladd, for example,\r\nin his usually excellent book,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_616_616\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_616_616\"\u003e[616]\u003c/a\u003e after well showing the\r\nmatter-of-fact dependence of retention and reproduction on\r\nbrain-paths, says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In the study of perception psycho-physics \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e do much towards a\r\nscientific explanation. It can tell what qualities of stimuli produce\r\ncertain qualities of sensations, it can suggest a principle relating the\r\nquantity of the stimuli to the intensity of the sensation; it can\r\ninvestigate the laws under which, by combined action of various\r\nexcitations, the \u003ci\u003esensations are combined\u003c/i\u003e [?] into presentations\r\nof sense; it can show how the time-relations of the sensations\r\nand percepts in consciousness correspond to the objective relations\r\nin time of the stimulations. But for that spiritual activity\r\nwhich actually \u003ci\u003eputs together\u003c/i\u003e in consciousness the sensations, it cannot\r\neven suggest the beginning of a physical explanation. Moreover,\r\nno cerebral process can be conceived of, which—in case it\r\nwere known to exist—could possibly be regarded as a fitting basis\r\nfor this unifying \u003ci\u003eactus\u003c/i\u003e of mind. Thus also, and even more emphatically,\r\nmust we insist upon the complete inability of physiology to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_688\"\u003e[Pg 688]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuggest an explanation for conscious memory, in so far as it is \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e—that\r\nis, in so far as it most imperatively calls for explanation….\r\nThe very essence of the act of memory consists in the ability to say:\r\nThis after-image is the image of a percept I had a moment since; or\r\nthis image of memory is the image of the percept I had at a certain\r\ntime—I do not remember precisely how long since. It would, then, be\r\nquite contrary to the facts to hold that, when an image of memory appears\r\nin consciousness, it is recognized as belonging to a particular\r\noriginal percept on account of its perceived resemblance to this percept.\r\nThe original percept does not exist and will never be \u003ci\u003ereproduced\u003c/i\u003e. Even\r\nmore palpably false and absurd would it be to hold that any similarity\r\nof the impressions or processes in end organs or central organs explains\r\nthe act of conscious memory. Consciousness knows nothing of\r\nsuch similarity; knows nothing even of the existence of nervous impressions\r\nand processes. Moreover, we could never \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e two impressions\r\nor processes that are separated in time to be similar, without\r\ninvolving the same inexplicable act of memory. It is a fact of consciousness\r\non which all possibility of connected experience and of\r\nrecorded and cumulative human knowledge is dependent that certain\r\nphases or products of consciousness appear with a claim to stand for\r\n(to represent)\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_617_617\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_617_617\"\u003e[617]\u003c/a\u003e past experiences to which they are regarded as in some\r\nrespect similar. It is this peculiar claim in consciousness which constitutes\r\nthe essence of an act of memory; it is this which makes the\r\nmemory wholly inexplicable as a mere persistence or recurrence of\r\nsimilar impressions. It is this which makes conscious memory a\r\nspiritual phenomenon, the explanation of which, as arising out of nervous\r\nprocesses and conditions, is not simply undiscovered in fact, but\r\nutterly incapable of approach by the imagination. When, then, we\r\nspeak of a physical basis of memory, recognition must be made of the\r\ncomplete inability of science to suggest any physical process which can\r\nbe conceived of as correlated with that peculiar and mysterious \u003ci\u003eactus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the mind, \u003ci\u003econnecting\u003c/i\u003e its present and its past, which constitutes the\r\nessence of memory.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis passage seems to me characteristic of the reigning\r\nhalf-way modes of thought. It puts the difficulties in the\r\nwrong places. At one moment it seems to admit with the\r\ncruder sensationalists that the material of our thoughts is\r\nindependent sensations reproduced, and that the \u0027putting\r\ntogether\u0027 of these sensations would be knowledge, if it\r\ncould only be brought about, the only mystery being as to\r\nthe what \u0027\u003ci\u003eactus\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 can bring it about. At another moment it\r\nseems to contend that even this sort of \u0027combining\u0027 would\r\nnot be knowledge, because certain of the elements connected\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_689\"\u003e[Pg 689]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust \u0027claim to represent or stand for\u0027 past originals,\r\nwhich is incompatible with their being mere images revived.\r\nThe result is various confused and scattered mysteries and\r\nunsatisfied intellectual desires. But why not \u0027pool\u0027 our\r\nmysteries into one great mystery, the mystery that brain-processes\r\noccasion knowledge at all? It is surely no different\r\nmystery to \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e myself by means of one brain-process\r\nwriting at this table now, and by means of a different\r\nbrain-process a year hence to \u003ci\u003eremember\u003c/i\u003e myself writing. All\r\nthat psychology can do is to seek to determine \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nseveral brain-processes are; and this, in a wretchedly imperfect\r\nway, is what such writings as the present chapter\r\nhave begun to do. But of \u0027images reproduced,\u0027 and \u0027claiming\r\nto represent,\u0027 and \u0027put together by a unifying \u003ci\u003eactus\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027\r\nI have been silent, because such expressions either signify\r\nnothing, or they are only roundabout ways of simply saying\r\nthat the \u003ci\u003epast is known\u003c/i\u003e when certain brain-conditions\r\nare fulfilled, and it seems to me that the straightest and\r\nshortest way of saying that is the best.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor a history of opinion about Memory, and other bibliographic\r\nreferences, I must refer to the admirable little\r\nmonograph on the subject by Mr. W. H. Burnham in the\r\nAmerican Journal of Psychology, vols. i and ii. Useful\r\nbooks are: D. Kay\u0027s Memory, What It Is, and How to\r\nImprove It (1888); and F. Fauth\u0027s Das Gedächtniss, Studie\r\nzu einer Pädagogik, etc., 1888.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch5\u003eEND OF VOL. I.\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_567_567\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_567_567\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[567]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e L\u0027Homme et l\u0027Intelligence, p. 32.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_568_568\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_568_568\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[568]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor Richet has therefore no right to say, as he does in another\r\nplace (Revue Philosophique, xxi, 570): \"\u003ci\u003eWithout memory no conscious\r\nsensation, without memory no consciousness.\u003c/i\u003e\" All he is entitled to say is:\r\n\"Without memory no consciousness known outside of itself.\" Of the\r\nsort of consciousness that is an object for later states, and becomes as it\r\nwere permanent, he gives a good example: \"Who of us, alas! has not experienced\r\na bitter and profound grief, the immense laceration cause by the\r\ndeath of some cherished fellow-being? Well, in these great griefs the\r\npresent endures neither for a minute, for an hour, nor for a day, but for\r\nweeks and months. The memory of the cruel moment will not efface\r\nitself from consciousness. It disappears not, but remains living, present,\r\ncoexisting with the multitude of other sensations which are juxtaposed in\r\nconsciousness alongside of this one persistent emotion which is felt always\r\nin the present tense. A long time is needed ere we can attain to forgetting\r\nit, ere we can make it enter into the past. \u003ci\u003eHæret lateri letalis arundo.\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e 583.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_569_569\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_569_569\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[569]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This is the primary positive after-image. According to Helmholtz,\r\none third of a second is the most favorable length of exposure to the light\r\nfor producing it. Longer exposure, complicated by subsequent admission\r\nof light to the eye, results in the ordinary negative and complementary\r\nafter-images, with their changes, which may (if the original impression\r\nwas brilliant and the fixation long) last for many minutes. Fechner gives\r\nthe name of memory-after-images (Psychophysik, ii, 492) to the instantaneous\r\npositive effects, and distinguishes them from ordinary after images\r\nby the following characters: 1) Their originals must have been \u003ci\u003eattended\r\nto\u003c/i\u003e, only such parts of a compound original as have been attended to appearing.\r\nThis is not the case in common visual after-images. 2) The\r\nstrain of attention towards them is inward, as in ordinary remembering,\r\nnot outward, as in observing a common after-image. 3) A short fixation\r\nof the original is better for the memory-after-image, a long one for the\r\nordinary after-image. 4) The colors of the memory-after-image are\r\nnever complementary of those of the original.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_570_570\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_570_570\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[570]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hermann\u0027s Hdbch. ii, 2. 282.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_571_571\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_571_571\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[571]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Rev. Philos., 562.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_572_572\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_572_572\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[572]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Richet says: \"The present has a certain duration, a variable duration,\r\nsometimes a rather long one, which comprehends all the time occupied by\r\nthe after-reverberation [\u003ci\u003eretentissement\u003c/i\u003e, after-image] of a sensation. For example,\r\nif the reverberation of an electric shock within our nerves lasts\r\nten minutes, for that electric shock there is a present of ten minutes. On\r\nthe other hand, a feebler sensation will have a shorter present. But in\r\nevery case, for a conscious sensation [I should say for a \u003ci\u003eremembered\u003c/i\u003e sensation]\r\nto occur, there must be a present of a certain duration, of a few seconds\r\nat least.\" We have seen in the last chapter that it is hard to trace the\r\nbackward limits of this immediately intuited duration, or specious present.\r\nThe figures which M. Richet supposes appear to be considerably too large.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_573_573\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_573_573\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[573]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Fechner, Psychophysik, ii, 499.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_574_574\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_574_574\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[574]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The primary after-image itself cannot be utilized if the stimulus is too\r\nbrief. Mr. Cattell found (Psychologische Studien, iii, p. 93 ff.) that the\r\ncolor of a light must fall upon the eye for a period varying from 0.00275\r\nto 0.006 of a second, in order to be recognized for what it is. Letters\r\nof the alphabet and familiar words require from 0.00075 to 0.00175\r\nsec.—truly an interval extremely short. Some letters, E for example, are\r\nharder than others. In 1871 Helmholtz and Baxt had ascertained that\r\nwhen an impression was immediately followed by another, the latter\r\nquenched the former and prevented it from being known to later consciousness.\r\nThe first stimulus was letters of the alphabet, the second a bright\r\nwhite disk. \"With an interval of 0.0048 sec. between the two excitations\r\n[I copy here the abstract in Ladd\u0027s Physiological Psychology, p. 480],\r\nthe disk appeared as scarcely a trace of a weak shimmer; with an interval\r\nof 0.0096 sec., letters appeared in the shimmer—one or two which could\r\nbe partially recognized when the interval increased to 0.0144 sec. When\r\nthe interval was made 0.0192 sec. the objects were a little more clearly\r\ndiscerned; at 0.00336 sec. four letters could be well recognized; at 0.0432\r\nsec., five letters; and at 0.0528 sec. all the letters could be read.\" (Pflüger\u0027s\r\nArchiv, iv, 325 ff.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_575_575\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_575_575\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[575]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e When the past is recalled symbolically, or conceptually only, it is\r\ntrue that no such copy need be there. In no sort of conceptual knowledge\r\nis it requisite that definitely resembling images be there (cf. \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 471\u003c/a\u003e ff.).\r\nBut as all conceptual knowledge stands for intuitive knowledge, and terminates\r\ntherein, I abstract from this complication, and confine myself to those\r\nmemories in which the past is directly imaged in the mind, or, as we say,\r\nintuitively known.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_576_576\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_576_576\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[576]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g. Spencer, Psychology, i, p. 448. How do the believers in the\r\nsufficiency of the \u0027image\u0027 formulate the cases where we remember that\r\nsomething did \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e happen—that we did not wind our watch, did not lock\r\nthe door, etc.? It is very hard to account for these memories of omission.\r\nThe image of winding the watch is just as present to my mind now\r\nwhen I remember that I did not wind it as if I remembered that I did.\r\nIt must be a difference in the mode of feeling the image which leads me\r\nto such different conclusions in the two cases. When I remember that I\r\ndid wind it, I feel it grown together with its associates of past date and\r\nplace. When I remember that I did not, it keeps aloof; the associates fuse\r\nwith each other, but not with it. This sense of fusion, of the belonging\r\ntogether of things, is a most subtle relation; the sense of non-fusion is\r\nan equally subtle one. Both relations demand most complex mental processes\r\nto know them, processes quite different from that mere presence or\r\nabsence of an image which does such service in the cruder books.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_577_577\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_577_577\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[577]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologia Empirica, § 174.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_578_578\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_578_578\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[578]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis, i, 330-1. Mill believed that the various things remembered,\r\nthe self included, enter consciousness in the form of separate ideas, but so\r\nrapidly that they are \u0027all clustered into one.\u0027 \"Ideas called up in close\r\nconjunction … assume, even when there is the greatest complexity, the\r\nappearance, not of many ideas, but of one\" (vol. i, p. 123). This mythology\r\ndoes not impair the accuracy of his description of memory\u0027s \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_579_579\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_579_579\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[579]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare, however, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 251\u003c/a\u003e, Chapter IX.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_580_580\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_580_580\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[580]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor Bain adds, in a note to this passage of Mill\u0027s: \"This process\r\nseems best expressed by laying down a law of Compound or Composite\r\nAssociation, under which a plurality of feeble links of connection may be\r\na substitute for one powerful and self-sufficing link.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_581_581\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_581_581\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[581]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Analysis, chap. x.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_582_582\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_582_582\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[582]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e H. Maudsley, The Physiology of Mind (London, 1876), p. 513.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_583_583\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_583_583\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[583]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The only fact which might plausibly be alleged against this view is the\r\nfamiliar one that we may feel the lapse of time in an experience so monotonous\r\nthat its earlier portions can have no \u0027associates\u0027 different from its\r\nlater ones. Sit with closed eyes, for example, and steadily pronounce some\r\nvowel-sound, thus, \u003ci\u003ea—a—a—a—a—\u003c/i\u003e … thinking only of the sound.\r\nNothing changes during the time occupied by the experiment, and yet at\r\nthe end of it you know that its beginning was far away. I think, however,\r\nthat a close attention to what happens during this experiment shows\r\nthat it does not violate in the least the conditions of recall laid down\r\nin the text; and that if the moment to which we mentally hark back lie\r\nmany seconds behind the present instant, it always has different associates\r\nby which we define its date. Thus it was when I had just breathed\r\nout, or in; or it was the \u0027first moment\u0027 of the performance, the one \u0027preceded\r\nby silence;\u0027 or it was \u0027one very close to that;\u0027 or it was \u0027one when\r\nwe were looking forward instead of back, as now;\u0027 or it is simply represented\r\nby a number and conceived symbolically with no definite image\r\nof its date. It seems to me that I have no really intuitive discrimination\r\nof the different past moments after the experience has gone on some little\r\ntime, but that back of the \u0027specious present\u0027 they all fuse into a single\r\nconception of the \u003ci\u003ekind of thing\u003c/i\u003e that has been going on, with a more or less\r\nclear sense of the total time it has lasted, this latter being based on an\r\nautomatic counting of the successive pulses of thought by which the\r\nprocess is from moment to moment recognized as being always the same.\r\nWithin the few seconds which constitute the specious present there is an\r\nintuitive perception of the successive moments. But these moments, of\r\nwhich we have a primary memory-image, are not properly \u003ci\u003erecalled\u003c/i\u003e from\r\nthe past, our knowledge of them is in no way analogous to a memory properly\r\nso called. Cf. \u003ci\u003esupra\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_646\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 646\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_584_584\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_584_584\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[584]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On Intelligence, i, 258-9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_585_585\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_585_585\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[585]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Not that \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e native tenacity will make a man great. It must be\r\ncoupled with great passions and great intellect besides. Imbeciles sometimes\r\nhave extraordinary desultory memory. Drobisch describes (Empirische\r\nPsychol., p. 95) the case of a young man whom he examined. He\r\nhad with difficulty been taught to read and speak. \"But if two or three\r\nminutes were allowed him to peruse an octavo page, he then could spell\r\nthe single words out from his memory as well as if the book lay open\r\nbefore him…. That there was no deception I could test by means of a\r\nnew Latin law-dissertation which had just come into my hands, which he\r\nnever could have seen, and of which both subject and language were\r\nunknown to him. He read off [mentally] many lines, skipping about too,\r\nof the page which had been given him to see, no worse than if the experiment\r\nhad been made with a child\u0027s story.\" Drobisch describes this case\r\nas if it were one of unusual persistence in the visual image [\u0027primary\r\nmemory,\u0027 \u003ci\u003evide supra\u003c/i\u003e, p. 643]. But he adds that the youth \u0027remembered\r\nhis pages a long time.\u0027 In the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for Jan.\r\n1871 (vi, 6) is an account by Mr. W. D. Henkle (together with the stock\r\nclassic examples of preternatural memory) of an almost blind Pennsylvania\r\nfarmer who could remember the day of the week on which any date had\r\nfallen for forty-two years past, and also the kind of weather it was, and\r\nwhat he was doing on each of more than fifteen thousand days. Pity that\r\nsuch a magnificent faculty as this could not have found more worthy application!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat these cases show is that the mere organic retentiveness of a man\r\nneed bear no definite relation to his other mental powers. Men of the\r\nhighest general powers will often forget nothing, however insignificant.\r\nOne of the most generally accomplished men I know has a memory of this\r\nsort. He never keeps written note of anything, yet is never at a loss for a\r\nfact which he has once heard. He remembers the old addresses of all his\r\nNew York friends, living in numbered streets, addresses which they themselves\r\nhave long since moved away from and forgotten. He says that he\r\nshould probably recognize an individual fly, if he had seen him thirty\r\nyears previous—he is, by the way, an entomologist. As an instance of his\r\ndesultory memory, he was introduced to a certain colonel at a club. The\r\nconversation fell upon the signs of age in man. The colonel challenged\r\nhim to estimate his age. He looked at him, and gave the exact day of his\r\nbirth, to the wonder of all. But the secret of this accuracy was that, having\r\npicked up some days previously an army-register, he had idly turned over\r\nits list of names, with dates of birth, graduation, promotions, etc., attached,\r\nand when the colonel\u0027s name was mentioned to him at the club, these\r\nfigures, on which he had not bestowed a moment\u0027s thought, involuntarily\r\nsurged up in his mind. Such a memory is of course a priceless boon.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_586_586\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_586_586\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[586]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Ebbinghaus: Ueber das Gedächtniss (1885), pp. 67, 45. One may\r\nhear a person say: \"I have a very poor memory, because I was never systematically\r\nmade to learn poetry at school.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_587_587\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_587_587\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[587]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e How to Strengthen the Memory; or, The Natural and Scientific Methods\r\nof Never Forgetting. By M. H. Holbrook, M.D. New York (no date).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_588_588\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_588_588\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[588]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Page 39.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_589_589\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_589_589\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[589]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Op. cit. p. 100.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_590_590\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_590_590\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[590]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In order to test the opinion so confidently expressed in the text, I have\r\ntried to see whether a certain amount of daily training in learning poetry\r\nby heart will shorten the time it takes to learn an entirely different kind of\r\npoetry. During eight successive days I learned 158 lines of Victor Hugo\u0027s\r\n\u0027Satyr.\u0027 The total number of minutes required for this was 131 5/6—it should\r\nbe said that I had learned nothing by heart for many years. I then, working\r\nfor twenty-odd minutes daily, learned the entire first book of Paradise\r\nLost, occupying 38 days in the process. After this training I went back to\r\nVictor Hugo\u0027s poem, and found that 158 additional lines (divided exactly as\r\non the former occasion) took me 151 1/2 minutes. In other words, I committed\r\nmy Victor Hugo to memory before the training at the rate of a line in\r\n50 seconds, after the training at the rate of a line in 57 seconds, just the\r\nopposite result from that which the popular view would lead one to expect.\r\nBut as I was perceptibly fagged with other work at the time of the second\r\nbatch of Victor Hugo, I thought that might explain the retardation; so I\r\npersuaded several other persons to repeat the test.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDr. W. H. Burnham learned 16 lines of In Memoriam for 8 days; time,\r\n14-17 minutes—daily average 14 3/4. He then trained himself on Schiller\u0027s\r\ntranslation of the second book of the Æneid into German, 16 lines daily\r\nfor 26 consecutive days. On returning to the same quantity of In Memoriam\r\nagain, he found his maximum time 20 minutes, minimum 10, average\r\n14 27/48. As he feared the outer conditions might not have been as favorable\r\nthis time as the first, he waited a few days and got conditions as near as\r\npossible identical. The result was, minimum time 8 minutes; maximum\r\n19 1/2; average 14 3/48.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMr. E. S. Drown tested himself on Virgil for 16 days, then again for\r\n16 days, after training himself on Scott. Average time before training,\r\n13 minutes 26 seconds; after training, 12 minutes 16 seconds. [Sixteen\r\ndays is too long for the test, it gives time for training on the test-verse.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMr. C. H. Baldwin took 10 lines for 15 days as his test, trained himself\r\non 450 lines \u0027of an entirely different verse,\u0027 and then took 15 days more\r\nof the former verse 10 lines a day. Average result: 3 minutes 41 seconds\r\nbefore, 3 minutes 2 seconds after, training. [Same criticism as before.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMr. E. A. Pease tested himself on Idyls of the King, and trained himself\r\non Paradise Lost. Average result of 6 days each time: 14 minutes 34\r\nseconds before, 14 minutes 55 seconds after, training. Mr. Burnham having\r\nsuggested that to eliminate facilitating effect entirely from the training\r\nverses one ought to test one\u0027s self \u003ci\u003eà la\u003c/i\u003e Ebbinghaus on series of nonsense-syllables,\r\nhaving no analogy whatever with any system of expressive verses,\r\nI induced two of my students to perform that experiment also. The record\r\nis unfortunately lost; but the result was a very considerable shortening of\r\nthe average time of the second series of nonsense-syllables, learned after\r\ntraining. This seems to me, however, more to show the effects of rapid\r\nhabituation to the nonsense-verses themselves than those of the poetry\r\nused between them. But I mean to prosecute the experiments farther,\r\nand will report in another place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOne of my students having quoted a clergyman of his acquaintance\r\nwho had marvellously improved by practice his power of learning his\r\nsermons by heart, I wrote to the gentleman for corroboration. I append\r\nhis reply, which shows that the increased facility is due rather to a change\r\nin his methods of learning than to his native retentiveness having grown\r\nby exercise: \"As for memory, mine has improved year by year, except\r\nwhen in ill-health, like a gymnast\u0027s muscle. Before twenty it took three\r\nor four days to commit an hour-long sermon; after twenty, two days, one\r\nday, half a day, and now one slow analytic, very attentive or adhesive\r\nreading does it. But memory seems to me the most physical of intellectual\r\npowers. Bodily ease and freshness have much to do with it. Then there\r\nis a great difference of facility in method. I used to commit sentence by\r\nsentence. Now I take the idea of the whole, then its leading divisions,\r\nthen its subdivisions, then its sentences.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_591_591\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_591_591\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[591]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E. Pick: Memory and its Doctors (1888), p. 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_592_592\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_592_592\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[592]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This system is carried out in great detail in a book called \u0027Memory\r\nTraining,\u0027 by Wm. L. Evans (1889).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_593_593\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_593_593\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[593]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Paulhan, L\u0027Activité mental, et les Éléments de l\u0027Esprit (1889). p. 70.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_594_594\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_594_594\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[594]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On Intelligence, i, 77-82.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_595_595\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_595_595\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[595]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychology, § 201.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_596_596\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_596_596\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[596]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor Höffding considers that the absence of contiguous associates\r\ndistinctly thought-of is a proof that associative processes are not concerned\r\nin these cases of instantaneous recognition where we get a strong sense of\r\nfamiliarity with the object, but no recall of previous time or place. His\r\ntheory of what happens is that the object before us, A, comes with a sense of\r\nfamiliarity whenever it awakens \u003ci\u003ea slumbering image, a, of its own past self,\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhilst without this image it seems unfamiliar. The \u003ci\u003equality of familiarity\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis due to the coalescence of the two similar processes A + \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e in the brain\r\n(Psychologie, p. 188; Vierteljsch. f. wiss. Phil., xiii, 432 [1889]). This\r\nexplanation is a very tempting one where the phenomenon of recognition is\r\nreduced to its simplest terms. Experiments have been performed in Wundt\u0027s\r\nlaboratory by Messrs. Wolfe, see below, \u003ca href=\"#Page_679\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 679\u003c/a\u003e, and Lehmann (Philosophische\r\nStudien, v, 96), in which a person had to tell out of several closely resembling\r\nsensible impressions (sounds, tints of color) presented, which of\r\nthem was the same with one presented a moment before. And it does\r\nseem here as if the fading process in the just-excited tract must combine\r\nwith the process of the new impression to give to the latter a peculiar subjective\r\ntinge which should separate it from the impressions which the\r\nother objects give. But recognition of this immediate sort is beyond our\r\npower after a very short time has intervened. A couple of minutes\u0027 interval\r\nis generally fatal to it; so that it is impossible to conceive that\r\nour frequent instantaneous recognition of a face, e.g., as having been\r\nmet before, takes place by any such simple process. Where we associate\r\na \u003ci\u003ehead of classification\u003c/i\u003e with the object, the time-interval has\r\nmuch less effect. Dr. Lehmann could identify shades of gray much\r\nmore successfully and permanently after mentally attaching names or\r\nnumbers to them. Here it is the recall of the contiguous associate,\r\nthe number or name, which brings about the recognition. Where an\r\nexperience is complex, each element of the total object has had the other\r\nelements for its past contiguous associates. Each element thus tends to\r\nrevive the other elements from within, at the same time that the outward\r\nobject is making them revive from without. We have thus, whenever we\r\nmeet a familiar object, that sense of \u003ci\u003eexpectation gratified\u003c/i\u003e which is so large\r\na factor in our æsthetic emotions; and even were there no \u0027fringe of tendency\u0027\r\ntoward the arousal of \u003ci\u003eextrinsic\u003c/i\u003e associates (which there certainly always is),\r\nstill this \u003ci\u003eintrinsic\u003c/i\u003e play of mutual association among the parts\r\nwould give a character of ease to familiar percepts which would make of\r\nthem a distinct subjective class. A process fills its old bed in a different\r\nway from that in which it makes a new bed. One can appeal to introspection\r\nfor proof. When, for example, I go into a slaughter-house into which\r\nI once went years ago, and the horrid din of the screaming hogs strikes\r\nme with the overpowering sense of identification, when the blood-stained\r\nface of the \u0027sticker,\u0027 whom I had long ceased to think of, is immediately\r\nrecognized as the face that struck me so before; when the dingy and reddened\r\nwoodwork, the purple-flowing floor, the smell, the emotion of disgust,\r\nand \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e the details, in a word, forthwith re-establish themeelves as\r\nfamiliar occupants of my mind; the \u003ci\u003eextraneous\u003c/i\u003e associates of the past time\r\nare anything but prominent. Again, in trying to think of an engraving,\r\nsay the portrait of Rajah Brooke prefixed to his biography, I can do so\r\nonly partially; but when I take down the book and, looking at the actual\r\nface, am smitten with the intimate sense of its sameness with the one I was\r\nstriving to resuscitate,—where in the experience is the element of \u003ci\u003eextrinsic\u003c/i\u003e\r\nassociation? In both these cases it surely \u003ci\u003efeels\u003c/i\u003e as if the moment when the\r\nsense of recall is most vivid were also the moment when all \u003ci\u003eextraneous\u003c/i\u003e\r\nassociates were most suppressed. The butcher\u0027s face recalls the former\r\nwalls of the shambles; their thought recalls the groaning beasts, and they\r\nthe face again, just as I now experience them, with no different past ingredient.\r\nIn like manner the peculiar deepening of my consciousness of the\r\nRajah\u0027s physiognomy at the moment when I open the book and say \"Ah!\r\nthat\u0027s the very face!\" is so intense as to banish from my mind all collateral\r\ncircumstances, whether of the present or of former experiences. But here\r\nit is the nose preparing tracts for the eye, the eye preparing them for the\r\nmouth, the mouth preparing them for the nose again, all these processes\r\ninvolving paths of contiguous association, as defended in the text. I cannot\r\nagree, therefore, with Prof. Höffding, in spite of my respect for him as\r\na psychologist, that the phenomenon of instantaneous recognition is only\r\nexplicable through the recall and comparison of the thing with its own\r\npast image. Nor can I see in the facts in question any additional ground for\r\nreinstating the general notion which we have already rejected (\u003ci\u003esupra\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_592\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n592\u003c/a\u003e) that a \u0027sensation\u0027 is ever received into the mind by an \u0027image\u0027 of\r\nits own past self. It is received by contiguous associates; or if they form\r\ntoo faint a fringe, its neural currents run into a bed which is still \u0027warm\u0027\r\nfrom just-previous currents, and which consequently feel different from\r\ncurrents whose bed is cold. I agree, however, with Höffding that Dr.\r\nLehmann\u0027s experiments (many of them) do not seem to prove the point\r\nwhich he seeks to establish. Lehmann, indeed, seems himself to believe\r\nthat we recognize a sensation A by comparing it with its own past image\r\nα (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 114), in which opinion I altogether fail to concur.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_597_597\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_597_597\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[597]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Duality of the Mind, p. 84. The same thesis is defended by the late\r\nMr. R. H. Proctor, who gives some cases rather hard to reconcile with my\r\nown proposed explanation, in \u0027Knowledge\u0027 for Nov. 8, 1884. See also\r\nRibot, Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 149 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_598_598\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_598_598\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[598]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Zeitschr. f. Völkerpsychologie u. s. w., Bd. v, p. 146.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_599_599\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_599_599\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[599]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ueber das Gedächtniss, experimentelle Untersuchungen (1885), p. 64.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_600_600\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_600_600\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[600]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e § 23.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_601_601\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_601_601\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[601]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e p. 103.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_602_602\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_602_602\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[602]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e All the inferences for which we can give no articulate reasons exemplify\r\nthis law. In the chapter on Perception we shall have innumerable\r\nexamples of it. A good pathological illustration of it is given in the curious\r\nobservations of M. Binet on certain hysterical subjects, with anæsthetic\r\nhands, who saw what was done with their hands as an independent vision\r\nbut did not feel it. The hand being hidden by a screen, the patient was\r\nordered to look at another screen and to tell of any visual image which\r\nmight project itself thereon. Numbers would then come, corresponding\r\nto the number of times the insensible member was raised, touched, etc.\r\nColored lines and figures would come, corresponding to similar ones traced\r\non the palm; the hand itself, or its fingers, would come when manipulated;\r\nand, finally, objects placed in it would come; but on the hand itself nothing\r\ncould ever be felt. The whole phenomenon shows how an idea which\r\nremains itself below the threshold of a certain conscious self may occasion\r\nassociative effects therein. The skin-sensations, unfelt by the patient\u0027s\r\nprimary consciousness, awaken, nevertheless, their usual visual associates\r\ntherein.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_603_603\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_603_603\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[603]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I copy from the abstract of Wolfe\u0027s paper in \u0027Science\u0027 for Nov. 19,\r\n1886. The original is in Psychologische Studien, iii, 534 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_604_604\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_604_604\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[604]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Essay conc. Human Understanding, ii, x, 5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_605_605\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_605_605\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[605]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Th. Ribot, Les Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 46.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_606_606\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_606_606\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[606]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Biographia Literaria, ed. 1847, i, 117 (quoted in Carpenter\u0027s Mental\r\nPhysiology, chapter x, which see for a number of other cases, all unfortunately\r\ndeficient, like this one, in the evidence of exact verification which\r\n\u0027psychical research \u0027demands). Compare also Th. Ribot, Diseases of Memory,\r\nchap. iv. The knowledge of foreign words, etc., reported in trance\r\nmediums, etc., may perhaps often be explained by exaltation of memory.\r\nAn hystero-epileptic girl, whose case I quoted in Proc. of Am. Soc. for\r\nPsychical Research, automatically writes an \u0027Ingoldsby Legend\u0027 in several\r\ncantos, which her parents say she \u0027had never read.\u0027 Of course she must\r\nhave read or heard it, but perhaps never \u003ci\u003elearned\u003c/i\u003e it. Of some macaronic\r\nLatin-English verses about a sea-serpent which her hand also wrote unconsciously,\r\nI have vainly sought the original (see Proc., etc., p. 553).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_607_607\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_607_607\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[607]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lectures on Metaph., ii, 212.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_608_608\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_608_608\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[608]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. on this point J. Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. 119\r\nff.; R. Verdon, Forgetfulness, in Mind, ii, 437.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_609_609\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_609_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[609]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. A. Maury, Le Sommeil et les Rêves, p. 442.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_610_610\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_610_610\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[610]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Störungen der Sprache, quoted by Ribot, Les Maladies de la M., p. 133.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_611_611\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_611_611\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[611]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Op. cit. chap. iii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_612_612\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_612_612\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[612]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Those who have a good memory for figures are in general those\r\nwho know best how to handle them, that is, those who are most familiar\r\nwith their relations to each other and to things.\" (A. Maury, Le Sommeil\r\net les Rêves, p. 443.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_613_613\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_613_613\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[613]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 107-121.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_614_614\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_614_614\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[614]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For other examples see Hamilton\u0027s Lectures, ii, 219, and A. Huber:\r\nDas Gedächtniss, p. 36 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_615_615\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_615_615\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[615]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mind, ii, 449.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_616_616\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_616_616\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[616]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiological Psychology, pt. ii, chap. x, § 23.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_617_617\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_617_617\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[617]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Why not say \u0027know\u0027?—W. J.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e \u003ca id=\"INDEX\"\u003eINDEX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: larger\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Abbott_T_K\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eA.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Babe_and_candle_scheme_of\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eB.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Caird_E\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eC.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Darwin_C\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eD.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Ebbinghaus_H\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eE.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Fallacy_the_Psychologists\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eF.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Galton_F\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eG.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Habit\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eH.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Ideal_objects\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eI.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Jackson_Hughlings\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eJ.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Kandinsky_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eK.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Ladd_G_T\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eL.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#McCosh\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eM.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Nature_the_order_of\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eN.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Obersteiner\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eO.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Pain\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eP.\u003c/a\u003e \r\n\u003ca href=\"#Questioning_mania\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eQ.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Rabier\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eR.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Sagacity\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eS.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Tactile_centre\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eT.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Ueberweg\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eU.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Valentin\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eV.\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Wahle\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eW.\u003c/a\u003e X. Y. \u003ca href=\"#Zollner\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eZ.\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAuthors the titles only of whose works are cited are not, as a rule, referred to in\r\nthis index.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Abbott_T_K\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAbbott, T. K.\u003c/span\u003e, II. 221\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAbstract ideas, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e468\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e508\u003c/a\u003e; II. 48\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAbstract qualities, II. 329-37, 340\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAbstraction, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_505\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e505\u003c/a\u003e; II. 346 ff. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Distraction\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003edistraction\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAccommodation, feeling of, II. 93, 235\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAcquaintance, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_220\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAcquired characters, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Inheritance\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einheritance\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAcquisitiveness, II. 422, 679\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nActors, their emotions whilst playing, II. 464\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAdaptation of mind to environment results in our knowing the impressing circumstances, II. 625 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nÆsthetic principles, II. 639, 672\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAfter-images, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_645\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e645-7\u003c/a\u003e; II. 67, 200, 604\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eAgoraphobia\u003c/i\u003e, II. 421\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eAgraphia\u003c/i\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAlfieri\u003c/span\u003e, II. 543\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAllen, G.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e; II. 631\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAlteration of one impression by another one simultaneously taking place, II. 28 ff., 201\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAlternating personality, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e379\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAmbiguity of optical sensations, II. 231-7\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAmidon\u003c/span\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Amnesia\"\u003eAmnesia\u003c/a\u003e in hysterical disease, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_384\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e384\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eaccompanies anæsthesia, \u003ca href=\"#Page_386\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e386\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_682\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e682\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein hypnotic trance, II. 602.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Forgetting\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eforgetting\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAmputated limbs, feeling of, II. 38-9, 105\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAnæsthesia, in hysterics, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves correlated amnesia, \u003ca href=\"#Page_386\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e386\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emovements executed during, II. 105, 489-92, 520-1;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand emotion, 455-6;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein hypnotism, 606-9\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAnalogies, the perception of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAnalysis, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_502\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e502\u003c/a\u003e; II. 344\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAnger, II. 409, 460, 478\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Aphasia\"\u003eAphasia\u003c/a\u003e, motor, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esensory, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53-4-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eoptical, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamnesia in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_640\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e640\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_684\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e684\u003c/a\u003e; II. 58\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nApperception, II. 107 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nApperception, transcendental Unity of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAppropriateness, characterizes mental acts, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eApraxia\u003c/i\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003ca id=\"A_priori\"\u003eA priori\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e connections exist only between objects of perception and movements, not between sensory ideas, II. 581.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eA priori\u003c/i\u003e ideas and experience, Chapter XXVIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eA priori\u003c/i\u003e propositions, II. 661-5\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eArcher, W.\u003c/span\u003e, II. 464\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nArithmetic, II. 654.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nArticular sensibility, II. 189 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAssociation, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIV463\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XIV\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis not of ideas, but of things thought of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_554\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e554\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexamples of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e555\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits rapidity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e557\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eby contiguity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e561\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eelementary law of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e566\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u0027mixed\u0027 association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_571\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e571\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_575\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e575\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eby similarity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethree kinds of association compared, \u003ca href=\"#Page_580\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e580\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein voluntary thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_583\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e583\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eby contrast, \u003ca href=\"#Page_593\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e593\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehistory of the doctrine of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eassociation the means of localization, II. 158 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econnection of association by similarity with reasoning, 345 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAssociationism, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAssociationist theory of the self, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof space-perception, II. 271 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eAsymbolia\u003c/i\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAttention, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XI\u003c/a\u003e: to how many things possible, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto simultaneous sight and sound, \u003ca href=\"#Page_411\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e411\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits varieties, \u003ca href=\"#Page_416\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e416\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epassive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_417\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e417\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_420\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e420\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits effects, \u003ca href=\"#Page_424\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e424\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits influence on reaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427-34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eaccompanied by feelings of tension due to adaptation of sense-organs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_434\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e434-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves imagination or preperception of object, \u003ca href=\"#Page_438\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e438-44\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econceivable as a mere effect, \u003ca href=\"#Page_448\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAubert, H.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 235\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAuditory centre in brain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAuditory type of imagination, II. 60\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u0027Ausfallserscheinungen,\u0027\u003c/i\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nAutomatic writing, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAusten, Jane,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_571\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e571\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Automaton-Theory\"\u003eAutomaton-Theory,\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter V\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epostulated rather than proved, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e134-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereasons against it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e138-144\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eapplied to attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_448\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edisregarded in this book, II. 583\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAzam,\u003c/span\u003e Dr., I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_380\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e380\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Babe_and_candle_scheme_of\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eBabe and candle, scheme of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBaby\u0027s first perception, II. 8, 84;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis early instinctive movements, 404 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBær, von,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_639\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e639\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBagehot, W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e; II. 283, 308\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBain,\u003c/span\u003e on series conscious of itself, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon self-esteem, \u003ca href=\"#Page_313\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e313\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon self-love, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_485\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e485\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e561\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_589\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e589\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_601\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e601\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_653\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e653\u003c/a\u003e; II. 6, 12, 69, 186, 271, 282, 296, 319, 322, 372-3, 463, 466, 551, 554-5\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBallard,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBalzac,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBartels,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBastian, H. C.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 488\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBaumann,\u003c/span\u003e II. 409\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBaxt,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_648\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e648\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBeaunis, E.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 492\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBechterew,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBelief, Chapter XXI:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein sensations, II. 299 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein objects of emotion, 306 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein theories, 311 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand will, 319.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Reality\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ereality\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBell, C.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 483, 492\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBergson, J.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 609\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_469\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e469\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_476\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e476\u003c/a\u003e; II. 43, 49, 77, 212, 240, 666\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBernhardt,\u003c/span\u003e II. 502\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBernheim,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBertrand, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 518\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBessel,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_413\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e413\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBinet, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e ff.; II. 71, 74, 128 ff., 130, 167, 491, 520\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBlack, R. W.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 339\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBleek,\u003c/span\u003e II. 358\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBlind, the, their space-perception, II. 202 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter restoration to sight, 211-2;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehallucination of a blind man, 323;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edreams of the, 44\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBlindness, mental, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Sight\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eSight\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Hemianopsia\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eHemianopsia\u003c/a\u003e,\u003c/i\u003e etc.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBlix,\u003c/span\u003e II. 170\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBloch,\u003c/span\u003e II. 515\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBlood, its exciting effect on the nerves, II. 412-3\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBlood, B. P.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 284\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBlood-supply to brain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBourne, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_391\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e391\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBourru,\u003c/span\u003e Dr., I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_388\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e388\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBowditch, H. P.,\u003c/span\u003e his reaction-timer, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon contrast in seen motion, II. 247;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon knee-jerk, 380;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecomparison of touch and sight, 520\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBowen, F.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBowne, B. P.,\u003c/span\u003e on knowledge, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley, F. H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_452\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e452\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_474\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e474\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_604\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e604\u003c/a\u003e; II. 7, 9, 284, 648\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Brain\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eBrain, its functions, Chapter II:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof frog, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof dog, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof monkey, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elower centres compared with hemispheres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9-10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecirculation in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einstability, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits connection with Mind, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u0027entire\u0027 brain not a real physical fact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits changes as subtle as those of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_234\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits dying vibrations operative in producing consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eInfluence of environment upon it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_626\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e626\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBrain-process, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Neural_process\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eneural process\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBrain-structure, the two modes of its genesis, II. 624\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrentano,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_547\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e547\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBridgeman, Laura,\u003c/span\u003e II. 62, 358, 420\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBroca\u0027s convolution, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrodhun,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e542\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrown, Thos.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_248\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_371\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e371\u003c/a\u003e; II. 271\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrown-Séquard,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e; II. 695\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBrutes, the intellect of, II. 348 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBucke, R. M.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 460\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBubnoff,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBurke,\u003c/span\u003e II. 464\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBurnham, W. H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_689\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e689\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBurot,\u003c/span\u003e Dr., I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_388\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e388\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Caird_E\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCaird, E.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e366\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_469\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e469\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e471\u003c/a\u003e, II. ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCalmeil, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 524\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCampanella,\u003c/span\u003e II. 464\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCampbell, G.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCardaillac,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCarlyle, T.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_311\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCarpenter, W. B.,\u003c/span\u003e on formation of habits, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical remarks on habit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emistakes in speech, \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elapses of memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon not feeling pain, \u003ca href=\"#Page_419\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e419\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon ideo-motor action, II. 522\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCarville,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCatalepsy, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e; II. 583\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCattell,\u003c/span\u003e on reaction-time, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_524\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e524\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon recognition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_648\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e648\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_420\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e420\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon association-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_558\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e558\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCause, consciousness a, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e; II. 583, 592\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCentres, cortical, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emotor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evisual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauditory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eolfactory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egustatory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etactile, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCerebral process, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Neural_process\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eneural process\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCerebrum, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Brain\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eBrain\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Hemispheres\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eHemispheres\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eChadbourne, P A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 383\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCharacters, general, II. 329 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharcot,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54-5\u003c/a\u003e; II. 58, 596\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nChloroform, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_531\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e531\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nChoice, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Selection\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eselection\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Interest\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einterest\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCirculation in brain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffects of sensory stimuli upon, II. 374 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein grief, 443-4\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nClassic and romantic, II. 469\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nClassifications, II. 646\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eClay, E. C. R.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e609\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCleanliness, II. 434\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nClearness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_426\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e426\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eClifford,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e130-2\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eClouston,\u003c/span\u003e II. 114, 284-5, 537, 539\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCobbe, F. P.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCochlea, theory of its action, II. 169\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCognition, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Knowing\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eknowing\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCohen, H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_365\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e365\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eColeridge, S. T.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_681\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e681\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCollateral innervation, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Vicarious_function\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003evicarious function\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nComparison, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XIII\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations discovered by comparison have nothing to do with the time and space order of their terms, II. 641;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emediate, 489, 644;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Difference\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003edifference\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Likeness\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003elikeness\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nComposition, of Mind out of its elements, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Mind-Stuff_theory\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eMind-Stuff theory\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferences due to, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_491\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e491\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eComte, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConceivability, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_463\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e463\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Conceptions\"\u003eConceptions,\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XII\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_461\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir permanence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_464\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edo not develop of themselves, \u003ca href=\"#Page_466\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e466\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eabstract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e468\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euniversal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_478\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e478\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eessentially teleological, II. 332\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConceptual order different from perceptual, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e482\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConcomitants, law of varying, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_506\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e506\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConfusion, II. 352\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConsciousness, its seat, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits distribution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e142-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits function of selection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e139-41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis \u003ci\u003epersonal\u003c/i\u003e in form, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis continuous, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_488\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e488\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof lack, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof self not essential, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e comes first, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealways partial and selective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e ff., see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Selection\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eSelection\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the process of thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe span of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConsent, in willing, II. 568\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConsiderations, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConstructiveness, II. 426\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nContiguity, association by, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e561\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nContinuity of object of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_488\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e488\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nContrast, of colors, II. 13-27;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof temperatures, 14;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etwo theories of, 17 ff., 245;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof movements, 245 ff., 250\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nConvolutions, motor, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCortex, of brain, experiments on, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCramming, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_663\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e663\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCredulity, our primitive, II. 319\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCudworth, R.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 9\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Cue,\u0027 the mental, II. 497, 518\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCumberland, S.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 525\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCuriosity, II. 429\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCzermak,\u003c/span\u003e II. 170, 175\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Darwin_C\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDarwin, C.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 432, 446, 479, 484, 678, 681-2-4\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDarwinism, scholastic reputation of, II. 670\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nData, the, of psychology, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDavidson, T.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_474\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e474\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDeaf-mute\u0027s thought in infancy, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDeafness, mental, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e55-6\u003c/a\u003e. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Hearing\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ehearing\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDean, S.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_394\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e394\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Decision\"\u003eDecision,\u003c/a\u003e five types of, II. 531\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDegenerations, descending in nerve-centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDelabarre, E.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 13-27, 71\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDelbœuf, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_455\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_531\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e531\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_541\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e541\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e542\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e548-9\u003c/a\u003e; II. 100, 189, 249, 264, 605, 609, 612\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDeliberation, II. 528 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDelusions, insane, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e; II. 114 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDepth, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Third_dimension\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ethird dimension\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDescartes,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDestutt de Tracy,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDeterminism must be postulated by psychology, II. 576\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDewey, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_473\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e473\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDichotomy in thinking, II. 654\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDickens, C.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDietze,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_617\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e617\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Difference\"\u003eDifference\u003c/a\u003e, not resolvable into composition, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_490\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e490\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enoticed most between species of a genus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_529\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e529\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe magnitude of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_531\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e531\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eleast discernible, \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e537\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emethods for ascertaining, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e540\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDifference, local, II. 167 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egenesis of our perception of, 642\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDiffusion of movements, the law of, II. 372\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDimension, third, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDipsomania, II. 543\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDisbelief, II. 284\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDiscrimination, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XIII\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions which favor it, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_494\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e494\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimproves by practice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e508\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003espatial, II. 167 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Difference\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003edifference\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDissociation, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_486\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e486-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elaw of, by varying concomitants, \u003ca href=\"#Page_506\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e506\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDissociation, ditto, II. 345, 359\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDissociation, of one part of the mind from another, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Janet_Pierre\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eJanet, Pierre\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDistance, between terms of a series, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDistance, in space, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Third_dimension\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ethird dimension\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003ca id=\"Distraction\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDistraction\u003c/i\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_401\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e401\u003c/a\u003e. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Inattention\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einattention\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDizziness, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Vertigo\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003evertigo\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDog\u0027s cortical centres, after Ferrier, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter Munk, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter Luciani, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efor special muscles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehemispheres ablated, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDonaldson,\u003c/span\u003e II. 170\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDonders,\u003c/span\u003e II. 235\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDouble images, II. 225-30, 252\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDoubt, II. 284, 318 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe mania of, 545\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDougal, J. D.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 222\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDrainage of one brain-cell by another, II. 583 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDreams, II. 294\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDrobisch,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_632\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e632\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_660\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e660\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDrunkard, II. 565\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDrunkenness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e; II. 543, 565, 628\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDualism of object and knower, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_220\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDuality, of Brain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_390\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e390\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_399\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e399\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDudley, A. T.,\u003c/span\u003e on mental qualities of an athlete, II. 539\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDufour,\u003c/span\u003e II. 211\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDunan, Ch.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 176, 206, 208-9\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDuration, the primitive object in time-perception, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e609\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eour estimate of short, \u003ca href=\"#Page_611\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e611\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Dynamogeny,\u0027 II. 379 ff., 491\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Ebbinghaus_H\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEbbinghaus, H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e548\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_676\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e676\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEccentric projection of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEducation of hemispheres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pedagogic_remarks\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epedagogic remarks\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEffort, II. 534-7;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eMuscular effort, 562;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eMoral effort, 549, 561, 578-9\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEgger, V.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_280\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e280-1-2\u003c/a\u003e; II. 256\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEgo, Empirical, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u0027transcendental,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nElementary factors of mind, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Units\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eUnits of consciousness\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eElsas,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e548\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEmerson, R. W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e, II. 307\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEmotion, Chapter XXV:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtinuous with instinct, II. 442;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edescription of typical emotions, 443-9;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eresults from reflex effects of stimulus upon organism, 449 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir classification, 454;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein anæsthetic subjects, 455;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein the absence of normal stimulus, 458-60;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffects of expressing, 463 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof repressing, 466;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe subtler, 469 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe neural process in, 472;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferences in individuals, 474;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eevolution of special emotions, 477 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEmpirical ego, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_290\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEmpirical propositions, II. 644\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEmulation, II. 409\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEnnui, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_626\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e626\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEntoptic sensations, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEquation, personal, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_413\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e413\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Equilibration,\u0027 direct and indirect, II. 627\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Essences\"\u003eEssences,\u003c/a\u003e their meaning, II. 329 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esentimental and mechanical, 665\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEssential qualities, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Essences\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eessences\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEstel,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_613\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e613\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_618\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e618\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nEvolutionism demands a \u0027mind-dust,\u0027 I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExner,\u003c/span\u003e on human cortical centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \u0027circumvallation\u0027 of centres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis psychodometer, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon perception of rapid succession, \u003ca href=\"#Page_409\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e409\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon time-perception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_615\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e615\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_638\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e638\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_646\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e646\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling of motion, II. 172\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Experience\"\u003eExperience,\u003c/a\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e487\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eRelation of experience to necessary judgments, Chapter XXVIII;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eExperience defined, II. 619 ff., 628\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nExperimentation in psychology, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nExtradition of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Fallacy_the_Psychologists\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eFallacy, the Psychologist\u0027s, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e; II. 281\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFamiliarity, sense of, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Recognition\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003erecognition\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFatalism, II. 574\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFatigue, diminishes span of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_640\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e640\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFear, instinct of, II. 396, 415;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe symptoms of, 446;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emorbid, 460;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of, 478\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFechner,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_435\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e435-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_533\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e533\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_539\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e539\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_549\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e549\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_616\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e616\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_645\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e645\u003c/a\u003e; II. 50, 70, 137 ff., 178, 464\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFeeling, synonym for consciousness in general in this book, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efeelings of relation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFélida X.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_380\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e380-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFéré, Ch.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 68, 378 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFerrier, D.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46-7-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57-8-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e445\u003c/a\u003e; II. 503\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFerrier, Jas.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_475\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e475\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eFiat\u003c/i\u003e, of the will, II. 501, 526, 561, 564; 568.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Decision\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003edecision\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFichte,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_365\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e365\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFick,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFiske, J.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 577\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFixed ideas. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Insistent_ideas\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einsistent ideas\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFlechsig\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s Pyramidenbahn, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFlint, R.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 425\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFlourens, P.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nForce, supposed sense of, II. 518\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Forgetting\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eForgetting, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_679\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e679\u003c/a\u003e ff.; II. 870-1. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Amnesia\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eamnesia\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFouillée, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 500, 570\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFrançois-Franck,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFranklin,\u003c/span\u003e Mrs. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. L.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 94\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFranz,\u003c/span\u003e Dr., II. 63\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFreedom, of the will, II. 569 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Fringe\u0027 of object, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e281-2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e471-2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_478\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e478\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFrog\u0027s nerve-centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFusion of feelings unintelligible, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e157-62\u003c/a\u003e; II. 2. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Mind-Stuff_theory\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eMind-stuff theory\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFusion of impressions into one object, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_484\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e484\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_502\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e502\u003c/a\u003e; II. 103, 183\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Galton_F\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eGalton, F.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_685\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e685\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon mental imagery, II. 51-7;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon gregariousness, 430\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"General_propositions\"\u003eGeneral propositions\u003c/a\u003e, what they involve, II. 337 ff. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Universal_conceptions\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003euniversal conceptions\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGenesis of brain-structure, its two modes, II. 624\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGenius, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_423\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e423\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e; II. 110, 352, 360\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGentleman, the mind of the, II. 370\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGeometry, II. 658\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGiddiness, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Vertigo\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003evertigo\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGilman, B. I.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGley, E.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 514-5, 525\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGoldscheider,\u003c/span\u003e II. 170, 192 ff., 200\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGoltz,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGorilla, II. 416\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGraefe, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 507, 510\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGrashey,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_640\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e640\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGrassman, R.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 654\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGregariousness, II. 430\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGreen, T. H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e366-8\u003c/a\u003e; II. 4, 10, 11\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGrief, II. 448, 480\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGriesinger, W.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 298\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGrubelsucht,\u003c/span\u003e II. 284\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGuinea-pigs, epileptic, etc., II. 682-7\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGuislain,\u003c/span\u003e II. 546\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGurney, E.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e; II. 117, 130, 469, 610\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGuyau,\u003c/span\u003e II. 414, 469\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Habit\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHabit, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IV136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IV\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edue to plasticity of brain-matter, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edepends on \u003ci\u003epaths\u003c/i\u003e in nerve-centres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigination of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109-13\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emechanism of concatenated habits, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e114-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethey demand some sensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical and pedagogic maxims, \u003ca href=\"#Page_121\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e121-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis the ground of association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e566\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_655\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e655\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHabits may inhibit instincts, II. 394;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eHabit accounts for one large part of our knowledge, 632\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHall, G. S.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e96-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_558\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e558\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_614\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e614\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_616\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e616\u003c/a\u003e; II. 155, 247, 281, 423\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHallucination, sensation a veridical, II. 33;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof lost limbs, 38, 105;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof emotional feeling, 459\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Hallucinations\"\u003eHallucinations,\u003c/a\u003e II. 114 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehypnagogic, 124;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe brain-process in, 122 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehypnotic, 604\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHamilton, W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_406\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_419\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e419\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_569\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e569\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_682\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e682\u003c/a\u003e; II. 113\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHammond, E.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 673\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHaploscopic method, II. 226\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHarless,\u003c/span\u003e II. 497\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHartley,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e553\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e561\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e564\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_600\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e600\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHartmann, R.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 416\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHasheesh-delirium, II. 121\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Hearing\"\u003eHearing\u003c/a\u003e, its cortical centre, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHeat, of mental work, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHecker,\u003c/span\u003e II. 480\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHegel,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e366\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_369\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e369\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_666\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e666\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHeidenhain,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHelmholtz, H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_285\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_422\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e422\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e487\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_441\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e441\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_504\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e504\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_516\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e516-21\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etime as a category, \u003ca href=\"#Page_637\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e637-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter-images, \u003ca href=\"#Page_645\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e645\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_648\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e648\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon color-contrast, II. 17 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon sensation, 33;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon cochlea, 170;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon convergence of eyes, 200;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evision with inverted head, 213;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon what marks a sensation, 218 ff., 243-4;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon entoptic objects, 241-2;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon contrast in seen movement, 247;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon relief, 257;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon measurement of the field of view, 266 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon theory of space-perception, 279;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling of innervation, 493, 507, 510;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon conservation of energy, 667\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHemiamblyopia, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Hemianopsia\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHemianopsia, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e; II. 73\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Hemispheres\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHemispheres, their distinction from lower centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir education, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elocalization of function in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe exclusive seat of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffects of deprivation of, on frogs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon fishes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon birds, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon rodents, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon dogs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \u003ci\u003eprimates\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot devoid of connate paths, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir evolution from lower centres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHenle, J.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 445, 461, 481\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerbart,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e418\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_603\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e603\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_608\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e608\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_626\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e626\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHereditary transmission of acquired characters, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Inheritance\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einheritance\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHering, E.,\u003c/span\u003e on attention, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_438\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e438\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_449\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e449\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon comparing weights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_544\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e544\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon pure sensation, II. 4;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon color-contrast, 20 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon roomy character of sensations, 136 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon after-images and convergence, 200;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon distance of double images, 230;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon stereoscopy, 252;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reproduction in vision, 260 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon movements of closed eye, 510\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerzen,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reaction-time from a corn, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon cerebral thermometry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon swooning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHitzig,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHobbes, T.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_573\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e573\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_587\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e587\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHodgson, R.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_398\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e398\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHodgson, S. H.,\u003c/span\u003e on inertness of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e129-30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_341\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon conceptual order, \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e482\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_603\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e603\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon voluntary redintegration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_588\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e588-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the \u0027present\u0027 in time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_607\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e607\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHöffding, H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_674\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e674\u003c/a\u003e; II. 455\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHolbrook, M. H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_665\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e665\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHolmes, O. W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHoltei, von,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_624\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e624\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHoropter, II. 226\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHorsley, V.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHorwicz,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_314\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_325\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e325-7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHowe, S. G.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 358\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHuman intellect, compared with that of brute, II. 348 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edepends on association by similarity, 353 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evarious orders of, 360;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat brain-peculiarity it depends on, 366, 638\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHume,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon personal identity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_351\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e351-3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eassociation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_597\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e597\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edue to brain-laws, \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e564\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon mental images, II. 45-6;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon belief, 295-6, 302;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon pleasure and will, 558\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHunting instinct, II. 411\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHuxley,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e130-1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e; II. 46\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHyatt, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 102\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHylozoism, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Mind-Stuff_theory\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eMind-stuff theory\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHyperæsthesia, in hypnotism, II. 609\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Hypnotism\"\u003eHypnotism\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e; II. 128, 351;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral account of, Chapter XXVII;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emethods, II. 593;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheories of, 596;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esymptoms of trance, 602 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epost-hypnotic suggestion, 618\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Hysterics\"\u003eHysterics\u003c/a\u003e, their so-called anæsthesias, and unconsciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Ideal_objects\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIdeal objects, eternal and necessary relations between, II. 639, 661.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Conceptions\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003econception\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Ideas,\u0027 the theory of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econfounded with objects, \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_399\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e399\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_521\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e521\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethey do not exist as parts of our thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e553\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplatonic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_462\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eabstract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e468\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euniversal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_473\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e473\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enever come twice the same, \u003ca href=\"#Page_480\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e480-1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIdeation, no distinct centres for, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e564\u003c/a\u003e; II. 78\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIdentity, sense of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e459\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethree principles of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_460\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e460\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot the foundation of likeness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_492\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e492\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIdentity, personal, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebased on ordinary judgment of sameness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_334\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edue to resemblance and continuity of our feelings, \u003ca href=\"#Page_336\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e336\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eonly relatively true, \u003ca href=\"#Page_372\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e372\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIdeo-motor action the type of all volition, II. 522\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIdiosyncrasy, II. 631\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Idomenians,\u0027 II. 214\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIllusions, II. 85 ff., 129, 232 ff., 243-66.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Hallucinations\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ehallucination\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImages, double, in vision, II. 225-30\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImages, mental, not lost in mental blindness, etc., I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e; II. 73\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImages, are usually vague, II. 45;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evisual, 51 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauditory, 160;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emotor, 61;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etactile, 165;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebetween sleep and waking, 124-6\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImagination, Chapter XVIII:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eit differs in individuals, II. 51 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esometimes leaves an after-image, 67;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe cerebral process of, 68 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot locally distinct from that of sensation, 73;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis \u003ci\u003efigured\u003c/i\u003e, 82\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImitation, II. 408\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImmortality, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e348-9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImpulses, morbid, II. 542 ff. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Instinct\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einstincts\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nImpulsiveness of all consciousness, II. 526 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Inattention\"\u003eInattention\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_404\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e404\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_455\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIncrease, serial, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_490\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e490\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIndeterminism, II. 569 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIngersoll, R.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 469\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Inheritance\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eInheritance of acquired characters, II. 367, 678 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nInhibition, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_404\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e404\u003c/a\u003e; II. 126, 373;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof instincts, 391, 394;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof one cortical process by another, 583\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nInnervation, feeling of, II. 236, 493;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eit is unnecessary, 494 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eno evidence for it, 499, 518\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nInnervation, collateral, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Vicarious_function\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003evicarious function\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nInsane delusions, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e; II. 113\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Insistent_ideas\"\u003eInsistent ideas,\u003c/a\u003e II. 545\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Instinct\"\u003eInstinct.\u003c/a\u003e Chapter XXIV;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, II. 384;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis a reflex impulse, 385 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis neither blind nor invariable, 389;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrary instincts in same animal, 392;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eman has more than other mammals, 393, 441;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir transitoriness, 398;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003especial instincts, 404-441;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe origin of instincts, 678\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Integration\u0027 of feelings, Spencer\u0027s theory of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Intelligence\"\u003eIntelligence,\u003c/a\u003e the test of its presence, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof lower brain-centres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIntention to speak, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_253\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Interest\"\u003eInterest\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e402-3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e482\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e; II. 312 ff., 344-5, 634\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIntermediaries, the axiom of skipped, II. 646\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIntrospection, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nInverted head, vision with, II. 213\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Jackson_Hughlings\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eJackson, Hughlings,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_400\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e400\u003c/a\u003e; II. 125-6\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJanet, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_385\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e385\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJanet, Paul,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_625\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e625\u003c/a\u003e; II. 40-1\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Janet_Pierre\"\u003eJanet, Pierre,\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_227\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_384\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e384\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_682\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e682\u003c/a\u003e; II. 456, 614\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJastrow,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_543\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e543\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e545\u003c/a\u003e; II. 44, 135, 180\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJevons, W. S.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_406\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nJoints, their sensibility, II. 189 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nJudgments, existential, II. 290\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nJustice, II. 673\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Kandinsky_V\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eKandinsky, V.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 70, 116\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKant,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_331\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e331\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis \u0027transcendental\u0027 deduction of the categories, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis paralogisms, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_363\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e363-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_642\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e642\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon symmetrical figures, II. 150;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon space, 273 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the real, 296;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon synthetic judgments \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, 661,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand their relation to experience, 664\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nKinæsthetic feelings, II. 488 ff., 493\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Kleptomania,\u0027 II. 425\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nKnee-jerk, II. 380\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Knowing\"\u003eKnowing\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychology assumes it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot reducible to any other relation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e471\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_688\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e688\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nKnowledge, two kinds of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof Self not essential to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe relativity of, II. 9 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe genesis of, 630 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nKnowledge-\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKönig,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e542\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKries, von,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_547\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e547\u003c/a\u003e; II. 253\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKrishaber,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_377\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e377\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKussmaul, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_684\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e684\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Ladd_G_T\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eLadd, G. T.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_687\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e687\u003c/a\u003e; II. 3, 311\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLamarck,\u003c/span\u003e II. 678\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLandry,\u003c/span\u003e II. 490, 492\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLange, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLange, C.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 443, 449, 455, 457, 460, 462\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLange, K.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 111\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLange, L.,\u003c/span\u003e on reaction-time, muscular and sensorial, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLange, N.,\u003c/span\u003e on muscular element in imagination, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLanguage, as a human function, II. 356-8\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLaromiguèire,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLaughter, II. 480\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLazarus,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_624\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e624\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_626\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e626\u003c/a\u003e; II. 84, 97, 369, 429\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLe Conte, Joseph,\u003c/span\u003e II. 228, 252, 265\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLéonie,\u003c/span\u003e M. Janet\u0027s trance-subject, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_387\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e387\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLevy, W. H.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 204\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLewes,\u003c/span\u003e on frog\u0027s sp. cord, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon thought as a sort of algebra, \u003ca href=\"#Page_270\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \u0027preperception,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_442\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e442\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon muscular feeling, II. 199;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon begging in pup, 400;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon lapsed intelligence, 678\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLewinski,\u003c/span\u003e II. 192\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLiberatore,\u003c/span\u003e II. 670\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLiebman, O.,\u003c/span\u003e on brain as a machine, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e; II. 34\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLiégeois, J.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 594, 606\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLight, effects of, on movement, II. 379\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Likeness\"\u003eLikeness\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e528\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLindsay, T. L.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 421\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLipps,\u003c/span\u003e on \u0027unconscious\u0027 sensations, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon theory of ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_603\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e603\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etime-perception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_632\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e632\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon muscular feeling, II. 200;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon distance, 221;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon visual illusions, 251, 264;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon space-perception, 280;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reality, 297;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon effort, 575\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLissauer,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLocal signs, II. 155 ff., 167\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLocalization, in hemispheres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLocalization, II. 153 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof one sensible object in another, II. 31 ff., 183 ff., 195 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLocke, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_390\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e390\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_462\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_483\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e483\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e553\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_563\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e563\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_679\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e679\u003c/a\u003e; II. 210, 306, 644, 662-4\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Locksley Hall,\u0027 I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_567\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e567\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLocomotion, instinct of, II. 405\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLoeb,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e; II. 255, 516, 628\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Logic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/a\u003e, II. 647\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLombard, J. S.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLombard, W.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 380\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon immortality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon personal identity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_442\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e442-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon fusion and discrimination of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_522\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e522\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon local signs, II. 157, 495;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon volition, 523-4\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLouis V.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_388\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e388\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLove, sexual, II. 437, 543;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eparental, 439;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBain\u0027s explanation of, 551\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLowell, J. R.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLuciani,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44-5-6-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"McCosh\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eMcCosh,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_501\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e501\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMach, E.,\u003c/span\u003e on attention, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_436\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e436\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon space-feeling, \u003ca href=\"#Page_449\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e449\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon time feeling, \u003ca href=\"#Page_616\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e616\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_635\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e635\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon motion-contrast, II. 247;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon optical inversion, 255;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon probability, 258;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling of innervation, 509, 511\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMagnitude of differences, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMalebranche,\u003c/span\u003e II. 9\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eManouvrier,\u003c/span\u003e II. 496\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMania, transitory, II. 460\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMan\u0027s intellectual distinction from brutes, II. 348 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMansel, H. L.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMantegazza, P.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 447, 479, 481\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMarcus Aurelius,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_313\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e313\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e; II. 675\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMarillier, L.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e445\u003c/a\u003e; II. 514\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMarique,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMartin, H. N.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e; II. 3\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMartineau, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_484\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e484\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_506\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e506\u003c/a\u003e; II. 9\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaudsley, H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_656\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e656\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaury, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 83, 124, 127\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMechanical philosophy, the, II. 666 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMechanism \u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e intelligence, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8-14\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMediate comparison, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMediumship, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMehner,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_618\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e618\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMemory, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XVI\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eit depends on material conditions, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe essential function of the hemispheres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elapses of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein hysterics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_384\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e384\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efavored by attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprimary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_638\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e638\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_643\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e643\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of the phenomenon of Memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_648\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e648\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe return of a mental image is not memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_619\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e619\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ememory\u0027s causes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_653\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e653\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe result of association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_654\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e654\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions of good memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_659\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e659\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebrute retentiveness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_660\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e660\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emultiple associations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_662\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e662\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimprovement of memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_667\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e667\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits usefulness depends on forgetting much, \u003ca href=\"#Page_680\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e680\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits decay, \u003ca href=\"#Page_683\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e683\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emetaphysical explanations of it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_687\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e687\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMentality, the mark of its presence, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMental operations, simultaneous, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_408\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e408\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMercier, C.,\u003c/span\u003e on inertness of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon inhibition, II. 583\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMerkel,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e542-3-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMetaphysical principles, II. 669 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMetaphysics, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_401\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e401\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMeyer\u0027s experiment on color-contrast, II. 21\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeyer, G. H.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 66, 97-8\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeynert, T.,\u003c/span\u003e his brain-scheme, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, James,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_355\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e355\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_470\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e470\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_476\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e476\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_485\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e485\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_499\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e499\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_597\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e597\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_651\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e651\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_653\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e653\u003c/a\u003e; II. 77\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, J. S.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon unity of self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_356\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e356-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon abstract ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_470\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e470\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emethods of inquiry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_590\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e590\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon infinitude and association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_600\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e600\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon space, II. 271;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon belief, 285, 822;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reasoning, 331;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the order of Nature, 634;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon arithmetical propositions, 654\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMills, C. K.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMimicry, its effects on emotion, II. 463-6\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMind, depends on brain-conditions, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e553\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe mark of its presence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifficulty of stating its connection with brain, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat psychology means by it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Mind-Stuff_theory\"\u003eMind-Stuff theory\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter VI\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea postulate of evolution, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esome proofs of it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauthor\u0027s interpretation of them, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efeelings cannot mix, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e ff., II. 2, 103\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMiser, associationist explanation of the, II. 423 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMitchell, J. K.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 616\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMitchell, S. W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_381\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e381\u003c/a\u003e; II. 38-9, 380\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nModesty, II. 435\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMoll, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 616\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMolyneux,\u003c/span\u003e II. 210\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMonadism, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMonism, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e366-7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMonkey\u0027s cortical centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMontgomery, E.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMoral principles, II. 639, 672\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMorris, G. S.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_365\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e365\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMosso,\u003c/span\u003e on blood-supply to brain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97-9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplethysmographic researches, II. 378;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon fear, 419, 483\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMotor centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Motor circle,\u0027 II. 583\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMotor strands, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efor special muscles, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMotor type of imagination, II. 61\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMovement, perception of, by sensory surfaces, II. 171 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epart played by, in vision, 197, 203, 234-7\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe, Production of, Chap. XXII\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erequires guiding sensations, 490\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eillusory perception of, during anæsthesia, 489;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eresults from every kind of consciousness, 526\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMozart,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_255\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMüller, G. E.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e445\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e456-8\u003c/a\u003e; II. 198, 280, 491, 502, 508, 517\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMüller, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e; II. 640\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMüller, J. J.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 213\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMüller, Max,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMunk, H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41-3-4-5-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57-8-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMünsterberg,\u003c/span\u003e on Meynert\u0027s scheme, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reaction times with intellectual operation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e:\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_562\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e562\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon time-perception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_620\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e620\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_637\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e637\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon imagination, II. 74;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon muscular sensibility, 189;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon volition, 505;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling of innervation, 514;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon association, 590\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMuscles, how represented in nerve-centres, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMuscle-reading, II. 525\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMuscular sense, its cortical centre, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits existence, II. 189 ff., 197 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits insignificance in space-perception, 197-203, 234-7\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMusic, its accidental genesis, II. 627; 687\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMussey,\u003c/span\u003e II. 543\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMutilations, inherited, II. 627\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMyers, F. W. H.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_400\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e400\u003c/a\u003e; II. 133\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMysophobia, II. 435, 545\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Nature_the_order_of\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eNature, the order of, its incongruence with that of our thought, II. 634 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNaunyn,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNecessary truths are all truths of comparison, II. 641 ff., 651, 662.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Experience\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eexperience\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#A_priori\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ea priori connections\u003c/a\u003e,\u003c/i\u003e etc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNeiglick,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_543\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e543\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Neural_process\"\u003eNeural process\u003c/a\u003e, in perception. I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein habit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e566\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_655\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e655\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein imagination, II. 68 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein perception, 82 ff., 103 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein hallucination, 122 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein space-perception, 143;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein emotion, 474;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein volition, 580 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein association, 587 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNitrous oxide intoxication, II. 284\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNonsense, how it escapes detection, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNormal position in vision, II. 238\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNothnagel,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60-1\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNumber, II. 653\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Obersteiner\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eObersteiner,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e445\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nObject, use of the word, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e471\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econfusion of, with thought that knows it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nObjective world, known before self, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits primitive unity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e487-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003editto, II. 8\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nObjects \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e ideas, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nOld-fogyism, II. 110\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOrchansky,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Overtone\u0027 (psychic), I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e281-2\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Pain\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits relations to the will, II. 549 ff., 583-4\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePaneth,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nParallelism, theory of, between mental and cerebral phenomena, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Automaton-Theory\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eAutomaton-theory\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nParesis of external rectus muscle, II. 236, 507\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eParinaud,\u003c/span\u003e II. 71\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPartiality of mind, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Interest\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003einterest\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Teleology\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eteleology\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Intelligence\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eintelligence\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Selection\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eselection\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Essences\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eessences\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPast time, known in a present feeling, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_627\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e627\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe immediate past is a portion of the present duration-block, \u003ca href=\"#Page_608\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e608\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPatellar reflex, II. 380\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPaths through cortex, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir formation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e107-12\u003c/a\u003e; II. 584 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eassociation depends on them, 567 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ememory depends on them, 655 ff., 661, 686\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePaulhan, F.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_408\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e408\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_670\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e670\u003c/a\u003e; II. 64, 476\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Pedagogic_remarks\"\u003ePedagogic remarks\u003c/a\u003e: I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_121\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e121-7\u003c/a\u003e; II. 110, 401-2, 409, 463, 466\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPerception. Chapter XIX:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with sensation, II. 1, 76;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves reproductive processes, 78;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis of \u003ci\u003eprobable\u003c/i\u003e objects, 82 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot an unconscious inference, 111 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erapidity of, 131\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPerception-time, II. 131\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerez, B.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_446\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e446\u003c/a\u003e; II. 416\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPersonal equation, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_413\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e413\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPersonality, alterations of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePflüger,\u003c/span\u003e on frog\u0027s spinal cord, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPhilosophies, their test, II. 312\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPhosphorus and thought, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Phrenology\"\u003ePhrenology\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePick, E.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_669\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e669\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePitres,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPlanchette-writing, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e208-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPlasticity, as basis of habit, defined, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePlatner,\u003c/span\u003e II. 208\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePlato,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_462\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPlay, II. 427\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPleasure, as related to will, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e; II. 549, 583-4\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Points_identical\"\u003ePoints, identical,\u003c/a\u003e theory of, II. 222 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPossession, Spirit-, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPost-hypnotic suggestion, II. 613\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPractical interests, their effects on discrimination, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPrayer, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_316\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Preperception,\u0027 I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPresent, the present moment, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_606\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e606\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePreyer,\u003c/span\u003e II. 403\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nProbability determines what object shall be perceived, II. 82, 104, 258, 260-3\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nProblematic conceptions, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_463\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e463\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nProblems, the process of solution of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e584\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nProjection of sensations, eccentric, II. 31 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Projection\"\u003eProjection\u003c/a\u003e, theory of, II. 228\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPsychologist\u0027s fallacy, the, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Fallacy_the_Psychologists\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eFallacy\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPsychophysic law, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_539\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e539\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPugnacity, II. 409\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPure Ego, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePutnam, J. J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Questioning_mania\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eQuestioning mania, II. 284\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Rabier\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eRabier,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_470\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e470\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_604\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e604\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRational propositions, II. 644\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRationality is based on apprehension of series, II. 659\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRationality, postulates of, II. 670, 677\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRationality, sense of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e260-4\u003c/a\u003e; II. 647\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Reaction-time\"\u003eReaction-time\u003c/a\u003e, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esimple, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat it measures is not conscious thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLange\u0027s distinction between muscular and sensorial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits variations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e94-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einfluenced by expectant attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter intellectual process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_523\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e523\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e557\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eafter perception, II. 131\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nReal size and shape of visual objects, II. 179, 237 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Reality\"\u003eReality\u003c/a\u003e, the Perception of, Chapter XXI;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot a distinct content of consciousness, II. 286;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evarious orders of, 287 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eevery object has \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e kind of reality, 291 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe choice of, 290;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractical, 293 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeans relation to the self, 295-8;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of sensations to, 299;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof emotions, 306\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nReason, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_551\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e551\u003c/a\u003e. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Logic\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eLogic\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nReasoning, Chapter XXII;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits definition, II. 325;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves the picking out of essences, or sagacity, 329;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand abstraction, 332;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits utility depends on the peculiar constitution of this world, 337 ff., 651;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edepends on association by similarity, 345\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRecall, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_654\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e654\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Recepts,\u0027 II. 327, 349, 351\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Recognition\"\u003eRecognition,\u003c/a\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_673\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e673\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRecollection, voluntary, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_585\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e585\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRedintegration, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_569\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e569\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Reductives,\u0027 II. 125, 291\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nReflex acts, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereaction-time measures one, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econcatenated habits are constituted by a chain of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReid, Thomas,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e609\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e; II. 214, 216, 218, 240, 309\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRelating principle, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_687\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e687-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRelation, feelings of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003espace-relations, II. 148 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRelations, inward, between ideas, II. 639, 642, 661, 671;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe principle of transferred, 646\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRelief, II. 254-7. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Third_dimension\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ethird dimension\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRenouvier, Ch.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_551\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e551\u003c/a\u003e; II. 309\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nReproduction in memory, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e574\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_654\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e654\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_585\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e585\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nResemblance, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e528\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRespiration, effects of sensory stimuli upon, II. 376\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRestitution of function, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRestoration of function, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRetention in memory, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_653\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e653\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRetentiveness, organic, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_659\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e659\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eit is unchangeable, \u003ca href=\"#Page_663\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e663\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRetinal image, II. 92\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRetinal sensibility, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Vision\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003evision\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Space\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003espace\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Points_identical\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eidentical points\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Third_dimension\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ethird dimension\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Projection\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eprojection\u003c/a\u003e,\u003c/i\u003e etc.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRevival in memory, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e574\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_654\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e654\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReynolds, Mary,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_381\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e381\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRibot, Th.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_446\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e446\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_680\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e680\u003c/a\u003e, 682\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRichet, Ch.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_638\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e638\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_644\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e644-6-7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRiehl, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 32\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRobertson, G. C.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_461\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e; II. 86\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRomanes, G. J.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 95, 132, 327-9, 349, 351, 355, 397\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nRomantic and classic, II. 469\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRosenthal,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoss, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e56-7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoyce, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e; II. 316-7\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoyer-Collard,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e609\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRutherford,\u003c/span\u003e II. 170\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Sagacity\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSagacity, II. 331, 343\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSameness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e459\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_480\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e480\u003c/a\u003e; II. 650\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchaefer, W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchiff, M.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchmid,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_683\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e683\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchmidt, H. D.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 399-400\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchneider, G. H.,\u003c/span\u003e on Habits, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e118-20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon perception of motion, II. 173;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon evolution of movements, 380;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon instincts, 387-8, 411, 418, 439\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchopenhauer,\u003c/span\u003e II. 33, 273\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchrader,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nScience, the genesis of, II. 665-9\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSea-sickness, susceptibility to, an accident, II. 627\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSeat of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof Soul, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof sensations, no original, II. 34\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSciences, the natural, the factors of their production, II. 633 ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea Turkish cadi upon, 640;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epostulate things with unchangeable properties, 656\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSciences, the pure, they express results of comparison exclusively, II. 641;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eclassifications, 646;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogic, 647;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emathematics, 653\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSecretiveness, II. 432\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSeguin,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Selection\"\u003eSelection\u003c/a\u003e, a cardinal function of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e; II. 584;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof visual reality, II. 177 ff., 237;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof reality in general, 290, 294;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof essential quality, 333, 370, 634\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSelf, consciousness of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChap. X\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot primary, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe empirical self, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits constituents, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe material self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe social self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe spiritual self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eresolvable into feelings localized in head, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econsciousness of personal identity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits alterations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSelf-feeling, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_305\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e305\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSelf-love, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe name for active impulses and emotions towards certain \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e; we do not love our bare principle of individuality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_323\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e323\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSelf-seeking, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSelves, their rivalry, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSemi-reflex acts, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSensation, does attention increase its strength? I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_425\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e425\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eterminus of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e471\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSensation, Chapter XVII;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from perception, II. 1, 76;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits cognitive function, 3;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epure sensation an abstraction, 3;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe terminus of thought, 7\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSensations, are not compounds, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e ff.; II. 2;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir supposed combination by a higher principle, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_687\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e687\u003c/a\u003e; II. 27-30;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir influence on each other, II. 28-30;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir eccentric projection, 31 ff., 195 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir localization inside of one another, 183 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir relation to reality, 299 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto emotions, 453;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir fusion, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Mind-Stuff_theory\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eMind-stuff theory\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSensationalism, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised by spiritualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_687\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e687\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSensationalism, II. 5;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein the field of space-perception, criticised, 216 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits difficulties, 231-7;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefended, 237 ff., 517\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSergi,\u003c/span\u003e II. 34\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSerial increase, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_490\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e490\u003c/a\u003e; II. 644\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSeries, II. 644-51, 659 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSeth, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 4\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSexual function, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nShadows, colored, II. 25\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nShame, II. 435\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eShoemaker,\u003c/span\u003e Dr., I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nShyness, II. 430\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Sight\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSight, its cortical centre, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSign-making, a differentia of man, II. 356\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSigns, local, II. 155 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSigwart, C.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 634-6\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSikorsky,\u003c/span\u003e II. 465\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSimilarity, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e528\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSimilarity, association by, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e; II. 345, 353\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSkin, discrimination of points on, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_512\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e512\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSleep, partial consciousness during, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSociability, II. 430\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSomnambulism, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Hypnotism\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ehypnotism\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Hysterics\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ehysterics\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSoul, theory of the, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einaccessibility of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits essence is to think (according to Descartes), \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eseat of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003earguments for its existence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_343\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e343\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ean unnecessary hypothesis for psychology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with transcendental Ego, \u003ca href=\"#Page_365\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e365\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea relating principle, \u003ca href=\"#Page_499\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e499\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Space\"\u003eSpace,\u003c/a\u003e the perception of, Chapter XX;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprimitive extensity in three dimensions, II. 134-9;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003espatial order, 145;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003espace-relations, 148;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elocalization in, 153 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow real space is mentally constructed, 166 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epart played by movement in, 171-6;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeasurement of extensions, 177 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esynthesis of originally chaotic sensations of extension, 181 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epart played by articular surfaces in, 189 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eby muscles, 197 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow the blind perceive space, 203 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evisual space, 211-268;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of identical points, 222;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof projection, 228;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifficulties of sensation-theory expounded and replied to, 231-268;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehistorical sketch of opinion, 270 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpalding, D. A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 396, 398, 400, 406\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSpan of consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_640\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e640\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSpeech, the \u0027centre\u0027 of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits misleading influence in psychology, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought possible without it, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Aphasia\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eAphasia\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Phrenology\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ePhrenology\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpencer,\u003c/span\u003e his formula of \u0027adjustment,\u0027 I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon formation of paths in nerve-centres, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon chasm between mind and matter, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon origin of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \u0027integration\u0027 of nervous shocks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feelings of relation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon unity of self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon conceivability, \u003ca href=\"#Page_464\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon abstraction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_506\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e506\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_600\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e600\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon time perception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_622\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e622\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_639\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e639\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon memory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_649\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e649\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon recognition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_673\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e673\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling and perception, II. 113, 180;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon space-perception, 272, 282;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon genesis of emotions, 478 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon free-will, 576;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon inheritance of acquired peculiarities, 620 ff., 679;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \u0027equilibration,\u0027 627;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon genesis of cognition, 643;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon that of sociality and pity, 685\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpinoza,\u003c/span\u003e II. 288\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpir, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 665, 677\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Spirit-control,\u0027 I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSpiritualist theory of the self, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e; II. 5\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSpiritualists, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStanley, Henry M.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 310\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStarr, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nStatistical method in psychology, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSteiner,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72-3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSteinthal,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_604\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e604\u003c/a\u003e; II. 107-9\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStepanoff,\u003c/span\u003e II. 170\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nStereoscope, II. 87\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nStereoscopy, II. 223, 252. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Third_dimension\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ethird dimension\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSternberg,\u003c/span\u003e II. 105, 515\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStevens,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_617\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e617\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStevens, E. W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_397\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e397\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStory, Jean,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nStream of Thought, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eschematic representations of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e279-82\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStricker, S.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 62 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStrümpell, A.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_376\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e376\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e445\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_491\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e491\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStrümpell,\u003c/span\u003e Prof., II. 353\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStuart, D.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_406\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStumpf. C,\u003c/span\u003e on attention, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_426\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e426\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon difference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_493\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e493\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon fusion of impressions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_522\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e522\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e530-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon strong and weak sensations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_547\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e547\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon relativity of knowledge, II. 11;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon sensations of extent, 219, 221\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSubjective sensations, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_516\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e516\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSubstance, spiritual, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSubstantive states of mind, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSubstitution of parts for wholes in reasoning, II. 330;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the same for the same, 650\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSubsumption, the principle of mediate, II. 648\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSuccession, not known by successive feelings, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_628\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e628\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e duration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e609\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSuggestion, in hypnotism, II. 598-601;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epost-hypnotic, 613\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSuicide, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSully, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e; II. 79, 221, 272, 281, 322, 425\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSummation of stimuli, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof elements of feeling, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe latter is inadmissible, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSuperposition, in space-measurements, II. 177, 266 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSymbols as substitutes for reality, II. 305\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSympathy, II. 410\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSynthetic judgments \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, II. 661-2\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSystems, philosophic, sentimental, and mechanical, II. 665-7\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Tactile_centre\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTactile centre, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTactile images, II. 65\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTactile sensibility, its cortical centre, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaine, H.,\u003c/span\u003e on unity of self, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_355\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e355\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon alterations of ditto, \u003ca href=\"#Page_376\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e376\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon recollecting, \u003ca href=\"#Page_658\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e658\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_670\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e670\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eOn projection of sensations, II. 33;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon images, 48, and their \u0027reduction,\u0027 125-6;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reality, 291\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTàkacs,\u003c/span\u003e II. 490\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTarde, G.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaylor, C. F.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 99\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTedium, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_626\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e626\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Teleology\"\u003eTeleology,\u003c/a\u003e created by consciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e140-1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eessence of intelligence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e482\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolved in the fact of essences, II. 335;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits barrenness in the natural sciences, 665\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTendency, feelings of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e250-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThackeray, W. M.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 434\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nThermometry, cerebral, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Thing,\u0027 II. 184, 259\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nThinking, the consciousness of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nThinking principle, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Third_dimension\"\u003eThird dimension\u003c/a\u003e of space, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThompson, D. G.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e; II. 662\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThomson, Allen,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nThought, synonym for consciousness at large, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe stream of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e:\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eit tends to personal form, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esame thought never comes twice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esense in which it is continuous, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecan be carried on in any terms, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e260-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat constitutes its rational character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis cognitive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot made up of parts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e ff., II. 79 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealways partial to some of its objects, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe consciousness of it as a process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe present thought is the thinker, \u003ca href=\"#Page_369\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e369\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_401\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e401\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edepends on material conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e553\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027Thought reading,\u0027 II. 525\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTime, occupied by neural and mental processes, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Reaction-time\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ereaction-time\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTime, unconscious registration of, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTime, the perception of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XV512\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eChapter XV\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebegins with duration, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_609\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e609\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with perception of space, \u003ca href=\"#Page_610\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e610\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eempty time not perceived, \u003ca href=\"#Page_619\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e619\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits discrete flow, \u003ca href=\"#Page_621\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e621\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_637\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e637\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elong intervals conceived symbolically, \u003ca href=\"#Page_622\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e622\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evariations in our estimate of its length, \u003ca href=\"#Page_623\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e623\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecerebral process underlying, \u003ca href=\"#Page_627\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e627\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTischer,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_524\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e524\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e527\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTouch, cortical centre for, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTrance, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Hypnotism\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ehypnotism\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTranscendentalist theory of the Self, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_363\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e363\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTransitive states of mind, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTschisch, von,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_414\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e414\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_560\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e560\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTuke, D. H.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 130, 413\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaylor, E. B.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 304\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTympanic membrane, its tactile sensibility, II. 140\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTyndall,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e147-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Ueberweg\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eUeberweg,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nUnconscious states of Mind, proofs of their existence, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eObjections, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nUnconsciousness, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein hysterics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof useless sensations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_517\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e517\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nUnderstanding of a sentence, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Units\"\u003eUnits, psychic,\u003c/a\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nUnity of original object, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e487-8\u003c/a\u003e; II. 8, 183 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Universal_conceptions\"\u003eUniversal conceptions,\u003c/a\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_473\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e473\u003c/a\u003e. See \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#General_propositions\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003egeneral propositions\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nUnreality, the feeling of, II. 298\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Valentin\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eValentin,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e557\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVarying concomitants, law of dissociation by, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_506\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e506\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVennum, Lurancy,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_397\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e397\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVentriloquism, II. 184\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVerdon, R.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_685\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e685\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Vertigo\"\u003eVertigo,\u003c/a\u003e II. 89;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eMental vertigo, 309;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eoptical, 506\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Vicarious_function\"\u003eVicarious function\u003c/a\u003e of brain-parts, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e; II. 592\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVierordt,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_616\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e616\u003c/a\u003e ff.; II. 154, 172\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVintschgau,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Vision\"\u003eVision\u003c/a\u003e with head upside down, II. 213\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVisual centre in brain, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVisual space, II. 211 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVisualizing power, II. 51-60\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVocalization, II. 407\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVolition, see \u003ci\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Will\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eWill\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVolkmann. A. W.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 198, 252 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVolkmann, W. von Volkmar,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_627\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e627\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_629\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e629\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_631\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e631\u003c/a\u003e; II. 276\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVoluminousness, primitive, of sensations, II. 184\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVoluntary thinking, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_583\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e583\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nVulgarity of mind, II. 370\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVulpian,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Wahle\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWahle,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_493\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e493\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWaitz, Th.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_632\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e632\u003c/a\u003e; II. 436\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nWalking, in child, II. 405\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWalter. J. E.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWard, J.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_454\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e454\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e548\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_562\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e562\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_629\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e629\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_633\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e633\u003c/a\u003e; II. 282\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWarren, J. W.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWayland,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWeber, E. H.,\u003c/span\u003e his \u0027law,\u0027 I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e537\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eOn space-perception on skin, II. 141-2;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon muscular feeling, 198\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWeed, T.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_665\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e665\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWeissmann, A.,\u003c/span\u003e II. 684 ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nWernicke\u0027s convolution, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWheatstone\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s experiment,\u0027 II. 326-7\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWigan,\u003c/span\u003e Dr., I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_390\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e390\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_675\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e675\u003c/a\u003e; II. 566-7\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWilbrand,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e50-1\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"Will\"\u003eWill\u003c/a\u003e, Chapter XXVI;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves memory of past acts, and nothing else but consent that they shall occur again, II. 487-518;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe memory may involve images of either resident or remote effects of the movement, 518-22;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eideo-motor action, 522-8;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eaction after deliberation, 528;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edecision, 531;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffort, 535;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe explosive will, 537;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe obstructed will, 546;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of will to pleasure and pain, 549 ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto attention, 561;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eterminates in an \u0027idea\u0027, 567;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe question of its indeterminism, 569;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychology must assume determinism, 576;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eneural processes concerned in education of the will, 579 ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nWill, relations of, to Belief, II. 320\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWills, Jas.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nWitchcraft, II. 309\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWolfe, H. K.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_674\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e674\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_679\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e679\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWolff, Chr.,\u003c/span\u003e I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_409\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e409\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_651\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e651\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nWorld, the peculiar constitution of the, II. 337, 647, 651-2\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\nWriting, automatic, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWundt,\u003c/span\u003e on frontal lobes, I. \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89-94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon introspective method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon self-consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon perception of strokes of sound, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon perception of simultaneous events, \u003ca href=\"#Page_411\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e411\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon Weber\u0027s law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_534\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e534\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eassociation-time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e557\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_560\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e560\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon time-perception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_608\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e608\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_612\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e612\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_620\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e620\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_634\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e634\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon local signs, II. 155-7;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon eyeball-muscles, 200;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon sensations, 219;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon paresis of ext. rectus, 236;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon contrast, 250;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon certain illusions, 264;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling of innervation, 266, 493;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon space as synthesis, 276;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon emotions, 481;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon dichotomic form of thought, 654\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Zollner\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eZöllner\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s pattern, II. 232\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"full\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}