Psychology: Briefer Course
{"WorkMasterId":7515,"WpPageId":288900,"ParentWpPageId":193821,"Slug":"psychology-briefer-course","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/psychology-briefer-course/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/psychology-briefer-course/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":1194861,"CleanHtmlLength":1139163,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Psychology: Briefer Course","Deck":"James condenses his psychology into a teaching text on consciousness, attention, habit, emotion, will, and the self.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/william-james-01-alice-boughton-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"William James by Alice M. Boughton","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"William James","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","Copies":["1842 CE – 1910 CE","New York City, New York","American philosopher and psychologist whose pragmatism, radical empiricism, stream-of-consciousness psychology, pluralism, and philosophy of religion reshaped modern philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1892 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1892 CE for the Briefer Course publication.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"Psychology: Briefer Course","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-mind"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-science"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #55262 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["James condenses his psychology into a teaching text on consciousness, attention, habit, emotion, will, and the self."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Briefer Course; Psychology","KeyConcepts":"psychology; consciousness; habit; attention; emotion; self; teaching","Methodology":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported.","Structure":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."},"Arguments":["James condenses his psychology into a teaching text on consciousness, attention, habit, emotion, will, and the self."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct James work through catalog, public edition, and psychology-history evidence.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct James work through catalog, public edition, and psychology-history evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #55262\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55262\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["James condenses his psychology into a teaching text on consciousness, attention, habit, emotion, will, and the self."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Briefer Course; Psychology"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"psychology; consciousness; habit; attention; emotion; self; teaching"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["James condenses his psychology into a teaching text on consciousness, attention, habit, emotion, will, and the self."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, phenomenology of experience, philosophy of religion, pluralism, moral psychology, process thought, analytic pragmatism, and modern discussions of consciousness."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct James work through catalog, public edition, and psychology-history evidence.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct James work through catalog, public edition, and psychology-history evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55262\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #55262\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"full\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-cover.jpg\" alt=\"Image unavailable: book-cover\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\r\nstyle=\"border: 2px black solid;margin:auto auto 3em auto;max-width:20em;\r\npadding:1%;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CONTENTS\"\u003eContents.\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cspan class=\"nonvis\"\u003e(In certain versions of this etext [in certain browsers]\r\nclicking on the image will bring up a larger version.)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e(etext transcriber\u0027s note)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eBRIEFER COURSE\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch1\u003ePSYCHOLOGY\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003eBY\r\nWILLIAM JAMES\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eProfessor of Psychology in Harvard University\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"eng\"\u003eLondon\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMACMILLAN AND CO.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n1892\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCopyright\u003c/span\u003e, 1892,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBY\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHENRY HOLT \u0026amp; CO.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRobert Drummond\u003c/span\u003e,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eElectrotyper and Printer\u003c/i\u003e,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNew York.\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_iii\" id=\"page_iii\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{iii}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"PREFACE\" id=\"PREFACE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePREFACE.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIn\u003c/span\u003e preparing the following abridgment of my larger work, the Principles\r\nof Psychology, my chief aim has been to make it more directly available\r\nfor class-room use. For this purpose I have omitted several whole\r\nchapters and rewritten others. I have left out all the polemical and\r\nhistorical matter, all the metaphysical discussions and purely\r\nspeculative passages, most of the quotations, all the book-references,\r\nand (I trust) all the impertinences, of the larger work, leaving to the\r\nteacher the choice of orally restoring as much of this material as may\r\nseem to him good, along with his own remarks on the topics successively\r\nstudied. Knowing how ignorant the average student is of physiology, I\r\nhave added brief chapters on the various senses. In this shorter work\r\nthe general point of view, which I have adopted as that of \u0027natural\r\nscience,\u0027 has, I imagine, gained in clearness by its extrication from so\r\nmuch critical matter and its more simple and dogmatic statement. About\r\ntwo fifths of the volume is either new or rewritten, the rest is\r\n\u0027scissors and paste.\u0027 I regret to have been unable to supply chapters on\r\npleasure and pain, æsthetics, and the moral sense. Possibly the defect\r\nmay be made up in a later edition, if such a thing should ever be\r\ndemanded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI cannot forbear taking advantage of this preface to make a statement\r\nabout the composition of the \u0027Principles of Psychology.\u0027 My critics in\r\nthe main have been so indulgent that I must cordially thank them; but\r\nthey have been unanimous in one reproach, namely, that my\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_iv\" id=\"page_iv\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{iv}\u003c/span\u003e order of\r\nchapters is planless and unnatural; and in one charitable excuse for\r\nthis, namely, that the work, being largely a collection of\r\nreview-articles, could not be expected to show as much system as a\r\ntreatise cast in a single mould. Both the reproach and the excuse\r\nmisapprehend the facts of the case. The order of composition is\r\ndoubtless unshapely, or it would not be found so by so many. But\r\nplanless it is not, for I deliberately followed what seemed to me a good\r\npedagogic order, in proceeding from the more concrete mental aspects\r\nwith which we are best acquainted to the so-called elements which we\r\nnaturally come to know later by way of abstraction. The opposite order,\r\nof \u0027building-up\u0027 the mind out of its \u0027units of composition,\u0027 has the\r\nmerit of expository elegance, and gives a neatly subdivided table of\r\ncontents; but it often purchases these advantages at the cost of reality\r\nand truth. I admit that my \u0027synthetic\u0027 order was stumblingly carried\r\nout; but this again was in consequence of what I thought were pedagogic\r\nnecessities. On the whole, in spite of my critics, I venture still to\r\nthink that the \u0027unsystematic\u0027 form charged upon the book is more\r\napparent than profound, and that we really gain a more living\r\nunderstanding of the mind by keeping our attention as long as possible\r\nupon our entire conscious states as they are concretely given to us,\r\nthan by the \u003ci\u003epost-mortem\u003c/i\u003e study of their comminuted \u0027elements.\u0027 This\r\nlast is the study of artificial abstractions, not of natural things.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_1_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_v\" id=\"page_v\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{v}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut whether the critics are right, or I am, on this first point, the\r\ncritics are wrong about the relation of the magazine-articles to the\r\nbook. With a single exception all the chapters were written for the\r\nbook; and then by an after-thought some of them were sent to magazines,\r\nbecause the completion of the whole work seemed so distant. My lack of\r\ncapacity has doubtless been great, but the charge of not having taken\r\nthe utmost pains, according to my lights, in the composition of the\r\nvolumes, cannot justly be laid at my door.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_vii\" id=\"page_vii\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{vii}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CONTENTS\" id=\"CONTENTS\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCONTENTS.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"1\" cellspacing=\"2\" summary=\"\"\r\nstyle=\"margin:auto auto;max-width:80%;\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_I\"\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003ePAGE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIntroductory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_001\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003ePsychology defined; psychology as a natural science, its\r\ndata, \u003ca href=\"#page_001\"\u003e1.\u003c/a\u003e The human mind and its environment, \u003ca href=\"#page_003\"\u003e3.\u003c/a\u003e The postulate\r\nthat all consciousness has cerebral activity for its condition,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_005\"\u003e5.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_II\"\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSensation in General\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eIncoming nerve-currents, \u003ca href=\"#page_009\"\u003e9.\u003c/a\u003e Terminal organs, \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10.\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Specific\r\nenergies,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11.\u003c/a\u003e Sensations cognize qualities, \u003ca href=\"#page_013\"\u003e13.\u003c/a\u003e Knowledge\r\nof acquaintance and knowledge-about, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14.\u003c/a\u003e Objects of\r\nsensation appear in space, \u003ca href=\"#page_015\"\u003e15.\u003c/a\u003e The intensity of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_016\"\u003e16.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWeber\u0027s law, \u003ca href=\"#page_017\"\u003e17.\u003c/a\u003e Fechner\u0027s law, \u003ca href=\"#page_021\"\u003e21.\u003c/a\u003e Sensations are not\r\npsychic compounds, \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23.\u003c/a\u003e The \u0027law of relativity,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24.\u003c/a\u003e Effects\r\nof contrast, \u003ca href=\"#page_026\"\u003e26.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_III\"\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSight\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_028\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe eye, \u003ca href=\"#page_028\"\u003e28.\u003c/a\u003e Accommodation, \u003ca href=\"#page_032\"\u003e32.\u003c/a\u003e Convergence, binocular\r\nvision, \u003ca href=\"#page_033\"\u003e33.\u003c/a\u003e Double images, \u003ca href=\"#page_036\"\u003e36.\u003c/a\u003e Distance, \u003ca href=\"#page_039\"\u003e39.\u003c/a\u003e Size, color,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_040\"\u003e40.\u003c/a\u003e After-images, \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43.\u003c/a\u003e Intensity of luminous objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_045\"\u003e45.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IV\"\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHearing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_047\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe ear, \u003ca href=\"#page_047\"\u003e47.\u003c/a\u003e The qualities of sound, \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43.\u003c/a\u003e Pitch, \u003ca href=\"#page_044\"\u003e44.\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Timbre,\u0027\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_045\"\u003e45.\u003c/a\u003e Analysis of compound air-waves, \u003ca href=\"#page_056\"\u003e56.\u003c/a\u003e No fusion of\r\nelementary sensations of sound, \u003ca href=\"#page_057\"\u003e57.\u003c/a\u003e Harmony and discord, \u003ca href=\"#page_058\"\u003e58.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDiscrimination by the ear, \u003ca href=\"#page_059\"\u003e59.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_V\"\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTouch, the Temperature Sense, the Muscular Sense,\r\nand Pain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eEnd-organs in the skin, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60.\u003c/a\u003e Touch, sense of pressure, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLocalization, \u003ca href=\"#page_061\"\u003e61.\u003c/a\u003e Sensibility to temperature, \u003ca href=\"#page_063\"\u003e63.\u003c/a\u003e The muscular\r\nsense, \u003ca href=\"#page_065\"\u003e65.\u003c/a\u003e Pain, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\"\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSensations of Motion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe feeling of motion over surfaces, \u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70.\u003c/a\u003e Feelings in joints,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_074\"\u003e74.\u003c/a\u003e The sense of translation, the sensibility of the semicircular\r\ncanals, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VII\"\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Structure of the Brain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_078\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eEmbryological sketch, \u003ca href=\"#page_078\"\u003e78.\u003c/a\u003e Practical dissection of the sheep\u0027s\r\nbrain, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VIII\"\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Functions of the Brain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eGeneral idea of nervous function, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91.\u003c/a\u003e The frog\u0027s nerve-centres,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_092\"\u003e92.\u003c/a\u003e The pigeon\u0027s nerve-centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_096\"\u003e96.\u003c/a\u003e What the hemispheres\r\ndo, \u003ca href=\"#page_097\"\u003e97.\u003c/a\u003e The automaton-theory, \u003ca href=\"#page_101\"\u003e101.\u003c/a\u003e The localization\r\nof functions, \u003ca href=\"#page_104\"\u003e104.\u003c/a\u003e Brain and mind have analogous \u0027elements,\u0027\r\nsensory and motor, \u003ca href=\"#page_105\"\u003e105.\u003c/a\u003e The motor zone, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106.\u003c/a\u003e Aphasia, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe visual region, \u003ca href=\"#page_110\"\u003e110.\u003c/a\u003e Mental blindness, \u003ca href=\"#page_112\"\u003e112.\u003c/a\u003e The auditory\r\nregion, mental deafness, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113.\u003c/a\u003e Other centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_116\"\u003e116.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\"\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSome General Conditions of Neural Activity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe nervous discharge, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120.\u003c/a\u003e Reaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#page_121\"\u003e121.\u003c/a\u003e Simple\r\nreactions, \u003ca href=\"#page_122\"\u003e122.\u003c/a\u003e Complicated reactions, \u003ca href=\"#page_124\"\u003e124.\u003c/a\u003e The summation\r\nof stimuli, \u003ca href=\"#page_128\"\u003e128.\u003c/a\u003e Cerebral blood-supply, \u003ca href=\"#page_130\"\u003e130.\u003c/a\u003e Brain-thermometry,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_131\"\u003e131.\u003c/a\u003e Phosphorus and thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_132\"\u003e132.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\"\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHabit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eIts importance, and its physical basis, \u003ca href=\"#page_134\"\u003e134.\u003c/a\u003e Due to pathways\r\nformed in the centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_136\"\u003e136.\u003c/a\u003e Its practical uses, \u003ca href=\"#page_138\"\u003e138.\u003c/a\u003e Concatenated\r\nacts, \u003ca href=\"#page_140\"\u003e140.\u003c/a\u003e Necessity for guiding sensations in secondarily\r\nautomatic performances, \u003ca href=\"#page_141\"\u003e141.\u003c/a\u003e Pedagogical maxims concerning\r\nthe formation of habits, \u003ca href=\"#page_142\"\u003e142.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\"\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Stream of Consciousness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eAnalytic order of our study, \u003ca href=\"#page_151\"\u003e151.\u003c/a\u003e Every state of mind forms\r\npart of a personal consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_152\"\u003e152.\u003c/a\u003e The same state of mind\r\nis never had twice, \u003ca href=\"#page_154\"\u003e154.\u003c/a\u003e Permanently recurring ideas are a\r\nfiction, \u003ca href=\"#page_156\"\u003e156.\u003c/a\u003e Every personal consciousness is continuous, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSubstantive and transitive states, \u003ca href=\"#page_160\"\u003e160.\u003c/a\u003e Every object appears\r\nwith a \u0027fringe\u0027 of relations, \u003ca href=\"#page_163\"\u003e163.\u003c/a\u003e The \u0027topic\u0027 of the thought,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_167\"\u003e167.\u003c/a\u003e Thought may be rational in any sort of imagery, \u003ca href=\"#page_168\"\u003e168.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nConsciousness is always especially interested in some one part\r\nof its object, \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003e170.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\"\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Self\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe Me and the I, \u003ca href=\"#page_176\"\u003e176.\u003c/a\u003e The material Me, \u003ca href=\"#page_177\"\u003e177.\u003c/a\u003e The social\r\nMe, \u003ca href=\"#page_179\"\u003e179.\u003c/a\u003e The spiritual Me, \u003ca href=\"#page_181\"\u003e181.\u003c/a\u003e Self-appreciation, \u003ca href=\"#page_182\"\u003e182.\u003c/a\u003e Self-seeking,\r\nbodily, social, and spiritual, \u003ca href=\"#page_184\"\u003e184.\u003c/a\u003e Rivalry of the Mes,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_186\"\u003e186.\u003c/a\u003e Their hierarchy, \u003ca href=\"#page_190\"\u003e190.\u003c/a\u003e Teleology of self-interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_193\"\u003e193.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe I, or \u0027pure ego,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_195\"\u003e195.\u003c/a\u003e Thoughts are not compounded of\r\n\u0027fused\u0027 sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196.\u003c/a\u003e The \u0027soul\u0027 as a combining medium,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_200\"\u003e200.\u003c/a\u003e The sense of personal identity, \u003ca href=\"#page_201\"\u003e201.\u003c/a\u003e Explained by identity\r\nof function in successive passing thoughts, \u003ca href=\"#page_203\"\u003e203.\u003c/a\u003e Mutations\r\nof the self, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205.\u003c/a\u003e Insane delusions, \u003ca href=\"#page_207\"\u003e207.\u003c/a\u003e Alternating personalities,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_210\"\u003e210.\u003c/a\u003e Mediumships or possessions, \u003ca href=\"#page_212\"\u003e212.\u003c/a\u003e Who is the\r\nThinker, \u003ca href=\"#page_215\"\u003e215.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\"\u003eCHAPTER XIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAttention\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe narrowness of the field of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_217\"\u003e217.\u003c/a\u003e Dispersed\r\nattention, \u003ca href=\"#page_218\"\u003e218.\u003c/a\u003e To how much can we attend at once?\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_219\"\u003e219.\u003c/a\u003e The varieties of attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_220\"\u003e220.\u003c/a\u003e Voluntary attention, its\r\nmomentary character, \u003ca href=\"#page_224\"\u003e224.\u003c/a\u003e To keep our attention, an object\r\nmust change, \u003ca href=\"#page_226\"\u003e226.\u003c/a\u003e Genius and attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_227\"\u003e227.\u003c/a\u003e Attention\u0027s\r\nphysiological conditions, \u003ca href=\"#page_228\"\u003e228.\u003c/a\u003e The sense-organ must be\r\nadapted, \u003ca href=\"#page_229\"\u003e229.\u003c/a\u003e The idea of the object must be aroused, \u003ca href=\"#page_232\"\u003e232.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPedagogic remarks, \u003ca href=\"#page_236\"\u003e236.\u003c/a\u003e Attention and free-will, \u003ca href=\"#page_237\"\u003e237.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIV\"\u003eCHAPTER XIV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConception\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eDifferent states of mind can mean the same, \u003ca href=\"#page_239\"\u003e239.\u003c/a\u003e Conceptions\r\nof abstract, of universal, and of problematic objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe thought of \u0027the same\u0027 is not the same thought over\r\nagain, \u003ca href=\"#page_243\"\u003e243.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XV\"\u003eCHAPTER XV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiscrimination\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eDiscrimination and association; definition of discrimination,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_244\"\u003e244.\u003c/a\u003e Conditions which favor it, \u003ca href=\"#page_245\"\u003e245.\u003c/a\u003e The sensation of difference,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_246\"\u003e246.\u003c/a\u003e Differences inferred, \u003ca href=\"#page_248\"\u003e248.\u003c/a\u003e The analysis of compound\r\nobjects, \u003ca href=\"#page_248\"\u003e248.\u003c/a\u003e To be easily singled out, a quality should\r\nalready be separately known, \u003ca href=\"#page_250\"\u003e250.\u003c/a\u003e Dissociation by varying\r\nconcomitants, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251.\u003c/a\u003e Practice improves discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#page_252\"\u003e252.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVI\"\u003eCHAPTER XVI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAssociation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe order of our ideas, \u003ca href=\"#page_253\"\u003e253.\u003c/a\u003e It is determined by cerebral\r\nlaws, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255.\u003c/a\u003e The ultimate cause of association is habit, \u003ca href=\"#page_256\"\u003e256.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe elementary law in association, \u003ca href=\"#page_257\"\u003e257.\u003c/a\u003e Indeterminateness of\r\nits results, \u003ca href=\"#page_258\"\u003e258.\u003c/a\u003e Total recall, \u003ca href=\"#page_259\"\u003e259.\u003c/a\u003e Partial recall, and the law\r\nof interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_261\"\u003e261.\u003c/a\u003e Frequency, recency, vividness, and emotional\r\ncongruity tend to determine the object recalled, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264.\u003c/a\u003e Focalized\r\nrecall, or \u0027association by similarity,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_267\"\u003e267.\u003c/a\u003e Voluntary trains of\r\nthought, \u003ca href=\"#page_271\"\u003e271.\u003c/a\u003e The solution of problems, \u003ca href=\"#page_273\"\u003e273.\u003c/a\u003e Similarity no\r\nelementary law; summary and conclusion, \u003ca href=\"#page_277\"\u003e277.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVII\"\u003eCHAPTER XVII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Sense of Time\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe sensible present has duration, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280.\u003c/a\u003e We have no sense\r\nfor absolutely empty time, \u003ca href=\"#page_281\"\u003e281.\u003c/a\u003e We measure duration by the\r\nevents which succeed in it, \u003ca href=\"#page_283\"\u003e283.\u003c/a\u003e The feeling of past time is a\r\npresent feeling, \u003ca href=\"#page_285\"\u003e285.\u003c/a\u003e Due to a constant cerebral condition, \u003ca href=\"#page_286\"\u003e286.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVIII\"\u003eCHAPTER XVIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMemory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eWhat it is, \u003ca href=\"#page_287\"\u003e287.\u003c/a\u003e It involves both retention and recall, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBoth elements explained by paths formed by habit in the brain,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_290\"\u003e290.\u003c/a\u003e Two conditions of a good memory, persistence and numerousness\r\nof paths, \u003ca href=\"#page_292\"\u003e292.\u003c/a\u003e Cramming, \u003ca href=\"#page_295\"\u003e295.\u003c/a\u003e One\u0027s native retentiveness\r\nis unchangeable, \u003ca href=\"#page_296\"\u003e296.\u003c/a\u003e Improvement of the memory,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_298\"\u003e298.\u003c/a\u003e Recognition, \u003ca href=\"#page_299\"\u003e299.\u003c/a\u003e Forgetting, \u003ca href=\"#page_300\"\u003e300.\u003c/a\u003e Pathological\r\nconditions, \u003ca href=\"#page_301\"\u003e301.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIX\"\u003eCHAPTER XIX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eImagination\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eWhat it is, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302.\u003c/a\u003e Imaginations differ from man to man; Galton\u0027s\r\nstatistics of visual imagery, \u003ca href=\"#page_303\"\u003e303.\u003c/a\u003e Images of sounds, \u003ca href=\"#page_306\"\u003e306.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nImages of movement, \u003ca href=\"#page_307\"\u003e307.\u003c/a\u003e Images of touch, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308.\u003c/a\u003e Loss of\r\nimages in aphasia, \u003ca href=\"#page_309\"\u003e309.\u003c/a\u003e The neural process in imagination,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_310\"\u003e310.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XX\"\u003eCHAPTER XX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerception\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003ePerception and sensation compared, \u003ca href=\"#page_312\"\u003e312.\u003c/a\u003e The perceptive\r\nstate of mind is not a compound, \u003ca href=\"#page_313\"\u003e313.\u003c/a\u003e Perception is of definite\r\nthings, \u003ca href=\"#page_316\"\u003e316.\u003c/a\u003e Illusions, \u003ca href=\"#page_317\"\u003e317.\u003c/a\u003e First type: inference of the more\r\nusual object, \u003ca href=\"#page_318\"\u003e318.\u003c/a\u003e Second type: inference of the object of\r\nwhich our mind is full, \u003ca href=\"#page_321\"\u003e321.\u003c/a\u003e \u0027Apperception,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_326\"\u003e326.\u003c/a\u003e Genius\r\nand old-fogyism, \u003ca href=\"#page_327\"\u003e327.\u003c/a\u003e The physiological process in perception,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_329\"\u003e329.\u003c/a\u003e Hallucinations, \u003ca href=\"#page_330\"\u003e330.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXI\"\u003eCHAPTER XXI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Perception of Space\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_335\"\u003e335\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eThe attribute of extensity belongs to all objects of sensation,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_335\"\u003e335.\u003c/a\u003e The construction of real space, \u003ca href=\"#page_337\"\u003e337.\u003c/a\u003e The processes\r\nwhich it involves: 1) Subdivision, 338; 2) Coalescence of different\r\nsensible data into one \u0027thing,\u0027 339; 3) Location in an environment,\r\n340; 4) Place in a series of positions, 341; 5) Measurement,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_342\"\u003e342.\u003c/a\u003e Objects which are signs, and objects which\r\nare realities, \u003ca href=\"#page_345\"\u003e345.\u003c/a\u003e The \u0027third dimension,\u0027 Berkeley\u0027s theory of\r\ndistance, \u003ca href=\"#page_346\"\u003e346.\u003c/a\u003e The part played by the intellect in space-perception,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_349\"\u003e349.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXII\"\u003eCHAPTER XXII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReasoning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_351\"\u003e351\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eWhat it is, \u003ca href=\"#page_351\"\u003e351.\u003c/a\u003e It involves the use of abstract characters,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_353\"\u003e353.\u003c/a\u003e What is meant by an \u0027essential\u0027 character, \u003ca href=\"#page_354\"\u003e354.\u003c/a\u003e The\r\n\u0027essence\u0027 varies with the subjective interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_358\"\u003e358.\u003c/a\u003e The two\r\ngreat points in reasoning, \u0027sagacity\u0027 and \u0027wisdom,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_360\"\u003e360.\u003c/a\u003e Sagacity,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_362\"\u003e362.\u003c/a\u003e The help given by association by similarity, \u003ca href=\"#page_364\"\u003e364.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe reasoning powers of brutes, \u003ca href=\"#page_367\"\u003e367.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXIII\"\u003eCHAPTER XXIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConsciousness and Movement\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eAll consciousness is motor, \u003ca href=\"#page_370\"\u003e370.\u003c/a\u003e Three classes of movement\r\nto which it leads, \u003ca href=\"#page_372\"\u003e372.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXIV\"\u003eCHAPTER XXIV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEmotion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_373\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eEmotions compared with instincts, \u003ca href=\"#page_373\"\u003e373.\u003c/a\u003e The varieties of\r\nemotion are innumerable, \u003ca href=\"#page_374\"\u003e374.\u003c/a\u003e The cause of their varieties,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_375\"\u003e375.\u003c/a\u003e The feeling, in the coarser emotions, results from the\r\nbodily expression, \u003ca href=\"#page_375\"\u003e375.\u003c/a\u003e This view must not be called materialistic,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_380\"\u003e380.\u003c/a\u003e This view explains the great variability of emotion,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_381\"\u003e381.\u003c/a\u003e A corollary verified, \u003ca href=\"#page_382\"\u003e382.\u003c/a\u003e An objection replied to, \u003ca href=\"#page_383\"\u003e383.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe subtler emotions, \u003ca href=\"#page_384\"\u003e384.\u003c/a\u003e Description of fear, \u003ca href=\"#page_385\"\u003e385.\u003c/a\u003e Genesis\r\nof the emotional reactions, \u003ca href=\"#page_386\"\u003e386.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXV\"\u003eCHAPTER XXV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInstinct\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_391\"\u003e391\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eIts definition, \u003ca href=\"#page_391\"\u003e391.\u003c/a\u003e Every instinct is an impulse, \u003ca href=\"#page_392\"\u003e392.\u003c/a\u003e Instincts\r\nare not always blind or invariable, \u003ca href=\"#page_395\"\u003e395.\u003c/a\u003e Two principles\r\nof non-uniformity, \u003ca href=\"#page_398\"\u003e398.\u003c/a\u003e Enumeration of instincts in man, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDescription of fear, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXVI\"\u003eCHAPTER XXVI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_415\"\u003e415\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eVoluntary acts, \u003ca href=\"#page_415\"\u003e415.\u003c/a\u003e They are secondary performances, \u003ca href=\"#page_415\"\u003e415.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNo third kind of idea is called for, \u003ca href=\"#page_418\"\u003e418.\u003c/a\u003e The motor-cue, \u003ca href=\"#page_420\"\u003e420.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIdeo-motor action, \u003ca href=\"#page_432\"\u003e432.\u003c/a\u003e Action after deliberation, \u003ca href=\"#page_428\"\u003e428.\u003c/a\u003e Five\r\nchief types of decision, \u003ca href=\"#page_429\"\u003e429.\u003c/a\u003e The feeling of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_434\"\u003e434.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHealthiness of will, \u003ca href=\"#page_435\"\u003e435.\u003c/a\u003e Unhealthiness of will, \u003ca href=\"#page_436\"\u003e436.\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nexplosive will: (1) from defective inhibition, 437; (2) from\r\nexaggerated impulsion, \u003ca href=\"#page_439\"\u003e439.\u003c/a\u003e The obstructed will, \u003ca href=\"#page_441\"\u003e441.\u003c/a\u003e Effort\r\nfeels like an original force, \u003ca href=\"#page_442\"\u003e442.\u003c/a\u003e Pleasure and pain as\r\nsprings of action, \u003ca href=\"#page_444\"\u003e444.\u003c/a\u003e What holds attention determines action,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_448\"\u003e448.\u003c/a\u003e Will is a relation between the mind and its\r\n\u0027ideas,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_449\"\u003e449.\u003c/a\u003e Volitional effort is effort of attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_450\"\u003e450.\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nquestion of free-will, \u003ca href=\"#page_455\"\u003e455.\u003c/a\u003e Ethical importance of the phenomenon\r\nof effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_458\"\u003e458.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#EPILOGUE\"\u003eEPILOGUE.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePsychology and Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#page_461\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd valign=\"top\" colspan=\"2\" class=\"indd\"\u003eWhat the word metaphysics means, \u003ca href=\"#page_461\"\u003e461.\u003c/a\u003e Relation of consciousness\r\nto the brain, \u003ca href=\"#page_462\"\u003e462.\u003c/a\u003e The relation of states of mind to\r\ntheir \u0027objects,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003e464.\u003c/a\u003e The changing character of consciousness,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_466\"\u003e466.\u003c/a\u003e States of consciousness themselves are not verifiable\r\nfacts, \u003ca href=\"#page_467\"\u003e467.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_001\" id=\"page_001\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{1}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch1\u003ePSYCHOLOGY.\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_I\" id=\"CHAPTER_I\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eINTRODUCTORY.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe definition of Psychology\u003c/b\u003e may be best given in the words of Professor\r\nLadd, as the \u003ci\u003edescription and explanation of states of consciousness as\r\nsuch\u003c/i\u003e. By states of consciousness are meant such things as sensations,\r\ndesires, emotions, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, volitions, and the\r\nlike. Their \u0027explanation\u0027 must of course include the study of their\r\ncauses, conditions, and immediate consequences, so far as these can be\r\nascertained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePsychology is to be treated as a natural science\u003c/b\u003e in this book. This\r\nrequires a word of commentary. Most thinkers have a faith that at bottom\r\nthere is but one Science of all things, and that until all is known, no\r\none thing can be completely known. Such a science, if realized, would be\r\nPhilosophy. Meanwhile it is far from being realized; and instead of it,\r\nwe have a lot of beginnings of knowledge made in different places, and\r\nkept separate from each other merely for practical convenience\u0027 sake,\r\nuntil with later growth they may run into one body of Truth. These\r\nprovisional beginnings of learning we call \u0027the Sciences\u0027 in the plural.\r\nIn order not to be unwieldy, every such science has to stick to its own\r\narbitrarily-selected problems, and to ignore all others. Every science\r\nthus accepts certain data unquestioningly, leaving it to the other parts\r\nof Philosophy\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_002\" id=\"page_002\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{2}\u003c/span\u003e to scrutinize their significance and truth. All the\r\nnatural sciences, for example, in spite of the fact that farther\r\nreflection leads to Idealism, assume that a world of matter exists\r\naltogether independently of the perceiving mind. Mechanical Science\r\nassumes this matter to have \u0027mass\u0027 and to exert \u0027force,\u0027 defining these\r\nterms merely phenomenally, and not troubling itself about certain\r\nunintelligibilities which they present on nearer reflection. Motion\r\nsimilarly is assumed by mechanical science to exist independently of the\r\nmind, in spite of the difficulties involved in the assumption. So\r\nPhysics assumes atoms, action at a distance, etc., uncritically;\r\nChemistry uncritically adopts all the data of Physics; and Physiology\r\nadopts those of Chemistry. Psychology as a natural science deals with\r\nthings in the same partial and provisional way. In addition to the\r\n\u0027material world\u0027 with all its determinations, which the other sciences\r\nof nature assume, she assumes additional data peculiarly her own, and\r\nleaves it to more developed parts of Philosophy to test their ulterior\r\nsignificance and truth. These data are\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003ci\u003eThoughts and feelings\u003c/i\u003e, or whatever other names transitory \u003ci\u003estates\r\nof consciousness\u003c/i\u003e may be known by.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \u003ci\u003eKnowledge\u003c/i\u003e, by these states of consciousness, of other things. These\r\nthings may be material objects and events, or other states of mind. The\r\nmaterial objects may be either near or distant in time and space, and\r\nthe states of mind may be those of other people, or of the thinker\r\nhimself at some other time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow one thing \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e know another is the problem of what is called the\r\nTheory of Knowledge. How such a thing as a \u0027state of mind\u0027 can be at all\r\nis the problem of what has been called Rational, as distinguished from\r\nEmpirical, Psychology. The \u003ci\u003efull\u003c/i\u003e truth about states of mind cannot be\r\nknown until both Theory of Knowledge and Rational Psychology have said\r\ntheir say. Meanwhile an immense amount of provisional truth about them\r\ncan be got together, which will work in with the larger truth and be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_003\" id=\"page_003\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{3}\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninterpreted by it when the proper time arrives. Such a provisional body\r\nof propositions about states of mind, and about the cognitions which\r\nthey enjoy, is what I mean by Psychology considered as a natural\r\nscience. On any ulterior theory of matter, mind, and knowledge, the\r\nfacts and laws of Psychology thus understood will have their value. If\r\ncritics find that this natural-science point of view cuts things too\r\narbitrarily short, they must not blame the book which confines itself to\r\nthat point of view; rather must they go on themselves to complete it by\r\ntheir deeper thought. Incomplete statements are often practically\r\nnecessary. To go beyond the usual \u0027scientific\u0027 assumptions in the\r\npresent case, would require, not a volume, but a shelfful of volumes,\r\nand by the present author such a shelfful could not be written at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet it also be added that \u003cb\u003ethe human mind is all that can be touched upon\u003c/b\u003e\r\nin this book. Although the mental life of lower creatures has been\r\nexamined into of late years with some success, we have no space for its\r\nconsideration here, and can only allude to its manifestations\r\nincidentally when they throw light upon our own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMental facts cannot be properly studied apart from the physical\r\nenvironment of which they take cognizance.\u003c/b\u003e The great fault of the older\r\nrational psychology was to set up the soul as an absolute spiritual\r\nbeing with certain faculties of its own by which the several activities\r\nof remembering, imagining, reasoning, willing, etc., were explained,\r\nalmost without reference to the peculiarities of the world with which\r\nthese activities deal. But the richer insight of modern days perceives\r\nthat our inner faculties are \u003ci\u003eadapted\u003c/i\u003e in advance to the features of the\r\nworld in which we dwell, adapted, I mean, so as to secure our safety and\r\nprosperity in its midst. Not only are our capacities for forming new\r\nhabits, for remembering sequences, and for abstracting general\r\nproperties from things and associating their usual consequences with\r\nthem, exactly the faculties needed for steering us in this world of\r\nmixed variety and uniformity, but our emotions\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_004\" id=\"page_004\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{4}\u003c/span\u003e and instincts are\r\nadapted to very special features of that world. In the main, if a\r\nphenomenon is important for our welfare, it interests and excites us the\r\nfirst time we come into its presence. Dangerous things fill us with\r\ninvoluntary fear; poisonous things with distaste; indispensable things\r\nwith appetite. Mind and world in short have been evolved together, and\r\nin consequence are something of a mutual fit. The special interactions\r\nbetween the outer order and the order of consciousness, by which this\r\nharmony, such as it is, may in the course of time have come about, have\r\nbeen made the subject of many evolutionary speculations, which, though\r\nthey cannot so far be said to be conclusive, have at least refreshed and\r\nenriched the whole subject, and brought all sorts of new questions to\r\nthe light.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe chief result of all this more modern view is the gradually growing\r\nconviction that \u003cb\u003emental life is primarily teleological\u003c/b\u003e; that is to say,\r\nthat our various ways of feeling and thinking have grown to be what they\r\nare because of their utility in shaping our \u003ci\u003ereactions\u003c/i\u003e on the outer\r\nworld. On the whole, few recent formulas have done more service in\r\npsychology than the Spencerian one that the essence of mental life and\r\nbodily life are one, namely, \u0027the adjustment of inner to outer\r\nrelations.\u0027 The adjustment is to immediately present objects in lower\r\nanimals and in infants. It is to objects more and more remote in time\r\nand space, and inferred by means of more and more complex and exact\r\nprocesses of reasoning, when the grade of mental development grows more\r\nadvanced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrimarily then, and fundamentally, the mental life is for the sake of\r\naction of a preservative sort. Secondarily and incidentally it does many\r\nother things, and may even, when ill \u0027adapted,\u0027 lead to its possessor\u0027s\r\ndestruction. Psychology, taken in the widest way, ought to study every\r\nsort of mental activity, the useless and harmful sorts as well as that\r\nwhich is \u0027adapted.\u0027 But the study of the harmful in mental life has been\r\nmade the subject of a special branch called \u0027Psychiatry\u0027\u0026mdash;the science of\r\ninsanity\u0026mdash;and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_005\" id=\"page_005\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{5}\u003c/span\u003e the study of the useless is made over to \u0027Æsthetics.\u0027\r\nÆsthetics and Psychiatry will receive no special notice in this book.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAll mental states\u003c/b\u003e (no matter what their character as regards utility may\r\nbe) \u003cb\u003eare followed by bodily activity of some sort.\u003c/b\u003e They lead to\r\ninconspicuous changes in breathing, circulation, general muscular\r\ntension, and glandular or other visceral activity, even if they do not\r\nlead to conspicuous movements of the muscles of voluntary life. Not only\r\ncertain particular states of mind, then (such as those called volitions,\r\nfor example), but states of mind as such, \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e states of mind, even\r\nmere thoughts and feelings, are \u003ci\u003emotor\u003c/i\u003e in their consequences. This will\r\nbe made manifest in detail as our study advances. Meanwhile let it be\r\nset down as one of the fundamental facts of the science with which we\r\nare engaged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was said above that the \u0027conditions\u0027 of states of consciousness must\r\nbe studied. \u003cb\u003eThe immediate condition of a state of consciousness is an\r\nactivity of some sort in the cerebral hemispheres.\u003c/b\u003e This proposition is\r\nsupported by so many pathological facts, and laid by physiologists at\r\nthe base of so many of their reasonings, that to the medically educated\r\nmind it seems almost axiomatic. It would be hard, however, to give any\r\nshort and peremptory proof of the unconditional dependence of mental\r\naction upon neural change. That a general and usual amount of dependence\r\nexists cannot possibly be ignored. One has only to consider how quickly\r\nconsciousness may be (so far as we know) abolished by a blow on the\r\nhead, by rapid loss of blood, by an epileptic discharge, by a full dose\r\nof alcohol, opium, ether, or nitrous oxide\u0026mdash;or how easily it may be\r\naltered in quality by a smaller dose of any of these agents or of\r\nothers, or by a fever,\u0026mdash;to see how at the mercy of bodily happenings our\r\nspirit is. A little stoppage of the gall-duct, a swallow of cathartic\r\nmedicine, a cup of strong coffee at the proper moment, will entirely\r\noverturn for the time a man\u0027s views of life. Our moods and resolutions\r\nare more determined\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_006\" id=\"page_006\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{6}\u003c/span\u003e by the condition of our circulation than by our\r\nlogical grounds. Whether a man shall be a hero or a coward is a matter\r\nof his temporary \u0027nerves.\u0027 In many kinds of insanity, though by no means\r\nin all, distinct alterations of the brain-tissue have been found.\r\nDestruction of certain definite portions of the cerebral hemispheres\r\ninvolves losses of memory and of acquired motor faculty of quite\r\ndeterminate sorts, to which we shall revert again under the title of\r\n\u003ci\u003eaphasias\u003c/i\u003e. Taking all such facts together, the simple and radical\r\nconception dawns upon the mind that mental action may be uniformly and\r\nabsolutely a function of brain-action, varying as the latter varies, and\r\nbeing to the brain-action as effect to cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThis conception is the \u0027working hypothesis\u0027 which underlies all the\r\n\u0027physiological psychology\u0027 of recent years\u003c/b\u003e, and it will be the working\r\nhypothesis of this book. Taken thus absolutely, it may possibly be too\r\nsweeping a statement of what in reality is only a partial truth. But the\r\nonly way to make sure of its unsatisfactoriness is to apply it seriously\r\nto every possible case that can turn up. To work an hypothesis \u0027for all\r\nit is worth\u0027 is the real, and often the only, way to prove its\r\ninsufficiency. I shall therefore assume without scruple at the outset\r\nthat the uniform correlation of brain-states with mind-states is a law\r\nof nature. The interpretation of the law in detail will best show where\r\nits facilities and where its difficulties lie. To some readers such an\r\nassumption will seem like the most unjustifiable \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e materialism.\r\nIn one sense it doubtless is materialism: it puts the Higher at the\r\nmercy of the Lower. But although we affirm that the \u003ci\u003ecoming to pass\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthought is a consequence of mechanical laws,\u0026mdash;for, according to another\r\n\u0027working hypothesis,\u0027 that namely of physiology, the laws of\r\nbrain-action are at bottom mechanical laws,\u0026mdash;we do not in the least\r\nexplain the \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e of thought by affirming this dependence, and in\r\nthat latter sense our proposition is not materialism. The authors who\r\nmost unconditionally affirm the dependence of our thoughts\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_007\" id=\"page_007\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{7}\u003c/span\u003e on our brain\r\nto be a fact are often the loudest to insist that the fact is\r\ninexplicable, and that the intimate essence of consciousness can never\r\nbe rationally accounted for by any material cause. It will doubtless\r\ntake several generations of psychologists to test the hypothesis of\r\ndependence with anything like minuteness. The books which postulate it\r\nwill be to some extent on conjectural ground. But the student will\r\nremember that the Sciences constantly have to take these risks, and\r\nhabitually advance by zig\u0026mdash;zagging from one absolute formula to another\r\nwhich corrects it by going too far the other way. At present Psychology\r\nis on the materialistic tack, and ought in the interests of ultimate\r\nsuccess to be allowed full headway even by those who are certain she\r\nwill never fetch the port without putting down the helm once more. The\r\nonly thing that is perfectly certain is that when taken up into the\r\ntotal body of Philosophy, the formulas of Psychology will appear with a\r\nvery different meaning from that which they suggest so long as they are\r\nstudied from the point of view of an abstract and truncated \u0027natural\r\nscience,\u0027 however practically necessary and indispensable their study\r\nfrom such a provisional point of view may be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Divisions of Psychology.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;So far as possible, then, we are to study\r\nstates of consciousness in correlation with their probable neural\r\nconditions. Now the nervous system is well understood to-day to be\r\nnothing but a machine for receiving impressions and discharging\r\nreactions preservative to the individual and his kind\u0026mdash;so much of\r\nphysiology the reader will surely know. Anatomically, therefore, the\r\nnervous system falls into three main divisions, comprising\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e1) The fibres which carry currents in;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e2) The organs of central redirection of them; and\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e3) The fibres which carry them out.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFunctionally, we have sensation, central reflection, and motion, to\r\ncorrespond to these anatomical divisions. In Psychology we may divide\r\nour work according to a similar\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_008\" id=\"page_008\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{8}\u003c/span\u003e scheme, and treat successively of three\r\nfundamental conscious processes and their conditions. The first will be\r\nSensation; the second will be Cerebration or Intellection; the third\r\nwill be the Tendency to Action. Much vagueness results from this\r\ndivision, but it has practical conveniences for such a book as this, and\r\nthey may be allowed to prevail over whatever objections may be urged.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_009\" id=\"page_009\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{9}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_II\" id=\"CHAPTER_II\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSENSATION IN GENERAL.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIncoming nerve-currents are the only agents which normally affect the\r\nbrain.\u003c/b\u003e The human nerve-centres are surrounded by many dense wrappings of\r\nwhich the effect is to protect them from the direct action of the forces\r\nof the outer world. The hair, the thick skin of the scalp, the skull,\r\nand two membranes at least, one of them a tough one, surround the brain;\r\nand this organ moreover, like the spinal cord, is bathed by a serous\r\nfluid in which it floats suspended. Under these circumstances the only\r\nthings that can \u003ci\u003ehappen\u003c/i\u003e to the brain are:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) The dullest and feeblest mechanical jars;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) Changes in the quantity and quality of the blood-supply; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) Currents running in through the so-called afferent or centripetal\r\nnerves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mechanical jars are usually ineffective; the effects of the\r\nblood-changes are usually transient; the nerve-currents, on the\r\ncontrary, produce consequences of the most vital sort, both at the\r\nmoment of their arrival, and later, through the invisible paths of\r\nescape which they plough in the substance of the organ and which, as we\r\nbelieve, remain as more or less permanent features of its structure,\r\nmodifying its action throughout all future time.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_010\" id=\"page_010\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{10}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEach afferent nerve comes from a determinate part of the periphery and\r\nis played upon and excited to its inward activity by a particular force\r\nof the outer world.\u003c/b\u003e Usually it is insensible to other forces: thus the\r\noptic nerves are not impressible by air-waves, nor those of the skin by\r\nlight-waves. The lingual nerve is not excited by aromatic effluvia, the\r\nauditory nerve is unaffected by heat. Each selects from the vibrations\r\nof the outer world some one rate to which it responds exclusively. The\r\nresult is that our sensations form a discontinuous series, broken by\r\nenormous gaps. There is no reason to suppose that the order of\r\nvibrations in the outer world is anything like as interrupted as the\r\norder of our sensations. Between the quickest audible air-waves (40,000\r\nvibrations a second at the outside) and the slowest sensible heat-waves\r\n(which number probably billions), Nature must somewhere have realized\r\ninnumerable intermediary rates which we have no nerves for perceiving.\r\nThe process in the nerve-fibres themselves is very likely the same, or\r\nmuch the same, in all the different nerves. It is the so-called\r\n\u0027current\u0027; but the current is \u003ci\u003estarted\u003c/i\u003e by one order of outer vibrations\r\nin the retina, and in the ear, for example, by another. This is due to\r\nthe different \u003ci\u003eterminal organs\u003c/i\u003e with which the several afferent nerves\r\nare armed. Just as we arm ourselves with a spoon to pick up soup, and\r\nwith a fork to pick up meat, so our nerve-fibres arm themselves with one\r\nsort of end-apparatus to pick up air-waves, with another to pick up\r\nether-waves. The terminal apparatus always consists of modified\r\nepithelial cells with which the fibre is continuous. The fibre itself is\r\nnot directly excitable by the outer agent which impresses the terminal\r\norgan. The optic fibres are unmoved by the direct rays of the sun; a\r\ncutaneous nerve-trunk may be touched with ice without feeling cold.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_011\" id=\"page_011\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{11}\u003c/span\u003e fibres are mere transmitters; the terminal organs are so many\r\nimperfect telephones into which the material world speaks, and each of\r\nwhich takes up but a portion of what it says; the brain-cells at the\r\nfibres\u0027 central end are as many others at which the mind listens to the\r\nfar-off call.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe \u0027Specific Energies\u0027 of the Various Parts of the Brain.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To a certain\r\nextent anatomists have traced definitely the paths which the sensory\r\nnerve-fibres follow after their entrance into the centres, as far as\r\ntheir termination in the gray matter of the cerebral convolutions.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e It\r\nwill be shown on a later page that the consciousness which accompanies\r\nthe excitement of this gray matter varies from one portion of it to\r\nanother. It is consciousness of things seen, when the occipital lobes,\r\nand of things heard, when the upper part of the temporal lobes, share in\r\nthe excitement. Each region of the cerebral cortex responds to the\r\nstimulation which its afferent fibres bring to it, in a manner with\r\nwhich a peculiar quality of feeling seems invariably correlated. This is\r\nwhat has been called the law of \u0027specific energies\u0027 in the nervous\r\nsystem. Of course we are without even a conjectural explanation of the\r\n\u003ci\u003eground\u003c/i\u003e of such a law. Psychologists (as Lewes, Wundt, Rosenthal,\r\nGoldscheider, etc.) have debated a good deal as to whether the specific\r\nquality of the feeling depends solely on the \u003ci\u003eplace\u003c/i\u003e stimulated in the\r\ncortex, or on the \u003ci\u003esort of current\u003c/i\u003e which the nerve pours in. Doubtless\r\nthe sort of outer force habitually impinging on the end-organ gradually\r\nmodifies the end-organ, the sort of commotion received from the\r\nend-organ modifies the fibre, and the sort of current a so-modified\r\nfibre pours into the cortical centre modifies the centre. The\r\nmodification of the centre in turn (though no man\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_012\" id=\"page_012\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{12}\u003c/span\u003e can guess how or why)\r\nseems to modify the resultant consciousness. But these adaptive\r\nmodifications must be excessively slow; and as matters actually stand in\r\nany adult individual, it is safe to say that, more than anything else,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eplace\u003c/i\u003e excited in his cortex decides what kind of thing he shall\r\nfeel. Whether we press the retina, or prick, cut, pinch, or galvanize\r\nthe living optic nerve, the Subject always feels flashes of light, since\r\nthe ultimate result of our operations is to stimulate the cortex of his\r\noccipital region. Our habitual ways of feeling outer things thus depend\r\non which convolutions happen to be connected with the particular\r\nend-organs which those things impress. We \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e the sunshine and the\r\nfire, simply because the only peripheral end-organ susceptible of taking\r\nup the ether-waves which these objects radiate excites those particular\r\nfibres which run to the centres of sight. If we could interchange the\r\ninward connections, we should feel the world in altogether new ways. If,\r\nfor instance, we could splice the outer extremity of our optic nerves to\r\nour ears, and that of our auditory nerves to our eyes, we should hear\r\nthe lightning and see the thunder, see the symphony and hear the\r\nconductor\u0027s movements. Such hypotheses as these form a good training for\r\nneophytes in the idealistic philosophy!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSensation distinguished from Perception.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is impossible rigorously to\r\n\u003ci\u003edefine\u003c/i\u003e a sensation; and in the actual life of consciousness\r\nsensations, popularly so called, and perceptions merge into each other\r\nby insensible degrees. All we can say is that \u003ci\u003ewhat we mean by\r\nsensations are\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eFIRST\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003ethings in the way of consciousness\u003c/i\u003e. They are the\r\n\u003ci\u003eimmediate\u003c/i\u003e results upon consciousness of nerve-currents as they enter\r\nthe brain, and before they have awakened any suggestions or associations\r\nwith past experience. But it is obvious that \u003ci\u003esuch immediate sensations\r\ncan only be realized in the earliest days of life\u003c/i\u003e. They are all but\r\nimpossible to adults with memories and stores of associations acquired.\r\nPrior to all impressions on sense-organs, the brain is plunged in deep\r\nsleep and consciousness is practically non-existent\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_013\" id=\"page_013\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{13}\u003c/span\u003e. Even the first\r\nweeks after birth are passed in almost unbroken sleep by human infants.\r\nIt takes a strong message from the sense-organs to break this slumber.\r\nIn a new-born brain this gives rise to an absolutely pure sensation. But\r\nthe experience leaves its \u0027unimaginable touch\u0027 on the matter of the\r\nconvolutions, and the next impression which a sense-organ transmits\r\nproduces a cerebral reaction in which the awakened vestige of the last\r\nimpression plays its part. Another sort of feeling and a higher grade of\r\ncognition are the consequence. \u0027Ideas\u0027 \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e the object mingle with\r\nthe awareness of its mere sensible presence, we name it, class it,\r\ncompare it, utter propositions concerning it, and the complication of\r\nthe possible consciousness which an incoming current may arouse, goes on\r\nincreasing to the end of life. In general, this higher consciousness\r\nabout things is called Perception, the mere inarticulate feeling of\r\ntheir presence is Sensation, so far as we have it at all. To some degree\r\nwe seem able to lapse into this inarticulate feeling at moments when our\r\nattention is entirely dispersed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSensations are cognitive.\u003c/b\u003e A sensation is thus an abstraction seldom\r\nrealized by itself; and the object which a sensation knows is an\r\nabstract object which cannot exist alone. \u003ci\u003e\u0027Sensible qualities\u0027 are the\r\nobjects of sensation.\u003c/i\u003e The sensations of the eye are aware of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ecolors\u003c/i\u003e of things, those of the ear are acquainted with their \u003ci\u003esounds\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nthose of the skin feel their tangible \u003ci\u003eheaviness\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esharpness\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ewarmth\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor \u003ci\u003ecoldness\u003c/i\u003e, etc., etc. From all the organs of the body currents may\r\ncome which reveal to us the quality of \u003ci\u003epain\u003c/i\u003e, and to a certain extent\r\nthat of \u003ci\u003epleasure\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch qualities as \u003ci\u003estickiness\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eroughness\u003c/i\u003e, etc., are supposed to be\r\nfelt through the coöperation of muscular sensations with those of the\r\nskin. The geometrical qualities of things, on the other hand, their\r\n\u003ci\u003eshapes\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ebignesses\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edistances\u003c/i\u003e, etc. (so far as we discriminate and\r\nidentify them), are by most psychologists supposed to be impossible\r\nwithout the evocation of memories from the past; and the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_014\" id=\"page_014\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{14}\u003c/span\u003e cognition of\r\nthese attributes is thus considered to exceed the power of sensation\r\npure and simple.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u0027Knowledge of Acquaintance\u0027 and \u0027Knowledge about.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Sensation, thus\r\nconsidered, differs from perception only in the extreme simplicity of\r\nits object or content. Its object, being a simple quality, is sensibly\r\n\u003ci\u003ehomogeneous\u003c/i\u003e; and its function is that of mere \u003ci\u003eacquaintance\u003c/i\u003e with this\r\nhomogeneous seeming fact. Perception\u0027s function, on the other hand, is\r\nthat of knowing something \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e the fact. But we must know \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e fact\r\nwe mean, all the while, and the various \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e are what sensations\r\ngive. Our earliest thoughts are almost exclusively sensational. They\r\ngive us a set of \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003ethats\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e; of subjects of discourse\r\nin other words, with their relations not yet brought out. The first time\r\nwe see \u003ci\u003elight\u003c/i\u003e, in Condillac\u0027s phrase we \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e it rather than see it.\r\nBut all our later optical knowledge is about what this experience gives.\r\nAnd though we were struck blind from that first moment, our scholarship\r\nin the subject would lack no essential feature so long as our memory\r\nremained. In training-institutions for the blind they teach the pupils\r\nas much \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e light as in ordinary schools. Reflection, refraction,\r\nthe spectrum, the ether-theory, etc., are all studied. But the best\r\ntaught born-blind pupil of such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge\r\nwhich the least instructed seeing baby has. They can never show him\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e light is in its \u0027first intention\u0027; and the loss of that sensible\r\nknowledge no book-learning can replace. All this is so obvious that we\r\nusually find sensation \u0027postulated\u0027 as an element of experience, even by\r\nthose philosophers who are least inclined to make much of its\r\nimportance, or to pay respect to the knowledge which it brings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSensations distinguished from Images.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Both sensation and perception,\r\nfor all their difference, are yet alike in that their objects appear\r\n\u003ci\u003evivid\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003elively\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e. Objects merely \u003ci\u003ethought of\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003erecollected\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003eimagined\u003c/i\u003e, on the contrary, are relatively faint and\r\ndevoid of this pungency, or tang, this quality of \u003ci\u003ereal presence\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nthe objects of sensation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_015\" id=\"page_015\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{15}\u003c/span\u003e possess. Now the cortical brain-processes to\r\nwhich sensations are attached are due to incoming currents from the\r\nperiphery of the body\u0026mdash;an external object must excite the eye, ear,\r\netc., before the sensation comes. Those cortical processes, on the other\r\nhand, to which mere ideas or images are attached are due in all\r\nprobability to currents from other convolutions. It would seem, then,\r\nthat the currents from the periphery normally awaken a kind of\r\nbrain-activity which the currents from other convolutions are inadequate\r\nto arouse. To this sort of activity\u0026mdash;a profounder degree of\r\ndisintegration, perhaps\u0026mdash;the quality of vividness, presence, or reality\r\nin the object of the resultant consciousness seems correlated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Exteriority of Objects of Sensation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Every thing or quality felt is\r\nfelt in outer space. It is impossible to conceive a brightness or a\r\ncolor otherwise than as extended and outside of the body. Sounds also\r\nappear in space. Contacts are against the body\u0027s surface; and pains\r\nalways occupy some organ. An opinion which has had much currency in\r\npsychology is that sensible qualities are first apprehended as \u003ci\u003ein the\r\nmind itself\u003c/i\u003e, and then \u0027projected\u0027 from it, or \u0027extradited,\u0027 by a\r\nsecondary intellectual or super-sensational mental act. There is no\r\nground whatever for this opinion. The only facts which even seem to make\r\nfor it can be much better explained in another way, as we shall see\r\nlater on. The very first sensation which an infant gets \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e for him the\r\nouter universe. And the universe which he comes to know in later life is\r\nnothing but an amplification of that first simple germ which, by\r\naccretion on the one hand and intussusception on the other, has grown so\r\nbig and complex and articulate that its first estate is unrememberable.\r\nIn his dumb awakening to the consciousness of \u003ci\u003esomething there\u003c/i\u003e, a mere\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e as yet (or something for which even the term \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e would perhaps\r\nbe too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which\r\nwould be better expressed by the bare interjection \u0027lo!\u0027), the infant\r\nencounters an object in which (though it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_016\" id=\"page_016\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{16}\u003c/span\u003e be given in a pure sensation)\r\nall the \u0027categories of the understanding\u0027 are contained. \u003ci\u003eIt has\r\nexternality, objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality, in the full\r\nsense in which any later object or system of objects has these things.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nHere the young knower meets and greets his world; and the miracle of\r\nknowledge bursts forth, as Voltaire says, as much in the infant\u0027s lowest\r\nsensation as in the highest achievement of a Newton\u0027s brain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe physiological condition of this first sensible experience is\r\nprobably many nerve-currents coming in from various peripheral organs at\r\nonce; but this multitude of organic conditions does not prevent the\r\nconsciousness from being one consciousness. We shall see as we go on\r\nthat it can be one consciousness, even though it be due to the\r\ncoöperation of numerous organs and be a consciousness of many things\r\ntogether. The Object which the numerous inpouring currents of the baby\r\nbring to his consciousness is one big blooming buzzing Confusion. That\r\nConfusion is the baby\u0027s universe; and the universe of all of us is still\r\nto a great extent such a Confusion, potentially resolvable, and\r\ndemanding to be resolved, but not yet actually resolved, into parts. It\r\nappears from first to last as a space-occupying thing. So far as it is\r\nunanalyzed and unresolved we may be said to know it sensationally; but\r\nas fast as parts are distinguished in it and we become aware of their\r\nrelations, our knowledge becomes perceptual or even conceptual, and as\r\nsuch need not concern us in the present chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Intensity of Sensations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A light may be so weak as not sensibly to\r\ndispel the darkness, a sound so low as not to be heard, a contact so\r\nfaint that we fail to notice it. In other words, a certain finite amount\r\nof the outward stimulus is required to produce any sensation of its\r\npresence at all. This is called by Fechner the law of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ethreshold\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;something must be stepped over before the object can gain\r\nentrance to the mind. An impression just above the threshold is called\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eminimum visibile\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eaudibile\u003c/i\u003e, etc.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_017\" id=\"page_017\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{17}\u003c/span\u003e From this point onwards, as\r\nthe impressing force increases, the sensation increases also, though at\r\na slower rate, until at last an \u003ci\u003eacme\u003c/i\u003e of the sensation is reached which\r\nno increase in the stimulus can make sensibly more great. Usually,\r\nbefore the acme, \u003ci\u003epain\u003c/i\u003e begins to mix with the specific character of the\r\nsensation. This is definitely observable in the cases of great pressure,\r\nintense heat, cold, light, and sound; and in those of smell and taste\r\nless definitely so only from the fact that we can less easily increase\r\nthe force of the stimuli here. On the other hand, all sensations,\r\nhowever unpleasant when more intense, are rather agreeable than\r\notherwise in their very lowest degrees. A faintly bitter taste, or\r\nputrid smell, may at least be \u003ci\u003einteresting\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_1\" id=\"ill_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-017-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-017-sml.png\" width=\"433\" height=\"187\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 1.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 1.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWeber\u0027s Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;I said that the intensity of the sensation increases by\r\nslower steps than those by which its exciting cause increases. If there\r\nwere no threshold, and if every equal increment in the outer stimulus\r\nproduced an equal increment in the sensation\u0027s intensity, a simple\r\nstraight line would represent graphically the \u0027curve\u0027 of the relation\r\nbetween the two things. Let the horizontal line stand for the scale of\r\nintensities of the objective stimulus, so that at 0 it has no intensity,\r\nat 1 intensity 1, and so forth. Let the verticals dropped from the\r\nslanting line stand for the sensations aroused. At 0 there will be no\r\nsensation; at 1 there will be a sensation represented by the length of\r\nthe vertical \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e¹\u0026mdash;1, at 2 the sensation will be represented by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_018\" id=\"page_018\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{18}\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e²\u0026mdash;2, and so on. The line of \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s will rise evenly because by the\r\nhypothesis the verticals (or sensations) increase at the same rate as\r\nthe horizontals (or stimuli) to which they severally correspond. But in\r\nNature, as aforesaid, they increase at a slower rate. If each step\r\nforward in the horizontal direction be equal to the last, then each step\r\nupward in the vertical direction will have to be somewhat shorter than\r\nthe last; the line of sensations will be convex on top instead of\r\nstraight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_2\" id=\"ill_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-018-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-018-sml.png\" width=\"492\" height=\"192\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 2.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 2.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"#ill_2\"\u003eFig. 2\u003c/a\u003e represents this actual state of things, 0 being the zero-point of\r\nthe stimulus, and conscious sensation, represented by the curved line,\r\nnot beginning until the \u0027threshold\u0027 is reached, at which the stimulus\r\nhas the value 3. From here onwards the sensation increases, but it\r\nincreases less at each step, until at last, the \u0027acme\u0027 being reached,\r\nthe sensation-line grows flat. The exact law of retardation is called\r\n\u003ci\u003eWeber\u0027s law\u003c/i\u003e, from the fact that he first observed it in the case of\r\nweights. I will quote Wundt\u0027s account of the law and of the facts on\r\nwhich it is based.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Every one knows that in the stilly night we hear things unnoticed\r\nin the noise of day. The gentle ticking of the clock, the air\r\ncirculating through the chimney, the cracking of the chairs in the\r\nroom, and a thousand other slight noises, impress themselves upon\r\nour ear. It is equally well known that in the confused hubbub of\r\nthe streets, or the clamor of a railway, we may lose not only what\r\nour neighbor says to us, but even not hear the sound of our own\r\nvoice. The stars\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_019\" id=\"page_019\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{19}\u003c/span\u003e which are brightest at night are invisible by\r\nday; and although we see the moon then, she is far paler than at\r\nnight. Every one who has had to deal with weights knows that if to\r\na pound in the hand a second pound be added, the difference is\r\nimmediately felt; whilst if it be added to a hundredweight, we are\r\nnot aware of the difference at all….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The sound of the clock, the light of the stars, the pressure of\r\nthe pound, these are all \u003ci\u003estimuli\u003c/i\u003e to our senses, and stimuli whose\r\noutward amount remains the same. What then do these experiences\r\nteach? Evidently nothing but this, that one and the same stimulus,\r\naccording to the circumstances under which it operates, will be\r\nfelt either more or less intensely, or not felt at all. Of what\r\nsort now is the alteration in the circumstances upon which this\r\nalteration in the feeling may depend? On considering the matter\r\nclosely we see that it is everywhere of one and the same kind. The\r\ntick of the clock is a feeble stimulus for our auditory nerve,\r\nwhich we hear plainly when it is alone, but not when it is added to\r\nthe strong stimulus of the carriage-wheels and other noises of the\r\nday. The light of the stars is a stimulus to the eye. But if the\r\nstimulation which this light exerts be added to the strong stimulus\r\nof daylight, we feel nothing of it, although we feel it distinctly\r\nwhen it unites itself with the feebler stimulation of the twilight.\r\nThe poundweight is a stimulus to our skin, which we feel when it\r\njoins itself to a preceding stimulus of equal strength, but which\r\nvanishes when it is combined with a stimulus a thousand times\r\ngreater in amount.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We may therefore lay it down as a general rule that a stimulus, in\r\norder to be felt, may be so much the smaller if the already\r\npreëxisting stimulation of the organ is small, but must be so much\r\nthe larger, the greater the preëxisting stimulation is…. The\r\nsimplest relation would obviously be that the sensation should\r\nincrease in identically the same ratio as the stimulus…. But if\r\nthis simplest of all relations prevailed, … the light of the\r\nstars, e.g., ought to make as great an addition to the daylight as\r\nit does to the darkness of the nocturnal sky, and this we know to\r\nbe not the case…. So it is clear that the strength of the\r\nsensations does not increase in proportion to the amount of the\r\nstimuli, but more slowly. And now comes the question, in what\r\nproportion does the increase of the sensation grow less as the\r\nincrease of the stimulus grows greater? To answer this question,\r\nevery-day experiences do not suffice. We need exact measurements,\r\nboth of the amounts of the various stimuli, and of the intensity of\r\nthe sensations themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"How to execute these measurements, however, is something which\r\ndaily experience suggests. To measure the strength of sensations\r\nis, as we saw, impossible; we can only measure the difference of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_020\" id=\"page_020\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{20}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsensations. Experience showed us what very unequal differences of\r\nsensation might come from equal differences of outward stimulus.\r\nBut all these experiences expressed themselves in one kind of fact,\r\nthat the same difference of stimulus could in one case be felt, and\r\nin another case not felt at all\u0026mdash;a pound felt if added to another\r\npound, but not if added to a hundredweight…. We can quickest\r\nreach a result with our observations if we start with an arbitrary\r\nstrength of stimulus, notice what sensation it gives us, and then\r\n\u003ci\u003esee how much we can increase the stimulus without making the\r\nsensation seem to change\u003c/i\u003e. If we carry out such observations with\r\nstimuli of varying absolute amounts, we shall be forced to choose\r\nin an equally varying way the amounts of addition to the stimulus\r\nwhich are capable of giving us a just barely perceptible feeling of\r\n\u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e. A light to be just perceptible in the twilight need not be\r\nnear as bright as the starlight; it must be far brighter to be just\r\nperceived during the day. If now we institute such observations for\r\nall possible strengths of the various stimuli, and note for each\r\nstrength the amount of addition of the latter required to produce a\r\nbarely perceptible alteration of sensation, we shall have a series\r\nof figures in which is immediately expressed the law according to\r\nwhich the sensation alters when the stimulation is increased….\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObservations according to this method are particularly easy to make in\r\nthe spheres of light, sound, and pressure. Beginning with the latter\r\ncase,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"We find a surprisingly simple result. \u003ci\u003eThe barely sensible\r\naddition to the original weight must stand exactly in the same\r\nproportion to it\u003c/i\u003e, be the \u003ci\u003esame fraction\u003c/i\u003e of it, no matter what the\r\nabsolute value may be of the weights on which the experiment is\r\nmade…. As the average of a number of experiments, this fraction\r\nis found to be about ⅓; that is, no matter what pressure there may\r\nalready be made upon the skin, an increase or a diminution of the\r\npressure will be \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e, as soon as the added or subtracted weight\r\namounts to one third of the weight originally there.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt then describes how differences may be observed in the muscular\r\nfeelings, in the feelings of heat, in those of light, and in those of\r\nsound; and he concludes thus:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"So we have found that all the senses whose stimuli we are enabled\r\nto measure accurately, obey a uniform law. However various may be\r\ntheir several delicacies of discrimination, \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e holds true of\r\nall, that \u003ci\u003ethe increase of the stimulus necessary to produce an\r\nincrease\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_021\" id=\"page_021\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{21}\u003c/span\u003e of the sensation bears a constant ratio to the total\r\nstimulus\u003c/i\u003e. The figures which express this ratio in the several\r\nsenses may be shown thus in tabular form:\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eSensation of light\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e100\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eMuscular sensation\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e17\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eFeeling of pressure,\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" rowspan=\"3\" class=\"bl\"\r\nvalign=\"middle\"\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e3\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cspan class=\"ditto\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"ditto\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e warmth,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cspan class=\"ditto\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"ditto\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e sound,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"These figures are far from giving as accurate a measure as might\r\nbe desired. But at least they are fit to convey a general notion of\r\nthe relative discriminative susceptibility of the different\r\nsenses…. The important law which gives in so simple a form the\r\nrelation of the sensation to the stimulus that calls it forth was\r\nfirst discovered by the physiologist Ernst Heinrich Weber to obtain\r\nin special cases.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_4_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFechner\u0027s Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Another way of expressing Weber\u0027s law is to say that to\r\nget equal positive additions to the sensation, one must make equal\r\n\u003ci\u003erelative\u003c/i\u003e additions to the stimulus. Professor Fechner of Leipzig\r\nfounded upon Weber\u0027s law a theory of the numerical measurement of\r\nsensations, over which much metaphysical discussion has raged. Each just\r\nperceptible addition to the sensation, as we gradually let the stimulus\r\nincrease, was supposed by him to be a \u003ci\u003eunit\u003c/i\u003e of sensation, and all these\r\nunits were treated by him as equal, in spite of the fact that \u003ci\u003eequally\r\nperceptible\u003c/i\u003e increments need by no means appear \u003ci\u003eequally big\u003c/i\u003e when they\r\nonce are perceived. The many pounds which form the just perceptible\r\naddition to a hundredweight feel bigger when added than the few ounces\r\nwhich form the just perceptible addition to a pound. Fechner ignored\r\nthis fact. He considered that if \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e distinct perceptible steps of\r\nincrease might be passed through in gradually increasing a stimulus from\r\nthe threshold-value till the intensity \u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e was felt, then the sensation\r\nof \u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e was composed of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e units, which were of the same value all along\r\nthe line.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e Sensations once\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_022\" id=\"page_022\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{22}\u003c/span\u003e represented by numbers, psychology may\r\nbecome, according to Fechner, an \u0027exact\u0027 science, susceptible of\r\nmathematical treatment. His general formula for getting at the number of\r\nunits in any sensation is \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e = \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e log \u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e, where \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e stands for the\r\nsensation, \u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e for the stimulus numerically estimated, and \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e for a\r\nconstant that must be separately determined by experiment in each\r\nparticular order of sensibility. The sensation is proportional to the\r\nlogarithm of the stimulus; and the absolute values, in units, of any\r\nseries of sensations might be got from the ordinates of the curve in\r\n\u003ca href=\"#ill_2\"\u003eFig. 2\u003c/a\u003e, if it were a correctly drawn logarithmic curve, with the\r\nthresholds rightly plotted out from experiments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFechner\u0027s psycho-physic formula, as he called it, has been attacked on\r\nevery hand; and as absolutely nothing practical has come of it, it need\r\nreceive no farther notice here. The main outcome of his book has been to\r\nstir up experimental investigation into the validity of Weber\u0027s law\r\n(which concerns itself merely with the just perceptible increase, and\r\nsays nothing about the measurement of the sensation as a whole) and to\r\npromote discussion of statistical methods. Weber\u0027s law, as will appear\r\nwhen we take the senses, \u003ci\u003eseriatim\u003c/i\u003e, is only approximately verified. The\r\ndiscussion of statistical methods is necessitated by the extraordinary\r\nfluctuations of our sensibility from one moment to the next. It is\r\nfound, namely, when the difference of two sensations approaches the\r\nlimit of discernibility, that at one moment we discern it and at the\r\nnext we do not. Our incessant accidental inner alterations make it\r\nimpossible to tell just what the least discernible increment of the\r\nsensation is without taking the average of a large number of\r\nappreciations. These \u003ci\u003eaccidental errors\u003c/i\u003e are as likely to increase as to\r\ndiminish our sensibility, and are eliminated in such an average, for\r\nthose above and those below\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_023\" id=\"page_023\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{23}\u003c/span\u003e the line then neutralize each other in the\r\nsum, and the normal sensibility, if there be one (that is, the\r\nsensibility due to constant causes as distinguished from these\r\naccidental ones), stands revealed. The methods of getting the average\r\nall have their difficulties and their snares, and controversy over them\r\nhas become very subtle indeed. As an instance of how laborious some of\r\nthe statistical methods are, and how patient German investigators can\r\nbe, I may say that Fechner himself, in testing Weber\u0027s law for weights\r\nby the so-called \u0027method of true and false cases,\u0027 tabulated and\r\ncomputed no less than 24,576 separate judgments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSensations are not compounds.\u003c/b\u003e The fundamental objection to Fechner\u0027s\r\nwhole attempt seems to be this, that although the outer \u003ci\u003ecauses\u003c/i\u003e of our\r\nsensations may have many parts, every distinguishable degree, as well as\r\nevery distinguishable quality, of the \u003ci\u003esensation itself\u003c/i\u003e appears to be a\r\nunique fact of consciousness. Each sensation is a complete integer. \"A\r\nstrong one,\" as Dr. Münsterberg says, \"is not the multiple of a weak\r\none, or a compound of many weak ones, but rather something entirely new,\r\nand as it were incomparable, so that to seek a measurable difference\r\nbetween strong and weak sonorous, luminous, or thermic sensations would\r\nseem at first sight as senseless as to try to compute mathematically the\r\ndifference between salt and sour, or between headache and toothache. It\r\nis clear that if in the stronger sensation of light the weaker sensation\r\nis not \u003ci\u003econtained\u003c/i\u003e, it is unpsychological to say that the former differs\r\nfrom the latter by a certain \u003ci\u003eincrement\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e Surely our feeling of\r\nscarlet is not a feeling of pink with a lot more pink added; it is\r\nsomething quite other than pink. Similarly with our sensation of an\r\nelectric arc-light: it does not contain that of many smoky tallow\r\ncandles in itself. Every sensation presents itself as an indivisible\r\nunit; and it is quite impossible to read any clear meaning into the\r\nnotion that they are masses of units combined.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_024\" id=\"page_024\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{24}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no inconsistency between this statement and the fact that,\r\nstarting with a weak sensation and increasing it, we feel \u0027more,\u0027\r\n\u0027more,\u0027 \u0027more,\u0027 as the increase goes on. It is not more of the same\r\n\u003ci\u003estuff\u003c/i\u003e added, so to speak; but it is more and more \u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e, more\r\nand more \u003ci\u003edistance\u003c/i\u003e, from the starting-point, which we feel. In the\r\nchapter on Discrimination we shall see that Difference can be perceived\r\nbetween simple things. We shall see, too, that \u003ci\u003edifferences themselves\r\ndiffer\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;there are \u003ci\u003evarious directions of difference\u003c/i\u003e; and along any one\r\nof them a series of things may be arranged so as to increase steadily in\r\nthat direction. In any such series the end differs more from the\r\nbeginning than the middle does. Differences of \u0027intensity\u0027 form one such\r\ndirection of possible increase\u0026mdash;so our judgments of more intensity can\r\nbe expressed without the hypothesis that more units have been added to a\r\ngrowing sum.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe so-called \u0027Law of Relativity.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Weber\u0027s law seems only one case of\r\nthe still wider law that the more we have to attend to the less capable\r\nwe are of noticing any one detail. The law is obvious where the things\r\ndiffer in kind. How easily do we forget a bodily discomfort when\r\nconversation waxes hot; how little do we notice the noises in the room\r\nso long as our work absorbs us! \u003ci\u003eAd plura intentus minus est ad singula\r\nsensus\u003c/i\u003e, as the old proverb says. One might now add that the homogeneity\r\nof what we have to attend to does not alter the result; but that a mind\r\nwith two strong sensations of the same sort already before it is\r\nincapacitated by their amount from noticing the detail of a difference\r\nbetween them which it would immediately be struck by, were the\r\nsensations themselves weaker and consequently endowed with less\r\ndistracting power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis particular idea may be taken for what it is worth.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_7_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e Meanwhile it\r\nis an undoubted general fact that the psychical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_025\" id=\"page_025\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{25}\u003c/span\u003e effect of incoming\r\ncurrents does depend on what other currents may be simultaneously\r\npouring in. Not only the \u003ci\u003eperceptibility\u003c/i\u003e of the object which the\r\ncurrent brings before the mind, but the \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e of it, is changed by\r\nthe other currents. \"Simultaneous\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e sensations modify each other\" is a\r\nbrief expression for this law. \"We feel all things in relation to each\r\nother\" is Wundt\u0027s vaguer formula for this general \u0027law of relativity,\u0027\r\nwhich in one shape or other has had vogue since Hobbes\u0027s time in\r\npsychology. Much mystery has been made of it, but although we are of\r\ncourse ignorant of the more intimate processes involved, there seems no\r\nground to doubt that they are physiological, and come from the\r\ninterference of one current with another. A current interfered with\r\nmight naturally give rise to a modified sensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExamples of the modification in question are easy to find.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e Notes make\r\neach other sweeter in a chord, and so do colors when harmoniously\r\ncombined. A certain amount of skin dipped in hot water gives the\r\nperception of a certain heat. More skin immersed makes the heat much\r\nmore intense, although of course the water\u0027s heat is the same. Similarly\r\nthere is a \u003ci\u003echromatic minimum\u003c/i\u003e of size in objects. The image they cast\r\non the retina must needs excite a sufficient number of fibres, or it\r\nwill give no sensation of color at all. Weber observed that a thaler\r\nlaid on the skin of the forehead feels heavier when cold than when warm.\r\nUrbantschitsch has found that all our sense-organs influence each\r\nother\u0027s sensations. The hue of patches of color so distant as not to be\r\nrecognized was immediately, in his patients, perceived when a\r\ntuning-fork was sounded close to the ear. Letters too far off to be read\r\ncould be read\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_026\" id=\"page_026\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{26}\u003c/span\u003e when the tuning-fork was heard, etc., etc. The most\r\nfamiliar examples of this sort of thing seem to be the increase of\r\n\u003ci\u003epain\u003c/i\u003e by noise or light, and the increase of \u003ci\u003enausea\u003c/i\u003e by all\r\nconcomitant sensations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEffects of Contrast.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The best-known examples of the way in which one\r\nnerve-current modifies another are the phenomena of what is known as\r\n\u0027simultaneous color-contrast.\u0027 Take a number of sheets of brightly and\r\ndifferently colored papers, lay on each of them a bit of one and the\r\nsame kind of gray paper, then cover each sheet with some transparent\r\nwhite paper, which softens the look of both the gray paper and the\r\ncolored ground. The gray patch will appear in each case tinged by the\r\ncolor \u003ci\u003ecomplementary\u003c/i\u003e to the ground; and so different will the several\r\npieces appear that no observer, before raising the transparent paper,\r\nwill believe them all cut out of the same gray. Helmholtz has\r\ninterpreted these results as being due to a false application of an\r\ninveterate habit\u0026mdash;that, namely, of making allowance for the color of the\r\nmedium through which things are seen. The same \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e, in the blue\r\nlight of a clear sky, in the reddish-yellow light of a candle, in the\r\ndark brown light of a polished mahogany table which may reflect its\r\nimage, is always judged of its own proper color, which the mind \u003ci\u003eadds\u003c/i\u003e\r\nout of its own knowledge to the appearance, thereby correcting the\r\nfalsifying medium. In the cases of the papers, according to Helmholtz,\r\nthe mind believes the color of the ground, subdued by the transparent\r\npaper, to be faintly spread \u003ci\u003eover\u003c/i\u003e the gray patch. But a patch to \u003ci\u003elook\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngray through such a colored film would have really to \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\ncomplementary color to the film. Therefore it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e of the complementary\r\ncolor, we think, and proceed to \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e it of that color.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis theory has been shown to be untenable by Hering. The discussion of\r\nthe facts is too minute for recapitulation here, but suffice it to say\r\nthat it proves the phenomenon to be physiological\u0026mdash;a case of the way in\r\nwhich, when sensory nerve-currents run in together, the effect of each\r\non\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_027\" id=\"page_027\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{27}\u003c/span\u003e consciousness is different from that which it would be if they ran\r\nin separately.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027\u003ci\u003eSuccessive contrast\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 differs from the simultaneous variety, and is\r\nsupposed to be due to fatigue. The facts will be noticed under the head\r\nof \u0027after-images,\u0027 in the section on Vision. It must be borne in mind,\r\nhowever, that after-images from previous sensations may coexist with\r\npresent sensations, and the two may modify each other just as coexisting\r\nsensational processes do.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOther senses than sight show phenomena of contrast, but they are much\r\nless obvious, so I will not notice them here. We can now pass to a very\r\nbrief survey of the various senses in detail.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_028\" id=\"page_028\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{28}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_III\" id=\"CHAPTER_III\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSIGHT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Eye\u0027s Structure\u003c/b\u003e is described in all the books on anatomy. I will\r\nonly mention the few points which concern the psychologist.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_10_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_10_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e It is a\r\nflattish sphere formed by a tough\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_029\" id=\"page_029\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{29}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_3\" id=\"ill_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-029-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-029-sml.png\" width=\"467\" height=\"525\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 3.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 3.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ewhite membrane (the sclerotic), which encloses a nervous surface and\r\ncertain refracting media (lens and \u0027humors\u0027) which cast a picture of the\r\nouter world thereon. It is in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_030\" id=\"page_030\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{30}\u003c/span\u003e fact a little camera obscura, the\r\nessential part of which is the sensitive plate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_4\" id=\"ill_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 152px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-030a-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-030a-sml.png\" width=\"152\" height=\"663\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 4.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 4.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_5\" id=\"ill_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 299px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-030b-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-030b-sml.png\" width=\"299\" height=\"279\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 5.\u0026mdash;Scheme of retinal fibres, after Küss. Nop. optic nerve;\r\nS, sclerotic; Ch, choroid; R, retina; P, papilla (blind\r\nspot); F, fovea.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 5.\u0026mdash;Scheme of retinal fibres, after Küss. Nop. optic nerve;\r\nS, sclerotic; Ch, choroid; R, retina; P, papilla (blind\r\nspot); F, fovea.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe retina\u003c/b\u003e is what corresponds to this plate. The optic nerve pierces\r\nthe sclerotic shell and spreads its fibres radially in every direction\r\nover its inside, forming a thin translucent film (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_3\"\u003eFig. 3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ci\u003eRet.\u003c/i\u003e).\r\nThe fibres pass into a complicated apparatus of cells, granules, and\r\nbranches (\u003ca href=\"#ill_4\"\u003eFig. 4\u003c/a\u003e), and finally end in the so-called rods and cones (\u003ca href=\"#ill_4\"\u003eFig. 4\u003c/a\u003e,\u0026mdash;9), which are the specific organs for taking up the influence of the\r\nwaves of light. Strange to say, these end-organs are not pointed forward\r\ntowards the light as it streams through the pupil, but backwards towards\r\nthe sclerotic membrane itself, so that the light-waves traverse the\r\ntranslucent nerve-fibres, and the cellular and granular layers of the\r\nretina, before they touch the rods and cones themselves. (See \u003ca href=\"#ill_5\"\u003eFig. 5.\u003c/a\u003e)\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_031\" id=\"page_031\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{31}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Blind Spot.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The optic nerve-fibres must thus be unimpressible by\r\nlight directly. The place where the nerve enters is in fact entirely\r\nblind, because nothing but fibres exist there, the other layers of the\r\nretina only beginning round about the entrance. Nothing is easier than\r\nto prove the existence of this blind spot. Close the right eye and look\r\nsteadily with the left at the cross in \u003ca href=\"#ill_6\"\u003eFig. 6\u003c/a\u003e, holding the book\r\nvertically in front of the face, and moving it to and fro. It will be\r\nfound that at about a foot off the black disk disappears; but when the\r\npage is nearer or farther, it is seen. During the experiment the gaze\r\nmust be kept fixed on the cross. It is easy to show by measurement that\r\nthis blind spot lies where the optic nerve enters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_6\" id=\"ill_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-031-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-031-sml.png\" width=\"418\" height=\"120\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 6.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 6.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Fovea.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Outside of the blind spot the sensibility of the retina\r\nvaries. It is greatest at the \u003ci\u003efovea\u003c/i\u003e, a little pit lying outwardly from\r\nthe entrance of the optic nerve, and round which the radiating\r\nnerve-fibres bend without passing over it. The other layers also\r\ndisappear at the fovea, leaving the cones alone to represent the retina\r\nthere. The sensibility of the retina grows progressively less towards\r\nits periphery, by means of which neither colors, shapes, nor number of\r\nimpressions can be well discriminated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the normal use of our two eyes, the eyeballs are rotated so as to\r\ncause the two images of any object which catches the attention to fall\r\non the two foveæ, as the spots of acutest vision. This happens\r\ninvoluntarily, as any one may observe. In fact, it is almost impossible\r\n\u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e to \u0027turn the eyes,\u0027 the moment any peripherally lying object does\r\ncatch our attention, the turning of the eyes being only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_032\" id=\"page_032\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{32}\u003c/span\u003e another name\r\nfor such rotation of the eyeballs as will bring the foveæ under the\r\nobject\u0027s image.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_7\" id=\"ill_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-032-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-032-sml.png\" width=\"460\" height=\"179\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 7.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 7.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAccommodation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The \u003ci\u003efocussing\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003esharpening\u003c/i\u003e of the image is\r\nperformed by a special apparatus. In every camera, the farther the\r\nobject is from the eye the farther forward, and the nearer the object is\r\nto the eye the farther backward, is its image thrown. In photographers\u0027\r\ncameras the back is made to slide, and can be drawn away from the lens\r\nwhen the object that casts the picture is near, and pushed forward when\r\nit is far. The picture is thus kept always sharp. But no such change of\r\nlength is possible in the eyeball; and the same result is reached in\r\nanother way. The lens, namely, grows more convex when a near object is\r\nlooked at, and flatter when the object recedes. This change is due to\r\nthe antagonism of the circular \u0027ligament\u0027 in which the lens is\r\nsuspended, and the \u0027ciliary muscle.\u0027 The ligament, when the ciliary\r\nmuscle is at rest, assumes such a spread-out shape as to keep the lens\r\nrather flat. But the lens is highly elastic; and it springs into the\r\nmore convex form which is natural to it whenever the ciliary muscle, by\r\ncontracting, causes the ligament to relax its pressure. The contraction\r\nof the muscle, by thus rendering the lens more refractive, adapts the\r\neye for near objects (\u0027accommodates\u0027 it for them, as we say); and its\r\nrelaxation, by rendering the lens less refractive, adapts the eye for\r\ndistant vision. Accommodation for the near is thus\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_033\" id=\"page_033\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{33}\u003c/span\u003e the more \u003ci\u003eactive\u003c/i\u003e\r\nchange, since it involves contraction of the ciliary muscle. When we\r\nlook far off, we simply let our eyes go passive. We feel this difference\r\nin the effort when we compare the two sensations of change.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConvergence accompanies accommodation.\u003c/b\u003e The two eyes act as one organ;\r\nthat is, when an object catches the attention, both eyeballs turn so\r\nthat its images may fall on the foveæ. When the object is near, this\r\nnaturally requires them to turn inwards, or converge; and as\r\naccommodation then also occurs, the two movements of convergence and\r\naccommodation form a naturally associated couple, of which it is\r\ndifficult to execute either singly. Contraction of the pupil also\r\naccompanies the accommodative act. When we come to stereoscopic vision,\r\nit will appear that by much practice one can learn to converge with\r\nrelaxed accommodation, and to accommodate with parallel axes of vision.\r\nThese are accomplishments which the student of psychological optics will\r\nfind most useful.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSingle Vision by the two Retinæ.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We hear single with two ears, and\r\nsmell single with two nostrils, and we also see single with two eyes.\r\nThe difference is that we also \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e see double under certain\r\nconditions, whereas under no conditions can we hear or smell double. The\r\nmain conditions of single vision can be simply expressed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, impressions on the two foveæ always appear in the\r\nsame place. By no artifice can they be made to appear alongside of each\r\nother. The result is that one object, casting its images on the foveæ of\r\nthe two converging eyeballs will necessarily always appear as what it\r\nis, namely, one object. Furthermore, if the eyeballs, instead of\r\nconverging, are kept parallel, and two similar objects, one in front of\r\neach, cast their respective images on the foveæ, the two will also\r\nappear as one, or (in common parlance) \u0027their images will fuse.\u0027 To\r\nverify this, let the reader stare fixedly before him as if through the\r\npaper at infinite distance, with the black spots in Fig. 8 in front of\r\nhis respective eyes. He\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_034\" id=\"page_034\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{34}\u003c/span\u003e will then see the two black spots swim\r\ntogether, as it were, and combine into one, which appears situated\r\nbetween their original two positions and as if opposite the root of his\r\nnose. This combined spot is the result of the spots opposite both eyes\r\nbeing seen in the same place. But in addition to the combined spot, each\r\neye sees also the spot opposite the \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e eye. To the right eye this\r\nappears to the left of the combined spot, to the left eye it appears to\r\nthe right of it; so that what is seen is \u003ci\u003ethree\u003c/i\u003e spots, of which the\r\nmiddle one is seen by both eyes, and is flanked by two others, each seen\r\nby one. That such are the facts can be tested by interposing some small\r\nopaque object so as to cut off the vision of either of the spots in the\r\nfigure from the \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e eye. A vertical partition in the median plane,\r\ngoing from the paper to the nose, will effectually confine each eye\u0027s\r\nvision to the spot in front of it, and then the single combined spot\r\nwill be all that appears.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_11_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_8\" id=\"ill_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-034-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-034-sml.png\" width=\"396\" height=\"143\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 8.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 8.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, instead of two identical spots, we use two different figures, or two\r\ndifferently colored spots, as objects for the two foveæ to look at, they\r\nstill are seen in the \u003ci\u003esame place\u003c/i\u003e; but since they cannot appear as a\r\nsingle object, they appear there \u003ci\u003ealternately\u003c/i\u003e displacing each other\r\nfrom the view. This is the phenomenon called \u003ci\u003eretinal rivalry\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs regards the parts of the retinæ round about the foveæ, a similar\r\ncorrespondence obtains. Any impression on the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_035\" id=\"page_035\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{35}\u003c/span\u003e upper half of either\r\nretina makes us see an object as below, on the lower half as above, the\r\nhorizon; and on the right half of either retina, an impression makes us\r\nsee an object to the left, on the left half one to the right, of the\r\nmedian line. Thus each quadrant of one retina corresponds as a whole to\r\nthe geometrically \u003ci\u003esimilar\u003c/i\u003e quadrant of the other; and within two\r\nsimilar quadrants, \u003ci\u003eal\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ear\u003c/i\u003e for example, there should, if the\r\ncorrespondence were carried out in detail, be geometrically similar\r\npoints which, if impressed at the same time by light emitted from the\r\nsame object, should cause that object to appear in the same direction to\r\neither eye. Experiment verifies this surmise. If we look at the starry\r\nvault with parallel eyes, the stars all seem single; and the laws of\r\nperspective show that under the circumstances the parallel light-rays\r\ncoming from each star must impinge on points within either retina which\r\n\u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e geometrically similar to each other. Similarly, a pair of\r\nspectacles held an inch or so from the eyes seem like one large median\r\nglass. Or we may make an experiment like that with the spots. If we take\r\ntwo exactly similar pictures, no larger than those on an ordinary\r\nstereoscopic slide, and if we look at one with each eye (a median\r\npartition confining the view) we shall see but one flat picture, all of\r\nwhose parts appear single. \u0027Identical retinal points\u0027 being impressed,\r\nboth eyes see their object in the same direction, and the two objects\r\nconsequently coalesce into one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_9\" id=\"ill_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-035-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-035-sml.png\" width=\"390\" height=\"126\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 9.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 9.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere again retinal rivalry occurs if the pictures differ. And it must be\r\nnoted that when the experiment is performed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_036\" id=\"page_036\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{36}\u003c/span\u003e for the first time the\r\ncombined picture is always far from sharp. This is due to the difficulty\r\nmentioned on \u003ca href=\"#page_033\"\u003ep. 33\u003c/a\u003e, of accommodating for anything as near as the surface\r\nof the paper, whilst at the same time the convergence is relaxed so that\r\neach eye sees the picture in front of itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_10\" id=\"ill_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-036-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-036-sml.png\" width=\"359\" height=\"388\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 10.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 10.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDouble Images.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Now it is an immediate consequence of the law of\r\nidentical location of images falling on geometrically similar points\r\nthat \u003ci\u003eimages which fall upon geometrically\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eDISPARATE\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003epoints of the two\r\nretinæ should be seen in\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eDISPARATE\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003edirections, and that their objects\r\nshould consequently appear in\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eTWO\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eplaces, or\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eLOOK DOUBLE\u003c/small\u003e. Take the\r\nparallel rays from a star falling upon two eyes which converge upon a\r\nnear object, \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e, instead of being parallel as in the previously\r\ninstanced case. The two foveæ will receive the images of \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\ntherefore will look single. If then \u003ci\u003eSL\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eSR\u003c/i\u003e in Fig. 10 be the\r\nparallel rays, each of them will fall upon the nasal half of the retina\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_037\" id=\"page_037\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{37}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich it strikes. But the two nasal halves are disparate, geometrically\r\n\u003ci\u003esymmetrical\u003c/i\u003e, not geometrically \u003ci\u003esimilar\u003c/i\u003e. The star\u0027s image on the left\r\neye will therefore appear as if lying to the left of \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e; its image on\r\nthe right eye will appear to the right of this point. The star will, in\r\nshort, be seen double\u0026mdash;\u0027homonymously\u0027 double.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConversely, if the star be looked at directly with parallel axes, any\r\nnear object like \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e will be seen double, because its images will affect\r\nthe outer or cheek halves of the two retinæ, instead of one outer and\r\none nasal half. The position of the images will here be reversed from\r\nthat of the previous case. The right eye\u0027s image will now appear to the\r\nleft, the left eye\u0027s to the right; the double images will be\r\n\u0027heteronymous.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same reasoning and the same result ought to apply where the object\u0027s\r\nplace with respect to the direction of the two optic axes is such as to\r\nmake its images fall not on non-similar retinal halves, but on\r\nnon-similar parts of similar halves. Here, of course, the positions seen\r\nwill be less widely disparate than in the other case, and the double\r\nimages will appear to lie less widely apart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCareful experiments made by many observers according to the so-called\r\nhaploscopic method confirm this law, and show that \u003ci\u003ecorresponding\r\npoints, of single visual direction\u003c/i\u003e, exist upon the two retinæ. For the\r\ndetail of these one must consult the special treatises.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVision of Solidity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This description of binocular vision follows what\r\nis called the theory of identical points. On the whole it formulates the\r\nfacts correctly. The only odd thing is that we should be so little\r\ntroubled by the innumerable double images which objects nearer and\r\nfarther than the point looked at must be constantly producing. The\r\nanswer to this is that \u003ci\u003ewe have trained ourselves to habits of\r\ninattention\u003c/i\u003e in regard to double images. So far as things interest us we\r\nturn our foveæ upon them, and they are necessarily seen single; so that\r\nif an object impresses disparate points, that may be taken as proof that\r\nit is so\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_038\" id=\"page_038\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{38}\u003c/span\u003e unimportant for us that we needn\u0027t notice whether it appears\r\nin one place or in two. By long practice one may acquire great\r\nexpertness in detecting double images, though, as some one says, it is\r\nan art which is not to be learned completely either in one year or in\r\ntwo.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_11\" id=\"ill_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-038a-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-038a-sml.png\" width=\"366\" height=\"154\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 11.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 11.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the disparity of the images is but slight it is almost impossible\r\nto see them as if double. They give rather the perception of a solid\r\nobject being there. To fix our ideas, take \u003ca href=\"#ill_11\"\u003eFig. 11.\u003c/a\u003e Suppose we look at\r\nthe dots in the middle of the lines \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e just as we looked at the\r\nspots in \u003ca href=\"#ill_8\"\u003eFig. 8.\u003c/a\u003e We shall get the same result\u0026mdash;i.e., they will coalesce\r\nin the median line. But the entire lines will not coalesce, for, owing\r\nto their inclination, their tops fall on the temporal, and their bottoms\r\non the nasal, retinal halves. What we see will be two lines crossed in\r\nthe middle, thus (\u003ca href=\"#ill_12\"\u003eFig. 12\u003c/a\u003e):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_12\" id=\"ill_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 65px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-038c-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-038c-sml.png\" width=\"65\" height=\"147\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 12.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 12.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moment we attend to the tops of these lines, however, our foveæ tend\r\nto abandon the dots and to move upwards, and in doing so, to converge\r\nsomewhat, following the lines, which then appear coalescing at the top\r\nas in \u003ca href=\"#ill_13\"\u003eFig. 13.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_13\" id=\"ill_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca name=\"ill_14\" id=\"ill_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-038b-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-038b-sml.png\" width=\"218\" height=\"145\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 13.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig\u003c/span\u003e. 13.\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 6em;\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig\u003c/span\u003e. 14.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we think of the bottom, the eyes descend and diverge, and what we see\r\nis \u003ca href=\"#ill_14\"\u003eFig. 14.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRunning our eyes up and down the lines makes them converge and diverge\r\njust as they would were they running\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_039\" id=\"page_039\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{39}\u003c/span\u003e up and down some single line whose\r\ntop was nearer to us than its bottom. Now, if the inclination of the\r\nlines be moderate, we may not see them double at all, but single\r\nthroughout their length, when we look at the dots. Under these\r\nconditions their top does look nearer than their bottom\u0026mdash;in other words,\r\nwe see them stereoscopically; and we see them so even when our eyes are\r\nrigorously motionless. In other words, the slight disparity in the\r\nbottom-ends which \u003ci\u003ewould\u003c/i\u003e draw the foveæ divergently apart makes us see\r\nthose ends farther, the slight disparity in the top ends which \u003ci\u003ewould\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndraw them convergently together makes us see these ends nearer, than the\r\npoint at which we look. The disparities, in short, affect our perception\r\nas the actual movements would.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_12_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Perception of Distance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we look about us at things, our eyes\r\nare incessantly moving, converging, diverging, accommodating, relaxing,\r\nand sweeping over the field. The field appears extended in three\r\ndimensions, with some of its parts more distant and some more near.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"With one eye our perception of distance is very imperfect, as\r\nillustrated by the common trick of holding a ring suspended by a\r\nstring in front of a person\u0027s face, and telling him to shut one eye\r\nand pass a rod from one side through the ring. If a penholder be\r\nheld erect before one eye, while the other is closed, and an\r\nattempt be made to touch it with a finger moved across towards it,\r\nan error will nearly always be made. In such cases we get the only\r\nclue from the amount of effort needed to \u0027accommodate\u0027 the eye to\r\nsee the object distinctly. When we use both eyes our perception of\r\ndistance is much better; when we look at an object with two eyes\r\nthe visual axes are converged on it, and the nearer the object the\r\ngreater the convergence. We have a pretty accurate knowledge of the\r\ndegree of muscular effort required to converge the eyes on all\r\ntolerably near points. When objects are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_040\" id=\"page_040\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{40}\u003c/span\u003e farther off, their\r\napparent size, and the modifications their retinal images\r\nexperience by aërial perspective, come in to help. The relative\r\ndistance of objects is easiest determined by moving the eyes; all\r\nstationary objects then appear displaced in the opposite direction\r\n(as for example when we look out of the window of a railway car)\r\nand those nearest most rapidly; from the different apparent rates\r\nof movement we can tell which are farther and which nearer.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_13_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSubjectively considered, distance is an altogether peculiar content of\r\nconsciousness. Convergence, accommodation, binocular disparity, size,\r\ndegree of brightness, parallax, etc., all give us special feelings which\r\nare \u003ci\u003esigns\u003c/i\u003e of the distance feeling, but not it. They simply suggest it\r\nto us. The best way to get it strongly is to go upon some hill-top and\r\ninvert one\u0027s head. The horizon then looks very distant, and draws near\r\nas the head erects itself again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Perception of Size.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The dimensions of the retinal image determine\r\nprimarily the sensations on which conclusions as to size are based; and\r\nthe larger the visual angle the larger the retinal image: since the\r\nvisual angle depends on the distance of an object, the correct\r\nperception of size depends largely upon a correct perception of\r\ndistance; having formed a judgment, conscious or unconscious, as to\r\nthat, we conclude as to size from the extent of the retinal region\r\naffected. Most people have been surprised now and then to find that what\r\nappeared a large bird in the clouds was only a small insect close to the\r\neye; the large apparent size being due to the previous incorrect\r\njudgment as to the distance of the object. The presence of an object of\r\ntolerably well-known height, as a man, also assists in forming\r\nconceptions (by comparison) as to size; artists for this purpose\r\nfrequently introduce human figures to assist in giving an idea of the\r\nsize of other objects represented.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_14_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSensations of Color.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The system of colors is a very complex thing. If\r\none take any color, say green, one can pass\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_041\" id=\"page_041\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{41}\u003c/span\u003e away from it in more than\r\none direction, through a series of greens more and more yellowish, let\r\nus say, towards yellow, or through another series more and more bluish\r\ntowards blue. The result would be that if we seek to plot out on paper\r\nthe various distinguishable tints, the arrangement cannot be that of a\r\nline, but has to cover a surface. With the tints arranged on a surface\r\nwe can pass from any one of them to any other by various lines of\r\ngradually changing intermediaries. Such an arrangement is represented in\r\n\u003ca href=\"#ill_15\"\u003eFig. 15.\u003c/a\u003e It is a merely classificatory diagram based on degrees of\r\ndifference simply felt, and has no physical significance. Black is a\r\ncolor, but does not figure on the plane of the diagram. We cannot place\r\nit anywhere alongside of the other colors because we need both to\r\nrepresent the straight gradation from untinted white to black, and that\r\nfrom each pure color towards black as well as towards white. The best\r\nway is to put black into the third dimension, beneath the paper, \u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nas is shown perspectively in \u003ca href=\"#ill_16\"\u003eFig. 16\u003c/a\u003e, then all the transitions can be\r\nschematically shown. One can pass straight from black to white, or one\r\ncan pass round by way of olive, green, and pale green; or one can change\r\nfrom dark blue to yellow through green, or by way of sky-blue, white and\r\nstraw color; etc., etc. In any case the changes are continuous; and the\r\ncolor system thus forms what Wundt calls a tri-dimensional continuum.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_15\" id=\"ill_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 197px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-041-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-041-sml.png\" width=\"197\" height=\"195\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 15.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 15.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eColor-mixture.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Physiologically considered, the colors have this\r\npeculiarity, that many pairs of them, when they impress the retina\r\ntogether, produce the sensation of white. The colors which do this are\r\ncalled \u003ci\u003ecomplementaries\u003c/i\u003e. Such are spectral red and green-blue, spectral\r\nyellow and indigo-blue. Green and purple, again, are complementaries.\r\nAll\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_042\" id=\"page_042\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{42}\u003c/span\u003e the spectral colors added together also make white light, such as\r\nwe daily experience in the sunshine. Furthermore, both homogeneous\r\nether-waves and heterogeneous ones may make us feel the same color, when\r\nthey fall on our retina. Thus yellow, which is a simple spectral color,\r\nis also felt when green light is added to red; blue is felt when violet\r\nand green lights are mixed. Purple, which is not a spectral color at\r\nall, results when the waves either of red and of violet or those of blue\r\nand of orange are superposed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_15_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_16\" id=\"ill_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 218px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-042-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-042-sml.png\" width=\"218\" height=\"523\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 16 (after Ziehen).\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 16 (after Ziehen).\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom all this it follows that there is no particular congruence between\r\nour system of color-sensations and the physical stimuli which excite\r\nthem. Each color-feeling is a \u0027specific energy\u0027 (\u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003ep. 11\u003c/a\u003e) which many\r\ndifferent physical causes may arouse. Helmholtz, Hering, and others have\r\nsought to simplify the tangle of the facts, by physiological hypotheses\r\nwhich, differing much in detail, agree in principle, since they all\r\npostulate a limited number of elementary retinal processes to which,\r\nwhen excited singly,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_043\" id=\"page_043\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{43}\u003c/span\u003e certain \u0027fundamental\u0027 colors severally correspond.\r\nWhen excited in combination, as they may be by the most various physical\r\nstimuli, other colors, called \u0027secondary,\u0027 are felt. The secondary\r\ncolor-sensations are often spoken of as if they were compounded of the\r\nprimary sensations. This is a great mistake. The \u003ci\u003esensations as such\u003c/i\u003e\r\nare not compounded\u0026mdash;yellow, for example, a secondary on Helmholtz\u0027s\r\ntheory, is as unique a quality of feeling as the primaries red and\r\ngreen, which are said to \u0027compose\u0027 it. What are compounded are merely\r\nthe elementary retinal processes. These, according to their combination,\r\nproduce diverse results on the brain, and thence the secondary colors\r\nresult immediately in consciousness. The \u0027color-theories\u0027 are thus\r\nphysiological, not psychological, hypotheses, and for more information\r\nconcerning them the reader must consult the physiological books.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Duration of Luminous Sensations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"This is greater than that of the\r\nstimulus, a fact taken advantage of in making fireworks: an ascending\r\nrocket produces the sensation of a trail of light extending far behind\r\nthe position of the bright part of the rocket itself at the moment,\r\nbecause the sensation aroused by it in a lower part of its course still\r\npersists. So, shooting stars appear to have luminous tails behind them.\r\nBy rotating rapidly before the eye a disk with alternate white and black\r\nsectors we get for each point of the retina alternate stimulation (due\r\nto the passage of white sector) and rest (when a black sector is\r\npassing). If the rotation be rapid enough the sensation aroused is that\r\nof a uniform gray, such as would be produced if the white and black were\r\nmixed and spread evenly over the disk. In each revolution the eye gets\r\nas\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_044\" id=\"page_044\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{44}\u003c/span\u003e much light as if that were the case, and is unable to distinguish\r\nthat this light is made up of separate portions reaching it at\r\nintervals: the stimulation due to each lasts until the next begins, and\r\nso all are fused together. If one turns out suddenly the gas in a room\r\ncontaining no other light, the image of the flame persists a short time\r\nafter the flame itself is extinguished.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_16_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e If we open our eyes\r\ninstantaneously upon a scene, and then shroud them in complete darkness,\r\nit will be as if we saw the scene in ghostly light through the dark\r\nscreen. We can read off details in it which were unnoticed whilst the\r\neyes were open. This is the primary positive after-image, so-called.\r\nAccording to Helmholtz, one third of a second is the most favorable\r\nlength of exposure to the light for producing it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNegative after-images\u003c/b\u003e are due to more complex conditions, in which\r\nfatigue of the retina is usually supposed to play the chief part.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The nervous visual apparatus is easily fatigued. Usually we do not\r\nobserve this because its restoration is also rapid, and in ordinary\r\nlife our eyes, when open, are never at rest; we move them to and\r\nfro, so that parts of the retina receive light alternately from\r\nbrighter and darker objects, and are alternately excited and\r\nrested. How constant and habitual the movement of the eyes is can\r\nbe readily observed by trying to \u0027fix\u0027 for a short time a small\r\nspot without deviating the glance; to do so for even a few seconds\r\nis impossible without practice. If any small object is steadily\r\n\u0027fixed\u0027 for twenty or thirty seconds, it will be found that the\r\nwhole field of vision becomes grayish and obscure, because the\r\nparts of the retina receiving most light get fatigued, and arouse\r\nno more sensation than those less fatigued and stimulated by light\r\nfrom less illuminated objects. Or look steadily at a black object,\r\nsay a blot on a white page, for twenty seconds, and then turn the\r\neye on a white wall; the latter will seem dark gray, with a white\r\npatch on it; an effect due to the greater excitability of the\r\nretinal parts previously rested by the black, when compared with\r\nthe sensation aroused elsewhere by light from the white wall acting\r\non the previously stimulated parts of the visual surface. All\r\npersons will recall many instances of such phenomena, which are\r\nespecially noticeable soon after rising in the morning.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_045\" id=\"page_045\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{45}\u003c/span\u003e Similar\r\nthings may be noticed with colors; after looking at a red patch the\r\neye turned on a white wall sees a blue-green patch; the elements\r\ncausing red sensations having been fatigued, the white mixed light\r\nfrom the wall now excites on that region of the retina only the\r\nother primary color sensations. The blending of colors so as to\r\nsecure their greatest effect depends on this fact; red and green go\r\nwell together because each rests the parts of the visual apparatus\r\nmost excited by the other, and so each appears bright and vivid as\r\nthe eye wanders to and fro; while red and orange together, each\r\nexciting and exhausting mainly the same visual elements, render\r\ndull, or in popular phrase \u0027kill,\u0027 one another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If we fix steadily for thirty seconds a point between two white\r\nsquares about 4 mm. (⅙ inch) apart on a large black sheet, and then\r\nclose and cover our eyes, we get a negative after-image in which\r\nare seen two dark squares on a brighter surface; this surface is\r\nbrighter close around the negative after-image of each square, and\r\nbrightest of all between them. This luminous boundary is called the\r\n\u003ci\u003ecorona\u003c/i\u003e, and is explained usually as an effect of simultaneous\r\ncontrast; the dark after-image of the square it is said makes us\r\nmentally err in judgment, and think the clear surface close to it\r\nbrighter than elsewhere; and it is brightest between the two dark\r\nsquares, just as a middle-sized man between two tall ones looks\r\nshorter than if alongside one only. If, however, the after-image be\r\nwatched, it will often be noticed not only that the light band\r\nbetween the squares is intensely white, much more so than the\r\nnormal idio-retinal light [see below], but, as the image fades\r\naway, often the two dark after-images of the squares disappear\r\nentirely with all of the corona, except that part between them\r\nwhich is still seen as a bright band on a uniform grayish field.\r\nHere there is no \u003ci\u003econtrast\u003c/i\u003e to produce the error of judgment; and\r\nfrom this and other experiments Hering concludes that light acting\r\non one part of the retina produces inverse changes in all the rest,\r\nand that this plays an important part in producing the phenomena of\r\ncontrasts. Similar phenomena may be observed with colored objects;\r\nin their negative after-images each tint is represented by its\r\ncomplementary, as black is by white in colorless vision.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_17_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is one of the facts referred to on \u003ca href=\"#page_027\"\u003ep. 27\u003c/a\u003e which have made Hering\r\nreject the psychological explanation of simultaneous contrast.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Intensity of Luminous Objects.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Black is an optical sensation. We\r\nhave no black except in the field of view;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_046\" id=\"page_046\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{46}\u003c/span\u003e we do not, for instance, see\r\nblack out of our stomach or out of the palm of our hand. \u003ci\u003ePure\u003c/i\u003e black\r\nis, however, only an \u0027abstract idea,\u0027 for the retina itself (even in\r\ncomplete objective darkness) seems to be always the seat of internal\r\nchanges which give some luminous sensation. This is what is meant by the\r\n\u0027idio-retinal light,\u0027 spoken of a few lines back. It plays its part in\r\nthe determination of all after-images with closed eyes. Any objective\r\nluminous stimulus, to be perceived, must be strong enough to give a\r\nsensible increment of sensation over and above the idio-retinal light.\r\nAs the objective stimulus increases the perception is of an intenser\r\nluminosity; but the perception changes, as we saw on \u003ca href=\"#page_018\"\u003ep. 18\u003c/a\u003e, more slowly\r\nthan the stimulus. The latest numerical determinations, by König and\r\nBrodhun, were applied to six different colors and ran from an intensity\r\narbitrarily called 1 to one which was 100,000 times as great. From\r\nintensity 2000 to 20,000 Weber\u0027s law held good; below and above this\r\nrange discriminative sensibility declined. The relative increment\r\ndiscriminated here was the same for all colors of light, and lay\r\n(according to the tables) between 1 and 2 per cent of the stimulus.\r\nPrevious observers have got different results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA certain amount of luminous intensity must exist in an object for its\r\ncolor to be discriminated at all. \"In the dark all cats are gray.\" But\r\nthe colors rapidly become distincter as the light increases, first the\r\nblues and last the reds and yellows, up to a certain point of intensity,\r\nwhen they grow indistinct again through the fact that each takes a turn\r\ntowards white. At the highest bearable intensity of the light all colors\r\nare lost in the blinding white dazzle. This again is usually spoken of\r\nas a \u0027mixing\u0027 of the sensation white with the original color-sensation.\r\nIt is no mixing of two sensations, but the replacement of one sensation\r\nby another, in consequence of a changed neural process.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_047\" id=\"page_047\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{47}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_IV\" id=\"CHAPTER_IV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eHEARING.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_18_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_17\" id=\"ill_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width:429px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-047-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-047-sml.png\" width=\"429\" height=\"331\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 17.\u0026mdash;Semidiagrammatic section through the right ear (Czermak).\r\nM, concha; G, external auditory meatus; T, tympanic membrane;\r\nP, tympanic cavity; o, oval foramen; r, round foramen; R,\r\npharyngeal opening of Eustachian tube; V, vestibule; B, a\r\nsemicircular canal; S, the cochlea; Vt, scala vestibuli; Pt,\r\nscala tympani; A, auditory nerve.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 17.\u0026mdash;Semidiagrammatic section through the right ear (Czermak).\r\nM, concha; G, external auditory meatus; T, tympanic membrane;\r\nP, tympanic cavity; o, oval foramen; r, round foramen; R,\r\npharyngeal opening of Eustachian tube; V, vestibule; B, a\r\nsemicircular canal; S, the cochlea; Vt, scala vestibuli; Pt,\r\nscala tympani; A, auditory nerve.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Ear.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The auditory organ in man consists of three portions, known\r\nrespectively as the \u003ci\u003eexternal ear\u003c/i\u003e, the \u003ci\u003emiddle ear\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003etympanum\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nthe \u003ci\u003einternal ear\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003elabyrinth\u003c/i\u003e; the latter contains the end-organs of\r\nthe auditory nerve. The external ear consists of the expansion seen on\r\nthe exterior of the head, called the \u003ci\u003econcha\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#ill_17\"\u003eFig. 17\u003c/a\u003e,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_048\" id=\"page_048\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{48}\u003c/span\u003e and a\r\npassage leading in from it, the \u003ci\u003eexternal auditory meatus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eG\u003c/i\u003e. This\r\npassage is closed at its inner end by the \u003ci\u003etympanic\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003edrum membrane\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eT\u003c/i\u003e. It is lined by skin, through which numerous small glands, secreting\r\nthe \u003ci\u003ewax\u003c/i\u003e of the ear, open.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_18\" id=\"ill_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 241px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-048-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-048-sml.png\" width=\"241\" height=\"238\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 18.\u0026mdash;Mcp, Mc, Ml, and Mm stand for different parts of\r\nthe malleus; Jc, Jb, Jl, Jpl, for different parts of the\r\nincus. S is the stapes.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 18.\u0026mdash;Mcp, Mc, Ml, and Mm stand for different parts of\r\nthe malleus; Jc, Jb, Jl, Jpl, for different parts of the\r\nincus. S is the stapes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u003ci\u003eThe Tympanum\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eP\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#ill_17\"\u003eFig. 17\u003c/a\u003e) is an irregular cavity in the temporal\r\nbone, closed externally by the drum membrane. From its inner side the\r\n\u003ci\u003eEustachian tube\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e) proceeds and opens into the pharynx. The inner\r\nwall of the tympanum is bony except for two small apertures, the \u003ci\u003eoval\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003eround foramens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e, which lead into the labyrinth. During\r\nlife the round aperture is closed by the lining mucous membrane, and the\r\noval by the stirrup-bones. The \u003ci\u003etympanic membrane\u003c/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eT\u003c/i\u003e, stretched across\r\nthe outer side of the tympanum, forms a shallow funnel with its\r\nconcavity outwards. It is pressed by the external air on its exterior,\r\nand by air entering the tympanic cavity through the Eustachian tube on\r\nits inner side. If the tympanum were closed these pressures would not be\r\nalways equal when barometric pressure varied, and the membrane would be\r\nbulged in or out according as the external or internal pressure on it\r\nwere the greater. On the other hand, were the Eustachian tube always\r\nopen the sounds of our own voices would be loud and disconcerting, so it\r\nis usually closed; but every time we swallow it is opened, and thus the\r\nair-pressure in the cavity is kept equal to that in the external\r\nauditory meatus. On making a balloon ascent or going rapidly down a deep\r\nmine, the sudden and great change of aërial pressure outside frequently\r\ncauses\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_049\" id=\"page_049\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{49}\u003c/span\u003e painful tension of the drum-membrane, which may be greatly\r\nalleviated by frequent swallowing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Auditory Ossicles.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Three small bones lie in the tympanum forming\r\na chain from the drum-membrane to the oval foramen. The external bone is\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emalleus\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ehammer\u003c/i\u003e; the middle one, the \u003ci\u003eincus\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eanvil\u003c/i\u003e; and\r\nthe internal one, the \u003ci\u003estapes\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003estirrup\u003c/i\u003e. They are represented in\r\n\u003ca href=\"#ill_18\"\u003eFig. 18.\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_19_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_19_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAccommodation\u003c/b\u003e is provided for in the ear as well as in the eye. One\r\nmuscle an inch long, the \u003ci\u003etensor tympani\u003c/i\u003e, arises in the petrous portion\r\nof the temporal bone (running in a canal parallel to the Eustachian\r\ntube) and is inserted into the malleus below its head. When it\r\ncontracts, it makes the membrane of the tympanum more tense. Another\r\nsmaller muscle, the \u003ci\u003estapedius\u003c/i\u003e, goes to the head of the stirrup-bone.\r\nThese muscles are by many persons felt distinctly contracting when\r\ncertain notes are heard, and some can make them contract at will. In\r\nspite of this, uncertainty still reigns as to their exact use in\r\nhearing, though it is highly probable that they give to the membranes\r\nwhich they influence the degree of tension best suited to take up\r\nwhatever rates of vibration may fall upon them at the time. In\r\nlistening, the head and ears in lower animals, and the head alone in\r\nman, are turned so as best to receive the sound. This also is a part of\r\nthe reaction called \u0027adaptation\u0027 of the organ (see the chapter on\r\nAttention).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Internal Ear.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The labyrinth consists primarily of chambers and\r\ntubes hollowed out in the temporal bone and inclosed by it on all sides,\r\nexcept for the oval and round foramens on its exterior, and certain\r\napertures for blood-vessels and the auditory nerve; during life all\r\nthese are closed water-tight in one way or another. Lying in the \u003ci\u003ebony\r\nlabyrinth\u003c/i\u003e thus constituted are membranous parts, of the same general\r\nform but smaller, so that between the two\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_050\" id=\"page_050\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{50}\u003c/span\u003e a space is left; this is\r\nfilled with a watery fluid, called the \u003ci\u003eperilymph\u003c/i\u003e; and the \u003ci\u003emembranous\r\ninternal ear\u003c/i\u003e is filled by a similar liquid, the \u003ci\u003eendolymph\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_19\" id=\"ill_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width:449px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-050-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-050-sml.png\" width=\"449\" height=\"190\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 19.\u0026mdash;Casts of the bony labyrinth. A, left labyrinth seen\r\nfrom the outer side; B, right labyrinth from the inner side; C,\r\nleft labyrinth from above; Co, cochlea; V, vestibule; Fc,\r\nround foramen; Fv, oval foramen; h, horizontal semicircular\r\ncanal; ha, its ampulla; vaa, ampulla of anterior vertical\r\nsemicircular canal; vpa, ampulla of posterior vertical\r\nsemicircular canal; vc, conjoined portion of the two vertical\r\ncanals.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 19.\u0026mdash;Casts of the bony labyrinth. A, left labyrinth seen\r\nfrom the outer side; B, right labyrinth from the inner side; C,\r\nleft labyrinth from above; Co, cochlea; V, vestibule; Fc,\r\nround foramen; Fv, oval foramen; h, horizontal semicircular\r\ncanal; ha, its ampulla; vaa, ampulla of anterior vertical\r\nsemicircular canal; vpa, ampulla of posterior vertical\r\nsemicircular canal; vc, conjoined portion of the two vertical\r\ncanals.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Bony Labyrinth.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The bony labyrinth is described in three portions,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003evestibule\u003c/i\u003e, the \u003ci\u003esemicircular canals\u003c/i\u003e, and the \u003ci\u003ecochlea\u003c/i\u003e; casts of\r\nits interior are represented from different aspects in \u003ca href=\"#ill_19\"\u003eFig. 19.\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nvestibule is the central part and has on its exterior the oval foramen\r\n(\u003ci\u003eFv\u003c/i\u003e) into which the base of the stirrup-bone fits. Behind the\r\nvestibule are three bony semicircular canals, communicating with the\r\nback of the vestibule at each end, and dilated near one end to form an\r\n\u003ci\u003eampulla\u003c/i\u003e. The bony cochlea is a tube coiled on itself somewhat like a\r\nsnail\u0027s shell, and lying in front of the vestibule.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Membranous Labyrinth.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The membranous vestibule, lying in the bony,\r\nconsists of two sacs communicating by a narrow aperture. The posterior\r\nis called the \u003ci\u003eutriculus\u003c/i\u003e, and into it the membranous semicircular\r\ncanals open. The anterior, called the \u003ci\u003esacculus\u003c/i\u003e, communicates by a tube\r\nwith the membranous cochlea. The membranous semicircular canals much\r\nresemble the bony, and each has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_051\" id=\"page_051\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{51}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_20\" id=\"ill_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 261px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-051a-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-051a-sml.png\" width=\"261\" height=\"214\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 20.\u0026mdash;A section through the cochlea in the line of\r\nits axis.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 20.\u0026mdash;A section through the cochlea in the line of\r\nits axis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_21\" id=\"ill_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width:309px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-051b-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-051b-sml.png\" width=\"309\" height=\"210\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 21.\u0026mdash;Section of one coil of the cochlea, magnified. SV,\r\nscala vestibuli; R, membrane of Reissner; CC, membranous\r\ncochlea (scala media); lls, limbus laminæ spiralis; t,\r\ntectorial membrane; ST, scala tympani; lso, spiral lamina;\r\nCo, rods of Corti; b, basilar membrane.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 21.\u0026mdash;Section of one coil of the cochlea, magnified. SV,\r\nscala vestibuli; R, membrane of Reissner; CC, membranous\r\ncochlea (scala media); lls, limbus laminæ spiralis; t,\r\ntectorial membrane; ST, scala tympani; lso, spiral lamina;\r\nCo, rods of Corti; b, basilar membrane.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ean ampulla; in the ampulla one side of the membranous tube is closely\r\nadherent to its bony protector; at this point nerves enter the former.\r\nThe relations of the membranous to the bony cochlea are more\r\ncomplicated. A section through this part of the auditory apparatus (\u003ca href=\"#ill_20\"\u003eFig.\r\n20\u003c/a\u003e) shows that its osseous portion consists of a tube wound two and a\r\nhalf times round a central bony axis, the \u003ci\u003emodiolus\u003c/i\u003e. From the axis a\r\nshelf, the \u003ci\u003elamina spiralis\u003c/i\u003e, projects and partially subdivides the\r\ntube, extending farthest across in its lower coils. Attached to the\r\nouter edge of this bony plate is the membranous cochlea (\u003ci\u003escala media\u003c/i\u003e),\r\na tube triangular in cross-section and attached by its base to the outer\r\nside of the bony cochlear spiral. The spiral lamina and the membranous\r\ncochlea thus subdivide the cavity of the bony tube (\u003ca href=\"#ill_21\"\u003eFig. 21\u003c/a\u003e) into an\r\nupper portion, the \u003ci\u003escala vestibuli\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eSV\u003c/i\u003e, and a lower, the \u003ci\u003escala\r\ntympani\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eST\u003c/i\u003e. Between these lie the lamina spiralis (\u003ci\u003elso\u003c/i\u003e) and the\r\nmembranous\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_052\" id=\"page_052\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{52}\u003c/span\u003e cochlea (\u003ci\u003eCC\u003c/i\u003e), the latter being bounded above by the\r\nmembrane of Reissner (\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e) and below by the basilar membrane (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e).\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_20_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe membranous cochlea does not extend to the tip of the bony cochlea;\r\nabove its apex the scala vestibuli and scala tympani communicate. Both\r\nare filled with perilymph, so that when the stapes is pushed into the\r\noval foramen, \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e, in \u003ca href=\"#ill_17\"\u003eFig. 17\u003c/a\u003e, by the impact of an air-wave on the\r\ntympanic membrane, a wave of perilymph runs up the scala vestibuli to\r\nthe top, where it turns into the scala tympani, down whose whorls it\r\nruns and pushes out the round foramen \u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e, ruffling probably the\r\nmembrane of Reissner and the basilar membrane on its way up and down.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_22\" id=\"ill_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width:507px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-052-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-052-sml.png\" width=\"507\" height=\"183\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 22.\u0026mdash;The rods of Corti. A, a pair of rods separated from the\r\nrest; B, a bit of the basilar membrane with several rods on it,\r\nshowing how they cover in the tunnel of Corti; i, inner, and\r\ne, outer rods; b, basilar membrane; r, reticular membrane.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 22.\u0026mdash;The rods of Corti. A, a pair of rods separated from the\r\nrest; B, a bit of the basilar membrane with several rods on it,\r\nshowing how they cover in the tunnel of Corti; i, inner, and\r\ne, outer rods; b, basilar membrane; r, reticular membrane.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Terminal Organs.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The membranous cochlea contains certain solid\r\nstructures seated on the basilar membrane and forming the \u003ci\u003eorgan of\r\nCorti\u003c/i\u003e. This contains the end-organs of the cochlear nerves. Lining the\r\nsulcus spiralis, a groove in the edge of the bony lamina spiralis, are\r\ncuboidal cells; on the inner margin of the basilar membrane they become\r\ncolumnar, and then are succeeded by a row which bear on their upper ends\r\na set of short stiff hairs, and constitute the \u003ci\u003einner hair-cells\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\nare fixed below by a narrow apex to the basilar membrane; nerve-fibres\r\nenter them. To the inner hair-cells succeed the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_053\" id=\"page_053\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{53}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003erods of Corti\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eCo\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#ill_21\"\u003eFig. 21\u003c/a\u003e), which are represented highly magnified in \u003ca href=\"#ill_22\"\u003eFig. 22.\u003c/a\u003e These rods\r\nare stiff and arranged side by side in two rows, leaned against one\r\nanother by their upper ends so as to cover in a tunnel; they are known\r\nrespectively as the \u003ci\u003einner\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eouter rods\u003c/i\u003e, the former being nearer\r\nthe \u003ci\u003elamina spiralis\u003c/i\u003e. The inner rods are more numerous than the outer,\r\nthe numbers being about 6000 and 4500 respectively. Attached to the\r\nexternal sides of the heads of the outer rods is the \u003ci\u003ereticular\r\nmembrane\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#ill_22\"\u003eFig. 22\u003c/a\u003e), which is stiff and perforated by holes.\r\nExternal to the outer rods come four rows of \u003ci\u003eouter hair-cells\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nconnected like the inner row with nerve-fibres; their bristles project\r\ninto the holes of the reticular membrane. Beyond the outer hair-cells is\r\nordinary columnar epithelium, which passes gradually into cuboidal cells\r\nlining most of the membranous cochlea. From the upper lip of the sulcus\r\nspiralis projects the \u003ci\u003etectorial membrane\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003et\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#ill_21\"\u003eFig. 21\u003c/a\u003e) which extends\r\nover the rods of Corti and the hair-cells.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_21_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_21_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_23\" id=\"ill_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 170px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-053-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-053-sml.png\" width=\"170\" height=\"263\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 23.\u0026mdash;Sensory epithelium from ampulla or semicircular canal,\r\nand saccule. At n a nerve-fibre pierces the wall, and after\r\nbranching enters the two hair-cells, c. At h a \u0027columnar cell\u0027\r\nwith a long hair is shown, the nerve-fibre being broken away from\r\nits base. The slender cells at f seem unconnected with nerves.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 23.\u0026mdash;Sensory epithelium from ampulla or semicircular canal,\r\nand saccule. At n a nerve-fibre pierces the wall, and after\r\nbranching enters the two hair-cells, c. At h a \u0027columnar cell\u0027\r\nwith a long hair is shown, the nerve-fibre being broken away from\r\nits base. The slender cells at f seem unconnected with nerves.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe hair-cells would thus seem to be the terminal organs for \u0027picking\r\nup\u0027 the vibrations which the air-waves communicate through all the\r\nintervening apparatus, solid and liquid, to the basilar membrane.\r\nAnalogous hair-cells receive the terminal nerve-filaments in the walls\r\nof the saccule, utricle, and ampullæ (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_23\"\u003eFig. 23\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Various Qualities of Sound.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Physically, sounds consist of\r\nvibrations, and these are, generally speaking, \u003ci\u003eaërial waves\u003c/i\u003e. When the\r\nwaves are non-periodic the result is a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_054\" id=\"page_054\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{54}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003enoise\u003c/i\u003e; when periodic it is\r\nwhat is nowadays called a \u003ci\u003etone\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e. The \u003ci\u003eloudness\u003c/i\u003e of a sound\r\ndepends on the \u003ci\u003eforce\u003c/i\u003e of the waves. When they recur periodically a\r\npeculiar quality called \u003ci\u003epitch\u003c/i\u003e is the effect of their \u003ci\u003efrequency\u003c/i\u003e. In\r\naddition to loudness and pitch tones have each their \u003ci\u003evoice\u003c/i\u003e or\r\n\u003ci\u003etimbre\u003c/i\u003e, which may differ widely in different instruments giving\r\nequally loud tones of the same pitch. This voice depends on the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the aërial wave.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePitch.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A single puff of air, set in motion by no matter what cause,\r\nwill give a sensation of sound, but it takes at least four or five\r\npuffs, or more, to convey a sensation of pitch. The pitch of the note\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, for instance, is due to 132 vibrations a second, that of its octave\r\n\u003ci\u003ec´\u003c/i\u003e is produced by twice as many, or 264 vibrations; but in neither\r\ncase is it necessary for the vibrations to go on during a full second\r\nfor the pitch to be discerned. \"Sound vibrations may be too rapid or too\r\nslow in succession to produce sonorous sensations, just as the\r\nultra-violet and ultra-red rays of the solar spectrum fail to excite the\r\nretina. The highest-pitched audible note answers to about 38,016\r\nvibrations in a second, but it differs in individuals; many persons\r\ncannot hear the cry of a bat nor the chirp of a cricket, which lie near\r\nthis upper audible limit. On the other hand, sounds of vibrational rate\r\nabout 40 per second are not well heard, and a little below this they\r\nproduce rather a \u0027hum\u0027 than a true tone-sensation, and are only used\r\nalong with notes of higher octaves to which they give a character of\r\ngreater depth.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_22_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe entire system of pitches forms \u003ci\u003ea continuum of one dimension\u003c/i\u003e; that\r\nis to say, you can pass from one pitch to another only by one set of\r\nintermediaries, instead of by more than one, as in the case of colors.\r\n(See \u003ca href=\"#page_041\"\u003ep. 41\u003c/a\u003e.) The whole series of pitches is embraced in and between the\r\nterms of what is called the musical scale. The adoption of certain\r\narbitrary points in this scale as \u0027notes\u0027 has an explanation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_055\" id=\"page_055\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{55}\u003c/span\u003e partly\r\nhistoric and partly æsthetic, but too complex for exposition here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe \u0027timbre\u0027\u003c/b\u003e of a note is due to its \u003ci\u003ewave-form\u003c/i\u003e. Waves are either\r\nsimple (\u0027pendular\u0027) or compound. Thus if a tuning-fork (which gives\r\nwaves nearly simple) vibrate 132 times a second, we shall hear the note\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e. If simultaneously a fork of 264 vibrations be struck, giving the\r\nnext higher octave, \u003ci\u003ec´\u003c/i\u003e, the aërial movement at any time will be the\r\nalgebraic sum of the movements due to both forks; whenever both drive\r\nthe air one way they reinforce one another; when on the contrary the\r\nrecoil of one fork coincides with the forward stroke of another, they\r\ndetract from each other\u0027s effect. The result is a movement which is\r\nstill periodic, repeating itself at equal intervals of time, but no\r\nlonger \u003ci\u003ependular\u003c/i\u003e, since it is not alike on the ascending and descending\r\nlimbs of the curves. We thus get at the fact that non-pendular\r\nvibrations may be produced by the fusion of pendular, or, in technical\r\nphrase, by their \u003ci\u003ecomposition\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose several musical instruments, as those of an orchestra, to be\r\nsounded together. Each produces its own effect on the air-particles,\r\nwhose movements, being an algebraical sum, must at any given instant be\r\nvery complex; yet the ear can pick out at will and follow the tones of\r\nany one instrument. Now in most musical instruments it is susceptible of\r\nphysical proof that with every single note that is sounded many upper\r\noctaves and other \u0027harmonics\u0027 sound simultaneously in fainter form. On\r\nthe relative strength of this or that one or more of these Helmholtz has\r\nshown that the instrument\u0027s peculiar voice depends. The several\r\nvowel-sounds in the human voice also depend on the predominance of\r\ndiverse upper harmonics accompanying the note on which the vowel is\r\nsung. When the two tuning-forks of the last paragraph are sounded\r\ntogether the new form of vibration has the same \u003ci\u003eperiod\u003c/i\u003e as the\r\nlower-pitched fork; yet the ear can clearly distinguish the resultant\r\nsound from that of the lower fork alone, as a note of the same pitch but\r\nof different timbre; and within\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_056\" id=\"page_056\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{56}\u003c/span\u003e the compound sound the two components\r\ncan by a trained ear be severally heard. Now how can one resultant\r\nwave-form make us hear so many sounds at once?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe analysis of compound wave-forms\u003c/b\u003e is supposed (after Helmholtz) to be\r\neffected through the different rates of sympathetic resonance of the\r\ndifferent parts of the membranous cochlea. The basilar membrane is some\r\ntwelve times broader at the apex of the cochlea than at the base where\r\nit begins, and is largely composed of radiating fibres which may be\r\nlikened to stretched strings. Now the physical principle of sympathetic\r\nresonance says that when stretched strings are near a source of\r\nvibration those whose own rate agrees with that of the source also\r\nvibrate, the others remaining at rest. On this principle, waves of\r\nperilymph running down the scala tympani at a certain rate of frequency\r\nought to set certain particular fibres of the basilar membrane\r\nvibrating, and ought to leave others unaffected. If then each vibrating\r\nfibre stimulated the hair-cell above it, and no others, and each such\r\nhair-cell, sending a current to the auditory brain-centre, awakened\r\ntherein a specific process to which the sensation of one particular\r\npitch was correlated, the physiological condition of our several\r\npitch-sensations would be explained. Suppose now a chord to be struck in\r\nwhich perhaps twenty different physical rates of vibration are found: at\r\nleast twenty different hair-cells or end-organs will receive the jar;\r\nand if the power of mental discrimination be at its maximum, twenty\r\ndifferent \u0027objects\u0027 of hearing, in the shape of as many distinct pitches\r\nof sound, may appear before the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe rods of Corti are supposed to be \u003ci\u003edampers\u003c/i\u003e of the fibres of the\r\nbasilar membrane, just as the malleus, incus, and stapes are dampers of\r\nthe tympanic membrane, as well as transmitters of its oscillations to\r\nthe inner ear. There must be, in fact, an instantaneous \u003ci\u003edamping\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nphysiological vibrations, for there are no such positive after-images,\r\nand no such blendings of rapidly successive tones, as the retina shows\r\nus in the case of light. Helmholtz\u0027s theory of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_057\" id=\"page_057\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{57}\u003c/span\u003e the analysis of sounds\r\nis plausible and ingenious. One objection to it is that the keyboard of\r\nthe cochlea does not seem extensive enough for the number of distinct\r\nresonances required. We can discriminate many more degrees of pitch than\r\nthe 20,000 hair-cells, more or less, will allow for.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe so-called Fusion of Sensations in Hearing.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A very common way of\r\nexplaining the fact that waves which singly give no feeling of pitch\r\ngive one when recurrent, is to say that their several sensations \u003ci\u003efuse\r\ninto a compound sensation\u003c/i\u003e. A preferable explanation is that which\r\nfollows the analogy of muscular contraction. If electric shocks are sent\r\ninto a frog\u0027s sciatic nerve at slow intervals, the muscle which the\r\nnerve supplies will give a series of distinct twitches, one for each\r\nshock. But if they follow each other at the rate of as many as thirty a\r\nsecond, no distinct twitches are observed, but a steady state of\r\ncontraction instead. This steady contraction is known as \u003ci\u003etetanus\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nexperiment proves that there is a physiological cumulation or\r\noverlapping of processes in the muscular tissue. It takes a twentieth of\r\na second or more for the latter to relax after the twitch due to the\r\nfirst shock. But the second shock comes in before the relaxation can\r\noccur, then the third again, and so on; so that continuous tetanus takes\r\nthe place of discrete twitching. Similarly in the auditory nerve. One\r\nshock of air starts in it a current to the auditory brain-centre, and\r\naffects the latter, so that a dry stroke of sound is heard. If other\r\nshocks follow slowly, the brain-centre recovers its equilibrium after\r\neach, to be again upset in the same way by the next, and the result is\r\nthat for each shock of air a distinct sensation of sound occurs. But if\r\nthe shock comes in too quick succession, the later ones reach the brain\r\nbefore the effects of the earlier ones on that organ have died away.\r\nThere is thus an overlapping of processes in the auditory centre, a\r\nphysiological condition analogous to the muscle\u0027s tetanus, to which new\r\ncondition a new quality of feeling, that of pitch, directly corresponds.\r\nThis latter\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_058\" id=\"page_058\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{58}\u003c/span\u003e feeling is a new kind of sensation altogether, not a mere\r\n\u0027appearance\u0027 due to many sensations of dry stroke being compounded into\r\none. No sensations of dry stroke can exist under these circumstances,\r\nfor their physiological conditions have been replaced by others. What\r\n\u0027compounding\u0027 there is has already taken place in the brain-cells before\r\nthe threshold of sensation was reached. Just so red light and green\r\nlight beating on the retina in rapid enough alternation, arouse the\r\ncentral process to which the sensation \u003ci\u003eyellow\u003c/i\u003e directly corresponds.\r\nThe sensations of red and of green get no chance, under such conditions,\r\nto be born. Just so if the muscle could feel, it would have a certain\r\nsort of feeling when it gave a single twitch, but it would undoubtedly\r\nhave a distinct sort of feeling altogether, when it contracted\r\ntetanically; and this feeling of the tetanic contraction would by no\r\nmeans be identical with a multitude of the feelings of twitching.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHarmony and Discord.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When several tones sound together we may get\r\npeculiar feelings of pleasure or displeasure designated as consonance\r\nand dissonance respectively. A note sounds most consonant with its\r\noctave. When with the octave the \u0027third\u0027 and the \u0027fifth\u0027 of the note are\r\nsounded, for instance \u003ci\u003ec\u0026mdash;e\u0026mdash;g\u0026mdash;c´\u003c/i\u003e, we get the \u0027full chord\u0027 or maximum\r\nof consonance. The ratios of vibration here are as 4:5:6:8, so that one\r\nmight think simple ratios were the ground of harmony. But the interval\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u0026mdash;d\u003c/i\u003e is discordant, with the comparatively simple ratio 8:9. Helmholtz\r\nexplains discord by the overtones making \u0027beats\u0027 together. This gives a\r\nsubtle grating which is unpleasant. Where the overtones make no \u0027beats\u0027,\r\nor beats too rapid for their effect to be perceptible, there is\r\nconsonance, according to Helmholtz, which is thus a negative rather than\r\na positive thing. Wundt explains consonance by the presence of strong\r\nidentical overtones in the notes which harmonize. No one of these\r\nexplanations of musical harmony can be called quite satisfactory; and\r\nthe subject is too intricate to be treated farther in this place.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_059\" id=\"page_059\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{59}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDiscriminative Sensibility of the Ear.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Weber\u0027s law holds fairly well\r\nfor the intensity of sounds. If ivory or metal balls are dropped on an\r\nebony or iron plate, they make a sound which is the louder as they are\r\nheavier or dropped from a greater height. Experimenting in this way\r\n(after others) Merkel found that the just perceptible increment of\r\nloudness required an increase of \u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e10\u003c/sub\u003e of the original stimulus\r\neverywhere between the intensities marked 20 and 5000 of his arbitrary\r\nscale. Below this the fractional increment of stimulus must be larger;\r\nabove it, no measurements were made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDiscrimination of differences of \u003ci\u003epitch\u003c/i\u003e varies in different parts of\r\nthe scale. In the neighborhood of 1000 vibrations per second, one fifth\r\nof a vibration more or less can make the sound sharp or flat for a good\r\near. It takes a much greater \u003ci\u003erelative\u003c/i\u003e alteration to sound sharp or\r\nflat elsewhere on the scale. The chromatic scale itself has been used as\r\nan illustration of Weber\u0027s law. The notes seem to differ equally from\r\neach other, yet their vibration-numbers form a series of which each is a\r\ncertain multiple of the last. This, however, has nothing to do with\r\nintensities or just perceptible differences; so the peculiar parallelism\r\nbetween the sensation series and the outer-stimulus series forms here a\r\ncase all by itself, rather than an instance under Weber\u0027s more general\r\nlaw.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_060\" id=\"page_060\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{60}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_V\" id=\"CHAPTER_V\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTOUCH, THE TEMPERATURE SENSE, THE MUSCULAR SENSE, AND PAIN.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNerve-endings in the Skin.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"Many of the afferent skin-nerves end in\r\nconnection with hair-bulbs; the fine hairs over most of the cutaneous\r\nsurface, projecting from the skin, transmit any movement impressed on\r\nthem, with increased force, to the nerve-fibres at their fixed ends.\r\nFine branches of axis-cylinders have also been described as penetrating\r\nbetween epidermic cells and ending there without terminal organs. In or\r\nimmediately beneath the skin several peculiar forms of nerve end-organs\r\nhave also been described; they are known as (1) \u003ci\u003eTouch-cells\u003c/i\u003e; (2)\r\n\u003ci\u003ePacinian corpuscles\u003c/i\u003e; (3) \u003ci\u003eTactile corpuscles\u003c/i\u003e; (4) \u003ci\u003eEnd-bulbs\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_23_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_23_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_24\" id=\"ill_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 156px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-060-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-060-sml.png\" width=\"156\" height=\"151\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 24.\u0026mdash;End-bulbs from the conjunctiva of the human eye,\r\nmagnified.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 24.\u0026mdash;End-bulbs from the conjunctiva of the human eye,\r\nmagnified.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese bodies all consist essentially of granules formed of connective\r\ntissue, in which or round about which one or more sensory nerve-fibres\r\nterminate. They probably magnify impressions just as a grain of sand\r\ndoes in a shoe, or a crumb does in a finger of a glove.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTouch, or the Pressure Sense.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"Through the skin we get several kinds of\r\nsensation; touch proper, heat and cold, and pain; and we can with more\r\nor less accuracy localize them on the surface of the body. The interior\r\nof the mouth possesses also three sensibilities. Through touch proper we\r\nrecognize pressure or traction exerted on the skin, and the force of the\r\npressure; the softness or hardness, roughness or smoothness, of the body\r\nproducing it;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_061\" id=\"page_061\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{61}\u003c/span\u003e and the form of this when not too large to be felt all\r\nover. When to learn the form of an object we move the hand over it,\r\nmuscular sensations are combined with proper tactile, and such a\r\ncombination of the two sensations is frequent; moreover, we rarely touch\r\nanything without at the same time getting temperature sensations;\r\ntherefore pure tactile feelings are rare. From an evolution point of\r\nview, touch is probably the first distinctly differentiated sensation,\r\nand this primary position it still largely holds in our mental\r\nlife.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_24_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObjects are most important to us when in direct contact. The chief\r\nfunction of our eyes and ears is to enable us to prepare ourselves for\r\ncontact with approaching bodies, or to ward such contact off. They have\r\naccordingly been characterized as organs of anticipatory touch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The delicacy of the tactile sense varies on different parts of the\r\nskin; it is greatest on the forehead, temples, and back of the forearm,\r\nwhere a weight of 2 milligr. pressing on an area of 9 sq. millim. can be\r\nfelt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In order that the sense of touch may be excited neighboring skin-areas\r\nmust be differently pressed. When the hand is immersed in a liquid, as\r\nmercury, which fits into all its inequalities and presses with\r\npractically the same weight on all neighboring immersed areas, the sense\r\nof pressure is only felt at a line along the surface, where the immersed\r\nand non-immersed parts of the skin meet.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Localizing Power of the Skin.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"When the eyes are closed and a point\r\nof the skin is touched we can with some accuracy indicate the region\r\nstimulated; although tactile feelings are in general characters alike,\r\nthey differ in something besides intensity by which we can distinguish\r\nthem; some sub-sensation quality not rising definitely into prominence\r\nin consciousness must be present, comparable to the upper partials\r\ndetermining the timbre of a tone. The accuracy of the localizing power\r\nvaries widely in different\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_062\" id=\"page_062\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{62}\u003c/span\u003e skin regions and is measured by observing\r\nthe least distance which must separate two objects (as the blunted\r\npoints of a pair of compasses) in order that they may be felt as two.\r\nThe following table illustrates some of the differences observed:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eTongue-tip\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e1.1 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(.04 inch)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePalm side of last phalanx of finger\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e2.2 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(.08 inch)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eRed part of lips\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e4.4 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(.16 inch)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eTip of nose\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e6.6 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(.24 inch)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eBack of second phalanx of finger\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e11.0 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(.44 inch)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eHeel\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e22.0 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(.88 inch)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eBack of hand\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e30.8 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(1.23 inches)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eForearm\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e39.6 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(1.58 inches)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eSternum\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e44.0 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(1.76 inches)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eBack of neck\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e52.8 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(2.11 inches)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eMiddle of back\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"rt\"\u003e66.0 mm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003e(2.64 inches)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eThe localizing power is a little more acute across the long axis of a\r\nlimb than in it; and is better when the pressure is only strong enough\r\nto just cause a distinct tactile sensation than when it is more\r\npowerful; it is also very readily and rapidly improvable by practice.\"\r\nIt seems to be naturally delicate in proportion as the skin which\r\npossesses it covers a more movable part of the body.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_25\" id=\"ill_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 170px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-062-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-062-sml.png\" width=\"170\" height=\"251\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 25.\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 25.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It might be thought that this localizing power depended directly on\r\nnerve-distribution; that each touch-nerve had connection with a special\r\nbrain-centre at one end (the excitation of which caused a sensation with\r\na characteristic local sign), and at the other end was distributed over\r\na certain skin-area, and that the larger this area the farther apart\r\nmight two points be and still give rise to only one sensation. If this\r\nwere so, however, the peripheral tactile areas (each being determined by\r\nthe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_063\" id=\"page_063\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{63}\u003c/span\u003e anatomical distribution of a nerve-fibre) must have definite\r\nunchangeable limits, which experiment shows that they do not possess.\r\nSuppose the small areas in Fig. 25 to each represent a peripheral area\r\nof nerve-distribution. If any two points in \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e were touched we should\r\naccording to the theory get but a single sensation; but if, while the\r\ncompass-points remained the same distance apart, or were even\r\napproximated, one were placed in \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e and the other on a contiguous area,\r\ntwo fibres would be stimulated and we ought to get two sensations; but\r\nsuch is not the case; on the same skin-region the points must be always\r\nthe same distance apart, no matter how they be shifted, in order to give\r\nrise to two just distinguishable sensations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is probable that the nerve-areas are much smaller than the tactile;\r\nand that several unstimulated must intervene between the excited, in\r\norder to produce sensations which shall be distinct. If we suppose\r\ntwelve unexcited nerve-areas must intervene, then, in \u003ca href=\"#ill_25\"\u003eFig. 25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e will be just on the limits of a single tactile area; and no matter\r\nhow the points are moved, so long as eleven, or fewer, unexcited areas\r\ncome between, we would get a single tactile sensation; in this way we\r\ncan explain the fact that tactile areas have no fixed boundaries in the\r\nskin, although the nerve-distribution in any part must be constant. We\r\nalso see why the back of a knife laid on the surface causes a continuous\r\nlinear sensation, although it touches many distinct nerve-areas. If we\r\ncould discriminate the excitations of each of these from that of its\r\nimmediate neighbors we should get the sensation of a series of points\r\ntouching us, one for each nerve-region excited; but in the absence of\r\nintervening unexcited nerve-areas the sensations are fused together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Temperature-sense. Its Terminal Organs.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"By this we mean our\r\nfaculty of perceiving cold and warmth; and, with the help of these\r\nsensations, of perceiving temperature differences in external objects.\r\nIts organ is the whole skin, the mucous membrane of mouth and fauces,\r\npharynx\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_064\" id=\"page_064\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{64}\u003c/span\u003e and gullet, and the entry of the nares. Direct heating or\r\ncooling of a sensory nerve may stimulate it and cause pain, but not a\r\ntrue temperature-sensation; hence we assume the presence of temperature\r\nend-organs. [These have not yet been ascertained anatomically.\r\nPhysiologically, however, the demonstration of special spots in the skin\r\nfor feeling heat and cold is one of the most interesting discoveries of\r\nrecent years. If one draw a pencil-point over the palm or cheek one will\r\nnotice certain spots of sudden coolness. These are the cold-spots; the\r\nheat-spots are less easy to single out. Goldscheider, Blix, and\r\nDonaldson have made minute exploration of determinate tracts of skin and\r\nfound the heat-and cold-spots thick-set and permanently distinct.\r\nBetween them no temperature-sensation is excited by contact with a\r\npointed cold or hot object. Mechanical and faradic irritation also\r\nexcites in these points their specific feelings respectively.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_26\" id=\"ill_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-064-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-064-sml.png\" width=\"216\" height=\"77\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 26.\u0026mdash;The figure marked C P shows the cold-spots, that marked H\r\nP the heat-spots, and the middle one the hairs on a certain patch\r\nof skin on one of Goldscheider\u0027s fingers.\r\n\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 26.\u0026mdash;The figure marked C P shows the cold-spots, that marked H\r\nP the heat-spots, and the middle one the hairs on a certain patch\r\nof skin on one of Goldscheider\u0027s fingers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe feeling of temperature is relative to the state of the skin.\u003c/b\u003e \"In a\r\ncomfortable room we feel at no part of the body either heat or cold,\r\nalthough different parts of its surface are at different temperatures;\r\nthe fingers and nose being cooler than the trunk which is covered by\r\nclothes, and this, in turn, cooler than the interior of the mouth. The\r\ntemperature which a given region of the temperature-organ has (as\r\nmeasured by a thermometer) when it feels neither heat nor cold, is its\r\n\u003ci\u003etemperature-sensation zero\u003c/i\u003e, and is not associated with any one\r\nobjective temperature; for not only, as we have just seen, does it vary\r\nin different parts of the organ, but also on the same part from time to\r\ntime. Whenever a skin-region has a temperature above its sensation-zero\r\nwe feel warmth; and \u003ci\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e: the sensation is more marked the\r\ngreater the difference, and the more suddenly it is produced; touching a\r\nmetallic body, which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_065\" id=\"page_065\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{65}\u003c/span\u003e conducts heat rapidly to or from the skin, causes\r\na more marked hot or cold sensation than touching a worse conductor, as\r\na piece of wood, of the same temperature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The change of temperature in the organ may be brought about by changes\r\nin the circulatory apparatus (more blood flowing through the skin warms\r\nit and less leads to its cooling), or by temperature-changes in gases,\r\nliquids, or solids in contact with it. Sometimes we fail to distinguish\r\nclearly whether the cause is external or internal; a person coming in\r\nfrom a windy walk often feels a room uncomfortably warm which is not\r\nreally so; the exercise has accelerated his circulation and tended to\r\nwarm his skin, but the moving outer air has rapidly conducted off the\r\nextra heat; on entering the house the stationary air there does this\r\nless quickly, the skin gets hot, and the cause is supposed to be\r\noppressive heat of the room. Hence, frequently, opening windows and\r\nsitting in a draught, with its concomitant risks; whereas keeping quiet\r\nfor five or ten minutes, until the circulation has returned to its\r\nnormal rate, would attain the same end without danger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The acuteness of the temperature-sense is greatest at temperatures\r\nwithin a few degrees of 30° C. (86° F.); at these differences of less\r\nthan 0.1° C. can be discriminated. As a means of measuring absolute\r\ntemperatures, however, the skin is very unreliable, on account of the\r\nchangeability of its sensation-zero. We can localize\r\ntemperature-sensations much as tactile, but not so accurately.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_25_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_25_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMuscular Sensation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The sensation in the muscle itself cannot well be\r\ndistinguished from that in the tendon or in its insertion. In muscular\r\nfatigue the insertions are the places most painfully felt. In muscular\r\nrheumatism, however, the whole muscle grows painful; and violent\r\ncontraction such as that caused by the faradic current, or known as\r\ncramp, produces a severe and peculiar pain felt in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_066\" id=\"page_066\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{66}\u003c/span\u003e the whole mass of\r\nmuscle affected. Sachs also thought that he had demonstrated, both\r\nexperimentally and anatomically, the existence of special sensory\r\nnerve-fibres, distinct from the motor fibres, in the frog\u0027s muscle. The\r\nlatter end in the \u0027terminal plates,\u0027 the former in a network.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGreat importance has been attached to the muscular sense as a factor in\r\nour perceptions, not only of weight and pressure, but of the\r\nspace-relations between things generally. Our eyes and our hands, in\r\ntheir explorations of space, move over it and through it. It is usually\r\nsupposed that without this sense of an intervening motion performed we\r\nshould not perceive two seen points or two touched points to be\r\nseparated by an extended interval. I am far from denying the immense\r\nparticipation of experiences of motion in the construction of our\r\nspace-perceptions. But it is still an open question \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e our muscles\r\nhelp us in these experiences, whether by their own sensations, or by\r\nawakening sensations of motion on our skin, retina, and articular\r\nsurfaces. The latter seems to me the more probable view, and the reader\r\nmay be of the same opinion after reading \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSensibility to Weight.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we wish to estimate accurately the weight\r\nof an object we always, when possible, lift it, and so combine muscular\r\nand articular with tactile sensations. By this means we can form much\r\nbetter judgments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWeber found that whereas ⅓ must be added to a weight resting on the hand\r\nfor the increase to be felt, the same hand actively \u0027hefting\u0027 the weight\r\ncould feel an addition of as little as \u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e17\u003c/sub\u003e. Merkel\u0027s recent and very\r\ncareful experiments, in which the finger pressed down the beam of a\r\nbalance counterweighted by from 25 to 8020 grams, showed that between\r\n200 and 2000 grams a constant fractional increase of about \u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e13\u003c/sub\u003e was felt\r\nwhen there was no movement of the finger, and of about \u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e19\u003c/sub\u003e when there\r\nwas movement. Above and below these limits the discriminative power grew\r\nless.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_067\" id=\"page_067\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{67}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_27\" id=\"ill_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-067-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-067-sml.png\" width=\"481\" height=\"275\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 27 (after Wundt).\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 27 (after Wundt).\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePain.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The physiology of pain is still an enigma. One might suppose\r\nseparate afferent fibres with their own end-organs to carry painful\r\nimpressions to a specific pain-centre. Or one might suppose such a\r\nspecific centre to be reached by currents of overflow from the other\r\nsensory centres when the violence of their inner excitement should have\r\nreached a certain pitch. Or again one might suppose a certain extreme\r\ndegree of inner excitement to produce the feeling of pain in all the\r\ncentres. It is certain that sensations of every order, which in moderate\r\ndegrees are rather pleasant than otherwise, become painful when their\r\nintensity grows strong. The rate at which the agreeableness and\r\ndisagreeableness vary with the intensity of a sensation is roughly\r\nrepresented by the dotted curve in \u003ca href=\"#ill_27\"\u003eFig. 27.\u003c/a\u003e The horizontal line\r\nrepresents the threshold both of sensational and of agreeable\r\nsensibility. Below the line is the disagreeble. The continuous curve is\r\nthat of Weber\u0027s law which we learned to know in \u003ca href=\"#ill_2\"\u003eFig. 2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_018\"\u003ep. 18\u003c/a\u003e. With the\r\nminimal sensation the agreeableness is \u003ci\u003enil\u003c/i\u003e, as the dotted curve shows.\r\nIt rises at first more slowly than the sensational intensity, then\r\nfaster; and reaches its maximum before the sensation is near its acme.\r\nAfter its maximum of agreeableness the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_068\" id=\"page_068\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{68}\u003c/span\u003e dotted line rapidly sinks, and\r\nsoon tumbles below the horizontal into the realm of the disagreeable or\r\npainful in which it declines. That all sensations are painful when too\r\nstrong is a piece of familiar knowledge. Light, sound, odors, the taste\r\nof sweet even, cold, heat, and all the skin-sensations, must be moderate\r\nto be enjoyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe quality of the sensation complicates the question, however, for in\r\nsome sensations, as bitter, sour, salt, and certain smells, the turning\r\npoint of the dotted curve must be drawn very near indeed to the\r\nbeginning of the scale. In the skin the painful quality soon becomes so\r\nintense as entirely to overpower the specific quality of the sort of\r\nstimulus. Heat, cold, and pressure are indistinguishable when\r\nextreme\u0026mdash;we only feel the pain. The hypothesis of separate end-organs in\r\nthe skin receives some corroboration from recent experiments, for both\r\nBlix and Goldscheider have found, along with their special heat-and cold\r\nspots, also special \u0027pain-spots\u0027 on the skin. Mixed in with these are\r\nspots which are quite feelingless. However it may stand with the\r\nterminal pain-spots, separate paths of \u003ci\u003econduction\u003c/i\u003e to the brain, for\r\npainful and for merely tactile stimulations of the skin, are made\r\nprobable by certain facts. In the condition termed \u003ci\u003eanalgesia\u003c/i\u003e, a touch\r\nis felt, but the most violent pinch, burn, or electric spark destructive\r\nof the tissue will awaken no sensation. This may occur in disease of the\r\ncord, by suggestion in hypnotism, or in certain stages of ether and\r\nchloroform intoxication. \"In rabbits a similar state of things was\r\nproduced by Schiff, by dividing the gray matter of the cord, leaving the\r\nposterior white columns intact. If, on the contrary, the latter were\r\ndivided and the gray substance left, there was increased sensitiveness\r\nto pain, and possibly touch proper was lost. Such experiments make it\r\npretty certain that when afferent impulses reach the spinal cord at any\r\nlevel and there enter its gray matter with the posterior root-fibres,\r\nthey travel on in different tracts to conscious centres; the tactile\r\nones coming soon out of the gray network and coursing on in a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_069\" id=\"page_069\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{69}\u003c/span\u003e readily\r\nconducting white fibre, while the painful ones travel on farther in the\r\ngray substance. It is still uncertain if both impulses reach the cord in\r\nthe same fibres. The gray network conducts nerve-impulses, but not\r\neasily; they tend soon to be blocked in it. A feeble (tactile) impulse\r\nreaching it by an afferent fibre might only spread a short way and then\r\npass out into a single good conducting fibre in a white column, and\r\nproceed to the brain; while a stronger (painful) impulse would radiate\r\nfarther in the gray matter, and perhaps break out of it by many fibres\r\nleading to the brain through the white columns, and so give rise to an\r\nincoördinate and ill-localized sensation. That pains are badly\r\nlocalized, and worse the more intense they are, is a well-known fact,\r\nwhich would thus receive an explanation.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_26_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePain also gives rise to ill-coördinated movements of defence. The\r\nstronger the pain the more violent the start. Doubtless in low animals\r\npain is almost the only stimulus; and we have preserved the peculiarity\r\nin so far that to-day it is the stimulus of our most energetic, though\r\nnot of our most discriminating, reactions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTaste, smell, as well as hunger, thirst, nausea, and other so-called\r\n\u0027common\u0027 sensations\u003c/b\u003e need not be touched on in this book, as almost\r\nnothing of psychological interest is known concerning them.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_070\" id=\"page_070\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{70}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_VI\" id=\"CHAPTER_VI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSENSATIONS OF MOTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003etreat\u003c/span\u003e of these in a separate chapter in order to give them the\r\nemphasis which their importance deserves. They are of two orders:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) Sensations of objects moving over our sensory surfaces; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) Sensations of our whole person\u0027s translation through space.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1) The Sensation of Motion over Surfaces.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This has generally been\r\nassumed by physiologists to be impossible until the positions of\r\n\u003ci\u003eterminus a quo\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eterminus ad quem\u003c/i\u003e are severally cognized, and the\r\nsuccessive occupancies of these positions by the moving body are\r\nperceived to be separated by a distinct interval of time. As a matter of\r\nfact, however, we cognize only the very slowest motions in this way.\r\nSeeing the hand of a clock at XII and afterwards at VI, I judge that it\r\nhas moved through the interval. Seeing the sun now in the east and again\r\nin the west, I infer it to have passed over my head. But we can only\r\n\u003ci\u003einfer\u003c/i\u003e that which we already generically know in some more direct\r\nfashion, and it is experimentally certain that we have the feeling of\r\nmotion given us as a direct and simple \u003ci\u003esensation\u003c/i\u003e. Czermak long ago\r\npointed out the difference between \u003ci\u003eseeing the motion\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nsecond-hand of a watch, when we look directly at it, and noticing the\r\nfact that it has \u003ci\u003ealtered its position\u003c/i\u003e, whilst our gaze is fixed upon\r\nsome other point of the dial-plate. In the first case we have a specific\r\nquality of sensation which is absent in the second. If the reader will\r\nfind a portion of his skin\u0026mdash;the arm, for example\u0026mdash;where a pair of\r\ncompass-points an inch\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_071\" id=\"page_071\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{71}\u003c/span\u003e apart are felt as one impression, and if he will\r\nthen trace lines a tenth of an inch long on that spot with a\r\npencil-point, he will be distinctly aware of the point\u0027s motion and\r\nvaguely aware of the direction of the motion. The perception of the\r\nmotion here is certainly not derived from a preëxisting knowledge that\r\nits starting and ending points are separate positions in space, because\r\npositions in space ten times wider apart fail to be discriminated as\r\nsuch when excited by the compass-points. It is the same with the retina.\r\nOne\u0027s fingers when cast upon its peripheral portions cannot be\r\ncounted\u0026mdash;that is to say, the five retinal tracts which they occupy are\r\nnot distinctly apprehended by the mind as five separate positions in\r\nspace\u0026mdash;and yet the slightest \u003ci\u003emovement\u003c/i\u003e of the fingers is most vividly\r\nperceived as movement and nothing else. It is thus certain that our\r\nsense of movement, being so much more delicate than our sense of\r\nposition, cannot possibly be derived from it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVierordt, at almost the same time, called attention to certain\r\npersistent illusions, amongst which are these\u003c/i\u003e: If another person gently\r\ntrace a line across our wrist or finger, the latter being stationary, it\r\nwill feel to us as if the member were moving in the opposite direction\r\nto the tracing point. If, on the contrary, we move our limb across a\r\nfixed point, it will seem as if the point were moving as well. If the\r\nreader will touch his forehead with his forefinger kept motionless, and\r\nthen rotate the head so that the skin of the forehead passes beneath the\r\nfinger\u0027s tip, he will have an irresistible sensation of the latter being\r\nitself in motion in the opposite direction to the head. So in abducting\r\nthe fingers from each other; some may move and the rest be still, but\r\nthe still ones will feel as if they were actively separating from the\r\nrest. These illusions, according to Vierordt, are survivals of a\r\nprimitive form of perception, when motion was felt as such, but ascribed\r\nto the whole \u0027content\u0027 of consciousness, and not yet distinguished as\r\nbelonging exclusively to one of its parts. When\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_072\" id=\"page_072\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{72}\u003c/span\u003e our perception is fully\r\ndeveloped we go beyond the mere relative motion of thing and ground, and\r\ncan ascribe absolute motion to one of these components of our total\r\nobject, and absolute rest to another. When, in vision for example, the\r\nwhole field of view seems to move together, we think it is ourselves or\r\nour eyes which are moving; and any object in the foreground which may\r\nseem to move relatively to the background is judged by us to be really\r\nstill. But primitively this discrimination is not perfectly made. The\r\nsensation of the motion spreads over all that we see and infects it. Any\r\nrelative motion of object and retina both makes the object seem to move,\r\nand makes us feel ourselves in motion. Even now when our whole field of\r\nview really does move we get giddy, and feel as if we too were moving;\r\nand we still see an apparent motion of the entire field of view whenever\r\nwe suddenly jerk our head and eyes or shake them quickly to and fro.\r\nPushing our eyeballs gives the same illusion. We \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e in all these\r\ncases what really happens, but the conditions are unusual, so our\r\nprimitive sensation persists unchecked. So it does when clouds float by\r\nthe moon. We \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e the moon is still; but we \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e it move faster than\r\nthe clouds. Even when we slowly move our eyes the primitive sensation\r\npersists under the victorious conception. If we notice closely the\r\nexperience, we find that any object towards which we look appears moving\r\nto meet our eye.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the most valuable contribution to the subject is the paper of G. H.\r\nSchneider,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_27_27\" id=\"FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_27_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e who takes up the matter zoölogically, and shows by\r\nexamples from every branch of the animal kingdom that movement is the\r\nquality by which animals most easily attract each other\u0027s attention. The\r\ninstinct of \u0027shamming death\u0027 is no shamming of death at all, but rather\r\na paralysis through fear, which saves the insect, crustacean, or other\r\ncreature from being \u003ci\u003enoticed at all\u003c/i\u003e by his enemy. It is paralleled in\r\nthe human race by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_073\" id=\"page_073\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{73}\u003c/span\u003e the breath-holding stillness of the boy playing \u0027I\r\nspy,\u0027 to whom the seeker is near; and its obverse side is shown in our\r\ninvoluntary waving of arms, jumping up and down, and so forth, when we\r\nwish to attract someone\u0027s attention at a distance. Creatures \u0027stalking\u0027\r\ntheir prey and creatures hiding from their pursuers alike show how\r\nimmobility diminishes conspicuity. In the woods, if we are quiet, the\r\nsquirrels and birds will actually touch us. Flies will light on stuffed\r\nbirds and stationary frogs. On the other hand, the tremendous shock of\r\nfeeling the thing we are sitting on begin to move, the exaggerated start\r\nit gives us to have an insect unexpectedly pass over our skin, or a cat\r\nnoiselessly come and snuffle about our hand, the excessive reflex\r\neffects of tickling, etc., show how exciting the sensation of motion is\r\n\u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e. A kitten cannot help pursuing a moving ball. Impressions too\r\nfaint to be cognized at all are immediately felt if they move. A fly\r\nsitting is unnoticed,\u0026mdash;we feel it the moment it crawls. A shadow may be\r\ntoo faint to be perceived. If we hold a finger between our closed eyelid\r\nand the sunshine we do not notice its presence. The moment we move it to\r\nand fro, however, we discern it. Such visual perception as this\r\nreproduces the conditions of sight among the radiates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn ourselves, the main function of the peripheral parts of the retina is\r\nthat of sentinels, which, when beams of light move over them, cry \u0027Who\r\ngoes there?\u0027 and call the fovea to the spot. Most parts of the skin do\r\nbut perform the same office for the finger-tips. Of course \u003ci\u003emovement of\r\nsurface under object is (for purposes of stimulation) equivalent to\r\nmovement of object over surface\u003c/i\u003e. In exploring the shapes and sizes of\r\nthings by either eye or skin the movements of these organs are incessant\r\nand unrestrainable. Every such movement draws the points and lines of\r\nthe object across the surface, imprints them a hundred times more\r\nsharply, and drives them home to the attention. The immense part thus\r\nplayed by movements in our perceptive activity is held by many\r\npsychologists to prove that the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_074\" id=\"page_074\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{74}\u003c/span\u003e muscles are themselves the\r\nspace-perceiving organ. Not surface-sensibility, but \u0027the muscular\r\nsense,\u0027 is for these writers the original and only revealer of objective\r\nextension. But they have all failed to notice with what peculiar\r\nintensity muscular movements call surface-sensibilities into play, and\r\nhow largely the mere discernment of impressions depends on the mobility\r\nof the surfaces upon which they fall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur \u003ci\u003earticular surfaces are tactile organs\u003c/i\u003e which become intensely\r\npainful when inflamed. Besides pressure, \u003ci\u003ethe only stimulus they receive\r\nis their motion upon each other\u003c/i\u003e. To the sensation of this motion more\r\nthan anything else seems due the perception of the position which our\r\nlimbs may have assumed. Patients cutaneously and muscularly anæsthetic\r\nin one leg can often prove that their articular sensibility remains, by\r\nshowing (by movements of their well leg) the positions in which the\r\nsurgeon may place their insensible one. Goldscheider in Berlin caused\r\nfingers, arms, and legs to be passively rotated upon their various\r\njoints in a mechanical apparatus which registered both the velocity of\r\nmovement impressed and the amount of angular rotation. The minimal felt\r\namounts of rotation were much less than a single angular degree in all\r\nthe joints except those of the fingers. Such displacements as these,\r\nGoldscheider says, can hardly be detected by the eye. Anæsthesia of the\r\nskin produced by induction-currents had no disturbing effect on the\r\nperception, nor did the various degrees of pressure of the moving force\r\nupon the skin affect it. It became, in fact, all the more distinct in\r\nproportion as the concomitant pressure-feelings were eliminated by\r\nartificial anæsthesia. When the joints themselves, however, were made\r\nartificially anæsthetic, the perception of the movement grew obtuse and\r\nthe angular rotations had to be much increased before they were\r\nperceptible. All these facts prove, according to Herr Goldscheider, that\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe joint-surfaces and these alone are the seat of the impressions\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_075\" id=\"page_075\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{75}\u003c/span\u003e by\r\nwhich the movements of our members are immediately perceived\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2) Sensations of Movement through Space.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These may be divided, into\r\nfeelings of rotation and feelings of translation. As was stated at the\r\nend of the chapter on the ear, the labyrinth (semicircular canals,\r\nutricle and saccule) seems to have nothing to do with hearing. It is\r\nconclusively established to-day that the semicircular canals are the\r\norgans of a sixth special sense, that namely of rotation. When\r\nsubjectively excited, this sensation is known as \u003ci\u003edizziness\u003c/i\u003e or\r\n\u003ci\u003evertigo\u003c/i\u003e, and rapidly engenders the farther feeling of nausea.\r\nIrritative disease of the inner ear causes intense vertigo (Ménière\u0027s\r\ndisease). Traumatic irritation of the canals in birds and mammals makes\r\nthe animals tumble and throw themselves about in a way best explained by\r\nsupposing them to suffer from false sensations of falling, etc., which\r\nthey compensate by reflex muscular acts that throw them the other way.\r\nGalvanic irritation of the membranous canals in pigeons cause just the\r\nsame compensatory movements of head and eye which actual rotations\r\nimpressed on the creatures produce. Deaf and dumb persons (amongst whom\r\nmany must have had their auditory nerves or labyrinths destroyed by the\r\nsame disease which took away their hearing) are in a very large\r\npercentage of cases found quite insusceptible of being made dizzy by\r\nrotation. Purkinje and Mach have shown that, whatever the organ of the\r\nsense of rotation may be, it must have its seat in the head. The body is\r\nexcluded by Mach\u0027s elaborate experiments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe semicircular canals, being, as it were, six little spirit-levels in\r\nthree rectangular planes, seem admirably adapted to be organs of a sense\r\nof rotation. We need only suppose that when the head turns in the plane\r\nof any one of them, the relative inertia of the endolymph momentarily\r\nincreases its pressure on the nerve-termini in the appropriate ampulla,\r\nwhich pressure starts a current towards the central organ for feeling\r\nvertigo. This organ seems to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_076\" id=\"page_076\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{76}\u003c/span\u003e the cerebellum, and the teleology of\r\nthe whole business would appear to be the maintenance of the upright\r\nposition. If a man stand with shut eyes and attend to his body, he will\r\nfind that he is hardly for a moment in equilibrium. Incipient fallings\r\ntowards every side in succession are incessantly repaired by muscular\r\ncontractions which restore the balance; and although impressions on the\r\ntendons, ligaments, foot-soles, joints, etc., doubtless are among the\r\ncauses of the compensatory contractions, yet the strongest and most\r\nspecial reflex arc would seem to be that which has the sensation of\r\nincipient vertigo for its afferent member. This is experimentally proved\r\nto be much more easily excited than the other sensations referred to.\r\nWhen the cerebellum is disorganized the reflex response fails to occur\r\nproperly and loss of equilibrium is the result. Irritation of the\r\ncerebellum produces vertigo, loss of balance, and nausea; and galvanic\r\ncurrents through the head produce various forms of vertigo correlated\r\nwith their direction. It seems probable that direct excitement of the\r\ncerebellar centre is responsible for these feelings. In addition to\r\nthese corporeal reflexes the sense of rotation causes compensatory\r\nrollings of the eyeballs in the opposite direction, to which some of the\r\nsubjective phenomena of \u003ci\u003eoptical vertigo\u003c/i\u003e are due. Steady rotation gives\r\nno sensation; it is only starting or stopping, or, more generally\r\nspeaking, acceleration (positive or negative), which impresses the\r\nend-organs in the ampullæ. The sensation always has a little duration,\r\nhowever; and the feeling of reversed movement after whirling violently\r\nmay last for nearly a minute, slowly fading out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe cause of the \u003ci\u003esense of translation\u003c/i\u003e (movement forwards or backwards)\r\nis more open to dispute. The seat of this sensation has been assigned to\r\nthe semicircular canals when compounding their currents to the brain;\r\nand also to the utricle. The latest experimenter, M. Delage, considers\r\nthat it cannot possibly be in the head, and assigns it rather to the\r\nentire body, so far as its parts (blood-vessels,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_077\" id=\"page_077\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{77}\u003c/span\u003e viscera, etc.) are\r\nmovable against each other and suffer friction or pressure from their\r\nrelative inertia when a movement of translation begins. M. Delage\u0027s\r\nexclusion of the labyrinth from this form of sensibility cannot,\r\nhowever, yet be considered definitively established, so the matter may\r\nrest with this mention.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_078\" id=\"page_078\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{78}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_VII\" id=\"CHAPTER_VII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_28_28\" id=\"FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_28_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_28\" id=\"ill_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca name=\"ill_29\" id=\"ill_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-078-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-078-sml.png\" width=\"445\" height=\"207\" alt=\"Image unavailable: Fig. 28. Fig. 29. Fig. 30.\r\n\r\n(All after Huguenin.)\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig.\u003c/span\u003e 28.\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 10em;\"\u003eFig. 29.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 10em;\"\u003eFig. 30.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n(All after Huguenin.)\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmbryological Sketch.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The brain is a sort of \u003ci\u003epons asinorum\u003c/i\u003e in anatomy\r\nuntil one gets a certain general conception of it as a clue. Then it\r\nbecomes a comparatively simple affair. The clue is given by comparative\r\nanatomy and especially by embryology. At a certain moment in the\r\ndevelopment of all the higher vertebrates the cerebro-spinal axis is\r\nformed by a hollow tube containing fluid and terminated in front by an\r\nenlargement separated by transverse constrictions into three \u0027cerebral\r\nvesicles,\u0027 so called (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_28\"\u003eFig. 28\u003c/a\u003e). The walls of these vesicles thicken\r\nin most\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_079\" id=\"page_079\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{79}\u003c/span\u003e places, change in others into a thin vascular tissue, and in\r\nothers again send out processes which produce an appearance of farther\r\nsubdivision. The middle vesicle or mid-brain (\u003ci\u003eMb\u003c/i\u003e in the figures) is\r\nthe least affected by change. Its upper walls thicken into the optic\r\nlobes, or \u003ci\u003ecorpora quadrigemina\u003c/i\u003e as they are named in man; its lower\r\nwalls become the so-called peduncles or \u003ci\u003ecrura\u003c/i\u003e of the brain; and its\r\ncavity dwindles into the aqueduct of Silvius. A section through the\r\nadult human mid-brain is shown in \u003ca href=\"#ill_31\"\u003eFig. 31.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_31\" id=\"ill_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 169px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-079a-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-079a-sml.png\" width=\"169\" height=\"143\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 31.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;The \u0027nates\u0027 are the anterior corpora quadrigemina, the\r\nspot above \u003ci\u003eaq\u003c/i\u003e is a section of the sylvian aqueduct, and the\r\ntegmentum and two \u0027feet\u0027 together make the Crura. These are marked\r\n\u003ci\u003eC.C.\u003c/i\u003e, and a cross (+) marks the aqueduct, in \u003ca href=\"#ill_32\"\u003eFig. 32.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_32\" id=\"ill_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 182px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-079b-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-079b-sml.png\" width=\"182\" height=\"375\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 32\u003c/span\u003e (after Huxley).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe anterior and posterior vesicles undergo much more considerable\r\nchange. The walls of the posterior vesicle thicken enormously in their\r\nforemost portion and form the \u003ci\u003ecerebellum\u003c/i\u003e on top (\u003ci\u003eCb\u003c/i\u003e in all the\r\nfigures) and the \u003ci\u003epons Varolii\u003c/i\u003e below (\u003ci\u003eP.V.\u003c/i\u003e in \u003ca href=\"#ill_33\"\u003eFig. 33\u003c/a\u003e). In its\r\nhindmost portions the posterior vesicle thickens below into the medulla\r\noblongata (\u003ci\u003eMo\u003c/i\u003e in all the figures), whilst on top its walls thin out\r\nand melt, so that one can pass a probe into the cavity without breaking\r\nthrough any truly nervous tissue. The cavity which one thus enters from\r\nwithout is named the fourth ventricle (4 in Figs. \u003ca href=\"#ill_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#ill_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e). One can\r\nrun the probe forward\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_080\" id=\"page_080\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{80}\u003c/span\u003e through it, passing first under the cerebellum\r\nand then under a thin sheet of nervous tissue (the \u003ci\u003evalve of Vieussens\u003c/i\u003e)\r\njust anterior thereto, as far as the \u003ci\u003eaqueduct of Silvius\u003c/i\u003e. Passing\r\nthrough this, the probe emerges forward into what was once the cavity of\r\nthe anterior vesicle. But the covering has melted away at this place,\r\nand the cavity now forms a deep compressed pit or groove between the two\r\nwalls of the vesicle, and is called the \u003ci\u003ethird ventricle\u003c/i\u003e (3 in Figs. \u003ca href=\"#ill_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand \u003ca href=\"#ill_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e). The \u0027aqueduct of Sylvius\u0027 is in consequence of this connection\r\noften called the \u003ci\u003eiter a tertio ad quartum ventriculum\u003c/i\u003e. The walls of\r\nthe vesicle form the \u003ci\u003eoptic thalami\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eTh\u003c/i\u003e in all the figures).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_33\" id=\"ill_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 387px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-080-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-080-sml.png\" width=\"387\" height=\"162\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 33\u003c/span\u003e (after Huxley).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the anterior vesicle just in front of the thalami there buds out on\r\neither side an enlargement, into which the cavity of the vesicle\r\ncontinues, and which becomes the \u003ci\u003ehemisphere\u003c/i\u003e of that side. In man its\r\nwalls thicken enormously and form folds, the so-called \u003ci\u003econvolutions\u003c/i\u003e,\r\non their surface. At the same time they grow backwards rather than\r\nforwards of their starting-point just in front of the thalamus, arching\r\nover the latter; and growing fastest along their top circumference, they\r\nend by bending downwards and forwards again when they have passed the\r\nrear end of the thalamus. When fully developed in man, they overlay and\r\ncover in all the other parts of the brain. Their cavities form the\r\n\u003ci\u003elateral ventricles\u003c/i\u003e, easier to understand by a dissection than by a\r\ndescription. A probe can be passed into either of them from the third\r\nventricle at its anterior\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_081\" id=\"page_081\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{81}\u003c/span\u003e end; and like the third ventricle, their wall\r\nis melted down along a certain line, forming a long cleft through which\r\nthey can be entered without rupturing the nervous tissue. This cleft, on\r\naccount of the growth of the hemisphere outwards, backwards, and then\r\ndownwards from its starting point, has got rolled in and tucked away\r\nbeneath the apparent surface.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_29_29\" id=\"FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_29_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt first the two hemispheres are connected only with their respective\r\nthalami. But during the fourth and fifth months of embryonic life they\r\nbecome connected with each other above the thalami through the growth\r\nbetween them of a massive system of transverse fibres which crosses the\r\nmedian line like a great bridge and is called the \u003ci\u003ecorpus callosum\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThese fibres radiate in the walls of both hemispheres and form a direct\r\nconnection between the convolutions of the right and of the left side.\r\nBeneath the corpus callosum another system of fibres called the \u003ci\u003efornix\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis formed, between which and the corpus callosum there is a peculiar\r\nconnection. Just in front of the thalami, where the hemispheres begin\r\ntheir growth, a ganglionic mass called the \u003ci\u003ecorpus striatum\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eC.S.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nFigs. \u003ca href=\"#ill_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#ill_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e) is formed in their wall. It is complex in structure,\r\nconsisting of two main parts, called \u003ci\u003enucleus lenticularis\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003enucleus\r\ncandatus\u003c/i\u003e respectively. The figures, with their respective explanations,\r\nwill give a better idea of the farther details of structure than any\r\nverbal description; so, after some practical directions for dissecting\r\nthe organ, I will pass to a brief account of the physiological relations\r\nof its different parts to each other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDissection of Sheep\u0027s Brain.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The way really to understand the\r\nbrain is to dissect it. The brains of mammals differ only in their\r\nproportions, and from the sheep\u0027s one can learn all that is\r\nessential in man\u0027s. The student is therefore strongly urged to\r\ndissect a sheep\u0027s brain. Full directions of the order of procedure\r\nare given in the human dissecting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_082\" id=\"page_082\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{82}\u003c/span\u003e books, e.g. Holden\u0027s Practical\r\nAnatomy (Churchill), Morrell\u0027s Student\u0027s Manual of Comparative\r\nAnatomy and Guide to Dissection (Longmans), and Foster and\r\nLangley\u0027s Practical Physiology (Macmillan). For the use of classes\r\nwho cannot procure these books I subjoin a few practical notes. The\r\ninstruments needed are a small saw, a chisel with a shoulder, and a\r\nhammer with a hook on its handle, all three of which form part of\r\nthe regular medical autopsy-kit and can be had of\r\nsurgical-instrument-makers. In addition a scalpel, a pair of\r\nscissors, a pair of dissecting-forceps, and a silver probe are\r\nrequired. The solitary student can find home-made substitutes for\r\nall these things but the forceps, which he ought to buy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first thing is to get off the skull-cap. Make two saw-cuts,\r\nthrough the prominent portion of each condyle (or articular surface\r\nbounding the hole at the back of the skull, where the spinal cord\r\nenters) and passing forwards to the temples of the animal. Then\r\nmake two cuts, one on each side, which cross these and meet in an\r\nangle on the frontal bone. By actual trial, one will find the best\r\ndirection for the saw-cuts. It is hard to saw entirely through the\r\nskull-bone without in some places also sawing into the brain. Here\r\nis where the chisel comes in\u0026mdash;one can break by a smart blow on it\r\nwith the hammer any parts of the skull not quite sawn through. When\r\nthe skull-cap is ready to come off one will feel it \u0027wobble.\u0027\r\nInsert then the hook under its forward end and pull firmly. The\r\nbony skull-cap alone will come away, leaving the periosteum of the\r\ninner surface adhering to that of the base of the skull, enveloping\r\nthe brain, and forming the so-called \u003ci\u003edura mater\u003c/i\u003e or outer one of\r\nits \u0027meninges.\u0027 This dura mater should be slit open round the\r\nmargins, when the brain will be exposed wrapped in its nearest\r\nmembrane, the \u003ci\u003epia mater\u003c/i\u003e, full of blood-vessels whose branches\r\npenetrate the tissues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe brain in its pia mater should now be carefully \u0027shelled out.\u0027\r\nUsually it is best to begin at the forward end, turning it up there\r\nand gradually working backwards. The \u003ci\u003eolfactory lobes\u003c/i\u003e are liable\r\nto be torn; they must be carefully scooped from the pits in the\r\nbase of the skull to which they adhere by the branches which they\r\nsend through the bone into the nose-cavity. It is well to have a\r\nlittle blunt curved instrument expressly for this purpose. Next the\r\n\u003ci\u003eoptic nerves\u003c/i\u003e tie the brain down, and must be cut through\u0026mdash;close\r\nto the chiasma is easiest. After that comes the \u003ci\u003epituitary body\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhich has to be left behind. It is attached by a neck, the\r\nso-called \u003ci\u003einfundibulum\u003c/i\u003e, into the upper part of which the cavity\r\nof the third ventricle is prolonged downwards for a short distance.\r\nIt has no known function and is probably a \u0027rudimentary organ.\u0027\r\nOther nerves, into the detail of which I shall not go, must be cut\r\nsuccessively. Their places in the human brain are shown in \u003ca href=\"#ill_34\"\u003eFig. 34.\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWhen they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_083\" id=\"page_083\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{83}\u003c/span\u003e are divided, and the portion of dura mater (tentorium)\r\nwhich projects between the hemispheres and the cerebellum is cut\r\nthrough at its edges, the brain comes readily out.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_34\" id=\"ill_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 412px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-083-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-083-sml.png\" width=\"412\" height=\"475\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 34.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;The human brain from below, with its nerves numbered,\r\nafter Henle I, olfactory; II, optic; III, oculo-motorius; IV,\r\ntrochlearis; V, trifacial; VI, abducens oculi; VII, facial; VIII,\r\nauditory; IX, glosso-pharyngeal; X, pneumogastric; XI, spinal\r\naccessory; XII, hypoglossal; \u003ci\u003enc\u003c/i\u003eI, first cervical, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is best examined fresh. If numbers of brains have to be prepared\r\nand kept, I have found it a good plan to put them first in a\r\nsolution of chloride of zinc, just dense enough at first to float\r\nthem, and to leave them for a fortnight or less. This softens the\r\npia mater, which can then be removed in large shreds, after which\r\nit is enough to place them in quite weak alcohol to preserve them\r\nindefinitely, tough, elastic, and in their natural shape, though\r\nbleached to a uniform white color. Before immersion in the chloride\r\nall the more superficial adhesions of the parts must be broken\r\nthrough, to bring\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_084\" id=\"page_084\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{84}\u003c/span\u003e the fluid into contact with a maximum of\r\nsurface. If the brain is used fresh, the pia mater had better be\r\nremoved carefully in most places with the forceps, scalpel, and\r\nscissors. Over the grooves between the cerebellum and hemispheres,\r\nand between the cerebellum and medulla oblongata, thin cobwebby\r\nmoist transparent vestiges of the \u003ci\u003earachnoid\u003c/i\u003e membrane will be\r\nfound.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subdivisions may now be examined in due order. For the\r\nconvolutions, blood-vessels, and nerves the more special books must\r\nbe consulted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, looked at from above, with the deep \u003ci\u003elongitudinal fissure\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbetween them, the hemispheres are seen partly overlapping the\r\nintricately wrinkled \u003ci\u003ecerebellum\u003c/i\u003e, which juts out behind, and\r\ncovers in turn almost all the medulla oblongata. Drawing the\r\nhemispheres apart, the brilliant white \u003ci\u003ecorpus callosum\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nrevealed, some half an inch below their surface. There is no median\r\npartition in the cerebellum, but a median elevation instead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLooking at the brain from below, one still sees the longitudinal\r\nfissure in the median line in front, and on either side of it the\r\n\u003ci\u003eolfactory lobes\u003c/i\u003e, much larger than in man; the \u003ci\u003eoptic tracts\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003ecommissure\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003e\u0027chiasma\u0027\u003c/i\u003e; the \u003ci\u003einfundibulum\u003c/i\u003e cut through just\r\nbehind them; and behind that the single \u003ci\u003ecorpus albicans\u003c/i\u003e or\r\n\u003ci\u003emamillare\u003c/i\u003e, whose function is unknown and which is double in man.\r\nNext the \u003ci\u003ecrura\u003c/i\u003e appear, converging upon the pons as if carrying\r\nfibres back from either side. The \u003ci\u003epons\u003c/i\u003e itself succeeds, much less\r\nprominent than in man; and finally behind it comes the medulla\r\noblongata, broad and flat and relatively large. The pons looks like\r\na sort of collar uniting the two halves of the cerebellum, and\r\nsurrounding the medulla, whose fibres by the time they have emerged\r\nanteriorly from beneath the collar have divided into the two crura.\r\nThe inner relations are, however, somewhat less simple than what\r\nthis description may suggest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow turn forward the cerebellum; pull out the vascular \u003ci\u003echoroid\r\nplexuses\u003c/i\u003e of the pia, which fill the fourth ventricle; and bring\r\nthe upper surface of the \u003ci\u003emedulla oblongata\u003c/i\u003e into view. The \u003ci\u003efourth\r\nventricle\u003c/i\u003e is a triangular depression terminating in a posterior\r\npoint called the \u003ci\u003ecalamus scriptorius\u003c/i\u003e. (Here a very fine probe may\r\npass into the central canal of the spinal cord.) The lateral\r\nboundary of the ventricle on either side is formed by the\r\n\u003ci\u003erestiform body\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ecolumn\u003c/i\u003e, which runs into the cerebellum,\r\nforming its \u003ci\u003einferior\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eposterior peduncle\u003c/i\u003e on that side.\r\nIncluding the calamus scriptorius by their divergence, the\r\nposterior columns of the spinal cord continue into the medulla as\r\nthe \u003ci\u003efasciculi graciles\u003c/i\u003e. These are at first separated from the\r\nbroad restiform bodies by a slight groove. But this disappears\r\nanteriorly, and the \u0027slender\u0027 and \u0027ropelike\u0027 strands soon become\r\noutwardly indistinguishable.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_085\" id=\"page_085\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{85}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTurn next to the ventral surface of the medulla, and note the\r\n\u003ci\u003eanterior pyramids\u003c/i\u003e, two roundish cords, one on either side of the\r\nslight \u003ci\u003emedian groove\u003c/i\u003e. The pyramids are crossed and closed over\r\nanteriorly by the \u003ci\u003epons Varolii\u003c/i\u003e, a broad transverse band which\r\nsurrounds them like a collar, and runs up into the cerebellum on\r\neither side, forming its \u003ci\u003emiddle peduncles\u003c/i\u003e. The pons has a slight\r\nmedian depression and its posterior edge is formed by the\r\n\u003ci\u003etrapezium\u003c/i\u003e on either side. The trapezium consists of fibres which,\r\ninstead of surrounding the pyramid, seem to start from alongside of\r\nit. It is not visible in man. The \u003ci\u003eolivary bodies\u003c/i\u003e are small\r\neminences on the medulla lying just laterally of the pyramids and\r\nbelow the trapezium.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_35\" id=\"ill_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 271px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-085-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-085-sml.png\" width=\"271\" height=\"442\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 35.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Fourth ventricle, etc. (Henle). \u003ci\u003eIII\u003c/i\u003e, third ventricle;\r\n\u003ci\u003eIV\u003c/i\u003e, fourth ventricle; \u003ci\u003eP\u003c/i\u003e, anterior, middle, and posterior\r\npeduncles of cerebellum cut through; \u003ci\u003eCr\u003c/i\u003e, restiform body; \u003ci\u003eFg\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nfuniculus gracilis; \u003ci\u003eCq\u003c/i\u003e, corpora quadrigemina.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNow cut through the peduncles of the cerebellum, close to their\r\nentrance into that organ. They give one surface of section on each\r\nside, though they receive contributions from three directions. The\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_086\" id=\"page_086\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{86}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nposterior and middle portions we have seen: the \u003ci\u003eanterior\r\npeduncles\u003c/i\u003e pass forward to the \u003ci\u003ecorpora quadrigemina\u003c/i\u003e. The thin\r\nwhite layer of nerve-tissue between them and continuous with them\r\nis called the \u003ci\u003evalve of Vieussens\u003c/i\u003e. It covers part of the canal\r\nfrom the fourth ventricle to the third. The cerebellum being\r\nremoved, examine it, and cut sections to show the peculiar\r\ndistribution of white and gray matter, forming an appearance called\r\nthe \u003ci\u003earbor vitæ\u003c/i\u003e in the books.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow bend up the posterior edge of the hemispheres, exposing the\r\ncorpora quadrigemina (of which the anterior pair are dubbed the\r\n\u003ci\u003enates\u003c/i\u003e and the posterior the \u003ci\u003etestes\u003c/i\u003e), and noticing the \u003ci\u003epineal\r\ngland\u003c/i\u003e, a small median organ situated just in front of them and\r\nprobably, like the pituitary body, a vestige of something useful in\r\npremammalian times. The rounded posterior edge of the corpus\r\ncallosum is visible now passing from one hemisphere to the other.\r\nTurn it still farther up, letting the medulla, etc., hang down as\r\nmuch as possible and trace the under surface from this edge\r\nforward. It is broad behind but narrows forward, becoming\r\ncontinuous with the \u003ci\u003efornix\u003c/i\u003e. The anterior stem, so to speak, of\r\nthis organ plunges down just in front of the \u003ci\u003eoptic thalami\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\nnow appear with the fornix arching over them, and the median \u003ci\u003ethird\r\nventricle\u003c/i\u003e between them. The margins of the fornix, as they pass\r\nbackwards, diverge laterally farther than the margins of the corpus\r\ncallosum, and under the name of \u003ci\u003ecorpora fimbriata\u003c/i\u003e are carried\r\ninto the lateral ventricles, as will be seen again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt takes a good topographical mind to understand these ventricles\r\nclearly, even when they are followed with eye and hand. A verbal\r\ndescription is absolutely useless. The essential thing to remember\r\nis that they are offshoots from the original cavity (now the third\r\nventricle) of the anterior vesicle, and that a great split has\r\noccurred in the walls of the hemispheres so that they (the lateral\r\nventricles) now communicate with the exterior along a cleft which\r\nappears sickle shaped, as it were, and folded in.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe student will probably examine the relations of the parts in\r\nvarious ways. But he will do well to begin in any case by cutting\r\nhorizontal slices off the hemispheres almost down to the level of\r\nthe corpus callosum, and examining the distribution of gray and\r\nwhite matter on the surfaces of section, any one of which is the\r\nso-called \u003ci\u003ecentrum ovale\u003c/i\u003e. Then let him cut down in a fore-and-aft\r\ndirection along the edge of the corpus callosum, till he comes\r\n\u0027through\u0027 and draw the hemispherical margin of the cut outwards\u0026mdash;he\r\nwill see a space which is the ventricle, and which farther cutting\r\nalong the side and removing of its hemisphere-roof will lay more\r\nbare. The most conspicuous object on its floor is the \u003ci\u003enucleus\r\ncaudatus\u003c/i\u003e of the \u003ci\u003ecorpus striatum\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_087\" id=\"page_087\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{87}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_36\" id=\"ill_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 345px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-087-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-087-sml.png\" width=\"345\" height=\"568\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 36.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Horizontal section of human brain just above the\r\nthalami.\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eCcl\u003c/i\u003e, corpus callosum in section; \u003ci\u003eCs\u003c/i\u003e, corpus striatum;\r\n\u003ci\u003eSl\u003c/i\u003e, septum lucidum; \u003ci\u003eCf\u003c/i\u003e, columns of the fornix; \u003ci\u003eTho\u003c/i\u003e, optic\r\nthalami; \u003ci\u003eCn\u003c/i\u003e, pineal gland. (After Henle.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCut the corpus callosum transversely through near its posterior\r\nedge and bend the anterior portion of it forwards and sideways. The\r\nrear edge (\u003ci\u003esplenium\u003c/i\u003e) left \u003ci\u003ein situ\u003c/i\u003e bends round and downwards and\r\nbecomes continuous with the \u003ci\u003efornix\u003c/i\u003e. The anterior part is also\r\ncontinuous with the fornix, but more along the median line, where a\r\nthinnish membrane, the \u003ci\u003eseptum lucidum\u003c/i\u003e, triangular in shape,\r\nreaching from the one body to the other, practically forms a sort\r\nof partition between the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_088\" id=\"page_088\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{88}\u003c/span\u003e contiguous portion of the lateral\r\nventricles on the two sides. Break through the \u003ci\u003eseptum\u003c/i\u003e if need be\r\nand expose the upper surface of the fornix, broad behind and narrow\r\nin front where its \u003ci\u003eanterior pillars\u003c/i\u003e plunge down in front of the\r\nthird ventricle (from a thickening in whose anterior walls they\r\nwere originally formed), and finally penetrate the corpus albicans.\r\nCut these pillars through and fold them back, exposing the thalamic\r\nportion of the brain, and noting the under surface of the fornix.\r\nIts diverging \u003ci\u003eposterior pillars\u003c/i\u003e run backwards, downwards, and\r\nthen forwards again, forming with their sharp edges the \u003ci\u003ecorpora\r\nfimbriata\u003c/i\u003e, which bound the cleft by which the ventricle lies open.\r\nThe semi-cylindrical welts behind the \u003ci\u003ecorpora fimbriata\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nparallel thereto in the wall of the ventricle are the \u003ci\u003ehippocampi\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nImagine the fornix and corpus callosum shortened in the\r\nfore-and-aft direction to a transverse cord; imagine the\r\nhemispheres not having grown backwards and downwards round the\r\nthalamus; and the corpus fimbriatum on either side would then be\r\nthe upper or anterior margin of a split in the wall of the\r\nhemispheric ventricle of which the lower and posterior margin would\r\nbe the posterior border of the corpus striatum where it grows out\r\nof the thalamus.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe little notches just behind the anterior pillar of the fornix\r\nand between them and the thalami are the so-called \u003ci\u003eforamina of\r\nMonro\u003c/i\u003e through which the plexus of vessels, etc., passes from the\r\nmedian to the lateral ventricles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSee the thick \u003ci\u003emiddle commissure\u003c/i\u003e joining the two thalami, just as\r\nthe corpus callosum and fornix join the hemispheres. These are all\r\nembryological aftergrowths. Seek also the \u003ci\u003eanterior commissure\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncrossing just in front of the anterior pillars of the fornix, as\r\nwell as the \u003ci\u003eposterior commissure\u003c/i\u003e with its lateral prolongations\r\nalong the thalami, just below the pineal gland.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn a median section, note the thinnish \u003ci\u003eanterior wall\u003c/i\u003e of the third\r\nventricle and its prolongation downwards into the \u003ci\u003einfundibulum\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTurn up or cut off the rear end of one hemisphere so as to see\r\nclearly the optic tracts turning upwards towards the rear corner of\r\nthe thalamus. The \u003ci\u003ecorpora geniculata\u003c/i\u003e to which they also go,\r\ndistinct in man, are less so in the sheep. The lower ones are\r\nvisible between the optic-tract band and the \u0027testes,\u0027 however.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe brain\u0027s principal parts are thus passed in review. A\r\nlongitudinal section of the whole organ through the median line\r\nwill be found most instructive (\u003ca href=\"#ill_37\"\u003eFig. 37\u003c/a\u003e). The student should also\r\n(on a \u003ci\u003efresh\u003c/i\u003e brain, or one hardened in bichromate of potash or\r\nammonia to save the contrast of color between white and gray\r\nmatter) make transverse sections through the \u003ci\u003enates\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ecrura\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand through the\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_089\" id=\"page_089\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{89}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_37\" id=\"ill_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-089-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-089-sml.png\" width=\"327\" height=\"628\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 37.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Median section of human brain below the hemispheres.\r\n\u003ci\u003eTh\u003c/i\u003e, thalamus; \u003ci\u003eCg\u003c/i\u003e, corpora quadrigemina; \u003ci\u003eV\u003csup\u003eIII\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/i\u003e, third\r\nventricle; \u003ci\u003eCom\u003c/i\u003e, middle commissure; \u003ci\u003eF\u003c/i\u003e, columns of fornix; \u003ci\u003eInf\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ninfundibulum; \u003ci\u003eOp.n\u003c/i\u003e, optic nerve; \u003ci\u003ePit\u003c/i\u003e, pituitary body; \u003ci\u003eAv\u003c/i\u003e,\r\narbor vitæ. (After Obersteiner).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_090\" id=\"page_090\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{90}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ehemispheres just in front of the corpus albicans. The latter\r\nsection shows on each side the \u003ci\u003enucleus lenticularis\u003c/i\u003e of the corpus\r\nstriatum, and also the \u003ci\u003einner capsule\u003c/i\u003e (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_38\"\u003eFig. 38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ci\u003eNl\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\n\u003ci\u003eIc\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_38\" id=\"ill_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 225px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-090-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-090-sml.png\" width=\"225\" height=\"255\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 38.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Transverse section through right hemisphere (after\r\nGegenbaur). \u003ci\u003eCc\u003c/i\u003e, corpus callosum; \u003ci\u003ePf\u003c/i\u003e, pillars of fornix; \u003ci\u003eIc\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ninternal capsule; \u003ci\u003eV\u003c/i\u003e, third ventricle; \u003ci\u003eNl\u003c/i\u003e, nucleus lenticularis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen all is said and done, the fact remains that, for the beginner, the\r\nunderstanding of the brain\u0027s structure is not an easy thing. It must be\r\ngone over and forgotten and learned again many times before it is\r\ndefinitively assimilated by the mind. But patience and repetition, here\r\nas elsewhere, will bear their perfect fruit.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_091\" id=\"page_091\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{91}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_VIII\" id=\"CHAPTER_VIII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGeneral Idea of Nervous Function.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If I begin chopping the foot of a\r\ntree, its branches are unmoved by my act, and its leaves murmur as\r\npeacefully as ever in the wind. If, on the contrary, I do violence to\r\nthe foot of a fellow-man, the rest of his body instantly responds to the\r\naggression by movements of alarm or defence. The reason of this\r\ndifference is that the man has a nervous system, whilst the tree has\r\nnone; and the function of the nervous system is to bring each part into\r\nharmonious coöperation with every other. The afferent nerves, when\r\nexcited by some physical irritant, be this as gross in its mode of\r\noperation as a chopping axe or as subtle as the waves of light, conveys\r\nthe excitement to the nervous centres. The commotion set up in the\r\ncentres does not stop there, but discharges through the efferent nerves,\r\nexciting movements which vary with the animal and with the irritant\r\napplied. These acts of response have usually the common character of\r\nbeing of service. They ward off the noxious stimulus and support the\r\nbeneficial one; whilst if, in itself indifferent, the stimulus be a sign\r\nof some distant circumstance of practical importance, the animal\u0027s acts\r\nare addressed to this circumstance so as to avoid its perils or secure\r\nits benefits, as the case may be. To take a common example, if I hear\r\nthe conductor calling \u0027All aboard!\u0027 as I enter the station, my heart\r\nfirst stops, then palpitates, and my legs respond to the air-waves\r\nfalling on my tympanum by quickening their movements. If I stumble as I\r\nrun, the sensation of falling provokes a movement of the hands towards\r\nthe direction of the fall, the effect of which is to shield the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_092\" id=\"page_092\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{92}\u003c/span\u003e body\r\nfrom too sudden a shock. If a cinder enter my eye, its lids close\r\nforcibly and a copious flow of tears tends to wash it out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese three responses to a sensational stimulus differ, however, in many\r\nrespects. The closure of the eye and the lachrymation are quite\r\ninvoluntary, and so is the disturbance of the heart. Such involuntary\r\nresponses we know as \u0027reflex\u0027 acts. The motion of the arms to break the\r\nshock of falling may also be called reflex, since it occurs too quickly\r\nto be deliberately intended. It is, at any rate, less automatic than the\r\nprevious acts, for a man might by conscious effort learn to perform it\r\nmore skilfully, or even to suppress it altogether. Actions of this kind,\r\ninto which instinct and volition enter upon equal terms, have been\r\ncalled \u0027semi-reflex.\u0027 The act of running towards the train, on the other\r\nhand, has no instinctive element about it. It is purely the result of\r\neducation, and is preceded by a consciousness of the purpose to be\r\nattained and a distinct mandate of the will. It is a \u0027voluntary act.\u0027\r\nThus the animal\u0027s reflex and voluntary performances shade into each\r\nother gradually, being connected by acts which may often occur\r\nautomatically, but may also be modified by conscious intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Frog\u0027s Nerve-centres.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Let us now look a little more closely at what\r\ngoes on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe best way to enter the subject will be to take a lower creature, like\r\na frog, and study by the vivisectional method the functions of his\r\ndifferent nerve-centres. The frog\u0027s nerve-centres are figured in the\r\ndiagram over the page, which needs no further explanation. I shall first\r\nproceed to state what happens when various amounts of the anterior parts\r\nare removed, in different frogs, in the way in which an ordinary student\r\nremoves them\u0026mdash;that is, with no extreme precautions as to the purity of\r\nthe operation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, then, we reduce the frog\u0027s nervous system to the spinal cord alone,\r\nby making a section behind the base of the skull, between the spinal\r\ncord and the medulla oblongata,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_093\" id=\"page_093\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{93}\u003c/span\u003e thereby cutting off the brain from all\r\nconnection with the rest of the body, the frog will still continue to\r\nlive, but with a very peculiarly modified activity. It ceases to breathe\r\nor swallow; it lies flat on its belly, and does not, like a normal frog,\r\nsit up on its forepaws, though its hind-legs are kept, as usual, folded\r\nagainst its body and immediately resume this position if drawn out. If\r\nthrown on its back it lies there quietly, without turning over like a\r\nnormal frog. Locomotion and voice seem entirely abolished. If we suspend\r\nit by the nose, and irritate different portions of its skin by acid, it\r\nperforms a set of remarkable \u0027defensive\u0027 movements calculated to wipe\r\naway the irritant. Thus, if the breast be touched, both fore-paws will\r\nrub it vigorously; if we touch the outer side of the elbow, the\r\nhind-foot of the same side will rise directly to the spot and wipe it.\r\nThe back of the foot will rub the knee if that be attacked, whilst if\r\nthe foot be cut away, the stump will make ineffectual movements, and\r\nthen, in many frogs, a pause will come, as if for deliberation,\r\nsucceeded by a rapid passage of the opposite unmutilated foot to the\r\nacidulated spot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_39\" id=\"ill_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-093-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-093-sml.png\" width=\"125\" height=\"253\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 39.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eH\u003c/i\u003e, cerebral hemispheres; \u003ci\u003eO Th\u003c/i\u003e, optic thalami; \u003ci\u003eO\r\nL\u003c/i\u003e, optic lobes; \u003ci\u003eCb\u003c/i\u003e, cerebellum; \u003ci\u003eM O\u003c/i\u003e, medulla oblongata; \u003ci\u003eS C\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nspinal cord.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most striking character of all these movements, after their\r\nteleological appropriateness, is their precision. They vary, in\r\nsensitive frogs and with a proper amount of irritation, so little as\r\nalmost to resemble in their machine-like regularity the performances of\r\na jumping-jack, whose legs must twitch whenever you pull the string. The\r\nspinal cord of the frog thus contains arrangements of cells and fibres\r\nfitted to convert skin-irritations into movements of defence. We may\r\ncall it the \u003ci\u003ecentre for defensive movements\u003c/i\u003e in this animal. We may\r\nindeed go farther than this, and by cutting the spinal cord in various\r\nplaces find that its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_094\" id=\"page_094\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{94}\u003c/span\u003e separate segments are independent mechanisms, for\r\nappropriate activities of the head and of the arms and legs\r\nrespectively. The segment governing the arms is especially active, in\r\nmale frogs, in the breeding season; and these members alone, with the\r\nbreast and back appertaining to them, and everything else cut away, will\r\nactively grasp a finger placed between them and remain hanging to it for\r\na considerable time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSimilarly of the medulla oblongata, optic lobes, and other centres\r\nbetween the spinal cord and the hemispheres of the frog. Each of them is\r\nproved by experiment to contain a mechanism for the accurate execution,\r\nin response to definite stimuli, of certain special acts. Thus with the\r\nmedulla the animal swallows; with the medulla and cerebellum together he\r\njumps, swims, and turns over from his back; with his optic lobes he\r\ncroaks when pinched; etc. \u003ci\u003eA frog which has lost his cerebral\r\nhemispheres alone is by an unpractised observer indistinguishable from a\r\nnormal animal.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot only is he capable, on proper instigation, of all the acts already\r\nmentioned, but he guides himself by sight, so that if an obstacle be set\r\nup between him and the light, and he be forced to move forward, he\r\neither jumps over it or swerves to one side. He manifests the sexual\r\ninstinct at the proper seasons, and discriminates between male and\r\nfemale individuals of his own species. He is, in short, so similar in\r\nevery respect to a normal frog that it would take a person very familiar\r\nwith these animals to suspect anything wrong or wanting about him; but\r\neven then such a person would soon remark the almost entire absence of\r\nspontaneous motion\u0026mdash;that is, motion unprovoked by any present incitation\r\nof sense. The continued movements of swimming, performed by the creature\r\nin the water, seem to be the fatal result of the contact of that fluid\r\nwith its skin. They cease when a stick, for example, touches his hands.\r\nThis is a sensible irritant towards which the feet are automatically\r\ndrawn by reflex action, and on which the animal remains sitting. He\r\nmanifests no hunger, and will\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_095\" id=\"page_095\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{95}\u003c/span\u003e suffer a fly to crawl over his nose\r\nunsnapped at. Fear, too, seems to have deserted him. In a word, he is an\r\nextremely complex machine whose actions, so far as they go, tend to\r\nself-preservation; but still a \u003ci\u003emachine\u003c/i\u003e, in this sense\u0026mdash;that it seems\r\nto contain no incalculable element. By applying the right sensory\r\nstimulus to him we are almost as certain of getting a fixed response as\r\nan organist is of hearing a certain tone when he pulls out a certain\r\nstop.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBut now if to the lower centres we add the cerebral hemispheres\u003c/i\u003e, or\r\nif, in other words, we make an intact animal the subject of our\r\nobservations, all this is changed. In addition to the previous responses\r\nto present incitements of sense, our frog now goes through long and\r\ncomplex acts of locomotion \u003ci\u003espontaneously\u003c/i\u003e, or as if moved by what in\r\nourselves we should call an idea. His reactions to outward stimuli vary\r\ntheir form, too. Instead of making simple defensive movements with his\r\nhind-legs, like a headless frog, if touched; or of giving one or two\r\nleaps and then sitting still like a hemisphereless one, he makes\r\npersistent and varied efforts of escape, as if, not the mere contact of\r\nthe physiologist\u0027s hand, but the notion of danger suggested by it were\r\nnow his spur. Led by the feeling of hunger, too, he goes in search of\r\ninsects, fish, or smaller frogs, and varies his procedure with each\r\nspecies of victim. The physiologist cannot by manipulating him elicit\r\ncroaking, crawling up a board, swimming or stopping, at will. His\r\nconduct has become incalculable\u0026mdash;we can no longer foretell it exactly.\r\nEffort to escape is his dominant reaction, but he \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e do anything\r\nelse, even swell up and become perfectly passive in our hands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch are the phenomena commonly observed, and such the impressions which\r\none naturally receives. Certain general conclusions follow irresistibly.\r\nFirst of all the following:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe acts of all the centres involve the use of the same muscles.\u003c/i\u003e When\r\na brainless frog\u0027s hind-leg wipes the acid,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_096\" id=\"page_096\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{96}\u003c/span\u003e he calls into play all the\r\nleg-muscles which a frog with his full medulla oblongata and cerebellum\r\nuses when he turns from his back to his belly. Their contractions are,\r\nhowever, \u003ci\u003ecombined\u003c/i\u003e differently in the two cases, so that the results\r\nvary widely. We must consequently conclude that specific arrangements of\r\ncells and fibres exist in the cord for wiping, in the medulla for\r\nturning over, etc. Similarly they exist in the thalami for jumping over\r\nseen obstacles and for balancing the moved body; in the optic lobes for\r\ncreeping backwards, or what not. But in the hemispheres, since the\r\npresence of these organs \u003ci\u003ebrings no new elementary form of movement\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith it, but only \u003ci\u003edetermines differently the occasions\u003c/i\u003e on which the\r\nmovements shall occur, making the usual stimuli less fatal and\r\nmachine-like, we need suppose no such machinery \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e coördinative\r\nof muscular contractions to exist. We may rather assume, when the\r\nmandate for a wiping-movement is sent forth by the hemispheres, that a\r\ncurrent goes straight to the wiping-arrangement in the spinal cord,\r\nexciting this arrangement as a whole. Similarly, if an intact frog\r\nwishes to jump, all he need do is to excite from the hemispheres the\r\njumping-centre in the thalami or wherever it may be, and the latter will\r\nprovide for the details of the execution. It is like a general ordering\r\na colonel to make a certain movement, but not telling him how it shall\r\nbe done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe same muscle, then, is repeatedly represented at different heights\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand at each it enters into a different combination with other muscles to\r\ncoöperate in some special form of concerted movement. At each height the\r\nmovement is discharged by some particular form of sensorial stimulus,\r\nwhilst the stimuli which discharge the hemispheres would seem not so\r\nmuch to be elementary sorts of sensation, as groups of sensations\r\nforming determinate \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Pigeon\u0027s Lower Centres.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The results are just the same if, instead\r\nof a frog, we take a pigeon, cut out his hemispheres carefully and wait\r\ntill he recovers from the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_097\" id=\"page_097\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{97}\u003c/span\u003e operation. There is not a movement natural to\r\nhim which this brainless bird cannot execute; he seems, too, after some\r\ndays to execute movements from some inner irritation, for he moves\r\nspontaneously. But his emotions and instincts exist no longer. In\r\nSchrader\u0027s striking words:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The hemisphereless animal moves in a world of bodies which … are all\r\nof equal value for him…. He is, to use Goltz\u0027s apt expression,\r\n\u003ci\u003eimpersonal\u003c/i\u003e…. Every object is for him only a space-occupying mass, he\r\nturns out of his path for an ordinary pigeon no otherwise than for a\r\nstone. He may try to climb over both. All authors agree that they never\r\nfound any difference, whether it was an inanimate body, a cat, a dog, or\r\na bird of prey which came in their pigeon\u0027s way. The creature knows\r\nneither friends nor enemies, in the thickest company it lives like a\r\nhermit. The languishing cooing of the male awakens no more impression\r\nthan the rattling of the peas, or the call-whistle which in the days\r\nbefore the injury used to make the birds hasten to be fed. Quite as\r\nlittle as the earlier observers have I seen hemisphereless she-birds\r\nanswer the courting of the male. A hemisphereless male will coo all day\r\nlong and show distinct signs of sexual excitement, but his activity is\r\nwithout any object, it is entirely indifferent to him whether the\r\nshe-bird be there or not. If one is placed near him, he leaves her\r\nunnoticed…. As the male pays no attention to the female, so she pays\r\nnone to her young. The brood may follow the mother ceaselessly calling\r\nfor food, but they might as well ask it from a stone…. The\r\nhemisphereless pigeon is in the highest degree tame, and fears man as\r\nlittle as cat or bird of prey.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGeneral Notion of Hemispheres.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All these facts lead us, when we try to\r\nformulate them broadly, to some such conception as this: \u003ci\u003eThe lower\r\ncentres act from present sensational stimuli alone; the hemispheres act\r\nfrom considerations\u003c/i\u003e, the sensations which they may receive serving only\r\nas suggesters of these. But what are considerations but expectations, in\r\nthe fancy, of sensations which will be felt one way or another according\r\nas action takes this course or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_098\" id=\"page_098\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{98}\u003c/span\u003e that? If I step aside on seeing a\r\nrattlesnake, from considering how dangerous an animal he is, the mental\r\nmaterials which constitute my prudential reflection are images more or\r\nless vivid of the movement of his head, of a sudden pain in my leg, of a\r\nstate of terror, a swelling of the limb, a chill, delirium, death, etc.,\r\netc., and the ruin of my hopes. But all these images are constructed out\r\nof my past experiences. They are \u003ci\u003ereproductions\u003c/i\u003e of what I have felt or\r\nwitnessed. They are, in short, \u003ci\u003eremote\u003c/i\u003e sensations; and the main\r\ndifference between the hemisphereless animal and the whole one may be\r\nconcisely expressed by saying that \u003ci\u003ethe one obeys absent, the other only\r\npresent, objects\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe hemispheres would then seem to be the chief seat of memory.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nVestiges of past experience must in some way be stored up in them, and\r\nmust, when aroused by present stimuli, first appear as representations\r\nof distant goods and evils; and then must discharge into the appropriate\r\nmotor channels for warding off the evil and securing the benefits of the\r\ngood. If we liken the nervous currents to electric currents, we can\r\ncompare the nervous system, \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, below the hemispheres to a direct\r\ncircuit from sense-organ to muscle along the line \u003ci\u003eS …C …M\u003c/i\u003e of \u003ca href=\"#ill_40\"\u003eFig.\r\n40.\u003c/a\u003e The hemisphere, \u003ci\u003eH\u003c/i\u003e, adds the long circuit or loop-line through\r\nwhich the current may pass when for any reason the direct line is not\r\nused.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_40\" id=\"ill_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 204px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-098-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-098-sml.png\" width=\"204\" height=\"203\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 40.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, a tired wayfarer on a hot day throws himself on the damp earth\r\nbeneath a maple-tree. The sensations of delicious rest and coolness\r\npouring themselves through the direct line would naturally discharge\r\ninto the muscles of complete extension: he would abandon himself to the\r\ndangerous repose. But the loop-line being open, part of the current is\r\ndrafted along it, and awakens rheumatic or catarrhal reminiscences,\r\nwhich prevail over the instigations of sense, and make the man arise and\r\npursue his way\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_099\" id=\"page_099\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{99}\u003c/span\u003e to where he may enjoy his rest more safely. Presently we\r\nshall examine the manner in which the hemispheric loop-line may be\r\nsupposed to serve as a reservoir for such reminiscences as these.\r\nMeanwhile I will ask the reader to notice some corollaries of its being\r\nsuch a reservoir.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, no animal without it can deliberate, pause, postpone, nicely\r\nweigh one motive against another, or compare. Prudence, in a word, is\r\nfor such a creature an impossible virtue. Accordingly we see that nature\r\nremoves those functions in the exercise of which prudence is a virtue\r\nfrom the lower centres and hands them over to the cerebrum. Wherever a\r\ncreature has to deal with complex features of the environment, prudence\r\nis a virtue. The higher animals have so to deal; and the more complex\r\nthe features, the higher we call the animals. The fewer of his acts,\r\nthen, can \u003ci\u003esuch\u003c/i\u003e an animal perform without the help of the organs in\r\nquestion. In the frog many acts devolve wholly on the lower centres; in\r\nthe bird fewer; in the rodent fewer still; in the dog very few indeed;\r\nand in apes and men hardly any at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe advantages of this are obvious. Take the prehension of food as an\r\nexample and suppose it to be a reflex performance of the lower centres.\r\nThe animal will be condemned fatally and irresistibly to snap at it\r\nwhenever presented, no matter what the circumstances may be; he can no\r\nmore disobey this prompting than water can refuse to boil when a fire is\r\nkindled under the pot. His life will again and again pay the forfeit of\r\nhis gluttony. Exposure to retaliation, to other enemies, to traps, to\r\npoisons, to the dangers of repletion, must be regular parts of his\r\nexistence. His lack of all thought by which to weigh the danger against\r\nthe attractiveness of the bait, and of all volition to remain hungry a\r\nlittle while longer, is the direct measure of his lowness in the mental\r\nscale. And those fishes which, like our cunners and sculpins, are no\r\nsooner thrown back from the hook into the water than they automatically\r\nseize the hook again, would soon expiate the degradation of their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_100\" id=\"page_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{100}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nintelligence by the extinction of their type, did not their\r\nextraordinary fecundity atone for their imprudence. Appetite and the\r\nacts it prompts have consequently become in all higher vertebrates\r\nfunctions of the cerebrum. They disappear when the physiologist\u0027s knife\r\nhas left the subordinate centres alone in place. The brainless pigeon\r\nwill starve though left on a corn-heap.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake again the sexual function. In birds this devolves exclusively upon\r\nthe hemispheres. When these are shorn away the pigeon pays no attention\r\nto the billings and cooings of its mate. It is the same, according to\r\nGoltz, with male dogs who have suffered large losses of cerebral tissue.\r\nThose who have read Darwin\u0027s Descent of Man will recollect what an\r\nimportance this author ascribes to the agency of sexual selection in the\r\namelioration of the breeds of birds. The females are naturally coy, and\r\ntheir coyness must be overcome by the exhibition of the gorgeous\r\nplumage, and various accomplishments in the way of strutting and\r\nfighting, of the males. In frogs and toads, on the other hand, where (as\r\nwe saw on\u003ca href=\"#page_094\"\u003e page 94\u003c/a\u003e) the sexual instinct devolves upon the lower centres,\r\nwe find a machine-like obedience to the present incitements of sense,\r\nand an almost total exclusion of the power of choice. The consequence is\r\nthat every spring an immense waste of batrachian life, involving numbers\r\nof adult animals and innumerable eggs, takes place from no other cause\r\nthan the blind character of the sexual impulse in these creatures.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo one need be told how dependent all human social elevation is upon the\r\nprevalence of chastity. Hardly any factor measures more than this the\r\ndifference between civilization and barbarism. Physiologically\r\ninterpreted, chastity means nothing more than the fact that present\r\nsolicitations of sense are overpowered by suggestions of æsthetic and\r\nmoral fitness which the circumstances awaken in the cerebrum; and that\r\nupon the inhibitory or permissive influence of these alone action\r\ndirectly depends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWithin the psychic life due to the cerebrum itself the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_101\" id=\"page_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{101}\u003c/span\u003e same general\r\ndistinction obtains, between considerations of the more immediate and\r\nconsiderations of the more remote. In all ages the man whose\r\ndeterminations are swayed by reference to the most distant ends has been\r\nheld to possess the highest intelligence. The tramp who lives from hour\r\nto hour; the bohemian whose engagements are from day to day; the\r\nbachelor who builds but for a single life; the father who acts for\r\nanother generation; the patriot who thinks of a whole community and many\r\ngenerations; and, finally, the philosopher and saint whose cares are for\r\nhumanity and for eternity,\u0026mdash;these range themselves in an unbroken\r\nhierarchy, wherein each successive grade results from an increased\r\nmanifestation of the special form of action by which the cerebral\r\ncentres are distinguished from all below them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Automaton-Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the \u0027loop-line\u0027 along which the memories and\r\nideas of the distant are supposed to lie, the action, so far as it is a\r\nphysical process, must be interpreted after the type of the action in\r\nthe lower centres. If regarded here as a reflex process, it must be\r\nreflex there as well. The current in both places runs out into the\r\nmuscles only after it has first run in; but whilst the path by which it\r\nruns out is determined in the lower centres by reflections few and fixed\r\namongst the cell-arrangements, in the hemispheres the reflections are\r\nmany and instable. This, it will be seen, is only a difference of degree\r\nand not of kind, and does not change the reflex type. The conception of\r\n\u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e action as conforming to this type is the fundamental conception of\r\nmodern nerve-physiology. This conception, now, has led to two quite\r\nopposite theories about the relation to consciousness of the nervous\r\nfunctions. Some authors, finding that the higher voluntary functions\r\nseem to require the guidance of feeling, conclude that over the lowest\r\nreflexes some such feeling also presides, though it may be a feeling\r\nconnected with the spinal cord, of which the higher conscious self\r\nconnected with the hemispheres remains unconscious. Others, finding\r\nthat\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_102\" id=\"page_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{102}\u003c/span\u003e reflex and semi-automatic acts may, notwithstanding their\r\nappropriateness, take place with an unconsciousness apparently complete,\r\nfly to the opposite extreme and maintain that the appropriateness even\r\nof the higher voluntary actions connected with the hemispheres owes\r\nnothing to the fact that consciousness attends them. They are, according\r\nto these writers, results of physiological mechanism pure and simple.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo comprehend completely this latter doctrine one should apply it to\r\nexamples. The movements of our tongues and pens, the flashings of our\r\neyes in conversation, are of course events of a physiological order, and\r\nas such their causal antecedents may be exclusively mechanical. If we\r\nknew thoroughly the nervous system of Shakespeare, and as thoroughly all\r\nhis environing conditions, we should be able, according to the theory of\r\nautomatism, to show why at a given period of his life his hand came to\r\ntrace on certain sheets of paper those crabbed little black marks which\r\nwe for shortness\u0027 sake call the manuscript of Hamlet. We should\r\nunderstand the rationale of every erasure and alteration therein, and we\r\nshould understand all this without in the slightest degree acknowledging\r\nthe existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare\u0027s mind. The words and\r\nsentences would be taken, not as signs of anything beyond themselves,\r\nbut as little outward facts, pure and simple. In like manner, the\r\nautomaton-theory affirms, we might exhaustively write the biography of\r\nthose two hundred pounds, more or less, of warmish albuminoid matter\r\ncalled Martin Luther, without ever implying that it felt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, on the other hand, nothing in all this could prevent us from giving\r\nan equally complete account of either Luther\u0027s or Shakespeare\u0027s\r\nspiritual history, an account in which every gleam of thought and\r\nemotion should find its place. The mind-history would run alongside of\r\nthe body-history of each man, and each point in the one would correspond\r\nto, but not react upon, a point in the other. So the melody floats from\r\nthe harp-string, but neither checks\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_103\" id=\"page_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{103}\u003c/span\u003e nor quickens its vibrations; so the\r\nshadow runs alongside the pedestrian, but in no way influences his\r\nsteps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a mere \u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e, and so long as we confine our view to the\r\nnervous centres themselves, few things are more seductive than this\r\nradically mechanical theory of their action. And yet our consciousness\r\n\u003ci\u003eis there\u003c/i\u003e, and has in all probability been evolved, like all other\r\nfunctions, for a use\u0026mdash;it is to the highest degree improbable \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthat it should have no use. Its use \u003ci\u003eseems\u003c/i\u003e to be that of \u003ci\u003eselection\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nbut to select, it must be efficacious. States of consciousness which\r\nfeel right are held fast to; those which feel wrong are checked. If the\r\n\u0027holding\u0027 and the \u0027checking\u0027 of the conscious states severally mean also\r\nthe efficacious reinforcing or inhibiting of the correlated neural\r\nprocesses, then it would seem as if the presence of the states of mind\r\nmight help to steer the nervous system and keep it in the path which to\r\nthe consciousness seemed best. Now on the average what seems best to\r\nconsciousness is really best for the creature. It is a well-known fact\r\nthat pleasures are generally associated with beneficial, pains with\r\ndetrimental, experiences. All the fundamental vital processes illustrate\r\nthis law. Starvation; suffocation; privation of food, drink, and sleep;\r\nwork when exhausted; burns, wounds, inflammation; the effects of poison,\r\nare as disagreeable as filling the hungry stomach, enjoying rest and\r\nsleep after fatigue, exercise after rest, and a sound skin and unbroken\r\nbones at all times, are pleasant. Mr. Spencer and others have suggested\r\nthat these coincidences are due, not to any preëstablished harmony, but\r\nto the mere action of natural selection, which would certainly kill off\r\nin the long-run any breed of creatures to whom the fundamentally noxious\r\nexperience seemed enjoyable. An animal that should take pleasure in a\r\nfeeling of suffocation would, if that pleasure were efficacious enough\r\nto make him keep his head under water, enjoy a longevity of four or five\r\nminutes. But if conscious pleasure does not reinforce, and conscious\r\npain does not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_104\" id=\"page_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{104}\u003c/span\u003e inhibit, anything, one does not see (without some such \u003ci\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e rational harmony as would be scouted by the \u0027scientific\u0027\r\nchampions of the automaton-theory) why the most noxious acts, such as\r\nburning, might not with perfect impunity give thrills of delight, and\r\nthe most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony. The only\r\nconsiderable attempt that has been made to explain the \u003ci\u003edistribution\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nour feelings is that of Mr. Grant Allen in his suggestive little work,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhysiological Æsthetics\u003c/i\u003e; and his reasoning is based exclusively on\r\nthat causal efficacy of pleasures and pains which the partisans of pure\r\nautomatism so strenuously deny.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProbability and circumstantial evidence thus run dead against the theory\r\nthat our actions are \u003ci\u003epurely\u003c/i\u003e mechanical in their causation. From the\r\npoint of view of descriptive Psychology (even though we be bound to\r\nassume, as on \u003ca href=\"#page_006\"\u003ep. 6\u003c/a\u003e, that all our feelings have brain-processes for their\r\ncondition of existence, and can be remotely traced in every instance to\r\ncurrents coming from the outer world) we have no clear reason to doubt\r\nthat the feelings may react so as to further or to dampen the processes\r\nto which they are due. I shall therefore not hesitate in the course of\r\nthis book to use the language of common-sense. I shall talk as if\r\nconsciousness kept actively pressing the nerve-centres in the direction\r\nof its own ends, and was no mere impotent and paralytic spectator of\r\nlife\u0027s game.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Localization of Functions in the Hemispheres.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The hemispheres, we\r\nlately said, must be the organ of memory, and in some way retain\r\nvestiges of former currents, by means of which mental considerations\r\ndrawn from the past may be aroused before action takes place. The\r\nvivisections of physiologists and the observations of physicians have of\r\nlate years given a concrete confirmation to this notion which the first\r\nrough appearances suggest. The various convolutions have had special\r\nfunctions assigned to them in relation to this and that sense-organ, as\r\nwell as to this or that portion of the muscular system. This book is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_105\" id=\"page_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{105}\u003c/span\u003e no\r\nplace for going over the evidence in detail, so I will simply indicate\r\nthe conclusions which are most probable at the date of writing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMental and Cerebral Elements.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the first place, there is a very neat\r\nparallelism between the analysis of brain-functions by the physiologists\r\nand that of mental functions by the \u0027analytic\u0027 psychologists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phrenological brain-doctrine divided the brain into \u0027organs,\u0027 each\r\nof which stood for the man in a certain partial attitude. The organ of\r\n\u0027Philoprogenitiveness,\u0027 with its concomitant consciousness, is an entire\r\nman so far as he loves children, that of \u0027Reverence\u0027 is an entire man\r\nworshipping, etc. The spiritualistic psychology, in turn, divided the\r\nMind into \u0027faculties,\u0027 which were also entire mental men in certain\r\nlimited attitudes. But \u0027faculties\u0027 are not mental \u003ci\u003eelements\u003c/i\u003e any more\r\nthan \u0027organs\u0027 are brain-elements. Analysis breaks both into more\r\nelementary constituents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBrain and mind alike consist of simple elements, sensory and motor. \"All\r\nnervous centres,\" says Dr. Hughlings Jackson, \"from the lowest to the\r\nvery highest (the substrata of consciousness), are made up of nothing\r\nelse than nervous arrangements, representing impressions and\r\nmovements…. I do not see of what other materials the brain \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be\r\nmade.\" Meynert represents the matter similarly when he calls the cortex\r\nof the hemispheres the surface of projection for every muscle and every\r\nsensitive point of the body. The muscles and the sensitive points are\r\n\u003ci\u003erepresented\u003c/i\u003e each by a cortical point, and the Brain is little more\r\nthan the sum of all these cortical points, to which, on the mental side,\r\nas many sensations and \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e correspond. The sensations and ideas of\r\nsensation and of motion are, in turn, the elements out of which the Mind\r\nis built according to the analytic school of psychology. The relations\r\nbetween objects are explained by \u0027associations\u0027 between the ideas; and\r\nthe emotional and instinctive tendencies, by associations between ideas\r\nand movements.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_106\" id=\"page_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{106}\u003c/span\u003e The same diagram can symbolize both the inner and the\r\nouter world; dots or circles standing indifferently for cells or ideas,\r\nand lines joining them, for fibres or associations. The associationist\r\ndoctrine of \u0027ideas\u0027 may be doubted to be a literal expression of the\r\ntruth, but it probably will always retain a didactic usefulness. At all\r\nevents, it is interesting to see how well physiological analysis plays\r\ninto its hands. To proceed to details.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_41\" id=\"ill_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 466px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-106-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-106-sml.png\" width=\"466\" height=\"345\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 41.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Left hemisphere of monkey\u0027s brain. Outer\r\nsurface.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Motor Region.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The one thing which is \u003ci\u003eperfectly\u003c/i\u003e well established\r\nis this, that the \u0027central\u0027 convolutions, on either side of the fissure\r\nof Rolando, and (at least in the monkey) the calloso-marginal\r\nconvolution (which is continuous with them on the mesial surface where\r\none hemisphere is applied against the other), form the region by which\r\nall the motor incitations which leave the cortex pass out, on their way\r\nto those executive centres in the region of the pons, medulla, and\r\nspinal cord from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_107\" id=\"page_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{107}\u003c/span\u003e which the muscular contractions are discharged in the\r\nlast resort. The existence of this so-called \u0027motor zone\u0027 is established\r\nby anatomical as well as vivisectional and pathological evidence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe accompanying figures (Figs. \u003ca href=\"#ill_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#ill_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e), from Schaefer and Horsley,\r\nshow the topographical arrangement of the monkey\u0027s motor zone more\r\nclearly than any description.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_42\" id=\"ill_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 449px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-107-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-107-sml.png\" width=\"449\" height=\"326\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 42.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Left hemisphere of monkey\u0027s brain. Mesial\r\nsurface.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"#ill_43\"\u003eFig. 43\u003c/a\u003e, after Starr, shows how the fibres run downwards. All sensory\r\ncurrents entering the hemispheres run out from the Rolandic region,\r\nwhich may thus be regarded as a sort of funnel of escape, which narrows\r\nstill more as it plunges beneath the surface, traversing the inner\r\ncapsule, pons, and parts below. The dark ellipses on the left half of\r\nthe diagram stand for hemorrhages or tumors, and the reader can easily\r\ntrace, by following the course of the fibres, what the effect of them in\r\ninterrupting motor currents may be.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_108\" id=\"page_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{108}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_43\" id=\"ill_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 410px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-108-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-108-sml.png\" width=\"410\" height=\"453\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 43.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Schematic transverse section of the human brain, through\r\nthe rolandic region. \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e, fissure of Sylvius; \u003ci\u003eN.C.\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enucleus\r\ncandatus\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eN.L.\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enucleus lenticularis\u003c/i\u003e, of the corpus\r\nstriatum; \u003ci\u003eO.T.\u003c/i\u003e, thalamus; \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, crus; \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, medulla oblongata;\r\n\u003ci\u003eVII\u003c/i\u003e, the facial nerves passing out from their nucleus in the\r\nregion of the \u003ci\u003epons\u003c/i\u003e. The fibres passing between \u003ci\u003eO.T.\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eN.L.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nconstitute the so-called internal capsule.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the most instructive proofs of motor localization in the cortex\r\nis that furnished by the disease now called aphemia, or \u003ci\u003emotor aphasia\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nMotor aphasia is neither loss of voice nor paralysis of the tongue or\r\nlips. The patient\u0027s voice is as strong as ever, and all the innervations\r\nof his hypoglossal and facial nerves, except those necessary for\r\nspeaking, may go on perfectly well. He can laugh and cry, and even sing;\r\nbut he either is unable to utter any words at all; or a few meaningless\r\nstock phrases form his only speech; or else he speaks incoherently and\r\nconfusedly,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_109\" id=\"page_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{109}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_44\" id=\"ill_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 436px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-109-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-109-sml.png\" width=\"436\" height=\"360\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"hang\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 44.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Schematic profile of left hemisphere, with the\r\nparts shaded whose destruction causes motor (\u0027Broca\u0027) and sensory\r\n(\u0027Wernicke\u0027) aphasia.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003emispronouncing, misplacing, and misusing his words in various degrees.\r\nSometimes his speech is a mere broth of unintelligible syllables. In\r\ncases of pure motor aphasia the patient recognizes his mistakes and\r\nsuffers acutely from them. Now whenever a patient dies in such a\r\ncondition as this, and an examination of his brain is permitted, it is\r\nfound that the lowest frontal gyrus (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_44\"\u003eFig. 44\u003c/a\u003e) is the seat of injury.\r\nBroca first noticed this fact in 1861, and since then the gyrus has gone\r\nby the name of Broca\u0027s convolution. The injury in right-handed people is\r\nfound on the left hemisphere, and in left-handed people on the right\r\nhemisphere. Most people, in fact, are left-brained, that is, all their\r\ndelicate and specialized movements are handed over to the charge of the\r\nleft hemisphere. The ordinary right-handedness for such movements is\r\nonly a consequence of that fact, a consequence which shows outwardly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_110\" id=\"page_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{110}\u003c/span\u003e on\r\naccount of that extensive crossing of the fibres from the left\r\nhemisphere to the right half of the body only, which is shown in \u003ca href=\"#ill_41\"\u003eFig.\r\n41\u003c/a\u003e, below the letter M. But the left-brainedness might exist and \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e\r\nshow outwardly. This would happen wherever organs on \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e sides of the\r\nbody could be governed by the left hemisphere; and just such a case\r\nseems offered by the vocal organs, in that highly delicate and special\r\nmotor service which we call speech. Either hemisphere \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e innervate\r\nthem bilaterally, just as either seems able to innervate bilaterally the\r\nmuscles of the trunk, ribs, and diaphragm. Of the special movements of\r\nspeech, however, it would appear (from these very facts of aphasia) that\r\nthe left hemisphere in most persons habitually takes exclusive charge.\r\nWith that hemisphere thrown out of gear, speech is undone; even though\r\nthe opposite hemisphere still be there for the performance of less\r\nspecialized acts, such as the various movements required in eating.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe visual centre\u003c/b\u003e is in the \u003ci\u003eoccipital lobes\u003c/i\u003e. This also is proved by\r\nall the three kinds of possible evidence. It seems that the fibres from\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eleft\u003c/i\u003e halves of \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e retinæ go to the \u003ci\u003eleft\u003c/i\u003e hemisphere, those\r\nfrom the right half to the right hemisphere. The consequence is that\r\nwhen the right occipital lobe, for example, is injured, \u0027hemianopsia\u0027\r\nresults in both eyes, that is, both retinæ grow blind as to their right\r\nhalves, and the patient loses the leftward half of his field of view.\r\nThe diagram on \u003ca href=\"#page_111\"\u003ep. 111\u003c/a\u003e will make this matter clear (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_45\"\u003eFig. 45\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eQuite recently, both Schaefer and Munk, in studying the movements of the\r\neyeball produced by galvanizing the visual cortex in monkeys and dogs,\r\nhave found reason to plot out an analogous correspondence between the\r\nupper and lower portions of the retinæ and certain parts of the visual\r\ncortex. If both occipital lobes were destroyed, we should have double\r\nhemiopia, or, in other words, total blindness. In human hemiopic\r\nblindness there is insensibility to light on one half of the field of\r\nview, but\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_111\" id=\"page_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{111}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_45\" id=\"ill_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 416px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-111-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-111-sml.png\" width=\"416\" height=\"545\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquotcap\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 45.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Scheme of the mechanism of vision, after Seguin. The\r\n\u003ci\u003ecuneus\u003c/i\u003e convolution (\u003ci\u003eCu\u003c/i\u003e) of the right occipital lobe is supposed\r\nto be injured, and all the parts which lead to it are darkly shaded\r\nto show that they fail to exert their function. \u003ci\u003eF.O.\u003c/i\u003e are the\r\nintra-hemispheric optical fibres. \u003ci\u003eP.O.C.\u003c/i\u003e is the region of the\r\nlower optic centres (corpora geniculata and quadrigemina). \u003ci\u003eT.O.D.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis the right optic tract; \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, the chiasma; \u003ci\u003eF.L.D.\u003c/i\u003e are the fibres\r\ngoing to the lateral or temporal half \u003ci\u003eT\u003c/i\u003e of the right retina, and\r\n\u003ci\u003eF.C.S.\u003c/i\u003e are those going to the central or nasal half of the left\r\nretina. \u003ci\u003eO.D.\u003c/i\u003e is the right, and \u003ci\u003eO.S.\u003c/i\u003e the left, eyeball. The\r\nrightward half of each is therefore blind; in other words, the\r\nright nasal field, \u003ci\u003eR.N.F.\u003c/i\u003e, and the left temporal field, \u003ci\u003eL.T.F.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nhave become invisible to the subject with the lesion at \u003ci\u003eCu\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003emental images of visible things remain. In \u003ci\u003edouble\u003c/i\u003e hemiopia there is\r\nevery reason to believe that not only the sensation of light must go,\r\nbut that all memories and images\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_112\" id=\"page_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{112}\u003c/span\u003e of a visual order must be annihilated\r\nalso. The man loses his visual \u0027ideas.\u0027 Only \u0027cortical\u0027 blindness can\r\nproduce this effect on the ideas. Destruction of the retinæ or of the\r\nvisual tracts anywhere between the cortex and the eyes impairs the\r\nretinal sensibility to light, but not the power of visual imagination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_46\" id=\"ill_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 510px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-112-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-112-sml.png\" width=\"510\" height=\"330\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 46.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Fibres associating the cortical centres\r\ntogether. (Schematic, after Starr.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMental Blindness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A most interesting effect of cortical disorder is\r\n\u003ci\u003emental blindness\u003c/i\u003e. This consists not so much in insensibility to\r\noptical impressions, as in \u003ci\u003einability to understand them\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nPsychologically it is interpretable as \u003ci\u003eloss of associations\u003c/i\u003e between\r\noptical sensations and what they signify; and any interruption of the\r\npaths between the optic centres and the centres for other ideas ought to\r\nbring it about. Thus, printed letters of the alphabet, or words, signify\r\nboth certain sounds and certain articulatory movements. But the\r\nconnection between the articulating or auditory centres and those for\r\nsight being ruptured, we ought \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e to expect that the sight of\r\nwords would\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_113\" id=\"page_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{113}\u003c/span\u003e fail to awaken the idea of their sound, or of the movement\r\nfor pronouncing them. We ought, in short, to have \u003ci\u003ealexia\u003c/i\u003e, or inability\r\nto read: and this is just what we do have as a complication of \u003ci\u003eaphasic\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndisease in many cases of extensive injury about the fronto-temporal\r\nregions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere an object fails to be recognized by sight, it often happens that\r\nthe patient will recognize and name it as soon as he touches it with his\r\nhand. This shows in an interesting way how numerous are the incoming\r\npaths which all end by running out of the brain through the channel of\r\nspeech. The hand-path is open, though the eye-path be closed. When\r\nmental blindness is most complete, neither sight, touch, nor sound\r\navails to steer the patient, and a sort of dementia which has been\r\ncalled \u003ci\u003easymbolia\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eapraxia\u003c/i\u003e is the result. The commonest articles\r\nare not understood. The patient will put his breeches on one shoulder\r\nand his hat upon the other, will bite into the soap and lay his shoes on\r\nthe table, or take his food into his hand and throw it down again, not\r\nknowing what to do with it, etc. Such disorder can only come from\r\nextensive brain-injury.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe centre for hearing\u003c/b\u003e is situated in man in the upper convolution of\r\nthe temporal lobe (see the part marked \u0027Wernicke\u0027 in \u003ca href=\"#ill_44\"\u003eFig. 44\u003c/a\u003e). The\r\nphenomena of aphasia show this. We studied motor aphasia a few pages\r\nback; we must now consider \u003ci\u003esensory aphasia\u003c/i\u003e. Our knowledge of aphasia\r\nhas had three stages: we may talk of the period of Broca, the period of\r\nWernicke, and the period of Charcot. What Broca\u0027s discovery was we have\r\nseen. Wernicke was the first to discriminate those cases in which the\r\npatient can \u003ci\u003enot even understand\u003c/i\u003e speech from those in which he can\r\nunderstand, only not talk; and to ascribe the former condition to lesion\r\nof the temporal lobe. The condition in question is \u003ci\u003eword-deafness\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nthe disease is \u003ci\u003eauditory aphasia\u003c/i\u003e. The latest statistical survey of the\r\nsubject is that by Dr. Allen Starr. In the seven cases of \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e\r\nword-deafness which he has collected (cases in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_114\" id=\"page_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{114}\u003c/span\u003e which the patient could\r\nread, talk, and write, but not understand what was said to him), the\r\nlesion was limited to the first and second temporal convolutions in\r\ntheir posterior two thirds. The lesion (in right-handed, i.e.\r\nleft-brained, persons) is always on the left side, like the lesion in\r\nmotor aphasia. Crude hearing would not be abolished, even were the left\r\ncentre for it utterly destroyed; the right centre would still provide\r\nfor that. But the \u003ci\u003elinguistic use\u003c/i\u003e of hearing appears bound up with the\r\nintegrity of the left centre more or less exclusively. Here it must be\r\nthat words heard enter into association with the things which they\r\nrepresent, on the one hand, and with the movements necessary for\r\npronouncing them, on the other. In most of us (as Wernicke said) speech\r\nmust go on from auditory cues; that is, our visual, tactile, and other\r\nideas probably do not innervate our motor centres directly, but only\r\nafter first arousing the mental sound of the words. This is the\r\nimmediate stimulus to articulation; and where the possibility of this is\r\nabolished by the destruction of its usual channel in the left temporal\r\nlobe, the articulation must suffer. In the few cases in which the\r\nchannel is abolished with no bad effect on speech we must suppose an\r\nidiosyncrasy. The patient must innervate his speech-organs either from\r\nthe corresponding portion of the other hemisphere or directly from the\r\ncentres of vision, touch, etc., without leaning on the auditory region.\r\nIt is the minuter analysis of such individual differences as these which\r\nconstitutes Charcot\u0027s contribution towards clearing up the subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery namable thing has numerous properties, qualities, or aspects. In\r\nour minds the properties together with the name form an associated\r\ngroup. If different parts of the brain are severally concerned with the\r\nseveral properties, and a farther part with the hearing, and still\r\nanother with the uttering, of the name, there must inevitably be brought\r\nabout (through the law of association which we shall later study) such a\r\nconnection amongst all these brain-parts that the activity of any one of\r\nthem will be likely to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_115\" id=\"page_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{115}\u003c/span\u003e awaken the activity of all the rest. When we are\r\ntalking whilst we think, the \u003ci\u003eultimate\u003c/i\u003e process is utterance. If the\r\nbrain-part for \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e be injured, speech is impossible or disorderly,\r\neven though all the other brain-parts be intact: and this is just the\r\ncondition of things which, on \u003ca href=\"#page_109\"\u003ep. 109\u003c/a\u003e, we found to be brought about by\r\nlesion of the convolution of Broca. But back of that last act various\r\norders of succession are possible in the associations of a talking man\u0027s\r\nideas. The more usual order is, as aforesaid, from the tactile, visual,\r\nor other properties of the things thought-about to the sound of their\r\nnames, and then to the latter\u0027s utterance. But if in a certain\r\nindividual\u0027s mind the \u003ci\u003elook\u003c/i\u003e of an object or the \u003ci\u003elook\u003c/i\u003e of its name be\r\nwhat habitually precedes articulation, then the loss of the \u003ci\u003ehearing\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncentre will \u003ci\u003epro tanto\u003c/i\u003e not affect that individual\u0027s speech or reading.\r\nHe will be mentally deaf, i.e. his \u003ci\u003eunderstanding\u003c/i\u003e of the human voice\r\nwill suffer, but he will not be aphasic. In this way it is possible to\r\nexplain the seven cases of word-deafness without motor aphasia which\r\nfigure in Dr. Starr\u0027s table.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf this order of association be ingrained and habitual in that\r\nindividual, injury to his \u003ci\u003evisual\u003c/i\u003e centres will make him not only\r\nword-blind, but aphasic as well. His speech will become confused in\r\nconsequence of an occipital lesion. Naunyn, consequently, plotting out\r\non a diagram of the hemisphere the 71 irreproachably reported cases of\r\naphasia which he was able to collect, finds that the lesions concentrate\r\nthemselves in three places: first, on Broca\u0027s centre; second, on\r\nWernicke\u0027s; third, on the supra-marginal and angular convolutions under\r\nwhich those fibres pass which connect the visual centres with the rest\r\nof the brain (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_47\"\u003eFig. 47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003ep. 116\u003c/a\u003e). With this result Dr. Starr\u0027s\r\nanalysis of purely sensory cases agrees.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the chapter on Imagination we shall return to these differences in\r\nthe sensory spheres of different individuals. Meanwhile few things show\r\nmore beautifully than the history of our knowledge of aphasia how the\r\nsagacity and patience of many banded workers are in time certain to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_116\" id=\"page_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{116}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanalyze the darkest confusion into an orderly display. There is no\r\n\u0027organ\u0027 of Speech in the brain any more than there is a \u0027faculty\u0027 of\r\nSpeech in the mind. The entire mind and the entire brain are more or\r\nless at work in a man who uses language. The subjoined diagram, from\r\nRoss, shows the four parts most vitally concerned, and, in the light of\r\nour text, needs no farther explanation (see \u003ca href=\"#ill_48\"\u003eFig. 48\u003c/a\u003e, p. 117).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_47\" id=\"ill_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 459px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-116-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-116-sml.png\" width=\"459\" height=\"350\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 47.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCentres for Smell, Taste, and Touch.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The other sensory centres are less\r\ndefinitely made out. Of smell and taste I will say nothing; and of\r\nmuscular and cutaneous feeling only this, that it seems most probably\r\nseated in the motor zone, and possibly in the convolutions immediately\r\nbackwards and midwards thereof. The incoming tactile currents must enter\r\nthe cells of this region by one set of fibres, and the discharges leave\r\nthem by another, but of these\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_117\" id=\"page_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{117}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_48\" id=\"ill_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 281px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-117-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-117-sml.png\" width=\"281\" height=\"451\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 48.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e is the auditory centre, \u003ci\u003eV\u003c/i\u003e the visual, \u003ci\u003eW\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe writing, and \u003ci\u003eE\u003c/i\u003e that for speech.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConclusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We thus see the postulate of Meynert and Jackson, with\r\nwhich we started on \u003ca href=\"#page_105\"\u003ep. 105\u003c/a\u003e, to be on the whole most satisfactorily\r\ncorroborated by objective research. \u003ci\u003eThe highest centres do probably\r\ncontain nothing but arrangements for representing impressions and\r\nmovements, and other arrangements for coupling the activity of these\r\narrangements together.\u003c/i\u003e Currents pouring in from the sense-organs first\r\nexcite some arrangements, which in turn excite others, until at last a\r\ndischarge downwards of some sort occurs. When this is once clearly\r\ngrasped there remains little ground for asking whether the motor zone is\r\nexclusively motor, or sensitive as well. The whole cortex, inasmuch as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_118\" id=\"page_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{118}\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncurrents run through it, is both. All the currents probably have\r\nfeelings going with them, and sooner or later bring movements about. In\r\none aspect, then, every centre is afferent, in another efferent, even\r\nthe motor cells of the spinal cord having these two aspects inseparably\r\nconjoined. Marique, and Exner and Paneth have shown that by cutting\r\n\u003ci\u003eround\u003c/i\u003e a \u0027motor\u0027 centre and so separating it from the influence of the\r\nrest of the cortex, the same disorders are produced as by cutting it\r\nout, so that it is really just what I called it, only the funnel through\r\nwhich the stream of innervation, starting from elsewhere, escapes;\r\n\u003ci\u003econsciousness accompanying the stream, and being mainly of things seen\r\nif the stream is strongest occipitally, of things heard if it is\r\nstrongest temporally, of things felt, etc., if the stream occupies most\r\nintensely the \u0027motor zone.\u0027\u003c/i\u003e It seems to me that some broad and vague\r\nformulation like this is as much as we can safely venture on in the\r\npresent state of science\u0026mdash;so much at least is not likely to be\r\noverturned. But it is obvious how little this tells us of the detail of\r\nwhat goes on in the brain when a certain thought is before the mind. The\r\ngeneral forms of relation perceived between things, as their identities,\r\nlikenesses, or contrasts; the forms of the consciousness itself, as\r\neffortless or perplexed, attentive or inattentive, pleasant or\r\ndisagreeable; the phenomena of interest and selection, etc., etc., are\r\nall lumped together as effects correlated with the currents that connect\r\none centre with another. Nothing can be more vague than such a formula.\r\nMoreover certain portions of the brain, as the lower frontal lobes,\r\nescape formulational together. Their destruction gives rise to no local\r\ntrouble of either motion or sensibility in dogs, and in monkeys neither\r\nstimulation nor excision of these lobes produces any symptoms whatever.\r\nOne monkey of Horsley and Schaefer\u0027s was as tame, and did certain tricks\r\nas well, after as before the operation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is in short obvious that our knowledge of our mental states\r\ninfinitely exceeds our knowledge of their concomitant cerebral\r\nconditions. Without introspective analysis of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_119\" id=\"page_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{119}\u003c/span\u003e the mental elements of\r\nspeech, the doctrine of Aphasia, for instance, which is the most\r\nbrilliant jewel in Physiology, would have been utterly impossible. Our\r\nassumption, therefore (\u003ca href=\"#page_005\"\u003ep. 5\u003c/a\u003e), that mind-states are absolutely dependent\r\non brain-conditions, must still be understood as a mere postulate. We\r\nmay have a general faith that it must be true, but any exact insight as\r\nto \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e it is true lags wofully behind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore taking up the study of conscious states properly so called, I\r\nwill in a separate chapter speak of two or three aspects of\r\nbrain-function which have a general importance and which coöperate in\r\nthe production of all our mental states.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_120\" id=\"page_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{120}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_IX\" id=\"CHAPTER_IX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF NEURAL ACTIVITY.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Nervous Discharge.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The word discharge is constantly used, and must\r\nbe used in this book, to designate the escape of a current downwards\r\ninto muscles or other internal organs. The reader must not understand\r\nthe word figuratively. From the point of view of dynamics the passage of\r\na current out of a motor cell is probably altogether analogous to the\r\nexplosion of a gun. The matter of the cell is in a state of internal\r\ntension, which the incoming current resolves, tumbling the molecules\r\ninto a more stable equilibrium and liberating an amount of energy which\r\nstarts the current of the outgoing fibre. This current is stronger than\r\nthat of the incoming fibre. When it reaches the muscle it produces an\r\nanalogous disintegration of pent-up molecules and the result is a\r\nstronger effect still. Matteuci found that the work done by a muscle\u0027s\r\ncontraction was 27,000 times greater than that done by the galvanic\r\ncurrent which stimulated its motor nerve. When a frog\u0027s leg-muscle is\r\nmade to contract, first directly, by stimulation of its motor nerve, and\r\nsecond reflexly, by stimulation of a sensory nerve, it is found that the\r\nreflex way requires a stronger current and is more tardy, but that the\r\ncontraction is stronger when it does occur. These facts prove that the\r\ncells in the spinal cord through which the reflex takes place offer a\r\nresistance which has first to be overcome, but that a relatively violent\r\noutward current outwards then escapes from them. What is this but an\r\nexplosive discharge on a minute scale?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReaction-time.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The measurement of the time required for the discharge\r\nis one of the lines of experimental investigation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_121\" id=\"page_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{121}\u003c/span\u003e most diligently\r\nfollowed of late years. Helmholtz led the way by discovering the\r\nrapidity of the outgoing current in the sciatic nerve of the frog. The\r\nmethods he used were soon applied to sensory reactions, and the results\r\ncaused much popular admiration when described as measurements of the\r\n\u0027velocity of thought.\u0027 The phrase \u0027quick as thought\u0027 had from time\r\nimmemorial signified all that was wonderful and elusive of determination\r\nin the line of speed; and the way in which Science laid her doomful hand\r\nupon this mystery reminded people of the day when Franklin first\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eeripuit cœlo fulmen\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 foreshadowing the reign of a newer and\r\ncolder race of gods. I may say, however, immediately, that the phrase\r\n\u0027velocity of \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is misleading, for it is by no means clear in\r\nany of the cases what particular act of thought occurs during the time\r\nwhich is measured. What the times in question really represent is the\r\ntotal duration of certain \u003ci\u003ereactions upon stimuli\u003c/i\u003e. Certain of the\r\nconditions of the reaction are prepared beforehand; they consist in the\r\nassumption of those motor and sensory tensions which we name the\r\nexpectant state. Just what happens during the actual time occupied by\r\nthe reaction (in other words, just what is added to the preëxistent\r\ntensions to produce the actual discharge) is not made out at present,\r\neither from the neural or from the mental point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe method is essentially the same in all these investigations. A signal\r\nof some sort is communicated to the subject, and at the same instant\r\nrecords itself on a time-registering apparatus. The subject then makes a\r\nmuscular movement of some sort, which is the \u0027reaction,\u0027 and which also\r\nrecords itself automatically. The time found to have elapsed between the\r\ntwo records is the total time of that reaction. The time-registering\r\ninstruments are of various types. One type is that of the revolving drum\r\ncovered with smoked paper, on which one electric pen traces a line which\r\nthe signal breaks and the \u0027reaction\u0027 draws again; whilst another\r\nelectric pen (connected with a rod of metal\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_122\" id=\"page_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{122}\u003c/span\u003e vibrating at a known rate)\r\ntraces alongside of the former line a \u0027time-line\u0027 of which each\r\nundulation or link stands for a certain fraction of a second, and\r\nagainst which the break in the reaction-line can be measured. Compare\r\n\u003ca href=\"#ill_49\"\u003eFig. 49\u003c/a\u003e, where the line is broken by the signal at the first arrow, and\r\ncontinued again by the reaction at the second. The machine most often\r\nused is Hipp\u0027s chronoscopic clock. The hands are placed at zero, the\r\nsignal starts them (by an electric connection), and the reaction stops\r\nthem. The duration of their movement, down to 1000ths of a second, is\r\nthen read off from the dial-plates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_49\" id=\"ill_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 453px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-122-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-122-sml.png\" width=\"453\" height=\"156\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 49.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSimple Reactions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is found that the reaction-time differs in the\r\nsame person according to the direction of his expectant attention. If he\r\nthinks as little as possible of the movement which he is to make, and\r\nconcentrates his mind upon the signal to be received, it is longer; if,\r\non the contrary, he bends his mind exclusively upon the muscular\r\nresponse, it is shorter. Lange, who first noticed this fact when working\r\nin Wundt\u0027s laboratory, found his own \u0027muscular\u0027 reaction-time to average\r\n0´´.123, whilst his \u0027sensorial\u0027 reaction-time averaged as much as\r\n0´´.230. It is obvious that experiments, to have any \u003ci\u003ecomparative\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvalue, must always be made according to the \u0027muscular\u0027 method, which\r\nreduces the figure to its minimum and makes it more constant. In general\r\nit lies between one and two tenths of a second. It seems to me that\r\nunder these circumstances the reaction is essentially a reflex act. The\r\npreliminary \u003ci\u003emaking-ready\u003c/i\u003e of the muscles for the movement\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_123\" id=\"page_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{123}\u003c/span\u003e means the\r\nexcitement of the paths of discharge to a point just short of actual\r\ndischarge before the signal comes in. In other words, it means the\r\ntemporary formation of a real \u0027reflex-arc\u0027 in the centres, through which\r\nthe incoming current instantly can pour out again. But when, on the\r\nother hand, the expectant attention is exclusively addressed to the\r\nsignal, the excitement of the motor tracts can only begin after this\r\nlatter has come in, and under this condition the reaction takes more\r\ntime. In the hair-trigger condition in which we stand when making\r\nreactions by the \u0027muscular\u0027 method, we sometimes respond to a wrong\r\nsignal, especially if it be of the same \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e with the one we expect.\r\nThe signal is but the spark which touches off a train already laid.\r\nThere is no thought in the matter; the hand jerks by an involuntary\r\nstart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese experiments are thus in no sense measurements of the swiftness of\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e. Only when we complicate them is there a chance for anything\r\nlike an intellectual operation to occur. They may be complicated in\r\nvarious ways. The reaction may be withheld until the signal has\r\nconsciously awakened a distinct idea (Wundt\u0027s discrimination-time,\r\nassociation-time), and may then be performed. Or there may be a variety\r\nof possible signals, each with a different reaction assigned to it, and\r\nthe reacter may be uncertain which one he is about to receive. The\r\nreaction would then hardly seem to occur without a preliminary\r\nrecognition and choice. Even here, however, the discrimination and\r\nchoice are widely different from the intellectual operations of which we\r\nare ordinarily conscious under those names. Meanwhile the simple\r\nreaction-time remains as the starting point of all these superinduced\r\ncomplications, and its own variations must be briefly passed in review.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reaction-time varies with the \u003ci\u003eindividual\u003c/i\u003e and his \u003ci\u003eage\u003c/i\u003e. Old and\r\nuncultivated people have it long (nearly a second, in an old pauper\r\nobserved by Exner). Children have it long (half a second, according to\r\nHerzen).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePractice\u003c/i\u003e shortens it to a quantity which is for each individual\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_124\" id=\"page_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{124}\u003c/span\u003e a\r\nminimum beyond which no farther reduction can be made. The aforesaid old\r\npauper\u0027s time was, after much practice, reduced to 0.1866 sec.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFatigue\u003c/i\u003e lengthens it, and \u003ci\u003econcentration of attention\u003c/i\u003e shortens it.\r\nThe \u003ci\u003enature of the signal\u003c/i\u003e makes it vary. I here bring together the\r\naverages which have been obtained by some observers:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"2\" cellspacing=\"2\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eHirsch.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eHankel.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eExner.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eWundt.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eSound\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.149\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.1505\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.1360\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.167\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eLight\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.200\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.2246\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.1506\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.222\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eTouch\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.182\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.1546\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.1337\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e0.213\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be observed that \u003ci\u003esound\u003c/i\u003e is more promptly reacted on than either\r\n\u003ci\u003esight\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003etouch\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eTaste\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esmell\u003c/i\u003e are slower than either. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eintensity of the signal\u003c/i\u003e makes a difference. The intenser the stimulus\r\nthe shorter the time. Herzen compared the reaction from a \u003ci\u003ecorn\u003c/i\u003e on the\r\ntoe with that from the skin of the hand of the same subject. The two\r\nplaces were stimulated simultaneously, and the subject tried to react\r\nsimultaneously with both hand and foot, but the foot always went\r\nquickest. When the sound skin of the foot was touched instead of the\r\ncorn, it was the hand which always reacted first. \u003ci\u003eIntoxicants\u003c/i\u003e on the\r\nwhole lengthen the time, but much depends on the dose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eComplicated Reactions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These occur when some kind of intellectual\r\noperation accompanies the reaction. The rational place in which to\r\nreport of them would be under the head of the various intellectual\r\noperations concerned. But certain persons prefer to see all these\r\nmeasurements bunched together regardless of context; so, to meet their\r\nviews, I give the complicated reactions here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we have to think before reacting it is obvious that there is no\r\ndefinite reaction-time of which we can talk\u0026mdash;it all depends on how long\r\nwe think. The only times we can measure are the \u003ci\u003eminimum\u003c/i\u003e times of\r\ncertain determinate and very simple intellectual operations. The \u003ci\u003etime\r\nrequired for discrimination\u003c/i\u003e has thus been made a subject of\r\nexperimental measurement. Wundt calls it \u003ci\u003eUnterscheidungszeit\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_125\" id=\"page_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{125}\u003c/span\u003e His\r\nsubjects (whose simple reaction-time had previously been determined)\r\nwere required to make a movement, always the same, the instant they\r\ndiscerned \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e of two or more signals they received. The \u003ci\u003eexcess\u003c/i\u003e of\r\ntime occupied by these reactions \u003ci\u003eover the simple reaction-time\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nwhich only one signal was used and known in advance, measured, according\r\nto Wundt, the time required for the act of discrimination. It was found\r\nlonger when four different signals were irregularly used than when only\r\ntwo were used. When two were used (the signals being the sudden\r\nappearance of a black or of a white object), the average times of three\r\nobservers were respectively (in seconds)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.050\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.047\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.079\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen four signals were used, a red and a green light being added to the\r\nothers, it became, for the same observers,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.157\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.073\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.132\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProf. Cattell found he could get no results by this method, and reverted\r\nto one used by observers previous to Wundt and which Wundt had rejected.\r\nThis is the \u003ci\u003eeinfache Wahlmethode\u003c/i\u003e, as Wundt calls it. The reacter\r\nawaits the signal and reacts if it is of one sort, but omits to act if\r\nit is of another sort. The reaction thus occurs after discrimination;\r\nthe motor impulse cannot be sent to the hand until the subject knows\r\nwhat the signal is. Reacting in this way, Prof. Cattell found the\r\nincrement of time required for distinguishing a white signal from no\r\nsignal to be, in two observers,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.030\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eand\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.050;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ethat for distinguishing one color from another was similarly\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.100\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eand\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.110;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ethat for distinguishing a certain color from ten other colors,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.105\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eand\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.117;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ethat for distinguishing the letter A in ordinary print from the letter\r\nZ,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.142\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eand\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.137;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_126\" id=\"page_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{126}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ethat for distinguishing a given letter from all the rest of the alphabet\r\n(not reacting until that letter appeared),\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.119\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eand\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.116;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003ethat for distinguishing a word from any of twenty-five other words, from\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.118\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eto\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e0.158 sec.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003e\u0026mdash;the difference depending on the length of the words and the\r\nfamiliarity of the language to which they belonged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProf. Cattell calls attention to the fact that the time for\r\ndistinguishing a word is often but little more than that for\r\ndistinguishing a letter: \"We do not, therefore,\" he says, \"distinguish\r\nseparately the letters of which a word is composed, but the word as a\r\nwhole. The application of this in teaching children to read is evident.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe also finds a great difference in the time with which various letters\r\nare distinguished, E being particularly bad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe time required for association\u003c/i\u003e of one idea with another has been\r\nmeasured. Gallon, using a very simple apparatus, found that the sight of\r\nan unforeseen word would awaken an associated \u0027idea\u0027 in about ⅚ of a\r\nsecond. Wundt next made determinations in which the \u0027cue\u0027 was given by\r\nsingle-syllabled words called out by an assistant. The person\r\nexperimented on had to press a key as soon as the sound of the word\r\nawakened an associated idea. Both word and reaction were\r\nchronographically registered, and the total time-interval between the\r\ntwo amounted, in four observers, to 1.009, 0.896, 1.037, and 1.154\r\nseconds respectively. From this the simple reaction-time and the time of\r\nmerely identifying the word\u0027s sound (the \u0027apperception-time,\u0027 as Wundt\r\ncalls it) must be subtracted, to get the exact time required for the\r\nassociated idea to arise. These times were separately determined and\r\nsubtracted. The difference, called by Wundt \u003ci\u003eassociation-time\u003c/i\u003e,\r\namounted, in the same four persons, to 706, 723, 752, and 874\r\nthousandths of a second respectively. The length of the last figure is\r\ndue to the fact that the person reacting was an American, whose\r\nassociations with German words would naturally be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_127\" id=\"page_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{127}\u003c/span\u003e slower than those of\r\nnatives. The shortest association-time noted was when the word \u0027Sturm\u0027\r\nsuggested to Wundt the word \u0027Wind\u0027 in 0.341 second. Prof. Cattell made\r\nsome interesting observations upon the association-time between the look\r\nof letters and their names. \"I pasted letters,\" he says, \"on a revolving\r\ndrum, and determined at what rate they could be read aloud as they\r\npassed by a slit in a screen.\" He found it to vary according as one, or\r\nmore than one, letter was visible at a time through the slit, and gives\r\nhalf a second as about the time which it takes to see and name a single\r\nletter seen alone. The rapidity of a man\u0027s \u003ci\u003ereading\u003c/i\u003e is of course a\r\nmeasure of that of his associations, since each seen word must call up\r\nits name, at least, ere it is read. \"I find,\" says Prof. Cattell, \"that\r\nit takes about twice as long to read (aloud, as fast as possible) words\r\nwhich have no connection, as words which make sentences, and letters\r\nwhich have no connection, as letters which make words. When the words\r\nmake sentences and the letters words, not only do the processes of\r\nseeing and naming overlap, but by one mental effort the subject can\r\nrecognize a whole group of words or letters, and by one will-act choose\r\nthe motions to be made in naming, so that the rate at which the words\r\nand letters are read is really only limited by the maximum rapidity at\r\nwhich the speech-organs can be moved…. For example, when reading as\r\nfast as possible the writer\u0027s rate was, English 138, French 167, German\r\n250, Italian 327, Latin 434, and Greek 484; the figures giving the\r\nthousandths of a second taken to read each word. Experiments made on\r\nothers strikingly confirm these results. The subject does not know that\r\nhe is reading the foreign language more slowly than his own; this\r\nexplains why foreigners seem to talk so fast….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The time required to see and name colors and pictures of objects was\r\ndetermined in the same way. The time was found to be about the same\r\n(over ½ sec.) for colors as for pictures, and about twice as long as for\r\nwords and letters. Other experiments I have made show that we can\r\nrecognize\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_128\" id=\"page_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{128}\u003c/span\u003e a single color or picture in a slightly shorter time than a\r\nword or letter, but take longer to name it. This is because, in the case\r\nof words and letters, the association between the idea and the name has\r\ntaken place so often that the process has become automatic, whereas in\r\nthe case of colors and pictures we must by a voluntary effort choose the\r\nname.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Romanes has found \"astonishing differences in the \u003ci\u003emaximum\u003c/i\u003e rate of\r\nreading which is possible to different individuals, all of whom have\r\nbeen accustomed to extensive reading. That is to say, the difference may\r\namount to 4 to 1; or, otherwise stated, in a given time one individual\r\nmay be able to read four times as much as another. Moreover, it appeared\r\nthat there was no relationship between slowness of reading and power of\r\nassimilation; on the contrary, when all the efforts are directed to\r\nassimilating as much as possible in a given time, the rapid readers (as\r\nshown by their written notes) usually give a better account of the\r\nportions of the paragraph which have been compassed by the slow readers\r\nthan the latter are able to give; and the most rapid reader I have found\r\nis also the best at assimilating. I should further say,\" Dr. R.\r\ncontinues, \"that there is no relationship between rapidity of perception\r\nas thus tested and intellectual activity as tested by the general\r\nresults of intellectual work; for I have tried the experiment with\r\nseveral highly distinguished men in science and literature, most of whom\r\nI found to be slow readers.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe degree of concentration of the attention\u003c/i\u003e has much to do with\r\ndetermining the reaction-time. Anything which baffles or distracts us\r\nbeforehand, or startles us in the signal, makes the time proportionally\r\nlong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Summation of Stimuli.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Throughout the nerve-centres it is a law that\r\n\u003ci\u003ea stimulus which would be inadequate by itself to excite a nerve-centre\r\nto effective discharge may, by acting with one or more other stimuli\r\n(equally ineffectual by themselves alone) bring the discharge about\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_129\" id=\"page_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{129}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe natural way to consider this is as a summation of tensions which at\r\nlast overcome a resistance. The first of them produce a \u0027latent\r\nexcitement\u0027 or a \u0027heightened irritability\u0027\u0026mdash;the phrase is immaterial so\r\nfar as practical consequences go;\u0026mdash;the last is the straw which breaks\r\nthe camel\u0027s back.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is proved by many physiological experiments which cannot here be\r\ndetailed; but outside of the laboratory we constantly apply the law of\r\nsummation in our practical appeals. If a car-horse balks, the final way\r\nof starting him is by applying a number of customary incitements at\r\nonce. If the driver uses reins and voice, if one bystander pulls at his\r\nhead, another lashes his hind-quarters, the conductor rings the bell,\r\nand the dismounted passengers shove the car, all at the same moment, his\r\nobstinacy generally yields, and he goes on his way rejoicing. If we are\r\nstriving to remember a lost name or fact, we think of as many \u0027cues\u0027 as\r\npossible, so that by their joint action they may recall what no one of\r\nthem can recall alone. The sight of a dead prey will often not stimulate\r\na beast to pursuit, but if the sight of movement be added to that of\r\nform, pursuit occurs. \"Brücke noted that his brainless hen which made no\r\nattempt to peck at the grain under her very eyes, began pecking if the\r\ngrain were thrown on the ground with force, so as to produce a rattling\r\nsound.\" \"Dr. Allen Thomson hatched out some chickens on a carpet, where\r\nhe kept them for several days. They showed no inclination to scrape, …\r\nbut when Dr. Thomson sprinkled a little gravel on the carpet, … the\r\nchickens immediately began their scraping movements.\" A strange person,\r\nand darkness, are both of them stimuli to fear and mistrust in dogs (and\r\nfor the matter of that, in men). Neither circumstance alone may awaken\r\noutward manifestations, but together, i.e. when the strange man is met\r\nin the dark, the dog will be excited to violent defiance. Street hawkers\r\nwell know the efficacy of summation, for they arrange themselves in a\r\nline on the sidewalk, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_130\" id=\"page_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{130}\u003c/span\u003e the passer often buys from the last one of\r\nthem, through the effect of the reiterated solicitation, what he refused\r\nto buy from the first in the row.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_50\" id=\"ill_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 470px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-130-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-130-sml.png\" width=\"470\" height=\"132\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 50.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;Sphygmographic pulse-tracing. \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, during\r\nintellectual repose; \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, during intellectual activity. (Mosso.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCerebral Blood-supply.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All parts of the cortex, when electrically\r\nexcited, produce alterations both of respiration and circulation. The\r\nblood-pressure somewhat rises, as a rule, all over the body, no matter\r\nwhere the cortical irritation is applied, though the motor zone is the\r\nmost sensitive region for the purpose. Slowing and quickening of the\r\nheart are also observed. Mosso, using his \u0027plethysmograph\u0027 as an\r\nindicator, discovered that the blood-supply to the arms diminished\r\nduring intellectual activity, and found furthermore that the arterial\r\ntension (as shown by the sphygmograph) was increased in these members\r\n(see \u003ca href=\"#ill_50\"\u003eFig. 50\u003c/a\u003e). So slight an emotion as that produced by the entrance of\r\nProfessor Ludwig into the laboratory was instantly followed by a\r\nshrinkage of the arms. The brain itself is an excessively vascular\r\norgan, a sponge full of blood, in fact; and another of Mosso\u0027s\r\ninventions showed that when less blood went to the legs, more went to\r\nthe head. The subject to be observed lay on a delicately balanced table\r\nwhich could tip downward either at the head or at the foot if the weight\r\nof either end were increased. The moment emotional or intellectual\r\nactivity began in the subject, down went the head-end, in consequence of\r\nthe redistribution of blood in his system. But the best proof of the\r\nimmediate afflux of blood to the brain during mental activity is due to\r\nMosso\u0027s observations on three persons whose brain had been laid bare by\r\nlesion of the skull.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_131\" id=\"page_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{131}\u003c/span\u003e By means of apparatus described in his book, this\r\nphysiologist was enabled to let the brain-pulse record itself directly\r\nby a tracing. The intra-cranial blood-pressure rose immediately whenever\r\nthe subject was spoken to, or when he began to think actively, as in\r\nsolving a problem in mental arithmetic. Mosso gives in his work a large\r\nnumber of reproductions of tracings which show the instantaneity of the\r\nchange of blood-supply, whenever the mental activity was quickened by\r\nany cause whatever, intellectual or emotional. He relates of his female\r\nsubject that one day whilst tracing her brain-pulse he observed a sudden\r\nrise with no apparent outer or inner cause. She however confessed to him\r\nafterwards that at that moment she had caught sight of a \u003ci\u003eskull\u003c/i\u003e on top\r\nof a piece of furniture in the room, and that this had given her a\r\nslight emotion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCerebral Thermometry.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eBrain-activity seems accompanied by a local\r\ndisengagement of heat.\u003c/i\u003e The earliest careful work in this direction was\r\nby Dr. J. S. Lombard in 1867. He noted the changes in delicate\r\nthermometers and electric piles placed against the scalp in human\r\nbeings, and found that any intellectual effort, such as computing,\r\ncomposing, reciting poetry silently or aloud, and especially that\r\nemotional excitement such as an angry fit, caused a general rise of\r\ntemperature, which rarely exceeded a degree Fahrenheit. In 1870 the\r\nindefatigable Schiff took up the subject, experimenting on live dogs and\r\nchickens by plunging thermo-electric needles into the substance of their\r\nbrain. After habituation was established, he tested the animals with\r\nvarious sensations, tactile, optic, olfactory, and auditory. He found\r\nvery regularly an abrupt alteration of the intra-cerebral temperature.\r\nWhen, for instance, he presented an empty roll of paper to the nose of\r\nhis dog as it lay motionless, there was a small deflection, but when a\r\npiece of meat was in the paper the deflection was much greater. Schiff\r\nconcluded from these and other experiments that sensorial activity heats\r\nthe brain-tissue, but he did not try to localize the increment of heat\r\nbeyond finding\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_132\" id=\"page_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{132}\u003c/span\u003e that it was in both hemispheres, whatever might be the\r\nsensation applied. Dr. Amidon in 1880 made a farther step forward, in\r\nlocalizing the heat produced by voluntary muscular contractions.\r\nApplying a number of delicate surface-thermometers simultaneously\r\nagainst the scalp, he found that when different muscles of the body were\r\nmade to contract vigorously for ten minutes or more, different regions\r\nof the scalp rose in temperature, that the regions were well focalized,\r\nand that the rise of temperature was often considerably over a\r\nFahrenheit degree. To a large extent these regions correspond to the\r\ncentres for the same movements assigned by Ferrier and others on other\r\ngrounds; only they cover more of the skull.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePhosphorus and Thought.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Considering the large amount of popular\r\nnonsense which passes current on this subject I may be pardoned for a\r\nbrief mention of it here. \u003ci\u003e\u0027Ohne Phosphor, kein Gedanke\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 was a noted\r\nwar-cry of the \u0027materialists\u0027 during the excitement on that subject\r\nwhich filled Germany in the \u002760s. The brain, like every other organ of\r\nthe body, contains phosphorus, and a score of other chemicals besides.\r\nWhy the phosphorus should be picked out as its essence, no one knows. It\r\nwould be equally true to say, \u0027Ohne Wasser, kein Gedanke,\u0027 or \u0027Ohne\r\nKochsalz, kein Gedanke\u0027; for thought would stop as quickly if the brain\r\nshould dry up or lose its NaCl as if it lost its phosphorus. In America\r\nthe phosphorus-delusion has twined itself round a saying quoted (rightly\r\nor wrongly) from Professor L. Agassiz, to the effect that fishermen are\r\nmore intelligent than farmers because they eat so much fish, which\r\ncontains so much phosphorus. All the alleged facts may be doubted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only straight way to ascertain the importance of phosphorus to\r\nthought would be to find whether more is excreted by the brain during\r\nmental activity than during rest. Unfortunately we cannot do this\r\ndirectly, but can only gauge the amount of PO\u003csub\u003e5\u003c/sub\u003e in the urine, and this\r\nprocedure has been adopted by a variety of observers, some of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_133\" id=\"page_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{133}\u003c/span\u003e whom\r\nfound the phosphates in the urine diminished, whilst others found them\r\nincreased, by intellectual work. On the whole, it is impossible to trace\r\nany constant relation. In maniacal excitement less phosphorus than usual\r\nseems to be excreted. More is excreted during sleep. The fact that\r\nphosphorus-preparations may do good in nervous exhaustion proves nothing\r\nas to the part played by phosphorus in mental activity. Like iron,\r\narsenic, and other remedies it is a stimulant or tonic, of whose\r\nintimate workings in the system we know absolutely nothing, and which\r\nmoreover does good in an extremely small number of the cases in which it\r\nis prescribed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phosphorus-philosophers have often compared thought to a secretion.\r\n\"The brain secretes thought, as the kidneys secrete urine, or as the\r\nliver secretes bile,\" are phrases which one sometimes hears. The lame\r\nanalogy need hardly be pointed out. The materials which the brain \u003ci\u003epours\r\ninto the blood\u003c/i\u003e (cholesterin, creatin, xanthin, or whatever they may be)\r\nare the analogues of the urine and the bile, being in fact real material\r\nexcreta. As far as these matters go, the brain is a ductless gland. But\r\nwe know of nothing connected with liver-and kidney-activity which can be\r\nin the remotest degree compared with the stream of thought that\r\naccompanies the brain\u0027s material secretions.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_134\" id=\"page_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{134}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_X\" id=\"CHAPTER_X\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eHABIT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIts Importance for Psychology.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There remains a condition of general\r\nneural activity so important as to deserve a chapter by itself\u0026mdash;I refer\r\nto the aptitude of the nerve-centres, especially of the hemispheres, for\r\nacquiring habits. \u003ci\u003eAn acquired habit, from the physiological point of\r\nview, is nothing but a new pathway of discharge formed in the brain, by\r\nwhich certain incoming currents ever after tend to escape.\u003c/i\u003e That is the\r\nthesis of this chapter; and we shall see in the later and more\r\npsychological chapters that such functions as the association of ideas,\r\nperception, memory, reasoning, the education of the will, etc., etc.,\r\ncan best be understood as results of the formation \u003ci\u003ede novo\u003c/i\u003e of just\r\nsuch pathways of discharge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHabit has a physical basis.\u003c/b\u003e The moment one tries to define what habit\r\nis, one is led to the fundamental properties of matter. The laws of\r\nNature are nothing but the immutable habits which the different\r\nelementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon\r\neach other. In the organic world, however, the habits are more variable\r\nthan this. Even instincts vary from one individual to another of a kind;\r\nand are modified in the same individual, as we shall later see, to suit\r\nthe exigencies of the case. On the principles of the atomistic\r\nphilosophy the habits of an elementary particle of matter cannot change,\r\nbecause the particle is itself an unchangeable thing; but those of a\r\ncompound mass of matter can change, because they are in the last\r\ninstance due to the structure of the compound, and either outward forces\r\nor inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that structure\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_135\" id=\"page_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{135}\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninto something different from what it was. That is, they can do so if\r\nthe body be plastic enough to maintain its integrity, and be not\r\ndisrupted when its structure yields. The change of structure here spoken\r\nof need not involve the outward shape; it may be invisible and\r\nmolecular, as when a bar of iron becomes magnetic or crystalline through\r\nthe action of certain outward causes, or india-rubber becomes friable,\r\nor plaster \u0027sets.\u0027 All these changes are rather slow; the material in\r\nquestion opposes a certain resistance to the modifying cause, which it\r\ntakes time to overcome, but the gradual yielding whereof often saves the\r\nmaterial from being disintegrated altogether. When the structure has\r\nyielded, the same inertia becomes a condition of its comparative\r\npermanence in the new form, and of the new habits the body then\r\nmanifests. \u003ci\u003ePlasticity\u003c/i\u003e, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the\r\npossession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but\r\nstrong enough not to yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of\r\nequilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set\r\nof habits. Organic matter, especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with\r\na very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we may\r\nwithout hesitation lay down as our first proposition the following: that\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe phenomena of habit in living beings are due to the plasticity of\r\nthe organic materials of which their bodies are composed\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe philosophy of habit is thus, in the first instance, a chapter in\r\nphysics rather than in physiology or psychology. That it is at bottom a\r\nphysical principle, is admitted by all good recent writers on the\r\nsubject. They call attention to analogues of acquired habits exhibited\r\nby dead matter. Thus, M. Léon Dumont writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Every one knows how a garment, after having been worn a certain time,\r\nclings to the shape of the body better than when it was new; there has\r\nbeen a change in the tissue, and this change is a new habit of cohesion.\r\nA lock works better after being used some time; at the outset more\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_136\" id=\"page_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{136}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nforce was required to overcome certain roughness in the mechanism. The\r\novercoming of their resistance is a phenomenon of habituation. It costs\r\nless trouble to fold a paper when it has been folded already; … and\r\njust so in the nervous system the impressions of outer objects fashion\r\nfor themselves more and more appropriate paths, and these vital\r\nphenomena recur under similar excitements from without, when they have\r\nbeen interrupted a certain time.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot in the nervous system alone. A scar anywhere is a \u003ci\u003elocus minoris\r\nresistentiæ\u003c/i\u003e, more liable to be abraded, inflamed, to suffer pain and\r\ncold, than are the neighboring parts. A sprained ankle, a dislocated\r\narm, are in danger of being sprained or dislocated again; joints that\r\nhave once been attacked by rheumatism or gout, mucous membranes that\r\nhave been the seat of catarrh, are with each fresh recurrence more prone\r\nto a relapse, until often the morbid state chronically substitutes\r\nitself for the sound one. And in the nervous system itself it is well\r\nknown how many so-called functional diseases seem to keep themselves\r\ngoing simply because they happen to have once begun; and how the\r\nforcible cutting short by medicine of a few attacks is often sufficient\r\nto enable the physiological forces to get possession of the field again,\r\nand to bring the organs back to functions of health. Epilepsies,\r\nneuralgias, convulsive affections of various sorts, insomnias, are so\r\nmany cases in point. And, to take what are more obviously habits, the\r\nsuccess with which a \u0027weaning\u0027 treatment can often be applied to the\r\nvictims of unhealthy indulgence of passion, or of mere complaining or\r\nirascible disposition, shows us how much the morbid manifestations\r\nthemselves were due to the mere inertia of the nervous organs, when once\r\nlaunched on a false career.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHabits are due to pathways through the nerve-centres.\u003c/b\u003e If habits are due\r\nto the plasticity of materials to outward agents, we can immediately see\r\nto what outward influences, if to any, the brain-matter is plastic. Not\r\nto mechanical pressures, not to thermal changes, not to any of the\r\nforces\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_137\" id=\"page_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{137}\u003c/span\u003e to which all the other organs of our body are exposed; for, as\r\nwe saw on pp. \u003ca href=\"#page_009\"\u003e9-10\u003c/a\u003e, Nature has so blanketed and wrapped the brain about\r\nthat the only impressions that can be made upon it are through the\r\nblood, on the one hand, and the sensory nerve-roots, on the other; and\r\nit is to the infinitely attenuated currents that pour in through these\r\nlatter channels that the hemispherical cortex shows itself to be so\r\npeculiarly susceptible. The currents, once in, must find a way out. In\r\ngetting out they leave their traces in the paths which they take. The\r\nonly thing they \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e do, in short, is to deepen old paths or to make\r\nnew ones; and the whole plasticity of the brain sums itself up in two\r\nwords when we call it an organ in which currents pouring in from the\r\nsense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do not easily\r\ndisappear. For, of course, a simple habit, like every other nervous\r\nevent\u0026mdash;the habit of snuffling, for example, or of putting one\u0027s hands\r\ninto one\u0027s pockets, or of biting one\u0027s nails\u0026mdash;is, mechanically, nothing\r\nbut a reflex discharge; and its anatomical substratum must be a path in\r\nthe system. The most complex habits, as we shall presently see more\r\nfully, are, from the same point of view, nothing but \u003ci\u003econcatenated\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndischarges in the nerve-centres, due to the presence there of systems of\r\nreflex paths, so organized as to wake each other up successively\u0026mdash;the\r\nimpression produced by one muscular contraction serving as a stimulus to\r\nprovoke the next, until a final impression inhibits the process and\r\ncloses the chain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be noticed that the growth of structural modification in living\r\nmatter may be more rapid than in any lifeless mass, because the\r\nincessant nutritive renovation of which the living matter is the seat\r\ntends often to corroborate and fix the impressed modification, rather\r\nthan to counteract it by renewing the original constitution of the\r\ntissue that has been impressed. Thus, we notice after exercising our\r\nmuscles or our brain in a new way, that we can do so no longer at that\r\ntime; but after a day or two of rest, when we resume the discipline, our\r\nincrease in skill\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_138\" id=\"page_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{138}\u003c/span\u003e not seldom surprises us. I have often noticed this in\r\nlearning a tune; and it has led a German author to say that we learn to\r\nswim during the winter, and to skate during the summer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePractical Effects of Habit.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;First, habit simplifies our movements,\r\nmakes them accurate, and diminishes fatigue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMan is born with a tendency to do more things than he has ready-made\r\narrangements for in his nerve-centres. Most of the performances of other\r\nanimals are automatic. But in him the number of them is so enormous that\r\nmost of them must be the fruit of painful study. If practice did not\r\nmake perfect, nor habit economize the expense of nervous and muscular\r\nenergy, he would be in a sorry plight. As Dr. Maudsley says:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_30_30\" id=\"FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_30_30\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the\r\ncareful direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment\r\non each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime\r\nmight be confined to one or two deeds\u0026mdash;that no progress could take place\r\nin development. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and\r\nundressing himself; the attitude of his body would absorb all his\r\nattention and energy; the washing of his hands or the fastening of a\r\nbutton would be as difficult to him on each occasion as to the child on\r\nits first trial; and he would, furthermore, be completely exhausted by\r\nhis exertions. Think of the pains necessary to teach a child to stand,\r\nof the many efforts which it must make, and of the ease with which it at\r\nlast stands, unconscious of any effort. For while secondarily-automatic\r\nacts are accomplished with comparatively little weariness\u0026mdash;in this\r\nregard approaching the organic movements, or the original reflex\r\nmovements\u0026mdash;the conscious effort of the will soon produces exhaustion. A\r\nspinal cord without … memory would simply be an idiotic spinal\r\ncord…. It is impossible for an individual\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_139\" id=\"page_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{139}\u003c/span\u003e to realize how much he owes\r\nto its automatic agency until disease has impaired its functions.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecondly, \u003ci\u003ehabit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts\r\nare performed\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne may state this abstractly thus: If an act require for its execution\r\na chain, \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G\u003c/i\u003e, etc., of successive nervous events, then\r\nin the first performances of the action the conscious will must choose\r\neach of these events from a number of wrong alternatives that tend to\r\npresent themselves; but habit soon brings it about that each event calls\r\nup its own appropriate successor without any alternative offering\r\nitself, and without any reference to the conscious will, until at last\r\nthe whole chain, \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G\u003c/i\u003e, rattles itself off as soon as\r\n\u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e occurs, just as if \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and the rest of the chain were fused into a\r\ncontinuous stream. Whilst we are learning to walk, to ride, to swim,\r\nskate, fence, write, play, or sing, we interrupt ourselves at every step\r\nby unnecessary movements and false notes. When we are proficients, on\r\nthe contrary, the results follow not only with the very minimum of\r\nmuscular action requisite to bring them forth, but they follow from a\r\nsingle instantaneous \u0027cue.\u0027 The marksman sees the bird, and, before he\r\nknows it, he has aimed and shot. A gleam in his adversary\u0027s eye, a\r\nmomentary pressure from his rapier, and the fencer finds that he has\r\ninstantly made the right parry and return. A glance at the musical\r\nhieroglyphics, and the pianist\u0027s fingers have rippled through a shower\r\nof notes. And not only is it the right thing at the right time that we\r\nthus involuntarily do, but the wrong thing also, if it be an habitual\r\nthing. Who is there that has never wound up his watch on taking off his\r\nwaistcoat in the daytime, or taken his latch-key out on arriving at the\r\ndoor-step of a friend? Persons in going to their bedroom to dress for\r\ndinner have been known to take off one garment after another and finally\r\nto get into bed, merely because that was the habitual issue of the first\r\nfew movements when performed at a later hour. We all have a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_140\" id=\"page_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{140}\u003c/span\u003e definite\r\nroutine manner of performing certain daily offices connected with the\r\ntoilet, with the opening and shutting of familiar cupboards, and the\r\nlike. But our higher thought-centres know hardly anything about the\r\nmatter. Few men can tell off-hand which sock, shoe, or trousers-leg they\r\nput on first. They must first mentally rehearse the act; and even that\r\nis often insufficient\u0026mdash;the act must be \u003ci\u003eperformed\u003c/i\u003e. So of the questions,\r\nWhich valve of the shutters opens first? Which way does my door swing?\r\netc. I cannot \u003ci\u003etell\u003c/i\u003e the answer; yet my \u003ci\u003ehand\u003c/i\u003e never makes a mistake. No\r\none can \u003ci\u003edescribe\u003c/i\u003e the order in which he brushes his hair or teeth; yet\r\nit is likely that the order is a pretty fixed one in all of us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese results may be expressed as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn action grown habitual, what instigates each new muscular contraction\r\nto take place in its appointed order is not a thought or a perception,\r\nbut the \u003ci\u003esensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just\r\nfinished\u003c/i\u003e. A strictly voluntary act has to be guided by idea,\r\nperception, and volition, throughout its whole course. In habitual\r\naction, mere sensation is a sufficient guide, and the upper regions of\r\nbrain and mind are set comparatively free. A diagram will make the\r\nmatter clear:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_51\" id=\"ill_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 478px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-140-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-140-sml.png\" width=\"478\" height=\"162\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 51.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F, G\u003c/i\u003e represent an habitual chain of muscular\r\ncontractions, and let \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e, f\u003c/i\u003e stand for the several\r\nsensations which these contractions excite in us when they are\r\nsuccessively performed. Such sensations\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_141\" id=\"page_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{141}\u003c/span\u003e will usually be in the parts\r\nmoved, but they may also be effects of the movement upon the eye or the\r\near. Through them, and through them alone, we are made aware whether or\r\nnot the contraction has occurred. When the series, \u003ci\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F,\r\nG\u003c/i\u003e, is being learned, each of these sensations becomes the object of a\r\nseparate act of attention by the mind. We test each movement\r\nintellectually, to see if it have been rightly performed, before\r\nadvancing to the next. We hesitate, compare, choose, revoke, reject,\r\netc.; and the order by which the next movement is discharged is an\r\nexpress order from the ideational centres after this deliberation has\r\nbeen gone through.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn habitual action, on the contrary, the only impulse which the\r\nintellectual centres need send down is that which carries the command to\r\n\u003ci\u003estart\u003c/i\u003e. This is represented in the diagram by \u003ci\u003eV\u003c/i\u003e; it may be a thought\r\nof the first movement or of the last result, or a mere perception of\r\nsome of the habitual conditions of the chain, the presence, e.g., of the\r\nkeyboard near the hand. In the present example, no sooner has this\r\nconscious thought or volition instigated movement \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, than \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, through\r\nthe sensation \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e of its own occurrence, awakens \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e reflexly; \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e then\r\nexcites \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e through \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, and so on till the chain is ended, when the\r\nintellect generally takes cognizance of the final result. The\r\nintellectual perception at the end is indicated in the diagram by the\r\nsensible effect of the movement \u003ci\u003eG\u003c/i\u003e being represented at \u003ci\u003eG´\u003c/i\u003e, in the\r\nideational centres above the merely sensational line. The sensational\r\nimpressions, \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d, e, f\u003c/i\u003e, are all supposed to have their seat\r\nbelow the ideational level.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHabits depend on sensations not attended to.\u003c/b\u003e We have called \u003ci\u003ea, b, c, d,\r\ne, f\u003c/i\u003e, by the name of \u0027sensations.\u0027 If sensations, they are sensations\r\nto which we are usually inattentive; but that they are more than\r\nunconscious nerve-currents seems certain, for they catch our attention\r\nif they go wrong. Schneider\u0027s account of these sensations deserves to be\r\nquoted. In the act of walking, he says, even when our attention is\r\nentirely absorbed elsewhere,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_142\" id=\"page_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{142}\u003c/span\u003e it is doubtful whether we could preserve\r\nequilibrium if no sensation of our body\u0027s attitude were there, and\r\ndoubtful whether we should advance our leg if we had no sensation of its\r\nmovement as executed, and not even a minimal feeling of impulse to set\r\nit down. Knitting appears altogether mechanical, and the knitter keeps\r\nup her knitting even while she reads or is engaged in lively talk. But\r\nif we ask her how this is possible, she will hardly reply that the\r\nknitting goes on of itself. She will rather say that she has a feeling\r\nof it, that she feels in her hands that she knits and how she must knit,\r\nand that therefore the movements of knitting are called forth and\r\nregulated by the sensations associated therewithal, even when the\r\nattention is called away….\" Again: \"When a pupil begins to play on the\r\nviolin, to keep him from raising his right elbow in playing a book is\r\nplaced under his right armpit, which he is ordered to hold fast by\r\nkeeping the upper arm tight against his body. The muscular feelings, and\r\nfeelings of contact connected with the book, provoke an impulse to press\r\nit tight. But often it happens that the beginner, whose attention gets\r\nabsorbed in the production of the notes, lets drop the book. Later,\r\nhowever, this never happens; the faintest sensations of contact suffice\r\nto awaken the impulse to keep it in its place, and the attention may be\r\nwholly absorbed by the notes and the fingering with the left hand. \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nsimultaneous combination of movements is thus in the first instance\r\nconditioned by the facility with which in us, alongside of intellectual\r\nprocesses, processes of inattentive feeling may still go on.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEthical and Pedagogical Importance of the Principle of Habit.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"Habit a\r\nsecond nature! Habit is ten times nature,\" the Duke of Wellington is\r\nsaid to have exclaimed; and the degree to which this is true no one\r\nprobably can appreciate as well as one who is a veteran soldier himself.\r\nThe daily drill and the years of discipline end by fashioning a man\r\ncompletely over again, as to most of the possibilities of his conduct.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_143\" id=\"page_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{143}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There is a story,\" says Prof. Huxley, \"which is credible enough, though\r\nit may not be true, of a practical joker who, seeing a discharged\r\nveteran carrying home his dinner, suddenly called out, \u0027Attention!\u0027\r\nwhereupon the man instantly brought his hands down, and lost his mutton\r\nand potatoes in the gutter. The drill had been thorough, and its effects\r\nhad become embodied in the man\u0027s nervous structure.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRiderless cavalry-horses, at many a battle, have been seen to come\r\ntogether and go through their customary evolutions at the sound of the\r\nbugle-call. Most domestic beasts seem machines almost pure and simple,\r\nundoubtingly, unhesitatingly doing from minute to minute the duties they\r\nhave been taught, and giving no sign that the possibility of an\r\nalternative ever suggests itself to their mind. Men grown old in prison\r\nhave asked to be readmitted after being once set free. In a railroad\r\naccident a menagerie-tiger, whose cage had broken open, is said to have\r\nemerged, but presently crept back again, as if too much bewildered by\r\nhis new responsibilities, so that he was without difficulty secured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious\r\nconservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of\r\nordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings\r\nof the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of\r\nlife from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps\r\nthe fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the\r\nminer in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his\r\nlonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion\r\nby the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to\r\nfight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early\r\nchoice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there\r\nis no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again.\r\nIt keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of\r\ntwenty-five you\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_144\" id=\"page_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{144}\u003c/span\u003e see the professional mannerism settling down on the\r\nyoung commercial traveller, on the young doctor, on the young minister,\r\non the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage\r\nrunning through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices,\r\nthe ways of the \u0027shop,\u0027 in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no\r\nmore escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of\r\nfolds. On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the\r\nworld that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set\r\nlike plaster, and will never soften again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the period between twenty and thirty is the critical one in the\r\nformation of intellectual and professional habits, the period below\r\ntwenty is more important still for the fixing of \u003ci\u003epersonal\u003c/i\u003e habits,\r\nproperly so called, such as vocalization and pronunciation, gesture,\r\nmotion, and address. Hardly ever is a language learned after twenty\r\nspoken without a foreign accent; hardly ever can a youth transferred to\r\nthe society of his betters unlearn the nasality and other vices of\r\nspeech bred in him by the associations of his growing years. Hardly\r\never, indeed, no matter how much money there be in his pocket, can he\r\neven learn to \u003ci\u003edress\u003c/i\u003e like a gentleman-born. The merchants offer their\r\nwares as eagerly to him as to the veriest \u0027swell,\u0027 but he simply\r\n\u003ci\u003ecannot\u003c/i\u003e buy the right things. An invisible law, as strong as\r\ngravitation, keeps him within his orbit, arrayed this year as he was the\r\nlast; and how his better-clad acquaintances contrive to get the things\r\nthey wear will be for him a mystery till his dying day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe great thing, then, in all education, is to \u003ci\u003emake our nervous system\r\nour ally instead of our enemy\u003c/i\u003e. It is to fund and capitalize our\r\nacquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the fund. \u003ci\u003eFor this\r\nwe must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many\r\nuseful actions as we can\u003c/i\u003e, and guard against the growing into ways that\r\nare likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the\r\nplague. The more of the details of our daily life we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_145\" id=\"page_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{145}\u003c/span\u003e can hand over to\r\nthe effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind\r\nwill be set free for their own proper work. There is no more miserable\r\nhuman being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for\r\nwhom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of\r\nrising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of\r\nwork, are subjects of express volitional deliberation. Full half the\r\ntime of such a man goes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which\r\nought to be so ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his\r\nconsciousness at all. If there be such daily duties not yet ingrained in\r\nany one of my readers, let him begin this very hour to set the matter\r\nright.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Professor Bain\u0027s chapter on \u0027The Moral Habits\u0027 there are some\r\nadmirable practical remarks laid down. Two great maxims emerge from his\r\ntreatment. The first is that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the\r\nleaving off of an old one, we must take care to \u003ci\u003elaunch ourselves with\r\nas strong and decided an initiative as possible\u003c/i\u003e. Accumulate all the\r\npossible circumstances which shall re-enforce the right motives; put\r\nyourself assiduously in conditions that encourage the new way; make\r\nengagements incompatible with the old; take a public pledge, if the case\r\nallows; in short, envelop your resolution with every aid you know. This\r\nwill give your new beginning such a momentum that the temptation to\r\nbreak down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day\r\nduring which a breakdown is postponed adds to the chances of its not\r\noccurring at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second maxim is: \u003ci\u003eNever suffer an exception to occur till the new\r\nhabit is securely rooted in your life\u003c/i\u003e. Each lapse is like the letting\r\nfall of a ball of string which one is carefully winding up; a single\r\nslip undoes more than a great many turns will wind again. \u003ci\u003eContinuity\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof training is the great means of making the nervous system act\r\ninfallibly right. As Professor Bain says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The peculiarity of the moral habits, contradistinguishing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_146\" id=\"page_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{146}\u003c/span\u003e them from\r\nthe intellectual acquisitions, is the presence of two hostile powers,\r\none to be gradually raised into the ascendant over the other. It is\r\nnecessary, above all things, in such a situation, never to lose a\r\nbattle. Every gain on the wrong side undoes the effect of many conquests\r\non the right. The essential precaution, therefore, is so to regulate the\r\ntwo opposing powers that the one may have a series of uninterrupted\r\nsuccesses, until repetition has fortified it to such a degree as to\r\nenable it to cope with the opposition, under any circumstances. This is\r\nthe theoretically best career of mental progress.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe need of securing success at the \u003ci\u003eoutset\u003c/i\u003e is imperative. Failure at\r\nfirst is apt to damp the energy of all future attempts, whereas past\r\nexperiences of success nerve one to future vigor. Goethe says to a man\r\nwho consulted him about an enterprise but mistrusted his own powers:\r\n\"Ach! you need only blow on your hands!\" And the remark illustrates the\r\neffect on Goethe\u0027s spirits of his own habitually successful career.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question of \"tapering-off,\" in abandoning such habits as drink and\r\nopium-indulgence comes in here, and is a question about which experts\r\ndiffer within certain limits, and in regard to what may be best for an\r\nindividual case. In the main, however, all expert opinion would agree\r\nthat abrupt acquisition of the new habit is the best way, \u003ci\u003eif there be a\r\nreal possibility of carrying it out\u003c/i\u003e. We must be careful not to give the\r\nwill so stiff a task as to insure its defeat at the very outset; but,\r\n\u003ci\u003eprovided one can stand it\u003c/i\u003e, a sharp period of suffering, and then a\r\nfree time, is the best thing to aim at, whether in giving up a habit\r\nlike that of opium, or in simply changing one\u0027s hours of rising or of\r\nwork. It is surprising how soon a desire will die of inanition if it be\r\n\u003ci\u003enever\u003c/i\u003e fed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"One must first learn, unmoved, looking neither to the right nor left,\r\nto walk firmly on the strait and narrow path, before one can begin \u0027to\r\nmake one\u0027s self over again.\u0027 He who every day makes a fresh resolve is\r\nlike one who,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_147\" id=\"page_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{147}\u003c/span\u003e arriving at the edge of the ditch he is to leap, forever\r\nstops and returns for a fresh run. Without \u003ci\u003eunbroken\u003c/i\u003e advance there is\r\nno such thing as \u003ci\u003eaccumulation\u003c/i\u003e of the ethical forces possible, and to\r\nmake this possible, and to exercise us and habituate us in it, is the\r\nsovereign blessing of regular work.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_31_31\" id=\"FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_31_31\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA third maxim may be added to the preceding pair: \u003ci\u003eSeize the very first\r\npossible opportunity to act on every resolution you make, and on every\r\nemotional prompting you may experience in the direction of the habits\r\nyou aspire to gain\u003c/i\u003e. It is not in the moment of their forming, but in\r\nthe moment of their producing \u003ci\u003emotor effects\u003c/i\u003e, that resolves and\r\naspirations communicate the new \u0027set\u0027 to the brain. As the author last\r\nquoted remarks:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The actual presence of the practical opportunity alone furnishes the\r\nfulcrum upon which the lever can rest, by means of which the moral will\r\nmay multiply its strength, and raise itself aloft. He who has no solid\r\nground to press against will never get beyond the stage of empty\r\ngesture-making.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo matter how full a reservoir of \u003ci\u003emaxims\u003c/i\u003e one may possess, and no\r\nmatter how good one\u0027s \u003ci\u003esentiments\u003c/i\u003e may be, if one have not taken\r\nadvantage of every concrete opportunity to \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e, one\u0027s character may\r\nremain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions,\r\nhell is proverbially paved. And this is an obvious consequence of the\r\nprinciples we have laid down. A \u0027character,\u0027 as J. S. Mill says, \u0027is a\r\ncompletely fashioned will\u0027; and a will, in the sense in which he means\r\nit, is an aggregate of tendencies to act in a firm and prompt and\r\ndefinite way upon all the principal emergencies of life. A tendency to\r\nact only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the\r\nuninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur, and the\r\nbrain \u0027grows\u0027 to their use. When a resolve or a fine glow of feeling is\r\nallowed to evaporate without\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_148\" id=\"page_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{148}\u003c/span\u003e bearing practical fruit it is worse than a\r\nchance lost; it works so as positively to hinder future resolutions and\r\nemotions from taking the normal path of discharge. There is no more\r\ncontemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless\r\nsentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of\r\nsensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed.\r\nRousseau, inflaming all the mothers of France, by his eloquence, to\r\nfollow Nature and nurse their babies themselves, while he sends his own\r\nchildren to the foundling hospital, is the classical example of what I\r\nmean. But every one of us in his measure, whenever, after glowing for an\r\nabstractly formulated Good, he practically ignores some actual case,\r\namong the squalid \u0027other particulars\u0027 of which that same Good lurks\r\ndisguised, treads straight on Rousseau\u0027s path. All Goods are disguised\r\nby the vulgarity of their concomitants, in this work-a-day world; but\r\nwoe to him who can only recognize them when he thinks them in their pure\r\nand abstract form! The habit of excessive novel-reading and\r\ntheatre-going will produce true monsters in this line. The weeping of\r\nthe Russian lady over the fictitious personages in the play, while her\r\ncoachman is freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort of thing\r\nthat everywhere happens on a less glaring scale. Even the habit of\r\nexcessive indulgence in music, for those who are neither performers\r\nthemselves nor musically gifted enough to take it in a purely\r\nintellectual way, has probably a relaxing effect upon the character. One\r\nbecomes filled with emotions which habitually pass without prompting to\r\nany deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept up. The\r\nremedy would be, never to suffer one\u0027s self to have an emotion at a\r\nconcert, without expressing it afterward in \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e active way. Let the\r\nexpression be the least thing in the world\u0026mdash;speaking genially to one\u0027s\r\ngrandmother, or giving up one\u0027s seat in a horse-car, if nothing more\r\nheroic offers\u0026mdash;but let it not fail to take place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese latter cases make us aware that it is not simply\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_149\" id=\"page_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{149}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eparticular\r\nlines\u003c/i\u003e of discharge, but also \u003ci\u003egeneral forms\u003c/i\u003e of discharge, that seem to\r\nbe grooved out by habit in the brain. Just as, if we let our emotions\r\nevaporate, they get into a way of evaporating; so there is reason to\r\nsuppose that if we often flinch from making an effort, before we know it\r\nthe effort-making capacity will be gone; and that, if we suffer the\r\nwandering of our attention, presently it will wander all the time.\r\nAttention and effort are, as we shall see later, but two names for the\r\nsame psychic fact. To what brain-processes they correspond we do not\r\nknow. The strongest reason for believing that they do depend on\r\nbrain-processes at all, and are not pure acts of the spirit, is just\r\nthis fact, that they seem in some degree subject to the law of habit,\r\nwhich is a material law. As a final practical maxim, relative to these\r\nhabits of the will, we may, then, offer something like this: \u003ci\u003eKeep the\r\nfaculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every\r\nday\u003c/i\u003e. That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary\r\npoints, do every day or two something for no other reason than that you\r\nwould rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh,\r\nit may find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. Asceticism\r\nof this sort is like the insurance which a man pays on his house and\r\ngoods. The tax does him no good at the time, and possibly may never\r\nbring him a return. But if the fire \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e come, his having paid it will\r\nbe his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has daily inured himself\r\nto habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial\r\nin unnecessary things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks\r\naround him, and when his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff\r\nin the blast.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most powerful\r\nally of hortatory ethics. The hell to be endured hereafter, of which\r\ntheology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this\r\nworld by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could\r\nthe young but realize how soon they will become mere walking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_150\" id=\"page_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{150}\u003c/span\u003e bundles of\r\nhabits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic\r\nstate. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be\r\nundone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so\r\nlittle scar. The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson\u0027s play, excuses\r\nhimself for every fresh dereliction by saying, \u0027I won\u0027t count this\r\ntime!\u0027 Well! he may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it;\r\nbut it is being counted none the less. Down among his nerve-cells and\r\nfibres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to\r\nbe used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do\r\nis, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. Of course this has its\r\ngood side as well as its bad one. As we become permanent drunkards by so\r\nmany separate drinks, so we become saints in the moral, and authorities\r\nand experts in the practical and scientific spheres, by so many separate\r\nacts and hours of work. Let no youth have any anxiety about the upshot\r\nof his education, whatever the line of it may be. If he keep faithfully\r\nbusy each hour of the working day, he may safely leave the final result\r\nto itself. He can with perfect certainty count on waking up some fine\r\nmorning, to find himself one of the competent ones of his generation, in\r\nwhatever pursuit he may have singled out. Silently, between all the\r\ndetails of his business, the \u003ci\u003epower of judging\u003c/i\u003e in all that class of\r\nmatter will have built itself up within him as a possession that will\r\nnever pass away. Young people should know this truth in advance. The\r\nignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement and\r\nfaint-heartedness in youths embarking on arduous careers than all other\r\ncauses put together.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_151\" id=\"page_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{151}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XI\" id=\"CHAPTER_XI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe order of our study must be analytic.\u003c/b\u003e We are now prepared to begin\r\nthe introspective study of the adult consciousness itself. Most books\r\nadopt the so-called synthetic method. Starting with \u0027simple ideas of\r\nsensation,\u0027 and regarding these as so many atoms, they proceed to build\r\nup the higher states of mind out of their \u0027association,\u0027 \u0027integration,\u0027\r\nor \u0027fusion,\u0027 as houses are built by the agglutination of bricks. This\r\nhas the didactic advantages which the synthetic method usually has. But\r\nit commits one beforehand to the very questionable theory that our\r\nhigher states of consciousness are compounds of units; and instead of\r\nstarting with what the reader directly knows, namely his total concrete\r\nstates of mind, it starts with a set of supposed \u0027simple ideas\u0027 with\r\nwhich he has no immediate acquaintance at all, and concerning whose\r\nalleged interactions he is much at the mercy of any plausible phrase. On\r\nevery ground, then, the method of advancing from the simple to the\r\ncompound exposes us to illusion. All pedants and abstractionists will\r\nnaturally hate to abandon it. But a student who loves the fulness of\r\nhuman nature will prefer to follow the \u0027analytic\u0027 method, and to begin\r\nwith the most concrete facts, those with which he has a daily\r\nacquaintance in his own inner life. The analytic method will discover in\r\ndue time the elementary parts, if such exist, without danger of\r\nprecipitate assumption. The reader will bear in mind that our own\r\nchapters on sensation have dealt mainly with the physiological\r\nconditions thereof. They were put first as a mere matter of convenience,\r\nbecause incoming currents come first. \u003ci\u003ePsychologically\u003c/i\u003e they might\r\nbetter have come last. Pure sensations were\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_152\" id=\"page_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{152}\u003c/span\u003e described on \u003ca href=\"#page_012\"\u003epage 12\u003c/a\u003e as\r\nprocesses which in adult life are well-nigh unknown, and nothing was\r\nsaid which could for a moment lead the reader to suppose that they were\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eelements of composition\u003c/i\u003e of the higher states of mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Fundamental Fact.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The first and foremost concrete fact which every\r\none will affirm to belong to his inner experience is the fact that\r\n\u003ci\u003econsciousness of some sort goes on. \u0027States of mind\u0027 succeed each other\r\nin him.\u003c/i\u003e If we could say in English \u0027it thinks,\u0027 as we say \u0027it rains\u0027 or\r\n\u0027it blows,\u0027 we should be stating the fact most simply and with the\r\nminimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that \u003ci\u003ethought\r\ngoes on\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFour Characters in Consciousness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;How does it go on? We notice\r\nimmediately four important characters in the process, of which it shall\r\nbe the duty of the present chapter to treat in a general way:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) Every \u0027state\u0027 tends to be part of a personal consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) Within each personal consciousness states are always changing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) Each personal consciousness is sensibly continuous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4) It is interested in some parts of its object to the exclusion of\r\nothers, and welcomes or rejects\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003echooses\u003c/i\u003e from among them, in a\r\nword\u0026mdash;all the while.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn considering these four points successively, we shall have to plunge\r\n\u003ci\u003ein medias res\u003c/i\u003e as regards our nomenclature and use psychological terms\r\nwhich can only be adequately defined in later chapters of the book. But\r\nevery one knows what the terms mean in a rough way; and it is only in a\r\nrough way that we are now to take them. This chapter is like a painter\u0027s\r\nfirst charcoal sketch upon his canvas, in which no niceties appear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I say \u003ci\u003eevery \u0027state\u0027 or \u0027thought\u0027 is part of a personal\r\nconsciousness\u003c/i\u003e, \u0027personal consciousness\u0027 is one of the terms in\r\nquestion. Its meaning we know so long as no one asks us to define it,\r\nbut to give an accurate account of it is the most difficult of\r\nphilosophic tasks. This task we must\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_153\" id=\"page_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{153}\u003c/span\u003e confront in the next chapter; here\r\na preliminary word will suffice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this room\u0026mdash;this lecture-room, say\u0026mdash;there are a multitude of thoughts,\r\nyours and mine, some of which cohere mutually, and some not. They are as\r\nlittle each-for-itself and reciprocally independent as they are\r\nall-belonging-together. They are neither: no one of them is separate,\r\nbut each belongs with certain others and with none beside. My thought\r\nbelongs with \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e other thoughts, and your thought with \u003ci\u003eyour\u003c/i\u003e other\r\nthoughts. Whether anywhere in the room there be a \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e thought, which\r\nis nobody\u0027s thought, we have no means of ascertaining, for we have no\r\nexperience of its like. The only states of consciousness that we\r\nnaturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, minds,\r\nselves, concrete particular I\u0027s and you\u0027s.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach of these minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving\r\nor bartering between them. No thought even comes into direct \u003ci\u003esight\u003c/i\u003e of\r\na thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute\r\ninsulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the\r\nelementary psychic fact were not \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethis thought\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethat\r\nthought\u003c/i\u003e, but \u003ci\u003emy thought\u003c/i\u003e, every thought being \u003ci\u003eowned\u003c/i\u003e. Neither\r\ncontemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and\r\ncontent are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this\r\nbarrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between\r\nsuch thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature. Every one will\r\nrecognize this to be true, so long as the existence of \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncorresponding to the term \u0027personal mind\u0027 is all that is insisted on,\r\nwithout any particular view of its nature being implied. On these terms\r\nthe personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the\r\nimmediate datum in psychology. The universal conscious fact is not\r\n\u0027feelings and thoughts exist,\u0027 but \u0027I think\u0027 and \u0027I feel.\u0027 No\r\npsychology, at any rate, can question the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of personal\r\nselves. Thoughts connected as we feel them to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_154\" id=\"page_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{154}\u003c/span\u003e be connected are \u003ci\u003ewhat we\r\nmean\u003c/i\u003e by personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to\r\ninterpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their \u003ci\u003eworth\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConsciousness is in constant change.\u003c/b\u003e I do not mean by this to say that\r\nno one state of mind has any duration\u0026mdash;even if true, that would be hard\r\nto establish. What I wish to lay stress on is this, that \u003ci\u003eno state once\r\ngone can recur and be identical with what it was before\u003c/i\u003e. Now we are\r\nseeing, now hearing; now reasoning, now willing; now recollecting, now\r\nexpecting; now loving, now hating; and in a hundred other ways we know\r\nour minds to be alternately engaged. But all these are complex states,\r\nit may be said, produced by combination of simpler ones;\u0026mdash;do not the\r\nsimpler ones follow a different law? Are not the \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e which we\r\nget from the same object, for example, always the same? Does not the\r\nsame piano-key, struck with the same force, make us hear in the same\r\nway? Does not the same grass give us the same feeling of green, the same\r\nsky the same feeling of blue, and do we not get the same olfactory\r\nsensation no matter how many times we put our nose to the same flask of\r\ncologne? It seems a piece of metaphysical sophistry to suggest that we\r\ndo not; and yet a close attention to the matter shows that \u003ci\u003ethere is no\r\nproof that an incoming current ever gives us just the same bodily\r\nsensation twice\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWhat is got twice is the same\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eOBJECT\u003c/small\u003e. We hear the same \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e over and\r\nover again; we see the same \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e of green, or smell the same\r\nobjective perfume, or experience the same \u003ci\u003especies\u003c/i\u003e of pain. The\r\nrealities, concrete and abstract, physical and ideal, whose permanent\r\nexistence we believe in, seem to be constantly coming up again before\r\nour thought, and lead us, in our carelessness, to suppose that our\r\n\u0027ideas\u0027 of them are the same ideas. When we come, some time later, to\r\nthe chapter on Perception, we shall see how inveterate is our habit of\r\nsimply using our sensible impressions as stepping-stones to pass over to\r\nthe recognition of the realities whose presence they reveal. The grass\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_155\" id=\"page_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{155}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nout of the window now looks to me of the same green in the sun as in the\r\nshade, and yet a painter would have to paint one part of it dark brown,\r\nanother part bright yellow, to give its real sensational effect. We take\r\nno heed, as a rule, of the different way in which the same things look\r\nand sound and smell at different distances and under different\r\ncircumstances. The sameness of the \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e is what we are concerned to\r\nascertain; and any sensations that assure us of that will probably be\r\nconsidered in a rough way to be the same with each other. This is what\r\nmakes off-hand testimony about the subjective identity of different\r\nsensations well-nigh worthless as a proof of the fact. The entire\r\nhistory of what is called Sensation is a commentary on our inability to\r\ntell whether two sensible qualities received apart are exactly alike.\r\nWhat appeals to our attention far more than the absolute quality of an\r\nimpression is its \u003ci\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e to whatever other impressions we may have at\r\nthe same time. When everything is dark a somewhat less dark sensation\r\nmakes us see an object white. Helmholtz calculates that the white marble\r\npainted in a picture representing an architectural view by moonlight is,\r\nwhen seen by daylight, from ten to twenty thousand times brighter than\r\nthe real moonlit marble would be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a difference as this could never have been \u003ci\u003esensibly\u003c/i\u003e learned; it\r\nhad to be inferred from a series of indirect considerations. These make\r\nus believe that our sensibility is altering all the time, so that the\r\nsame object cannot easily give us the same sensation over again. We feel\r\nthings differently accordingly as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or\r\nfull, fresh or tired; differently at night and in the morning,\r\ndifferently in summer and in winter; and above all, differently in\r\nchildhood, manhood, and old age. And yet we never doubt that our\r\nfeelings reveal the same world, with the same sensible qualities and the\r\nsame sensible things occupying it. The difference of the sensibility is\r\nshown best by the difference of our emotion about the things from one\r\nage to another, or when we are in different\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_156\" id=\"page_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{156}\u003c/span\u003e organic moods. What was\r\nbright and exciting becomes weary, flat, and unprofitable. The bird\u0027s\r\nsong is tedious, the breeze is mournful, the sky is sad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo these indirect presumptions that our sensations, following the\r\nmutations of our capacity for feeling, are always undergoing an\r\nessential change, must be added another presumption, based on what must\r\nhappen in the brain. Every sensation corresponds to some cerebral\r\naction. For an identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the\r\nsecond time \u003ci\u003ein an unmodified brain\u003c/i\u003e. But as this, strictly speaking, is\r\na physiological impossibility, so is an unmodified feeling an\r\nimpossibility; for to every brain-modification, however small, we\r\nsuppose that there must correspond a change of equal amount in the\r\nconsciousness which the brain subserves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if the assumption of \u0027simple sensations\u0027 recurring in immutable\r\nshape is so easily shown to be baseless, how much more baseless is the\r\nassumption of immutability in the larger masses of our thought!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor there it is obvious and palpable that our state of mind is never\r\nprecisely the same. Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly\r\nspeaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of kind with our other\r\nthoughts of the same fact. When the identical fact recurs, we \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthink of it in a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different angle,\r\napprehend it in different relations from those in which it last\r\nappeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is the thought of\r\nit-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the consciousness of all\r\nthat dim context. Often we are ourselves struck at the strange\r\ndifferences in our successive views of the same thing. We wonder how we\r\never could have opined as we did last month about a certain matter. We\r\nhave outgrown the possibility of that state of mind, we know not how.\r\nFrom one year to another we see things in new lights. What was unreal\r\nhas grown real, and what was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to\r\ncare the world for are shrunken to shadows;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_157\" id=\"page_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{157}\u003c/span\u003e the women once so divine,\r\nthe stars, the woods, and the waters, how now so dull and common!\u0026mdash;the\r\nyoung girls that brought an aura of infinity, at present hardly\r\ndistinguishable existences; the pictures so empty; and as for the books,\r\nwhat \u003ci\u003ewas\u003c/i\u003e there to find so mysteriously significant in Goethe, or in\r\nJohn Mill so full of weight? Instead of all this, more zestful than ever\r\nis the work; and fuller and deeper the import of common duties and of\r\ncommon goods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI am sure that this concrete and total manner of regarding the mind\u0027s\r\nchanges is the only true manner, difficult as it may be to carry it out\r\nin detail. If anything seems obscure about it, it will grow clearer as\r\nwe advance. Meanwhile, if it be true, it is certainly also true that no\r\ntwo \u0027ideas\u0027 are ever exactly the same, which is the proposition we\r\nstarted to prove. The proposition is more important theoretically than\r\nit at first sight seems. For it makes it already impossible for us to\r\nfollow obediently in the footprints of either the Lockian or the\r\nHerbartian school, schools which have had almost unlimited influence in\r\nGermany and among ourselves. No doubt it is often \u003ci\u003econvenient\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nformulate the mental facts in an atomistic sort of way, and to treat the\r\nhigher states of consciousness as if they were all built out of\r\nunchanging simple ideas which \u0027pass and turn again.\u0027 It is convenient\r\noften to treat curves as if they were composed of small straight lines,\r\nand electricity and nerve-force as if they were fluids. But in the one\r\ncase as in the other we must never forget that we are talking\r\nsymbolically, and that there is nothing in nature to answer to our\r\nwords. \u003ci\u003eA permanently existing \u0027Idea\u0027 which makes its appearance before\r\nthe footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals is as\r\nmythological an entity as the Jack of Spades.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWithin each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly continuous.\u003c/b\u003e I\r\ncan only define \u0027continuous\u0027 as that which is without breach, crack, or\r\ndivision. The only breaches that can well be conceived to occur within\r\nthe limits of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_158\" id=\"page_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{158}\u003c/span\u003e single mind would either be \u003ci\u003einterruptions\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003etime\u003c/i\u003e-gaps during which the consciousness went out; or they would be\r\nbreaks in the content of the thought, so abrupt that what followed had\r\nno connection whatever with what went before. The proposition that\r\nconsciousness feels continuous, means two things:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e That even where there is a time-gap the consciousness after it\r\nfeels as if it belonged together with the consciousness before it, as\r\nanother part of the same self;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e That the changes from one moment to another in the quality of the\r\nconsciousness are never absolutely abrupt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe case of the time-gaps, as the simplest, shall be taken first.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e When Paul and Peter wake up in the same bed, and recognize that\r\nthey have been asleep, each one of them mentally reaches back and makes\r\nconnection with but \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e of the two streams of thought which were\r\nbroken by the sleeping hours. As the current of an electrode buried in\r\nthe ground unerringly finds its way to its own similarly buried mate,\r\nacross no matter how much intervening earth; so Peter\u0027s present\r\ninstantly finds out Peter\u0027s past, and never by mistake knits itself on\r\nto that of Paul. Paul\u0027s thought in turn is as little liable to go\r\nastray. The past thought of Peter is appropriated by the present Peter\r\nalone. He may have a \u003ci\u003eknowledge\u003c/i\u003e, and a correct one too, of what Paul\u0027s\r\nlast drowsy states of mind were as he sank into sleep, but it is an\r\nentirely different sort of knowledge from that which he has of his own\r\nlast states. He \u003ci\u003eremembers\u003c/i\u003e his own states, whilst he only \u003ci\u003econceives\u003c/i\u003e\r\nPaul\u0027s. Remembrance is like direct feeling; its object is suffused with\r\na warmth and intimacy to which no object of mere conception ever\r\nattains. This quality of warmth and intimacy and immediacy is what\r\nPeter\u0027s \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e thought also possesses for itself. So sure as this\r\npresent is me, is mine, it says, so sure is anything else that comes\r\nwith the same warmth and intimacy and immediacy, me and mine. What the\r\nqualities called warmth and intimacy may in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_159\" id=\"page_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{159}\u003c/span\u003e themselves be will have to\r\nbe matter for future consideration. But whatever past states appear with\r\nthose qualities must be admitted to receive the greeting of the present\r\nmental state, to be owned by it, and accepted as belonging together with\r\nit in a common self. This community of self is what the time-gap cannot\r\nbreak in twain, and is why a present thought, although not ignorant of\r\nthe time-gap, can still regard itself as continuous with certain chosen\r\nportions of the past.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such\r\nwords as \u0027chain\u0027 or \u0027train\u0027 do not describe it fitly as it presents\r\nitself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A \u0027river\u0027\r\nor a \u0027stream\u0027 are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described.\r\n\u003ci\u003eIn talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of\r\nconsciousness, or of subjective life.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e But now there appears, even within the limits of the same self, and\r\nbetween thoughts all of which alike have this same sense of belonging\r\ntogether, a kind of jointing and separateness among the parts, of which\r\nthis statement seems to take no account. I refer to the breaks that are\r\nproduced by sudden \u003ci\u003econtrasts in the quality\u003c/i\u003e of the successive segments\r\nof the stream of thought. If the words \u0027chain\u0027 and \u0027train\u0027 had no\r\nnatural fitness in them, how came such words to be used at all? Does not\r\na loud explosion rend the consciousness upon which it abruptly breaks,\r\nin twain? No; for even into our awareness of the thunder the awareness\r\nof the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the\r\nthunder crashes is not thunder \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e, but\r\nthunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it. Our feeling of\r\nthe same objective thunder, coming in this way, is quite different from\r\nwhat it would be were the thunder a continuation of previous thunder.\r\nThe thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence; but\r\nthe \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as just\r\ngone; and it would be difficult to find in the actual concrete\r\nconsciousness of man a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_160\" id=\"page_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{160}\u003c/span\u003e feeling so limited to the present as not to have\r\nan inkling of anything that went before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u0027Substantive\u0027 and \u0027Transitive\u0027 States of Mind.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we take a general\r\nview of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first\r\nis the different pace of its parts. Like a bird\u0027s life, it seems to be\r\nan alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language\r\nexpresses this, where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and\r\nevery sentence closed by a period. The resting-places are usually\r\noccupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is\r\nthat they can be held before the mind for an indefinite time, and\r\ncontemplated without changing; the places of flight are filled with\r\nthoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain\r\nbetween the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eLet us call the resting-places the \u0027substantive parts,\u0027 and the places\r\nof flight the \u0027transitive parts,\u0027 of the stream of thought.\u003c/i\u003e It then\r\nappears that our thinking tends at all times towards some other\r\nsubstantive part than the one from which it has just been dislodged. And\r\nwe may say that the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from\r\none substantive conclusion to another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts\r\nfor what they really are. If they are but flights to a conclusion,\r\nstopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is really\r\nannihilating them. Whilst if we wait till the conclusion \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e reached,\r\nit so exceeds them in vigor and stability that it quite eclipses and\r\nswallows them up in its glare. Let anyone try to cut a thought across in\r\nthe middle and get a look at its section, and he will see how difficult\r\nthe introspective observation of the transitive tracts is. The rush of\r\nthe thought is so headlong that it almost always brings us up at the\r\nconclusion before we can arrest it. Or if our purpose is nimble enough\r\nand we do arrest it, it ceases forthwith to be itself. As a snowflake\r\ncrystal caught in the warm hand\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_161\" id=\"page_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{161}\u003c/span\u003e is no longer a crystal but a drop, so,\r\ninstead of catching the feeling of relation moving to its term, we find\r\nwe have caught some substantive thing, usually the last word we were\r\npronouncing, statically taken, and with its function, tendency, and\r\nparticular meaning in the sentence quite evaporated. The attempt at\r\nintrospective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning\r\ntop to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to\r\nsee how the darkness looks. And the challenge to \u003ci\u003eproduce\u003c/i\u003e these\r\ntransitive states of consciousness, which is sure to be thrown by\r\ndoubting psychologists at anyone who contends for their existence, is as\r\nunfair as Zeno\u0027s treatment of the advocates of motion, when, asking them\r\nto point out in what place an arrow is when it moves, he argues the\r\nfalsity of their thesis from their inability to make to so preposterous\r\na question an immediate reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe results of this introspective difficulty are baleful. If to hold\r\nfast and observe the transitive parts of thought\u0027s stream be so hard,\r\nthen the great blunder to which all schools are liable must be the\r\nfailure to register them, and the undue emphasizing of the more\r\nsubstantive parts of the stream. Now the blunder has historically worked\r\nin two ways. One set of thinkers have been led by it to\r\n\u003ci\u003eSensationalism\u003c/i\u003e. Unable to lay their hands on any substantive feelings\r\ncorresponding to the innumerable relations and forms of connection\r\nbetween the sensible things of the world, finding no \u003ci\u003enamed\u003c/i\u003e mental\r\nstates mirroring such relations, they have for the most part denied that\r\nany such states exist; and many of them, like Hume, have gone on to deny\r\nthe reality of most relations \u003ci\u003eout\u003c/i\u003e of the mind as well as in it. Simple\r\nsubstantive \u0027ideas,\u0027 sensations and their copies, juxtaposed like\r\ndominoes in a game, but really separate, everything else verbal\r\nillusion,\u0026mdash;such is the upshot of this view. The \u003ci\u003eIntellectualists\u003c/i\u003e, on\r\nthe other hand, unable to give up the reality of relations \u003ci\u003eextra\r\nmentem\u003c/i\u003e, but equally unable to point to any distinct substantive\r\nfeelings in which they were known, have made the same admission\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_162\" id=\"page_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{162}\u003c/span\u003e that\r\nsuch feelings do not exist. But they have drawn an opposite conclusion.\r\nThe relations must be known, they say, in something that is no feeling,\r\nno mental \u0027state,\u0027 continuous and consubstantial with the subjective\r\ntissue out of which sensations and other substantive conditions of\r\nconsciousness are made. They must be known by something that lies on an\r\nentirely different plane, by an \u003ci\u003eactus purus\u003c/i\u003e of Thought, Intellect, or\r\nReason, all written with capitals and considered to mean something\r\nunutterably superior to any passing perishing fact of sensibility\r\nwhatever.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut from our point of view both Intellectualists and Sensationalists are\r\nwrong. If there be such things as feelings at all, \u003ci\u003ethen so surely as\r\nrelations between objects exist\u003c/i\u003e in rerum naturâ, \u003ci\u003eso surely, and more\r\nsurely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known\u003c/i\u003e. There is\r\nnot a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase,\r\nsyntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not\r\nexpress some shading or other of relation which we at some moment\r\nactually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought. If we\r\nspeak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we\r\nspeak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each\r\nof them by an inward coloring of its own. In either case the relations\r\nare numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to\r\nall their shades.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe ought to say a feeling of \u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e, a feeling of \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e, a feeling of\r\n\u003ci\u003ebut\u003c/i\u003e, and a feeling of \u003ci\u003eby\u003c/i\u003e, quite as readily as we say a feeling of\r\n\u003ci\u003eblue\u003c/i\u003e or a feeling of \u003ci\u003ecold\u003c/i\u003e. Yet we do not: so inveterate has our\r\nhabit become of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts\r\nalone, that language almost refuses to lend itself to any other use.\r\nConsider once again the analogy of the brain. We believe the brain to be\r\nan organ whose internal equilibrium is always in a state of change\u0026mdash;the\r\nchange affecting every part. The pulses of change are doubtless more\r\nviolent in one place than in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_163\" id=\"page_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{163}\u003c/span\u003e another, their rhythm more rapid at this\r\ntime than at that. As in a kaleidoscope revolving at a uniform rate,\r\nalthough the figures are always rearranging themselves, there are\r\ninstants during which the transformation seems minute and interstitial\r\nand almost absent, followed by others when it shoots with magical\r\nrapidity, relatively stable forms thus alternating with forms we should\r\nnot distinguish if seen again; so in the brain the perpetual\r\nrearrangement must result in some forms of tension lingering relatively\r\nlong, whilst others simply come and pass. But if consciousness\r\ncorresponds to the fact of rearrangement itself, why, if the\r\nrearrangement stop not, should the consciousness ever cease? And if a\r\nlingering rearrangement brings with it one kind of consciousness, why\r\nshould not a swift rearrangement bring another kind of consciousness as\r\npeculiar as the rearrangement itself?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe object before the mind always has a \u0027Fringe.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e There are other\r\nunnamed modifications of consciousness just as important as the\r\ntransitive states, and just as cognitive as they. Examples will show\r\nwhat I mean.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose three successive persons say to us: \u0027Wait!\u0027 \u0027Hark!\u0027 \u0027Look!\u0027 Our\r\nconsciousness is thrown into three quite different attitudes of\r\nexpectancy, although no definite object is before it in any one of the\r\nthree cases. Probably no one will deny here the existence of a real\r\nconscious affection, a sense of the direction from which an impression\r\nis about to come, although no positive impression is yet there.\r\nMeanwhile we have no names for the psychoses in question but the names\r\nhark, look, and wait.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our\r\nconsciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It\r\nis a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in\r\nit, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with\r\nthe sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the\r\nlonged-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly\r\ndefinite gap acts immediately so as to negate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_164\" id=\"page_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{164}\u003c/span\u003e them. They do not fit\r\ninto its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of\r\nanother, all empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when\r\ndescribed as gaps. When I vainly try to recall the name of Spalding, my\r\nconsciousness is far removed from what it is when I vainly try to recall\r\nthe name of Bowles. There are innumerable consciousnesses of \u003ci\u003ewant\u003c/i\u003e, no\r\none of which taken in itself has a name, but all different from each\r\nother. Such a feeling of want is \u003ci\u003etoto cœlo\u003c/i\u003e other than a want of\r\nfeeling: it is an intense feeling. The rhythm of a lost word may be\r\nthere without a sound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of something\r\nwhich is the initial vowel or consonant may mock us fitfully, without\r\ngrowing more distinct. Every one must know the tantalizing effect of the\r\nblank rhythm of some forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one\u0027s mind,\r\nstriving to be filled out with words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is that first instantaneous glimpse of some one\u0027s meaning which we\r\nhave, when in vulgar phrase we say we \u0027twig\u0027 it? Surely an altogether\r\nspecific affection of our mind. And has the reader never asked himself\r\nwhat kind of a mental fact is his \u003ci\u003eintention of saying a thing\u003c/i\u003e before\r\nhe has said it? It is an entirely definite intention, distinct from all\r\nother intentions, an absolutely distinct state of consciousness,\r\ntherefore; and yet how much of it consists of definite sensorial images,\r\neither of words or of things? Hardly anything! Linger, and the words and\r\nthings come into the mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is\r\nthere no more. But as the words that replace it arrive, it welcomes them\r\nsuccessively and calls them right if they agree with it, it rejects them\r\nand calls them wrong if they do not. The intention \u003ci\u003eto-say-so-and-so\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nthe only name it can receive. One may admit that a good third of our\r\npsychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of\r\nschemes of thought not yet articulate. How comes it about that a man\r\nreading something aloud for the first time is able immediately to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_165\" id=\"page_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{165}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nemphasize all his words aright, unless from the very first he have a\r\nsense of at least the form of the sentence yet to come, which sense is\r\nfused with his consciousness of the present word, and modifies its\r\nemphasis in his mind so as to make him give it the proper accent as he\r\nutters it? Emphasis of this kind almost altogether depends on\r\ngrammatical construction. If we read \u0027no more,\u0027 we expect presently a\r\n\u0027than\u0027; if we read \u0027however,\u0027 it is a \u0027yet,\u0027 a \u0027still,\u0027 or a\r\n\u0027nevertheless,\u0027 that we expect. And this foreboding of the coming verbal\r\nand grammatical scheme is so practically accurate that a reader\r\nincapable of understanding four ideas of the book he is reading aloud\r\ncan nevertheless read it with the most delicately modulated expression\r\nof intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, the reader will see, the reinstatement of the vague and\r\ninarticulate to its proper place in our mental life which I am so\r\nanxious to press on the attention. Mr. Galton and Prof. Huxley have, as\r\nwe shall see in the chapter on Imagination, made one step in advance in\r\nexploding the ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley that we can have no\r\nimages but of perfectly definite things. Another is made if we overthrow\r\nthe equally ridiculous notion that, whilst simple objective qualities\r\nare revealed to our knowledge in \u0027states of consciousness,\u0027 relations\r\nare not. But these reforms are not half sweeping and radical enough.\r\nWhat must be admitted is that the definite images of traditional\r\npsychology form but the very smallest part of our minds as they actually\r\nlive. The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river\r\nconsists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful,\r\nand other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all\r\nactually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would\r\ncontinue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that\r\npsychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is\r\nsteeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes the\r\nsense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_166\" id=\"page_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{166}\u003c/span\u003e of whence it\r\ncame to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The\r\nsignificance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra\r\nthat surrounds and escorts it,\u0026mdash;or rather that is fused into one with it\r\nand has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it\r\nis true, an image of the same \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e it was before, but making it an\r\nimage of that thing newly taken and freshly understood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eLet us call the consciousness of this halo of relations around the\r\nimage by the name of \u0027psychic overtone\u0027 or \u0027fringe.\u0027\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCerebral Conditions of the \u0027Fringe.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Nothing is easier than to\r\nsymbolize these facts in terms of brain-action. Just as the echo of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhence\u003c/i\u003e, the sense of the starting point of our thought, is probably\r\ndue to the dying excitement of processes but a moment since vividly\r\naroused; so the sense of the whither, the foretaste of the terminus,\r\nmust be due to the waxing excitement of tracts or processes whose\r\npsychical correlative will a moment hence be the vividly present feature\r\nof our thought. Represented by a curve, the neurosis underlying\r\nconsciousness must at any moment be like this:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_52\" id=\"ill_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 404px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-166-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-166-sml.png\" width=\"404\" height=\"179\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 52.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet the horizontal in Fig. 52 be the line of time, and let the three\r\ncurves beginning at \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e respectively stand for the neural\r\nprocesses correlated with the thoughts of those three letters. Each\r\nprocess occupies a certain time during which its intensity waxes,\r\nculminates, and wanes. The process for \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e has not yet died out, the\r\nprocess\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_167\" id=\"page_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{167}\u003c/span\u003e for \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e has already begun, when that for \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e is culminating. At\r\nthe time-instant represented by the vertical line all three processes\r\nare \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e, in the intensities shown by the curve. Those before \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s\r\napex \u003ci\u003ewere\u003c/i\u003e more intense a moment ago; those after it \u003ci\u003ewill be\u003c/i\u003e more\r\nintense a moment hence. If I recite \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, then, at the moment\r\nof uttering \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, neither \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e nor \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e is out of my consciousness\r\naltogether, but both, after their respective fashions, \u0027mix their dim\r\nlights\u0027 with the stronger \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, because their processes are both awake in\r\nsome degree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is just like \u0027overtones\u0027 in music: they are not separately heard by\r\nthe ear; they blend with the fundamental note, and suffuse it, and alter\r\nit; and even so do the waxing and waning brain-processes at every moment\r\nblend with and suffuse and alter the psychic effect of the processes\r\nwhich are at their culminating point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe \u0027Topic\u0027 of the Thought.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If we then consider the \u003ci\u003ecognitive\r\nfunction\u003c/i\u003e of different states of mind, we may feel assured that the\r\ndifference between those that are mere \u0027acquaintance\u0027 and those that are\r\n\u0027knowledges-\u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 is reducible almost entirely to the absence or\r\npresence of psychic fringes or overtones. Knowledge \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e a thing is\r\nknowledge of its relations. Acquaintance with it is limitation to the\r\nbare impression which it makes. Of most of its relations we are only\r\naware in the penumbral nascent way of a \u0027fringe\u0027 of unarticulated\r\naffinities about it. And, before passing to the next topic in order, I\r\nmust say a little of this sense of affinity, as itself one of the most\r\ninteresting features of the subjective stream.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThought may be equally rational in any sort of terms.\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eIn all our\r\nvoluntary thinking there is some\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eTOPIC\u003c/small\u003e or \u003csmall\u003eSUBJECT\u003c/small\u003e about which all the\r\nmembers of the thought revolve. Relation to this topic or interest is\r\nconstantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony\r\nand discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic. Any thought the\r\nquality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves \u0027all right,\u0027 may be\r\nconsidered a thought that furthers the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_168\" id=\"page_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{168}\u003c/span\u003e topic. Provided we only feel its\r\nobject to have a place in the scheme of relations in which the topic\r\nalso lies, that is sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate\r\nportion of our train of ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow we may think about our topic mainly in words, or we may think about\r\nit mainly in visual or other images, but this need make no difference as\r\nregards the furtherance of our knowledge of the topic. If we only feel\r\nin the terms, whatever they be, a fringe of affinity with each other and\r\nwith the topic, and if we are conscious of approaching a conclusion, we\r\nfeel that our thought is rational and right. The words in every language\r\nhave contracted by long association fringes of mutual repugnance or\r\naffinity with each other and with the conclusion, which run exactly\r\nparallel with like fringes in the visual, tactile, and other ideas. The\r\nmost important element of these fringes is, I repeat, the mere feeling\r\nof harmony or discord, of a right or wrong direction in the thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we know English and French and begin a sentence in French, all the\r\nlater words that come are French; we hardly ever drop into English. And\r\nthis affinity of the French words for each other is not something merely\r\noperating mechanically as a brain-law, it is something we feel at the\r\ntime. Our understanding of a French sentence heard never falls to so low\r\nan ebb that we are not aware that the words linguistically belong\r\ntogether. Our attention can hardly so wander that if an English word be\r\nsuddenly introduced we shall not start at the change. Such a vague sense\r\nas this of the words belonging together is the very minimum of fringe\r\nthat can accompany them, if \u0027thought\u0027 at all. Usually the vague\r\nperception that all the words we hear belong to the same language and to\r\nthe same special vocabulary in that language, and that the grammatical\r\nsequence is familiar, is practically equivalent to an admission that\r\nwhat we hear is sense. But if an unusual foreign word be introduced, if\r\nthe grammar trip, or if a term from an incongruous vocabulary suddenly\r\nappear,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_169\" id=\"page_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{169}\u003c/span\u003e such as \u0027rat-trap\u0027 or \u0027plumber\u0027s bill\u0027 in a philosophical\r\ndiscourse, the sentence detonates as it were, we receive a shock from\r\nthe incongruity, and the drowsy assent is gone. The feeling of\r\nrationality in these cases seems rather a negative than a positive\r\nthing, being the mere absence of shock, or sense of discord, between the\r\nterms of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConversely, if words do belong to the same vocabulary, and if the\r\ngrammatical structure is correct, sentences with absolutely no meaning\r\nmay be uttered in good faith and pass unchallenged. Discourses at\r\nprayer-meetings, re-shuffling the same collection of cant phrases, and\r\nthe whole genus of penny-a-line-isms and newspaper-reporter\u0027s flourishes\r\ngive illustrations of this. \"The birds filled the tree-tops with their\r\nmorning song, making the air moist, cool, and pleasant,\" is a sentence I\r\nremember reading once in a report of some athletic exercises in Jerome\r\nPark. It was probably written unconsciously by the hurried reporter, and\r\nread uncritically by many readers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_53\" id=\"ill_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 231px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-169-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-169-sml.png\" width=\"231\" height=\"147\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 53.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe see, then, that it makes little or no difference in what sort of\r\nmind-stuff, in what quality of imagery, our thinking goes on. The only\r\nimages \u003ci\u003eintrinsically\u003c/i\u003e important are the halting-places, the substantive\r\nconclusions, provisional or final, of the thought. Throughout all the\r\nrest of the stream, the feelings of relation are everything, and the\r\nterms related almost naught. These feelings of relation, these psychic\r\novertones, halos, suffusions, or fringes about the terms, may be the\r\nsame in very different systems of imagery. A diagram may help to\r\naccentuate this indifference of the mental means where the end is the\r\nsame. Let \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e be some experience from which a number of thinkers start.\r\nLet \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e be the practical conclusion rationally inferrible from it. One\r\ngets to this conclusion by one line, another\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_170\" id=\"page_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{170}\u003c/span\u003e by another; one follows a\r\ncourse of English, another of German, verbal imagery. With one, visual\r\nimages predominate; with another, tactile. Some trains are tinged with\r\nemotions, others not; some are very abridged, synthetic and rapid;\r\nothers, hesitating and broken into many steps. But when the penultimate\r\nterms of all the trains, however differing \u003ci\u003einter se\u003c/i\u003e, finally shoot\r\ninto the same conclusion, we say, and rightly say, that all the thinkers\r\nhave had substantially the same thought. It would probably astound each\r\nof them beyond measure to be let into his neighbor\u0027s mind and to find\r\nhow different the scenery there was from that in his own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe last peculiarity to which attention is to be drawn in this first\r\nrough description of thought\u0027s stream is that\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConsciousness is always interested more in one part of its object than\r\nin another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it\r\nthinks.\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe phenomena of selective attention and of deliberative will are of\r\ncourse patent examples of this choosing activity. But few of us are\r\naware how incessantly it is at work in operations not ordinarily called\r\nby these names. Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every\r\nperception we have. We find it quite impossible to disperse our\r\nattention impartially over a number of impressions. A monotonous\r\nsuccession of sonorous strokes is broken up into rhythms, now of one\r\nsort, now of another, by the different accent which we place on\r\ndifferent strokes. The simplest of these rhythms is the double one,\r\ntick-tóck, tick-tóck, tick-tóck. Dots dispersed on a surface are\r\nperceived in rows and groups. Lines separate into diverse figures. The\r\nubiquity of the distinctions, \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehere\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e, in our minds is the result of our laying the same\r\nselective emphasis on parts of place and time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we do far more than emphasize things, and unite some, and keep\r\nothers apart. We actually \u003ci\u003eignore\u003c/i\u003e most of the things before us. Let me\r\nbriefly show how this goes on.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_171\" id=\"page_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{171}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo begin at the bottom, what are our very senses themselves, as we saw\r\non pp. \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10-12\u003c/a\u003e, but organs of selection? Out of the infinite chaos of\r\nmovements, of which physics teaches us that the outer world consists,\r\neach sense-organ picks out those which fall within certain limits of\r\nvelocity. To these it responds, but ignores the rest as completely as if\r\nthey did not exist. Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable,\r\nswarming \u003ci\u003econtinuum\u003c/i\u003e, devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses make\r\nfor us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that, a world full of\r\ncontrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, of picturesque light and\r\nshade.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the sensations we receive from a given organ have their causes thus\r\npicked out for us by the conformation of the organ\u0027s termination,\r\nAttention, on the other hand, out of all the sensations yielded, picks\r\nout certain ones as worthy of its notice and suppresses all the rest. We\r\nnotice only those sensations which are signs to us of \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nhappen practically or æsthetically to interest us, to which we therefore\r\ngive substantive names, and which we exalt to this exclusive status of\r\nindependence and dignity. But in itself, apart from my interest, a\r\nparticular dust-wreath on a windy day is just as much of an individual\r\n\u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e, and just as much or as little deserves an individual name, as\r\nmy own body does.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd then, among the sensations we get from each separate thing, what\r\nhappens? The mind selects again. It chooses certain of the sensations to\r\nrepresent the thing most \u003ci\u003etruly\u003c/i\u003e, and considers the rest as its\r\nappearances, modified by the conditions of the moment. Thus my table-top\r\nis named \u003ci\u003esquare\u003c/i\u003e, after but one of an infinite number of retinal\r\nsensations which it yields, the rest of them being sensations of two\r\nacute and two obtuse angles; but I call the latter \u003ci\u003eperspective\u003c/i\u003e views,\r\nand the four right angles the \u003ci\u003etrue\u003c/i\u003e form of the table, and erect the\r\nattribute squareness into the table\u0027s essence, for æsthetic reasons of\r\nmy own. In like manner, the real form of the circle is deemed to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_172\" id=\"page_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{172}\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nsensation it gives when the line of vision is perpendicular to its\r\ncentre\u0026mdash;all its other sensations are \u003ci\u003esigns\u003c/i\u003e of this sensation. The real\r\nsound of the cannon is the sensation it makes when the ear is close by.\r\nThe real color of the brick is the sensation it gives when the eye looks\r\nsquarely at it from a near point, out of the sunshine and yet not in the\r\ngloom; under other circumstances it gives us other color-sensations\r\nwhich are but signs of this\u0026mdash;we then see it looks pinker or bluer than\r\nit really is. The reader knows no object which he does not represent to\r\nhimself by preference as in some typical attitude, of some normal size,\r\nat some characteristic distance, of some standard tint, etc., etc. But\r\nall these essential characteristics, which together form for us the\r\ngenuine objectivity of the thing and are contrasted with what we call\r\nthe subjective sensations it may yield us at a given moment, are mere\r\nsensations like the latter. The mind chooses to suit itself, and decides\r\nwhat particular sensation shall be held more real and valid than all the\r\nrest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNext, in a world of objects thus individualized by our mind\u0027s selective\r\nindustry, what is called our \u0027experience\u0027 is almost entirely determined\r\nby our habits of attention. A thing may be present to a man a hundred\r\ntimes, but if he persistently fails to notice it, it cannot be said to\r\nenter into his experience. We are all seeing flies, moths, and beetles\r\nby the thousand, but to whom, save an entomologist, do they say anything\r\ndistinct? On the other hand, a thing met only once in a lifetime may\r\nleave an indelible experience in the memory. Let four men make a tour in\r\nEurope. One will bring home only picturesque impressions\u0026mdash;costumes and\r\ncolors, parks and views and works of architecture, pictures and statues.\r\nTo another all this will be non-existent; and distances and prices,\r\npopulations and drainage-arrangements, door-and window-fastenings, and\r\nother useful statistics will take their place. A third will give a rich\r\naccount of the theatres, restaurants, and public halls, and naught\r\nbeside; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_173\" id=\"page_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{173}\u003c/span\u003e wrapped in his own\r\nsubjective broodings as to be able to tell little more than a few names\r\nof places through which he passed. Each has selected, out of the same\r\nmass of presented objects, those which suited his private interest and\r\nhas made his experience thereby.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf now, leaving the empirical combination of objects, we ask how the\r\nmind proceeds \u003ci\u003erationally\u003c/i\u003e to connect them, we find selection again to\r\nbe omnipotent. In a future chapter we shall see that all Reasoning\r\ndepends on the ability of the mind to break up the totality of the\r\nphenomenon reasoned about, into parts, and to pick out from among these\r\nthe particular one which, in the given emergency, may lead to the proper\r\nconclusion. The man of genius is he who will always stick in his bill at\r\nthe right point, and bring it out with the right element\u0026mdash;\u0027reason\u0027 if\r\nthe emergency be theoretical, \u0027means\u0027 if it be practical\u0026mdash;transfixed\r\nupon it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf now we pass to the æsthetic department, our law is still more\r\nobvious. The artist notoriously selects his items, rejecting all tones,\r\ncolors, shapes, which do not harmonize with each other and with the main\r\npurpose of his work. That unity, harmony, \u0027convergence of characters,\u0027\r\nas M. Taine calls it, which gives to works of art their superiority over\r\nworks of nature, is wholly due to \u003ci\u003eelimination\u003c/i\u003e. Any natural subject\r\nwill do, if the artist has wit enough to pounce upon some one feature of\r\nit as characteristic, and suppress all merely accidental items which do\r\nnot harmonize with this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAscending still higher, we reach the plane of Ethics, where choice\r\nreigns notoriously supreme. An act has no ethical quality whatever\r\nunless it be chosen out of several all equally possible. To sustain the\r\narguments for the good course and keep them ever before us, to stifle\r\nour longing for more flowery ways, to keep the foot unflinchingly on the\r\narduous path, these are characteristic ethical energies. But more than\r\nthese; for these but deal with the means of compassing interests already\r\nfelt by the man\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_174\" id=\"page_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{174}\u003c/span\u003e to be supreme. The ethical energy \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e has\r\nto go farther and choose which \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e out of several, equally\r\ncoercive, shall become supreme. The issue here is of the utmost\r\npregnancy, for it decides a man\u0027s entire career. When he debates, Shall\r\nI commit this crime? choose that profession? accept that office, or\r\nmarry this fortune?\u0026mdash;his choice really lies between one of several\r\nequally possible future Characters. What he shall \u003ci\u003ebecome\u003c/i\u003e is fixed by\r\nthe conduct of this moment. Schopenhauer, who enforces his determinism\r\nby the argument that with a given fixed character only one reaction is\r\npossible under given circumstances, forgets that, in these critical\r\nethical moments, what consciously \u003ci\u003eseems\u003c/i\u003e to be in question is the\r\ncomplexion of the character itself. The problem with the man is less\r\nwhat act he shall now resolve to do than what being he shall now choose\r\nto become.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaking human experience in a general way, the choosings of different men\r\nare to a great extent the same. The race as a whole largely agrees as to\r\nwhat it shall notice and name; and among the noticed parts we select in\r\nmuch the same way for accentuation and preference, or subordination and\r\ndislike. There is, however, one entirely extraordinary case in which no\r\ntwo men ever are known to choose alike. One great splitting of the whole\r\nuniverse into two halves is made by each of us; and for each of us\r\nalmost all of the interest attaches to one of the halves; but we all\r\ndraw the line of division between them in a different place. When I say\r\nthat we all call the two halves by the same names, and that those names\r\nare \u0027\u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 and \u0027\u003ci\u003enot-me\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 respectively, it will at once be seen what I\r\nmean. The altogether unique kind of interest which each human mind feels\r\nin those parts of creation which it can call \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e may be a\r\nmoral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological fact. No mind can\r\ntake the same interest in his neighbor\u0027s \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e as in his own. The\r\nneighbor\u0027s me falls together with all the rest of things in one foreign\r\nmass against which his own \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e stands out in startling relief.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_175\" id=\"page_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{175}\u003c/span\u003e Even\r\nthe trodden worm, as Lotze somewhere says, contrasts his own suffering\r\nself with the whole remaining universe, though he have no clear\r\nconception either of himself or of what the universe may be. He is for\r\nme a mere part of the world; for him it is I who am the mere part. Each\r\nof us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDescending now to finer work than this first general sketch, let us in\r\nthe next chapter try to trace the psychology of this fact of\r\nself-consciousness to which we have thus once more been led.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_176\" id=\"page_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{176}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XII\" id=\"CHAPTER_XII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE SELF.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Me and the I.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the\r\nsame time more or less aware of \u003ci\u003emyself\u003c/i\u003e, of my \u003ci\u003epersonal existence\u003c/i\u003e. At\r\nthe same time it is \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e who am aware; so that the total self of me,\r\nbeing as it were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly object\r\nand partly subject, must have two aspects discriminated in it, of which\r\nfor shortness we may call one the \u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e and the other the \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e. I call\r\nthese \u0027discriminated aspects,\u0027 and not separate things, because the\r\nidentity of \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e with \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e, even in the very act of their discrimination,\r\nis perhaps the most ineradicable dictum of common-sense, and must not be\r\nundermined by our terminology here at the outset, whatever we may come\r\nto think of its validity at our inquiry\u0027s end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI shall therefore treat successively of A) the self as known, or the\r\n\u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e, the \u0027empirical ego\u0027 as it is sometimes called; and of B) the self\r\nas knower, or the I, the \u0027pure ego\u0027 of certain authors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eA) \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Self as Known.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Empirical Self or Me.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Between what a man calls \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e and what he\r\nsimply calls \u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about\r\ncertain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about\r\nourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of our hands, may be as dear\r\nto us as our bodies are, and arouse the same feelings and the same acts\r\nof reprisal if attacked. And our bodies themselves, are they simply\r\nours, or are they \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e? Certainly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_177\" id=\"page_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{177}\u003c/span\u003e men have been ready to disown their\r\nvery bodies and to regard them as mere vestures, or even as prisons of\r\nclay from which they should some day be glad to escape.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe see then that we are dealing with a fluctuating material; the same\r\nobject being sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times as simply\r\nmine, and then again as if I had nothing to do with it at all. \u003ci\u003eIn its\r\nwidest possible sense\u003c/i\u003e, however, \u003ci\u003ea man\u0027s Me is the sum total of all\r\nthat he\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eCAN\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003ecall his\u003c/i\u003e, not only his body and his psychic powers, but\r\nhis clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and\r\nfriends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and\r\nbank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax\r\nand prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels\r\ncast down,\u0026mdash;not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in\r\nmuch the same way for all. Understanding the Me in this widest sense, we\r\nmay begin by dividing the history of it into three parts, relating\r\nrespectively to\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e Its constituents;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e The feelings and emotions they arouse,\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eself-appreciation\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec.\u003c/i\u003e The act to which they prompt,\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eself-seeking and\r\nself-preservation\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe constituents of the Me\u003c/i\u003e may be divided into two classes, those\r\nwhich make up respectively\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eThe material me;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eThe social me; and\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eThe spiritual me.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Material Me.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The \u003ci\u003ebody\u003c/i\u003e is the innermost part of the material me in\r\neach of us; and certain parts of the body seem more intimately ours than\r\nthe rest. The clothes come next. The old saying that the human person is\r\ncomposed of three parts\u0026mdash;soul, body and clothes\u0026mdash;is more than a joke. We\r\nso appropriate our clothes and identify ourselves\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_178\" id=\"page_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{178}\u003c/span\u003e with them that there\r\nare few of us who, if asked to choose between having a beautiful body\r\nclad in raiment perpetually shabby and unclean, and having an ugly and\r\nblemished form always spotlessly attired, would not hesitate a moment\r\nbefore making a decisive reply. Next, our immediate family is a part of\r\nourselves. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our\r\nbone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is\r\ngone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted,\r\nour anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place. Our\r\nhome comes next. Its scenes are part of our life; its aspects awaken the\r\ntenderest feelings of affection; and we do not easily forgive the\r\nstranger who, in visiting it, finds fault with its arrangements or\r\ntreats it with contempt. All these different things are the objects of\r\ninstinctive preferences coupled with the most important practical\r\ninterests of life. We all have a blind impulse to watch over our body,\r\nto deck it with clothing of an ornamental sort, to cherish parents,\r\nwife, and babes, and to find for ourselves a house of our own which we\r\nmay live in and \u0027improve.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect property; and the\r\ncollections thus made become, with different degrees of intimacy, parts\r\nof our empirical selves. The parts of our wealth most intimately ours\r\nare those which are saturated with our labor. There are few men who\r\nwould not feel personally annihilated if a life-long construction of\r\ntheir hands or brains\u0026mdash;say an entomological collection or an extensive\r\nwork in manuscript\u0026mdash;were suddenly swept away. The miser feels similarly\r\ntowards his gold; and although it is true that a part of our depression\r\nat the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go\r\nwithout certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their\r\ntrain, yet in every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of\r\nthe shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to\r\nnothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_179\" id=\"page_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{179}\u003c/span\u003e are all\r\nat once assimilated to the tramps and poor devils whom we so despise,\r\nand at the same time removed farther than ever away from the happy sons\r\nof earth who lord it over land and sea and men in the full-blown\r\nlustihood that wealth and power can give, and before whom, stiffen\r\nourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish first principles, we\r\ncannot escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Social Me.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A man\u0027s social me is the recognition which he gets from\r\nhis mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of\r\nour fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed,\r\nand noticed favorably, by our kind. No more fiendish punishment could be\r\ndevised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be\r\nturned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the\r\nmembers thereof. If no one turned round when we entered, answered when\r\nwe spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met \u0027cut us\r\ndead,\u0027 and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and\r\nimpotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruellest\r\nbodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that,\r\nhowever bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to\r\nbe unworthy of attention at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProperly speaking, \u003ci\u003ea man has as many social selves as there are\r\nindividuals who recognize him\u003c/i\u003e and carry an image of him in their mind.\r\nTo wound any one of these his images is to wound him. But as the\r\nindividuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may\r\npractically say that he has as many different social selves as there are\r\ndistinct \u003ci\u003egroups\u003c/i\u003e of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally\r\nshows a different side of himself to each of these different groups.\r\nMany a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers,\r\nswears and swaggers like a pirate among his \u0027tough\u0027 young friends. We do\r\nnot show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our\r\ncustomers as to the laborers we employ,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_180\" id=\"page_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{180}\u003c/span\u003e to our own masters and\r\nemployers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what\r\npractically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may\r\nbe a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his\r\nacquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly\r\nharmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is\r\nstern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most peculiar social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of\r\nthe person one is in love with. The good or bad fortunes of this self\r\ncause the most intense elation and dejection\u0026mdash;unreasonable enough as\r\nmeasured by every other standard than that of the organic feeling of the\r\nindividual. To his own consciousness he \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not, so long as this\r\nparticular social self fails to get recognition, and when it is\r\nrecognized his contentment passes all bounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA man\u0027s \u003ci\u003efame\u003c/i\u003e, good or bad, and his \u003ci\u003ehonor\u003c/i\u003e or dishonor, are names for\r\none of his social selves. The particular social self of a man called his\r\nhonor is usually the result of one of those splittings of which we have\r\nspoken. It is his image in the eyes of his own \u0027set,\u0027 which exalts or\r\ncondemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not\r\nbe made of one in another walk of life. Thus a layman may abandon a city\r\ninfected with cholera; but a priest or a doctor would think such an act\r\nincompatible with his honor. A soldier\u0027s honor requires him to fight or\r\nto die under circumstances where another man can apologize or run away\r\nwith no stain upon his social self. A judge, a statesman, are in like\r\nmanner debarred by the honor of their cloth from entering into pecuniary\r\nrelations perfectly honorable to persons in private life. Nothing is\r\ncommoner than to hear people discriminate between their different selves\r\nof this sort: \"As a man I pity you, but as an official I must show you\r\nno mercy\"; \"As a politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I\r\nloathe him\"; etc., etc. What may be called \u0027club-opinion\u0027 is one of the\r\nvery strongest forces in life. The thief must not steal from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_181\" id=\"page_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{181}\u003c/span\u003e other\r\nthieves; the gambler must pay his gambling-debts, though he pay no other\r\ndebts in the world. The code of honor of fashionable society has\r\nthroughout history been full of permissions as well as of vetoes, the\r\nonly reason for following either of which is that so we best serve one\r\nof our social selves. You must not lie in general, but you may lie as\r\nmuch as you please if asked about your relations with a lady; you must\r\naccept a challenge from an equal, but if challenged by an inferior you\r\nmay laugh him to scorn: these are examples of what is meant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Spiritual Me.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;By the \u0027spiritual me,\u0027 so far as it belongs to the\r\nempirical self, I mean no one of my passing states of consciousness. I\r\nmean rather the entire collection of my states of consciousness, my\r\npsychic faculties and dispositions taken concretely. This collection can\r\nat any moment become an object to my thought at that moment and awaken\r\nemotions like those awakened by any of the other portions of the Me.\r\nWhen we \u003ci\u003ethink of ourselves as thinkers\u003c/i\u003e, all the other ingredients of\r\nour Me seem relatively external possessions. Even within the spiritual\r\n\u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e some ingredients seem more external than others. Our capacities for\r\nsensation, for example, are less intimate possessions, so to speak, than\r\nour emotions and desires; our intellectual processes are less intimate\r\nthan our volitional decisions. The more \u003ci\u003eactive-feeling\u003c/i\u003e states of\r\nconsciousness are thus the more central portions of the spiritual Me.\r\nThe very core and nucleus of our self, as we know it, the very sanctuary\r\nof our life, is the sense of activity which certain inner states\r\npossess. This sense of activity is often held to be a direct revelation\r\nof the living substance of our Soul. Whether this be so or not is an\r\nulterior question. I wish now only to lay down the peculiar\r\n\u003ci\u003einternality\u003c/i\u003e of whatever states possess this quality of seeming to be\r\nactive. It is as if they \u003ci\u003ewent out to meet\u003c/i\u003e all the other elements of\r\nour experience. In thus feeling about them probably all men agree.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_182\" id=\"page_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{182}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe feelings and emotions of self\u003c/i\u003e come after the constituents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSelf-appreciation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This is of two sorts, \u003ci\u003eself-complacency\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003eself-dissatisfaction\u003c/i\u003e. \u0027Self-love\u0027 more properly belongs under the\r\ndivision \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, of \u003ci\u003eacts\u003c/i\u003e, since what men mean by that name is rather a\r\nset of motor tendencies than a kind of feeling properly so called.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLanguage has synonyms enough for both kinds of self-appreciation. Thus\r\npride, conceit, vanity, self-esteem, arrogance, vainglory, on the one\r\nhand; and on the other modesty, humility, confusion, diffidence, shame,\r\nmortification, contrition, the sense of obloquy, and personal despair.\r\nThese two opposite classes of affection seem to be direct and elementary\r\nendowments of our nature. Associationists would have it that they are,\r\non the other hand, secondary phenomena arising from a rapid computation\r\nof the sensible pleasures or pains to which our prosperous or debased\r\npersonal predicament is likely to lead, the sum of the represented\r\npleasures forming the self-satisfaction, and the sum of the represented\r\npains forming the opposite feeling of shame. No doubt, when we are\r\nself-satisfied, we do fondly rehearse all possible rewards for our\r\ndesert, and when in a fit of self-despair we forebode evil. But the mere\r\nexpectation of reward \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not the self-satisfaction, and the mere\r\napprehension of the evil \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not the self-despair; for there is a\r\ncertain average tone of self-feeling which each one of us carries about\r\nwith him, and which is independent of the objective reasons we may have\r\nfor satisfaction or discontent. That is, a very meanly-conditioned man\r\nmay abound in unfaltering conceit, and one whose success in life is\r\nsecure, and who is esteemed by all, may remain diffident of his powers\r\nto the end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne may say, however, that the normal \u003ci\u003eprovocative\u003c/i\u003e of self-feeling is\r\none\u0027s actual success or failure, and the good or bad actual position one\r\nholds in the world. \"He put in his thumb and pulled out a plum, and\r\nsaid, \u0027What a good\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_183\" id=\"page_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{183}\u003c/span\u003e boy am I!\u0027\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e A man with a broadly extended empirical\r\nEgo, with powers that have uniformly brought him success, with place and\r\nwealth and friends and fame, is not likely to be visited by the morbid\r\ndiffidences and doubts about himself which he had when he was a boy. \"Is\r\nnot this great Babylon, which I have planted?\" Whereas he who has made\r\none blunder after another, and still lies in middle life among the\r\nfailures at the foot of the hill, is liable to grow all sicklied o\u0027er\r\nwith self-distrust, and to shrink from trials with which his powers can\r\nreally cope.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe emotions themselves of self-satisfaction and abasement are of a\r\nunique sort, each as worthy to be classed as a primitive emotional\r\nspecies as are, for example, rage or pain. Each has its own peculiar\r\nphysiognomical expression. In self-satisfaction the extensor muscles are\r\ninnervated, the eye is strong and glorious, the gait rolling and\r\nelastic, the nostril dilated, and a peculiar smile plays upon the lips.\r\nThis whole complex of symptoms is seen in an exquisite way in lunatic\r\nasylums, which always contain some patients who are literally mad with\r\nconceit, and whose fatuous expression and absurdly strutting or\r\nswaggering gait is in tragic contrast with their lack of any valuable\r\npersonal quality. It is in these same castles of despair that we find\r\nthe strongest examples of the opposite physiognomy, in good people who\r\nthink they have committed \u0027the unpardonable sin\u0027 and are lost forever,\r\nwho crouch and cringe and slink from notice, and are unable to speak\r\naloud or look us in the eye. Like fear and like anger, in similar morbid\r\nconditions, these opposite feelings of Self may be aroused with no\r\nadequate exciting cause. And in fact we ourselves know how the barometer\r\nof our self-esteem and confidence rises and falls from one day to\r\nanother through causes that seem to be visceral and organic rather than\r\nrational, and which certainly answer to no corresponding variations in\r\nthe esteem in which we are held by our friends.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_184\" id=\"page_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{184}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec.\u003c/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eSelf-seeking and self-preservation\u003c/i\u003e come next.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese words cover a large number of our fundamental instinctive\r\nimpulses. We have those of \u003ci\u003ebodily self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e, those of \u003ci\u003esocial\r\nself-seeking\u003c/i\u003e, and those of \u003ci\u003espiritual self-seeking\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBodily Self-seeking.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All the ordinary useful reflex actions and\r\nmovements of alimentation and defence are acts of bodily\r\nself-preservation. Fear and anger prompt to acts that are useful in the\r\nsame way. Whilst if by self-seeking we mean the providing for the future\r\nas distinguished from maintaining the present, we must class both anger\r\nand fear, together with the hunting, the acquisitive, the\r\nhome-constructing and the tool-constructing instincts, as impulses to\r\nself-seeking of the bodily kind. Really, however, these latter\r\ninstincts, with amativeness, parental fondness, curiosity and emulation,\r\nseek not only the development of the bodily Me, but that of the material\r\nMe in the widest possible sense of the word.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur \u003cb\u003esocial self-seeking\u003c/b\u003e, in turn, is carried on directly through our\r\namativeness and friendliness, our desire to please and attract notice\r\nand admiration, our emulation and jealousy, our love of glory,\r\ninfluence, and power, and indirectly through whichever of the material\r\nself-seeking impulses prove serviceable as means to social ends. That\r\nthe direct social self-seeking impulses are probably pure instincts is\r\neasily seen. The noteworthy thing about the desire to be \u0027recognized\u0027 by\r\nothers is that its strength has so little to do with the worth of the\r\nrecognition computed in sensational or rational terms. We are crazy to\r\nget a visiting-list which shall be large, to be able to say when any one\r\nis mentioned, \"Oh! I know him well,\" and to be bowed to in the street by\r\nhalf the people we meet. Of course distinguished friends and admiring\r\nrecognition are the most desirable\u0026mdash;Thackeray somewhere asks his readers\r\nto confess whether it would not give each of \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e an exquisite\r\npleasure to be met walking down Pall Mall with a duke on either arm. But\r\nin default of dukes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_185\" id=\"page_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{185}\u003c/span\u003e and envious salutions almost anything will do for\r\nsome of us; and there is a whole race of beings to-day whose passion is\r\nto keep their names in the newspapers, no matter under what heading,\r\n\u0027arrivals and departures,\u0027 \u0027personal paragraphs,\u0027 \u0027interviews,\u0027\u0026mdash;gossip,\r\neven scandal, will suit them if nothing better is to be had. Guiteau,\r\nGarfield\u0027s assassin, is an example of the extremity to which this sort\r\nof craving for the notoriety of print may go in a pathological case. The\r\nnewspapers bounded his mental horizon; and in the poor wretch\u0027s prayer\r\non the scaffold, one of the most heart-felt expressions was: \"The\r\nnewspaper press of this land has a big bill to settle with thee, O\r\nLord!\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in\r\na sort of metaphoric social way. \u0027\u003ci\u003eÇa me connaît\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 as the French\r\nworkman says of the implement he can use well. So that it comes about\r\nthat persons for whose \u003ci\u003eopinion\u003c/i\u003e we care nothing are nevertheless\r\npersons whose notice we woo; and that many a man truly great, many a\r\nwoman truly fastidious in most respects, will take a deal of trouble to\r\ndazzle some insignificant cad whose whole personality they heartily\r\ndespise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder the head of \u003cb\u003espiritual self-seeking\u003c/b\u003e ought to be included every\r\nimpulse towards psychic progress, whether intellectual, moral, or\r\nspiritual in the narrow sense of the term. It must be admitted, however,\r\nthat much that commonly passes for spiritual self-seeking in this narrow\r\nsense is only material and social self-seeking beyond the grave. In the\r\nMohammedan desire for paradise and the Christian aspiration not to be\r\ndamned in hell, the materiality of the goods sought is undisguised. In\r\nthe more positive and refined view of heaven, many of its goods, the\r\nfellowship of the saints and of our dead ones, and the presence of God,\r\nare but social goods of the most exalted kind. It is only the search of\r\nthe redeemed inward nature, the spotlessness from sin, whether here or\r\nhereafter, that can count as spiritual self-seeking pure and undefiled.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_186\" id=\"page_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{186}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this broad external review of the facts of the life of the Me will\r\nbe incomplete without some account of the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRivalry and Conflict of the Different Mes.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;With most objects of desire,\r\nphysical nature restricts our choice to but one of many represented\r\ngoods, and even so it is here. I am often confronted by the necessity of\r\nstanding by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not\r\nthat I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed,\r\nand a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a\r\n\u003ci\u003ebon-vivant\u003c/i\u003e, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a\r\nphilanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a\r\n\u0027tone-poet\u0027 and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The\r\nmillionaire\u0027s work would run counter to the saint\u0027s; the \u003ci\u003ebon-vivant\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the\r\nlady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay. Such\r\ndifferent characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike\r\n\u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must\r\nmore or less be suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest,\r\ndeepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out the one on\r\nwhich to stake his salvation. All other selves thereupon become unreal,\r\nbut the fortunes of this self are real. Its failures are real failures,\r\nits triumphs real triumphs, carrying shame and gladness with them. This\r\nis as strong an example as there is of that selective industry of the\r\nmind on which I insisted some pages back (\u003ca href=\"#page_173\"\u003ep. 173\u003c/a\u003e ff.). Our thought,\r\nincessantly deciding, among many things of a kind, which ones for it\r\nshall be realities, here chooses one of many possible selves or\r\ncharacters, and forthwith reckons it no shame to fail in any of those\r\nnot adopted expressly as its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo we have the paradox of a man shamed to death because he is only the\r\nsecond pugilist or the second oarsman in the world. That he is able to\r\nbeat the whole population of the globe minus one is nothing; he has\r\n\u0027pitted\u0027 himself to beat that one; and as long as he doesn\u0027t\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_187\" id=\"page_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{187}\u003c/span\u003e do that\r\nnothing else counts. He is to his own regard as if he were not, indeed\r\nhe \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not. Yonder puny fellow, however, whom every one can beat,\r\nsuffers no chagrin about it, for he has long ago abandoned the attempt\r\nto \u0027carry that line,\u0027 as the merchants say, of self at all. With no\r\nattempt there can be no failure; with no failure, no humiliation. So our\r\nself-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we \u003ci\u003eback\u003c/i\u003e ourselves\r\nto be and do. It is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our\r\nsupposed potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions are the\r\ndenominator and the numerator our success: thus,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"1\" cellspacing=\"1\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\" valign=\"middle\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003eSelf-esteem\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd align=\"left\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e=\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"c\"\u003eSuccess.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"bt\"\u003ePretensions.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eSuch a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator\r\nas by increasing the numerator. To give up pretensions is as blessed a\r\nrelief as to get them gratified; and where disappointment is incessant\r\nand the struggle unending, this is what men will always do. The history\r\nof evangelical theology, with its conviction of sin, its self-despair,\r\nand its abandonment of salvation by works, is the deepest of possible\r\nexamples, but we meet others in every walk of life. There is the\r\nstrangest lightness about the heart when one\u0027s nothingness in a\r\nparticular line is once accepted in good faith. \u003ci\u003eAll\u003c/i\u003e is not bitterness\r\nin the lot of the lover sent away by the final inexorable \u0027No.\u0027 Many\r\nBostonians, \u003ci\u003ecrede experto\u003c/i\u003e (and inhabitants of other cities, too, I\r\nfear), would be happier women and men to-day, if they could once for all\r\nabandon the notion of keeping up a Musical Self, and without shame let\r\npeople hear them call a symphony a nuisance. How pleasant is the day\r\nwhen we give up striving to be young,\u0026mdash;or slender! Thank God! we say,\r\n\u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e illusions are gone. Everything added to the Self is a burden as\r\nwell as a pride. A certain man who lost every penny during our civil war\r\nwent and actually rolled in the dust, saying he had not felt so free and\r\nhappy since he was born.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_188\" id=\"page_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{188}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, then, our self-feeling is in our power. As Carlyle says:\r\n\"Make thy claim of wages a zero, then hast thou the world under thy\r\nfeet. Well did the wisest of our time write, it is only with\r\n\u003ci\u003erenunciation\u003c/i\u003e that life, properly speaking, can be said to begin.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNeither threats nor pleadings can move a man unless they touch some one\r\nof his potential or actual selves. Only thus can we, as a rule, get a\r\n\u0027purchase\u0027 on another\u0027s will. The first care of diplomatists and\r\nmonarchs and all who wish to rule or influence is, accordingly, to find\r\nout their victim\u0027s strongest principle of self-regard, so as to make\r\nthat the fulcrum of all appeals. But if a man has given up those things\r\nwhich are subject to foreign fate, and ceased to regard them as parts of\r\nhimself at all, we are well-nigh powerless over him. The Stoic receipt\r\nfor contentment was to dispossess yourself in advance of all that was\r\nout of your own power,\u0026mdash;then fortune\u0027s shocks might rain down unfelt.\r\nEpictetus exhorts us, by thus narrowing and at the same time solidifying\r\nour Self to make it invulnerable: \"I must die; well, but must I die\r\ngroaning too? I will speak what appears to be right, and if the despot\r\nsays, \u0027Then I will put you to death,\u0027 I will reply, \u0027When did I ever\r\ntell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine; it is\r\nyours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish, mine to depart\r\nuntroubled.\u0027 How do we act in a voyage? We choose the pilot, the\r\nsailors, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My\r\npart is performed. This matter belongs to the pilot. But the ship is\r\nsinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do\u0026mdash;submit to\r\nbeing drowned without fear, without clamor or accusing of God, but as\r\none who knows that what is born must likewise die.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis Stoic fashion, though efficacious and heroic enough in its place\r\nand time, is, it must be confessed, only possible as an habitual mood of\r\nthe soul to narrow and unsympathetic characters. It proceeds altogether\r\nby exclusion. If I am a Stoic, the goods I cannot appropriate cease to\r\nbe \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_189\" id=\"page_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{189}\u003c/span\u003e goods, and the temptation lies very near to deny that they are\r\ngoods at all. We find this mode of protecting the Self by exclusion and\r\ndenial very common among people who are in other respects not Stoics.\r\nAll narrow people \u003ci\u003eintrench\u003c/i\u003e their Me, they \u003ci\u003eretract\u003c/i\u003e it,\u0026mdash;from the\r\nregion of what they cannot securely possess. People who don\u0027t resemble\r\nthem, or who treat them with indifference, people over whom they gain no\r\ninfluence, are people on whose existence, however meritorious it may\r\nintrinsically be, they look with chill negation, if not with positive\r\nhate. Who will not be mine I will exclude from existence altogether;\r\nthat is, as far as I can make it so, such people shall be as if they\r\nwere not. Thus may a certain absoluteness and definiteness in the\r\noutline of my Me console me for the smallness of its content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSympathetic people, on the contrary, proceed by the entirely opposite\r\nway of expansion and inclusion. The outline of their self often gets\r\nuncertain enough, but for this the spread of its content more than\r\natones. \u003ci\u003eNil humani a me alienum.\u003c/i\u003e Let them despise this little person\r\nof mine, and treat me like a dog, \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e shall not negate \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e so long as\r\nI have a soul in my body. They are realities as much as I am. What\r\npositive good is in them shall be mine too, etc., etc. The magnanimity\r\nof these expansive natures is often touching indeed. Such persons can\r\nfeel a sort of delicate rapture in thinking that, however sick,\r\nill-favored, mean-conditioned, and generally forsaken they may be, they\r\nyet are integral parts of the whole of this brave world, have a fellow\u0027s\r\nshare in the strength of the dray-horses, the happiness of the young\r\npeople, the wisdom of the wise ones, and are not altogether without part\r\nor lot in the good fortunes of the Vanderbilts and the Hohenzollerns\r\nthemselves. Thus either by negating or by embracing, the Ego may seek to\r\nestablish itself in reality. He who, with Marcus Aurelius, can truly\r\nsay, \"O Universe, I wish all that thou wishest,\" has a self from which\r\nevery trace of negativeness and obstructiveness has been removed\u0026mdash;no\r\nwind can blow except to fill its sails.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_190\" id=\"page_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{190}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Hierarchy of the Mes.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the\r\ndifferent selves of which a man may be \u0027seized and possessed,\u0027 and the\r\nconsequent different orders of his self-regard, in an \u003ci\u003ehierarchical\r\nscale, with the bodily me at the bottom, the spiritual me at top, and\r\nthe extra-corporeal material selves and the various social selves\r\nbetween\u003c/i\u003e. Our merely natural self-seeking would lead us to aggrandize\r\nall these selves; we give up deliberately only those among them which we\r\nfind we cannot keep. Our unselfishness is thus apt to be a \u0027virtue of\r\nnecessity\u0027; and it is not without all show of reason that cynics quote\r\nthe fable of the fox and the grapes in describing our progress therein.\r\nBut this is the moral education of the race; and if we agree in the\r\nresult that on the whole the selves we can keep are the intrinsically\r\nbest, we need not complain of being led to the knowledge of their\r\nsuperior worth in such a tortuous way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course this is not the only way in which we learn to subordinate our\r\nlower selves to our higher. A direct ethical judgment unquestionably\r\nalso plays its part, and last, not least, we apply to our own persons\r\njudgments originally called forth by the acts of others. It is one of\r\nthe strangest laws of our nature that many things which we are well\r\nsatisfied with in ourselves disgust us when seen in others. With another\r\nman\u0027s bodily \u0027hoggishness\u0027 hardly anyone has any sympathy; almost as\r\nlittle with his cupidity, his social vanity and eagerness, his jealousy,\r\nhis despotism, and his pride. Left absolutely to myself I should\r\nprobably allow all these spontaneous tendencies to luxuriate in me\r\nunchecked, and it would be long before I formed a distinct notion of the\r\norder of their subordination. But having constantly to pass judgment on\r\nmy associates, I come ere long to see, as Herr Horwicz says, my own\r\nlusts in the mirror of the lusts of others, and to \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e about them in\r\na very different way from that in which I simply \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e. Of course, the\r\nmoral generalities which from childhood have been instilled into me\r\naccelerate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_191\" id=\"page_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{191}\u003c/span\u003e enormously the advent of this reflective judgment on myself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo it comes to pass that, as aforesaid, men have arranged the various\r\nselves which they may seek in an hierarchical scale according to their\r\nworth. A certain amount of bodily selfishness is required as a basis for\r\nall the other selves. But too much sensuality is despised, or at best\r\ncondoned on account of the other qualities of the individual. The wider\r\nmaterial selves are regarded as higher than the immediate body. He is\r\nesteemed a poor creature who is unable to forego a little meat and drink\r\nand warmth and sleep for the sake of getting on in the world. The social\r\nself as a whole, again, ranks higher than the material self as a whole.\r\nWe must care more for our honor, our friends, our human ties, than for a\r\nsound skin or wealth. And the spiritual self is so supremely precious\r\nthat, rather than lose it, a man ought to be willing to give up friends\r\nand good fame, and property, and life itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn each kind of Me, material, social, and spiritual, men distinguish\r\nbetween the immediate and actual, and the remote and potential\u003c/i\u003e, between\r\nthe narrower and the wider view, to the detriment of the former and the\r\nadvantage of the latter. One must forego a present bodily enjoyment for\r\nthe sake of one\u0027s general health; one must abandon the dollar in the\r\nhand for the sake of the hundred dollars to come; one must make an enemy\r\nof his present interlocutor if thereby one makes friends of a more\r\nvalued circle; one must go without learning and grace and wit, the\r\nbetter to compass one\u0027s soul\u0027s salvation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf all these wider, more potential selves, \u003ci\u003ethe potential social Me\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nthe most interesting, by reason of certain apparent paradoxes to which\r\nit leads in conduct, and by reason of its connection with our moral and\r\nreligious life. When for motives of honor and conscience I brave the\r\ncondemnation of my own family, club, and \u0027set\u0027; when, as a Protestant, I\r\nturn Catholic; as a Catholic, freethinker; as a \u0027regular practitioner,\u0027\r\nhomœopath, or what not, I am\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_192\" id=\"page_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{192}\u003c/span\u003e always inwardly strengthened in my\r\ncourse and steeled against the loss of my actual social self by the\r\nthought of other and better \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e social judges than those whose\r\nverdict goes against me now. The ideal social self which I thus seek in\r\nappealing to their decision may be very remote: it may be represented as\r\nbarely possible. I may not hope for its realization during my lifetime;\r\nI may even expect the future generations, which would approve me if they\r\nknew me, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone. Yet still the\r\nemotion that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal social\r\nself, of a self that is at least \u003ci\u003eworthy\u003c/i\u003e of approving recognition by\r\nthe highest \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e judging companion, if such companion there be.\r\nThis self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent me\r\nwhich I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the \u0027Great\r\nCompanion.\u0027 We hear, in these days of scientific enlightenment, a great\r\ndeal of discussion about the efficacy of prayer; and many reasons are\r\ngiven us why we should not pray, whilst others are given us why we\r\nshould. But in all this very little is said of the reason why we \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e\r\npray, which is simply that we cannot help praying. It seems probable\r\nthat, in spite of all that \u0027science\u0027 may do to the contrary, men will\r\ncontinue to pray to the end of time, unless their mental nature changes\r\nin a manner which nothing we know should lead us to expect. The impulse\r\nto pray is a necessary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost\r\nof the empirical selves of a man is a Self of the \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e sort, it yet\r\ncan find its only adequate \u003ci\u003eSocius\u003c/i\u003e in an ideal world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll progress in the social Self is the substitution of higher tribunals\r\nfor lower; this ideal tribunal is the highest; and most men, either\r\ncontinually or occasionally, carry a reference to it in their breast.\r\nThe humblest outcast on this earth can feel himself to be real and valid\r\nby means of this higher recognition. And, on the other hand, for most of\r\nus, a world with no such inner refuge when the outer social self failed\r\nand dropped from us would be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_193\" id=\"page_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{193}\u003c/span\u003e the abyss of horror. I say \u0027for most of\r\nus,\u0027 because it is probable that individuals differ a good deal in the\r\ndegree in which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal spectator. It\r\nis a much more essential part of the consciousness of some men than of\r\nothers. Those who have the most of it are possibly the most \u003ci\u003ereligious\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmen. But I am sure that even those who say they are altogether without\r\nit deceive themselves, and really have it in some degree. Only a\r\nnon-gregarious animal could be completely without it. Probably no one\r\ncan make sacrifices for \u0027right,\u0027 without to some degree personifying the\r\nprinciple of right for which the sacrifice is made, and expecting thanks\r\nfrom it. \u003ci\u003eComplete\u003c/i\u003e social unselfishness, in other words, can hardly\r\nexist; \u003ci\u003ecomplete\u003c/i\u003e social suicide hardly occur to a man\u0027s mind. Even such\r\ntexts as Job\u0027s, \"Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him,\" or Marcus\r\nAurelius\u0027s, \"If gods hate me and my children, there is a reason for it,\"\r\ncan least of all be cited to prove the contrary. For beyond all doubt\r\nJob revelled in the thought of Jehovah\u0027s recognition of the worship\r\nafter the slaying should have been done; and the Roman emperor felt sure\r\nthe Absolute Reason would not be all indifferent to his acquiescence in\r\nthe gods\u0027 dislike. The old test of piety, \"Are you willing to be damned\r\nfor the glory of God?\" was probably never answered in the affirmative\r\nexcept by those who felt sure in their heart of hearts that God would\r\n\u0027credit\u0027 them with their willingness, and set more store by them thus\r\nthan if in His unfathomable scheme He had not damned them at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTeleological Uses of Self-interest.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;On zoölogical principles it is easy\r\nto see why we have been endowed with impulses of self-seeking and with\r\nemotions of self-satisfaction and the reverse. Unless our consciousness\r\nwere something more than cognitive, unless it experienced a partiality\r\nfor certain of the objects, which, in succession, occupy its ken, it\r\ncould not long maintain itself in existence; for, by an inscrutable\r\nnecessity, each human mind\u0027s appearance on this earth is conditioned\r\nupon the integrity\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_194\" id=\"page_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{194}\u003c/span\u003e of the body with which it belongs, upon the\r\ntreatment which that body gets from others, and upon the spiritual\r\ndispositions which use it as their tool, and lead it either towards\r\nlongevity or to destruction. \u003ci\u003eIts own body, then, first of all, its\r\nfriends next, and finally its spiritual dispositions\u003c/i\u003e, \u003csmall\u003eMUST\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003ebe the\r\nsupremely interesting objects for each human mind\u003c/i\u003e. Each mind, to begin\r\nwith, must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the shape of\r\ninstincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist. This minimum must be\r\nthere as a basis for all farther conscious acts, whether of\r\nself-negation or of a selfishness more subtle still. All minds must have\r\ncome, by the way of the survival of the fittest, if by no directer path,\r\nto take an intense interest in the bodies to which they are yoked,\r\naltogether apart from any interest in the pure Ego which they also\r\npossess.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd similarly with the images of their person in the minds of others. I\r\nshould not be extant now had I not become sensitive to looks of approval\r\nor disapproval on the faces among which my life is cast. Looks of\r\ncontempt cast on other persons need affect me in no such peculiar way.\r\nMy spiritual powers, again, must interest me more than those of other\r\npeople, and for the same reason. I should not be here at all unless I\r\nhad cultivated them and kept them from decay. And the same law which\r\nmade me once care for them makes me care for them still.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll these three things form the \u003ci\u003enatural Me\u003c/i\u003e. But all these things are\r\n\u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e, properly so called, to the thought which at any time may be\r\ndoing the thinking; and if the zoölogical and evolutionary point of view\r\nis the true one, there is no reason why one object \u003ci\u003emight\u003c/i\u003e not arouse\r\npassion and interest as primitively and instinctively as any other. The\r\nphenomenon of passion is in origin and essence the same, whatever be the\r\ntarget upon which it is discharged; and what the target actually happens\r\nto be is solely a question of fact. I might conceivably be as much\r\nfascinated, and as primitively so, by the care of my neighbor\u0027s body as\r\nby the care of my own. I \u003ci\u003eam\u003c/i\u003e thus fascinated\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_195\" id=\"page_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{195}\u003c/span\u003e by the care of my child\u0027s\r\nbody. The only check to such exuberant non-egoistic interests is natural\r\nselection, which would weed out such as were very harmful to the\r\nindividual or to his tribe. Many such interests, however, remain\r\nunweeded out\u0026mdash;the interest in the opposite sex, for example, which seems\r\nin mankind stronger than is called for by its utilitarian need; and\r\nalongside of them remain interests, like that in alcoholic intoxication,\r\nor in musical sounds, which, for aught we can see, are without any\r\nutility whatever. The sympathetic instincts and the egoistic ones are\r\nthus coördinate. They arise, so far as we can tell, on the same\r\npsychologic level. The only difference between them is that the\r\ninstincts called egoistic form much the larger mass.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The following table may serve for a summary of what has been\r\nsaid thus far. The empirical life of Self is divided, as below, into\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellpadding=\"2\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\r\n class=\"sml85\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaterial.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd class=\"smcap\"\u003eSocial.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpiritual.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\" valign=\"middle\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf-Seeking.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd\u003eBodily Appetites\r\nand Instincts.\r\nLove of Adornment,\r\nFoppery,\r\nAcquisitiveness,\r\nConstructiveness.\r\nLove of Home, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd\u003eDesire to Please,\r\nbe Noticed, Admired,\r\netc.\r\nSociability, Emulation,\r\nEnvy,\r\nLove, Pursuit\r\nof Honor, Ambition,\r\netc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIntellectual, Moral\r\nand Religious\r\nAspirations,\r\nConscientiousness.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\" valign=\"middle\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf-Estimation.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd\u003ePersonal Vanity,\r\nModesty, etc.\r\nPride of Wealth,\r\nFear of Poverty.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSocial and Family\r\nPride, Vainglory,\r\nSnobbery,\r\nHumility,\r\nShame, etc.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSense of Moral or\r\nMental Superiority,\r\nPurity, etc.\r\nSense of Inferiority\r\nor of Guilt.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eB) \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Self as Knower.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe I, or \u0027pure ego,\u0027 is a very much more difficult subject of inquiry\r\nthan the Me. It is that which at any given moment \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e conscious,\r\nwhereas the Me is only one of the things which it is conscious \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e. In\r\nother words, it is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_196\" id=\"page_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{196}\u003c/span\u003e the \u003ci\u003eThinker\u003c/i\u003e; and the question immediately comes\r\nup, \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e is the thinker? Is it the passing state of consciousness\r\nitself, or is it something deeper and less mutable? The passing state we\r\nhave seen to be the very embodiment of change (see \u003ca href=\"#page_155\"\u003ep. 155\u003c/a\u003e ff.). Yet each\r\nof us spontaneously considers that by \u0027I,\u0027 he means something always the\r\nsame. This has led most philosophers to postulate behind the passing\r\nstate of consciousness a permanent Substance or Agent whose modification\r\nor act it is. This Agent is the thinker; the \u0027state\u0027 is only its\r\ninstrument or means. \u0027Soul,\u0027 \u0027transcendental Ego,\u0027 \u0027Spirit,\u0027 are so many\r\nnames for this more permanent sort of Thinker. Not discriminating them\r\njust yet, let us proceed to define our idea of the passing state of\r\nconsciousness more clearly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Unity of the Passing Thought.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Already, in speaking of \u0027sensations,\u0027\r\nfrom the point of view of Fechner\u0027s idea of measuring them, we saw that\r\nthere was no ground for calling them compounds. But what is true of\r\nsensations cognizing simple qualities is also true of thoughts with\r\ncomplex objects composed of many parts. This proposition unfortunately\r\nruns counter to a wide-spread prejudice, and will have to be defended at\r\nsome length. Common-sense, and psychologists of almost every school,\r\nhave agreed that whenever an object of thought contains many elements,\r\nthe thought itself must be made up of just as many ideas, one idea for\r\neach element, all fused together in appearance, but really separate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There can be no difficulty in admitting that association \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e form\r\nthe ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea,\"\r\nsays James Mill, \"because it is an acknowledged fact. Have we not the\r\nidea of an army? And is not that precisely the ideas of an indefinite\r\nnumber of men formed into one idea?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSimilar quotations might be multiplied, and the reader\u0027s own first\r\nimpressions probably would rally to their support. Suppose, for example,\r\nhe thinks that \"the pack of cards is on the table.\" If he begins to\r\nreflect, he is as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_197\" id=\"page_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{197}\u003c/span\u003e likely as not to say: \"Well, isn\u0027t that a thought of\r\nthe pack of cards? Isn\u0027t it of the cards as included in the pack? Isn\u0027t\r\nit of the table? And of the legs of the table as well? Hasn\u0027t my\r\nthought, then, all these parts\u0026mdash;one part for the pack and another for\r\nthe table? And within the pack-part a part for each card, as within the\r\ntable-part a part for each leg? And isn\u0027t each of these parts an idea?\r\nAnd can thought, then, be anything but an assemblage or pack of ideas,\r\neach answering to some element of what it knows?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePlausible as such considerations may seem, it is astonishing how little\r\nforce they have. In assuming a pack of ideas, each cognizant of some one\r\nelement of the fact one has assumed, nothing has been assumed which\r\nknows the whole fact \u003ci\u003eat once\u003c/i\u003e. The idea which, on the hypothesis of the\r\npack of ideas, knows, \u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e, the ace of spades must be ignorant of the\r\nleg of the table, since to account for that knowledge another special\r\nidea is by the same hypothesis invoked; and so on with the rest of the\r\nideas, all equally ignorant of each other\u0027s objects. And yet in the\r\nactual living human mind what knows the cards also knows the table, its\r\nlegs, etc., for all these things are known in relation to each other and\r\nat once. Our notion of the abstract numbers eight, four, two is as truly\r\none feeling of the mind as our notion of simple unity. Our idea of a\r\ncouple is not a couple of ideas. \"But,\" the reader may say, \"is not the\r\ntaste of lemonade composed of that of lemon \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e that of sugar?\" No! I\r\nreply, this is taking the combining of objects for that of feelings. The\r\nphysical lemonade contains both the lemon and the sugar, but its taste\r\ndoes not contain their tastes; for if there are any two things which are\r\ncertainly \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e present in the taste of lemonade, those are the pure\r\nlemon-sour on the one hand and the pure sugar-sweet on the other. These\r\ntastes are absent utterly. A taste somewhat \u003ci\u003elike\u003c/i\u003e both of them is\r\nthere, but that is a distinct state of mind altogether.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDistinct mental states cannot \u0027fuse.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e But not only is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_198\" id=\"page_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{198}\u003c/span\u003e the notion that\r\nour ideas are combinations of smaller ideas improbable, it is logically\r\nunintelligible; it leaves out the essential features of all the\r\n\u0027combinations\u0027 which we actually know.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAll the \u0027combinations\u0027 which we actually know are\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eEFFECTS\u003c/small\u003e, \u003ci\u003ewrought by\r\nthe units said to be \u0027combined,\u0027\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eUPON SOME ENTITY OTHER THAN\r\nTHEMSELVES\u003c/small\u003e. Without this feature of a medium or vehicle, the notion of\r\ncombination has no sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, no possible number of entities (call them as you like,\r\nwhether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can sum\r\n\u003ci\u003ethemselves\u003c/i\u003e together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always was; and\r\nthe sum itself exists only \u003ci\u003efor a bystander\u003c/i\u003e who happens to overlook the\r\nunits and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape\r\nof some other effect on an entity external to the sum itself. When H\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e\r\nand O are said to combine into \u0027water,\u0027 and thenceforward to exhibit new\r\nproperties, the \u0027water\u0027 is just the old atoms in the new position,\r\nH-O-H; the \u0027new properties\u0027 are just their combined \u003ci\u003eeffects\u003c/i\u003e, when in\r\nthis position, upon external media, such as our sense-organs and the\r\nvarious reagents on which water may exert its properties and be known.\r\nJust so, the strength of many men may combine when they pull upon one\r\nrope, of many muscular fibres when they pull upon one tendon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the parallelogram of forces, the \u0027forces\u0027 do not combine \u003ci\u003ethemselves\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninto the diagonal resultant; a \u003ci\u003ebody\u003c/i\u003e is needed on which they may\r\nimpinge, to exhibit their resultant effect. No more do musical sounds\r\ncombine \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e into concords or discords. Concord and discord are\r\nnames for their combined effects on that external medium, the \u003ci\u003eear\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no\r\nwise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as\r\nclose together as you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains\r\nthe same\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_199\" id=\"page_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{199}\u003c/span\u003e feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless,\r\nignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a\r\nhundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such\r\nfeelings were set up, a consciousness \u003ci\u003ebelonging to the group as such\u003c/i\u003e\r\nshould emerge, and this one hundred and first feeling would be a totally\r\nnew fact. The one hundred original feelings might, by a curious physical\r\nlaw, be a signal for its \u003ci\u003ecreation\u003c/i\u003e, when they came together\u0026mdash;we often\r\nhave to learn things separately before we know them as a sum\u0026mdash;but they\r\nwould have no substantial identity with the new feeling, nor it with\r\nthem; and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any\r\nintelligible sense) say that they \u003ci\u003eevolved\u003c/i\u003e it out of themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each\r\none word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let\r\neach think of his word as intently as he will: nowhere will there be a\r\nconsciousness of the whole sentence. We talk, it is true, of the \u0027spirit\r\nof the age,\u0027 and the \u0027sentiment of the people,\u0027 and in various ways we\r\nhypostatize \u0027public opinion.\u0027 But we know this to be symbolic speech,\r\nand never dream that the spirit, opinion, or sentiment constitutes a\r\nconsciousness other than, and additional to, that of the several\r\nindividuals whom the words \u0027age,\u0027 \u0027people,\u0027 or \u0027public\u0027 denote. The\r\nprivate minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind. This has\r\nalways been the invincible contention of the spiritualists against the\r\nassociationists in Psychology. The associationists say the mind is\r\nconstituted by a multiplicity of distinct \u0027ideas\u0027 \u003ci\u003eassociated\u003c/i\u003e into a\r\nunity. There is, they say, an idea of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, and also an idea of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003ci\u003eTherefore\u003c/i\u003e, they say, there is an idea of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, or of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntogether. Which is like saying that the mathematical square of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e plus\r\nthat of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the square of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, a palpable untruth.\r\nIdea of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + idea of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e identical with idea of (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e).\r\nIt is one, they are two; in it, what knows \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e also knows \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e; in them,\r\nwhat knows \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e is expressly posited as not knowing \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e; etc. In short,\r\nthe two separate ideas\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_200\" id=\"page_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{200}\u003c/span\u003e can never by any logic be made to figure as one\r\nidea. If one idea (of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e + \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, for example) come as a matter of fact\r\nafter the two separate ideas (of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e), then we must hold it\r\nto be as direct a product of the later conditions as the two separate\r\nideas were of the earlier conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe simplest thing, therefore, if we are to assume the existence of a\r\nstream of consciousness at all, would be to suppose that things that are\r\nknown together are known in single pulses of that stream.\u003c/i\u003e The things\r\nmay be many, and may occasion many currents in the brain. But the\r\npsychic phenomenon correlative to these many currents is one integral\r\n\u0027state,\u0027 transitive or substantive (see \u003ca href=\"#page_161\"\u003ep. 161\u003c/a\u003e), to which the many\r\nthings appear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Soul as a Combining Medium.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The spiritualists in philosophy have\r\nbeen prompt to see that things which are known together are known by one\r\n\u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e, but that something, they say, is no mere passing thought,\r\nbut a simple and permanent spiritual being on which many ideas combine\r\ntheir effects. It makes no difference in this connection whether this\r\nbeing be called Soul, Ego, or Spirit, in either case its chief function\r\nis that of a combining medium. This is a different vehicle of knowledge\r\nfrom that in which we just said that the mystery of knowing things\r\ntogether might be most simply lodged. Which is the real knower, this\r\npermanent being, or our passing state? If we had other grounds, not yet\r\nconsidered, for admitting the Soul into our psychology, then getting\r\nthere on those grounds, she might turn out to be the knower too. But if\r\nthere be no \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e grounds for admitting the Soul, we had better cling\r\nto our passing \u0027states\u0027 as the exclusive agents of knowledge; for we\r\nhave to assume their existence anyhow in psychology, and the knowing of\r\nmany things together is just as well accounted for when we call it one\r\nof their functions as when we call it a reaction of the Soul.\r\n\u003ci\u003eExplained\u003c/i\u003e it is not by either conception, and has to figure in\r\npsychology as a datum that is ultimate.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_201\" id=\"page_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{201}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there are other alleged grounds for admitting the Soul into\r\npsychology, and the chief of them is\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Sense of Personal Identity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the last chapter it was stated (see\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_154\"\u003ep. 154\u003c/a\u003e) that the thoughts which we actually know to exist do not fly\r\nabout loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to\r\nanother. Each thought, out of a multitude of other thoughts of which it\r\nmay think, is able to distinguish those which belong to it from those\r\nwhich do not. The former have a warmth and intimacy about them of which\r\nthe latter are completely devoid, and the result is a Me of yesterday,\r\njudged to be in some peculiarly subtle sense the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e with the I who\r\nnow make the judgment. As a mere subjective phenomenon the judgment\r\npresents no special mystery. It belongs to the great class of judgments\r\nof sameness; and there is nothing more remarkable in making a judgment\r\nof sameness in the first person than in the second or the third. The\r\nintellectual operations seem essentially alike, whether I say \u0027I am the\r\nsame as I was,\u0027 or whether I say \u0027the pen is the same as it was,\r\nyesterday.\u0027 It is as easy to think this as to think the opposite and say\r\n\u0027neither of us is the same.\u0027 The only question which we have to consider\r\nis whether it be a right judgment. \u003ci\u003eIs the sameness predicated really\r\nthere?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSameness in the Self as Known.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If in the sentence \"I am the same that I\r\nwas yesterday,\" we take the \u0027I\u0027 broadly, it is evident that in many ways\r\nI am \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e the same. As a concrete Me, I am somewhat different from what\r\nI was: then hungry, now full; then walking, now at rest; then poorer,\r\nnow richer; then younger, now older; etc. And yet in other ways I \u003ci\u003eam\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe same, and we may call these the essential ways. My name and\r\nprofession and relations to the world are identical, my face, my\r\nfaculties and store of memories, are practically indistinguishable, now\r\nand then. Moreover the Me of now and the Me of then are \u003ci\u003econtinuous\u003c/i\u003e:\r\nthe alterations were gradual and never affected the whole of me at once.\r\nSo far, then, my personal identity is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_202\" id=\"page_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{202}\u003c/span\u003e just like the sameness predicated\r\nof any other aggregate thing. It is a conclusion grounded either on the\r\nresemblance in essential respects, or on the continuity of the phenomena\r\ncompared. And it must not be taken to mean more than these grounds\r\nwarrant, or treated as a sort of metaphysical or absolute Unity in which\r\nall differences are overwhelmed. The past and present selves compared\r\nare the same just so far as they \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e the same, and no farther. They\r\nare the same in \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e. But this generic sameness coexists with generic\r\ndifferences just as real; and if from the one point of view I am one\r\nself, from another I am quite as truly many. Similarly of the attribute\r\nof continuity: it gives to the self the unity of mere connectedness, or\r\nunbrokenness, a perfectly definite phenomenal thing\u0026mdash;but it gives not a\r\njot or tittle more.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSameness in the Self as Knower.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But all this is said only of the Me, or\r\nSelf as known. In the judgment \u0027I am the same,\u0027 etc., the \u0027I\u0027 was taken\r\nbroadly as the concrete person. Suppose, however, that we take it\r\nnarrowly, as the \u003ci\u003eThinker\u003c/i\u003e, as \u0027\u003ci\u003ethat to which\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 all the concrete\r\ndeterminations of the Me belong and are known: does there not then\r\nappear an absolute identity at different times? That something which at\r\nevery moment goes out and knowingly appropriates the \u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e of the past,\r\nand discards the non-me as foreign, is it not a permanent abiding\r\nprinciple of spiritual activity identical with itself wherever found?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat it is such a principle is the reigning doctrine both of philosophy\r\nand common-sense, and yet reflection finds it difficult to justify the\r\nidea. \u003ci\u003eIf there were no passing states of consciousness\u003c/i\u003e, then indeed we\r\nmight suppose an abiding principle, absolutely one with itself, to be\r\nthe ceaseless thinker in each one of us. But if the states of\r\nconsciousness be accorded as realities, no such \u0027substantial\u0027 identity\r\nin the thinker need be supposed. Yesterday\u0027s and to-day\u0027s states of\r\nconsciousnesses have no \u003ci\u003esubstantial\u003c/i\u003e identity, for when one is here the\r\nother is irrevocably dead and gone. But they have a \u003ci\u003efunctional\u003c/i\u003e\r\nidentity, for both\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_203\" id=\"page_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{203}\u003c/span\u003e know the same objects, and so far as the by-gone me\r\nis one of those objects, they react upon it in an identical way,\r\ngreeting it and calling it \u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e, and opposing it to all the other\r\nthings they know. This functional identity seems really the only sort of\r\nidentity in the thinker which the facts require us to suppose.\r\nSuccessive thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the same\r\npast in the same way, form an adequate vehicle for all the experience of\r\npersonal unity and sameness which we actually have. And just such a\r\ntrain of successive thinkers is the stream of mental states (each with\r\nits complex object cognized and emotional and selective reaction\r\nthereupon) which psychology treated as a natural science has to assume\r\n(see \u003ca href=\"#page_002\"\u003ep. 2\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe logical conclusion seems then to be that \u003ci\u003ethe states of\r\nconsciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with.\r\nMetaphysics or theology may prove the Soul to exist; but for psychology\r\nthe hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHow the I appropriates the Me.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e should each successive mental\r\nstate appropriate the same past Me? I spoke a while ago of my own past\r\nexperiences appearing to me with a \u0027warmth and intimacy\u0027 which the\r\nexperiences thought of by me as having occurred to other people lack.\r\nThis leads us to the answer sought. My present Me is felt with warmth\r\nand intimacy. The heavy warm mass of my body is there, and the nucleus\r\nof the \u0027spiritual me,\u0027 the sense of intimate activity (\u003ca href=\"#page_184\"\u003ep. 184\u003c/a\u003e), is\r\nthere. We cannot realize our present self without simultaneously feeling\r\none or other of these two things. Any other object of thought which\r\nbrings these two things with it into consciousness will be thought with\r\na warmth and an intimacy like those which cling to the present me.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny \u003ci\u003edistant\u003c/i\u003e object which fulfils this condition will be thought with\r\nsuch warmth and intimacy. But which distant objects \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e fulfil the\r\ncondition, when represented?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObviously those, and only those, which fulfilled it when they were\r\nalive. \u003ci\u003eThem\u003c/i\u003e we shall still represent with the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_204\" id=\"page_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{204}\u003c/span\u003e animal warmth upon\r\nthem; to them may possibly still cling the flavor of the inner activity\r\ntaken in the act. And by a natural consequence, we shall assimilate them\r\nto each other and to the warm and intimate self we now feel within us as\r\nwe think, and separate them as a collection from whatever objects have\r\nnot this mark, much as out of a herd of cattle let loose for the winter\r\non some wide Western prairie the owner picks out and sorts together,\r\nwhen the round-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which he finds\r\nhis own particular brand. Well, just such objects are the past\r\nexperiences which I now call mine. Other men\u0027s experiences, no matter\r\nhow much I may know about them, never bear this vivid, this peculiar\r\nbrand. This is why Peter, awakening in the same bed with Paul, and\r\nrecalling what both had in mind before they went to sleep, reidentifies\r\nand appropriates the \u0027warm\u0027 ideas as his, and is never tempted to\r\nconfuse them with those cold and pale-appearing ones which he ascribes\r\nto Paul. As well might he confound Paul\u0027s body, which he only sees, with\r\nhis own body, which he sees but also feels. Each of us when he awakens\r\nsays, Here\u0027s the same old Me again, just as he says, Here\u0027s the same old\r\nbed, the same old room, the same old world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd similarly in our waking hours, though each pulse of consciousness\r\ndies away and is replaced by another, yet that other, among the things\r\nit knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it \u0027warm,\u0027 in the way\r\nwe have described, greets it, saying: \"Thou art \u003ci\u003emine\u003c/i\u003e, and part of the\r\nsame self with me.\" Each later thought, knowing and including thus the\r\nthoughts that went before, is the final receptacle\u0026mdash;and appropriating\r\nthem is the final owner\u0026mdash;of all that they contain and own. As Kant says,\r\nit is as if elastic balls were to have not only motion but knowledge of\r\nit, and a first ball were to transmit both its motion and its\r\nconsciousness to a second, which took both up into \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e consciousness\r\nand passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other\r\nballs had held, and realized it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_205\" id=\"page_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{205}\u003c/span\u003e as its own. It is this trick which the\r\nnascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and\r\n\u0027adopting\u0027 it, which leads to the appropriation of most of the remoter\r\nconstituents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before\r\nthe last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed. It\r\nis impossible to discover any \u003ci\u003everifiable\u003c/i\u003e features in personal identity\r\nwhich this sketch does not contain, impossible to imagine how any\r\ntranscendent principle of Unity (were such a principle there) could\r\nshape matters to any other result, or be known by any other fruit, than\r\njust this production of a stream of consciousness each successive part\r\nof which should know, and knowing, hug to itself and adopt, all those\r\nthat went before,\u0026mdash;thus standing as the \u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e of an entire\r\npast stream with which it is in no wise to be identified.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMutations and Multiplications of the Self.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The Me, like every other\r\naggregate, changes as it grows. The passing states of consciousness,\r\nwhich should preserve in their succession an identical knowledge of its\r\npast, wander from their duty, letting large portions drop from out of\r\ntheir ken, and representing other portions wrong. The identity which we\r\nrecognize as we survey the long procession can only be the relative\r\nidentity of a slow shifting in which there is always some common\r\ningredient retained. The commonest element of all, the most uniform, is\r\nthe possession of some common memories. However different the man may be\r\nfrom the youth, both look back on the same childhood and call it their\r\nown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the identity found by the \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e in its \u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e is only a loosely\r\nconstrued thing, an identity \u0027on the whole,\u0027 just like that which any\r\noutside observer might find in the same assemblage of facts. We often\r\nsay of a man \u0027he is so changed one would not know him\u0027; and so does a\r\nman, less often, speak of himself. These changes in the \u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e, recognized\r\nby the I, or by outside observers, may be grave or slight. They deserve\r\nsome notice here.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_206\" id=\"page_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{206}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mutations of the Self may be divided into two main classes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e Alterations of memory; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e Alterations in the present bodily and spiritual selves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e Of the alterations of memory little need be said\u0026mdash;they are so\r\nfamiliar. Losses of memory are a normal incident in life, especially in\r\nadvancing years, and the person\u0027s \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e, as \u0027realized,\u0027 shrinks \u003ci\u003epari\r\npassu\u003c/i\u003e with the facts that disappear. The memory of dreams and of\r\nexperiences in the hypnotic trance rarely survives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFalse memories, also, are by no means rare occurrences, and whenever\r\nthey occur they distort our consciousness of our Me. Most people,\r\nprobably, are in doubt about certain matters ascribed to their past.\r\nThey may have seen them, may have said them, done them, or they may only\r\nhave dreamed or imagined they did so. The content of a dream will\r\noftentimes insert itself into the stream of real life in a most\r\nperplexing way. The most frequent source of false memory is the accounts\r\nwe give to others of our experiences. Such accounts we almost always\r\nmake both more simple and more interesting than the truth. We quote what\r\nwe should have said or done, rather than what we really said or did; and\r\nin the first telling we may be fully aware of the distinction. But ere\r\nlong the fiction expels the reality from memory and reigns in its stead\r\nalone. This is one great source of the fallibility of testimony meant to\r\nbe quite honest. Especially where the marvellous is concerned, the story\r\ntakes a tilt that way, and the memory follows the story.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e When we pass beyond alterations of memory to abnormal \u003ci\u003ealterations\r\nin the present self\u003c/i\u003e we have graver disturbances. These alterations are\r\nof three main types, but our knowledge of the elements and causes of\r\nthese changes of personality is so slight that the division into types\r\nmust not be regarded as having any profound significance. The types\r\nare:\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_207\" id=\"page_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{207}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eα. Insane delusions;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eβ. Alternating selves;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eγ. Mediumships or possessions.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eα. In insanity we often have delusions projected into the past, which are\r\nmelancholic or sanguine according to the character of the disease. But\r\nthe worst alterations of the self come from present perversions of\r\nsensibility and impulse which leave the past undisturbed, but induce the\r\npatient to think that the present \u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e is an altogether new personage.\r\nSomething of this sort happens normally in the rapid expansion of the\r\nwhole character, intellectual as well as volitional, which takes place\r\nafter the time of puberty. The pathological cases are curious enough to\r\nmerit longer notice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe basis of our personality, as M. Ribot says, is that feeling of our\r\nvitality which, because it is so perpetually present, remains in the\r\nbackground of our consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is the basis because, always present, always acting, without peace\r\nor rest, it knows neither sleep nor fainting, and lasts as long as life\r\nitself, of which it is one form. It serves as a support to that\r\nself-conscious \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e which memory constitutes, it is the medium of\r\nassociation among its other parts…. Suppose now that it were possible\r\nat once to change our body and put another into its place: skeleton,\r\nvessels, viscera, muscles, skin, everything made new, except the nervous\r\nsystem with its stored-up memory of the past. There can be no doubt that\r\nin such a case the afflux of unaccustomed vital sensations would produce\r\nthe gravest disorders. Between the old sense of existence engraved on\r\nthe nervous system, and the new one acting with all the intensity of its\r\nreality and novelty, there would be irreconcilable contradiction.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat the particular perversions of the bodily sensibility may be which\r\ngive rise to these contradictions is, for the most part, impossible for\r\na sound-minded person to conceive.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_208\" id=\"page_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{208}\u003c/span\u003e One patient has another self that\r\nrepeats all his thoughts for him. Others, amongst whom are some of the\r\nfirst characters in history, have internal dæmons who speak with them\r\nand are replied to. Another feels that someone \u0027makes\u0027 his thoughts for\r\nhim. Another has two bodies, lying in different beds. Some patients feel\r\nas if they had lost parts of their bodies, teeth, brain, stomach, etc.\r\nIn some it is made of wood, glass, butter, etc. In some it does not\r\nexist any longer, or is dead, or is a foreign object quite separate from\r\nthe speaker\u0027s self. Occasionally, parts of the body lose their\r\nconnection for consciousness with the rest, and are treated as belonging\r\nto another person and moved by a hostile will. Thus the right hand may\r\nfight with the left as with an enemy. Or the cries of the patient\r\nhimself are assigned to another person with whom the patient expresses\r\nsympathy. The literature of insanity is filled with narratives of such\r\nillusions as these. M. Taine quotes from a patient of Dr. Krishaber an\r\naccount of sufferings, from which it will be seen how completely aloof\r\nfrom what is normal a man\u0027s experience may suddenly become:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"After the first or second day it was for some weeks impossible to\r\nobserve or analyze myself. The suffering\u0026mdash;angina pectoris\u0026mdash;was too\r\noverwhelming. It was not till the first days of January that I could\r\ngive an account to myself of what I experienced…. Here is the first\r\nthing of which I retain a clear remembrance. I was alone, and already a\r\nprey to permanent visual trouble, when I was suddenly seized with a\r\nvisual trouble infinitely more pronounced. Objects grew small and\r\nreceded to infinite distances\u0026mdash;men and things together. I was myself\r\nimmeasurably far away. I looked about me with terror and astonishment;\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe world was escaping from me\u003c/i\u003e…. I remarked at the same time that my\r\nvoice was extremely far away from me, that it sounded no longer as if\r\nmine. I struck the ground with my foot, and perceived its resistance;\r\nbut this resistance seemed illusory\u0026mdash;not that the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_209\" id=\"page_209\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{209}\u003c/span\u003e soil was soft, but\r\nthat the weight of my body was reduced to almost nothing…. I had the\r\nfeeling of being without weight….\" In addition to being so distant,\r\n\"objects appeared to me \u003ci\u003eflat\u003c/i\u003e. When I spoke with anyone, I saw him like\r\nan image cut out of paper with no relief…. This sensation lasted\r\nintermittently for two years…. Constantly it seemed as if my legs did\r\nnot belong to me. It was almost as bad with my arms. As for my head, it\r\nseemed no longer to exist…. I appeared to myself to act automatically,\r\nby an impulsion foreign to myself…. There was inside of me a new\r\nbeing, and another part of myself, the old being, which took no interest\r\nin the newcomer. I distinctly remember saying to myself that the\r\nsufferings of this new being were to me indifferent. I was never really\r\ndupe of these illusions, but my mind grew often tired of incessantly\r\ncorrecting the new impressions, and I let myself go and live the unhappy\r\nlife of this new entity. I had an ardent desire to see my old world\r\nagain, to get back to my old self. This desire kept me from killing\r\nmyself…. I was another, and I hated, I despised this other; he was\r\nperfectly odious to me; it was certainly another who had taken my form\r\nand assumed my functions.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_32_32\" id=\"FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_32_32\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn cases like this, it is as certain that the \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e is unaltered as that\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e is changed. That is to say, the present Thought of the patient\r\nis cognitive of both the old Me and the new, so long as its memory holds\r\ngood. Only, within that objective sphere which formerly lent itself so\r\nsimply to the judgment of recognition and of egoistic appropriation,\r\nstrange perplexities have arisen. The present and the past, both seen\r\ntherein, will not unite. Where is my old Me? What is this new one? Are\r\nthey the same? Or have I two? Such questions, answered by whatever\r\ntheory the patient is able to conjure up as plausible, form the\r\nbeginning of his insane life.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_210\" id=\"page_210\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{210}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eβ. The phenomenon of \u003ci\u003ealternating personality\u003c/i\u003e in its simplest phases\r\nseems based on lapses of memory. Any man becomes, as we say,\r\n\u003ci\u003einconsistent\u003c/i\u003e with himself if he forgets his engagements, pledges,\r\nknowledges, and habits; and it is merely a question of degree at what\r\npoint we shall say that his personality is changed. But in the\r\npathological cases known as those of double or alternate personality the\r\nloss of memory is abrupt, and is usually preceded by a period of\r\nunconsciousness or syncope lasting a variable length of time. In the\r\nhypnotic trance we can easily produce an alteration of the personality,\r\neither by telling the subject to forget all that has happened to him\r\nsince such or such a date, in which case he becomes (it may be) a child\r\nagain, or by telling him he is another altogether imaginary personage,\r\nin which case all facts about himself seem for the time being to lapse\r\nfrom out his mind, and he throws himself into the new character with a\r\nvivacity proportionate to the amount of histrionic imagination which he\r\npossesses. But in the pathological cases the transformation is\r\nspontaneous. The most famous case, perhaps, on record is that of Félida\r\nX., reported by Dr. Azam of Bordeaux. At the age of fourteen this woman\r\nbegan to pass into a \u0027secondary\u0027 state characterized by a change in her\r\ngeneral disposition and character, as if certain \u0027inhibitions,\u0027\r\npreviously existing, were suddenly removed. During the secondary state\r\nshe remembered the first state, but on emerging from it into the first\r\nstate she remembered nothing of the second. At the age of forty-four the\r\nduration of the secondary state (which was on the whole superior in\r\nquality to the original state) had gained upon the latter so much as to\r\noccupy most of her time. During it she remembers the events belonging to\r\nthe original state, but her complete oblivion of the secondary state\r\nwhen the original state recurs is often very distressing to her, as, for\r\nexample, when the transition takes place in a carriage on her way to a\r\nfuneral, and she has no idea which one of her friends may be dead. She\r\nactually became\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_211\" id=\"page_211\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{211}\u003c/span\u003e pregnant during one of her early secondary states, and\r\nduring her first state had no knowledge of how it had come to pass. Her\r\ndistress at these blanks of memory is sometimes intense and once drove\r\nher to attempt suicide.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Pierre Janet describes a still more remarkable case as follows:\r\n\"Léonie B., whose life sounds more like an improbable romance than a\r\ngenuine history, has had attacks of natural somnambulism since the age\r\nof three years. She has been hypnotized constantly by all sorts of\r\npersons from the age of sixteen upwards, and she is now forty-five.\r\nWhilst her normal life developed in one way in the midst of her poor\r\ncountry surroundings, her second life was passed in drawing-rooms and\r\ndoctors\u0027 offices, and naturally took an entirely different direction.\r\nTo-day, when in her normal state, this poor peasant woman is a serious\r\nand rather sad person, calm and slow, very mild with every one, and\r\nextremely timid: to look at her one would never suspect the personage\r\nwhich she contains. But hardly is she put to sleep hypnotically when a\r\nmetamorphosis occurs. Her face is no longer the same. She keeps her eyes\r\nclosed, it is true, but the acuteness of her other senses supplies their\r\nplace. She is gay, noisy, restless, sometimes insupportably so. She\r\nremains good-natured, but has acquired a singular tendency to irony and\r\nsharp jesting. Nothing is more curious than to hear her after a sitting\r\nwhen she has received a visit from strangers who wished to see her\r\nasleep. She gives a word-portrait of them, apes their manners, claims to\r\nknow their little ridiculous aspects and passions, and for each invents\r\na romance. To this character must be added the possession of an enormous\r\nnumber of recollections, whose existence she does not even suspect when\r\nawake, for her amnesia is then complete…. She refuses the name of\r\nLéonie and takes that of Léontine (Léonie 2) to which her first\r\nmagnetizers had accustomed her. \u0027That good woman is not myself,\u0027 she\r\nsays, \u0027she is too stupid!\u0027 To herself, Léontine, or Léonie 2, she\r\nattributes all the sensations and all the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_212\" id=\"page_212\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{212}\u003c/span\u003e actions, in a word all the\r\nconscious experiences, which she has undergone \u003ci\u003ein somnambulism\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nknits them together to make the history of her already long life. To\r\nLéonie 1 [as M. Janet calls the waking woman], on the other hand, she\r\nexclusively ascribes the events lived through in waking hours. I was at\r\nfirst struck by an important exception to the rule, and was disposed to\r\nthink that there might be something arbitrary in this partition of her\r\nrecollections. In the normal state Léonie has a husband and children;\r\nbut Léonie 2, the somnambulist, whilst acknowledging the children as her\r\nown, attributes the husband to \u0027the other.\u0027 This choice was perhaps\r\nexplicable, but it followed no rule. It was not till later that I\r\nlearned that her magnetizers in early days, as audacious as certain\r\nhypnotizers of recent date, had somnambulized her for her first\r\n\u003ci\u003eaccouchements\u003c/i\u003e, and that she had lapsed into that state spontaneously\r\nin the later ones. Léonie 2 was thus quite right in ascribing to herself\r\nthe children\u0026mdash;it was she who had had them, and the rule that her first\r\ntrance-state forms a different personality was not broken. But it is the\r\nsame with her second or deepest state of trance. When after the renewed\r\npasses, syncope, etc., she reaches the condition which I have called\r\nLéonie 3, she is another person still. Serious and grave, instead of\r\nbeing a restless child, she speaks slowly and moves but little. Again\r\nshe separates herself from the waking Léonie 1. \u0027A good but rather\r\nstupid woman,\u0027 she says, \u0027and not me.\u0027 And she also separates herself\r\nfrom Léonie 2: \u0027How can you see anything of me in that crazy creature?\u0027\r\nshe says. \u0027Fortunately I am nothing for her.\u0027\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eλ. In \u0027\u003ci\u003emediumships\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 or \u0027\u003ci\u003epossessions\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 the invasion and the passing\r\naway of the secondary state are both relatively abrupt, and the duration\r\nof the state is usually short\u0026mdash;i.e., from a few minutes to a few hours.\r\nWhenever the secondary state is well developed, no memory for aught that\r\nhappened during it remains after the primary consciousness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_213\" id=\"page_213\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{213}\u003c/span\u003e comes back.\r\nThe subject during the secondary consciousness speaks, writes, or acts\r\nas if animated by a foreign person, and often names this foreign person\r\nand gives his history. In old times the foreign \u0027control\u0027 was usually a\r\ndemon, and is so now in communities which favor that belief. With us he\r\ngives himself out at the worst for an Indian or other grotesquely\r\nspeaking but harmless personage. Usually he purports to be the spirit of\r\na dead person known or unknown to those present, and the subject is then\r\nwhat we call a \u0027medium.\u0027 Mediumistic possession in all its grades seems\r\nto form a perfectly natural special type of alternate personality, and\r\nthe susceptibility to it in some form is by no means an uncommon gift,\r\nin persons who have no other obvious nervous anomaly. The phenomena are\r\nvery intricate, and are only just beginning to be studied in a proper\r\nscientific way. The lowest phase of mediumship is automatic writing, and\r\nthe lowest grade of that is where the Subject knows what words are\r\ncoming, but feels impelled to write them as if from without. Then comes\r\nwriting unconsciously, even whilst engaged in reading or talk.\r\nInspirational speaking, playing on musical instruments, etc., also\r\nbelong to the relatively lower phases of possession, in which the normal\r\nself is not excluded from conscious participation in the performance,\r\nthough their initiative seems to come from elsewhere. In the highest\r\nphase the trance is complete, the voice, language, and everything are\r\nchanged, and there is no after-memory whatever until the next trance\r\ncomes. One curious thing about trance-utterances is their generic\r\nsimilarity in different individuals. The \u0027control\u0027 here in America is\r\neither a grotesque, slangy, and flippant personage (\u0027Indian\u0027 controls,\r\ncalling the ladies \u0027squaws,\u0027 the men \u0027braves,\u0027 the house a \u0027wigwam,\u0027\r\netc., etc., are excessively common; or, if he ventures on higher\r\nintellectual flights, he abounds in a curiously vague optimistic\r\nphilosophy-and-water, in which phrases about spirit, harmony, beauty,\r\nlaw, progression, development, etc., keep recurring. It seems\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_214\" id=\"page_214\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{214}\u003c/span\u003e exactly\r\nas if one author composed more than half of the trance-messages, no\r\nmatter by whom they are uttered. Whether all sub-conscious selves are\r\npeculiarly susceptible to a certain stratum of the \u003ci\u003eZeitgeist\u003c/i\u003e, and get\r\ntheir inspiration from it, I know not; but this is obviously the case\r\nwith the secondary selves which become \u0027developed\u0027 in spiritualist\r\ncircles. There the beginnings of the medium trance are indistinguishable\r\nfrom effects of hypnotic suggestion. The subject assumes the rôle of a\r\nmedium simply because opinion expects it of him under the conditions\r\nwhich are present; and carries it out with a feebleness or a vivacity\r\nproportionate to his histrionic gifts. But the odd thing is that persons\r\nunexposed to spiritualist traditions will so often act in the same way\r\nwhen they become entranced, speak in the name of the departed, go\r\nthrough the motions of their several death-agonies, send messages about\r\ntheir happy home in the summer-land, and describe the ailments of those\r\npresent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have no theory to publish of these cases, the actual beginning of\r\nseveral of which I have personally seen. I am, however, persuaded by\r\nabundant acquaintance with the trances of one medium that the \u0027control\u0027\r\nmay be altogether different from any \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e waking self of the\r\nperson. In the case I have in mind, it professes to be a certain\r\ndeparted French doctor; and is, I am convinced, acquainted with facts\r\nabout the circumstances, and the living and dead relatives and\r\nacquaintances, of numberless sitters whom the medium never met before,\r\nand of whom she has never heard the names. I record my bare opinion here\r\nunsupported by the evidence, not, of course, in order to convert anyone\r\nto my view, but because I am persuaded that a serious study of these\r\ntrance-phenomena is one of the greatest needs of psychology, and think\r\nthat my personal confession may possibly draw a reader or two into a\r\nfield which the \u003ci\u003esoidisant\u003c/i\u003e \u0027scientist\u0027 usually refuses to explore.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_33_33\" id=\"FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_33_33\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_215\" id=\"page_215\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{215}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReview, and Psychological Conclusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To sum up this long chapter:\u0026mdash;The\r\nconsciousness of Self involves a stream of thought, each part of which\r\nas \u0027I\u0027 can remember those which went before, know the things they knew,\r\nand care paramountly for certain ones among them as \u0027\u003ci\u003eMe\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 and\r\n\u003ci\u003eappropriate to these\u003c/i\u003e the rest. This Me is an empirical aggregate of\r\nthings objectively known. The \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e which knows them cannot itself be an\r\naggregate; neither for psychological purposes need it be an unchanging\r\nmetaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the\r\ntranscendental Ego, viewed as \u0027out of time.\u0027 It is a \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e, at each\r\nmoment different from that of the last moment, but \u003ci\u003eappropriative\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe latter, together with all that the latter called its own. All the\r\nexperiential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered\r\nwith any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or\r\nstates of mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf passing thoughts be the directly verifiable existents which no school\r\nhas hitherto doubted them to be, then they are the only \u0027Knower\u0027 of\r\nwhich Psychology, treated as a natural science, need take any account.\r\nThe only pathway that I can discover for bringing in a more\r\ntranscendental Thinker would be to deny that we have any such \u003ci\u003edirect\u003c/i\u003e\r\nknowledge of the existence of our \u0027states of consciousness\u0027 as\r\ncommon-sense supposes us to possess. The existence of the \u0027states\u0027 in\r\nquestion would then be a mere hypothesis, or one way of asserting that\r\nthere \u003ci\u003emust be\u003c/i\u003e a knower correlative to all this known; but the problem\r\n\u003ci\u003ewho that knower is\u003c/i\u003e would have become a metaphysical problem. With the\r\nquestion once stated in these terms, the notion either of a Spirit of\r\nthe world which thinks through us, or that of a set of individual\r\nsubstantial souls, must be considered as \u003ci\u003eprimâ facie\u003c/i\u003e on a par with our\r\nown \u0027psychological\u0027 solution, and discussed impartially. I myself\r\nbelieve that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_216\" id=\"page_216\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{216}\u003c/span\u003e room for much future inquiry lies in this direction. The\r\n\u0027states of mind\u0027 which every psychologist believes in are by no means\r\nclearly apprehensible, if distinguished from their objects. But to doubt\r\nthem lies beyond the scope of our natural-science (see \u003ca href=\"#page_001\"\u003ep. 1\u003c/a\u003e) point of\r\nview. And in this book the provisional solution which we have reached\r\nmust be the final word: the thoughts themselves are the thinkers.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_217\" id=\"page_217\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{217}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XIII\" id=\"CHAPTER_XIII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eATTENTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Narrowness of Consciousness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;One of the most extraordinary facts of\r\nour life is that, although we are besieged at every moment by\r\nimpressions from our whole sensory surface, we notice so very small a\r\npart of them. The sum total of our impressions never enters into our\r\n\u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e, consciously so called, which runs through this sum total\r\nlike a tiny rill through a broad flowery mead. Yet the physical\r\nimpressions which do not count are \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e as much as those which do,\r\nand affect our sense-organs just as energetically. Why they fail to\r\npierce the mind is a mystery, which is only named and not explained when\r\nwe invoke \u003ci\u003edie Enge des Bewusstseins\u003c/i\u003e, \u0027the narrowness of\r\nconsciousness,\u0027 as its ground.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIts Physiological Ground.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Our consciousness certainly is narrow, when\r\ncontrasted with the breadth of our sensory surface and the mass of\r\nincoming currents which are at all times pouring in. Evidently no\r\ncurrent can be recorded in conscious experience unless it succeed in\r\npenetrating to the hemispheres and filling their pathways by the\r\nprocesses get up. When an incoming current thus occupies the hemispheres\r\nwith its consequences, other currents are for the time kept out. They\r\nmay show their faces at the door, but are turned back until the actual\r\npossessors of the place are tired. Physiologically, then, the narrowness\r\nof consciousness seems to depend on the fact that the activity of the\r\nhemispheres tends at all times to be a consolidated and unified affair,\r\ndeterminable now by this current and now by that, but determinable only\r\nas a whole. The ideas correlative to the reigning system of processes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_218\" id=\"page_218\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{218}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare those which are said to \u0027interest\u0027 us at the time; and thus that\r\nselective character of our attention on which so much stress was laid on\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_173\"\u003epp. 173 ff.\u003c/a\u003e appears to find a physiological ground. At all times,\r\nhowever, there is a liability to disintegration of the reigning system.\r\nThe consolidation is seldom quite complete, the excluded currents are\r\nnot wholly abortive, their presence affects the \u0027fringe\u0027 and margin of\r\nour thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDispersed Attention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Sometimes, indeed, the normal consolidation seems\r\nhardly to exist. At such moments it is possible that cerebral activity\r\nsinks to a minimum. Most of us probably fall several times a day into a\r\nfit somewhat like this: The eyes are fixed on vacancy, the sounds of the\r\nworld melt into confused unity, the attention is dispersed so that the\r\nwhole body is felt, as it were, at once, and the foreground of\r\nconsciousness is filled, if by anything, by a sort of solemn sense of\r\nsurrender to the empty passing of time. In the dim background of our\r\nmind we know meanwhile what we ought to be doing: getting up, dressing\r\nourselves, answering the person who has spoken to us, trying to make the\r\nnext step in our reasoning. But somehow we cannot \u003ci\u003estart\u003c/i\u003e; the \u003ci\u003epensée\r\nde derrière la tête\u003c/i\u003e fails to pierce the shell of lethargy that wraps\r\nour state about. Every moment we expect the spell to break, for we know\r\nno reason why it should continue. But it does continue, pulse after\r\npulse, and we float with it, until\u0026mdash;also without reason that we can\r\ndiscover\u0026mdash;an energy is given, something\u0026mdash;we know not what\u0026mdash;enables us to\r\ngather ourselves together, we wink our eyes, we shake our heads, the\r\nbackground-ideas become effective, and the wheels of life go round\r\nagain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is the extreme of what is called dispersed attention. Between this\r\nextreme and the extreme of concentrated attention, in which absorption\r\nin the interest of the moment is so complete that grave bodily injuries\r\nmay be unfelt, there are intermediate degrees, and these have been\r\nstudied experimentally. The problem is known as that of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_219\" id=\"page_219\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{219}\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003eThe Span of\r\nConsciousness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;How many objects can we attend to at once when they are\r\nnot embraced in one conceptual system? Prof. Cattell experimented with\r\ncombinations of letters exposed to the eye for so short a fraction of a\r\nsecond that attention to them in succession seemed to be ruled out. When\r\nthe letters formed familiar words, three times as many of them could be\r\nnamed as when their combination was meaningless. If the words formed a\r\nsentence, twice as many could be caught as when they had no connection.\r\n\"The sentence was then apprehended as a whole. If not apprehended thus,\r\nalmost nothing is apprehended of the several words; but if the sentence\r\nas a whole is apprehended, then the words appear very distinct.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA word is a conceptual system in which the letters do not enter\r\nconsciousness separately, as they do when apprehended alone. A sentence\r\nflashed at once upon the eye is such a system relatively to its words. A\r\nconceptual system may \u003ci\u003emean\u003c/i\u003e many sensible objects, may be translated\r\nlater into them, but as an actual existent mental state, it does not\r\n\u003ci\u003econsist of\u003c/i\u003e the consciousnesses of these objects. When I think of the\r\nword \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e as a whole, for instance, what is in my mind is something\r\ndifferent from what is there when I think of the letters \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\n\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, as so many disconnected data.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen data are so disconnected that we have no conception which embraces\r\nthem together it is much harder to apprehend several of them at once,\r\nand the mind tends to let go of one whilst it attends to another. Still,\r\nwithin limits this can be avoided. M. Paulhan has experimented on the\r\nmatter by declaiming one poem aloud whilst he repeated a different one\r\nmentally, or by writing one sentence whilst speaking another, or by\r\nperforming calculations on paper whilst reciting poetry. He found that\r\n\"the most favorable condition for the doubling of the mind was its\r\nsimultaneous application to two heterogeneous operations. Two operations\r\nof the same sort, two multiplications, two recitations,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_220\" id=\"page_220\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{220}\u003c/span\u003e or the reciting\r\nof one poem and writing of another, render the process more uncertain\r\nand difficult.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Paulhan compared the time occupied by the same two operations done\r\nsimultaneously or in succession, and found that there was often a\r\nconsiderable gain of time from doing them simultaneously. For instance:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I multiply 421 312 212 by 2; the operation takes 6 seconds; the\r\nrecitation of four verses also takes 6 seconds. But the two operations\r\ndone at once only take 6 seconds, so that there is no loss of time from\r\ncombining them.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, then, by the original question, how many objects can we attend to at\r\nonce, be meant how many entirely disconnected systems or processes can\r\ngo on simultaneously, the answer is, \u003ci\u003enot easily more than one, unless\r\nthe processes are very habitual; but then two, or even three\u003c/i\u003e, without\r\nvery much oscillation of the attention. Where, however, the processes\r\nare less automatic, as in the story of Julius Cæsar dictating four\r\nletters whilst he writes a fifth, there must be a rapid oscillation of\r\nthe mind from one to the next, and no consequent gain of time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the things to be attended to are minute sensations, and when the\r\neffort is to be exact in noting them, it is found that attention to one\r\ninterferes a good deal with the perception of the other. A good deal of\r\nfine work has been done in this field by Professor Wundt. He tried to\r\nnote the exact position on a dial of a rapidly revolving hand, at the\r\nmoment when a bell struck. Here were two disparate sensations, one of\r\nvision, the other of sound, to be noted together. But it was found that\r\nin a long and patient research, the eye-impression could seldom or never\r\nbe noted at the exact moment when the bell actually struck. An earlier\r\nor a later point were all that could be seen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Varieties of Attention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Attention may be divided into kinds in\r\nvarious ways. It is either to\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Objects of sense (sensorial attention); or to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_221\" id=\"page_221\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{221}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Ideal or represented objects (intellectual attention). It is either\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Immediate; or\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) Derived: immediate, when the topic or stimulus is interesting in\r\nitself, without relation to anything else; derived, when it owes its\r\ninterest to association with some other immediately interesting thing.\r\nWhat I call derived attention has been named \u0027apperceptive\u0027 attention.\r\nFurthermore, Attention may be either\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e) Passive, reflex, involuntary, effortless; or\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e) Active and voluntary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVoluntary attention is always derived\u003c/i\u003e; we never make an \u003ci\u003eeffort\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nattend to an object except for the sake of some \u003ci\u003eremote\u003c/i\u003e interest which\r\nthe effort will serve. But both sensorial and intellectual attention may\r\nbe either passive or voluntary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003einvoluntary attention\u003c/i\u003e of the \u003ci\u003eimmediate sensorial\u003c/i\u003e sort the\r\nstimulus is either a sense-impression, very intense, voluminous, or\r\nsudden; or it is an \u003ci\u003einstinctive\u003c/i\u003e stimulus, a perception which, by\r\nreason of its nature rather than its mere force, appeals to some one of\r\nour congenital impulses and has a directly exciting quality. In the\r\nchapter on Instinct we shall see how these stimuli differ from one\r\nanimal to another, and what most of them are in man: strange things,\r\nmoving things, wild animals, bright things, pretty things, metallic\r\nthings, words, blows, blood, etc., etc., etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSensitiveness to immediately exciting sensorial stimuli characterizes\r\nthe attention of childhood and youth. In mature age we have generally\r\nselected those stimuli which are connected with one or more so-called\r\npermanent interests, and our attention has grown irresponsive to the\r\nrest. But childhood is characterized by great active energy, and has few\r\norganized interests by which to meet new impressions and decide whether\r\nthey are worthy of notice or not, and the consequence is that extreme\r\nmobility of the attention with which we are all familiar in children,\r\nand which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_222\" id=\"page_222\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{222}\u003c/span\u003e makes of their first lessons such chaotic affairs. Any strong\r\nsensation whatever produces accommodation of the organs which perceive\r\nit, and absolute oblivion, for the time being, of the task in hand. This\r\nreflex and passive character of the attention which, as a French writer\r\nsays, makes the child seem to belong less to himself than to every\r\nobject which happens to catch his notice, is the first thing which the\r\nteacher must overcome. It never is overcome in some people, whose work,\r\nto the end of life, gets done in the interstices of their\r\nmind-wandering.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe passive sensorial attention is \u003ci\u003ederived\u003c/i\u003e when the impression,\r\nwithout being either strong or of an instinctively exciting nature, is\r\nconnected by previous experience and education with things that are so.\r\nThese things may be called the \u003ci\u003emotives\u003c/i\u003e of the attention. The\r\nimpression draws an interest from them, or perhaps it even fuses into a\r\nsingle complex object with them; the result is that it is brought into\r\nthe focus of the mind. A faint tap \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e is not an interesting sound;\r\nit may well escape being discriminated from the general rumor of the\r\nworld. But when it is a signal, as that of a lover on the window-pane,\r\nhardly will it go unperceived. Herbart writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"How a bit of bad grammar wounds the ear of the purist! How a false note\r\nhurts the musician! or an offence against good manners the man of the\r\nworld! How rapid is progress in a science when its first principles have\r\nbeen so well impressed upon us that we reproduce them mentally with\r\nperfect distinctness and ease! How slow and uncertain, on the other\r\nhand, is our learning of the principles themselves, when familiarity\r\nwith the still more elementary percepts connected with the subject has\r\nnot given us an adequate predisposition!\u0026mdash;Apperceptive attention may be\r\nplainly observed in very small children when, hearing the speech of\r\ntheir elders, as yet unintelligible to them, they suddenly catch a\r\nsingle known word here and there, and repeat it to themselves; yes! even\r\nin the dog who looks round at us when we speak of him and pronounce\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_223\" id=\"page_223\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{223}\u003c/span\u003e his\r\nname. Not far removed is the talent which mind-wandering school-boys\r\ndisplay during the hours of instruction, of noticing every moment in\r\nwhich the teacher tells a story. I remember classes in which,\r\ninstruction being uninteresting, and discipline relaxed, a buzzing\r\nmurmur was always to be heard, which invariably stopped for as long a\r\ntime as an anecdote lasted. How could the boys, since they seemed to\r\nhear nothing, notice when the anecdote began? Doubtless most of them\r\nalways heard something of the teacher\u0027s talk; but most of it had no\r\nconnection with their previous knowledge and occupations, and therefore\r\nthe separate words no sooner entered their consciousness than they fell\r\nout of it again; but, on the other hand, no sooner did the words awaken\r\nold thoughts, forming strongly-connected series with which the new\r\nimpression easily combined, than out of new and old together a total\r\ninterest resulted which drove the vagrant ideas below the threshold of\r\nconsciousness, and brought for a while settled attention into their\r\nplace.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eInvoluntary intellectual attention\u003c/i\u003e is immediate when we follow in\r\nthought a train of images exciting or interesting \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e; derived,\r\nwhen the images are interesting only as means to a remote end, or merely\r\nbecause they are associated with something which makes them dear. The\r\nbrain-currents may then form so solidly unified a system, and the\r\nabsorption in their object be so deep, as to banish not only ordinary\r\nsensations, but even the severest pain. Pascal, Wesley, Robert Hall, are\r\nsaid to have had this capacity. Dr. Carpenter says of himself that \"he\r\nhas frequently begun a lecture whilst suffering neuralgic pain so severe\r\nas to make him apprehend that he would find it impossible to proceed;\r\nyet no sooner has he by a determined effort fairly launched himself into\r\nthe stream of thought, than he has found himself continuously borne\r\nalong without the least distraction, until the end has come, and the\r\nattention has been released; when the pain has recurred with a force\r\nthat has overmastered all resistance,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_224\" id=\"page_224\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{224}\u003c/span\u003e making him wonder how he could\r\nhave ever ceased to feel it.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_34_34\" id=\"FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_34_34\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVoluntary Attention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Dr. Carpenter speaks of launching himself by a\r\ndetermined \u003ci\u003eeffort\u003c/i\u003e. This \u003ci\u003eeffort\u003c/i\u003e characterizes what we called \u003ci\u003eactive\r\nor voluntary attention\u003c/i\u003e. It is a feeling which everyone knows, but which\r\nmost people would call quite indescribable. We get it in the sensorial\r\nsphere whenever we seek to catch an impression of extreme \u003ci\u003efaintness\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbe it of sight, hearing, taste, smell, or touch; we get it whenever we\r\nseek to \u003ci\u003ediscriminate\u003c/i\u003e a sensation merged in a mass of others that are\r\nsimilar; we get it whenever we \u003ci\u003eresist the attractions\u003c/i\u003e of more potent\r\nstimuli and keep our mind occupied with some object that is naturally\r\nunimpressive. We get it in the intellectual sphere under exactly similar\r\nconditions: as when we strive to sharpen and make distinct an idea which\r\nwe but vaguely seem to have; or painfully discriminate a shade of\r\nmeaning from its similars; or resolutely hold fast to a thought so\r\ndiscordant with our impulses that, if left unaided, it would quickly\r\nyield place to images of an exciting and impassioned kind. All forms of\r\nattentive effort would be exercised at once by one whom we might suppose\r\nat a dinner-party resolutely to listen to a neighbor giving him insipid\r\nand unwelcome advice in a low voice, whilst all around the guests were\r\nloudly laughing and talking about exciting and interesting things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThere is no such thing as voluntary attention sustained for more than a\r\nfew seconds at a time.\u003c/i\u003e What is called sustained voluntary attention is\r\na repetition of successive efforts which bring back the topic to the\r\nmind. The topic once brought back, if a congenial one, \u003ci\u003edevelops\u003c/i\u003e; and\r\nif its development is interesting it engages the attention passively for\r\na time. Dr. Carpenter, a moment back, described the stream of thought,\r\nonce entered, as \u0027bearing him along.\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_225\" id=\"page_225\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{225}\u003c/span\u003e This passive interest may be\r\nshort or long. As soon as it flags, the attention is diverted by some\r\nirrelevant thing, and then a voluntary effort may bring it back to the\r\ntopic again; and so on, under favorable conditions, for hours together.\r\nDuring all this time, however, note that it is not an identical \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin the psychological sense, but a succession of mutually related objects\r\nforming an identical \u003ci\u003etopic\u003c/i\u003e only, upon which the attention is fixed.\r\n\u003ci\u003eNo one can possibly attend continuously to an object that does not\r\nchange.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow there are always some objects that for the time being \u003ci\u003ewill not\r\ndevelop\u003c/i\u003e. They simply \u003ci\u003ego out\u003c/i\u003e; and to keep the mind upon anything\r\nrelated to them requires such incessently renewed effort that the most\r\nresolute Will ere long gives out and lets its thoughts follow the more\r\nstimulating solicitations after it has withstood them for what length of\r\ntime it can. There are topics known to every man from which he shies\r\nlike a frightened horse, and which to get a glimpse of is to shun. Such\r\nare his ebbing assets to the spendthrift in full career. But why single\r\nout the spendthrift, when to every man actuated by passion the thought\r\nof interests which negate the passion can hardly for more than a\r\nfleeting instant stay before the mind? It is like \u0027memento mori\u0027 in the\r\nheydey of the pride of life. Nature rises at such suggestions, and\r\nexcludes them from the view:\u0026mdash;How long, O healthy reader, can you now\r\ncontinue thinking of your tomb?\u0026mdash;In milder instances the difficulty is\r\nas great, especially when the brain is fagged. One snatches at any and\r\nevery passing pretext, no matter how trivial or external, to escape from\r\nthe odiousness of the matter in hand. I know a person, for example, who\r\nwill poke the fire, set chairs straight, pick dust-specks from the\r\nfloor, arrange his table, snatch up the newspaper, take down any book\r\nwhich catches his eye, trim his nails, waste the morning \u003ci\u003eanyhow\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nshort, and all without premeditation,\u0026mdash;simply because the only thing he\r\n\u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to attend to is the preparation of a noonday\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_226\" id=\"page_226\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{226}\u003c/span\u003e lesson in formal\r\nlogic which he detests. Anything but \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_54\" id=\"ill_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 494px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-226-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-226-sml.png\" width=\"494\" height=\"245\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 54.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, the object must change. When it is one of sight, it will\r\nactually become invisible; when of hearing, inaudible,\u0026mdash;if we attend to\r\nit too unmovingly. Helmholtz, who has put his sensorial attention to the\r\nseverest tests, by using his eyes on objects which in common life are\r\nexpressly overlooked, makes some interesting remarks on this point in\r\nhis section on retinal rivalry. The phenomenon called by that name is\r\nthis, that if we look with each eye upon a different picture (as in the\r\nannexed stereoscopic slide), sometimes one picture, sometimes the other,\r\nor parts of both, will come to consciousness, but hardly ever both\r\ncombined. Helmholtz now says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I find that I am able to attend voluntarily, now to one and now to the\r\nother system of lines; and that then this system remains visible alone\r\nfor a certain time, whilst the other completely vanishes. This happens,\r\nfor example, whenever I try to count the lines first of one and then of\r\nthe other system…. But it is extremely hard to chain the attention\r\ndown to one of the systems for long, unless we associate with our\r\nlooking some distinct purpose which keeps the activity of the attention\r\nperpetually renewed.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_227\" id=\"page_227\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{227}\u003c/span\u003e Such a one is counting the lines, comparing their\r\nintervals, or the like. An equilibrium of the attention, persistent for\r\nany length of time, is under no circumstances attainable. The natural\r\ntendency of attention when left to itself is to wander to ever new\r\nthings; and so soon as the interest of its object is over, so soon as\r\nnothing new is to be noticed there, it passes, in spite of our will, to\r\nsomething else. \u003ci\u003eIf we wish to keep it upon one and the same object, we\r\nmust seek constantly to find out something new about the latter\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nespecially if other powerful impressions are attracting us away.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese words of Helmholtz are of fundamental importance. And if true of\r\nsensorial attention, how much more true are they of the intellectual\r\nvariety! The \u003ci\u003econditio sine quâ non\u003c/i\u003e of sustained attention to a given\r\ntopic of thought is that we should roll it over and over incessantly and\r\nconsider different aspects and relations of it in turn. Only in\r\npathological states will a fixed and ever monotonously recurring idea\r\npossess the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGenius and Attention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;And now we can see why it is that what is called\r\nsustained attention is the easier, the richer in acquisitions and the\r\nfresher and more original the mind. In such minds, subjects bud and\r\nsprout and grow. At every moment, they please by a new consequence and\r\nrivet the attention afresh. But an intellect unfurnished with materials,\r\nstagnant, unoriginal, will hardly be likely to consider any subject\r\nlong. A glance exhausts its possibilities of interest. Geniuses are\r\ncommonly believed to excel other men in their power of sustained\r\nattention. In most of them, it is to be feared, the so-called \u0027power\u0027 is\r\nof the passive sort. Their ideas coruscate, every subject branches\r\ninfinitely before their fertile minds, and so for hours they may be\r\nrapt. \u003ci\u003eBut it is their genius making them attentive, not their attention\r\nmaking geniuses of them.\u003c/i\u003e And, when we come down to the root of the\r\nmatter, we see that they differ from ordinary men less in the character\r\nof their attention than in the nature of the objects upon\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_228\" id=\"page_228\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{228}\u003c/span\u003e which it is\r\nsuccessively bestowed. In the genius, these form a concatenated series,\r\nsuggesting each other mutually by some rational law. Therefore we call\r\nthe attention \u0027sustained\u0027 and the topic of meditation for hours \u0027the\r\nsame.\u0027 In the common man the series is for the most part incoherent, the\r\nobjects have no rational bond, and we call the attention wandering and\r\nunfixed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is probable that genius tends actually to prevent a man from\r\nacquiring habits of voluntary attention, and that moderate intellectual\r\nendowments are the soil in which we may best expect, here as elsewhere,\r\nthe virtues of the will, strictly so called, to thrive. But, whether the\r\nattention come by grace of genius or by dint of will, the longer one\r\ndoes attend to a topic the more mastery of it one has. And the faculty\r\nof voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention over and over again\r\nis the very root of judgment, character, and will. No one is \u003ci\u003ecompos\r\nsui\u003c/i\u003e if he have it not. An education which should improve this faculty\r\nwould be \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e education \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e. But it is easier to define\r\nthis ideal than to give practical directions for bringing it about. The\r\nonly general pedagogic maxim bearing on attention is that the more\r\ninterests the child has in advance in the subject, the better he will\r\nattend. Induct him therefore in such a way as to knit each new thing on\r\nto some acquisition already there; and if possible awaken curiosity, so\r\nthat the new thing shall seem to come as an answer, or part of an\r\nanswer, to a question preëxisting in his mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Physiological Conditions of Attention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These seem to be the\r\nfollowing:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) \u003ci\u003eThe appropriate cortical centre must be excited ideationally as well\r\nas sensorially, before attention to an object can take place.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) \u003ci\u003eThe sense-organ must then adapt itself to clearest reception of the\r\nobject, by the adjustment of its muscular apparatus.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) \u003ci\u003eIn all probability a certain afflux of blood to the cortical centre\r\nmust ensue.\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_229\" id=\"page_229\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{229}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf this third condition I will say no more, since we have no proof of it\r\nin detail, and I state it on the faith of general analogies. Conditions\r\n1) and 2), however, are verifiable; and the best order will be to take\r\nthe latter first.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Adaptation of the Sense-organ.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This occurs not only in sensorial\r\nbut also in intellectual attention to an object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat it is present when we attend to \u003ci\u003esensible\u003c/i\u003e things is obvious. When\r\nwe look or listen we accommodate our eyes and ears involuntarily, and we\r\nturn our head and body as well; when we taste or smell we adjust the\r\ntongue, lips, and respiration to the object; in feeling a surface we\r\nmove the palpatory organ in a suitable way; in all these acts, besides\r\nmaking involuntary muscular contractions of a positive sort, we inhibit\r\nothers which might interfere with the result\u0026mdash;we close the eyes in\r\ntasting, suspend the respiration in listening, etc. The result is a more\r\nor less massive organic feeling that attention is going on. This organic\r\nfeeling we usually treat as part of the sense of our \u003ci\u003eown activity\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nalthough it comes in to us from our organs after they are accommodated.\r\nAny object, then, if \u003ci\u003eimmediately\u003c/i\u003e exciting, causes a reflex\r\naccommodation of the sense-organ, which has two results\u0026mdash;first, the\r\nfeeling of activity in question; and second, the object\u0027s increase in\r\nclearness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e attention similar feelings of activity occur.\r\nFechner was the first, I believe, to analyze these feelings, and\r\ndiscriminate them from the stronger ones just named. He writes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When we transfer the attention from objects of one sense to those of\r\nanother, we have an indescribable feeling (though at the same time one\r\nperfectly determinate, and reproducible at pleasure), of altered\r\n\u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e or differently localized tension (\u003ci\u003eSpannung\u003c/i\u003e). We feel a\r\nstrain forward in the eyes, one directed sidewise in the ears,\r\nincreasing with the degree of our attention, and changing according as\r\nwe look at an object carefully, or listen to something\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_230\" id=\"page_230\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{230}\u003c/span\u003e attentively; and\r\nwe speak accordingly of \u003ci\u003estraining the attention\u003c/i\u003e. The difference is\r\nmost plainly felt when the attention oscillates rapidly between eye and\r\near; and the feeling localizes itself with most decided difference in\r\nregard to the various sense-organs, according as we wish to discriminate\r\na thing delicately by touch, taste, or smell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But now I have, when I try to vividly recall a picture of memory or\r\nfancy, a feeling perfectly analogous to that which I experience when I\r\nseek to apprehend a thing keenly by eye or ear; and this analogous\r\nfeeling is very differently localized. While in sharpest possible\r\nattention to real objects (as well as to after-images) the strain is\r\nplainly forwards, and (when the attention changes from one sense to\r\nanother) only alters its direction between the several external\r\nsense-organs, leaving the rest of the head free from strain, the case is\r\ndifferent in memory or fancy, for here the feeling withdraws entirely\r\nfrom the external sense-organs, and seems rather to take refuge in that\r\npart of the head which the brain fills. If I wish, for example, to\r\n\u003ci\u003erecall\u003c/i\u003e a place or person, it will arise before me with vividness, not\r\naccording as I strain my attention forwards, but rather in proportion as\r\nI, so to speak, retract it backwards.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn myself the \u0027backward retraction\u0027 which is felt during attention to\r\nideas of memory, etc., seems to be principally constituted by the\r\nfeeling of an actual rolling outwards and upwards of the eyeballs, such\r\nas occurs in sleep, and is the exact opposite of their behavior when we\r\nlook at a physical thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis accommodation of the sense-organ is not, however, the \u003ci\u003eessential\u003c/i\u003e\r\nprocess, even in sensorial attention. It is a secondary result which may\r\nbe prevented from occurring, as certain observations show. Usually, it\r\nis true that no object lying in the marginal portions of the field of\r\nvision can catch our attention without at the same time \u0027catching our\r\neye\u0027\u0026mdash;that is, fatally provoking such movements of rotation and\r\naccommodation as will focus its image\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_231\" id=\"page_231\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{231}\u003c/span\u003e on the fovea, or point of\r\ngreatest sensibility. Practice, however, enables us, \u003ci\u003ewith effort\u003c/i\u003e, to\r\nattend to a marginal object whilst keeping the eyes immovable. The\r\nobject under these circumstances never becomes perfectly distinct\u0026mdash;the\r\nplace of its image on the retina makes distinctness impossible\u0026mdash;but (as\r\nanyone can satisfy himself by trying) we become more vividly conscious\r\nof it than we were before the effort was made. Teachers thus notice the\r\nacts of children in the school-room at whom they appear not to be\r\nlooking. Women in general train their peripheral visual attention more\r\nthan men. Helmholtz states the fact so strikingly that I will quote his\r\nobservation in full. He was trying to combine in a single solid percept\r\npairs of stereoscopic pictures illuminated instantaneously by the\r\nelectric spark. The pictures were in a dark box which the spark from\r\ntime to time lighted up; and, to keep the eyes from wandering\r\nbetweenwhiles, a pin-hole was pricked through the middle of each\r\npicture, through which the light of the room came, so that each eye had\r\npresented to it during the dark intervals a single bright point. With\r\nparallel optical axes these points combined into a single image; and the\r\nslightest movement of the eyeballs was betrayed by this image at once\r\nbecoming double. Helmholtz now found that simple linear figures could,\r\nwhen the eyes were thus kept immovable, be perceived as solids at a\r\nsingle flash of the spark. But when the figures were complicated\r\nphotographs, many successive flashes were required to grasp their\r\ntotality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Now it is interesting,\" he says, \"to find that, although we keep\r\nsteadily fixating the pin-holes and never allow their combined image to\r\nbreak into two, we can nevertheless, before the spark comes, keep our\r\nattention voluntarily turned to any particular portion we please of the\r\ndark field, so as then, when the spark comes, to receive an impression\r\nonly from such parts of the picture as lie in this region. In this\r\nrespect, then, our attention is quite independent of the position and\r\naccommodation of the eyes,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_232\" id=\"page_232\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{232}\u003c/span\u003e and of any known alteration in these organs,\r\nand free to direct itself by a conscious and voluntary effort upon any\r\nselected portion of a dark and undifferenced field of view. This is one\r\nof the most important observations for a future theory of\r\nattention.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_35_35\" id=\"FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_35_35\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Ideational Excitement of the Centre.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But if the peripheral part of\r\nthe picture in this experiment be not physically accommodated for, what\r\nis meant by its sharing our attention? What happens when we \u0027distribute\u0027\r\nor \u0027disperse\u0027 the latter upon a thing for which we remain unwilling to\r\n\u0027adjust\u0027? This leads us to that second feature in the process, the\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eideational excitement\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 of which we spoke. \u003ci\u003eThe effort to attend to\r\nthe marginal region of the picture consists in nothing more nor less\r\nthan the effort to form as clear an\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eIDEA\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eas is possible of what is\r\nthere portrayed.\u003c/i\u003e The idea is to come to the help of the sensation and\r\nmake it more distinct. It may come with effort, and such a mode of\r\ncoming is the remaining part of what we know as our attention\u0027s \u0027strain\u0027\r\nunder the circumstances. Let us show how universally present in our acts\r\nof attention is this anticipatory thinking of the thing to which we\r\nattend. Mr. Lewes\u0027s name of \u003ci\u003epreperception\u003c/i\u003e seems the best possible\r\ndesignation for this imagining of an experience before it occurs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must as a matter of course be present when the attention is of the\r\nintellectual variety, for the thing attended to then \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e nothing but an\r\nidea, an inward reproduction or conception. If then we prove ideal\r\nconstruction of the object to be present in \u003ci\u003esensorial\u003c/i\u003e attention, it\r\nwill be present everywhere. When, however, sensorial attention is at its\r\nheight, it is impossible to tell how much of the percept comes from\r\nwithout and how much from within; but if we find that the \u003ci\u003epreparation\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwe make for it always partly consists of the creation of an imaginary\r\nduplicate of the object in the mind, that will be enough to establish\r\nthe point in dispute.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_233\" id=\"page_233\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{233}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn reaction-time experiments, keeping our mind intent upon the motion\r\nabout to be made shortens the time. This shortening we ascribed in Chap.\r\nVIII to the fact that the signal when it comes finds the motor-centre\r\nalready charged almost to the explosion-point in advance. Expectant\r\nattention to a reaction thus goes with sub-excitement of the centre\r\nconcerned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the impression to be caught is very weak, the way not to miss it\r\nis to sharpen our attention for it by preliminary contact with it in a\r\nstronger form. Helmholtz says: \"If we wish to begin to observe\r\novertones, it is advisable, just before the sound which is to be\r\nanalyzed, to sound very softly the note of which we are in search…. If\r\nyou place the resonator which corresponds to a certain overtone, for\r\nexample \u003ci\u003eg´\u003c/i\u003e of the sound \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, against your ear, and then make the note\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e sound, you will hear \u003ci\u003eg´\u003c/i\u003e much strengthened by the resonator….\r\nThis strengthening by the resonator can be used to make the naked ear\r\nattentive to the sound which it is to catch. For when the resonator is\r\ngradually removed, the \u003ci\u003eg´\u003c/i\u003e grows weaker; but the attention, once\r\ndirected to it, holds it now more easily fast, and the observer hears\r\nthe tone \u003ci\u003eg´\u003c/i\u003e now in the natural unaltered sound of the note with his\r\nunaided ear.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt, commenting on experiences of this sort, says that \"The same thing\r\nis to be noticed in weak or fugitive visual impressions. Illuminate a\r\ndrawing by electric sparks separated by considerable intervals, and\r\nafter the first, and often after the second and third spark, hardly\r\nanything will be recognized. But the confused image is held fast in\r\nmemory; each successive illumination completes it; and so at last we\r\nattain to a clearer perception. The primary motive to this inward\r\nactivity proceeds usually from the outer impression itself. We hear a\r\nsound in which, from certain associations, we suspect a certain\r\novertone; the next thing is to recall the overtone in memory; and\r\nfinally we catch it in the sound we hear. Or perhaps we see some mineral\r\nsubstance we have met before; the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_234\" id=\"page_234\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{234}\u003c/span\u003e impression awakens the memory-image,\r\nwhich again more or less completely melts with the impression itself….\r\nDifferent qualities of impression require disparate adaptations. And we\r\nremark that our feeling of the \u003ci\u003estrain\u003c/i\u003e of our inward attentiveness\r\nincreases with every increase in the strength of the impressions on\r\nwhose perception we are intent.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe natural way of conceiving all this is under the symbolic form of a\r\nbrain-cell played upon from two directions. Whilst the object excites it\r\nfrom without, other brain-cells arouse it from within. \u003ci\u003eThe plenary\r\nenergy of the brain-cell demands the co-operation of both factors\u003c/i\u003e: not\r\nwhen merely present, but when both present and inwardly imagined, is the\r\nobject fully attended to and perceived.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA few additional experiences will now be perfectly clear. Helmholtz, for\r\ninstance, adds this observation concerning the stereoscopic pictures lit\r\nby the electric spark. \"In pictures,\" he says, \"so simple that it is\r\nrelatively difficult for me to see them double, I can succeed in seeing\r\nthem double, even when the illumination is only instantaneous, the\r\nmoment I strive to \u003ci\u003eimagine in a lively way how they ought then to\r\nlook\u003c/i\u003e. The influence of attention is here pure; for all eye-movements\r\nare shut out.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, writing of retinal rivalry, Helmholtz says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is not a trial of strength between two sensations, but depends on\r\nour fixing or failing to fix the attention. Indeed, there is scarcely\r\nany phenomenon so well fitted for the study of the causes which are\r\ncapable of determining the attention. It is not enough to form the\r\nconscious intention of seeing first with one eye and then with the\r\nother; \u003ci\u003ewe must form as clear a notion as possible of what we expect to\r\nsee. Then it will actually appear.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Figs. \u003ca href=\"#ill_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#ill_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, where the result is ambiguous, we can make the\r\nchange from one apparent form to the other by imagining strongly in\r\nadvance the form we wish to see. Similarly in those puzzles where\r\ncertain lines in a picture form by their combination an object that has\r\nno connection\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_235\" id=\"page_235\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{235}\u003c/span\u003e with what the picture obviously represents; or indeed in\r\nevery case where an object is inconspicuous and hard to discern from the\r\nbackground; we may not be able to see it for a long time; but, having\r\nonce seen it, we can attend to it again whenever we like, on account of\r\nthe mental duplicate of it which our imagination now bears. In the\r\nmeaningless French words \u0027\u003ci\u003epas de lieu Rhône que nous\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 who can\r\nrecognize immediately the English \u0027paddle your own canoe\u0027? But who that\r\nhas once noticed the identity can fail to have it arrest his attention\r\nagain? When watching for the distant clock to strike, our mind is so\r\nfilled with its image that at every moment we think we hear the\r\nlonged-for or dreaded sound. So of an awaited footstep. Every stir in\r\nthe wood is for the hunter his game; for the fugitive his pursuers.\r\nEvery bonnet in the street is momentarily taken by the lover to enshroud\r\nthe head of his idol. The image in the mind \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the attention; the\r\npreperception is half of the perception of the looked-for thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_55\" id=\"ill_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"ill_56\" id=\"ill_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 498px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-235-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-235-sml.png\" width=\"498\" height=\"212\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 55.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left:42%;\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 56.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is for this reason that men have no eyes but for those aspects of\r\nthings which they have already been taught to discern. Any one of us can\r\nnotice a phenomenon after it has once been pointed out, which not one in\r\nten thousand could ever have discovered for himself. Even in poetry and\r\nthe arts, some one has to come and tell us what\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_236\" id=\"page_236\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{236}\u003c/span\u003e aspects to single out,\r\nand what effects to admire, before our æsthetic nature can \u0027dilate\u0027 to\r\nits full extent and never \u0027with the wrong emotion.\u0027 In\r\nkindergarten-instruction one of the exercises is to make the children\r\nsee how many features they can point out in such an object as a flower\r\nor a stuffed bird. They readily name the features they know already,\r\nsuch as leaves, tail, bill, feet. But they may look for hours without\r\ndistinguishing nostrils, claws, scales, etc., until their attention is\r\ncalled to these details; thereafter, however, they see them every time.\r\nIn short, \u003ci\u003ethe only things which we commonly see are those which we\r\npreperceive\u003c/i\u003e, and the only things which we preperceive are those which\r\nhave been labelled for us, and the labels stamped into our mind. If we\r\nlost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the midst\r\nof the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEducational Corollaries.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;First, to \u003ci\u003estrengthen attention in children\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwho care nothing for the subject they are studying and let their wits go\r\nwool-gathering. The interest here must be \u0027derived\u0027 from something that\r\nthe teacher associates with the task, a reward or a punishment if\r\nnothing less internal comes to mind. If a topic awakens no spontaneous\r\nattention it must borrow an interest from elsewhere. But the best\r\ninterest is internal, and we must always try, in teaching a class, to\r\nknit our novelties by rational links on to things of which they already\r\nhave preperceptions. The old and familiar is readily attended to by the\r\nmind and helps to hold in turn the new, forming, in Herbartian\r\nphraseology, an \u0027\u003ci\u003eApperceptionsmasse\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 for it. Of course the teacher\u0027s\r\ntalent is best shown by knowing what \u0027Apperceptionsmasse\u0027 to use.\r\nPsychology can only lay down the general rule.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, take that mind-wandering which at a later age may trouble us\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhilst reading or listening to a discourse\u003c/i\u003e. If attention be the\r\nreproduction of the sensation from within, the habit of reading not\r\nmerely with the eye, and of listening not merely with the ear, but of\r\narticulating to one\u0027s self the words seen or heard, ought to deepen\r\none\u0027s\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_237\" id=\"page_237\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{237}\u003c/span\u003e attention to the latter. Experience shows that this is the case.\r\nI can keep my wandering mind a great deal more closely upon a\r\nconversation or a lecture if I actively re-echo to myself the words than\r\nif I simply hear them; and I find a number of my students who report\r\nbenefit from voluntarily adopting a similar course.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAttention and Free Will.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;I have spoken as if our attention were wholly\r\ndetermined by neural conditions. I believe that the array of \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e we\r\ncan attend to is so determined. No object can \u003ci\u003ecatch\u003c/i\u003e our attention\r\nexcept by the neural machinery. But the \u003ci\u003eamount\u003c/i\u003e of the attention which\r\nan object receives after it has caught our mental eye is another\r\nquestion. It often takes effort to keep the mind upon it. We feel that\r\nwe can make more or less of the effort as we choose. If this feeling be\r\nnot deceptive, if our effort be a spiritual force, and an indeterminate\r\none, then of course it contributes coequally with the cerebral\r\nconditions to the result. Though it \u003ci\u003eintroduce\u003c/i\u003e no new idea, it will\r\ndeepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of innumerable ideas which\r\nelse would fade more quickly away. The delay thus gained might not be\r\nmore than a second in duration\u0026mdash;but that second may be \u003ci\u003ecritical\u003c/i\u003e; for\r\nin the constant rising and falling of considerations in the mind, where\r\ntwo associated systems of them are nearly in equilibrium it is often a\r\nmatter of but a second more or less of attention at the outset, whether\r\none system shall gain force to occupy the field and develop itself, and\r\nexclude the other, or be excluded itself by the other. When developed,\r\nit may make us act; and that act may seal our doom. When we come to the\r\nchapter on the Will, we shall see that the whole drama of the voluntary\r\nlife hinges on the amount of attention, slightly more or slightly less,\r\nwhich rival motor ideas may receive. But the whole feeling of reality,\r\nthe whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our\r\nsense that in it things are \u003ci\u003ereally being decided\u003c/i\u003e from one moment to\r\nanother, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_238\" id=\"page_238\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{238}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nforged innumerable ages ago. This appearance, which makes life and\r\nhistory tingle with such a tragic zest, \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e not be an illusion. Effort\r\nmay be an original force and not a mere effect, and it may be\r\nindeterminate in amount. The last word of sober insight here is\r\nignorance, for the forces engaged are too delicate ever to be measured\r\nin detail. Psychology, however, as a would-be \u0027Science,\u0027 must, like\r\nevery other Science, \u003ci\u003epostulate\u003c/i\u003e complete determinism in its facts, and\r\nabstract consequently from the effects of free will, even if such a\r\nforce exist. I shall do so in this book like other psychologists; well\r\nknowing, however, that such a procedure, although a methodical device\r\njustified by the subjective need of arranging the facts in a simple and\r\n\u0027scientific\u0027 form, does not settle the ultimate truth of the free-will\r\nquestion one way or the other.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_239\" id=\"page_239\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{239}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XIV\" id=\"CHAPTER_XIV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XIV.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eCONCEPTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferent states of mind can mean the same.\u003c/b\u003e The function by which we\r\nmark off, discriminate, draw a line round, and identify a numerically\r\ndistinct subject of discourse is called \u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e. It is plain that\r\nwhenever one and the same mental state thinks of many things, it must be\r\nthe vehicle of many conceptions. If it has such a multiple conceptual\r\nfunction, it may be called a state of compound conception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may conceive realities supposed to be extra-mental, as steam-engine;\r\nfictions, as mermaid; or mere \u003ci\u003eentia rationis\u003c/i\u003e, like difference or\r\nnonentity. But whatever we do conceive, our conception is of that and\r\nnothing else\u0026mdash;nothing else, that is, \u003ci\u003einstead\u003c/i\u003e of that, though it may be\r\nof much else \u003ci\u003ein addition\u003c/i\u003e to that. Each act of conception results from\r\nour attention\u0027s having singled out some one part of the mass of\r\nmatter-for-thought which the world presents, and from our holding fast\r\nto it, without confusion. Confusion occurs when we do not know whether a\r\ncertain object proposed to us is \u003ci\u003ethe same\u003c/i\u003e with one of our meanings or\r\nnot; so that the conceptual function requires, to be complete, that the\r\nthought should not only say \u0027I mean this,\u0027 but also say \u0027I don\u0027t mean\r\nthat.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach conception thus eternally remains what it is, and never can become\r\nanother. The mind may change its states, and its meanings, at different\r\ntimes; may drop one conception and take up another: but the dropped\r\nconception itself can in no intelligible sense be said to \u003ci\u003echange into\u003c/i\u003e\r\nits successor. The paper, a moment ago white, I may now see to be\r\nscorched black. But my \u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e \u0027white\u0027\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_240\" id=\"page_240\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{240}\u003c/span\u003e does not change into my\r\n\u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e \u0027black.\u0027 On the contrary, it stays alongside of the\r\nobjective blackness, as a different meaning in my mind, and by so doing\r\nlets me judge the blackness as the paper\u0027s change. Unless it stayed, I\r\nshould simply say \u0027blackness\u0027 and know no more. Thus, amid the flux of\r\nopinions and of physical things, the world of conceptions, or things\r\nintended to be thought about, stands stiff and immutable, like Plato\u0027s\r\nRealm of Ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome conceptions are of things, some of events, some of qualities. Any\r\nfact, be it thing, event, or quality, may be conceived sufficiently for\r\npurposes of identification, if only it be singled out and marked so as\r\nto separate it from other things. Simply calling it \u0027this\u0027 or \u0027that\u0027\r\nwill suffice. To speak in technical language, a subject may be conceived\r\nby its \u003ci\u003edenotation\u003c/i\u003e, with no \u003ci\u003econnotation\u003c/i\u003e, or a very minimum of\r\nconnotation, attached. The essential point is that it should be\r\nre-identified by us as that which the talk is about; and no full\r\nrepresentation of it is necessary for this, even when it is a fully\r\nrepresentable thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this sense, creatures extremely low in the intellectual scale may\r\nhave conception. All that is required is that they should recognize the\r\nsame experience again. A polyp would be a conceptual thinker if a\r\nfeeling of \u0027Hollo! thingumbob again!\u0027 ever flitted through its mind.\r\nThis sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our\r\nconsciousness. The same matters can be thought of in different states of\r\nmind, and some of these states can know that they mean the same matters\r\nwhich the other states meant. In other words, \u003ci\u003ethe mind can always\r\nintend, and know when it intends, to think the Same\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConceptions of Abstract, of Universal, and of Problematic Objects.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nsense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought. It\r\nis one of those evanescent and \u0027transitive\u0027 facts of mind which\r\nintrospection cannot turn round upon, and isolate and hold up for\r\nexamination, as an entomologist passes round an insect on a pin. In the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_241\" id=\"page_241\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{241}\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it has to do with the\r\n\u0027fringe\u0027 of the object, and is a \u0027feeling of tendency,\u0027 whose neural\r\ncounterpart is undoubtedly a lot of dawning and dying processes too\r\nfaint and complex to be traced. (See \u003ca href=\"#page_169\"\u003ep. 169\u003c/a\u003e.) The geometer, with his one\r\ndefinite figure before him, knows perfectly that his thoughts apply to\r\ncountless other figures as well, and that although he \u003ci\u003esees\u003c/i\u003e lines of a\r\ncertain special bigness, direction, color, etc., he \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e not one of\r\nthese details. When I use the word \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e in two different sentences, I\r\nmay have both times exactly the same sound upon my lips and the same\r\npicture in my mental eye, but I may mean, and at the very moment of\r\nuttering the word and imagining the picture know that I mean, two\r\nentirely different things. Thus when I say: \"What a wonderful man Jones\r\nis!\" I am perfectly aware that I mean by man to exclude Napoleon\r\nBonaparte or Smith. But when I say: \"What a wonderful thing Man is!\" I\r\nam equally well aware that I mean no such exclusion. This added\r\nconsciousness is an absolutely positive sort of feeling, transforming\r\nwhat would otherwise be mere noise or vision into something\r\n\u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e; and determining the sequel of my thinking, the later words\r\nand images, in a perfectly definite way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo matter how definite and concrete the habitual imagery of a given mind\r\nmay be, the things represented appear always surrounded by their fringe\r\nof relations, and this is as integral a part of the mind\u0027s object as the\r\nthings themselves are. We come, by steps with which everyone is\r\nsufficiently familiar, to think of whole classes of things as well as of\r\nsingle specimens; and to think of the special qualities or attributes of\r\nthings as well as of the complete things\u0026mdash;in other words, we come to\r\nhave \u003ci\u003euniversals\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eabstracts\u003c/i\u003e, as the logicians call them, for our\r\nobjects. We also come to think of objects which are only \u003ci\u003eproblematic\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nor not yet definitely representable, as well as of objects imagined in\r\nall their details. An object which is problematic is defined by its\r\nrelations only. We think of a thing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_242\" id=\"page_242\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{242}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e which certain facts must\r\nobtain. But we do not yet know how the thing will look when\r\nrealized\u0026mdash;that is, although conceiving it we cannot \u003ci\u003eimagine\u003c/i\u003e it. We\r\nhave in the relations, however, enough to individualize our topic and\r\ndistinguish it from all the other meanings of our mind. Thus, for\r\nexample, we may conceive of a perpetual-motion machine. Such a machine\r\nis a \u003ci\u003equæsitum\u003c/i\u003e of a perfectly definite kind,\u0026mdash;we can always tell\r\nwhether the actual machines offered us do or do not agree with what we\r\nmean by it. The natural possibility or impossibility of the thing never\r\ntouches the question of its conceivability in this problematic way.\r\n\u0027Round-square,\u0027 again, or \u0027black-white-thing,\u0027 are absolutely definite\r\nconceptions; it is a mere accident, as far as conception goes, that they\r\nhappen to stand for things which nature never shows us, and of which we\r\nconsequently can make no picture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe nominalists and conceptualists carry on a great quarrel over the\r\nquestion whether \"the mind can frame abstract or universal ideas.\"\r\nIdeas, it should be said, of abstract or universal objects. But truly in\r\ncomparison with the wonderful fact that our thoughts, however different\r\notherwise, can still be of \u003ci\u003ethe same\u003c/i\u003e, the question whether that same be\r\na single thing, a whole class of things, an abstract quality or\r\nsomething unimaginable, is an insignificant matter of detail. Our\r\nmeanings are of singulars, particulars, indefinites, problematics, and\r\nuniversals, mixed together in every way. A singular individual is as\r\nmuch \u003ci\u003econceived\u003c/i\u003e when he is isolated and identified away from the rest\r\nof the world in my mind, as is the most rarefied and universally\r\napplicable quality he may possess\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e, for example, when treated in\r\nthe same way. From every point of view, the overwhelming and portentous\r\ncharacter ascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why, from\r\nSocrates downwards, philosophers should have vied with each other in\r\nscorn of the knowledge of the particular, and in adoration of that of\r\nthe general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more adorable\r\nknowledge ought to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_243\" id=\"page_243\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{243}\u003c/span\u003e that of the more adorable things, and that the\r\n\u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e of worth are all concretes and singulars. The only value of\r\nuniversal characters is that they help us, by reasoning, to know new\r\ntruths about individual things. The restriction of one\u0027s meaning,\r\nmoreover, to an individual thing, probably requires even more\r\ncomplicated brain-processes than its extension to all the instances of a\r\nkind; and the mere mystery, as such, of the knowledge, is equally great,\r\nwhether generals or singulars be the things known. In sum, therefore,\r\nthe traditional Universal-worship can only be called a bit of perverse\r\nsentimentalism, a philosophic \u0027idol of the cave.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNothing can be conceived as the same without being conceived in a novel\r\nstate of mind.\u003c/b\u003e It seems hardly necessary to add this, after what was\r\nsaid on \u003ca href=\"#page_156\"\u003ep. 156\u003c/a\u003e. Thus, my arm-chair is one of the things of which I have\r\na conception; I knew it yesterday and recognized it when I looked at it.\r\nBut if I think of it to-day as the same arm-chair which I looked at\r\nyesterday, it is obvious that the very conception of it \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e the same is\r\nan additional complication to the thought, whose inward constitution\r\nmust alter in consequence. In short, it is logically impossible that the\r\nsame thing should be \u003ci\u003eknown as the same\u003c/i\u003e by two successive copies of the\r\nsame thought. As a matter of fact, the thoughts by which we know that we\r\nmean the same thing are apt to be very different indeed from each other.\r\nWe think the thing now substantively, now transitively; now in a direct\r\nimage, now in one symbol, and now in another symbol; but nevertheless we\r\nsomehow always \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e know which of all possible subjects we have in mind.\r\nIntrospective psychology must here throw up the sponge; the fluctuations\r\nof subjective life are too exquisite to be described by its coarse\r\nterms. It must confine itself to bearing witness to the fact that all\r\nsorts of different subjective states do form the vehicle by which the\r\nsame is known; and it must contradict the opposite view.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_244\" id=\"page_244\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{244}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XV\" id=\"CHAPTER_XV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XV.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eDISCRIMINATION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDiscrimination versus Association.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;On \u003ca href=\"#page_015\"\u003ep. 15\u003c/a\u003e I spoke of the baby\u0027s first\r\nobject being the germ out of which his whole later universe develops by\r\nthe addition of new parts from without and the discrimination of others\r\nwithin. Experience, in other words, is trained \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e by association and\r\ndissociation, and psychology must be writ \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e in synthetic and in\r\nanalytic terms. Our original sensible totals are, on the one hand,\r\nsubdivided by discriminative attention, and, on the other, united with\r\nother totals,\u0026mdash;either through the agency of our own movements, carrying\r\nour senses from one part of space to another, or because new objects\r\ncome successively and replace those by which we were at first impressed.\r\nThe \u0027simple impression\u0027 of Hume, the \u0027simple idea\u0027 of Locke are\r\nabstractions, never realized in experience. Life, from the very first,\r\npresents us with concreted objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of\r\nthe world which envelops them in space and time, and potentially\r\ndivisible into inward elements and parts. These objects we break asunder\r\nand reunite. We must do both for our knowledge of them to grow; and it\r\nis hard to say, on the whole, which we do most. But since the elements\r\nwith which the traditional associationism performs its\r\nconstructions\u0026mdash;\u0027simple sensations,\u0027 namely\u0026mdash;are all products of\r\ndiscrimination carried to a high pitch, it seems as if we ought to\r\ndiscuss the subject of analytic attention and discrimination first.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDiscrimination defined.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The noticing of any \u003ci\u003epart\u003c/i\u003e whatever of our\r\nobject is an act of discrimination. Already on \u003ca href=\"#page_218\"\u003ep. 218\u003c/a\u003e I have described\r\nthe manner in which we often spontaneously\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_245\" id=\"page_245\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{245}\u003c/span\u003e lapse into the\r\nundiscriminating state, even with regard to objects which we have\r\nalready learned to distinguish. Such anæsthetics as chloroform, nitrous\r\noxide, etc., sometimes bring about transient lapses even more total, in\r\nwhich numerical discrimination especially seems gone; for one sees light\r\nand hears sound, but whether one or many lights and sounds is quite\r\nimpossible to tell. Where the parts of an object have already been\r\ndiscerned, and each made the object of a special discriminative act, we\r\ncan with difficulty feel the object again in its pristine unity; and so\r\nprominent may our consciousness of its composition be, that we may\r\nhardly believe that it ever could have appeared undivided. But this is\r\nan erroneous view, the undeniable fact being that \u003ci\u003eany number of\r\nimpressions, from any number of sensory sources, falling simultaneously\r\non a mind\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWHICH HAS NOT YET EXPERIENCED THEM SEPARATELY\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ewill yield a\r\nsingle undivided object to that mind\u003c/i\u003e. The law is that all things fuse\r\nthat \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e fuse, and that nothing separates except what must. What makes\r\nimpressions separate is what we have to study in this chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConditions which favor Discrimination.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;I will treat successively of\r\ndifferences:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) So far as they are directly \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) So far as they are \u003ci\u003einferred\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) So far as they are \u003ci\u003esingled out in compounds\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferences directly felt.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The first condition is that \u003ci\u003ethe things to\r\nbe discriminated must\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eBE\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003edifferent\u003c/i\u003e, either in time, place, or\r\nquality. In other words, and physiologically speaking, they must awaken\r\nneural processes which are \u003ci\u003edistinct\u003c/i\u003e. But this, as we have just seen,\r\nthough an indispensable condition, is not a sufficient condition. To\r\nbegin with, the several neural processes must be distinct \u003ci\u003eenough\u003c/i\u003e. No\r\none can help singling out a black stripe on a white ground, or feeling\r\nthe contrast between a bass note and a high one sounded immediately\r\nafter it. Discrimination is here \u003ci\u003einvoluntary\u003c/i\u003e. But where the objective\r\ndifference is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_246\" id=\"page_246\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{246}\u003c/span\u003e less, discrimination may require considerable effort of\r\nattention to be performed at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecondly, \u003ci\u003ethe sensations excited by the differing objects must not fall\r\nsimultaneously, but must fall in immediate\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eSUCCESSION\u003c/small\u003e upon the same\r\norgan. It is easier to compare successive than simultaneous sounds,\r\neasier to compare two weights or two temperatures by testing one after\r\nthe other with the same hand, than by using both hands and comparing\r\nboth at once. Similarly it is easier to discriminate shades of light or\r\ncolor by moving the eye from one to the other, so that they successively\r\nstimulate the same retinal tract. In testing the local discrimination of\r\nthe skin, by applying compass-points, it is found that they are felt to\r\ntouch different spots much more readily when set down one after the\r\nother than when both are applied at once. In the latter case they may be\r\ntwo or three inches apart on the back, thighs, etc., and still feel as\r\nif they were set down in one spot. Finally, in the case of smell and\r\ntaste it is well-nigh impossible to compare simultaneous impressions at\r\nall. The reason why successive impression so much favors the result\r\nseems to be that there is a real \u003ci\u003esensation of difference\u003c/i\u003e, aroused by\r\nthe shock of transition from one perception to another which is unlike\r\nthe first. This sensation of difference has its own peculiar quality, no\r\nmatter what the terms may be, between which it obtains. It is, in short,\r\none of those transitive feelings, or feelings of relation, of which I\r\ntreated in a former place (\u003ca href=\"#page_161\"\u003ep. 161\u003c/a\u003e); and, when once aroused, its object\r\nlingers in the memory along with the substantive terms which precede and\r\nfollow, and enables our \u003ci\u003ejudgments of comparison\u003c/i\u003e to be made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the difference between the successive sensations is but slight,\r\nthe transition between them must be made as immediate as possible, and\r\nboth must be compared \u003ci\u003ein memory\u003c/i\u003e, in order to get the best results. One\r\ncannot judge accurately of the difference between two similar wines\r\nwhilst the second is still in one\u0027s mouth. So of sounds, warmths,\r\netc.\u0026mdash;we must get the dying phases of both sensations\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_247\" id=\"page_247\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{247}\u003c/span\u003e of the pair we\r\nare comparing. Where, however, the difference is strong, this condition\r\nis immaterial, and we can then compare a sensation actually felt with\r\nanother carried in memory only. The longer the interval of time between\r\nthe sensations, the more uncertain is their discrimination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difference, thus immediately felt between two terms, is independent\r\nof our ability to say anything \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e either of the terms by itself. I\r\ncan feel two distinct spots to be touched on my skin, yet not know which\r\nis above and which below. I can observe two neighboring musical tones to\r\ndiffer, and still not know which of the two is the higher in pitch.\r\nSimilarly I may discriminate two neighboring tints, whilst remaining\r\nuncertain which is the bluer or the yellower, or \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e either differs\r\nfrom its mate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI said that in the immediate succession of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e upon \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e the shock of\r\ntheir difference is \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e. It is felt \u003ci\u003erepeatedly\u003c/i\u003e when we go back and\r\nforth from \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e; and we make a point of getting it thus repeatedly\r\n(by alternating our attention at least) whenever the shock is so slight\r\nas to be with difficulty perceived. But in addition to being felt at the\r\nbrief instant of transition, the difference also feels as if\r\nincorporated and taken up into the second term, which feels\r\n\u0027different-from-the-first\u0027 even while it lasts. It is obvious that the\r\n\u0027second term\u0027 of the mind in this case is not bald \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, but a very\r\ncomplex object; and that the sequence is not simply first \u0027\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then \u0027\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027; but first \u0027\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then \u0027\u003ci\u003edifference\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 then\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003en-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027 The first and third states of mind are\r\nsubstantive, the second transitive. As our brains and minds are actually\r\nmade, it is impossible to get certain \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s in immediate\r\nsequence and to keep them \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e. If kept pure, it would mean that they\r\nremained uncompared. With us, inevitably, by a mechanism which we as yet\r\nfail to understand, the shock of difference is felt between them, and\r\nthe second object is not \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e pure, but \u003ci\u003en-as-different-from-m\u003c/i\u003e. The pure\r\nidea of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003enever in the mind at all\u003c/i\u003e when \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e has gone before.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_248\" id=\"page_248\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{248}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferences inferred.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;With such direct perceptions of difference as\r\nthis, we must not confound those entirely unlike cases in which we\r\n\u003ci\u003einfer\u003c/i\u003e that two things must differ because we know enough \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e each\r\nof them taken by itself to warrant our classing them under distinct\r\nheads. It often happens, when the interval is long between two\r\nexperiences, that our judgments are guided, not so much by a positive\r\nimage or copy of the earlier one, as by our recollection of certain\r\nfacts about it. Thus I know that the sunshine to-day is less bright than\r\non a certain day last week, because I then said it was quite dazzling, a\r\nremark I should not now care to make. Or I know myself to feel livelier\r\nnow than I did last summer, because I can now psychologize, and then I\r\ncould not. We are constantly comparing feelings with whose quality our\r\nimagination has no sort of \u003ci\u003eacquaintance\u003c/i\u003e at the time\u0026mdash;pleasures, or\r\npains, for example. It is notoriously hard to conjure up in imagination\r\na lively image of either of these classes of feeling. The\r\nassociationists may prate of an idea of pleasure being a pleasant idea,\r\nof an idea of pain being a painful one, but the unsophisticated sense of\r\nmankind is against them, agreeing with Homer that the memory of griefs\r\nwhen past may be a joy, and with Dante that there is no greater sorrow\r\nthan, in misery, to recollect one\u0027s happier time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe \u0027Singling out\u0027 of Elements in a Compound.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is safe to lay it down\r\nas a fundamental principle that \u003ci\u003eany total impression made on the mind\r\nmust be unanalyzable so long as its elements have never been experienced\r\napart or in other combinations elsewhere\u003c/i\u003e. The components of an\r\nabsolutely changeless group of not-elsewhere-occurring attributes could\r\nnever be discriminated. If all cold things were wet, and all wet things\r\ncold; if all hard things pricked our skin, and no other things did so:\r\nis it likely that we should discriminate between coldness and wetness,\r\nand hardness and pungency, respectively? If all liquids were transparent\r\nand no non-liquid were\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_249\" id=\"page_249\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{249}\u003c/span\u003e transparent, it would be long before we had\r\nseparate names for liquidity and transparency. If heat were a function\r\nof position above the earth\u0027s surface, so that the higher a thing was\r\nthe hotter it became, one word would serve for hot and high. We have, in\r\nfact, a number of sensations whose concomitants are invariably the same,\r\nand we find it, accordingly, impossible to analyze them out from the\r\ntotals in which they are found. The contraction of the diaphragm and the\r\nexpansion of the lungs, the shortening of certain muscles and the\r\nrotation of certain joints, are examples. We learn that the \u003ci\u003ecauses\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nsuch groups of feelings are multiple, and therefore we frame theories\r\nabout the composition of the feelings themselves, by \u0027fusion,\u0027\r\n\u0027integration,\u0027 \u0027synthesis,\u0027 or what not. But by direct introspection no\r\nanalysis of the feelings is ever made. A conspicuous case will come to\r\nview when we treat of the emotions. Every emotion has its \u0027expression,\u0027\r\nof quick breathing, palpitating heart, flushed face, or the like. The\r\nexpression gives rise to bodily feelings; and the emotion is thus\r\nnecessarily and invariably accompanied by these bodily feelings. The\r\nconsequence is that it is impossible to apprehend it as a spiritual\r\nstate by itself, or to analyze it away from the lower feelings in\r\nquestion. It is in fact impossible to prove that it exists as a distinct\r\npsychic fact. The present writer strongly doubts that it does so exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn general, then, if an object affects us simultaneously in a number of\r\nways, \u003ci\u003eabcd\u003c/i\u003e, we get a peculiar integral impression, which thereafter\r\ncharacterizes to our mind the individuality of that object, and becomes\r\nthe sign of its presence; and which is only resolved into \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, respectively, by the aid of farther experiences. These we now\r\nmay turn to consider.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIf any single quality or constituent, a, of such an object have\r\npreviously been known by us isolatedly\u003c/i\u003e, or have in any other manner\r\nalready become an object of separate acquaintance on our part, so that\r\nwe have an image of it,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_250\" id=\"page_250\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{250}\u003c/span\u003e distinct or vague, in our mind, disconnected\r\nwith \u003ci\u003ebcd, then that constituent a may be analyzed out from the total\r\nimpression\u003c/i\u003e. Analysis of a thing means separate attention to each of its\r\nparts. In \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\"\u003eChapter XIII\u003c/a\u003e we saw that one condition of attending to a thing\r\nwas the formation from within of a separate image of that thing, which\r\nshould, as it were, go out to meet the impression received. Attention\r\nbeing the condition of analysis, and separate imagination being the\r\ncondition of attention, it follows also that separate imagination is the\r\ncondition of analysis. \u003ci\u003eOnly such elements as we are acquainted with,\r\nand can imagine separately, can be discriminated within a total\r\nsense-impression.\u003c/i\u003e The image seems to welcome its own mate from out of\r\nthe compound, and to separate it from the other constituents; and thus\r\nthe compound becomes broken for our consciousness into parts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll the facts cited in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\"\u003eChapter XIII\u003c/a\u003e to prove that attention involves\r\ninward reproduction prove that discrimination involves it as well. In\r\nlooking for any object in a room, for a book in a library, for example,\r\nwe detect it the more readily if, in addition to merely knowing its\r\nname, etc., we carry in our mind a distinct image of its appearance. The\r\nassafœdita in \u0027Worcestershire sauce\u0027 is not obvious to anyone who has\r\nnot tasted assafœtida \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e. In a \u0027cold\u0027 color an artist would\r\nnever be able to analyze out the pervasive presence of \u003ci\u003eblue\u003c/i\u003e, unless he\r\nhad previously made acquaintance with the color blue by itself. All the\r\ncolors we actually experience are mixtures. Even the purest primaries\r\nalways come to us with some white. Absolutely pure red or green or\r\nviolet is never experienced, and so can never be discerned in the\r\nso-called primaries with which we have to deal: the latter consequently\r\npass for pure.\u0026mdash;The reader will remember how an overtone can only be\r\nattended to in the midst of its consorts in the voice of a musical\r\ninstrument, by sounding it previously alone. The imagination, being then\r\nfull of it, hears the like of it in the compound tone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNon-isolable elements may be discriminated, provided\u003c/b\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_251\" id=\"page_251\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{251}\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003etheir concomitants\r\nchange.\u003c/b\u003e Very few elements of reality are experienced by us in absolute\r\nisolation. The most that usually happens to a constituent \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e of a\r\ncompound phenomenon \u003ci\u003eabcd\u003c/i\u003e is that its \u003ci\u003estrength\u003c/i\u003e relatively to \u003ci\u003ebcd\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvaries from a maximum to a minimum; or that it appears linked with\r\n\u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e qualities, in other compounds, as \u003ci\u003eaefg\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eahik\u003c/i\u003e. Either of\r\nthese vicissitudes in the mode of our experiencing \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e may, under\r\nfavorable circumstances, lead us to feel the difference between it and\r\nits concomitants, and to single it out\u0026mdash;not absolutely, it is true, but\r\napproximately\u0026mdash;and so to analyze the compound of which it is a part. The\r\nact of singling out is then called \u003ci\u003eabstraction\u003c/i\u003e, and the element\r\ndisengaged is an \u003ci\u003eabstract\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFluctuation in a quality\u0027s intensity is a less efficient aid to our\r\nabstracting of it than variety in the combinations in which it appears.\r\n\u003ci\u003eWhat is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to\r\nbecome dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract\r\ncontemplation by the mind.\u003c/i\u003e One might call this the \u003ci\u003elaw of dissociation\r\nby varying concomitants\u003c/i\u003e. The practical result of this law is that a\r\nmind which has once dissociated and abstracted a character by its means\r\ncan analyze it out of a total whenever it meets with it again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Martineau gives a good example of the law: \"When a red ivory ball,\r\nseen for the first time, has been withdrawn, it will leave a mental\r\nrepresentation of itself, in which all that it simultaneously gave us\r\nwill indistinguishably coexist. Let a white ball succeed to it; now, and\r\nnot before, will an attribute detach itself, and the \u003ci\u003ecolor\u003c/i\u003e, by force\r\nof contrast, be shaken out into the foreground. Let the white ball be\r\nreplaced by an egg, and this new difference will bring the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e into\r\nnotice from its previous slumber, and thus that which began by being\r\nsimply an object cut out from the surrounding scene becomes for us first\r\na \u003ci\u003ered\u003c/i\u003e object, then a \u003ci\u003ered round\u003c/i\u003e object, and so on.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eWhy\u003c/i\u003e the repetition of the character in combination with different\r\nwholes will cause it thus to break up its adhesion with any one of them,\r\nand roll out, as it were, alone upon\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_252\" id=\"page_252\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{252}\u003c/span\u003e the table of consciousness, is a\r\nlittle of a mystery, but one which need not be considered here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePractice improves Discrimination.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Any personal or practical interest in\r\nthe results to be obtained by distinguishing, makes one\u0027s wits amazingly\r\nsharp to detect differences. And long training and practice in\r\ndistinguishing has the same effect as personal interest. Both of these\r\nagencies give to small amounts of objective difference the same\r\neffectiveness upon the mind that, under other circumstances, only large\r\nones would have.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat \u0027practice makes perfect\u0027 is notorious in the field of motor\r\naccomplishments. But motor accomplishments depend in part on sensory\r\ndiscrimination. Billiard-playing, rifle-shooting, tight-rope-dancing\r\ndemand the most delicate appreciation of minute disparities of\r\nsensation, as well as the power to make accurately graduated muscular\r\nresponse thereto. In the purely sensorial field we have the well-known\r\nvirtuosity displayed by the professional buyers and testers of various\r\nkinds of goods. One man will distinguish by taste between the upper and\r\nthe lower half of a bottle of old Madeira. Another will recognize, by\r\nfeeling the flour in a barrel, whether the wheat was grown in Iowa or\r\nTennessee. The blind deaf-mute, Laura Bridgman, so improved her touch as\r\nto recognize, after a year\u0027s interval, the hand of a person who once had\r\nshaken hers; and her sister in misfortune, Julia Brace, is said to have\r\nbeen employed in the Hartford Asylum to sort the linen of its\r\nmultitudinous inmates, after it came from the wash, by her wonderfully\r\neducated sense of smell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fact is so familiar that few, if any, psychologists have even\r\nrecognized it as needing explanation. They have seemed to think that\r\npractice must, in the nature of things, improve the delicacy of\r\ndiscernment, and have let the matter rest. At most they have said,\r\n\"Attention accounts for it; we attend more to habitual things, and what\r\nwe attend to we perceive more minutely.\" This answer, though true, is\r\ntoo general; but we can say nothing more about the matter here.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_253\" id=\"page_253\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{253}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XVI\" id=\"CHAPTER_XVI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XVI.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eASSOCIATION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Order of our Ideas.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;After discrimination, association! It is\r\nobvious that all advance in knowledge must consist of both operations;\r\nfor in the course of our education, objects at first appearing as wholes\r\nare analyzed into parts, and objects appearing separately are brought\r\ntogether and appear as new compound wholes to the mind. Analysis and\r\nsynthesis are thus the incessantly alternating mental activities, a\r\nstroke of the one preparing the way for a stroke of the other, much as,\r\nin walking, a man\u0027s two legs are alternately brought into use, both\r\nbeing indispensable for any orderly advance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe manner in which trains of imagery and consideration follow each\r\nother through our thinking, the restless flight of one idea before the\r\nnext, the transitions our minds make between things wide as the poles\r\nasunder, transitions which at first sight startle us by their\r\nabruptness, but which, when scrutinized closely, often reveal\r\nintermediating links of perfect naturalness and propriety\u0026mdash;all this\r\nmagical, imponderable streaming has from time immemorial excited the\r\nadmiration of all whose attention happened to be caught by its\r\nomnipresent mystery. And it has furthermore challenged the race of\r\nphilosophers to banish something of the mystery by formulating the\r\nprocess in simpler terms. The problem which the philosophers have set\r\nthemselves is that of ascertaining, between the thoughts which thus\r\nappear to sprout one out of the other, \u003ci\u003eprinciples of connection\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhereby their peculiar succession or coexistence may be explained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut immediately an ambiguity arises: which sort of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_254\" id=\"page_254\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{254}\u003c/span\u003e connection is meant?\r\nconnection \u003ci\u003ethought-of\u003c/i\u003e, or connection \u003ci\u003ebetween thoughts\u003c/i\u003e? These are two\r\nentirely different things, and only in the case of one of them is there\r\nany hope of finding \u0027principles.\u0027 The jungle of connections \u003ci\u003ethought of\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncan never be formulated simply. Every conceivable connection may be\r\nthought of\u0026mdash;of coexistence, succession, resemblance, contrast,\r\ncontradiction, cause and effect, means and end, genus and species, part\r\nand whole, substance and property, early and late, large and small,\r\nlandlord and tenant, master and servant,\u0026mdash;Heaven knows what, for the\r\nlist is literally inexhaustible. The only simplification which could\r\npossibly be aimed at would be the reduction of the relations to a small\r\nnumber of \u003ci\u003etypes\u003c/i\u003e, like those which some authors call the \u0027categories\u0027\r\nof the understanding. According as we followed one category or another\r\nwe should sweep, from any object with our thought, in this way or in\r\nthat, to others. Were \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e the sort of connection sought between one\r\nmoment of our thinking and another, our chapter might end here. For the\r\nonly summary description of these categories is that they are all\r\nthinkable relations, and that the mind proceeds from one object to\r\nanother by some intelligible path.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs it determined by any laws?\u003c/b\u003e But as a matter of fact, What determines\r\nthe particular path? Why do we at a given time and place proceed to\r\nthink of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e if we have just thought of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, and at another time and\r\nplace why do we think, not of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, but of \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e? Why do we spend years\r\nstraining after a certain scientific or practical problem, but all in\r\nvain\u0026mdash;our thought unable to evoke the solution we desire? And why, some\r\nday, walking in the street with our attention miles away from that\r\nquest, does the answer saunter into our minds as carelessly as if it had\r\nnever been called for\u0026mdash;suggested, possibly, by the flowers on the bonnet\r\nof the lady in front of us, or possibly by nothing that we can discover?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth must be admitted that thought works under strange conditions.\r\nPure \u0027reason\u0027 is only one out of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_255\" id=\"page_255\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{255}\u003c/span\u003e thousand possibilities in the\r\nthinking of each of us. Who can count all the silly fancies, the\r\ngrotesque suppositions, the utterly irrelevant reflections he makes in\r\nthe course of a day? Who can swear that his prejudices and irrational\r\nopinions constitute a less bulky part of his mental furniture than his\r\nclarified beliefs? And yet, the \u003ci\u003emode of genesis\u003c/i\u003e of the worthy and the\r\nworthless in our thinking seems the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe laws are cerebral laws.\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eThere seem to be mechanical conditions on\r\nwhich thought depends, and which\u003c/i\u003e, to say the least, \u003ci\u003edetermine the\r\norder in which, the objects for her comparisons and selections are\r\npresented\u003c/i\u003e. It is a suggestive fact that Locke, and many more recent\r\nContinental psychologists, have found themselves obliged to invoke a\r\nmechanical process to account for the \u003ci\u003eaberrations\u003c/i\u003e of thought, the\r\nobstructive prepossessions, the frustrations of reason. This they found\r\nin the law of habit, or what we now call association by contiguity. But\r\nit never occurred to these writers that a process which could go the\r\nlength of actually producing some ideas and sequences in the mind might\r\nsafely be trusted to produce others too; and that those habitual\r\nassociations which further thought may also come from the same\r\nmechanical source as those which hinder it. Hartley accordingly\r\nsuggested habit as a sufficient explanation of the sequence of our\r\nthoughts, and in so doing planted himself squarely upon the properly\r\n\u003ci\u003ecausal\u003c/i\u003e aspect of the problem, and sought to treat both rational and\r\nirrational associations from a single point of view. How does a man\r\ncome, after having the thought of A, to have the thought of B the next\r\nmoment? or how does he come to think A and B always together? These were\r\nthe phenomena which Hartley undertook to explain by cerebral physiology.\r\nI believe that he was, in essential respects, on the right track, and I\r\npropose simply to revise his conclusions by the aid of distinctions\r\nwhich he did not make.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eObjects are associated, not ideas.\u003c/b\u003e We shall avoid confusion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_256\" id=\"page_256\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{256}\u003c/span\u003e if we\r\nconsistently speak as if \u003ci\u003eassociation\u003c/i\u003e, so far as the word stands for an\r\n\u003ci\u003eeffect, were between\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eTHINGS THOUGHT OF\u003c/small\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eas if it were\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eTHINGS\u003c/small\u003e, \u003ci\u003enot\r\nideas, which are associated in the mind\u003c/i\u003e. We shall talk of the\r\nassociation of \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e, not of the association of \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e. And so far\r\nas association stands for a \u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e, it is between \u003ci\u003eprocesses in the\r\nbrain\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;it is these which, by being associated in certain ways,\r\ndetermine what successive objects shall be thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Elementary Principle.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;I shall now try to show that there is no\r\nother \u003ci\u003eelementary\u003c/i\u003e causal law of association than the law of neural\r\nhabit. All the \u003ci\u003ematerials\u003c/i\u003e of our thought are due to the way in which\r\none elementary process of the cerebral hemispheres tends to excite\r\nwhatever other elementary process it may have excited at any former\r\ntime. The number of elementary processes at work, however, and the\r\nnature of those which at any time are fully effective in rousing the\r\nothers, determine the character of the total brain-action, and, as a\r\nconsequence of this, they determine the object thought of at the time.\r\nAccording as this resultant object is one thing or another, we call it a\r\nproduct of association by contiguity or of association by similarity, or\r\ncontrast, or whatever other sorts we may have recognized as ultimate.\r\nIts \u003ci\u003eproduction\u003c/i\u003e, however, is, in each one of these cases, to be\r\nexplained by a merely quantitative variation in the elementary\r\nbrain-processes momentarily at work under the law of habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy thesis, stated thus briefly, will soon become more clear; and at the\r\nsame time certain disturbing factors, which coöperate with the law of\r\nneural habit, will come to view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us then assume as the basis of all our subsequent reasoning this\r\nlaw: \u003ci\u003eWhen two elementary brain-processes have been active together or\r\nin immediate succession, one of them, on re-occurring, tends to\r\npropagate its excitement into the other.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, as a matter of fact, every elementary process has unavoidably found\r\nitself at different times excited in conjunction\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_257\" id=\"page_257\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{257}\u003c/span\u003e with \u003ci\u003emany\u003c/i\u003e other\r\nprocesses. Which of these others it shall awaken now becomes a problem.\r\nShall \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e be aroused next by the present \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e? To answer this, we\r\nmust make a further postulate, based on the fact of \u003ci\u003etension\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nnerve-tissue, and on the fact of summation of excitements, each\r\nincomplete or latent in itself, into an open resultant (see \u003ca href=\"#page_128\"\u003ep. 128\u003c/a\u003e). The\r\nprocess \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, rather than \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, will awake, if in addition to the\r\nvibrating tract \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e some other tract \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e is in a state of\r\nsub-excitement, and formerly was excited with \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e alone and not with\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e. In short, we may say:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe amount of activity at any given point in the brain-cortex is the\r\nsum of the tendencies of all other points to discharge into it, such\r\ntendencies being proportionate (1) to the number of times the excitement\r\nof each other point may have accompanied that of the point in question;\r\n(2) to the intensity of such excitements; and (3) to the absence of any\r\nrival point functionally disconnected with the first point, into which\r\nthe discharges might be diverted.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExpressing the fundamental law in this most complicated way leads to the\r\ngreatest ultimate simplification. Let us, for the present, only treat of\r\nspontaneous trains of thought and ideation, such as occur in revery or\r\nmusing. The case of voluntary thinking toward a certain end shall come\r\nup later.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSpontaneous Trains of Thought.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Take, to fix our ideas, the two verses\r\nfrom \u0027Locksley Hall\u0027:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003e\"I, the heir of all \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e in the foremost files of time,\"\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eand\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003e\"For I doubt not through \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e one increasing purpose runs.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eWhy is it that when we recite from memory one of these lines, and get as\r\nfar as \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e, that portion of the \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e line which follows and,\r\nso to speak, sprouts out of \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e does not also sprout out of our\r\nmemory and confuse the sense of our words? Simply because the word that\r\nfollows \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e has its brain-process awakened not simply by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_258\" id=\"page_258\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{258}\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nbrain-process of \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e alone, but by it \u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e the brain-processes\r\nof all the words preceding \u003ci\u003ethe ages\u003c/i\u003e. The word \u003ci\u003eages\u003c/i\u003e at its moment of\r\nstrongest activity would, \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, indifferently discharge into either\r\n\u0027in\u0027 or \u0027one.\u0027 So would the previous words (whose tension is momentarily\r\nmuch less strong than that of \u003ci\u003eages\u003c/i\u003e) each of them indifferently\r\ndischarge into either of a large number of other words with which they\r\nhave been at different times combined. But when the processes of \u0027\u003ci\u003eI,\r\nthe heir of all the ages\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 simultaneously vibrate in the brain, the\r\nlast one of them in a maximal, the others in a fading, phase of\r\nexcitement, then the strongest line of discharge will be that which they\r\n\u003ci\u003eall alike\u003c/i\u003e tend to take. \u0027\u003ci\u003eIn\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 and not \u0027\u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 or any other word will\r\nbe the next to awaken, for its brain-process has previously vibrated in\r\nunison not only with that of \u003ci\u003eages\u003c/i\u003e, but with that of all those other\r\nwords whose activity is dying away. It is a good case of the\r\neffectiveness over thought of what we called on \u003ca href=\"#page_168\"\u003ep. 168\u003c/a\u003e a \u0027fringe.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if some one of these preceding words\u0026mdash;\u0027heir,\u0027 for example\u0026mdash;had an\r\nintensely strong association with some brain-tracts entirely disjoined\r\nin experience from the poem of \u0027Locksley Hall\u0027\u0026mdash;if the reciter, for\r\ninstance, were tremulously awaiting the opening of a will which might\r\nmake him a millionaire\u0026mdash;it is probable that the path of discharge\r\nthrough the words of the poem would be suddenly interrupted at the word\r\n\u0027heir.\u0027 His \u003ci\u003eemotional interest in that word\u003c/i\u003e would be such that its\r\n\u003ci\u003eown special associations would prevail\u003c/i\u003e over the combined ones of the\r\nother words. He would, as we say, be abruptly reminded of his personal\r\nsituation, and the poem would lapse altogether from his thoughts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe writer of these pages has every year to learn the names of a large\r\nnumber of students who sit in alphabetical order in a lecture-room. He\r\nfinally learns to call them by name, as they sit in their accustomed\r\nplaces. On meeting one in the street, however, early in the year, the\r\nface hardly ever recalls the name, but it may recall the place of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_259\" id=\"page_259\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{259}\u003c/span\u003e its\r\nowner in the lecture-room, his neighbors\u0027 faces, and consequently his\r\ngeneral alphabetical position: and then, usually as the common associate\r\nof all these combined data, the student\u0027s name surges up in his mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA father wishes to show to some guests the progress of his rather dull\r\nchild in kindergarten-instruction. Holding the knife upright on the\r\ntable, he says, \"What do you call that, my boy?\" \"I calls it a \u003ci\u003eknife\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nI does,\" is the sturdy reply, from which the child cannot be induced to\r\nswerve by any alteration in the form of question, until the father,\r\nrecollecting that in the kindergarten a pencil was used and not a knife,\r\ndraws a long one from his pocket, holds it in the same way, and then\r\ngets the wished-for answer, \"I calls it \u003ci\u003evertical\u003c/i\u003e.\" All the\r\nconcomitants of the kindergarten experience had to recombine their\r\neffect before the word \u0027vertical\u0027 could be reawakened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTotal Recall.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The ideal working of the law of compound association, as\r\nProf. Bain calls it, were it unmodified by any extraneous influence,\r\nwould be such as to keep the mind in a perpetual treadmill of concrete\r\nreminiscences from which no detail could be omitted. Suppose, for\r\nexample, we begin by thinking of a certain dinner-party. The only thing\r\nwhich all the components of the dinner-party could combine to recall\r\nwould be the first concrete occurrence which ensued upon it. All the\r\ndetails of this occurrence could in turn only combine to awaken the next\r\nfollowing occurrence, and so on. If \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e, for\r\ninstance, be the elementary nerve-tracts excited by the last act of the\r\ndinner-party, call this act \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e be those of\r\nwalking home through the frosty night, which we may call \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, then the\r\nthought of \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e must awaken that of \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, because \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwill each and all discharge into \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e through the paths by which their\r\noriginal discharge took place. Similarly they will discharge into \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e; and these latter tracts will also each reinforce the\r\nother\u0027s action because, in the experience \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, they have already\r\nvibrated in unison. The lines in Fig. 57 symbolize the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_260\" id=\"page_260\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{260}\u003c/span\u003e summation of\r\ndischarges into each of the components of \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, and the consequent\r\nstrength of the combination of influences by which \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e in its totality\r\nis awakened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_57\" id=\"ill_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 418px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-260-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-260-sml.png\" width=\"418\" height=\"305\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 57.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHamilton first used the word \u0027redintegration\u0027 to designate all\r\nassociation. Such processes as we have just described might in an\r\nemphatic sense be termed redintegrations, for they would necessarily\r\nlead, if unobstructed, to the reinstatement in thought of the \u003ci\u003eentire\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncontent of large trains of past experience. From this complete\r\nredintegration there could be no escape save through the irruption of\r\nsome new and strong present impression of the senses, or through the\r\nexcessive tendency of some one of the elementary brain-tracts to\r\ndischarge independently into an aberrant quarter of the brain. Such was\r\nthe tendency of the word \u0027heir\u0027 in the verse from \u0027Locksley Hall,\u0027 which\r\nwas our first example. How such tendencies are constituted we shall have\r\nsoon to inquire with some care. Unless they are present, the panorama of\r\nthe past, once opened, must unroll itself with fatal literality to the\r\nend, unless some outward sound, sight, or touch divert the current of\r\nthought.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_261\" id=\"page_261\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{261}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us call this process \u003ci\u003eimpartial redintegration\u003c/i\u003e, or, still better,\r\n\u003ci\u003etotal recall\u003c/i\u003e. Whether it ever occurs in an absolutely complete form is\r\ndoubtful. We all immediately recognize, however, that in some minds\r\nthere is a much greater tendency than in others for the flow of thought\r\nto take this form. Those insufferably garrulous old women, those dry and\r\nfanciless beings who spare you no detail, however petty, of the facts\r\nthey are recounting, and upon the thread of whose narrative all the\r\nirrelevant items cluster as pertinaciously as the essential ones, the\r\nslaves of literal fact, the stumblers over the smallest abrupt step in\r\nthought, are figures known to all of us. Comic literature has made her\r\nprofit out of them. Juliet\u0027s nurse is a classical example. George\r\nEliot\u0027s village characters and some of Dickens\u0027s minor personages supply\r\nexcellent instances.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePerhaps as successful a rendering as any of this mental type is the\r\ncharacter of Miss Bates in Miss Austen\u0027s \u0027Emma.\u0027 Hear how she\r\nredintegrates:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\u0027\u003c/span\u003eBut where could \u003ci\u003eyou\u003c/i\u003e hear it?\u0027 cried Miss Bates. \u0027Where could you\r\npossibly hear it, Mr. Knightley? For it is not five minutes since I\r\nreceived Mrs. Cole\u0027s note\u0026mdash;no, it cannot be more than five\u0026mdash;or at least\r\nten\u0026mdash;for I had got my bonnet and spencer on, just ready to come out\u0026mdash;I\r\nwas only gone down to speak to Patty again about the pork\u0026mdash;Jane was\r\nstanding in the passage\u0026mdash;were not you, Jane?\u0026mdash;for my mother was so\r\nafraid that we had not any salting-pan large enough. So I said I would\r\ngo down and see, and Jane said: \"Shall I go down instead? for I think\r\nyou have a little cold, and Patty has been washing the kitchen.\" \"Oh, my\r\ndear,\" said I\u0026mdash;well, and just then came the note. A Miss Hawkins\u0026mdash;that\u0027s\r\nall I know\u0026mdash;a Miss Hawkins, of Bath. But, Mr. Knightley, how could you\r\npossibly have heard it? for the very moment Mr. Cole told Mrs. Cole of\r\nit, she sat down and wrote to me. A Miss Hawkins\u0026mdash;\u0027\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePartial Recall.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This case helps us to understand why it is that the\r\nordinary spontaneous flow of our ideas does not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_262\" id=\"page_262\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{262}\u003c/span\u003e follow the law of total\r\nrecall. \u003ci\u003eIn no revival of a past experience are all the items of our\r\nthought equally operative in determining what the next thought shall be.\r\nAlways some ingredient is prepotent over the rest.\u003c/i\u003e Its special\r\nsuggestions or associations in this case will often be different from\r\nthose which it has in common with the whole group of items; and its\r\ntendency to awaken these outlying associates will deflect the path of\r\nour revery. Just as in the original sensible experience our attention\r\nfocalized itself upon a few of the impressions of the scene before us,\r\nso here in the reproduction of those impressions an equal partiality is\r\nshown, and some items are emphasized above the rest. What these items\r\nshall be is, in most cases of spontaneous revery, hard to determine\r\nbeforehand. In subjective terms we say that \u003ci\u003ethe prepotent items are\r\nthose which appeal most to our\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eINTEREST\u003c/small\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExpressed in brain-terms, the law of interest will be: \u003ci\u003esome one\r\nbrain-process is always prepotent above its concomitants in arousing\r\naction elsewhere\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Two processes,\" says Mr. Hodgson, \"are constantly going on in\r\nredintegration. The one a process of corrosion, melting, decay; the\r\nother a process of renewing, arising, becoming…. No object of\r\nrepresentation remains long before consciousness in the same state, but\r\nfades, decays, and becomes indistinct. Those parts of the object,\r\nhowever, which possess an interest resist this tendency to gradual decay\r\nof the whole object…. This inequality in the object\u0026mdash;some parts, the\r\nuninteresting, submitting to decay; others, the interesting parts,\r\nresisting it\u0026mdash;when it has continued for a certain time, ends in becoming\r\na new object.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly where the interest is diffused equally over all the parts is this\r\nlaw departed from. It will be least obeyed by those minds which have the\r\nsmallest variety and intensity of interests\u0026mdash;those who, by the general\r\nflatness and poverty of their æsthetic nature, are kept for ever\r\nrotating among the literal sequences of their local and personal\r\nhistory.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_263\" id=\"page_263\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{263}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost of us, however, are better organized than this, and our musings\r\npursue an erratic course, swerving continually into some new direction\r\ntraced by the shifting play of interest as it ever falls on some partial\r\nitem in each complex representation that is evoked. Thus it so often\r\ncomes about that we find ourselves thinking at two nearly adjacent\r\nmoments of things separated by the whole diameter of space and time. Not\r\ntill we carefully recall each step of our cogitation do we see how\r\nnaturally we came by Hodgson\u0027s law to pass from one to the other. Thus,\r\nfor instance, after looking at my clock just now (1879), I found myself\r\nthinking of a recent resolution in the Senate about our legal-tender\r\nnotes. The clock called up the image of the man who had repaired its\r\ngong. He suggested the jeweller\u0027s shop where I had last seen him; that\r\nshop, some shirt-studs which I had bought there; they, the value of gold\r\nand its recent decline; the latter, the equal value of greenbacks, and\r\nthis, naturally, the question of how long they were to last, and of the\r\nBayard proposition. Each of these images offered various points of\r\ninterest. Those which formed the turning-points of my thought are easily\r\nassigned. The gong was momentarily the most interesting part of the\r\nclock, because, from having begun with a beautiful tone, it had become\r\ndiscordant and aroused disappointment. But for this the clock might have\r\nsuggested the friend who gave it to me, or any one of a thousand\r\ncircumstances connected with clocks. The jeweller\u0027s shop suggested the\r\nstuds, because they alone of all its contents were tinged with the\r\negoistic interest of possession. This interest in the studs, their\r\nvalue, made me single out the material as its chief source, etc., to the\r\nend. Every reader who will arrest himself at any moment and say, \"How\r\ncame I to be thinking of just this?\" will be sure to trace a train of\r\nrepresentations linked together by lines of contiguity and points of\r\ninterest inextricably combined. This is the ordinary process of the\r\nassociation of ideas as it spontaneously goes on in average minds. \u003ci\u003eWe\r\nmay call it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_264\" id=\"page_264\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{264}\u003c/span\u003e ordinary, or mixed, association\u003c/i\u003e, or, if we like better,\r\n\u003ci\u003epartial recall\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhich Associates come up, in Partial Recall?\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Can we determine, now,\r\nwhen a certain portion of the going thought has, by dint of its\r\ninterest, become so prepotent as to make its own exclusive associates\r\nthe dominant features of the coming thought\u0026mdash;can we, I say, determine\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e of its own associates shall be evoked? For they are many. As\r\nHodgson says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The interesting parts of the decaying object are free to combine again\r\nwith any objects or parts of objects with which at any time they have\r\nbeen combined before. All the former combinations of these parts may\r\ncome back into consciousness; one must, but which will?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Hodgson replies:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There can be but one answer: that which has been most \u003ci\u003ehabitually\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncombined with them before. This new object begins at once to form itself\r\nin consciousness, and to group its parts round the part still remaining\r\nfrom the former object; part after part comes out and arranges itself in\r\nits old position; but scarcely has the process begun, when the original\r\nlaw of interest begins to operate on this new formation, seizes on the\r\ninteresting parts and impresses them on the attention to the exclusion\r\nof the rest, and the whole process is repeated again with endless\r\nvariety. I venture to propose this as a complete and true account of the\r\nwhole process of redintegration.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn restricting the discharge from the interesting item into that channel\r\nwhich is simply most \u003ci\u003ehabitual\u003c/i\u003e in the sense of most frequent, Hodgson\u0027s\r\naccount is assuredly imperfect. An image by no means always revives its\r\nmost frequent associate, although frequency is certainly one of the most\r\npotent determinants of revival. If I abruptly utter the word \u003ci\u003eswallow\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe reader, if by habit an ornithologist, will think of a bird; if a\r\nphysiologist or a medical specialist in throat-diseases, he will think\r\nof deglutition. If I say \u003ci\u003edate\u003c/i\u003e, he will, if a fruit-merchant or an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_265\" id=\"page_265\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{265}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nArabian traveller, think of the produce of the palm; if an habitual\r\nstudent of history, figures with \u003csmall\u003eA.D.\u003c/small\u003e or \u003csmall\u003eB.C.\u003c/small\u003e before them will rise in\r\nhis mind. If I say \u003ci\u003ebed\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ebath\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003emorning\u003c/i\u003e, his own daily toilet will\r\nbe invincibly suggested by the combined names of three of its habitual\r\nassociates. But frequent lines of transition are often set at naught.\r\nThe sight of a certain book has most frequently awakened in me thoughts\r\nof the opinions therein propounded. The idea of suicide has never been\r\nconnected with the volume. But a moment since, as my eye fell upon it,\r\nsuicide was the thought that flashed into my mind. Why? Because but\r\nyesterday I received a letter informing me that the author\u0027s recent\r\ndeath was an act of self-destruction. Thoughts tend, then, to awaken\r\ntheir most recent as well as their most habitual associates. This is a\r\nmatter of notorious experience, too notorious, in fact, to need\r\nillustration. If we have seen our friend this morning, the mention of\r\nhis name now recalls the circumstances of that interview, rather than\r\nany more remote details concerning him. If Shakespeare\u0027s plays are\r\nmentioned, and we were last night reading \u0027Richard II.,\u0027 vestiges of\r\nthat play rather than of \u0027Hamlet\u0027 or \u0027Othello\u0027 float through our mind.\r\nExcitement of peculiar tracts, or peculiar modes of general excitement\r\nin the brain, leave a sort of tenderness or exalted sensibility behind\r\nthem which takes days to die away. As long as it lasts, those tracts or\r\nthose modes are liable to have their activities awakened by causes which\r\nat other times might leave them in repose. Hence, \u003ci\u003erecency\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nexperience is a prime factor in determining revival in thought.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_36_36\" id=\"FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_36_36\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVividness\u003c/i\u003e in an original experience may also have the same effect as\r\nhabit or recency in bringing about likelihood\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_266\" id=\"page_266\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{266}\u003c/span\u003e of revival. If we have\r\nonce witnessed an execution, any subsequent conversation or reading\r\nabout capital punishment will almost certainly suggest images of that\r\nparticular scene. Thus it is that events lived through only once, and in\r\nyouth, may come in after-years, by reason of their exciting quality or\r\nemotional intensity, to serve as types or instances used by our mind to\r\nillustrate any and every occurring topic whose interest is most remotely\r\npertinent to theirs. If a man in his boyhood once talked with Napoleon,\r\nany mention of great men or historical events, battles or thrones, or\r\nthe whirligig of fortune, or islands in the ocean, will be apt to draw\r\nto his lips the incidents of that one memorable interview. If the word\r\n\u003ci\u003etooth\u003c/i\u003e now suddenly appears on the page before the reader\u0027s eye, there\r\nare fifty chances out of a hundred that, if he gives it time to awaken\r\nany image, it will be an image of some operation of dentistry in which\r\nhe has been the sufferer. Daily he has touched his teeth and masticated\r\nwith them; this very morning he brushed, used, and picked them; but the\r\nrarer and remoter associations arise more promptly because they were so\r\nmuch more intense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA fourth factor in tracing the course of reproduction is \u003ci\u003econgruity in\r\nemotional tone\u003c/i\u003e between the reproduced idea and our mood. The same\r\nobjects do not recall the same associates when we are cheerful as when\r\nwe are melancholy. Nothing, in fact, is more striking than our inability\r\nto keep up trains of joyous imagery when we are depressed in spirits.\r\nStorm, darkness, war, images of disease, poverty, perishing, and dread\r\nafflict unremittingly the imaginations of melancholiacs. And those of\r\nsanguine temperament, when their spirits are high, find it impossible to\r\ngive any permanence to evil forebodings or to gloomy thoughts. In an\r\ninstant the train of association dances off to flowers and sunshine, and\r\nimages of spring and hope. The records of Arctic or African travel\r\nperused in one mood awaken no thoughts but those of horror at the\r\nmalignity of Nature; read at another time they suggest\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_267\" id=\"page_267\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{267}\u003c/span\u003e only\r\nenthusiastic reflections on the indomitable power and pluck of man. Few\r\nnovels so overflow with joyous animal spirits as \u0027The Three Guardsmen\u0027\r\nof Dumas. Yet it may awaken in the mind of a reader depressed with\r\nsea-sickness (as the writer can personally testify) a most woful\r\nconsciousness of the cruelty and carnage of which heroes like Athos,\r\nPorthos, and Aramis make themselves guilty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eHabit, recency, vividness, and emotional congruity\u003c/i\u003e are, then, all\r\nreasons why one representation rather than another should be awakened by\r\nthe interesting portion of a departing thought. We may say with truth\r\nthat \u003ci\u003ein the majority of cases the coming representation will have been\r\neither habitual, recent, or vivid, and will be congruous\u003c/i\u003e. If all these\r\nqualities unite in any one absent associate, we may predict almost\r\ninfallibly that that associate of the going object will form an\r\nimportant ingredient in the object which comes next. In spite of the\r\nfact, however, that the succession of representations is thus redeemed\r\nfrom perfect indeterminism and limited to a few classes whose\r\ncharacteristic quality is fixed by the nature of our past experience, it\r\nmust still be confessed that an immense number of terms in the linked\r\nchain of our representations fall outside of all assignable rule. To\r\ntake the instance of the clock given on \u003ca href=\"#page_263\"\u003epage 263\u003c/a\u003e. Why did the jeweller\u0027s\r\nshop suggest the shirt-studs rather than a chain which I had bought\r\nthere more recently, which had cost more, and whose sentimental\r\nassociations were much more interesting? Any reader\u0027s experience will\r\neasily furnish similar instances. So we must admit that to a certain\r\nextent, even in those forms of ordinary mixed association which lie\r\nnearest to impartial redintegration, \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e associate of the\r\ninteresting item shall emerge must be called largely a matter of\r\naccident\u0026mdash;accident, that is, for our intelligence. No doubt it is\r\ndetermined by cerebral causes, but they are too subtile and shifting for\r\nour analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFocalized Recall, or Association by Similarity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In partial or mixed\r\nassociation we have all along supposed the interesting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_268\" id=\"page_268\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{268}\u003c/span\u003e portion of the\r\ndisappearing thought to be of considerable extent, and to be\r\nsufficiently complex to constitute by itself a concrete object. Sir\r\nWilliam Hamilton relates, for instance, that after thinking of Ben\r\nLomond he found himself thinking of the Prussian system of education,\r\nand discovered that the links of association were a German gentleman\r\nwhom he had met on Ben Lomond, Germany, etc. The interesting part of Ben\r\nLomond as he had experienced it, the part operative in determining the\r\ntrain of his ideas, was the complex image of a particular man. But now\r\nlet us suppose that the interested attention refines itself still\r\nfurther and accentuates a portion of the passing object, so small as to\r\nbe no longer the image of a concrete thing, but only of an abstract\r\nquality or property. Let us moreover suppose that the part thus\r\naccentuated persists in consciousness (or, in cerebral terms, has its\r\nbrain-process continue) after the other portions of the object have\r\nfaded. \u003ci\u003eThis small surviving portion will then surround itself with its\r\nown associates\u003c/i\u003e after the fashion we have already seen, and the relation\r\nbetween the new thought\u0027s object and the object of the faded thought\r\nwill be a \u003ci\u003erelation of similarity\u003c/i\u003e. The pair of thoughts will form an\r\ninstance of what is called \u0027\u003ci\u003eassociation by similarity\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe similars which are here associated, or of which the first is\r\nfollowed by the second in the mind, are seen to be \u003ci\u003ecompounds\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nExperience proves that this is always the case. \u003ci\u003eThere is no tendency on\r\nthe part of\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eSIMPLE\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003e\u0027ideas,\u0027 attributes, or qualities to remind us of\r\ntheir like\u003c/i\u003e. The thought of one shade of blue does not summon up that of\r\nanother shade of blue, etc., unless indeed we have in mind some general\r\npurpose of nomenclature or comparison which requires a review of several\r\nblue tints.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow two compound things are similar when some one quality or group of\r\nqualities is shared alike by both, although as regards their other\r\nqualities they may have nothing in common. The moon is similar to a\r\ngas-jet, it is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_269\" id=\"page_269\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{269}\u003c/span\u003e also similar to a foot-ball; but a gas-jet and a\r\nfoot-ball are not similar to each other. When we affirm the similarity\r\nof two compound things, we should always say \u003ci\u003ein what respect it\r\nobtains\u003c/i\u003e. Moon and gas-jet are similar in respect of luminosity, and\r\nnothing else; moon and foot-ball in respect of rotundity, and nothing\r\nelse. Foot-ball and gas-jet are in no respect similar\u0026mdash;that is, they\r\npossess no common point, no identical attribute. \u003ci\u003eSimilarity, in\r\ncompounds, is partial identity.\u003c/i\u003e When the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e attribute appears in\r\ntwo phenomena, though it be their only common property, the two\r\nphenomena are similar in so far forth. To return now to our associated\r\nrepresentations. If the thought of the moon is succeeded by the thought\r\nof a foot-ball, and that by the thought of one of Mr. X\u0027s railroads, it\r\nis because the attribute rotundity in the moon broke away from all the\r\nrest and surrounded itself with an entirely new set of\r\ncompanions\u0026mdash;elasticity, leathery integument, swift mobility in obedience\r\nto human caprice, etc.; and because the last-named attribute in the\r\nfoot-ball in turn broke away from its companions, and, itself\r\npersisting, surrounded itself with such new attributes as make up the\r\nnotions of a \u0027railroad king,\u0027 of a rising and falling stock-market, and\r\nthe like.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_58\" id=\"ill_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 326px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-269-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-269-sml.png\" width=\"326\" height=\"154\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 58.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe gradual passage from total to focalized, through what we have called\r\nordinary partial, recall may be symbolized by diagrams. Fig. 58 is\r\ntotal, Fig. 59 is partial, and Fig. 60 focalized, recall. \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e in each is\r\nthe passing,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_270\" id=\"page_270\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{270}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e the coming, thought. In \u0027total recall,\u0027 all parts of\r\n\u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e are equally operative in calling up \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e. In \u0027partial recall,\u0027 most\r\nparts of \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e are inert. The part \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e alone breaks out and awakens \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIn similar association or \u0027focalized recall,\u0027 the part \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e is much\r\nsmaller than in the previous case, and after awakening its new set of\r\nassociates, instead of fading out itself, it continues persistently\r\nactive along with them, forming an identical part in the two ideas, and\r\nmaking these, \u003ci\u003epro tanto\u003c/i\u003e, resemble each other.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_37_37\" id=\"FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_37_37\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_59\" id=\"ill_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 348px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-270a-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-270a-sml.png\" width=\"348\" height=\"158\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 59.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_60\" id=\"ill_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 279px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-270b-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-270b-sml.png\" width=\"279\" height=\"149\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 60.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy a single portion of the passing thought should break out from its\r\nconcert with the rest and act, as we say, on its own hook, why the other\r\nparts should become inert, are mysteries which we can ascertain but not\r\nexplain.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_271\" id=\"page_271\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{271}\u003c/span\u003e Possibly a minuter insight into the laws of neural action will\r\nsome day clear the matter up; possibly neural laws will not suffice, and\r\nwe shall need to invoke a dynamic reaction of the consciousness itself.\r\nBut into this we cannot enter now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVoluntary Trains of Thought.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Hitherto we have assumed the process of\r\nsuggestion of one object by another to be spontaneous. The train of\r\nimagery wanders at its own sweet will, now trudging in sober grooves of\r\nhabit, now with a hop, skip, and jump, darting across the whole field of\r\ntime and space. This is revery, or musing; but great segments of the\r\nflux of our ideas consist of something very different from this. They\r\nare guided by a distinct purpose or conscious interest; and the course\r\nof our ideas is then called \u003ci\u003evoluntary\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhysiologically considered, we must suppose that a purpose means the\r\npersistent activity of certain rather definite brain-processes\r\nthroughout the whole course of thought. Our most usual cogitations are\r\nnot pure reveries, absolute driftings, but revolve about some central\r\ninterest or topic to which most of the images are relevant, and towards\r\nwhich we return promptly after occasional digressions.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_272\" id=\"page_272\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{272}\u003c/span\u003e This interest is\r\nsubserved by the persistently active brain-tracts we have supposed. In\r\nthe mixed associations which we have hitherto studied, the parts of each\r\nobject which form the pivots on which our thoughts successively turn\r\nhave their interest largely determined by their connection with some\r\n\u003ci\u003egeneral interest\u003c/i\u003e which for the time has seized upon the mind. If we\r\ncall \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e the brain-tract of general interest, then, if the object \u003ci\u003eabc\u003c/i\u003e\r\nturns up, and \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e has more associations with \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e than have either \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e or\r\n\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e will become the object\u0027s interesting, pivotal portion, and will\r\ncall up its own associates exclusively. For the energy of \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s\r\nbrain-tract will be augmented by \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s activity,\u0026mdash;an activity which,\r\nfrom lack of previous connection between \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ndoes not influence \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e. If, for instance, I think of Paris whilst\r\nI am \u003ci\u003ehungry\u003c/i\u003e, I shall not improbably find that its \u003ci\u003erestaurants\u003c/i\u003e have\r\nbecome the pivot of my thought, etc., etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblems.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But in the theoretic as well as in the practical life there\r\nare interests of a more acute sort, taking the form of definite images\r\nof some achievement which we desire to effect. The train of ideas\r\narising under the influence of such an interest constitutes usually the\r\nthought of the \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e by which the end shall be attained. If the end by\r\nits simple presence does not instantaneously suggest the means, the\r\nsearch for the latter becomes a \u003ci\u003eproblem\u003c/i\u003e; and the discovery of the\r\nmeans forms a new sort of end, of an entirely peculiar nature\u0026mdash;an end,\r\nnamely, which we intensely desire before we have attained it, but of the\r\nnature of which, even whilst most strongly craving it, we have no\r\ndistinct imagination whatever (compare pp. \u003ca href=\"#page_241\"\u003e241-2\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same thing occurs whenever we seek to recall something forgotten, or\r\nto state the reason for a judgment which we have made intuitively. The\r\ndesire strains and presses in a direction which it feels to be right,\r\nbut towards a point which it is unable to see. In short, the \u003ci\u003eabsence of\r\nan item\u003c/i\u003e is a determinant of our representations quite as positive as\r\nits presence can ever be. The gap becomes no\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_273\" id=\"page_273\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{273}\u003c/span\u003e mere void, but what is\r\ncalled an \u003ci\u003eaching\u003c/i\u003e void. If we try to explain in terms of brain-action\r\nhow a thought which only potentially exists can yet be effective, we\r\nseem driven to believe that the brain-tract thereof must actually be\r\nexcited, but only in a minimal and sub-conscious way. Try, for instance,\r\nto symbolize what goes on in a man who is racking his brains to remember\r\na thought which occurred to him last week. The associates of the thought\r\nare there, many of them at least, but they refuse to awaken the thought\r\nitself. We cannot suppose that they do not irradiate \u003ci\u003eat all\u003c/i\u003e into its\r\nbrain-tract, because his mind quivers on the very edge of its recovery.\r\nIts actual rhythm sounds in his ears; the words seem on the imminent\r\npoint of following, but fail (see \u003ca href=\"#page_165\"\u003ep. 165\u003c/a\u003e). Now the only difference\r\nbetween the effort to recall things forgotten and the search after the\r\nmeans to a given end is that the latter have not, whilst the former\r\nhave, already formed a part of our experience. If we first study \u003ci\u003ethe\r\nmode of recalling a thing forgotten\u003c/i\u003e, we can take up with better\r\nunderstanding the voluntary quest of the unknown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTheir Solution.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The forgotten thing is felt by us as a gap in the midst\r\nof certain other things. We possess a dim idea of where we were and what\r\nwe were about when it last occurred to us. We recollect the general\r\nsubject to which it pertains. But all these details refuse to shoot\r\ntogether into a solid whole, for the lack of the missing thing, so we\r\nkeep running over them in our mind, dissatisfied, craving something\r\nmore. From each detail there radiate lines of association forming so\r\nmany tentative guesses. Many of these are immediately seen to be\r\nirrelevant, are therefore void of interest, and lapse immediately from\r\nconsciousness. Others are associated with the other details present, and\r\nwith the missing thought as well. When \u003ci\u003ethese\u003c/i\u003e surge up, we have a\r\npeculiar feeling that we are \u0027warm,\u0027 as the children say when they play\r\nhide and seek; and such associates as these we clutch at and keep before\r\nthe attention. Thus we recollect successively that when we last were\r\nconsidering the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_274\" id=\"page_274\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{274}\u003c/span\u003e matter in question we were at the dinner-table; then\r\nthat our friend J. D. was there; then that the subject talked about was\r\nso and so; finally, that the thought came \u003ci\u003eà propos\u003c/i\u003e of a certain\r\nanecdote, and then that it had something to do with a French quotation.\r\nNow all these added associates \u003ci\u003earise independently of the will\u003c/i\u003e, by the\r\nspontaneous processes we know so well. \u003ci\u003eAll that the will does is to\r\nemphasize and linger over those which seem pertinent, and ignore the\r\nrest.\u003c/i\u003e Through this hovering of the attention in the neighborhood of the\r\ndesired object, the accumulation of associates becomes so great that the\r\ncombined tensions of their neural processes break through the bar, and\r\nthe nervous wave pours into the tract which has so long been awaiting\r\nits advent. And as the expectant, sub-conscious itching, so to speak,\r\nbursts into the fulness of vivid feeling, the mind finds an\r\ninexpressible relief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_61\" id=\"ill_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 211px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-274-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-274-sml.png\" width=\"211\" height=\"229\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 61.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe whole process can be rudely symbolized in a diagram. Call the\r\nforgotten thing \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e, the first facts with which we felt it was related\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, and the details finally operative in calling it up\r\n\u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e. Each circle will then stand for the brain-process\r\nprincipally concerned in the thought of the fact lettered within it. The\r\nactivity in \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e will at first be a mere tension; but as the activities\r\nin \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e little by little irradiate into \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_275\" id=\"page_275\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{275}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e these processes are somehow connected with \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e, their\r\ncombined irradiations upon \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e, represented by the centripetal arrows,\r\nsucceed in rousing \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e also to full activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTurn now to the case of finding the unknown means to a distinctly\r\nconceived end.\u003c/i\u003e The end here stands in the place of \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nthe diagram. It is the starting-point of the irradiations of suggestion;\r\nand here, as in that case, what the voluntary attention does is only to\r\ndismiss some of the suggestions as irrelevant, and hold fast to others\r\nwhich are felt to be more pertinent\u0026mdash;let these be symbolized by \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e. These latter at last accumulate sufficiently to discharge all\r\ntogether into \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e, the excitement of which process is, in the mental\r\nsphere, equivalent to the solution of our problem. The only difference\r\nbetween this and the previous case is that in this one there need be no\r\noriginal sub-excitement in \u003ci\u003eZ\u003c/i\u003e, coöperating from the very first. In the\r\nsolving of a problem, all that we are aware of in advance seems to be\r\nits \u003ci\u003erelations\u003c/i\u003e. It must be a cause, or it must be an effect, or it must\r\ncontain an attribute, or it must be a means, or what not. We know, in\r\nshort, a lot \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it, whilst as yet we have no \u003ci\u003eacquaintance\u003c/i\u003e with\r\nit. Our perception that one of the objects which turn up is, at last,\r\nour \u003ci\u003equæsitum\u003c/i\u003e, is due to our recognition that its relations are\r\nidentical with those we had in mind, and this may be a rather slow act\r\nof judgment. Every one knows that an object may be for some time present\r\nto his mind before its relations to other matters are perceived. Just so\r\nthe relations may be there before the object is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the guessing of newspaper enigmas to the plotting of the policy of\r\nan empire there is no other process than this. We must trust to the laws\r\nof cerebral nature to present us spontaneously with the appropriate\r\nidea, but we must know it for the right one when it comes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is foreign to my purpose here to enter into any detailed analysis of\r\nthe different classes of mental pursuit. In a scientific research we get\r\nperhaps as rich an example as can be found. The inquirer starts with a\r\nfact of which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_276\" id=\"page_276\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{276}\u003c/span\u003e he seeks the reason, or with an hypothesis of which he\r\nseeks the proof. In either case he keeps turning the matter incessantly\r\nin his mind until, by the arousal of associate upon associate, some\r\nhabitual, some similar, one arises which he recognizes to suit his need.\r\nThis, however, may take years. No rules can be given by which the\r\ninvestigator may proceed straight to his result; but both here and in\r\nthe case of reminiscence the accumulation of helps in the way of\r\nassociations may advance more rapidly by the use of certain routine\r\nmethods. In striving to recall a thought, for example, we may of set\r\npurpose run through the successive classes of circumstance with which it\r\nmay possibly have been connected, trusting that when the right member of\r\nthe class has turned up it will help the thought\u0027s revival. Thus we may\r\nrun through all the \u003ci\u003eplaces\u003c/i\u003e in which we may have had it. We may run\r\nthrough the \u003ci\u003epersons\u003c/i\u003e whom we remember to have conversed with, or we may\r\ncall up successively all the \u003ci\u003ebooks\u003c/i\u003e we have lately been reading. If we\r\nare trying to remember a person we may run through a list of streets or\r\nof professions. Some item out of the lists thus methodically gone over\r\nwill very likely be associated with the fact we are in need of, and may\r\nsuggest it or help to do so. And yet the item might never have arisen\r\nwithout such systematic procedure. In scientific research this\r\naccumulation of associates has been methodized by Mill under the title\r\nof \u0027The Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry.\u0027 By the \u0027method of\r\nagreement,\u0027 by that of \u0027difference,\u0027 by those of \u0027residues\u0027 and\r\n\u0027concomitant variations\u0027 (which cannot here be more nearly defined), we\r\nmake certain lists of cases; and by ruminating these lists in our minds\r\nthe cause we seek will be more likely to emerge. But the final stroke of\r\ndiscovery is only prepared, not effected, by them. The brain-tracts\r\nmust, of their own accord, shoot the right way at last, or we shall\r\nstill grope in darkness. That in some brains the tracts \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e shoot the\r\nright way much oftener than in others, and that we cannot tell\r\nwhy,\u0026mdash;these are ultimate facts to which we must never\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_277\" id=\"page_277\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{277}\u003c/span\u003e close our eyes.\r\nEven in forming our lists of instances according to Mill\u0027s methods, we\r\nare at the mercy of the spontaneous workings of Similarity in our brain.\r\nHow are a number of facts, resembling the one whose cause we seek, to be\r\nbrought together in a list unless one will rapidly suggest another\r\nthrough association by similarity?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSimilarity no Elementary Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such is the analysis I propose, first of\r\nthe three main types of spontaneous, and then of voluntary, trains of\r\nthought. It will be observed that the \u003ci\u003eobject called up may bear any\r\nlogical relation whatever to the one which suggested it\u003c/i\u003e. The law\r\nrequires only that one condition should be fulfilled. The fading object\r\nmust be due to a brain-process some of whose elements awaken through\r\nhabit some of the elements of the brain-process of the object which\r\ncomes to view. This awakening is the causal agency in the kind of\r\nassociation called Similarity, as in any other sort. The similarity\r\n\u003ci\u003eitself\u003c/i\u003e between the objects has no causal agency in carrying us from\r\none to the other. It is but a result\u0026mdash;the effect of the usual causal\r\nagent when this happens to work in a certain way. Ordinary writers talk\r\nas if the similarity of the objects were itself an agent, coördinate\r\nwith habit, and independent of it, and like it able to push objects\r\nbefore the mind. This is quite unintelligible. The similarity of two\r\nthings does not exist till both things are there\u0026mdash;it is meaningless to\r\ntalk of it as an \u003ci\u003eagent of production\u003c/i\u003e of anything, whether in the\r\nphysical or the psychical realms. It is a relation which the mind\r\nperceives after the fact, just as it may perceive the relations of\r\nsuperiority, of distance, of causality, of container and content, of\r\nsubstance and accident, or of contrast, between an object and some\r\nsecond object which the associative machinery calls up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConclusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To sum up, then, we see that \u003ci\u003ethe difference between the\r\nthree kinds of association reduces itself to a simple difference in the\r\namount of that portion of the nerve-tract supporting the going thought\r\nwhich is operative in calling up the thought which comes\u003c/i\u003e. But the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_278\" id=\"page_278\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{278}\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of this active part is the same, be it large or be it\r\nsmall. The items constituting the coming object waken in every instance\r\nbecause their nerve-tracts once were excited continuously with those of\r\nthe going object or its operative part. This ultimate physiological law\r\nof habit among the neural elements is what \u003ci\u003eruns\u003c/i\u003e the train. The\r\ndirection of its course and the form of its transitions are due to the\r\nunknown conditions by which in some brains action tends to focalize\r\nitself in small spots, while in others it fills patiently its broad bed.\r\nWhat these differing conditions are, it seems impossible to guess.\r\nWhatever they are, they are what separate the man of genius from the\r\nprosaic creature of habit and routine thinking. In the chapter on\r\nReasoning we shall need to recur again to this point. I trust that the\r\nstudent will now feel that the way to a deeper understanding of the\r\norder of our ideas lies in the direction of cerebral physiology. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eelementary\u003c/i\u003e process of revival can be nothing but the law of habit.\r\nTruly the day is distant when physiologists shall actually trace from\r\ncell-group to cell-group the irradiations which we have hypothetically\r\ninvoked. Probably it will never arrive. The schematism we have used is,\r\nmoreover, taken immediately from the analysis of objects into their\r\nelementary parts, and only extended by analogy to the brain. And yet it\r\nis only as incorporated in the brain that such a schematism can\r\nrepresent anything \u003ci\u003ecausal\u003c/i\u003e. This is, to my mind, the conclusive reason\r\nfor saying that the order of \u003ci\u003epresentation of the mind\u0027s materials\u003c/i\u003e is\r\ndue to cerebral physiology alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe law of accidental prepotency of certain processes over others falls\r\nalso within the sphere of cerebral probabilities. Granting such\r\ninstability as the brain-tissue requires, certain points must always\r\ndischarge more quickly and strongly than others; and this prepotency\r\nwould shift its place from moment to moment by accidental causes, giving\r\nus a perfect mechanical diagram of the capricious\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_279\" id=\"page_279\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{279}\u003c/span\u003e play of similar\r\nassociation in the most gifted mind. A study of dreams confirms this\r\nview. The usual abundance of paths of irradiation seems, in the dormant\r\nbrain, reduced. A few only are pervious, and the most fantastic\r\nsequences occur because the currents run\u0026mdash;\u0027like sparks in burnt-up\r\npaper\u0027\u0026mdash;wherever the nutrition of the moment creates an opening, but\r\nnowhere else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eeffects of interested attention and volition\u003c/i\u003e remain. These\r\nactivities seem to hold fast to certain elements and, by emphasizing\r\nthem and dwelling on them, to make their associates the only ones which\r\nare evoked. \u003ci\u003eThis\u003c/i\u003e is the point at which an anti-mechanical psychology\r\nmust, if anywhere, make its stand in dealing with association.\r\nEverything else is pretty certainly due to cerebral laws. My own opinion\r\non the question of active attention and spiritual spontaneity is\r\nexpressed elsewhere (see \u003ca href=\"#page_237\"\u003ep. 237\u003c/a\u003e). But even though there be a mental\r\nspontaneity, it can certainly not create ideas or summon them \u003ci\u003eex\r\nabrupto\u003c/i\u003e. Its power is limited to \u003ci\u003eselecting\u003c/i\u003e amongst those which the\r\nassociative machinery introduces. If it can emphasize, reinforce, or\r\nprotract for half a second either one of these, it can do all that the\r\nmost eager advocate of free will need demand; for it then decides the\r\ndirection of the \u003ci\u003enext\u003c/i\u003e associations by making them hinge upon the\r\nemphasized term; and determining in this wise the course of the man\u0027s\r\nthinking, it also determines his acts.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_280\" id=\"page_280\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{280}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XVII\" id=\"CHAPTER_XVII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XVII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE SENSE OF TIME.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe sensible present has duration.\u003c/b\u003e Let any one try, I will not say to\r\narrest, but to notice or attend to, the \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e moment of time. One of\r\nthe most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has\r\nmelted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of\r\nbecoming. As a poet, quoted by Mr. Hodgson, says,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003e\"Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,\"\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eand it is only as entering into the living and moving organization of a\r\nmuch wider tract of time that the strict present is apprehended at all.\r\nIt is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized\r\nin sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed to\r\nphilosophic meditation. Reflection leads us to the conclusion that it\r\n\u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e exist, but that it \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e exist can never be a fact of our\r\nimmediate experience. The only fact of our immediate experience is what\r\nhas been well called \u0027the specious\u0027 present, a sort of saddle-back of\r\ntime with a certain length of its own, on which we sit perched, and from\r\nwhich we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of\r\nour perception of time is a \u003ci\u003eduration\u003c/i\u003e, with a bow and a stern, as it\r\nwere\u0026mdash;a rearward-and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this\r\n\u003ci\u003eduration-block\u003c/i\u003e that the relation of \u003ci\u003esuccession\u003c/i\u003e of one end to the\r\nother is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other\r\nafter it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of\r\ntime between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with\r\nits two ends embedded in it. The experience is from the outset a\r\nsynthetic datum, not a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_281\" id=\"page_281\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{281}\u003c/span\u003e simple one; and to sensible perception its\r\nelements are inseparable, although attention looking back may easily\r\ndecompose the experience, and distinguish its beginning from its end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moment we pass beyond a very few seconds our consciousness of\r\nduration ceases to be an immediate perception and becomes a construction\r\nmore or less symbolic. To realize even an hour, we must count \u0027now! now!\r\nnow! now!\u0027 indefinitely. Each \u0027now\u0027 is the feeling of a separate \u003ci\u003ebit\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof time, and the exact sum of the bits never makes a clear impression on\r\nour mind. The \u003ci\u003elongest bit of duration\u003c/i\u003e which we can apprehend at once\r\nso as to discriminate it from longer and shorter bits of time would seem\r\n(from experiments made for another purpose in Wundt\u0027s laboratory) to be\r\nabout 12 seconds. \u003ci\u003eThe shortest interval\u003c/i\u003e which we can feel as time at\r\nall would seem to be \u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e/\u003csub\u003e500\u003c/sub\u003e of a second. That is, Exner recognized two\r\nelectric sparks to be successive when the second followed the first at\r\nthat interval.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWe have no sense for empty time.\u003c/b\u003e Let one sit with closed eyes and,\r\nabstracting entirely from the outer world, attend exclusively to the\r\npassage of time, like one who wakes, as the poet says, \"to hear time\r\nflowing in the middle of the night, and all things moving to a day of\r\ndoom.\" There seems under such circumstances as these no variety in the\r\nmaterial content of our thought, and what we notice appears, if\r\nanything, to be the pure series of durations budding, as it were, and\r\ngrowing beneath our indrawn gaze. Is this really so or not? The question\r\nis important; for, if the experience be what it roughly seems, we have a\r\nsort of special sense for pure time\u0026mdash;a sense to which empty duration is\r\nan adequate stimulus; while if it be an illusion, it must be that our\r\nperception of time\u0027s flight, in the experiences quoted, is due to the\r\n\u003ci\u003efilling\u003c/i\u003e of the time, and to our \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e of a content which it had a\r\nmoment previous, and which we feel to agree or disagree with its content\r\nnow.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_282\" id=\"page_282\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{282}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt takes but a small exertion of introspection to show that the latter\r\nalternative is the true one, and that \u003ci\u003ewe can no more perceive a\r\nduration than we can perceive an extension, devoid of all sensible\r\ncontent\u003c/i\u003e. Just as with closed eyes we see a dark visual field in which a\r\ncurdling play of obscurest luminosity is always going on; so, be we\r\nnever so abstracted from distinct outward impressions, we are always\r\ninwardly immersed in what Wundt has somewhere called the twilight of our\r\ngeneral consciousness. Our heart-beats, our breathing, the pulses of our\r\nattention, fragments of words or sentences that pass through our\r\nimagination, are what people this dim habitat. Now, all these processes\r\nare rhythmical, and are apprehended by us, as they occur, in their\r\ntotality; the breathing and pulses of attention, as coherent\r\nsuccessions, each with its rise and fall; the heart-beats similarly,\r\nonly relatively far more brief; the words not separately, but in\r\nconnected groups. In short, empty our minds as we may, some form of\r\n\u003ci\u003echanging process\u003c/i\u003e remains for us to feel, and cannot be expelled. And\r\nalong with the sense of the process and its rhythm goes the sense of the\r\nlength of time it lasts. Awareness of \u003ci\u003echange\u003c/i\u003e is thus the condition on\r\nwhich our perception of time\u0027s flow depends; but there exists no reason\r\nto suppose that empty time\u0027s own changes are sufficient for the\r\nawareness of change to be aroused. The change must be of some concrete\r\nsort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAppreciation of Longer Durations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the experience of watching empty\r\ntime flow\u0026mdash;\u0027empty\u0027 to be taken hereafter in the relative sense just set\r\nforth\u0026mdash;we tell it off in pulses. We say \u0027now! now! now!\u0027 or we count\r\n\u0027more! more! more!\u0027 as we feel it bud. This composition out of units of\r\nduration is called the law of time\u0027s \u003ci\u003ediscrete flow\u003c/i\u003e. The discreteness\r\nis, however, merely due to the fact that our successive acts of\r\n\u003ci\u003erecognition\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eapperception\u003c/i\u003e of \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e it is are discrete. The\r\nsensation is as continuous as any sensation can be. All continuous\r\nsensations are \u003ci\u003enamed\u003c/i\u003e in beats. We notice that a certain finite \u0027more\u0027\r\nof them is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_283\" id=\"page_283\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{283}\u003c/span\u003e passing or already past. To adopt Hodgson\u0027s image, the\r\nsensation is the measuring-tape, the perception the dividing-engine\r\nwhich stamps its length. As we listen to a steady sound, we \u003ci\u003etake it in\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin discrete pulses of recognition, calling it successively \u0027the same!\r\nthe same! the same!\u0027 The case stands no otherwise with time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter a small number of beats our impression of the amount we have told\r\noff becomes quite vague. Our only way of knowing it accurately is by\r\ncounting, or noticing the clock, or through some other symbolic\r\nconception. When the times exceed hours or days, the conception is\r\nabsolutely symbolic. We think of the amount we mean either solely as a\r\n\u003ci\u003ename\u003c/i\u003e, or by running over a few salient \u003ci\u003edates\u003c/i\u003e therein, with no\r\npretence of imagining the full durations that lie between them. No one\r\nhas anything like a \u003ci\u003eperception\u003c/i\u003e of the greater length of the time\r\nbetween now and the first century than of that between now and the\r\ntenth. To an historian, it is true, the longer interval will suggest a\r\nhost of additional dates and events, and so appear a more\r\n\u003ci\u003emultitudinous\u003c/i\u003e thing. And for the same reason most people will think\r\nthey directly perceive the length of the past fortnight to exceed that\r\nof the past week. But there is properly no comparative time-\u003ci\u003eintuition\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin these cases at all. It is but dates and events representing time,\r\ntheir abundance symbolizing its length. I am sure that this is so, even\r\nwhere the times compared are no more than an hour or so in length. It is\r\nthe same with spaces of many miles, which we always compare with each\r\nother by the numbers that measure them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this we pass naturally to speak of certain familiar variations in\r\nour estimation of lengths of time. \u003ci\u003eIn general, a time filled with\r\nvaried and interesting experiences seems short in passing, but long as\r\nwe look back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences\r\nseems long in passing, but in retrospect short.\u003c/i\u003e A week of travel and\r\nsight-seeing may subtend an angle more like three weeks in the memory;\r\nand a month of sickness yields hardly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_284\" id=\"page_284\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{284}\u003c/span\u003e more memories than a day. The\r\nlength in retrospect depends obviously on the multitudinousness of the\r\nmemories which the time affords. Many objects, events, changes, many\r\nsubdivisions, immediately widen the view as we look back. Emptiness,\r\nmonotony, familiarity, make it shrivel up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe same space of time seems shorter as we grow older\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;that is, the\r\ndays, the months, and the years do so; whether the hours do so is\r\ndoubtful, and the minutes and seconds to all appearance remain about the\r\nsame. An old man probably does not \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e his past life to be any longer\r\nthan he did when he was a boy, though it may be a dozen times as long.\r\nIn most men all the events of manhood\u0027s years are of such familiar\r\n\u003ci\u003esorts\u003c/i\u003e that the individual impressions do not last. At the same time\r\nmore and more of the earlier events get forgotten, the result being that\r\nno greater multitude of distinct objects remains in the memory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the apparent shortening of tracts of time in \u003ci\u003eretrospect\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThey shorten \u003ci\u003ein passing\u003c/i\u003e whenever we are so fully occupied with their\r\ncontent as not to note the actual time itself. A day full of excitement,\r\nwith no pause, is said to pass \u0027ere we know it.\u0027 On the contrary, a day\r\nfull of waiting, of unsatisfied desire for change, will seem a small\r\neternity. \u003ci\u003eTædium\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eennui\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLangweile\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eboredom\u003c/i\u003e, are words for\r\nwhich, probably, every language known to man has its equivalent. It\r\ncomes about whenever, from the relative emptiness of content of a tract\r\nof time, we grow attentive to the passage of the time itself. Expecting,\r\nand being ready for, a new impression to succeed; when it fails to come,\r\nwe get an empty time instead of it; and such experiences, ceaselessly\r\nrenewed, make us most formidably aware of the extent of the mere time\r\nitself. Close your eyes and simply wait to hear somebody tell you that a\r\nminute has elapsed, and the full length of your leisure with it seems\r\nincredible. You engulf yourself into its bowels as into those of that\r\ninterminable first week of an ocean voyage, and find yourself wondering\r\nthat history can have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_285\" id=\"page_285\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{285}\u003c/span\u003e overcome many such periods in its course. All\r\nbecause you attend so closely to the mere feeling of the time \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand because your attention to that is susceptible of such fine-grained\r\nsuccessive subdivision. The \u003ci\u003eodiousness\u003c/i\u003e of the whole experience comes\r\nfrom its insipidity; for \u003ci\u003estimulation\u003c/i\u003e is the indispensable requisite\r\nfor pleasure in an experience, and the feeling of bare time is the least\r\nstimulating experience we can have. The sensation of tedium is a\r\n\u003ci\u003eprotest\u003c/i\u003e, says Volkmann, against the entire present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe feeling of past time is a present feeling.\u003c/b\u003e In reflecting on the\r\n\u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of our consciousness of time, we are at first tempted\r\nto suppose it the easiest thing in the world to understand. Our inner\r\nstates succeed each other. They know themselves as they are; then of\r\ncourse, we say, they must know their own succession. But this philosophy\r\nis too crude; for between the mind\u0027s own changes \u003ci\u003ebeing\u003c/i\u003e successive, and\r\n\u003ci\u003eknowing their own succession\u003c/i\u003e, lies as broad a chasm as between the\r\nobject and subject of any case of cognition in the world. \u003ci\u003eA succession\r\nof feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And\r\nsince, to our successive feelings, a feeling of their succession is\r\nadded, that must be treated as an additional fact requiring its own\r\nspecial elucidation\u003c/i\u003e, which this talk about the feelings knowing their\r\ntime-relations as a matter of course leaves all untouched.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we represent the actual time-stream of our thinking by an horizontal\r\nline, the thought \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e the stream or of any segment of its length, past,\r\npresent, or to come, might be figured in a perpendicular raised upon the\r\nhorizontal at a certain point. The length of this perpendicular stands\r\nfor a certain object or content, which in this case is the time thought\r\nof at the actual moment of the stream upon which the perpendicular is\r\nraised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is thus a sort of \u003ci\u003eperspective projection\u003c/i\u003e of past objects upon\r\npresent consciousness, similar to that of wide landscapes upon a\r\ncamera-screen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd since we saw a while ago that our maximum distinct\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_286\" id=\"page_286\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{286}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eperception\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nduration hardly covers more than a dozen seconds (while our maximum\r\nvague perception is probably not more than that of a minute or so), we\r\nmust suppose that \u003ci\u003ethis amount of duration is pictured fairly steadily\r\nin each passing instant of consciousness\u003c/i\u003e by virtue of some fairly\r\nconstant feature in the brain-process to which the consciousness is\r\ntied. \u003ci\u003eThis feature of the brain-process, whatever it be, must be the\r\ncause of our perceiving the fact of time at all.\u003c/i\u003e The duration thus\r\nsteadily perceived is hardly more than the \u0027specious present,\u0027 as it was\r\ncalled a few pages back. Its \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e is in a constant flux, events\r\ndawning into its forward end as fast as they fade out of its rearward\r\none, and each of them changing its time-coefficient from \u0027not yet,\u0027 or\r\n\u0027not quite yet,\u0027 to \u0027just gone,\u0027 or \u0027gone,\u0027 as it passes by. Meanwhile,\r\nthe specious present, the intuited duration, stands permanent, like the\r\nrainbow on the waterfall, with its own quality unchanged by the events\r\nthat stream through it. Each of these, as it slips out, retains the\r\npower of being reproduced; and when reproduced, is reproduced with the\r\nduration and neighbors which it originally had. Please observe, however,\r\nthat the reproduction of an event, \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e it has once completely\r\ndropped out of the rearward end of the specious present, is an entirely\r\ndifferent psychic fact from its direct perception in the specious\r\npresent as a thing immediately past. A creature might be entirely devoid\r\nof \u003ci\u003ereproductive\u003c/i\u003e memory, and yet have the time-sense; but the latter\r\nwould be limited, in his case, to the few seconds immediately passing\r\nby. In the next chapter, assuming the sense of time as given, we will\r\nturn to the analysis of what happens in reproductive memory, the recall\r\nof \u003ci\u003edated\u003c/i\u003e things.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_287\" id=\"page_287\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{287}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XVIII\" id=\"CHAPTER_XVIII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XVIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eMEMORY.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAnalysis of the Phenomenon of Memory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Memory proper, or secondary\r\nmemory as it might be styled, is the knowledge of a former state of mind\r\nafter it has already once dropped from consciousness; or rather \u003ci\u003eit is\r\nthe knowledge of an event, or fact\u003c/i\u003e, of which meantime we have not been\r\nthinking, \u003ci\u003ewith the additional consciousness that we have thought or\r\nexperienced it before\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first element which such a knowledge involves would seem to be the\r\nrevival in the mind of an image or copy of the original event. And it is\r\nan assumption made by many writers that such revival of an image is all\r\nthat is needed to constitute the memory of the original occurrence. But\r\nsuch a revival is obviously not a \u003ci\u003ememory\u003c/i\u003e, whatever else it may be; it\r\nis simply a duplicate, a second event, having absolutely no connection\r\nwith the first event except that it happens to resemble it. The clock\r\nstrikes to-day; it struck yesterday; and may strike a million times ere\r\nit wears out. The rain pours through the gutter this week; it did so\r\nlast week; and will do so \u003ci\u003ein sæcula sæculorum\u003c/i\u003e. But does the present\r\nclock-stroke become aware of the past ones, or the present stream\r\nrecollect the past stream, because they repeat and resemble them?\r\nAssuredly not. And let it not be said that this is because clock-strokes\r\nand gutters are physical and not psychical objects; for psychical\r\nobjects (sensations, for example) simply recurring in successive\r\neditions will remember each other \u003ci\u003eon that account\u003c/i\u003e no more than\r\nclock-strokes do. No memory is involved in the mere fact of recurrence.\r\nThe successive editions of a feeling are so many independent events,\r\neach snug in its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_288\" id=\"page_288\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{288}\u003c/span\u003e own skin. Yesterday\u0027s feeling is dead and buried; and\r\nthe presence of to-day\u0027s is no reason why it should resuscitate along\r\nwith to-day\u0027s. A farther condition is required before the present image\r\ncan be held to stand for a \u003ci\u003epast original\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat condition is that the fact imaged be \u003ci\u003eexpressly referred to the\r\npast\u003c/i\u003e, thought as \u003ci\u003ein the past\u003c/i\u003e. But how can we think a thing as in the\r\npast, except by thinking of the past together with the thing, and of the\r\nrelation of the two? And how can we think of the past? In the chapter on\r\nTime-perception we have seen that our intuitive or immediate\r\nconsciousness of pastness hardly carries us more than a few seconds\r\nbackward of the present instant of time. Remoter dates are conceived,\r\nnot perceived; known symbolically by names, such as \u0027last week,\u0027 \u00271850\u0027;\r\nor thought of by events which happened in them, as the year in which we\r\nattended such a school, or met with such a loss. So that if we wish to\r\nthink of a particular past epoch, we must think of a name or other\r\nsymbol, or else of certain concrete events, associated therewithal. Both\r\nmust be thought of, to think the past epoch adequately. And to \u0027refer\u0027\r\nany special fact to the past epoch is to think that fact \u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nnames and events which characterize its date, to think it, in short,\r\nwith a lot of contiguous associates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even this would not be memory. Memory requires more than mere dating\r\nof a fact in the past. It must be dated in \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e past. In other words, I\r\nmust think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have that\r\n\u0027warmth and intimacy\u0027 which were so often spoken of in the chapter on\r\nthe Self, as characterizing all experiences \u0027appropriated\u0027 by the\r\nthinker as his own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA general feeling of the past direction in time, then, a particular date\r\nconceived as lying along that direction, and defined by its name or\r\nphenomenal contents, an event imagined as located therein, and owned as\r\npart of my experience,\u0026mdash;such are the elements of every object of\r\nmemory.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_289\" id=\"page_289\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{289}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRetention and Recall.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such being the phenomenon of memory, or the\r\nanalysis of its object, can we see how it comes to pass? can we lay bare\r\nits causes?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIts complete exercise presupposes two things:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) The \u003ci\u003eretention\u003c/i\u003e of the remembered fact; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) Its \u003ci\u003ereminiscence\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003erecollection\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ereproduction\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003erecall\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow \u003ci\u003ethe cause both of retention and of recollection is the law of habit\r\nin the nervous system, working as it does in the \u0027association of\r\nideas.\u0027\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAssociation explains Recall.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Associationists have long explained\r\n\u003ci\u003erecollection\u003c/i\u003e by association. James Mill gives an account of it which I\r\nam unable to improve upon, unless it might be by translating his word\r\n\u0027idea\u0027 into \u0027thing thought of,\u0027 or \u0027object.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"There is,\" he says, \"a state of mind familiar to all men, in which we\r\nare said to remember. In this state it is certain we have not in the\r\nmind the idea which we are trying to have in it. How is it, then, that\r\nwe proceed, in the course of our endeavor, to procure its introduction\r\ninto the mind? If we have not the idea itself, we have certain ideas\r\nconnected with it. We run over those ideas, one after another, in hopes\r\nthat some one of them will suggest the idea we are in quest of; and if\r\nany one of them does, it is always one so connected with it as to call\r\nit up in the way of association. I meet an old acquaintance, whose name\r\nI do not remember, and wish to recollect. I run over a number of names,\r\nin hopes that some of them may be associated with the idea of the\r\nindividual. I think of all the circumstances in which I have seen him\r\nengaged; the time when I knew him, the persons along with whom I knew\r\nhim, the things he did, or the things he suffered; and if I chance upon\r\nany idea with which the name is associated, then immediately I have the\r\nrecollection; if not, my pursuit of it is vain. There is another set of\r\ncases, very familiar, but affording very important evidence on the\r\nsubject. It frequently happens that there are matters which we desire\r\nnot to forget. What is the contrivance\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_290\" id=\"page_290\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{290}\u003c/span\u003e to which we have recourse for\r\npreserving the memory\u0026mdash;that is, for making sure that it will be called\r\ninto existence when it is our wish that it should? All men invariably\r\nemploy the same expedient. They endeavor to form an association between\r\nthe idea of the thing to be remembered and some sensation, or some idea,\r\nwhich they know beforehand will occur at or near the time when they wish\r\nthe remembrance to be in their minds. If this association is formed and\r\nthe association or idea with which it has been formed occurs, the\r\nsensation, or idea, calls up the remembrance, and the object of him who\r\nformed the association is attained. To use a vulgar instance: a man\r\nreceives a commission from his friend, and, that he may not forget it,\r\nties a knot in his handkerchief. How is this fact to be explained? First\r\nof all, the idea of the commission is associated with the making of the\r\nknot. Next, the handkerchief is a thing which it is known beforehand\r\nwill be frequently seen, and of course at no great distance of time from\r\nthe occasion on which the memory is desired. The handkerchief being\r\nseen, the knot is seen, and this sensation recalls the idea of the\r\ncommission, between which and itself the association had been purposely\r\nformed.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, we make search in our memory for a forgotten idea, just as we\r\nrummage our house for a lost object. In both cases we visit what seems\r\nto us the probable \u003ci\u003eneighborhood\u003c/i\u003e of that which we miss. We turn over\r\nthe things under which, or within which, or alongside of which, it may\r\npossibly be; and if it lies near them, it soon comes to view. But these\r\nmatters, in the case of a mental object sought, are nothing but its\r\n\u003ci\u003eassociates\u003c/i\u003e. The machinery of recall is thus the same as the machinery\r\nof association, and the machinery of association, as we know, is nothing\r\nbut the elementary law of habit in the nerve-centres.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIt also explains retention.\u003c/b\u003e And this same law of habit is the machinery\r\nof retention also. Retention means \u003ci\u003eliability\u003c/i\u003e to recall, and it means\r\nnothing more than such liability. The only proof of there being\r\nretention is that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_291\" id=\"page_291\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{291}\u003c/span\u003e recall actually takes place. The retention of an\r\nexperience is, in short, but another name for the \u003ci\u003epossibility\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthinking it again, or the \u003ci\u003etendency\u003c/i\u003e to think it again, with its past\r\nsurroundings. Whatever accidental cue may turn this tendency into an\r\nactuality, the permanent \u003ci\u003eground\u003c/i\u003e of the tendency itself lies in the\r\norganized neural paths by which the cue calls up the memorable\r\nexperience, the past associates, the sense that the self was there, the\r\nbelief that it all really happened, etc., as previously described. When\r\nthe recollection is of the \u0027ready\u0027 sort, the resuscitation takes place\r\nthe instant the cue arises; when it is slow, resuscitation comes after\r\ndelay. But be the recall prompt or slow, the condition which makes it\r\npossible at all (or, in other words, the \u0027retention\u0027 of the experience)\r\nis neither more nor less than the brain-paths which \u003ci\u003eassociate\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nexperience with the occasion and cue of the recall. \u003ci\u003eWhen slumbering,\r\nthese paths are the condition of retention; when active, they are the\r\ncondition of recall.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_62\" id=\"ill_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\" style=\"width: 182px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-291-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-291-sml.png\" width=\"182\" height=\"171\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 62.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBrain-scheme.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A simple scheme will now make the whole cause of memory\r\nplain. Let \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e be a past event, \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e its \u0027setting\u0027 (concomitants, date,\r\nself present, warmth and intimacy, etc., etc., as already set forth),\r\nand \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e some present thought or fact which may appropriately become the\r\noccasion of its recall. Let the nerve-centres, active in the thought of\r\n\u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e, be represented by \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e, respectively;\r\nthen the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of the \u003ci\u003epaths\u003c/i\u003e symbolized by the lines between \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e will be the fact indicated by the phrase\r\n\u0027retention of the event \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e in the memory,\u0027 and the \u003ci\u003eexcitement\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nbrain along these paths will be the condition of the event \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u0027s actual\r\nrecall. The \u003ci\u003eretention\u003c/i\u003e of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, it will be observed, is no mysterious\r\nstoring up of an \u0027idea\u0027 in an unconscious state. It is not a fact of the\r\nmental order at all. It is a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_292\" id=\"page_292\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{292}\u003c/span\u003e purely physical phenomenon, a\r\nmorphological feature, the presence of these \u0027paths,\u0027 namely, in the\r\nfinest recesses of the brain\u0027s tissue. The recall or recollection, on\r\nthe other hand, is a \u003ci\u003epsycho-physical\u003c/i\u003e phenomenon, with both a bodily\r\nand a mental side. The bodily side is the excitement of the paths in\r\nquestion; the mental side is the conscious representation of the past\r\noccurrence, and the belief that we experienced it before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only hypothesis, in short, to which the facts of inward experience\r\ngive countenance is that \u003ci\u003ethe brain-tracts excited by the event proper,\r\nand those excited in its recall, are in part\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eDIFFERENT\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003efrom each\r\nother\u003c/i\u003e. If we could revive the past event without any associates we\r\nshould exclude the possibility of memory, and simply dream that we were\r\nundergoing the experience as if for the first time. Wherever, in fact,\r\nthe recalled event does appear without a definite setting, it is hard to\r\ndistinguish it from a mere creation of fancy. But in proportion as its\r\nimage lingers and recalls associates which gradually become more\r\ndefinite, it grows more and more distinctly into a remembered thing. For\r\nexample, I enter a friend\u0027s room and see on the wall a painting. At\r\nfirst I have the strange, wondering consciousness, \u0027Surely I have seen\r\nthat before,\u0027 but when or how does not become clear. There only clings\r\nto the picture a sort of penumbra of familiarity,\u0026mdash;when suddenly I\r\nexclaim: \"I have it! It is a copy of part of one of the Fra Angelicos in\r\nthe Florentine Academy\u0026mdash;I recollect it there.\" Only when the image of\r\nthe Academy arises does the picture become remembered, as well as seen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Conditions of Goodness in Memory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The remembered fact being \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthen, the path N\u0026mdash;O is what arouses for \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e its setting when it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nrecalled, and makes it other than a mere imagination. The path M\u0026mdash;N, on\r\nthe other hand, gives the cue or occasion of its being recalled at all.\r\n\u003ci\u003eMemory being thus altogether conditioned on brain-paths, its excellence\r\nin a given individual will depend partly on the\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eNUMBER\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eand partly on\r\nthe\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003ePERSISTENCE\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eof these paths\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_293\" id=\"page_293\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{293}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe persistence or permanence of the paths is a physiological property\r\nof the brain-tissue of the individual, whilst their number is altogether\r\ndue to the facts of his mental experience. Let the quality of permanence\r\nin the paths be called the native tenacity, or physiological\r\nretentiveness. This tenacity differs enormously from infancy to old age,\r\nand from one person to another. Some minds are like wax under a seal\u0026mdash;no\r\nimpression, however disconnected with others, is wiped out. Others, like\r\na jelly, vibrate to every touch, but under usual conditions retain no\r\npermanent mark. These latter minds, before they can recollect a fact,\r\nmust weave it into their permanent stores of knowledge. They have no\r\n\u003ci\u003edesultory\u003c/i\u003e memory. Those persons, on the contrary who retain names,\r\ndates and addresses, anecdotes, gossip, poetry, quotations, and all\r\nsorts of miscellaneous facts, without an effort, have desultory memory\r\nin a high degree, and certainly owe it to the unusual tenacity of their\r\nbrain-substance for any path once formed therein. No one probably was\r\never effective on a voluminous scale without a high degree of this\r\nphysiological retentiveness. In the practical as in the theoretic life,\r\nthe man whose acquisitions \u003ci\u003estick\u003c/i\u003e is the man who is always achieving\r\nand advancing, whilst his neighbors, spending most of their time in\r\nrelearning what they once knew but have forgotten, simply hold their\r\nown. A Charlemagne, a Luther, a Leibnitz, a Walter Scott, any example,\r\nin short, of your quarto or folio editions of mankind, must needs have\r\namazing retentiveness of the purely physiological sort. Men without this\r\nretentiveness may excel in the \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e of their work at this point or\r\nat that, but will never do such mighty sums of it, or be influential\r\ncontemporaneously on such a scale.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there comes a time of life for all of us when we can do no more than\r\nhold our own in the way of acquisitions, when the old paths fade as fast\r\nas the new ones form in our brain, and when we forget in a week quite as\r\nmuch as we can learn in the same space of time. This equilibrium may\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_294\" id=\"page_294\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{294}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlast many, many years. In extreme old age it is upset in the reverse\r\ndirection, and forgetting prevails over acquisition, or rather there is\r\nno acquisition. Brain-paths are so transient that in the course of a few\r\nminutes of conversation the same question is asked and its answer\r\nforgotten half a dozen times. Then the superior tenacity of the paths\r\nformed in childhood becomes manifest: the dotard will retrace the facts\r\nof his earlier years after he has lost all those of later date.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the permanence of the paths. Now for their number.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is obvious that the more there are of such paths as M\u0026mdash;N in the\r\nbrain, and the more of such possible cues or occasions for the recall of\r\n\u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e in the mind, the prompter and surer, on the whole, the memory of \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwill be, the more frequently one will be reminded of it, the more\r\navenues of approach to it one will possess. In mental terms, \u003ci\u003ethe more\r\nother facts a fact is associated with in the mind, the better possession\r\nof it our memory retains\u003c/i\u003e. Each of its associates becomes a hook to\r\nwhich it hangs, a means to fish it up by when sunk beneath the surface.\r\nTogether, they form a network of attachments by which it is woven into\r\nthe entire tissue of our thought. The \u0027secret of a good memory\u0027 is thus\r\nthe secret of forming diverse and multiple associations with every fact\r\nwe care to retain. But this forming of associations with a fact, what is\r\nit but \u003ci\u003ethinking about\u003c/i\u003e the fact as much as possible? Briefly, then, of\r\ntwo men with the same outward experiences and the same amount of mere\r\nnative tenacity, \u003ci\u003ethe one who\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eTHINKS\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eover his experiences most, and\r\nweaves them into systematic relations with each other, will be the one\r\nwith the best memory\u003c/i\u003e. We see examples of this on every hand. Most men\r\nhave a good memory for facts connected with their own pursuits. The\r\ncollege athlete who remains a dunce at his books will astonish you by\r\nhis knowledge of men\u0027s \u0027records\u0027 in various feats and games, and will be\r\na walking dictionary of sporting statistics. The reason is that he is\r\nconstantly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_295\" id=\"page_295\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{295}\u003c/span\u003e going over these things in his mind, and comparing and\r\nmaking series of them. They form for him not so many odd facts, but a\r\nconcept-system\u0026mdash;so they stick. So the merchant remembers prices, the\r\npolitician other politicians\u0027 speeches and votes, with a copiousness\r\nwhich amazes outsiders, but which the amount of thinking they bestow on\r\nthese subjects easily explains. The great memory for facts which a\r\nDarwin and a Spencer reveal in their books is not incompatible with the\r\npossession on their part of a brain with only a middling degree of\r\nphysiological retentiveness. Let a man early in life set himself the\r\ntask of verifying such a theory as that of evolution, and facts will\r\nsoon cluster and cling to him like grapes to their stem. Their relations\r\nto the theory will hold them fast; and the more of these the mind is\r\nable to discern, the greater the erudition will become. Meanwhile the\r\ntheorist may have little, if any, desultory memory. Unutilizable facts\r\nmay be unnoted by him and forgotten as soon as heard. An ignorance\r\nalmost as encyclopædic as his erudition may coexist with the latter, and\r\nhide, as it were, in the interstices of its web. Those who have had much\r\nto do with scholars and \u003ci\u003esavants\u003c/i\u003e will readily think of examples of the\r\nclass of mind I mean.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a system, every fact is connected with every other by some\r\nthought-relation. The consequence is that every fact is retained by the\r\ncombined suggestive power of all the other facts in the system, and\r\nforgetfulness is well-nigh impossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe reason why cramming is such a bad mode of study\u003c/b\u003e is now made clear. I\r\nmean by cramming that way of preparing for examinations by committing\r\n\u0027points\u0027 to memory during a few hours or days of intense application\r\nimmediately preceding the final ordeal, little or no work having been\r\nperformed during the previous course of the term. Things learned thus in\r\na few hours, on one occasion, for one purpose, cannot possibly have\r\nformed many associations with other things in the mind. Their\r\nbrain-processes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_296\" id=\"page_296\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{296}\u003c/span\u003e are led into by few paths, and are relatively little\r\nliable to be awakened again. Speedy oblivion is the almost inevitable\r\nfate of all that is committed to memory in this simple way. Whereas, on\r\nthe contrary, the same materials taken in gradually, day after day,\r\nrecurring in different contexts, considered in various relations,\r\nassociated with other external incidents, and repeatedly reflected on,\r\ngrow into such a system, form such connections with the rest of the\r\nmind\u0027s fabric, lie open to so many paths of approach, that they remain\r\npermanent possessions. This is the \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e reason why habits of\r\ncontinuous application should be enforced in educational establishments.\r\nOf course there is no moral turpitude in cramming. Did it lead to the\r\ndesired end of secure learning, it were infinitely the best method of\r\nstudy. But it does not; and students themselves should understand the\r\nreason why.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOne\u0027s native retentiveness is unchangeable.\u003c/b\u003e It will now appear clear\r\nthat \u003ci\u003eall improvement of the memory lies in the line of\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eELABORATING THE\r\nASSOCIATES\u003c/small\u003e of each of the several things to be remembered. \u003ci\u003eNo amount of\r\nculture would seem capable of modifying a man\u0027s\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eGENERAL\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eretentiveness\u003c/i\u003e. This is a physiological quality, given once for all\r\nwith his organization, and which he can never hope to change. It differs\r\nno doubt in disease and health; and it is a fact of observation that it\r\nis better in fresh and vigorous hours than when we are fagged or ill. We\r\nmay say, then, that a man\u0027s native tenacity will fluctuate somewhat with\r\nhis hygiene, and that whatever is good for his tone of health will also\r\nbe good for his memory. We may even say that whatever amount of\r\nintellectual exercise is bracing to the general tone and nutrition of\r\nthe brain will also be profitable to the general retentiveness. But more\r\nthan this we cannot say; and this, it is obvious, is far less than most\r\npeople believe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, in fact, commonly thought that certain exercises, systematically\r\nrepeated, will strengthen, not only a man\u0027s remembrance of the\r\nparticular facts used in the exercises,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_297\" id=\"page_297\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{297}\u003c/span\u003e but his faculty for remembering\r\nfacts at large. And a plausible case is always made out by saying that\r\npractice in learning words by heart makes it easier to learn new words\r\nin the same way. If this be true, then what I have just said is false,\r\nand the whole doctrine of memory as due to \u0027paths\u0027 must be revised. But\r\nI am disposed to think the alleged fact untrue. I have carefully\r\nquestioned several mature actors on the point, and all have denied that\r\nthe practice of learning parts has made any such difference as is\r\nalleged. What it has done for them is to improve their power of\r\n\u003ci\u003estudying\u003c/i\u003e a part systematically. Their mind is now full of precedents\r\nin the way of intonation, emphasis, gesticulation; the new words awaken\r\ndistinct suggestions and decisions; are caught up, in fact, into a\r\npreëxisting network, like the merchant\u0027s prices, or the athlete\u0027s store\r\nof \u0027records,\u0027 and are recollected easier, although the mere native\r\ntenacity is not a whit improved, and is usually, in fact, impaired by\r\nage. It is a case of better remembering by better \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e. Similarly\r\nwhen schoolboys improve by practice in ease of learning by heart, the\r\nimprovement will, I am sure, be always found to reside in the \u003ci\u003emode of\r\nstudy of the particular piece\u003c/i\u003e (due to the greater interest, the greater\r\nsuggestiveness, the generic similarity with other pieces, the more\r\nsustained attention, etc., etc.), and not at all to any enhancement of\r\nthe brute retentive power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe error I speak of pervades an otherwise useful and judicious book,\r\n\u0027How to Strengthen the Memory,\u0027 by Dr. M. C. Holbrook of New York. The\r\nauthor fails to distinguish between the general physiological\r\nretentiveness and the retention of particular things, and talks as if\r\nboth must be benefited by the same means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I am now treating,\" he says, \"a case of loss of memory in a person\r\nadvanced in years, who did not know that his memory had failed most\r\nremarkably till I told him of it. He is making vigorous efforts to bring\r\nit back again, and with partial success. The method pursued is to spend\r\ntwo hours daily, one in the morning and one in the evening, in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_298\" id=\"page_298\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{298}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexercising this faculty. The patient is instructed to give the closest\r\nattention to all that he learns, so that it shall be impressed on his\r\nmind clearly. He is asked to recall every evening all the facts and\r\nexperiences of the day, and again the next morning. Every name heard is\r\nwritten down and impressed on his mind clearly, and an effort made to\r\nrecall it at intervals. Ten names from among public men are ordered to\r\nbe committed to memory every week. A verse of poetry is to be learned,\r\nalso a verse from the Bible, daily. He is asked to remember the number\r\nof the page in any book where any interesting fact is recorded. These\r\nand other methods are slowly resuscitating a failing memory.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI find it very hard to believe that the memory of the poor old gentleman\r\nis a bit the better for all this torture except in respect of the\r\nparticular facts thus wrought into it, and other matters that may have\r\nbeen connected therewithal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eImproving the Memory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All improvement of memory consists, then, in the\r\nimprovement of one\u0027s \u003ci\u003ehabitual methods of recording facts\u003c/i\u003e. Methods have\r\nbeen divided into the mechanical, the ingenious, and the judicious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003emechanical methods\u003c/i\u003e consist in the intensification, prolongation,\r\nand \u003ci\u003erepetition\u003c/i\u003e of the impression to be remembered. The modern method\r\nof teaching children to read by blackboard work, in which each word is\r\nimpressed by the fourfold channel of eye, ear, voice, and hand, is an\r\nexample of an improved mechanical method of memorizing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eJudicious methods\u003c/i\u003e of remembering things are nothing but logical ways\r\nof conceiving them and working them into rational systems, classifying\r\nthem, analyzing them into parts, etc., etc. All the sciences are such\r\nmethods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf \u003ci\u003eingenious methods\u003c/i\u003e many have been invented, under the name of\r\ntechnical memories. By means of these systems it is often possible to\r\nretain entirely disconnected facts, lists of names, numbers, and so\r\nforth, so multitudinous as to be entirely unrememberable in a natural\r\nway.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_299\" id=\"page_299\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{299}\u003c/span\u003e The method consists usually in a framework learned mechanically,\r\nof which the mind is supposed to remain in secure and permanent\r\npossession. Then, whatever is to be remembered is deliberately\r\nassociated by some fanciful analogy or connection with some part of this\r\nframework, and this connection thenceforward helps its recall. The best\r\nknown and most used of these devices is the figure-alphabet. To remember\r\nnumbers, e.g., a figure-alphabet is first formed, in which each\r\nnumerical digit is represented by one or more letters. The number is\r\nthen translated into such letters as will best make a word, if possible\r\na word suggestive of the object to which the number belongs. The word\r\nwill then be remembered when the numbers alone might be forgotten.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_38_38\" id=\"FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_38_38\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe recent system of Loisette is a method, much less mechanical, of\r\nweaving the thing into associations which may aid its recall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRecognition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If, however, a phenomenon be met with too often, and with\r\ntoo great a variety of contexts, although its image is retained and\r\nreproduced with correspondingly great facility, it fails to come up with\r\nany one particular setting, and the projection of it backwards to a\r\nparticular past date consequently does not come about. We \u003ci\u003erecognize\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbut do not \u003ci\u003eremember\u003c/i\u003e it\u0026mdash;its associates form too confused a cloud. A\r\nsimilar result comes about when a definite setting is only nascently\r\naroused. We then feel that we have seen the object already, but when or\r\nwhere we cannot say, though we may seem to ourselves to be on the brink\r\nof saying it. That nascent cerebral excitations can thus affect\r\nconsciousness is obvious from what happens when we seek to remember a\r\nname. It tingles, it trembles on the verge, but does not come. Just such\r\na tingling and trembling of unrecovered\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_300\" id=\"page_300\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{300}\u003c/span\u003e associates is the penumbra of\r\nrecognition that may surround any experience and make it seem familiar,\r\nthough we know not why.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a curious experience which everyone seems to have had\u0026mdash;the\r\nfeeling that the present moment in its completeness has been experienced\r\nbefore\u0026mdash;we were saying just this thing, in just this place, to just\r\nthese people, etc. This \u0027sense of preëxistence\u0027 has been treated as a\r\ngreat mystery and occasioned much speculation. Dr. Wigan considered it\r\ndue to a dissociation of the action of the two hemispheres, one of them\r\nbecoming conscious a little later than the other, but both of the same\r\nfact. I must confess that the quality of mystery seems to me here a\r\nlittle strained. I have over and over again in my own case succeeded in\r\nresolving the phenomenon into a case of memory, so indistinct that\r\nwhilst some past circumstances are presented again, the others are not.\r\nThe dissimilar portions of the past do not arise completely enough at\r\nfirst for the date to be identified. All we get is the present scene\r\nwith a general suggestion of pastness about it. That faithful observer,\r\nProf. Lazarus, interprets the phenomenon in the same way; and it is\r\nnoteworthy that just as soon as the past context grows complete and\r\ndistinct the emotion of weirdness fades from the experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eForgetting.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as\r\nimportant a function as remembering. \u0027Total recall\u0027 (see \u003ca href=\"#page_261\"\u003ep. 261\u003c/a\u003e) we saw\r\nto be comparatively rare in association. If we remembered everything, we\r\nshould on most occasions be as ill off as if we remembered nothing. It\r\nwould take as long for us to recall a space of time as it took the\r\noriginal time to elapse, and we should never get ahead with our\r\nthinking. All recollected times undergo, accordingly, what M. Ribot\r\ncalls foreshortening; and this foreshortening is due to the omission of\r\nan enormous number of the facts which filled them. \"We thus reach the\r\nparadoxical result,\" says M. Ribot, \"that one condition of remembering\r\nis that we should forget. Without totally\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_301\" id=\"page_301\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{301}\u003c/span\u003e forgetting a prodigious\r\nnumber of states of consciousness, and momentarily forgetting a large\r\nnumber, we could not remember at all. Oblivion, except in certain cases,\r\nis thus no malady of memory, but a condition of its health and its\r\nlife.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePathological Conditions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Hypnotic subjects as a rule forget all that\r\nhas happened in their trance. But in a succeeding trance they will often\r\nremember the events of a past one. This is like what happens in those\r\ncases of \u0027double personality\u0027 in which no recollection of one of the\r\nlives is to be found in the other. The sensibility in these cases often\r\ndiffers from one of the alternate personalities to another, the patient\r\nbeing often anæsthetic in certain respects in one of the secondary\r\nstates. Now the memory may come and go with the sensibility. M. Pierre\r\nJanet proved in various ways that what his patients forgot when\r\nanæsthetic they remembered when the sensibility returned. For instance,\r\nhe restored their tactile sense temporarily by means of electric\r\ncurrents, passes, etc., and then made them handle various objects, such\r\nas keys and pencils, or make particular movements, like the sign of the\r\ncross. The moment the anæsthesia returned they found it impossible to\r\nrecollect the objects or the acts. \u0027They had had nothing in their hands,\r\nthey had done nothing,\u0027 etc. The next day, however, sensibility being\r\nagain restored by similar processes, they remembered perfectly the\r\ncircumstance, and told what they had handled or done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll these pathological facts are showing us that the sphere of possible\r\nrecollection may be wider than we think, and that in certain matters\r\napparent oblivion is no proof against possible recall under other\r\nconditions. They give no countenance, however, to the extravagant\r\nopinion that absolutely no part of our experience can be forgotten.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_302\" id=\"page_302\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{302}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XIX\" id=\"CHAPTER_XIX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XIX.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eIMAGINATION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhat it is.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eSensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism,\r\nso that copies of them arise again in the mind after the original\r\noutward stimulus is gone.\u003c/i\u003e No mental copy, however, can arise in the\r\nmind, of any kind of sensation which has never been directly excited\r\nfrom without.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe blind may dream of sights, the deaf of sounds, for years after they\r\nhave lost their vision or hearing; but the man \u003ci\u003eborn\u003c/i\u003e deaf can never be\r\nmade to imagine what sound is like, nor can the man \u003ci\u003eborn\u003c/i\u003e blind ever\r\nhave a mental vision. In Locke\u0027s words, already quoted, \"the mind can\r\nframe unto itself no one new simple idea.\" The originals of them all\r\nmust have been given from without. Fantasy, or Imagination, are the\r\nnames given to the faculty of reproducing copies of originals once felt.\r\nThe imagination is called \u0027reproductive\u0027 when the copies are literal;\r\n\u0027productive\u0027 when elements from different originals are recombined so as\r\nto make new wholes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen represented with surroundings concrete enough to constitute a\r\n\u003ci\u003edate\u003c/i\u003e, these pictures, when they revive, form \u003ci\u003erecollections\u003c/i\u003e. We have\r\njust studied the machinery of recollection. When the mental pictures are\r\nof data freely combined, and reproducing no past combination exactly, we\r\nhave acts of imagination properly so called.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMen differ in visual imagination.\u003c/b\u003e Our ideas or images of past sensible\r\nexperiences may be either distinct and adequate or dim, blurred, and\r\nincomplete. It is likely that the different degrees in which different\r\nmen are able to make them sharp and complete has had something to do\r\nwith keeping up such philosophic disputes as that of Berkeley with Locke\r\nover abstract ideas. Locke had\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_303\" id=\"page_303\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{303}\u003c/span\u003e spoken of our possessing \u0027the general\r\nidea of a triangle\u0027 which \"must be neither oblique nor rectangle,\r\nneither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these\r\nat once.\" Berkeley says: \"If any man has the faculty of framing in his\r\nmind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to\r\npretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire\r\nis that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c/i\u003e\r\nhas such an idea or no.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUntil very recent years it was supposed by philosophers that there was a\r\ntypical human mind which all individual minds were like, and that\r\npropositions of universal validity could be laid down about such\r\nfaculties as \u0027the Imagination.\u0027 Lately, however, a mass of revelations\r\nhave poured in which make us see how false a view this is. There are\r\nimaginations, not \u0027the Imagination,\u0027 and they must be studied in detail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Galton in 1880 began a statistical inquiry which may be said to have\r\nmade an era in descriptive psychology. He addressed a circular to large\r\nnumbers of persons asking them to describe the image in their mind\u0027s eye\r\nof their breakfast-table on a given morning. The variations were found\r\nto be enormous; and, strange to say, it appeared that eminent scientific\r\nmen on the average had less visualizing power than younger and more\r\ninsignificant persons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader will find details in Mr. Galton\u0027s \u0027Inquiries into Human\r\nFaculty,\u0027 p\u003ca href=\"#page_083\"\u003ep. 83\u003c/a\u003e-114. I have myself for many years collected from each\r\nand all of my psychology-students descriptions of their own visual\r\nimagination; and found (together with some curious idiosyncrasies)\r\ncorroboration of all the variations which Mr. Galton reports. As\r\nexamples, I subjoin extracts from two cases near the ends of the scale.\r\nThe writers are first cousins, grandsons of a distinguished man of\r\nscience. The one who is a good visualizer says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This morning\u0027s breakfast-table is both dim and bright;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_304\" id=\"page_304\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{304}\u003c/span\u003e it is dim if I\r\ntry to think of it when my eyes are open upon any object; it is\r\nperfectly clear and bright if I think of it with my eyes closed.\u0026mdash;All\r\nthe objects are clear at once, yet when I confine my attention to any\r\none object it becomes far more distinct.\u0026mdash;I have more power to recall\r\ncolor than any other one thing: if, for example, I were to recall a\r\nplate decorated with flowers I could reproduce in a drawing the exact\r\ntone, etc. The color of anything that was on the table is perfectly\r\nvivid.\u0026mdash;There is very little limitation to the extent of my images: I\r\ncan see all four sides of a room, I can see all four sides of two,\r\nthree, four, even more rooms with such distinctness that if you should\r\nask me what was in any particular place in any one, or ask me to count\r\nthe chairs, etc., I could do it without the least hesitation.\u0026mdash;The more\r\nI learn by heart the more clearly do I see images of my pages. Even\r\nbefore I can recite the lines I see them so that I could give them very\r\nslowly word for word, but my mind is so occupied in looking at my\r\nprinted image that I have no idea of what I am saying, of the sense of\r\nit, etc. When I first found myself doing this I used to think it was\r\nmerely because I knew the lines imperfectly; but I have quite convinced\r\nmyself that I really do see an image. The strongest proof that such is\r\nreally the fact is, I think, the following:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I can look down the mentally seen page and see the words that\r\n\u003ci\u003ecommence\u003c/i\u003e all the lines, and from any one of these words I can continue\r\nthe line. I find this much easier to do if the words begin in a straight\r\nline than if there are breaks. Example:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eÉtant fait\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eTous\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eA des\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eQue fit\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eCéres\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eAvec\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eUn fleur\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 2em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eComme\u003c/i\u003e….\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e(La Fontaine 8. iv.)\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_305\" id=\"page_305\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{305}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe poor visualizer says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"My ability to form mental images seems, from what I have studied of\r\nother people\u0027s images, to be defective and somewhat peculiar. The\r\nprocess by which I seem to remember any particular event is not by a\r\nseries of distinct images, but a sort of panorama, the faintest\r\nimpressions of which are perceptible through a thick fog.\u0026mdash;I cannot shut\r\nmy eyes and get a distinct image of anyone, although I used to be able\r\nto a few years ago, and the faculty seems to have gradually slipped\r\naway.\u0026mdash;In my most vivid dreams, where the events appear like the most\r\nreal facts, I am often troubled with a dimness of sight which causes the\r\nimages to appear indistinct.\u0026mdash;To come to the question of the\r\nbreakfast-table, there is nothing definite about it. Everything is\r\nvague. I cannot say \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e I see. I could not possibly count the chairs,\r\nbut I happen to know that there are ten. I see nothing in detail.\u0026mdash;The\r\nchief thing is a general impression that I cannot tell exactly what I do\r\nsee. The coloring is about the same, as far as I can recall it, only\r\nvery much washed out. Perhaps the only color I can see at all distinctly\r\nis that of the table-cloth, and I could probably see the color of the\r\nwall-paper if I could remember what color it was.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA person whose visual imagination is strong finds it hard to understand\r\nhow those who are without the faculty can think at all. \u003ci\u003eSome people\r\nundoubtedly have no visual images at all worthy of the name\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\ninstead of \u003ci\u003eseeing\u003c/i\u003e their breakfast-table, they tell you that they\r\n\u003ci\u003eremember\u003c/i\u003e it or \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e what was on it. The \u0027mind-stuff\u0027 of which this\r\n\u0027knowing\u0027 is made seems to be verbal images exclusively. But if the\r\nwords \u0027coffee,\u0027 \u0027bacon,\u0027 \u0027muffins,\u0027 and \u0027eggs\u0027 lead a man to speak to\r\nhis cook, to pay his bills, and to take measures for the morrow\u0027s meal\r\nexactly as visual and gustatory memories would, why are they not, for\r\nall practical intents and purposes, as good a kind of material in which\r\nto think? In fact, we may suspect them to be for most purposes better\r\nthan terms with a richer imaginative\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_306\" id=\"page_306\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{306}\u003c/span\u003e coloring. The scheme of\r\nrelationship and the conclusion being the essential things in thinking,\r\nthat kind of mind-stuff which is handiest will be the best for the\r\npurpose. Now words, uttered or unexpressed, are the handiest mental\r\nelements we have. Not only are they very \u003ci\u003erapidly\u003c/i\u003e revivable, but they\r\nare revivable as actual sensations more easily than any other items of\r\nour experience. Did they not possess some such advantage as this, it\r\nwould hardly be the case that the older men are and the more effective\r\nas thinkers, the more, as a rule, they have lost their visualizing\r\npower, as Mr. Galton found to be the case with members of the Royal\r\nSociety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eImages of Sounds.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These also differ in individuals. Those who think by\r\npreference in auditory images are called audiles by Mr. Galton. \u003ci\u003eThis\r\ntype\u003c/i\u003e, says M. Binet, \"\u003ci\u003eappears to be rarer than the visual\u003c/i\u003e. Persons of\r\nthis type imagine what they think of in the language of sound. In order\r\nto remember a lesson they impress upon their mind, not the look of the\r\npage, but the sound of the words. They reason, as well as remember, by\r\near. In performing a mental addition they repeat verbally the names of\r\nthe figures, and add, as it were, the sounds, without any thought of the\r\ngraphic signs. Imagination also takes the auditory form. \u0027When I write a\r\nscene,\u0027 said Legouvé to Scribe, \u0027I \u003ci\u003ehear\u003c/i\u003e; but you \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e. In each phrase\r\nwhich I write, the voice of the personage who speaks strikes my ear.\r\n\u003ci\u003eVous, qui êtes le théâtre même\u003c/i\u003e, your actors walk, gesticulate before\r\nyour eyes; I am a \u003ci\u003elistener\u003c/i\u003e, you a \u003ci\u003espectator\u003c/i\u003e.\u0027\u0026mdash;\u0027Nothing more true,\u0027\r\nsaid Scribe; \u0027do you know where I am when I write a piece? In the middle\r\nof the parterre.\u0027 It is clear that the \u003ci\u003epure audile\u003c/i\u003e, seeking to develop\r\nonly a single one of his faculties, may, like the pure visualizer,\r\nperform astounding feats of memory\u0026mdash;Mozart, for example, noting from\r\nmemory the \u003ci\u003eMiserere\u003c/i\u003e of the Sistine Chapel after two hearings; the deaf\r\nBeethoven, composing and inwardly repeating his enormous symphonies. On\r\nthe other hand, the man of auditory\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_307\" id=\"page_307\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{307}\u003c/span\u003e type, like the visual, is exposed\r\nto serious dangers; for if he lose his auditory images, he is without\r\nresource and breaks down completely.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eImages of Muscular Sensations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Professor Stricker of Vienna, who seems\r\nto be a \u0027motile\u0027 or to have this form of imagination developed in\r\nunusual strength, has given a careful analysis of his own case. His\r\nrecollections both of his own movements and of those of other things are\r\naccompanied invariably by distinct muscular feelings in those parts of\r\nhis body which would naturally be used in effecting or in following the\r\nmovement. In thinking of a soldier marching, for example, it is as if he\r\nwere helping the image to march by marching himself in his rear. And if\r\nhe suppresses this sympathetic feeling in his own legs and concentrates\r\nall his attention on the imagined soldier, the latter becomes, as it\r\nwere, paralyzed. In general his imagined movements, of whatsoever\r\nobjects, seem paralyzed, the moment no feelings of movement either in\r\nhis own eyes or in his own limbs accompany them. The movements of\r\narticulate speech play a predominant part in his mental life. \"When,\r\nafter my experimental work,\" he says, \"I proceed to its description, as\r\na rule I reproduce in the first instance only words which I had already\r\nassociated with the perception of the various details of the observation\r\nwhilst the latter was going on. For speech plays in all my observing so\r\nimportant a part that I ordinarily clothe phenomena in words as fast as\r\nI observe them.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost persons, on being asked \u003ci\u003ein what sort of terms they imagine words\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwill say, \u0027In terms of hearing.\u0027 It is not until their attention is\r\nexpressly drawn to the point that they find it difficult to say whether\r\nauditory images or motor images connected with the organs of\r\narticulation predominate. A good way of bringing the difficulty to\r\nconsciousness is that proposed by Stricker: Partly open your mouth and\r\nthen imagine any word with labials or dentals in it, such as \u0027bubble,\u0027\r\n\u0027toddle.\u0027 Is your image under these conditions distinct? To most people\r\nthe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_308\" id=\"page_308\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{308}\u003c/span\u003e image is at first \u0027thick,\u0027 as the sound of the word would be if\r\nthey tried to pronounce it with the lips parted. Many can never imagine\r\nthe words clearly with the mouth open; others succeed after a few\r\npreliminary trials. The experiment proves how dependent our verbal\r\nimagination is on actual feelings in lips, tongue, throat, larynx, etc.\r\nProf. Bain says that \"a \u003ci\u003esuppressed articulation is in fact the material\r\nof our recollection\u003c/i\u003e, the intellectual manifestation, the \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nspeech.\" In persons whose auditory imagination is weak, the articulatory\r\nimage does indeed seem to constitute the whole material for verbal\r\nthought. Professor Stricker says that in his own case no auditory image\r\nenters into the words of which he thinks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eImages of Touch.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These are very strong in some people. The most vivid\r\ntouch-images come when we ourselves barely escape local injury, or when\r\nwe see another injured. The place may then actually tingle with the\r\nimaginary sensation\u0026mdash;perhaps not altogether imaginary, since\r\ngoose-flesh, paling or reddening, and other evidences of actual muscular\r\ncontraction in the spot, may result.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"An educated man,\" says Herr G. H. Meyer, \"told me once that on entering\r\nhis house one day he received a shock from crushing the finger of one of\r\nhis little children in the door. At the moment of his fright he felt a\r\nviolent pain in the corresponding finger of his own body, and this pain\r\nabode with him three days.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe imagination of a blind deaf-mute like Laura Bridgman must be\r\nconfined entirely to tactile and motor material. \u003ci\u003eAll blind persons must\r\nbelong to the \u0027tactile\u0027 and \u0027motile\u0027 types\u003c/i\u003e of the French authors. When\r\nthe young man whose cataracts were removed by Dr. Franz was shown\r\ndifferent geometric figures, he said he \"had not been able to form from\r\nthem the idea of a square and a disk until he perceived a sensation of\r\nwhat he saw in the points of his fingers, as if he really touched the\r\nobjects.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePathological Differences.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The study of Aphasia (see \u003ca href=\"#page_114\"\u003ep. 114\u003c/a\u003e) has of late\r\nyears shown how unexpectedly individuals\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_309\" id=\"page_309\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{309}\u003c/span\u003e differ in the use of their\r\nimagination. In some the habitual \u0027thought-stuff,\u0027 if one may so call\r\nit, is visual; in others it is auditory, articulatory, or motor; in\r\nmost, perhaps, it is evenly mixed. These are the \"indifferents\" of\r\nCharcot. The same local cerebral injury must needs work different\r\npractical results in persons who differ in this way. In one what is\r\nthrown out of gear is a much-used brain-tract; in the other an\r\nunimportant region is affected. A particularly instructive case was\r\npublished by Charcot in 1883. The patient was a merchant, an exceedingly\r\naccomplished man, but a visualizer of the most exclusive type. Owing to\r\nsome intra-cerebral accident he suddenly lost all his visual images, and\r\nwith them much of his intellectual power, without any other perversion\r\nof faculty. He soon discovered that he could carry on his affairs by\r\nusing his memory in an altogether new way, and described clearly the\r\ndifference between his two conditions. \"Every time he returns to A.,\r\nfrom which place business often calls him, he seems to himself as if\r\nentering a strange city. He views the monuments, houses, and streets\r\nwith the same surprise as if he saw them for the first time. When asked\r\nto describe the principal public place of the town, he answered, \u0027I know\r\nthat it is there, but it is impossible to imagine it, and I can tell you\r\nnothing about it.\u0027\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe can no more remember his wife and children\u0027s face than he can\r\nremember A. Even after being with them some time they seem unusual to\r\nhim. He forgets his own face, and once spoke to his image in a mirror,\r\ntaking it for a stranger. He complains of his loss of feeling for\r\ncolors. \"My wife has black hair, this I know; but I can no more recall\r\nits color than I can her person and features.\" This visual amnesia\r\nextends to objects dating from his childhood\u0027s years\u0026mdash;paternal mansion,\r\netc., forgotten. No other disturbances but this loss of visual images.\r\nNow when he seeks something in his correspondence, he must rummage among\r\nthe letters like other men, until he meets the passage. He can recall\r\nonly the first few verses of the Iliad,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_310\" id=\"page_310\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{310}\u003c/span\u003e and must \u003ci\u003egrope\u003c/i\u003e to recite\r\nHomer, Virgil, and Horace. Figures which he adds he must now whisper to\r\nhimself. He realizes clearly that he must help his memory out with\r\nauditory images, which he does with effort. \u003ci\u003eThe words and expressions\r\nwhich he recalls seem now to echo in his ear, an altogether novel\r\nsensation for him.\u003c/i\u003e If he wishes to learn by heart anything, a series of\r\nphrases for example, he must \u003ci\u003eread them several times aloud\u003c/i\u003e, so as to\r\nimpress his ear. When later he repeats the thing in question, the\r\nsensation of inward hearing which precedes articulation rises up in his\r\nmind. This feeling was formerly unknown to him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a man would have suffered relatively little inconvenience if his\r\nimages for hearing had been those suddenly destroyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Neural Process in Imagination.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Most medical writers assume that the\r\ncerebral activity on which imagination depends occupies a different\r\n\u003ci\u003eseat\u003c/i\u003e from that subserving sensation. It is, however, a simpler\r\ninterpretation of the facts to suppose that \u003ci\u003ethe same nerve-tracts are\r\nconcerned in the two processes\u003c/i\u003e. Our mental images are aroused always by\r\nway of association; some previous idea or sensation must have\r\n\u0027suggested\u0027 them. Association is surely due to currents from one\r\ncortical centre to another. Now all we need suppose is that these\r\nintra-cortical currents are unable to produce in the cells the strong\r\nexplosions which currents from the sense-organs occasion, to account for\r\nthe subjective difference between images and sensations, without\r\nsupposing any difference in their local seat. To the strong degree of\r\nexplosion corresponds the character of \u0027vividness\u0027 or sensible presence,\r\nin the object of thought; to the weak degree, that of \u0027faintness\u0027 or\r\noutward unreality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we admit that sensation and imagination are due to the activity of\r\nthe same parts of the cortex, we can see a very good teleological reason\r\nwhy they should correspond to discrete kinds of process in these\r\ncentres, and why the process which gives the sense that the object is\r\nreally there ought normally to be arousable only by currents entering\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_311\" id=\"page_311\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{311}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom the periphery and not by currents from the neighboring cortical\r\nparts. We can see, in short, why \u003ci\u003ethe sensational process\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eOUGHT TO\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003ebe\r\ndiscontinuous with all normal ideational processes, however intense\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nFor, as Dr. Münsterberg justly observes, \"Were there not this peculiar\r\narrangement we should not distinguish reality and fantasy, our conduct\r\nwould not be accommodated to the facts about us, but would be\r\ninappropriate and senseless, and we could not keep ourselves alive.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSometimes, by exception, the deeper sort of explosion may take place\r\nfrom intra-cortical excitement alone. In the sense of hearing, sensation\r\nand imagination \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e hard to discriminate where the sensation is so\r\nweak as to be just perceptible. At night, hearing a very faint striking\r\nof the hour by a far-off clock, our imagination reproduces both rhythm\r\nand sound, and it is often difficult to tell which was the last real\r\nstroke. So of a baby crying in a distant part of the house, we are\r\nuncertain whether we still hear it, or only imagine the sound. Certain\r\nviolin-players take advantage of this in diminuendo terminations. After\r\nthe pianissimo has been reached they continue to bow as if still\r\nplaying, but are careful not to touch the strings. The listener hears in\r\nimagination a degree of sound fainter than the pianissimo.\r\n\u003ci\u003eHallucinations\u003c/i\u003e, whether of sight or hearing, are another case in\r\npoint, to be touched on in the next chapter. I may mention as a fact\r\nstill unexplained that several observers (Herr G. H. Meyer, M. Ch. Féré,\r\nProfessor Scott of Ann Arbor, and Mr. T. C. Smith, one of my students)\r\nhave noticed negative after-images of objects which they had been\r\nimagining with the mind\u0027s eye. It is as if the retina itself were\r\nlocally fatigued by the act.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_312\" id=\"page_312\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{312}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XX\" id=\"CHAPTER_XX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XX.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003ePERCEPTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePerception and Sensation compared.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A pure sensation we saw above, p.\r\n12, to be an abstraction never realized in adult life. Anything which\r\naffects our sense-organs does also more than that: it arouses processes\r\nin the hemispheres which are partly due to the organization of that\r\norgan by past experiences, and the results of which in consciousness are\r\ndescribed as ideas which the sensation suggests. The first of these\r\nideas is that of the \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e to which the sensible quality belongs. \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nconsciousness of particular material things present to sense\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nnowadays called \u003ci\u003eperception\u003c/i\u003e. The consciousness of such things may be\r\nmore or less complete; it may be of the mere name of the thing and its\r\nother essential attributes, or it may be of the thing\u0027s various remoter\r\nrelations. It is impossible to draw any sharp line of distinction\r\nbetween the barer and the richer consciousness, because the moment we\r\nget beyond the first crude sensation all our consciousness is of what is\r\n\u003ci\u003esuggested\u003c/i\u003e, and the various suggestions shade gradually into each\r\nother, being one and all products of the same psychological machinery of\r\nassociation. In the directer consciousness fewer, in the remoter more,\r\nassociative processes are brought into play.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSensational and reproductive brain-processes combined, then, are what\r\ngive us the content of our perceptions.\u003c/i\u003e Every concrete particular\r\nmaterial thing is a conflux of sensible qualities, with which we have\r\nbecome acquainted at various times. Some of these qualities, since they\r\nare more constant, interesting, or practically important, we regard as\r\nessential constituents of the thing. In a general\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_313\" id=\"page_313\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{313}\u003c/span\u003e way, such are the\r\ntangible shape, size, mass, etc. Other properties, being more\r\nfluctuating, we regard as more or less accidental or inessential. We\r\ncall the former qualities the reality, the latter its appearances. Thus,\r\nI hear a sound, and say \u0027a horse-car\u0027; but the sound is not the\r\nhorse-car, it is one of the horse-car\u0027s least important manifestations.\r\nThe real horse-car is a feelable, or at most a feelable and visible,\r\nthing which in my imagination the sound calls up. So when I get, as now,\r\na brown eye-picture with lines not parallel, and with angles unlike, and\r\ncall it my big solid rectangular walnut library-table, that picture is\r\nnot the table. It is not even like the table as the table is for vision,\r\nwhen rightly seen. It is a distorted perspective view of three of the\r\nsides of what I mentally \u003ci\u003eperceive\u003c/i\u003e (more or less) in its totality and\r\nundistorted shape. The back of the table, its square corners, its size,\r\nits heaviness, are features of which I am conscious when I look, almost\r\nas I am conscious of its name. The suggestion of the name is of course\r\ndue to mere custom. But no less is that of the back, the size, weight,\r\nsquareness, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNature, as Reid says, is frugal in her operations, and will not be at\r\nthe expense of a particular instinct to give us that knowledge which\r\nexperience and habit will soon produce. Reproduced attributes tied\r\ntogether with presently felt attributes in the unity of a \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e with a\r\nname, these are the materials out of which my actually perceived table\r\nis made. Infants must go through a long education of the eye and ear\r\nbefore they can perceive the realities which adults perceive. \u003ci\u003eEvery\r\nperception is an acquired perception.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Perceptive State of Mind is not a Compound.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is no reason,\r\nhowever, for supposing that this involves a \u0027fusion\u0027 of separate\r\nsensations and ideas. The thing perceived is the object of a unique\r\nstate of thought; due no doubt in part to sensational, and in part to\r\nideational currents, but in no wise \u0027containing\u0027 psychically the\r\nidentical \u0027sensations\u0027 and images which these currents would severally\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_314\" id=\"page_314\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{314}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave aroused if the others were not simultaneously there. We can often\r\ndirectly notice a sensible difference in the consciousness, between the\r\nlatter case and the former. The sensible quality changes under our very\r\neye. Take the already-quoted catch, \u003ci\u003ePas de lieu Rhône que nous\u003c/i\u003e: one\r\nmay read this over and over again without recognizing the sounds to be\r\nidentical with those of the words \u003ci\u003epaddle your own canoe\u003c/i\u003e. As the\r\nEnglish associations arise, the sound itself appears to change. Verbal\r\nsounds are usually perceived with their meaning at the moment of being\r\nheard. Sometimes, however, the associative irradiations are inhibited\r\nfor a few moments (the mind being preoccupied with other thoughts),\r\nwhilst the words linger on the ear as mere echoes of acoustic sensation.\r\nThen, usually, their interpretation suddenly occurs. But at that moment\r\none may often surprise a change in the very \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e of the word. Our own\r\nlanguage would sound very different to us if we heard it without\r\nunderstanding, as we hear a foreign tongue. Rises and falls of voice,\r\nodd sibilants and other consonants, would fall on our ear in a way of\r\nwhich we can now form no notion. Frenchmen say that English sounds to\r\nthem like the \u003ci\u003egazouillement des oiseaux\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;an impression which it\r\ncertainly makes on no native ear. Many of us English would describe the\r\nsound of Russian in similar terms. All of us are conscious of the strong\r\ninflections of voice and explosives and gutturals of German speech in a\r\nway in which no German can be conscious of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is probably the reason why, if we look at an isolated printed word\r\nand repeat it long enough, it ends by assuming an entirely unnatural\r\naspect. Let the reader try this with any word on this page. He will soon\r\nbegin to wonder if it can possibly be the word he has been using all his\r\nlife with that meaning. It stares at him from the paper like a glass\r\neye, with no speculation in it. Its body is indeed there, but its soul\r\nis fled. It is reduced, by this new way of attending to it, to its\r\nsensational nudity. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_315\" id=\"page_315\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{315}\u003c/span\u003e never before attended to it in this way, but\r\nhabitually got it clad with its meaning the moment we caught sight of\r\nit, and rapidly passed from it to the other words of the phrase. We\r\napprehended it, in short, with a cloud of associates, and thus\r\nperceiving it, we felt it quite otherwise than as we feel it now\r\ndivested and alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother well-known change is when we look at a landscape with our head\r\nupside-down. Perception is to a certain extent baffled by this\r\nmanœuvre; gradations of distance and other space-determinations are\r\nmade uncertain; the reproductive or associative processes, in short,\r\ndecline; and, simultaneously with their diminution, the colors grow\r\nricher and more varied, and the contrasts of light and shade more\r\nmarked. The same thing occurs when we turn a painting bottom-upward. We\r\nlose much of its meaning, but, to compensate for the loss, we feel more\r\nfreshly the value of the mere tints and shadings, and become aware of\r\nany lack of purely sensible harmony or balance which they may show. Just\r\nso, if we lie on the floor and look up at the mouth of a person talking\r\nbehind us. His lower lip here takes the habitual place of the upper one\r\nupon our retina, and seems animated by the most extraordinary and\r\nunnatural mobility, a mobility which now strikes us because (the\r\nassociative processes being disturbed by the unaccustomed point of view)\r\nwe get it as a naked sensation and not as part of a familiar object\r\nperceived.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, then, we find ourselves driven to admit that when qualities\r\nof an object impress our sense and we thereupon perceive the object, the\r\npure sensation as such of those qualities does not still exist inside of\r\nthe perception and form a constituent thereof. The pure sensation is one\r\nthing and the perception another, and neither can take place at the same\r\ntime with the other, because their cerebral conditions are not the same.\r\nThey may \u003ci\u003eresemble\u003c/i\u003e each other, but in no respect are they identical\r\nstates of mind.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_316\" id=\"page_316\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{316}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePerception is of Definite and Probable Things.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The chief cerebral\r\nconditions of perception are old paths of association radiating from the\r\nsense-impression. If a certain impression be strongly associated with\r\nthe attributes of a certain thing, that thing is almost sure to be\r\nperceived when we get the impression. Examples of such things would be\r\nfamiliar people, places, etc., which we recognize and name at a glance.\r\nBut \u003ci\u003ewhere the impression is associated with more than one reality\u003c/i\u003e, so\r\nthat either of two discrepant sets of residual properties may arise, the\r\nperception is doubtful and vacillating, and \u003ci\u003ethe most that can then be\r\nsaid of it is that it will be of a\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003ePROBABLE\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e, of the thing which\r\nwould most usually have given us that sensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn these ambiguous cases it is interesting to note that perception is\r\nrarely abortive; \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e perception takes place. The two discrepant sets\r\nof associates do not neutralize each other or mix and make a blur. What\r\nwe more commonly get is first one object in its completeness, and then\r\nthe other in its completeness. In other words, \u003ci\u003eall brain-processes are\r\nsuch as give rise to what we may call\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eFIGURED\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e. If paths\r\nare shot-through at all, they are shot-through in consistent systems,\r\nand occasion thoughts of definite objects, not mere hodge-podges of\r\nelements. Even where the brain\u0027s functions are half thrown out of gear,\r\nas in aphasia or dropping asleep, this law of figured consciousness\r\nholds good. A person who suddenly gets sleepy whilst reading aloud will\r\nread wrong; but instead of emitting a mere broth of syllables, he will\r\nmake such mistakes as to read \u0027supper-time\u0027 instead of \u0027sovereign,\u0027\r\n\u0027overthrow\u0027 instead of \u0027opposite,\u0027 or indeed utter entirely imaginary\r\nphrases, composed of several definite words, instead of phrases of the\r\nbook. So in aphasia: where the disease is mild the patient\u0027s mistakes\r\nconsist in using entire wrong words instead of right ones. It is only in\r\ngrave lesions that he becomes quite inarticulate. These facts show how\r\nsubtle is the associative link; how delicate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_317\" id=\"page_317\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{317}\u003c/span\u003e yet how strong that\r\nconnection among brain-paths which makes any number of them, once\r\nexcited together, thereafter tend to vibrate as a systematic whole. A\r\nsmall group of elements, \u0027\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 common to two systems, \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nmay touch off \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e according as accident decides the next step\r\n(see \u003ca href=\"#ill_63\"\u003eFig. 63\u003c/a\u003e). If it happen that a single point leading from \u0027\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 to\r\n\u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e is momentarily a little more pervious than any leading from \u0027\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e\u0027\r\nto \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, then that little advantage will upset the equilibrium in favor\r\nof the entire system \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e. The currents will sweep first through that\r\npoint and thence into all the paths of \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, each increment of advance\r\nmaking \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e more and more impossible. The thoughts correlated with \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, in such a case, will have objects different, though similar.\r\nThe similarity will, however, consist in some very limited feature if\r\nthe \u0027this\u0027 be small. \u003ci\u003eThus the faintest sensations will give rise to the\r\nperception of definite things if only they resemble those which the\r\nthings are wont to arouse.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_63\" id=\"ill_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 394px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-317-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-317-sml.png\" width=\"394\" height=\"124\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 63.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIllusions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Let us now, for brevity\u0027s sake, treat \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e in Fig. 63\r\nas if they stood for objects instead of brain-processes. And let us\r\nfurthermore suppose that \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e are, both of them, objects which\r\nmight probably excite the sensation which I have called \u0027\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 but\r\nthat on the present occasion \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and not \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e is the one which actually\r\ndoes so. If, then, on this occasion \u0027\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 suggests \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and not \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe result is a \u003ci\u003ecorrect perception\u003c/i\u003e. But if, on the contrary, \u0027this\u0027\r\nsuggests \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e and not \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, the result is a \u003ci\u003efalse perception\u003c/i\u003e, or, as it\r\nis technically called, an \u003ci\u003eillusion\u003c/i\u003e. But the \u003ci\u003eprocess\u003c/i\u003e is the same,\r\nwhether the perception be true or false.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_318\" id=\"page_318\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{318}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNote that in every illusion what is false is what is inferred, not what\r\nis immediately given. The \u0027this,\u0027 if it were felt by itself alone, would\r\nbe all right; it only becomes misleading by what it suggests. If it is a\r\nsensation of sight, it may suggest a tactile object, for example, which\r\nlater tactile experiences prove to be not there. \u003ci\u003eThe so-called \u0027fallacy\r\nof the senses,\u0027 of which the ancient sceptics made so much account, is\r\nnot fallacy of the senses proper, but rather of the intellect, which\r\ninterprets wrongly what the senses give.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_39_39\" id=\"FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much premised, let us look a little closer at these illusions. They\r\nare due to two main causes. \u003ci\u003eThe wrong object is perceived either\r\nbecause\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) \u003ci\u003eAlthough not on this occasion the real cause, it is yet the\r\nhabitual, inveterate, or most probable cause of \u0027this\u0027\u003c/i\u003e; or because\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) \u003ci\u003eThe mind is temporarily full of the thought of that object, and\r\ntherefore \u0027this\u0027 is peculiarly prone to suggest it at this moment.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI will give briefly a number of examples under each head. The first head\r\nis the more important, because it includes a number of constant\r\nillusions to which all men are subject, and which can only be dispelled\r\nby much experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_64\" id=\"ill_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figleft\" style=\"width: 217px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-318-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-318-sml.png\" width=\"217\" height=\"127\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 64.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIllusions of the First Type.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;One of the oldest instances dates from\r\nAristotle. Cross two fingers and roll a pea, penholder, or other small\r\nobject between them. It will seem double. Professor Croom Robertson has\r\ngiven the clearest analysis of this illusion. He observes that if the\r\nobject be brought into\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_319\" id=\"page_319\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{319}\u003c/span\u003e contact first with the forefinger and next with\r\nthe second finger, the two contacts seem to come in at different points\r\nof space. The forefinger-touch seems higher, though the finger is really\r\nlower; the second-finger-touch seems lower, though the finger is really\r\nhigher. \"We perceive the contacts as double because we refer them to two\r\ndistinct parts of space.\" The touched sides of the two fingers are\r\nnormally not together in space, and customarily never do touch one\r\nthing; the one thing which now touches them, therefore, seems in two\r\nplaces, i.e. seems two things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a whole batch of illusions which come from optical sensations\r\ninterpreted by us in accordance with our usual rule, although they are\r\nnow produced by an unusual object. The \u003ci\u003estereoscope\u003c/i\u003e is an example. The\r\neyes see a picture apiece, and the two pictures are a little disparate,\r\nthe one seen by the right eye being a view of the object taken from a\r\npoint slightly to the right of that from which the left eye\u0027s picture is\r\ntaken. Pictures thrown on the two eyes by solid objects present this\r\nsort of disparity, so that we react on the sensation in our usual way,\r\nand perceive a solid. If the pictures be exchanged we perceive a hollow\r\nmould of the object, for a hollow mould would cast just such disparate\r\npictures as these. Wheatstone\u0027s instrument, the \u003ci\u003epseudoscope\u003c/i\u003e, allows us\r\nto look at solid objects and see with each eye the other eye\u0027s picture.\r\nWe then perceive the solid object hollow, \u003ci\u003eif it be an object which\r\nmight probably be hollow\u003c/i\u003e, but not otherwise. Thus the perceptive\r\nprocess is true to its law, which is \u003ci\u003ealways to react on the sensation\r\nin a determinate and figured fashion if possible, and in as probable a\r\nfashion as the case admits\u003c/i\u003e. A human face, e.g., never appears hollow to\r\nthe pseudoscope, for to couple faces and hollowness violates all our\r\nhabits. For the same reason it is very easy to make an intaglio cast of\r\na face, or the painted inside of a pasteboard mask, look convex, instead\r\nof concave as they are.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCurious illusions of movement\u003c/b\u003e in objects occur whenever the eyeballs\r\nmove without our intending it. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_320\" id=\"page_320\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{320}\u003c/span\u003e have learned in an earlier chapter\r\n(p. 72) that the original visual feeling of movement is produced by any\r\nimage passing over the retina. Originally, however, this sensation is\r\ndefinitely referred neither to the object nor to the eyes. Such definite\r\nreference grows up later, and obeys certain simple laws. For one thing,\r\nwe believe \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e to move whenever we get the retinal\r\nmovement-feeling, but think our \u003ci\u003eeyes\u003c/i\u003e are still. This gives rise to an\r\nillusion when, after whirling on our heel, we stand still; for then\r\nobjects appear to continue whirling in the same direction in which, a\r\nmoment previous, our body actually whirled. The reason is that our\r\n\u003ci\u003eeyes\u003c/i\u003e are animated, under these conditions, by an involuntary\r\n\u003ci\u003enystagmus\u003c/i\u003e or oscillation in their orbits, which may easily be observed\r\nin anyone with vertigo after whirling. As these movements are\r\nunconscious, the retinal movement-feelings which they occasion are\r\nnaturally referred to the objects seen. The whole phenomenon fades out\r\nafter a few seconds. And it ceases if we voluntarily fix our eyes upon a\r\ngiven point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is an illusion of movement of the opposite sort, with which every\r\none is familiar at \u003ci\u003erailway stations\u003c/i\u003e. Habitually, when we ourselves\r\nmove forward, our entire field of view glides backward over our retina.\r\nWhen our movement is due to that of the windowed carriage, car, or boat\r\nin which we sit, all stationary objects visible through the window give\r\nus a sensation of gliding in the opposite direction. Hence, whenever we\r\nget this sensation, of a window with \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e objects visible through it\r\nmoving in one direction, we react upon it in our customary way, and\r\nperceive a stationary field of view, over which the window, and we\r\nourselves inside of it, are passing by a motion of our own. Consequently\r\nwhen another train comes alongside of ours in a station, and fills the\r\nentire window, and, after standing still awhile, begins to glide away,\r\nwe judge that it is \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e train which is moving, and that the other\r\ntrain is still. If, however, we catch a glimpse of any part of the\r\nstation through the windows, or between the cars, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_321\" id=\"page_321\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{321}\u003c/span\u003e the other train,\r\nthe illusion of our own movement instantly disappears, and we perceive\r\nthe other train to be the one in motion. This, again, is but making the\r\nusual and probable inference from our sensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAnother illusion due to movement\u003c/i\u003e is explained by Helmholtz. Most\r\nwayside objects, houses, trees, etc., look small when seen from the\r\nwindows of a swift train. This is because we perceive them in the first\r\ninstance unduly near. And we perceive them unduly near because of their\r\nextraordinarily rapid parallactic flight backwards. When we ourselves\r\nmove forward all objects glide backwards, as aforesaid; but the nearer\r\nthey are, the more rapid is this apparent translocation. Relative\r\nrapidity of passage backwards is thus so familiarly associated with\r\nnearness that when we feel it we perceive nearness. But with a given\r\nsize of retinal image the nearer an object is, the smaller do we judge\r\nits actual size to be. Hence in the train, the faster we go, the nearer\r\ndo the trees and houses seem; and the nearer they seem, the smaller\r\n(with that size of retinal image) must they look.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe feelings of our eyes\u0027 convergence, of their accommodation, the size\r\nof the retinal image, etc., may give rise to illusions about the size\r\nand distance of objects, which also belong to this first type.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIllusions of the Second Type.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In this type we perceive a wrong object\r\nbecause our mind is full of the thought of it at the time, and any\r\nsensation which is in the least degree connected with it touches off, as\r\nit were, a train already laid, and gives us a sense that the object is\r\nreally before us. Here is a familiar example:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If a sportsman, while shooting woodcock in cover, sees a bird about the\r\nsize and color of a woodcock get up and fly through the foliage, not\r\nhaving time to see more than that it is a bird of such a size and color,\r\nhe immediately supplies by inference the other qualities of a woodcock,\r\nand is afterwards disgusted to find that he has shot a thrush. I have\r\ndone so myself, and could hardly believe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_322\" id=\"page_322\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{322}\u003c/span\u003e that the thrush was the bird I\r\nfired at, so complete was my mental supplement to my visual\r\nperception.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_40_40\" id=\"FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_40_40\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs with game, so with enemies, ghosts, and the like. Anyone waiting in a\r\ndark place and expecting or fearing strongly a certain object will\r\ninterpret any abrupt sensation to mean that object\u0027s presence. The boy\r\nplaying \u0027I spy,\u0027 the criminal skulking from his pursuers, the\r\nsuperstitious person hurrying through the woods or past the churchyard\r\nat midnight, the man lost in the woods, the girl who tremulously has\r\nmade an evening appointment with her swain, all are subject to illusions\r\nof sight and sound which make their hearts beat till they are dispelled.\r\nTwenty times a day the lover, perambulating the streets with his\r\npreoccupied fancy, will think he perceives his idol\u0027s bonnet before him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Proof-reader\u0027s Illusion.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;I remember one night in Boston, whilst\r\nwaiting for a \u0027Mount Auburn\u0027 car to bring me to Cambridge, reading most\r\ndistinctly that name upon the signboard of a car on which (as I\r\nafterwards learned) \u0027North Avenue\u0027 was painted. The illusion was so\r\nvivid that I could hardly believe my eyes had deceived me. All reading\r\nis more or less performed in this way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Practised novel-or newspaper-readers could not possibly get on so fast\r\nif they had to see accurately every single letter of every word in order\r\nto perceive the words. More than half of the words come out of their\r\nmind, and hardly half from the printed page. Were this not so, did we\r\nperceive each letter by itself, typographic errors in well-known words\r\nwould never be overlooked. Children, whose ideas are not yet ready\r\nenough to perceive words at a glance, read them wrong if they are\r\nprinted wrong, that is, right according to the way of printing. In a\r\nforeign language, although it may be printed with the same letters, we\r\nread by so much the more slowly as we do not understand, or are unable\r\npromptly to perceive, the words. But we notice\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_323\" id=\"page_323\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{323}\u003c/span\u003e misprints all the more\r\nreadily. For this reason Latin and Greek, and still better Hebrew, works\r\nare more correctly printed, because the proofs are better corrected,\r\nthan in German works. Of two friends of mine, one knew much Hebrew, the\r\nother little; the latter, however, gave instruction in Hebrew in a\r\ngymnasium; and when he called the other to help correct his pupils\u0027\r\nexercises, it turned out that he could find out all sorts of little\r\nerrors better than his friend, because the latter\u0027s perception of the\r\nwords as totals was too swift.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_41_41\" id=\"FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_41_41\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTestimony to personal identity is proverbially fallacious\u003c/i\u003e for similar\r\nreasons. A man has witnessed a rapid crime or accident, and carries away\r\nhis mental image. Later he is confronted by a prisoner whom he forthwith\r\nperceives in the light of that image, and recognizes or \u0027identifies\u0027 as\r\nthe criminal, although he may never have been near the spot. Similarly\r\nat the so-called \u0027materializing séances\u0027 which fraudulent mediums give:\r\nin a dark room a man sees a gauze-robed figure who in a whisper tells\r\nhim she is the spirit of his sister, mother, wife, or child, and falls\r\nupon his neck. The darkness, the previous forms, and the expectancy have\r\nso filled his mind with premonitory images that it is no wonder he\r\nperceives what is suggested. These fraudulent \u0027séances\u0027 would furnish\r\nmost precious documents to the psychology of perception, if they could\r\nonly be satisfactorily inquired into. In the hypnotic trance any\r\nsuggested object is sensibly perceived. In certain subjects this happens\r\nmore or less completely after waking from the trance. It would seem that\r\nunder favorable conditions a somewhat similar susceptibility to\r\nsuggestion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_324\" id=\"page_324\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{324}\u003c/span\u003e may exist in certain persons who are not otherwise entranced\r\nat all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis suggestibility obtains in all the senses, although high authorities\r\nhave doubted this power of imagination to falsify present impressions of\r\nsense. Everyone must be able to give instances from the smell-sense.\r\nWhen we have paid the faithless plumber for pretending to mend our\r\ndrains, the intellect inhibits the nose from perceiving the same\r\nunaltered odor, until perhaps several days go by. As regards the\r\nventilation or heating of rooms, we are apt to feel for some time as we\r\nthink we ought to feel. If we believe the ventilator is shut, we feel\r\nthe room close. On discovering it open, the oppression disappears.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the same with touch. Everyone must have felt the sensible quality\r\nchange under his hand, as sudden contact with something moist or hairy,\r\nin the dark, awoke a shock of disgust or fear which faded into calm\r\nrecognition of some familiar object. Even so small a thing as a crumb of\r\npotato on the table-cloth, which we pick up, thinking it a crumb of\r\nbread, feels horrible for a few moments to our fancy, and different from\r\nwhat it is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the sense of hearing, similar mistakes abound. Everyone must recall\r\nsome experience in which sounds have altered their character as soon as\r\nthe intellect referred them to a different source. The other day a\r\nfriend was sitting in my room, when the clock, which has a rich low\r\nchime, began to strike. \"Hollo!\" said he, \"hear that hand-organ in the\r\ngarden,\" and was surprised at finding the real source of the sound. I\r\nhave had myself a striking illusion of the sort. Sitting reading, late\r\none night, I suddenly heard a most formidable noise proceeding from the\r\nupper part of the house, which it seemed to fill. It ceased, and in a\r\nmoment renewed itself. I went into the hall to listen, but it came no\r\nmore. Resuming my seat in the room, however, there it was again, low,\r\nmighty, alarming, like a rising flood or the \u003ci\u003eavant-courier\u003c/i\u003e of an awful\r\ngale. It came from all space. Quite startled, I again went into the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_325\" id=\"page_325\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{325}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhall, but it had already ceased once more. On returning a second time to\r\nthe room, I discovered that it was nothing but the breathing of a little\r\nScotch terrier which lay asleep on the floor. The noteworthy thing is\r\nthat as soon as I recognized what it was, I was compelled to think it a\r\ndifferent sound, and could not then hear it as I had heard it a moment\r\nbefore.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sense of sight is pregnant with illusions of both the types\r\nconsidered. No sense gives such fluctuating impressions of the same\r\nobject as sight does. With no sense are we so apt to treat the\r\nsensations immediately given as mere signs; with none is the invocation\r\nfrom memory of a \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e, and the consequent perception of the latter,\r\nso immediate. The \u0027thing\u0027 which we perceive always resembles, as we\r\nshall hereafter see, the object of some absent sensation, usually\r\nanother optical figure which in our mind has come to be a standard bit\r\nof reality; and it is this incessant reduction of our immediately given\r\noptical objects to more standard and \u0027real\u0027 forms which has led some\r\nauthors into the mistake of thinking that our optical sensations are\r\noriginally and natively of no particular form at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf accidental and occasional illusions of sight many amusing examples\r\nmight be given. Two will suffice. One is a reminiscence of my own. I was\r\nlying in my berth in a steamer listening to the sailors \u0027at their\r\ndevotions with the holystones\u0027 outside; when, on turning my eyes to the\r\nwindow, I perceived with perfect distinctness that the chief-engineer of\r\nthe vessel had entered my state-room, and was standing looking through\r\nthe window at the men at work upon the guards. Surprised at his\r\nintrusion, and also at his intentness and immobility, I remained\r\nwatching him and wondering how long he would stand thus. At last I\r\nspoke; but getting no reply, sat up in my berth, and then saw that what\r\nI had taken for the engineer was my own cap and coat hanging on a peg\r\nbeside the window. The illusion was complete; the engineer was a\r\npeculiar-looking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_326\" id=\"page_326\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{326}\u003c/span\u003e man; and I saw him unmistakably; but after the\r\nillusion had vanished I found it hard voluntarily to make the cap and\r\ncoat look like him at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027\u003cb\u003eApperception.\u003c/b\u003e\u0027\u0026mdash;In Germany since Herbart\u0027s time psychology has always\r\nhad a great deal to say about a process called \u003ci\u003eApperception\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nincoming ideas or sensations are said to be \u0027apperceived\u0027 by \u0027masses\u0027 of\r\nideas already in the mind. It is plain that the process we have been\r\ndescribing as perception is, at this rate, an apperceptive process. So\r\nare all recognition, classing, and naming; and passing beyond these\r\nsimplest suggestions, all farther thoughts about our percepts are\r\napperceptive processes as well. I have myself not used the word\r\napperception, because it has carried very different meanings in the\r\nhistory of philosophy, and \u0027psychic reaction,\u0027 \u0027interpretation,\u0027\r\n\u0027conception,\u0027 \u0027assimilation,\u0027 \u0027elaboration,\u0027 or simply \u0027thought,\u0027 are\r\nperfect synonyms for its Herbartian meaning, widely taken. It is,\r\nmoreover, hardly worth while to pretend to analyze the so-called\r\napperceptive performances beyond the first or perceptive stage, because\r\ntheir variations and degrees are literally innumerable. \u0027Apperception\u0027\r\nis a name for the sum total of the effects of what we have studied as\r\nassociation; and it is obvious that the things which a given experience\r\nwill suggest to a man depend on what Mr. Lewes calls his entire\r\npsychostatical conditions, his nature and stock of ideas, or, in other\r\nwords, his character, habits, memory, education, previous experience,\r\nand momentary mood. We gain no insight into what really occurs either in\r\nthe mind or in the brain by calling all these things the \u0027apperceiving\r\nmass,\u0027 though of course this may upon occasion be convenient. On the\r\nwhole I am inclined to think Mr. Lewes\u0027s term of \u0027assimilation\u0027 the most\r\nfruitful one yet used.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0027apperceiving mass\u0027 is treated by the Germans as the active factor,\r\nthe apperceived sensation as the passive one; the sensation being\r\nusually modified by the ideas in the mind. Out of the interaction of the\r\ntwo, cognition is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_327\" id=\"page_327\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{327}\u003c/span\u003e produced. But as Steinthal remarks, the apperceiving\r\nmass is itself often modified by the sensation. To quote him: \"Although\r\nthe \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e moment commonly shows itself to be the more powerful,\r\napperception-processes can perfectly well occur in which the new\r\nobservation transforms or enriches the apperceiving group of ideas. A\r\nchild who hitherto has seen none but four-cornered tables apperceives a\r\nround one as a table; but by this the apperceiving mass (\u0027table\u0027) is\r\nenriched. To his previous knowledge of tables comes this new feature\r\nthat they need not be four-cornered, but may be round. In the history of\r\nscience it has happened often enough that some discovery, at the same\r\ntime that it was apperceived, i.e. brought into connection with the\r\nsystem of our knowledge, transformed the whole system. In principle,\r\nhowever, we must maintain that, although either factor is both active\r\nand passive, the \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e factor is almost always the more active of\r\nthe two.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_42_42\" id=\"FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_42_42\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGenius and Old-fogyism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This account of Steinthal\u0027s brings out very\r\nclearly the \u003ci\u003edifference between our psychological conceptions and what\r\nare called concepts in logic\u003c/i\u003e. In logic a concept is unalterable; but\r\nwhat are popularly called our \u0027conceptions of things\u0027 alter by being\r\nused. The aim of \u0027Science\u0027 is to attain conceptions so adequate and\r\nexact that we shall never need to change them. There is an everlasting\r\nstruggle in every mind between the tendency to keep unchanged, and the\r\ntendency to renovate, its ideas. Our education is a ceaseless compromise\r\nbetween the conservative and the progressive factors. Every new\r\nexperience must be disposed of under \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e old head. The great point is\r\nto find the head which has to be least altered to take it in. Certain\r\nPolynesian natives, seeing horses for the first time, called them pigs,\r\nthat being the nearest head. My child of two played for a week with the\r\nfirst orange that was given him, calling it a \u0027ball.\u0027 He\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_328\" id=\"page_328\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{328}\u003c/span\u003e called the\r\nfirst whole eggs he saw \u0027potatoes,\u0027 having been accustomed to see his\r\n\u0027eggs\u0027 broken into a glass, and his potatoes without the skin. A folding\r\npocket-corkscrew he unhesitatingly called \u0027bad-scissors.\u0027 Hardly any one\r\nof us can make new heads easily when fresh experiences come. Most of us\r\ngrow more and more enslaved to the stock conceptions with which we have\r\nonce become familiar, and less and less capable of assimilating\r\nimpressions in any but the old ways. Old-fogyism, in short, is the\r\ninevitable terminus to which life sweeps us on. Objects which violate\r\nour established habits of \u0027apperception\u0027 are simply not taken account of\r\nat all; or, if on some occasion we are forced by dint of argument to\r\nadmit their existence, twenty-four hours later the admission is as if it\r\nwere not, and every trace of the unassimilable truth has vanished from\r\nour thought. Genius, in truth, means little more than the faculty of\r\nperceiving in an unhabitual way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, nothing is more congenial, from babyhood to the end\r\nof life, than to be able to assimilate the new to the old, to meet each\r\nthreatening violator or burster of our well-known series of concepts, as\r\nit comes in, see through its unwontedness, and ticket it off as an old\r\nfriend in disguise. This victorious assimilation of the new is in fact\r\nthe type of all intellectual pleasure. The lust for it is scientific\r\ncuriosity. The relation of the new to the old, before the assimilation\r\nis performed, is wonder. We feel neither curiosity nor wonder concerning\r\nthings so far beyond us that we have no concepts to refer them to or\r\nstandards by which to measure them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_43_43\" id=\"FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_43_43\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e The Fuegians, in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_329\" id=\"page_329\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{329}\u003c/span\u003e Darwin\u0027s\r\nvoyage, wondered at the small boats, but took the big ship as a \u0027matter\r\nof course.\u0027 Only what we partly know already inspires us with a desire\r\nto know more. The more elaborate textile fabrics, the vaster works in\r\nmetal, to most of us are like the air, the water, and the ground,\r\nabsolute existences which awaken no ideas. It is a matter of course that\r\nan engraving or a copper-plate inscription should possess that degree of\r\nbeauty. But if we are shown a \u003ci\u003epen\u003c/i\u003e-drawing of equal perfection, our\r\npersonal sympathy with the difficulty of the task makes us immediately\r\nwonder at the skill. The old lady admiring the Academician\u0027s picture\r\nsays to him: \"And is it really all done \u003ci\u003eby hand\u003c/i\u003e?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Physiological Process in Perception.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Enough has now been said to\r\nprove the general law of perception, which is this: that \u003ci\u003ewhilst part of\r\nwhat we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us,\r\nanother part\u003c/i\u003e (and it may be the larger part) \u003ci\u003ealways comes out of our\r\nown mind\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt bottom this is but a case of the general fact that our nerve-centres\r\nare organs for reacting on sense-impressions, and that our hemispheres,\r\nin particular, are given us that records of our past private experience\r\nmay coöperate in the reaction. Of course such a general statement is\r\nvague. If we try to put an exact meaning into it, what we find most\r\nnatural to believe is that the \u003ci\u003ebrain reacts\u003c/i\u003e by paths which the\r\nprevious experiences have worn, \u003ci\u003eand which make us perceive the probable\r\nthing\u003c/i\u003e, i.e., the thing by which on the previous occasions the reaction\r\nwas most frequently aroused. The reaction of the hemispheres consists in\r\nthe lighting up of a certain system of paths by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_330\" id=\"page_330\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{330}\u003c/span\u003e the current entering\r\nfrom the outer world. What corresponds to this mentally is a certain\r\nspecial pulse of thought, the thought, namely, of that most probable\r\nobject. Farther than this in the analysis we can hardly go.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHallucinations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Between normal perception and illusion we have seen\r\nthat there is no break, the \u003ci\u003eprocess\u003c/i\u003e being identically the same in\r\nboth. The last illusions we considered might fairly be called\r\nhallucinations. We must now consider the false perceptions more commonly\r\ncalled by that name. In ordinary parlance hallucination is held to\r\ndiffer from illusion in that, whilst there is an object really there in\r\nillusion, \u003ci\u003ein hallucination there is no objective stimulus at all\u003c/i\u003e. We\r\nshall presently see that this supposed absence of objective stimulus in\r\nhallucination is a mistake, and that hallucinations are often only\r\n\u003ci\u003eextremes\u003c/i\u003e of the perceptive process, in which the secondary cerebral\r\nreaction is out of all normal proportion to the peripheral stimulus\r\nwhich occasions the activity. Hallucinations usually appear abruptly and\r\nhave the character of being forced upon the subject. But they possess\r\nvarious degrees of apparent \u003ci\u003eobjectivity\u003c/i\u003e. One mistake \u003ci\u003ein limine\u003c/i\u003e must\r\nbe guarded against. They are often talked of as \u003ci\u003eimages\u003c/i\u003e projected\r\noutwards by mistake. But where an hallucination is complete, it is much\r\nmore than a mental image. \u003ci\u003eAn hallucination, subjectively considered, is\r\na sensation, as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object\r\nthere.\u003c/i\u003e The object happens not to be there, that is all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe milder degrees of hallucination have been designated as\r\n\u003ci\u003epseudo-hallucinations\u003c/i\u003e. Pseudo-hallucinations and hallucinations have\r\nbeen sharply distinguished from each other only within a few years. From\r\nordinary images of memory and fancy, pseudo-hallucinations differ in\r\nbeing much more vivid, minute, detailed, steady, abrupt, and\r\nspontaneous, in the sense that all feeling of our own activity in\r\nproducing them is lacking. Dr. Kandinsky had a patient who, after taking\r\nopium or haschisch, had abundant pseudo-hallucinations and\r\nhallucinations. As he also\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_331\" id=\"page_331\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{331}\u003c/span\u003e had strong visualizing power and was an\r\neducated physician, the three sorts of phenomena could be easily\r\ncompared. Although projected outwards (usually not farther than the\r\nlimit of distinctest vision, a foot or so), the pseudo-hallucinations\r\n\u003ci\u003elacked the character of objective reality\u003c/i\u003e which the hallucinations\r\npossessed, but, unlike the pictures of imagination, it was almost\r\nimpossible to produce them at will. Most of the \u0027voices\u0027 which people\r\nhear (whether they give rise to delusions or not) are\r\npseudo-hallucinations. They are described as \u0027\u003ci\u003einner\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 voices, although\r\ntheir character is entirely unlike the inner speech of the subject with\r\nhimself. I know several persons who hear such inner voices making\r\nunforeseen remarks whenever they grow quiet and listen for them. They\r\nare a very common incident of delusional insanity, and may at last grow\r\ninto vivid or completely exteriorized hallucinations. The latter are\r\ncomparatively frequent occurrences in sporadic form; and certain\r\nindividuals are liable to have them often. From the results of the\r\n\u0027Census of Hallucinations,\u0027 which was begun by Edmund Gurney, it would\r\nappear that, roughly speaking, one person at least in every ten is\r\nlikely to have had a vivid hallucination at some time in his life. The\r\nfollowing case from a healthy person will give an idea of what these\r\nhallucinations are:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"When a girl of eighteen, I was one evening engaged in a very painful\r\ndiscussion with an elderly person. My distress was so great that I took\r\nup a thick ivory knitting-needle that was lying on the mantelpiece of\r\nthe parlor and broke it into small pieces as I talked. In the midst of\r\nthe discussion I was very wishful to know the opinion of a brother with\r\nwhom I had an unusually close relationship. I turned round and saw him\r\nsitting at the farther side of a centre-table, with his arms folded (an\r\nunusual position with him), but, to my dismay, I perceived from the\r\nsarcastic expression of his mouth that he was not in sympathy with me,\r\nwas not \u0027taking my side,\u0027 as I should\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_332\" id=\"page_332\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{332}\u003c/span\u003e then have expressed it. The\r\nsurprise cooled me, and the discussion was dropped.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Some minutes after, having occasion to speak to my brother, I turned\r\ntowards him, but he was gone. I inquired when he left the room, and was\r\ntold that he had not been in it, which I did not believe, thinking that\r\nhe had come in for a minute and had gone out without being noticed.\r\nAbout an hour and a half afterwards he appeared, and convinced me, with\r\nsome trouble, that he had never been near the house that evening. He is\r\nstill alive and well.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe hallucinations of fever-delirium are a mixture of\r\npseudo-hallucination, true hallucination, and illusion. Those of opium,\r\nhaschish, and belladonna resemble them in this respect. The commonest\r\nhallucination of all is that of hearing one\u0027s own name called aloud.\r\nNearly one half of the sporadic cases which I have collected are of this\r\nsort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHallucination and Illusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Hallucinations are easily produced by\r\nverbal suggestion in hypnotic subjects. Thus, point to a dot on a sheet\r\nof paper, and call it \u0027General Grant\u0027s photograph,\u0027 and your subject\r\nwill see a photograph of the General there instead of the dot. The dot\r\ngives objectivity to the appearance, and the suggested notion of the\r\nGeneral gives it form. Then magnify the dot by a lens; double it by a\r\nprism or by nudging the eyeball; reflect it in a mirror; turn it\r\nupside-down; or wipe it out; and the subject will tell you that the\r\n\u0027photograph\u0027 has been enlarged, doubled, reflected, turned about, or\r\nmade to disappear. In M. Binet\u0027s language, the dot is the outward \u003ci\u003epoint\r\nde repère\u003c/i\u003e which is needed to give objectivity to your suggestion, and\r\nwithout which the latter will only produce an inner image in the\r\nsubject\u0027s mind. M. Binet has shown that such a peripheral \u003ci\u003epoint de\r\nrepère\u003c/i\u003e is used in an enormous number, not only of hypnotic\r\nhallucinations, but of hallucinations of the insane. These latter are\r\noften \u003ci\u003eunilateral\u003c/i\u003e; that is, the patient hears the voices always on one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_333\" id=\"page_333\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{333}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nside of him, or sees the figure only when a certain one of his eyes is\r\nopen. In many of these cases it has been distinctly proved that a morbid\r\nirritation in the internal ear, or an opacity in the humors of the eye,\r\nwas the starting point of the current which the patient\u0027s diseased\r\nacoustic or optical centres clothed with their peculiar products in the\r\nway of ideas. \u003ci\u003eHallucinations produced in this way are \u0027illusions\u0027; and\r\nM. Binet\u0027s theory, that all hallucinations must start in the periphery,\r\nmay be called an attempt to reduce hallucination and illusion to one\r\nphysiological type\u003c/i\u003e, the type, namely, to which normal perception\r\nbelongs. In every case, according to M. Binet, whether of perception, of\r\nhallucination, or of illusion, we get the sensational vividness by means\r\nof a current from the peripheral nerves. It may be a mere trace of a\r\ncurrent. But that trace is enough to kindle the maximal process of\r\ndisintegration in the cells (cf. \u003ca href=\"#page_310\"\u003ep. 310\u003c/a\u003e), and to give to the object\r\nperceived the character of \u003ci\u003eexternality\u003c/i\u003e. What the \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nobject shall be will depend wholly on the particular system of paths in\r\nwhich the process is kindled. Part of the thing in all cases comes from\r\nthe sense-organ, the rest is furnished by the mind. But we cannot by\r\nintrospection distinguish between these parts; and our only formula for\r\nthe result is that the brain has \u003ci\u003ereacted on\u003c/i\u003e the impression in the\r\nresulting way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Binet\u0027s theory accounts indeed for a multitude of cases, but\r\ncertainly not for all. The prism does not always double the false\r\nappearance, nor does the latter always disappear when the eyes are\r\nclosed. For Binet, an abnormally or exclusively active part of the\r\ncortex gives the \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e of what shall appear, whilst a peripheral\r\nsense-organ alone can give the \u003ci\u003eintensity\u003c/i\u003e sufficient to make it appear\r\nprojected into real space. But since this intensity is after all but a\r\nmatter of degree, one does not see why, under rare conditions, the\r\ndegree in question \u003ci\u003emight\u003c/i\u003e not be attained by inner causes exclusively.\r\nIn that case we should have certain hallucinations centrally initiated,\r\nas well as the peripherally initiated hallucinations which are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_334\" id=\"page_334\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{334}\u003c/span\u003e the only\r\nsort that M. Binet\u0027s theory allows. \u003ci\u003eIt seems probable on the whole,\r\ntherefore, that centrally initiated hallucinations can exist.\u003c/i\u003e How often\r\nthey do exist is another question. The existence of hallucinations which\r\naffect more than one sense is an argument for central initiation. For,\r\ngrant that the thing seen may have its starting point in the outer\r\nworld, the voice which it is heard to utter must be due to an influence\r\nfrom the visual region, i.e. must be of central origin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSporadic cases of hallucination, visiting people only once in a lifetime\r\n(which seem to be a quite frequent type), are on any theory hard to\r\nunderstand in detail. They are often extraordinarily complete; and the\r\nfact that many of them are reported as \u003ci\u003everidical\u003c/i\u003e, that is, as\r\ncoinciding with real events, such as accidents, deaths, etc., of the\r\npersons seen, is an additional complication of the phenomenon. The first\r\nreally scientific study of hallucination in all its possible bearings,\r\non the basis of a large mass of empirical material, was begun by Mr.\r\nEdmund Gurney and is continued by other members of the Society for\r\nPsychical Research; and the \u0027Census\u0027 is now being applied to several\r\ncountries under the auspices of the International Congress of\r\nExperimental Psychology. It is to be hoped that out of these combined\r\nlabors something solid will eventually grow. The facts shade off into\r\nthe phenomena of motor automatism, trance, etc.; and nothing but a wide\r\ncomparative study can give really instructive results.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_44_44\" id=\"FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_44_44\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_335\" id=\"page_335\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{335}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XXI\" id=\"CHAPTER_XXI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXI.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs adult thinkers we have a definite and apparently instantaneous\r\nknowledge of the sizes, shapes, and distances of the things amongst\r\nwhich we live and move; and we have moreover a practically definite\r\nnotion of the whole great infinite continuum of real space in which the\r\nworld swings and in which all these things are located. Nevertheless it\r\nseems obvious that the baby\u0027s world is vague and confused in all these\r\nrespects. How does our definite knowledge of space grow up? This is one\r\nof the quarrelsome problems in psychology. This chapter must be so brief\r\nthat there will be no room for the polemic and historic aspects of the\r\nsubject, and I will state simply and dogmatically the conclusions which\r\nseem most plausible to me.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe quality of voluminousness\u003c/b\u003e exists in all sensations, just as\r\nintensity does. We call the reverberations of a thunder-storm more\r\nvoluminous than the squeaking of a slate-pencil; the entrance into a\r\nwarm bath gives our skin a more massive feeling than the prick of a pin;\r\na little neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face, seems less\r\nextensive than the heavy soreness of a boil or the vast discomfort of a\r\ncolic or a lumbago; and a solitary star looks smaller than the noonday\r\nsky. Muscular sensations and semicircular-canal sensations have volume.\r\nSmells and tastes are not without it; and sensations from our inward\r\norgans have it in a marked degree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRepletion and emptiness, suffocation, palpitation, headache, are\r\nexamples of this, and certainly not less spatial is the consciousness we\r\nhave of our general bodily condition\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_336\" id=\"page_336\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{336}\u003c/span\u003e in nausea, fever, heavy\r\ndrowsiness, and fatigue. Our entire cubic content seems then sensibly\r\nmanifest to us as such, and feels much larger than any local pulsation,\r\npressure, or discomfort. Skin and retina are, however, the organs in\r\nwhich the space-element plays the most active part. Not only does the\r\nmaximal vastness yielded by the retina surpass that yielded by any other\r\norgan, but the intricacy with which our attention can subdivide this\r\nvastness and perceive it to be composed of lesser portions\r\nsimultaneously coexisting alongside of each other is without a parallel\r\nelsewhere. The ear gives a greater vastness than the skin, but is\r\nconsiderably less able to subdivide it. The \u003ci\u003evastness, moreover, is as\r\ngreat in one direction as in another\u003c/i\u003e. Its dimensions are so vague that\r\nin it there is no question as yet of surface as opposed to depth;\r\n\u0027volume\u0027 being the best short name for the sensation in question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSensations of different orders are roughly comparable with each other\r\nas to their volumes.\u003c/i\u003e Persons born blind are said to be surprised at the\r\nlargeness with which objects appear to them when their sight is\r\nrestored. Franz says of his patient cured of cataract: \"He saw\r\neverything much larger than he had supposed from the idea obtained by\r\nhis sense of touch. Moving, and especially living, objects appeared very\r\nlarge.\" Loud sounds have a certain enormousness of feeling. \u0027Glowing\u0027\r\nbodies as Hering says, give us a perception \"which seems \u003ci\u003eroomy\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci\u003eraumhaft\u003c/i\u003e) in comparison with that of strictly surface-color. A\r\nglowing iron looks luminous through and through, and so does a flame.\"\r\nThe interior of one\u0027s mouth-cavity feels larger when explored by the\r\ntongue than when looked at. The crater of a newly-extracted tooth, and\r\nthe movements of a loose tooth in its socket, feel quite monstrous. A\r\nmidge buzzing against the drum of the ear will often seem as big as a\r\nbutterfly. The pressure of the air in the tympanic cavity upon the\r\nmembrane gives an astonishingly large sensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe voluminousness of the feeling seems to bear very little relation to\r\nthe size of the organ that yields it.\u003c/i\u003e The ear and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_337\" id=\"page_337\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{337}\u003c/span\u003e eye are\r\ncomparatively minute organs, yet they give us feelings of great volume.\r\nThe same lack of exact proportion between size of feeling and size of\r\norgan affected obtains within the limits of particular sensory organs.\r\nAn object appears smaller on the lateral portions of the retina than it\r\ndoes on the fovea, as may be easily verified by holding the two\r\nforefingers parallel and a couple of inches apart, and transferring the\r\ngaze of one eye from one to the other. Then the finger not directly\r\nlooked at will appear to shrink. On the skin, if two points kept\r\nequidistant (blunted compass-or scissors-points, for example) be drawn\r\nalong so as really to describe a pair of parallel lines, the lines will\r\nappear farther apart in some spots than in others. If, for example, we\r\ndraw them across the face, the person experimented upon will feel as if\r\nthey began to diverge near the mouth and to include it in a well-marked\r\nellipse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_65\" id=\"ill_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 278px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-337-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-337-sml.png\" width=\"278\" height=\"162\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 65\u003c/span\u003e (after Weber).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe dotted lines give the real course of the points, the continuous\r\nlines the course as felt.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNow my first thesis is that this extensity\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ediscernible in each and\r\nevery sensation, though more developed in some than in others\u003c/i\u003e, \u003csmall\u003eIS THE\r\nORIGINAL SENSATION OF SPACE\u003c/small\u003e, out of which all the exact knowledge about\r\nspace that we afterwards come to have is woven by processes of\r\ndiscrimination, association, and selection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Construction of Real Space.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To the babe who first opens his senses\r\nupon the world, though the experience is one of vastness or extensity,\r\nit is of an extensity within\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_338\" id=\"page_338\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{338}\u003c/span\u003e which no definite divisions, directions,\r\nsizes, or distances are yet marked out. Potentially, the room in which\r\nthe child is born is subdivisible into a multitude of parts, fixed or\r\nmovable, which at any given moment of time have definite relations to\r\neach other and to his person. Potentially, too, this room taken as a\r\nwhole can be prolonged in various directions by the addition to it of\r\nthose farther-lying spaces which constitute the outer world. But\r\nactually the further spaces are unfelt, and the subdivisions are\r\nundiscriminated, by the babe; the chief part of whose education during\r\nhis first year of life consists in his becoming acquainted with them and\r\nrecognizing and identifying them in detail. This process may be called\r\nthat of the \u003ci\u003econstruction of real space\u003c/i\u003e, as a newly apprehended object,\r\nout of the original chaotic experiences of vastness. It consists of\r\nseveral subordinate processes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, the total object of vision or of feeling at any time \u003ci\u003emust have\r\nsmaller objects definitely discriminated within it\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecondly, \u003ci\u003eobjects seen or tasted must be identified with objects felt,\r\nheard\u003c/i\u003e, etc., and \u003ci\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e, so that \u003ci\u003ethe same \u0027thing\u0027\u003c/i\u003e may come to\r\nbe recognized, although apprehended in such widely differing ways;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThird, the total extent felt at any time must be conceived as\r\n\u003ci\u003edefinitely located in the midst of the surrounding extents of which the\r\nworld consists\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFourth, these objects \u003ci\u003emust appear arranged in definite order\u003c/i\u003e in the\r\nso-called three dimensions; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFifth, their relative sizes must be perceived\u0026mdash;in other words, \u003ci\u003ethey\r\nmust be measured\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us take these processes in regular order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) \u003cb\u003eSubdivision or Discrimination.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Concerning this there is not much to\r\nbe added to what was set forth in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIV\"\u003eChapter XIV\u003c/a\u003e. Moving parts, sharp\r\nparts, brightly colored parts of the total field of perception \u0027catch\r\nthe attention\u0027 and are then discerned as special objects surrounded by\r\nthe remainder of the field of view or touch. That when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_339\" id=\"page_339\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{339}\u003c/span\u003e such objects are\r\ndiscerned apart they should appear as thus surrounded, must be set down\r\nas an ultimate fact of our sensibility of which no farther account can\r\nbe given. Later, as one partial object of this sort after another has\r\nbecome familiar and identifiable, the attention can be caught by more\r\nthan one at once. We then see or feel a number of distinct objects\r\nalongside of each other in the general extended field. The\r\n\u0027alongsideness\u0027 is in the first instance vague\u0026mdash;it may not carry with it\r\nthe sense of definite directions or distances\u0026mdash;and it too must be\r\nregarded as an ultimate fact of our sensibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) \u003cb\u003eCoalescence of Different Sensations into the Same \u0027Thing.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When two\r\nsenses are impressed simultaneously we tend to identify their objects as\r\n\u003ci\u003eone thing\u003c/i\u003e. When a conductor is brought near the skin, the snap heard,\r\nthe spark seen, and the sting felt, are all located together and\r\nbelieved to be different aspects of one entity, the \u0027electric\r\ndischarge.\u0027 The space of the seen object fuses with the space of the\r\nheard object and with that of the felt object by an ultimate law of our\r\nconsciousness, which is that we simplify, unify, and identify as much as\r\nwe possibly can. \u003ci\u003eWhatever sensible data can be attended to together we\r\nlocate together. Their several extents seem one extent. The place at\r\nwhich each clears is held to be the same with the place at which the\r\nothers appear.\u003c/i\u003e This is the first and great \u0027act\u0027 by which our world\r\ngets spatially arranged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this \u003ci\u003ecoalescence in a \u0027thing,\u0027\u003c/i\u003e one of the coalescing sensations is\r\nheld to \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e the thing, the other sensations are taken for its more or\r\nless accidental \u003ci\u003eproperties\u003c/i\u003e, or modes of appearance. The sensation\r\nchosen to be essentially the thing is the most constant and practically\r\nimportant of the lot; most often it is hardness or weight. But the\r\nhardness or weight is never without tactile bulk; and as we can always\r\nsee something in our hand when we feel something there, we equate the\r\nbulk felt with the bulk seen, and thenceforward this common bulk is also\r\napt to figure as of the essence of the \u0027thing.\u0027 Frequently a shape so\r\nfigures,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_340\" id=\"page_340\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{340}\u003c/span\u003e sometimes a temperature, a taste, etc.; but for the most part\r\ntemperature, smell, sound, color, or whatever other phenomena may\r\nvividly impress us simultaneously with the bulk felt or seen, figure\r\namong the accidents. Smell and sound impress us, it is true, when we\r\nneither see nor touch the thing; but they are strongest when we see or\r\ntouch, so we locate the \u003ci\u003esource\u003c/i\u003e of these properties within the touched\r\nor seen space, whilst the properties themselves we regard as overflowing\r\nin a weakened form into the spaces filled by other things. \u003ci\u003eIn all this,\r\nit will be observed, the sense-data whose spaces coalesce into one are\r\nyielded by different sense-organs.\u003c/i\u003e Such data have no tendency to\r\ndisplace each other from consciousness, but can be attended to together\r\nall at once. Often indeed they vary concomitantly and reach a maximum\r\ntogether. We may be sure, therefore, that the general rule of our mind\r\nis to locate \u003csmall\u003eIN\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eeach other\u003c/i\u003e all sensations which are associated in\r\nsimultaneous experience and do not interfere with each other\u0027s\r\nperception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) \u003cb\u003eThe Sense of the Surrounding World.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eDifferent impressions on the\r\nsame sense-organ\u003c/i\u003e do interfere with each other\u0027s perception and cannot\r\nwell be attended to at once. Hence \u003ci\u003ewe do not locate them in each\r\nother\u0027s spaces, but arrange them in a serial order of exteriority, each\r\nalongside of the rest, in a space larger than that which any one\r\nsensation brings\u003c/i\u003e. We can usually recover anything lost from our sight\r\nby moving our eyes back in its direction; and it is through these\r\nconstant changes that every field of seen things comes at last to be\r\nthought of as always having a fringe of \u003ci\u003eother things possible to be\r\nseen\u003c/i\u003e spreading in all directions round about it. Meanwhile the\r\nmovements concomitantly with which the various fields alternate are also\r\nfelt and remembered; and gradually (through association) this and that\r\nmovement come in our thought to suggest this or that extent of fresh\r\nobjects introduced. Gradually, too, since the objects vary indefinitely\r\nin kind, we abstract from their several natures and think separately\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_341\" id=\"page_341\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{341}\u003c/span\u003e of\r\ntheir mere extents, of which extents the various movements remain as the\r\nonly constant introducers and associates. More and more, therefore, do\r\nwe think of movement and seen extent as mutually involving each other,\r\nuntil at last we may get to regard them as synonymous; and, empty space\r\nthen meaning for us mere \u003ci\u003eroom for movement\u003c/i\u003e, we may, if we are\r\npsychologists, readily but erroneously assign to the \u0027muscular sense\u0027\r\nthe chief rôle in perceiving extensiveness at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4) \u003cb\u003eThe Serial Order of Locations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The muscular sense \u003ci\u003ehas\u003c/i\u003e much to do\r\nwith defining the \u003ci\u003eorder of position\u003c/i\u003e of things seen, felt, or heard. We\r\nlook at a point; another point upon the retina\u0027s margin catches our\r\nattention, and in an instant we turn the fovea upon it, letting its\r\nimage successively fall upon all the points of the intervening retinal\r\nline. The line thus traced so rapidly by the second point is itself a\r\nvisual object, with the first and second point at its respective ends.\r\nIt \u003ci\u003eseparates\u003c/i\u003e the points, which become \u003ci\u003elocated by its length\u003c/i\u003e with\r\nreference to each other. If a third point catch the attention, more\r\nperipheral still than the second point, then a still greater movement of\r\nthe eyeball and a continuation of the line will result, the second point\r\nnow appearing \u003ci\u003ebetween\u003c/i\u003e the first and third. Every moment of our life,\r\nperipherally-lying objects are drawing lines like this between\r\nthemselves and other objects which they displace from our attention as\r\nwe bring them to the centre of our field of view. Each peripheral\r\nretinal point comes in this way to \u003ci\u003esuggest\u003c/i\u003e a line at the end of which\r\nit lies, a line which a possible movement will trace; and even the\r\nmotionless field of vision ends at last by signifying a system of\r\npositions brought out by possible movements between its centre and all\r\nperipheral parts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the same with our skin and joints. By moving our hand over objects\r\nwe trace lines of direction, and new impressions arise at their ends.\r\nThe \u0027lines\u0027 are sometimes on the articular surfaces, sometimes on the\r\nskin as well; in either case they give a definite order of arrangement\r\nto the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_342\" id=\"page_342\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{342}\u003c/span\u003e successive objects between which they intervene. Similarly with\r\nsounds and smells. With our heads in a certain position, a certain sound\r\nor a certain smell is most distinct. Turning our head makes this\r\nexperience fainter and brings another sound, or another smell, to its\r\nmaximum. The two sounds or smells are thus separated by the movement\r\nlocated at its ends, the movement itself being realized as a sweep\r\nthrough space whose value is given partly by the semicircular-canal\r\nfeeling, partly by the articular cartilages of the neck, and partly by\r\nthe impressions produced upon the eye.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy such general principles of action as these everything looked at,\r\nfelt, smelt, or heard comes to be located in a more or less definite\r\nposition relatively to other collateral things either actually presented\r\nor only imagined as possibly there. I say \u0027collateral\u0027 things, for I\r\nprefer not to complicate the account just yet with any special\r\nconsideration of the \u0027third dimension,\u0027 distance, or depth, as it has\r\nbeen called.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3) \u003cb\u003eThe Measurement of Things in Terms of Each Other.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Here the first\r\nthing that seems evident is that we have no \u003ci\u003eimmediate\u003c/i\u003e power of\r\ncomparing together with any accuracy the extents revealed by different\r\nsensations. Our mouth-cavity feels indeed to the tongue larger than it\r\nfeels to the finger or eye, our lips feel larger than a surface equal to\r\nthem on our thigh. So much comparison is immediate; but it is vague; and\r\nfor anything exact we must resort to other help.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe great agent in comparing the extent felt by one sensory surface\r\nwith that felt by another is superposition\u0026mdash;superposition of one surface\r\nupon another, and superposition of one outer thing upon many surfaces.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo surfaces of skin superposed on each other are felt simultaneously,\r\nand by the law laid down on \u003ca href=\"#page_339\"\u003ep. 339\u003c/a\u003e are judged to occupy an identical\r\nplace. Similarly of our hand, when seen and felt at the same time by its\r\nresident sensibility.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_343\" id=\"page_343\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{343}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn these identifications and reductions of the many to the one it must\r\nbe noticed that \u003ci\u003ewhen the resident sensations of largeness of two\r\nopposed surfaces conflict, one of the sensations is chosen as the true\r\nstandard and the other treated as illusory. Thus an empty tooth-socket\r\nis believed to be\u003c/i\u003e really smaller than the finger-tip which it will not\r\nadmit, although it may \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e larger; and in general it may be said that\r\nthe hand, as the almost exclusive organ of palpation, gives its own\r\nmagnitude to the other parts, instead of having its size determined by\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even though exploration of one surface by another were impossible,\r\n\u003ci\u003ewe could always measure our various surfaces against each other by\r\napplying the same extended object first to one and then to another\u003c/i\u003e. We\r\nmight of course at first suppose that the object itself waxed and waned\r\nas it glided from one place to another (cf. above, \u003ca href=\"#ill_65\"\u003eFig. 65\u003c/a\u003e); but the\r\nprinciple of simplifying as much as possible our world would soon drive\r\nus out of that assumption into the easier one that objects as a rule\r\nkeep their sizes, and that most of our sensations are affected by errors\r\nfor which a constant allowance must be made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the retina there is no reason to suppose that the bignesses of two\r\nimpressions (lines or blotches) falling on different regions are at\r\nfirst felt to stand in any exact mutual ratio. But if the impressions\r\ncome from the \u003ci\u003esame object\u003c/i\u003e, then we might judge their sizes to be just\r\nthe same. This, however, only when the relation of the object to the eye\r\nis believed to be on the whole unchanged. When the object, by moving,\r\nchanges its relations to the eye, the sensation excited by its image\r\neven on the same retinal region becomes so fluctuating that we end by\r\nascribing no absolute import whatever to the retinal space-feeling which\r\nat any moment we may receive. So complete does this overlooking of\r\nretinal magnitude become that it is next to impossible to compare the\r\nvisual magnitudes of objects at different distances without making the\r\nexperiment of superposition. We cannot say beforehand how much of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_344\" id=\"page_344\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{344}\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndistant house or tree our finger will cover. The various answers to the\r\nfamiliar question, How large is the moon?\u0026mdash;answers which vary from a\r\ncartwheel to a wafer\u0026mdash;illustrate this most strikingly. The hardest part\r\nof the training of a young draughtsman is his learning to feel directly\r\nthe retinal (i.e. primitively sensible) magnitudes which the different\r\nobjects in the field of view subtend. To do this he must recover what\r\nRuskin calls the \u0027innocence of the eye\u0027\u0026mdash;that is, a sort of childish\r\nperception of stains of color merely as such, without consciousness of\r\nwhat they mean.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the rest of us this innocence is lost. \u003ci\u003eOut of all the visual\r\nmagnitudes of each known object we have selected one as the \u0027real\u0027 one\r\nto think of, and degraded all the others to serve as its signs.\u003c/i\u003e This\r\nreal magnitude is determined by æsthetic and practical interests. It is\r\nthat which we get when the object is at the distance most propitious for\r\nexact visual discrimination of its details. This is the distance at\r\nwhich we hold anything we are examining. Farther than this we see it too\r\nsmall, nearer too large. And the larger and the smaller feeling vanish\r\nin the act of suggesting this one, their more important \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e. As I\r\nlook along the dining-table I overlook the fact that the farther plates\r\nand glasses \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e so much smaller than my own, for I \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e that they\r\nare all equal in size; and the feeling of them, which is a present\r\nsensation, is eclipsed in the glare of the knowledge, which is a merely\r\nimagined one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIt is the same with shape as with size.\u003c/i\u003e Almost all the visible shapes\r\nof things are what we call perspective \u0027distortions.\u0027 Square table-tops\r\nconstantly present two acute and two obtuse angles; circles drawn on our\r\nwall-papers, our carpets, or on sheets of paper, usually show like\r\nellipses; parallels approach as they recede; human bodies are\r\nforeshortened; and the transitions from one to another of these altering\r\nforms are infinite and continual. Out of the flux, however, one phase\r\nalways stands prominent. It is the form the object has when we see it\r\neasiest and best: and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_345\" id=\"page_345\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{345}\u003c/span\u003e that is when our eyes and the object both are in\r\nwhat may be called \u003ci\u003ethe normal position\u003c/i\u003e. In this position our head is\r\nupright and our optic axes either parallel or symmetrically convergent;\r\nthe plane of the object is perpendicular to the visual plane; and if the\r\nobject is one containing many lines, it is turned so as to make them, as\r\nfar as possible, either parallel or perpendicular to the visual plane.\r\nIn this situation it is that we compare all shapes with each other; here\r\nevery exact measurement and every decision is made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMost sensations are signs to us of other sensations whose space-value is\r\nheld to be more real.\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe thing as it would appear to the eye if it\r\nwere in the normal position is what we think of\u003c/i\u003e whenever we get one of\r\nthe other optical views. Only as represented in the normal position do\r\nwe believe we see the object as it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e; elsewhere, only as it seems.\r\nExperience and custom soon teach us, however, that the seeming\r\nappearance passes into the real one by continuous gradations. They teach\r\nus, moreover, that seeming and being may be strangely interchanged. Now\r\na real circle may slide into a seeming ellipse; now an ellipse may, by\r\nsliding in the same direction, become a seeming circle; now a\r\nrectangular cross grows slant-legged; now a slant-legged one grows\r\nrectangular.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlmost any form in oblique vision may be thus a derivative of almost any\r\nother in \u0027primary\u0027 vision; and we must learn, when we get one of the\r\nformer appearances, to translate it into the appropriate one of the\r\nlatter class; we must learn of what optical \u0027reality\u0027 it is one of the\r\noptical signs. Having learned this, we do but obey that law of economy\r\nor simplification which dominates our whole psychic life, when we think\r\nexclusively of the \u0027reality\u0027 and ignore as much as our consciousness\r\nwill let us the \u0027sign\u0027 by which we came to apprehend it. The signs of\r\neach probable real thing being multiple and the thing itself one and\r\nfixed, we gain the same mental relief by abandoning the former for the\r\nlatter that we do when we abandon mental images, with all their\r\nfluctuating characters, for the definite and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_346\" id=\"page_346\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{346}\u003c/span\u003e unchangeable \u003ci\u003enames\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nthey suggest. The selection of the several \u0027normal\u0027 appearances from out\r\nof the jungle of our optical experiences, to serve as the real sights of\r\nwhich we shall think, has thus some analogy to the habit of thinking in\r\nwords, in that by both we substitute terms few and fixed for terms\r\nmanifold and vague.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf an optical sensation can thus be a mere sign to recall another\r\nsensation of the same sense, judged more real, \u003ci\u003ea fortiori\u003c/i\u003e can\r\nsensations of one sense be signs of realities which are objects of\r\nanother. Smells and tastes make us believe the \u003ci\u003evisible\u003c/i\u003e cologne-bottle,\r\nstrawberry, or cheese to be there. Sights suggest objects of touch,\r\ntouches suggest objects of sight, etc. In all this substitution and\r\nsuggestive recall the only law that holds good is that in general the\r\nmost \u003ci\u003einteresting\u003c/i\u003e of the sensations which the \u0027thing\u0027 can give us is\r\nheld to represent its real nature most truly. It is a case of the\r\nselective activity mentioned on \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003ep. 170\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Third Dimension or Distance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This service of sensations as mere\r\nsigns, to be ignored when they have evoked the other sensations which\r\nare their significates, was noticed first by Berkeley in his new theory\r\nof vision. He dwelt particularly on the fact that the signs were not\r\n\u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e signs, but properties of the object merely \u003ci\u003eassociated by\r\nexperience\u003c/i\u003e with the more real aspects of it which they recall. The\r\ntangible \u0027feel\u0027 of a thing, and the \u0027look\u0027 of it to the eye, have\r\nabsolutely no point in common, said Berkeley; and if I think of the look\r\nof it when I get the feel, or think of the feel when I get the look,\r\nthat is merely due to the fact that I have on so many previous occasions\r\nhad the two sensations at once. When we open our eyes, for example, we\r\nthink we see how far off the object is. But this feeling of distance,\r\naccording to Berkeley, cannot possibly be a retinal sensation, for a\r\npoint in outer space can only impress our retina by the single dot which\r\nit projects \u0027in the fund of the eye,\u0027 and this dot is the same for \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndistances. Distance from the eye, Berkeley considered not to be an\r\noptical object at all, but an object of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_347\" id=\"page_347\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{347}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003etouch\u003c/i\u003e, of which we have\r\noptical signs of various sorts, such as the image\u0027s apparent magnitude,\r\nits \u0027faintness\u0027 or \u0027confusion,\u0027 and the \u0027strain\u0027 of accommodation and\r\nconvergence. By distance being an object of \u0027touch,\u0027 Berkeley meant that\r\nour notion of it consists in ideas of the amount of muscular movement of\r\narm or legs which would be required to place our hand upon the object.\r\nMost authors have agreed with Berkeley that creatures unable to move\r\neither their eyes or limbs would have no notion whatever of distance or\r\nthe third dimension.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis opinion seems to me unjustifiable. I cannot get over the fact that\r\nall our sensations are of \u003ci\u003evolume\u003c/i\u003e, and that the primitive field of view\r\n(however imperfectly distance may be discriminated or measured in it)\r\ncannot be of something \u003ci\u003eflat\u003c/i\u003e, as these authors unanimously maintain.\r\nNor can I get over the fact that distance, when I see it, is a genuinely\r\n\u003ci\u003eoptical feeling\u003c/i\u003e, even though I be at a loss to assign any one\r\nphysiological process in the organ of vision to the varying degrees of\r\nwhich the variations of the feeling uniformly correspond. It is awakened\r\nby all the optical signs which Berkeley mentioned, and by more besides,\r\nsuch as Wheatstone\u0027s binocular disparity, and by the parallax which\r\nfollows on slightly moving the head. When awakened, however, it seems\r\noptical, and not heterogeneous with the other two dimensions of the\r\nvisual field.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mutual equivalencies of the distance-dimension with the up-and-down\r\nand right-to-left dimensions of the field of view can easily be settled\r\nwithout resorting to experiences of touch. A being reduced to a single\r\neyeball would perceive the same tridimensional world which we do, if he\r\nhad our intellectual powers. For the \u003ci\u003esame moving things\u003c/i\u003e, by\r\nalternately covering different parts of his retina, would determine the\r\nmutual equivalencies of the first two dimensions of the field of view;\r\nand by exciting the physiological cause of his perception of depth in\r\nvarious degrees, they would establish a scale of equivalency between the\r\nfirst two and the third.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_348\" id=\"page_348\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{348}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, one of the sensations given by the object would be chosen\r\nto represent its \u0027real\u0027 size and shape, in accordance with the\r\nprinciples so lately laid down. One sensation would measure the \u0027thing\u0027\r\npresent, and the \u0027thing\u0027 would measure the other sensations\u0026mdash;the\r\nperipheral parts of the retina would be equated with the central by\r\nreceiving the image of the same object. This needs no elucidation in\r\ncase the object does not change its distance or its front. But suppose,\r\nto take a more complicated case, that the object is a stick, seen first\r\nin its whole length, and then rotated round one of its ends; let this\r\nfixed end be the one near the eye. In this movement the stick\u0027s image\r\nwill grow progressively shorter; its farther end will appear less and\r\nless separated laterally from its fixed near end; soon it will be\r\nscreened by the latter, and then reappear on the opposite side, the\r\nimage there finally resuming its original length. Suppose this movement\r\nto become a familiar experience; the mind will presumably react upon it\r\nafter its usual fashion (which is that of unifying all data which it is\r\nin any way possible to unify), and consider it the movement of a\r\nconstant object rather than the transformation of a fluctuating one.\r\nNow, the \u003ci\u003esensation of depth\u003c/i\u003e which it receives during the experience is\r\nawakened more by the far than by the near end of the object. But how\r\nmuch depth? What shall measure its amount? Why, at the moment the far\r\nend is about to be eclipsed, the difference of its distance from the\r\nnear end\u0027s distance must be judged equal to the stick\u0027s whole length;\r\nbut that length has already been seen and measured by a certain visual\r\nsensation of breadth. \u003ci\u003eSo we find that given amounts of the visual\r\ndepth-feeling become signs of given amounts of the visual\r\nbreadth-feeling, depth becoming equated with breadth. The measurement of\r\ndistance is, as Berkeley truly said, a result of suggestion and\r\nexperience. But visual experience alone is adequate to produce it, and\r\nthis he erroneously denied.\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_349\" id=\"page_349\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{349}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Part played by the Intellect in Space-perception.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But although\r\nBerkeley was wrong in his assertion that out of optical experience alone\r\nno perception of distance can be evolved, he gave a great impetus to\r\npsychology by showing how originally incoherent and incommensurable in\r\nrespect of their extensiveness our different sensations are, and how our\r\nactually so rapid space-perceptions are almost altogether acquired by\r\neducation. Touch-space is one world; sight-space is another world. The\r\ntwo worlds have no essential or intrinsic congruence, and only through\r\nthe \u0027association of ideas\u0027 do we know what a seen object signifies in\r\nterms of touch. Persons with congenital cataracts relieved by surgical\r\naid, whose world until the operation has been a world of tangibles\r\nexclusively, are ludicrously unable at first to name any of the objects\r\nwhich newly fall upon their eye. \"It might very well be \u003ci\u003ea horse\u003c/i\u003e,\" said\r\nthe latest patient of this sort of whom we have an account, when a\r\n10-litre bottle was held up a foot from his face.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_45_45\" id=\"FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_45_45\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e Neither do such\r\npatients have any accurate notion in motor terms of the relative\r\ndistances of things from their eyes. All such confusions very quickly\r\ndisappear with practice, and the novel optical sensations translate\r\nthemselves into the familiar language of touch. The facts do not prove\r\nin the least that the optical sensations are not \u003ci\u003espatial\u003c/i\u003e, but only\r\nthat it needs a subtler sense for analogy than most people have, to\r\ndiscern the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e spatial aspects and relations in them which\r\npreviously-known tactile and motor experiences have yielded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConclusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To sum up, the whole history of space-perception is\r\nexplicable if we admit on the one hand sensations with certain amounts\r\nof extensity native to them, and on the other the ordinary powers of\r\ndiscrimination, selection, and association in the mind\u0027s dealings with\r\nthem. The fluctuating import of many of our optical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_350\" id=\"page_350\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{350}\u003c/span\u003e sensations, the\r\nsame sensation being so ambiguous as regards size, shape, locality, and\r\nthe like, has led many to believe that such attributes as these could\r\nnot possibly be the result of sensation at all, but must come from some\r\nhigher power of intuition, synthesis, or whatever it might be called.\r\nBut the fact that a present sensation can at any time become the sign of\r\na represented one judged to be more real, sufficiently accounts for all\r\nthe phenomena without the need of supposing that the quality of\r\nextensity is created out of non-extensive experiences by a\r\nsuper-sensational faculty of the mind.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_351\" id=\"page_351\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{351}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XXII\" id=\"CHAPTER_XXII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eREASONING.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhat Reasoning is.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We talk of man being the rational animal; and the\r\ntraditional intellectualist philosophy has always made a great point of\r\ntreating the brutes as wholly irrational creatures. Nevertheless, it is\r\nby no means easy to decide just what is meant by reason, or how the\r\npeculiar thinking process called reasoning differs from other\r\nthought-sequences which may lead to similar results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMuch of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by\r\nanother, of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems likely enough\r\nthat the higher brutes should be capable. This sort of thinking leads\r\nnevertheless to rational conclusions, both practical and theoretical.\r\nThe links between the terms are either \u0027contiguity\u0027 or \u0027similarity,\u0027 and\r\nwith a mixture of both these things we can hardly be very incoherent. As\r\na rule, in this sort of irresponsible thinking, the terms which fall to\r\nbe coupled together are empirical concretes, not abstractions. A sunset\r\nmay call up the vessel\u0027s deck from which I saw one last summer, the\r\ncompanions of my voyage, my arrival into port, etc.; or it may make me\r\nthink of solar myths, of Hercules\u0027 and Hector\u0027s funeral pyres, of Homer\r\nand whether he could write, of the Greek alphabet, etc. If habitual\r\ncontiguities predominate, we have a prosaic mind; if rare contiguities,\r\nor similarities, have free play, we call the person fanciful, poetic, or\r\nwitty. But the thought as a rule is of matters taken in their entirety.\r\nHaving been thinking of one, we find later that we are thinking of\r\nanother, to which we have been lifted along, we hardly know how. If an\r\nabstract\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_352\" id=\"page_352\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{352}\u003c/span\u003e quality figures in the procession, it arrests our attention\r\nbut for a moment, and fades into something else; and is never very\r\nabstract. Thus, in thinking of the sun-myths, we may have a gleam of\r\nadmiration at the gracefulness of the primitive human mind, or a moment\r\nof disgust at the narrowness of modern interpreters. But, in the main,\r\nwe think less of qualities than of concrete things, real or possible,\r\njust as we may experience them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur thought here may be rational, but it is not \u003ci\u003ereasoned\u003c/i\u003e, is not\r\nreasoning in the strict sense of the term. In reasoning, although our\r\nresults may be thought of as concrete things, they are \u003ci\u003enot suggested\r\nimmediately by other concrete things\u003c/i\u003e, as in the trains of simply\r\nassociative thought. They are linked to the concretes which precede them\r\nby intermediate steps, and these steps are formed by \u003ci\u003eabstract general\r\ncharacters\u003c/i\u003e articulately denoted and expressly analyzed out. A thing\r\ninferred by reasoning need neither have been an habitual associate of\r\nthe datum from which we infer it, nor need it be similar to it. It may\r\nbe a thing entirely unknown to our previous experience, something which\r\nno simple association of concretes could ever have evoked. The great\r\ndifference, in fact, between that simpler kind of rational thinking\r\nwhich consists in the concrete objects of past experience merely\r\nsuggesting each other, and reasoning distinctively so called, is this:\r\nthat whilst the empirical thinking is only reproductive, reasoning is\r\nproductive. An empirical, or \u0027rule-of-thumb,\u0027 thinker can deduce nothing\r\nfrom data with whose behavior and associates in the concrete he is\r\nunfamiliar. But put a reasoner amongst a set of concrete objects which\r\nhe has neither seen nor heard of before, and with a little time, if he\r\nis a good reasoner, he will make such inferences from them as will quite\r\natone for his ignorance. Reasoning helps us out of unprecedented\r\nsituations\u0026mdash;situations for which all our common associative wisdom, all\r\nthe \u0027education\u0027 which we share in common with the beasts, leaves us\r\nwithout resource.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_353\" id=\"page_353\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{353}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExact Definition of it.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eLet us make this ability to deal with novel\r\ndata the technical differentia of reasoning.\u003c/i\u003e This will sufficiently\r\nmark it out from common associative thinking, and will immediately\r\nenable us to say just what peculiarity it contains.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIt contains analysis and abstraction.\u003c/i\u003e Whereas the merely empirical\r\nthinker stares at a fact in its entirety, and remains helpless, or gets\r\n\u0027stuck,\u0027 if it suggests no concomitant or similar, the reasoner breaks\r\nit up and notices some one of its separate attributes. This attribute he\r\ntakes to be the essential part of the whole fact before him. This\r\nattribute has properties or consequences which the fact until then was\r\nnot known to have, but which, now that it is noticed to contain the\r\nattribute, it must have.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCall the fact or concrete datum S;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 4em;\"\u003ethe essential attribute M;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 4em;\"\u003ethe attribute\u0027s property P.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen the reasoned inference of P from S cannot be made without M\u0027s\r\nintermediation. The \u0027essence\u0027 M is thus that third or middle term in the\r\nreasoning which a moment ago was pronounced essential. \u003ci\u003eFor his original\r\nconcrete S the reasoner substitutes its abstract property M.\u003c/i\u003e What is\r\ntrue of M, what is coupled with M, thereupon holds true of S, is coupled\r\nwith S. As M is properly one of the \u003ci\u003eparts\u003c/i\u003e of the entire S, \u003ci\u003ereasoning\r\nmay then be very well defined as the substitution of parts and their\r\nimplications or consequences for wholes\u003c/i\u003e. And the art of the reasoner\r\nwill consist of two stages:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, \u003ci\u003esagacity\u003c/i\u003e, or the ability to discover what part, M, lies\r\nembedded in the whole S which is before him;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, \u003ci\u003elearning\u003c/i\u003e, or the ability to recall promptly M\u0027s consequences,\r\nconcomitants, or implications.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we glance at the ordinary syllogism\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd rowspan=\"3\" valign=\"bottom\"\u003e⁂\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eM is P;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eS is M;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eS is P\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_354\" id=\"page_354\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{354}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003e\u0026mdash;we see that the second or minor premise, the \u0027subsumption\u0027 as it is\r\nsometimes called, is the one requiring the sagacity; the first or major\r\nthe one requiring the fertility, or fulness of learning. Usually the\r\nlearning is more apt to be ready than the sagacity, the ability to seize\r\nfresh aspects in concrete things being rarer than the ability to learn\r\nold rules; so that, in most actual cases of reasoning, the minor\r\npremise, or the way of conceiving the subject, is the one that makes the\r\nnovel step in thought. This is, to be sure, not always the case; for the\r\nfact that M carries P with it may also be unfamiliar and now formulated\r\nfor the first time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe perception that S is M is a \u003ci\u003emode of conceiving S\u003c/i\u003e. The statement\r\nthat M is P is an \u003ci\u003eabstract or general proposition\u003c/i\u003e. A word about both\r\nis necessary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhat is meant by a Mode of Conceiving.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we conceive of S merely as\r\nM (of vermilion merely as a mercury-compound, for example), we neglect\r\nall the other attributes which it may have, and attend exclusively to\r\nthis one. We mutilate the fulness of S\u0027s reality. Every reality has an\r\ninfinity of aspects or properties. Even so simple a fact as a line which\r\nyou trace in the air may be considered in respect to its form, its\r\nlength, its direction, and its location. When we reach more complex\r\nfacts, the number of ways in which we may regard them is literally\r\nendless. Vermilion is not only a mercury-compound, it is vividly red,\r\nheavy, and expensive, it comes from China, and so on, \u003ci\u003ead infinitum\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAll objects are well-springs of properties, which are only little by\r\nlittle developed to our knowledge, and it is truly said that to know one\r\nthing thoroughly would be to know the whole universe. Mediately or\r\nimmediately, that one thing is related to everything else; and to know\r\n\u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e about it, all its relations need be known. But each relation forms\r\none of its attributes, one angle by which some one may conceive it, and\r\nwhile so conceiving it may ignore the rest of it. A man is such a\r\ncomplex fact. But out of the complexity all that an army commissary\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_355\" id=\"page_355\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{355}\u003c/span\u003e\r\npicks out as important for his purposes is his property of eating so\r\nmany pounds a day; the general, of marching so many miles; the\r\nchair-maker, of having such a shape; the orator, of responding to such\r\nand such feelings; the theatre-manager, of being willing to pay just\r\nsuch a price, and no more, for an evening\u0027s amusement. Each of these\r\npersons singles out the particular side of the entire man which has a\r\nbearing on \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e concerns, and not till this side is distinctly and\r\nseparately conceived can the proper practical conclusions \u003ci\u003efor that\r\nreasoner\u003c/i\u003e be drawn; and when they are drawn the man\u0027s other attributes\r\nmay be ignored.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll ways of conceiving a concrete fact, if they are true ways at all,\r\nare equally true ways. \u003ci\u003eThere is no property\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eABSOLUTELY\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003eessential to\r\nany one thing\u003c/i\u003e. The same property which figures as the essence of a\r\nthing on one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another.\r\nNow that I am writing, it is essential that I conceive my paper as a\r\nsurface for inscription. If I failed to do that, I should have to stop\r\nmy work. But if I wished to light a fire, and no other materials were\r\nby, the essential way of conceiving the paper would be as combustible\r\nmaterial; and I need then have no thought of any of its other\r\ndestinations. It is really \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e that it is: a combustible, a writing\r\nsurface, a thin thing, a hydrocarbonaceous thing, a thing eight inches\r\none way and ten another, a thing just one furlong east of a certain\r\nstone in my neighbor\u0027s field, an American thing, etc., etc., \u003ci\u003ead\r\ninfinitum\u003c/i\u003e. Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily\r\nclass it under makes me unjust to the other aspects. But as I always am\r\nclassing it under one aspect or another, I am always unjust, always\r\npartial, always exclusive. My excuse is necessity\u0026mdash;the necessity which\r\nmy finite and practical nature lays upon me. My thinking is first and\r\nlast and always for the sake of my doing, and I can only do one thing at\r\na time. A God who is supposed to drive the whole universe abreast may\r\nalso be supposed, without\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_356\" id=\"page_356\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{356}\u003c/span\u003e detriment to his activity, to see all parts\r\nof it at once and without emphasis. But were our human attention so to\r\ndisperse itself, we should simply stare vacantly at things at large and\r\nforfeit our opportunity of doing any particular act. Mr. Warner, in his\r\nAdirondack story, shot a bear by aiming, not at his eye or heart, but\r\n\u0027at him generally.\u0027 But we cannot aim \u0027generally\u0027 at the universe; or if\r\nwe do, we miss our game. Our scope is narrow, and we must attack things\r\npiecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness in which the elements of Nature\r\nexist, and stringing one after another of them together in a serial way,\r\nto suit our little interests as they change from hour to hour. In this,\r\nthe partiality of one moment is partly atoned for by the different sort\r\nof partiality of the next. To me now, writing these words, emphasis and\r\nselection seem to be the essence of the human mind. In other chapters\r\nother qualities have seemed, and will again seem, more important parts\r\nof psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMen are so ingrainedly partial that, for common-sense and scholasticism\r\n(which is only common-sense grown articulate), the notion that there is\r\nno one quality genuinely, absolutely, and exclusively essential to\r\nanything is almost unthinkable. \"A thing\u0027s essence makes it \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e it\r\nis. Without an exclusive essence it would be nothing in particular,\r\nwould be quite nameless, we could not say it was this rather than that.\r\nWhat you write on, for example,\u0026mdash;why talk of its being combustible,\r\nrectangular, and the like, when you know that these are mere accidents,\r\nand that what it really is, and was made to be, is just \u003ci\u003epaper\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nnothing else?\" The reader is pretty sure to make some such comment as\r\nthis. But he is himself merely insisting on an aspect of the thing which\r\nsuits his own petty purpose, that of \u003ci\u003enaming\u003c/i\u003e the thing; or else on an\r\naspect which suits the manufacturer\u0027s purpose, that of \u003ci\u003eproducing an\r\narticle for which there is a vulgar demand\u003c/i\u003e. Meanwhile the reality\r\noverflows these purposes at every pore. Our usual purpose with it, our\r\ncommonest title for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_357\" id=\"page_357\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{357}\u003c/span\u003e it, and the properties which this title suggests,\r\nhave in reality nothing sacramental. They characterize \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e more than\r\nthey characterize the thing. But we are so stuck in our prejudices, so\r\npetrified intellectually, that to our vulgarest names, with their\r\nsuggestions, we ascribe an eternal and exclusive worth. The thing must\r\nbe, essentially, what the vulgarest name connotes; what less usual names\r\nconnote, it can be only in an \u0027accidental\u0027 and relatively unreal\r\nsense.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_46_46\" id=\"FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_46_46\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke undermined the fallacy. But none of his successors, so far as I\r\nknow, have radically escaped it, or seen that \u003ci\u003ethe only meaning of\r\nessence is teleological, and that classification and conception are\r\npurely teleological weapons of the mind\u003c/i\u003e. The essence of a thing is that\r\none of its properties which is so \u003ci\u003eimportant for my interests\u003c/i\u003e that in\r\ncomparison with it I may neglect the rest. Amongst those other things\r\nwhich have this important property I class it, after this property I\r\nname it, as a thing endowed with this property I conceive it; and whilst\r\nso classing, naming, and conceiving it, all other truth about it becomes\r\nto me as naught. The properties which are important vary from man to man\r\nand from hour to hour. Hence divers appellations and conceptions for the\r\nsame thing. But many objects of daily use\u0026mdash;as paper, ink, butter,\r\novercoat\u0026mdash;have properties of such constant unwavering importance, and\r\nhave such stereotyped names, that we end by believing that to conceive\r\nthem in those ways is to conceive them in the only true way. Those are\r\nno truer ways of conceiving\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_358\" id=\"page_358\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{358}\u003c/span\u003e them than any others; they are only more\r\nfrequently serviceable ways to us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReasoning is always for a subjective interest.\u003c/b\u003e To revert now to our\r\nsymbolic representation of the reasoning process:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ctd\u003eM is P\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ctd\u003eS is M\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"bt\"\u003eS is P\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM is discerned and picked out for the time being to be the essence of\r\nthe concrete fact, phenomenon, or reality, S. But M in this world of\r\nours is inevitably conjoined with P; so that P is the next thing that we\r\nmay expect to find conjoined with the fact S. We may conclude or infer\r\nP, through the intermediation of the M which our sagacity began by\r\ndiscerning, when S came before it, to be the essence of the case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow note that if P have any value or importance for us, M was a very\r\ngood character for our sagacity to pounce upon and abstract. If, on the\r\ncontrary, P were of no importance, some other character than M would\r\nhave been a better essence for us to conceive of S by. Psychologically,\r\nas a rule, P overshadows the process from the start. We are \u003ci\u003eseeking\u003c/i\u003e P,\r\nor something like P. But the bare totality of S does not yield it to our\r\ngaze; and casting about for some point in S to take hold of which will\r\nlead us to P, we hit, if we are sagacious, upon M, because M happens to\r\nbe just the character which is knit up with P. Had we wished Q instead\r\nof P, and were N a property of S conjoined with Q, we ought to have\r\nignored M, noticed N, and conceived of S as a sort of N exclusively.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReasoning is always to attain some particular conclusion, or to gratify\r\nsome special curiosity. It not only breaks up the datum placed before it\r\nand conceives it abstractly; it must conceive it \u003ci\u003erightly\u003c/i\u003e too; and\r\nconceiving it rightly means conceiving it by that one particular\r\nabstract character which leads to the one sort of conclusion which it is\r\nthe reasoner\u0027s temporary interest to attain.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_359\" id=\"page_359\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{359}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eresults\u003c/i\u003e of reasoning may be hit upon by accident. The stereoscope\r\nwas actually a result of reasoning; it is conceivable, however that a\r\nman playing with pictures and mirrors might accidentally have hit upon\r\nit. Cats have been known to open doors by pulling latches, etc. But no\r\ncat, if the latch got out of order, could open the door again, unless\r\nsome new accident of random fumbling taught her to associate some new\r\ntotal movement with the total phenomenon of the closed door. A reasoning\r\nman, however, would open the door by first analyzing the hindrance. He\r\nwould ascertain what particular feature of the door was wrong. The\r\nlever, e.g., does not raise the latch sufficiently from its slot\u0026mdash;case\r\nof insufficient elevation: raise door bodily on hinges! Or door sticks\r\nat bottom by friction against sill: raise it bodily up! How it is\r\nobvious that a child or an idiot might without this reasoning learn the\r\n\u003ci\u003erule\u003c/i\u003e for opening that particular door. I remember a clock which the\r\nmaid-servant had discovered would not go unless it were supported so as\r\nto tilt slightly forwards. She had stumbled on this method after many\r\nweeks of groping. The reason of the stoppage was the friction of the\r\npendulum-bob against the back of the clock-case, a reason which an\r\neducated man would have analyzed out in five minutes. I have a student\u0027s\r\nlamp of which the flame vibrates most unpleasantly unless the chimney be\r\nraised about a sixteenth of an inch. I learned the remedy after much\r\ntorment by accident, and now always keep the chimney up with a small\r\nwedge. But my procedure is a mere association of two totals, diseased\r\nobject and remedy. One learned in pneumatics could have abstracted the\r\n\u003ci\u003ecause\u003c/i\u003e of the disease, and thence inferred the remedy immediately. By\r\nmany measurements of triangles one might find their area always equal to\r\ntheir height multiplied by half their base, and one might formulate an\r\nempirical law to that effect. But a reasoner saves himself all this\r\ntrouble by seeing that it is the essence (\u003ci\u003epro hac vice\u003c/i\u003e) of a triangle\r\nto be the half of a parallelogram whose area is the height into the\r\nentire base.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_360\" id=\"page_360\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{360}\u003c/span\u003e To see this he must invent additional lines; and the\r\ngeometer must often draw such to get at the essential property he may\r\nrequire in a figure. The essence consists in some \u003ci\u003erelation of the\r\nfigure to the new lines\u003c/i\u003e, a relation not obvious at all until they are\r\nput in. The geometer\u0027s genius lies in the imagining of the new lines,\r\nand his sagacity in the perceiving of the relation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThus, there are two great points in reasoning.\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eFirst, an extracted\r\ncharacter is taken as equivalent to the entire datum from which it\r\ncomes; and\u003c/i\u003e,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSecond, the character thus taken suggests a certain consequence more\r\nobviously than it was suggested by the total datum as it originally\r\ncame.\u003c/i\u003e Take these points again, successively.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1) Suppose I say, when offered a piece of cloth, \"I won\u0027t buy that; it\r\nlooks as if it would fade,\" meaning merely that something about it\r\nsuggests the idea of fading to my mind,\u0026mdash;my judgment, though possibly\r\ncorrect, is not reasoned, but purely empirical; but if I can say that\r\ninto the color there enters a certain dye which I know to be chemically\r\nunstable, and that \u003ci\u003etherefore\u003c/i\u003e the color will fade, my judgment is\r\nreasoned. The notion of the dye, which is one of the parts of the cloth,\r\nis the connecting link between the latter and the notion of fading. So,\r\nagain, an uneducated man will expect from past experience to see a piece\r\nof ice melt if placed near the fire, and the tip of his finger look\r\ncoarse if he view it through a convex glass. In neither of these cases\r\ncould the result be anticipated without full previous acquaintance with\r\nthe entire phenomenon. It is not a result of reasoning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut a man who should conceive heat as a mode of motion, and liquefaction\r\nas identical with increased motion of molecules; who should know that\r\ncurved surfaces bend light-rays in special ways, and that the apparent\r\nsize of anything is connected with the amount of the \u0027bend\u0027 of its\r\nlight-rays as they enter the eye,\u0026mdash;such a man would make the right\r\ninferences for all these objects, even though he\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_361\" id=\"page_361\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{361}\u003c/span\u003e had never in his life\r\nhad any concrete experience of them: and he would do this because the\r\nideas which we have above supposed him to possess would mediate in his\r\nmind between the phenomena he starts with and the conclusions he draws.\r\nBut these ideas are all mere extracted portions or circumstances. The\r\nmotions which form heat, the bending of the light-waves, are, it is\r\ntrue, excessively recondite ingredients; the hidden pendulum I spoke of\r\nabove is less so; and the sticking of a door on its sill in the earlier\r\nexample would hardly be so at all. But each and all agree in this, that\r\nthey bear a \u003ci\u003emore evident relation\u003c/i\u003e to the conclusion than did the facts\r\nin their immediate totality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2) And now to prove the second point: Why are the couplings,\r\nconsequences, and implications of extracts more evident and obvious than\r\nthose of entire phenomena? For two reasons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, the extracted characters are more general than the concretes, and\r\nthe connections they may have are, therefore, more familiar to us,\r\nhaving been more often met in our experience. Think of heat as motion,\r\nand whatever is true of motion will be true of heat; but we have had a\r\nhundred experiences of motion for every one of heat. Think of the rays\r\npassing through this lens as bending towards the perpendicular, and you\r\nsubstitute for the comparatively unfamiliar lens the very familiar\r\nnotion of a particular change in direction of a line, of which notion\r\nevery day brings us countless examples.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other reason why the relations of the extracted characters are so\r\nevident is that their properties are so \u003ci\u003efew\u003c/i\u003e, compared with the\r\nproperties of the whole, from which we derived them. In every concrete\r\nfact the characters and their consequences are so inexhaustibly numerous\r\nthat we may lose our way among them before noticing the particular\r\nconsequence it behooves us to draw. But, if we are lucky enough to\r\nsingle out the proper character, we take in, as it were, by a single\r\nglance all its possible\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_362\" id=\"page_362\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{362}\u003c/span\u003e consequences. Thus the character of scraping\r\nthe sill has very few suggestions, prominent among which is the\r\nsuggestion that the scraping will cease if we raise the door; whilst the\r\nentire refractory door suggests an enormous number of notions to the\r\nmind. Such examples may seem trivial, but they contain the essence of\r\nthe most refined and transcendental theorizing. The reason why physics\r\ngrows more deductive the more the fundamental properties it assumes are\r\nof a mathematical sort, such as molecular mass or wave-length, is that\r\nthe immediate consequences of these notions are so few that we can\r\nsurvey them all at once, and promptly pick out those which concern us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSagacity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To reason, then, we must be able to extract characters,\u0026mdash;not\r\n\u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e characters, but the right characters for our conclusion. If we\r\nextract the wrong character, it will not lead to that conclusion. Here,\r\nthen, is the difficulty: \u003ci\u003eHow are characters extracted, and why does it\r\nrequire the advent of a genius in many cases before the fitting\r\ncharacter is brought to light?\u003c/i\u003e Why cannot anybody reason as well as\r\nanybody else? Why does it need a Newton to notice the law of the\r\nsquares, a Darwin to notice the survival of the fittest? To answer these\r\nquestions we must begin a new research, and see how our insight into\r\nfacts naturally grows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll our knowledge at first is vague. When we say that a thing is vague,\r\nwe mean that it has no subdivisions \u003ci\u003eab intra\u003c/i\u003e, nor precise limitations\r\n\u003ci\u003eab extra\u003c/i\u003e; but still all the forms of thought may apply to it. It may\r\nhave unity, reality, externality, extent, and what not\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ethinghood\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\na word, but thinghood only as a whole. In this vague way, probably, does\r\nthe room appear to the babe who first begins to be conscious of it as\r\nsomething other than his moving nurse. It has no subdivisions in his\r\nmind, unless, perhaps, the window is able to attract his separate\r\nnotice. In this vague way, certainly, does every entirely new experience\r\nappear to the adult. A library, a museum, a machine-shop, are mere\r\nconfused wholes to the uninstructed,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_363\" id=\"page_363\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{363}\u003c/span\u003e but the machinist, the antiquary,\r\nand the bookworm perhaps hardly notice the whole at all, so eager are\r\nthey to pounce upon the details. Familiarity has in them bred\r\ndiscrimination. Such vague terms as \u0027grass,\u0027 \u0027mould,\u0027 and \u0027meat\u0027 do not\r\nexist for the botanist or the anatomist. They know too much about\r\ngrasses, moulds, and muscles. A certain person said to Charles Kingsley,\r\nwho was showing him the dissection of a caterpillar, with its exquisite\r\nviscera, \"Why, I thought it was nothing but skin and squash!\" A layman\r\npresent at a shipwreck, a battle, or a fire is helpless. Discrimination\r\nhas been so little awakened in him by experience that his consciousness\r\nleaves no single point of the complex situation accented and standing\r\nout for him to begin to act upon. But the sailor, the fireman, and the\r\ngeneral know directly at what corner to take up the business. They \u0027see\r\ninto the situation\u0027\u0026mdash;that is, they analyze it\u0026mdash;with their first glance.\r\nIt is full of delicately differenced ingredients which their education\r\nhas little by little brought to their consciousness, but of which the\r\nnovice gains no clear idea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow this power of analysis was brought about we saw in our chapters on\r\nDiscrimination and Attention. We dissociate the elements of originally\r\nvague totals by attending to them or noticing them alternately, of\r\ncourse. But what determines which element we shall attend to first?\r\nThere are two immediate and obvious answers: first, our practical or\r\ninstinctive interests; and second, our æsthetic interests. The dog\r\nsingles out of any situation its smells, and the horse its sounds,\r\nbecause they may reveal facts of practical moment, and are instinctively\r\nexciting to these several creatures. The infant notices the candle-flame\r\nor the window, and ignores the rest of the room, because those objects\r\ngive him a vivid pleasure. So, the country boy dissociates the\r\nblackberry, the chestnut, and the wintergreen, from the vague mass of\r\nother shrubs and trees, for their practical uses, and the savage is\r\ndelighted with the beads, the bits of looking-glass, brought by an\r\nexploring vessel, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_364\" id=\"page_364\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{364}\u003c/span\u003e gives no heed to the features of the vessel\r\nitself, which is too much beyond his sphere. These æsthetic and\r\npractical interests, then, are the weightiest factors in making\r\nparticular ingredients stand out in high relief. What they lay their\r\naccent on, that we notice; but what they are in themselves we cannot\r\nsay. We must content ourselves here with simply accepting them as\r\nirreducible ultimate factors in determining the way our knowledge grows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, a creature which has few instinctive impulses, or interests\r\npractical or æsthetic, will dissociate few characters, and will, at\r\nbest, have limited reasoning powers; whilst one whose interests are very\r\nvaried will reason much better. Man, by his immensely varied instincts,\r\npractical wants, and æsthetic feelings, to which every sense\r\ncontributes, would, by dint of these alone, be sure to dissociate vastly\r\nmore characters than any other animal; and accordingly we find that the\r\nlowest savages reason incomparably better than the highest brutes. The\r\ndiverse interests lead, too, to a diversification of experiences, whose\r\naccumulation becomes a condition for the play of that \u003ci\u003elaw of\r\ndissociation by varying concomitants\u003c/i\u003e of which I treated on \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003ep. 251\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Help given by Association by Similarity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is probable, also, that\r\nman\u0027s \u003ci\u003esuperior association by similarity\u003c/i\u003e has much to do with those\r\ndiscriminations of character on which his higher flights of reasoning\r\nare based. As this latter is an important matter, and as little or\r\nnothing was said of it in the chapter on Discrimination, it behooves me\r\nto dwell a little upon it here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat does the reader do when he wishes to see in what the precise\r\nlikeness or difference of two objects lies? He transfers his attention\r\nas rapidly as possible, backwards and forwards, from one to the other.\r\nThe rapid alteration in consciousness shakes out, as it were, the points\r\nof difference or agreement, which would have slumbered forever unnoticed\r\nif the consciousness of the objects compared had occurred at widely\r\ndistant periods of time. What does\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_365\" id=\"page_365\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{365}\u003c/span\u003e the scientific man do who searches\r\nfor the reason or law embedded in a phenomenon? He deliberately\r\naccumulates all the instances he can find which have any analogy to that\r\nphenomenon; and, by simultaneously filling his mind with them all, he\r\nfrequently succeeds in detaching from the collection the peculiarity\r\nwhich he was unable to formulate in one alone; even though that one had\r\nbeen preceded in his former experience by all of those with which he now\r\nat once confronts it. These examples show that the mere general fact of\r\nhaving occurred at some time in one\u0027s experience, with varying\r\nconcomitants, is not by itself a sufficient reason for a character to be\r\ndissociated now. We need something more; we need that the varying\r\nconcomitants should in all their variety be brought into consciousness\r\n\u003ci\u003eat once\u003c/i\u003e. Not till then will the character in question escape from its\r\nadhesion to each and all of them and stand alone. This will immediately\r\nbe recognized by those who have read Mill\u0027s Logic as the ground of\r\nUtility in his famous \u0027four methods of experimental inquiry,\u0027 the\r\nmethods of agreement, of difference, of residues, and of concomitant\r\nvariations. Each of these gives a list of analogous instances out of the\r\nmidst of which a sought-for character may roll and strike the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is obvious that any mind in which association by similarity is\r\nhighly developed is a mind which will spontaneously form lists of\r\ninstances like this. Take a present fact \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, with a character \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nit. The mind may fail at first to notice this character \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e at all. But\r\nif \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e calls up \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eD\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eE\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eF\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026mdash;these being phenomena which\r\nresemble \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e in possessing \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, but which may not have entered for\r\nmonths into the experience of the animal who now experiences \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, why,\r\nplainly, such association performs the part of the reader\u0027s deliberately\r\nrapid comparison referred to above, and of the systematic consideration\r\nof like cases by the scientific investigator, and may lead to the\r\nnoticing of \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e in an abstract way. Certainly this is obvious; and no\r\nconclusion is left to us but to assert that, after the few\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_366\" id=\"page_366\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{366}\u003c/span\u003e most\r\npowerful practical and æsthetic interests, our chief help towards\r\nnoticing those special characters of phenomena which, when once\r\npossessed and named, are used as reasons, class names, essences, or\r\nmiddle terms, \u003ci\u003eis this association by similarity\u003c/i\u003e. Without it, indeed,\r\nthe deliberate procedure of the scientific man would be impossible: he\r\ncould never collect his analogous instances. But it operates of itself\r\nin highly-gifted minds without any deliberation, spontaneously\r\ncollecting analogous instances, uniting in a moment what in nature the\r\nwhole breadth of space and time keeps separate, and so permitting a\r\nperception of identical points in the midst of different circumstances,\r\nwhich minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity could never begin\r\nto attain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"ill_66\" id=\"ill_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 304px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-366-lg.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-psychology-briefer-course-i-366-sml.png\" width=\"304\" height=\"306\" alt=\"[Image unavailable.]\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFig. 66.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"#ill_66\"\u003eFigure 66\u003c/a\u003e shows this. If \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, in the present representation \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, calls\r\nup \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eC\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eD\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eE\u003c/i\u003e, which are similar to \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e in possessing it,\r\nand calls them up in rapid succession, then \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, being associated almost\r\nsimultaneously with such varying concomitants, will \u0027roll out\u0027 and\r\nattract our separate notice.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_367\" id=\"page_367\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{367}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf so much is clear to the reader, he will be willing to admit that the\r\nmind \u003ci\u003ein which this mode of association most prevails\u003c/i\u003e will, from its\r\nbetter opportunity of extricating characters, be the one most prone to\r\nreasoned thinking; whilst, on the other hand, a mind in which we do not\r\ndetect reasoned thinking will probably be one in which association by\r\ncontiguity holds almost exclusive sway.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGeniuses are, by common consent, considered to differ from ordinary\r\nminds by an unusual development of association by similarity. One of\r\nProfessor Bain\u0027s best strokes of work is the exhibition of this truth.\r\nIt applies to geniuses in the line of reasoning as well as in other\r\nlines.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Reasoning Powers of Brutes.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;As the genius is to the vulgarian, so\r\nthe vulgar human mind is to the intelligence of a brute. Compared with\r\nmen, it is probable that brutes neither attend to abstract characters,\r\nnor have associations by similarity. Their thoughts probably pass from\r\none concrete object to its habitual concrete successor far more\r\nuniformly than is the case with us. In other words, their associations\r\nof ideas are almost exclusively by contiguity. So far, however, as any\r\nbrute might think by abstract characters instead of by the association\r\nof concretes, he would have to be admitted to be a reasoner in the true\r\nhuman sense. How far this may take place is quite uncertain. Certain it\r\nis that the more intelligent brutes \u003ci\u003eobey\u003c/i\u003e abstract characters, whether\r\nthey mentally single them out as such or not. They act upon things\r\naccording to their \u003ci\u003eclass\u003c/i\u003e. This involves some sort of emphasizing, if\r\nnot abstracting, of the class-essence by the animal\u0027s mind. A concrete\r\nindividual with none of his characters emphasized is one thing; a\r\nsharply conceived attribute marked off from everything else by a name is\r\nanother. But between no analysis of a concrete, and complete analysis;\r\nno abstraction of an embedded character, and complete abstraction, every\r\npossible intermediary grade must lie. And some of these grades ought to\r\nhave names, for they are certainly represented in the mind. Dr. Romanes\r\nhas proposed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_368\" id=\"page_368\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{368}\u003c/span\u003e the name \u003ci\u003erecept\u003c/i\u003e, and Prof. Lloyd Morgan the name\r\n\u003ci\u003econstruct\u003c/i\u003e, for the idea of a vaguely abstracted and generalized\r\nobject-class. A definite abstraction is called an \u003ci\u003eisolate\u003c/i\u003e by the\r\nlatter author. Neither \u003ci\u003econstruct\u003c/i\u003e nor \u003ci\u003erecept\u003c/i\u003e seems to me a felicitous\r\nword; but poor as both are, they form a distinct addition to psychology,\r\nso I give them here. Would such a word as \u003ci\u003einfluent\u003c/i\u003e sound better than\r\n\u003ci\u003erecept\u003c/i\u003e in the following passage from Romanes?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Water-fowl adopt a somewhat different mode of alighting upon land, or\r\neven upon ice, from that which they adopt when alighting upon water; and\r\nthose kinds which dive from a height (such as terns and gannets) never\r\ndo so upon land or upon ice. These facts prove that the animals have one\r\nrecept answering to a solid surface, and another answering to a fluid.\r\nSimilarly a man will not dive from a height over hard ground or over\r\nice, nor will he jump into water in the same way as he jumps upon dry\r\nland. In other words, like the water-fowl he has two distinct recepts,\r\none of which answers to solid ground, and the other to an unresisting\r\nfluid. But unlike the water-fowl he is able to bestow upon each of these\r\nrecepts a name, and thus to raise them both to the level of concepts. So\r\nfar as the practical purposes of locomotion are concerned, it is of\r\ncourse immaterial whether or not he thus raises his recepts into\r\nconcepts; but … for many other purposes it is of the highest\r\nimportance that he is able to do this.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_47_47\" id=\"FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_47_47\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA certain well-bred retriever of whom I know never bit his birds. But\r\none day having to bring two birds at once, which, though unable to fly,\r\nwere \u0027alive and kicking,\u0027 he deliberately gave one a bite which killed\r\nit, took the other one still alive to his master, and then returned for\r\nthe first. It is impossible not to believe that some such abstract\r\nthoughts as \u0027alive\u0026mdash;get away\u0026mdash;must kill,\u0027 … etc., passed in rapid\r\nsuccession through this dog\u0027s mind, whatever the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_369\" id=\"page_369\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{369}\u003c/span\u003e sensible imagery may\r\nhave been with which they were blended. Such practical obedience to the\r\nspecial aspects of things which may be important involves the essence of\r\nreasoning. But the characters whose presence impress brutes are very\r\nfew, being only those which are directly connected with their most\r\ninstinctive interests. They never extract characters for the mere fun of\r\nthe thing, as men do. One is tempted to explain this as the result in\r\nthem of an almost entire absence of such association by similarity as\r\ncharacterizes the human mind. A thing may remind a brute of its full\r\nsimilars, but not of things to which it is but slightly similar; and all\r\nthat dissociation by varying concomitants, which in man is based so\r\nlargely on association by similarity, hardly seems to take place at all\r\nin the infra-human mind. One total object suggests another total object,\r\nand the lower mammals find themselves acting with propriety, they know\r\nnot why. The great, the fundamental, defect of their minds seems to be\r\nthe inability of their groups of ideas to break across in unaccustomed\r\nplaces. They are enslaved to routine, to cut-and-dried thinking; and if\r\nthe most prosaic of human beings could be transported into his dog\u0027s\r\nsoul, he would be appalled at the utter absence of fancy which there\r\nreigns. Thoughts would not be found to call up their similars, but only\r\ntheir habitual successors. Sunsets would not suggest heroes\u0027 deaths, but\r\nsupper-time. This is why man is the only metaphysical animal. To wonder\r\nwhy the universe should be as it is presupposes the notion of its being\r\ndifferent, and a brute, who never reduces the actual to fluidity by\r\nbreaking up its literal sequences in his imagination, can never form\r\nsuch a notion. He takes the world simply for granted, and never wonders\r\nat it at all.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_370\" id=\"page_370\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{370}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XXIII\" id=\"CHAPTER_XXIII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eCONSCIOUSNESS AND MOVEMENT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAll consciousness is motor.\u003c/b\u003e The reader will not have forgotten, in the\r\njungle of purely inward processes and products through which the last\r\nchapters have borne him, that the final result of them all must be some\r\nform of bodily activity due to the escape of the central excitement\r\nthrough outgoing nerves. The whole neural organism, it will be\r\nremembered, is, physiologically considered, but a machine for converting\r\nstimuli into reactions; and the intellectual part of our life is knit up\r\nwith but the middle or \u0027central\u0027 part of the machine\u0027s operations. We\r\nnow go on to consider the final or emergent operations, the bodily\r\nactivities, and the forms of consciousness consequent thereupon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery impression which impinges on the incoming nerves produces some\r\ndischarge down the outgoing ones, whether we be aware of it or not.\r\nUsing sweeping terms and ignoring exceptions, \u003ci\u003ewe might say that every\r\npossible feeling produces a movement, and that the movement is a\r\nmovement of the entire organism, and of each and all its parts\u003c/i\u003e. What\r\nhappens patently when an explosion or a flash of lightning startles us,\r\nor when we are tickled, happens latently with every sensation which we\r\nreceive. The only reason why we do not feel the startle or tickle in the\r\ncase of insignificant sensations is partly its very small amount, partly\r\nour obtuseness. Professor Bain many years ago gave the name of the Law\r\nof Diffusion to this phenomenon of general discharge, and expressed it\r\nthus: \"According as an impression is accompanied with Feeling, the\r\naroused currents diffuse themselves over the brain,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_371\" id=\"page_371\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{371}\u003c/span\u003e leading to a\r\ngeneral agitation of the moving organs, as well as affecting the\r\nviscera.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are probably no exceptions to the diffusion of every impression\r\nthrough the \u003ci\u003enerve-centres\u003c/i\u003e. The \u003ci\u003eeffect\u003c/i\u003e of a new wave through the\r\ncentres may, however, often be to interfere with processes already going\r\non there; and the outward consequence of such interference may be the\r\nchecking of bodily activities in process of occurrence. When this\r\nhappens it probably is like the siphoning of certain channels by\r\ncurrents flowing through others; as when, in walking, we suddenly stand\r\nstill because a sound, sight, smell, or thought catches our attention.\r\nBut there are cases of arrest of peripheral activity which depend, not\r\non inhibition of centres, but on stimulation of centres which discharge\r\noutgoing currents of an inhibitory sort. Whenever we are startled, for\r\nexample, our heart momentarily stops or slows its beating, and then\r\npalpitates with accelerated speed. The brief arrest is due to an\r\noutgoing current down the pneumogastric nerve. This nerve, when\r\nstimulated, stops or slows the heart-beats, and this particular effect\r\nof startling fails to occur if the nerve be cut.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn general, however, the stimulating effects of a sense-impression\r\nproponderate over the inhibiting effects, so that we may roughly say, as\r\nwe began by saying, that the wave of discharge produces an activity in\r\nall parts of the body. The task of tracing out \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e the effects of any\r\none incoming sensation has not yet been performed by physiologists.\r\nRecent years have, however, begun to enlarge our information; and we\r\nhave now experimental proof that the heart-beats, the arterial pressure,\r\nthe respiration, the sweat-glands, the pupil, the bladder, bowels, and\r\nuterus, as well as the voluntary muscles, may have their tone and degree\r\nof contraction altered even by the most insignificant sensorial stimuli.\r\nIn short, a \u003ci\u003eprocess set up anywhere in the centres reverberates\r\neverywhere, and in some way or other affects the organism throughout,\r\nmaking its activities\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_372\" id=\"page_372\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{372}\u003c/span\u003e either greater or less\u003c/i\u003e. It is as if the\r\nnerve-central mass were like a good conductor charged with electricity,\r\nof which the tension cannot be changed at all without changing it\r\neverywhere at once.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHerr Schneider has tried to show, by an ingenious zoölogical review,\r\nthat all the \u003ci\u003especial\u003c/i\u003e movements which highly evolved animals make are\r\ndifferentiated from the two originally simple movements of contraction\r\nand expansion in which the entire body of simple organisms takes part.\r\nThe tendency to contract is the source of all the self-protective\r\nimpulses and reactions which are later developed, including that of\r\nflight. The tendency to expand splits up, on the contrary, into the\r\nimpulses and instincts of an aggressive kind, feeding, fighting, sexual\r\nintercourse, etc. I cite this as a sort of evolutionary reason to add to\r\nthe mechanical \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e reason why there \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to be the diffusive\r\nwave which \u003ci\u003ea posteriori\u003c/i\u003e instances show to exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI shall now proceed to a detailed study of the more important classes of\r\nmovement consequent upon cerebromental change. They may be enumerated\r\nas\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e1) Expressions of Emotion;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e2) Instinctive or Impulsive Performances; and\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e3) Voluntary Deeds;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eand each shall have a chapter to itself.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_373\" id=\"page_373\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{373}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XXIV\" id=\"CHAPTER_XXIV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXIV.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eEMOTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmotions compared with Instincts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;An emotion is a tendency to feel, and\r\nan instinct is a tendency to act, characteristically, when in presence\r\nof a certain object in the environment. But the emotions also have their\r\nbodily \u0027expression,\u0027 which may involve strong muscular activity (as in\r\nfear or anger, for example); and it becomes a little hard in many cases\r\nto separate the description of the \u0027emotional\u0027 condition from that of\r\nthe \u0027instinctive\u0027 reaction which one and the same object may provoke.\r\nShall \u003ci\u003efear\u003c/i\u003e be described in the chapter on Instincts or in that on\r\nEmotions? Where shall one describe \u003ci\u003ecuriosity\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eemulation\u003c/i\u003e, and the\r\nlike? The answer is quite arbitrary from the scientific point of view,\r\nand practical convenience may decide. As inner mental conditions,\r\nemotions are quite indescribable. Description, moreover, would be\r\nsuperfluous, for the reader knows already how they feel. Their relations\r\nto the objects which prompt them and to the reactions which they provoke\r\nare all that one can put down in a book.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well. The\r\nonly distinction one may draw is that the reaction called emotional\r\nterminates in the subject\u0027s own body, whilst the reaction called\r\ninstinctive is apt to go farther and enter into practical relations with\r\nthe exciting object. In both instinct and emotion the mere memory or\r\nimagination of the object may suffice to liberate the excitement. One\r\nmay even get angrier in thinking over one\u0027s insult than one was in\r\nreceiving it; and melt more over a mother who is dead than one ever did\r\nwhen she was living. In\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_374\" id=\"page_374\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{374}\u003c/span\u003e the rest of the chapter I shall use the word\r\n\u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of emotion indifferently to mean one which is physically\r\npresent or one which is merely thought of.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe varieties of emotion are innumerable.\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eAnger\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003efear\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003elove\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ehate\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ejoy\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003egrief\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eshame\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epride\u003c/i\u003e, and their varieties, may be\r\ncalled the \u003ci\u003ecoarser\u003c/i\u003e emotions, being coupled as they are with relatively\r\nstrong bodily reverberations. The \u003ci\u003esubtler\u003c/i\u003e emotions are the moral,\r\nintellectual, and æsthetic feelings, and their bodily reaction is\r\nusually much less strong. The mere description of the objects,\r\ncircumstances, and varieties of the different species of emotion may go\r\nto any length. Their internal shadings merge endlessly into each other,\r\nand have been partly commemorated in language, as, for example, by such\r\nsynonyms as hatred, antipathy, animosity, resentment, dislike, aversion,\r\nmalice, spite, revenge, abhorrence, etc., etc. Dictionaries of synonyms\r\nhave discriminated them, as well as text-books of psychology\u0026mdash;in fact,\r\nmany German psychological text-books \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e nothing but dictionaries of\r\nsynonyms when it comes to the chapter on Emotion. But there are limits\r\nto the profitable elaboration of the obvious, and the result of all this\r\nflux is that the merely descriptive literature of the subject, from\r\nDescartes downwards, is one of the most tedious parts of psychology. And\r\nnot only is it tedious, but you feel that its subdivisions are to a\r\ngreat extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to\r\naccuracy are a sham. But unfortunately there is little psychological\r\nwriting about the emotions which is not merely descriptive. As emotions\r\nare described in novels, they interest us, for we are made to share\r\nthem. We have grown acquainted with the concrete objects and emergencies\r\nwhich call them forth, and any knowing touch of introspection which may\r\ngrace the page meets with a quick and feeling response. Confessedly\r\nliterary works of aphoristic philosophy also flash lights into our\r\nemotional life, and give us a fitful delight. But as far as the\r\n\u0027scientific psychology\u0027 of the emotions goes, I may have been surfeited\r\nby too much\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_375\" id=\"page_375\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{375}\u003c/span\u003e reading of classic works on the subject, but I should as\r\nlief read verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New\r\nHampshire farm as toil through them again. They give one nowhere a\r\ncentral point of view, or a deductive or generative principle. They\r\ndistinguish and refine and specify \u003ci\u003ein infinitum\u003c/i\u003e without ever getting\r\non to another logical level. Whereas the beauty of all truly scientific\r\nwork is to get to ever deeper levels. Is there no way out from this\r\nlevel of individual description in the case of the emotions? I believe\r\nthere is a way out, if one will only take it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Cause of their Varieties.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The trouble with the emotions in\r\npsychology is that they are regarded too much as absolutely individual\r\nthings. So long as they are set down as so many eternal and sacred\r\npsychic entities, like the old immutable species in natural history, so\r\nlong all that \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be done with them is reverently to catalogue their\r\nseparate characters, points, and effects. But if we regard them as\r\nproducts of more general causes (as \u0027species\u0027 are now regarded as\r\nproducts of heredity and variation), the mere distinguishing and\r\ncataloguing becomes of subsidiary importance. Having the goose which\r\nlays the golden eggs, the description of each egg already laid is a\r\nminor matter. I will devote the next few pages to setting forth one very\r\ngeneral cause of our emotional feeling, limiting myself in the first\r\ninstance to what may be called the \u003ci\u003ecoarser\u003c/i\u003e emotions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe feeling, in the coarser emotions, results from the bodily\r\nexpression.\u003c/b\u003e Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is\r\nthat the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection\r\ncalled the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the\r\nbodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that \u003ci\u003ethe bodily\r\nchanges follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that\r\nour feeling of the same changes as they occur\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eIS\u003c/small\u003e \u003ci\u003ethe emotion\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nCommon-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a\r\nbear, are frightened and run;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_376\" id=\"page_376\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{376}\u003c/span\u003e we are insulted by a rival, are angry and\r\nstrike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of\r\nsequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately\r\ninduced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be\r\ninterposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel\r\nsorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we\r\ntremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry,\r\nangry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states\r\nfollowing on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in\r\nform, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see\r\nthe bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right\r\nto strike, but we should not actually \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e afraid or angry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure to meet with\r\nimmediate disbelief. And yet neither many nor far-fetched considerations\r\nare required to mitigate its paradoxical character, and possibly to\r\nproduce conviction of its truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo begin with, \u003ci\u003eparticular perceptions certainly do produce wide-spread\r\nbodily effects by a sort of immediate physical influence, antecedent to\r\nthe arousal of an emotion or emotional idea\u003c/i\u003e. In listening to poetry,\r\ndrama, or heroic narrative we are often surprised at the cutaneous\r\nshiver which like a sudden wave flows over us, and at the heart-swelling\r\nand the lachrymal effusion that unexpectedly catch us at intervals. In\r\nhearing music the same is even more strikingly true. If we abruptly see\r\na dark moving form in the woods, our heart stops beating, and we catch\r\nour breath instantly and before any articulate idea of danger can arise.\r\nIf our friend goes near to the edge of a precipice, we get the\r\nwell-known feeling of \u0027all-overishness,\u0027 and we shrink back, although we\r\npositively \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e him to be safe, and have no distinct imagination of\r\nhis fall. The writer well remembers his astonishment, when a boy of\r\nseven or eight, at fainting when he saw a horse bled. The blood was in a\r\nbucket, with a stick in it, and, if memory does not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_377\" id=\"page_377\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{377}\u003c/span\u003e deceive him, he\r\nstirred it round and saw it drip from the stick with no feeling save\r\nthat of childish curiosity. Suddenly the world grew black before his\r\neyes, his ears began to buzz, and he knew no more. He had never heard of\r\nthe sight of blood producing faintness or sickness, and he had so little\r\nrepugnance to it, and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger\r\nfrom it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers, he could\r\nnot help wondering how the mere physical presence of a pailful of\r\ncrimson fluid could occasion in him such formidable bodily effects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect\r\non the nerves is furnished by \u003ci\u003ethose pathological cases in which the\r\nemotion is objectless\u003c/i\u003e. One of the chief merits, in fact, of the view\r\nwhich I propose seems to be that we can so easily formulate by its means\r\npathological cases and normal cases under a common scheme. In every\r\nasylum we find examples of absolutely unmotived fear, anger, melancholy,\r\nor conceit; and others of an equally unmotived apathy which persists in\r\nspite of the best of outward reasons why it should give way. In the\r\nformer cases we must suppose the nervous machinery to be so \u0027labile\u0027 in\r\nsome one emotional direction that almost every stimulus (however\r\ninappropriate) causes it to upset in that way, and to engender the\r\nparticular complex of feelings of which the psychic body of the emotion\r\nconsists. Thus, to take one special instance, if inability to draw deep\r\nbreath, fluttering of the heart, and that peculiar epigastric change\r\nfelt as \u0027precordial anxiety,\u0027 with an irresistible tendency to take a\r\nsomewhat crouching attitude and to sit still, and with perhaps other\r\nvisceral processes not now known, all spontaneously occur together in a\r\ncertain person, his feeling of their combination \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the emotion of\r\ndread, and he is the victim of what is known as morbid fear. A friend\r\nwho has had occasional attacks of this most distressing of all maladies\r\ntells me that in his case the whole drama seems to centre about the\r\nregion of the heart and respiratory apparatus, that his main effort\r\nduring the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_378\" id=\"page_378\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{378}\u003c/span\u003e attacks is to get control of his inspirations and to slow\r\nhis heart, and that the moment he attains to breathing deeply and to\r\nholding himself erect, the dread, \u003ci\u003eipso facto\u003c/i\u003e, seems to depart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe emotion here is nothing but the feeling of a bodily state, and it\r\nhas a purely bodily cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next thing to be noticed is this, that \u003ci\u003eevery one of the bodily\r\nchanges, whatsoever it be, is\u003c/i\u003e \u003csmall\u003eFELT\u003c/small\u003e, \u003ci\u003eacutely or obscurely, the moment\r\nit occurs\u003c/i\u003e. If the reader has never paid attention to this matter, he\r\nwill be both interested and astonished to learn how many different local\r\nbodily feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of his\r\nvarious emotional moods. It would be perhaps too much to expect him to\r\narrest the tide of any strong gust of passion for the sake of any such\r\ncurious analysis as this; but he can observe more tranquil states, and\r\nthat may be assumed here to be true of the greater which is shown to be\r\ntrue of the less. Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each\r\nmorsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp,\r\npleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense of personality that every\r\none of us unfailingly carries with him. It is surprising what little\r\nitems give accent to these complexes of sensibility. When worried by any\r\nslight trouble, one may find that the focus of one\u0027s bodily\r\nconsciousness is the contraction, often quite inconsiderable, of the\r\neyes and brows. When momentarily embarrassed, it is something in the\r\npharynx that compels either a swallow, a clearing of the throat, or a\r\nslight cough; and so on for as many more instances as might be named.\r\nThe various permutations of which these organic changes are susceptible\r\nmake it abstractly possible that no shade of emotion should be without a\r\nbodily reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is the\r\nmental mood itself. The immense number of parts modified is what makes\r\nit so difficult for us to reproduce in cold blood the total and integral\r\nexpression of any one emotion. We may catch the trick with the voluntary\r\nmuscles, but fail\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_379\" id=\"page_379\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{379}\u003c/span\u003e with the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera. Just\r\nas an artificially imitated sneeze lacks something of the reality, so\r\nthe attempt to imitate grief or enthusiasm in the absence of its normal\r\ninstigating cause is apt to be rather \u0027hollow.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this:\r\n\u003ci\u003eIf we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our\r\nconsciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we\r\nhave nothing left behind\u003c/i\u003e, no \u0027mind-stuff\u0027 out of which the emotion can\r\nbe constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual\r\nperception is all that remains. It is true that, although most people,\r\nwhen asked, say that their introspection verifies this statement, some\r\npersist in saying theirs does not. Many cannot be made to understand the\r\nquestion. When you beg them to imagine away every feeling of laughter\r\nand of tendency to laugh from their consciousness of the ludicrousness\r\nof an object, and then to tell you what the feeling of its ludicrousness\r\nwould be like, whether it be anything more than the perception that the\r\nobject belongs to the class \u0027funny,\u0027 they persist in replying that the\r\nthing proposed is a physical impossibility, and that they always \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e\r\nlaugh if they see a funny object. Of course the task proposed is not the\r\npractical one of seeing a ludicrous object and annihilating one\u0027s\r\ntendency to laugh. It is the purely speculative one of subtracting\r\ncertain elements of feeling from an emotional state supposed to exist in\r\nits fulness, and saying what the residual elements are. I cannot help\r\nthinking that all who rightly apprehend this problem will agree with the\r\nproposition above laid down. What kind of an emotion of fear would be\r\nleft if the feeling neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow\r\nbreathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of\r\ngoose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite\r\nimpossible for me to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture\r\nno ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of\r\nthe nostrils, no clenching\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_380\" id=\"page_380\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{380}\u003c/span\u003e of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action,\r\nbut in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The\r\npresent writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely\r\nevaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the\r\nonly thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some\r\ncold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to\r\nthe intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons\r\nmerit chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief: what would\r\nit be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its\r\npang in the breast-bone? A feelingless cognition that certain\r\ncircumstances are deplorable, and nothing more. Every passion in turn\r\ntells the same story. A disembodied human emotion is a sheer nonentity.\r\nI do not say that it is a contradiction in the nature of things, or that\r\npure spirits are necessarily condemned to cold intellectual lives; but I\r\nsay that for \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is\r\ninconceivable. The more closely I scrutinize my states, the more\r\npersuaded I become that whatever \u0027coarse\u0027 affections and passions I have\r\nare in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes\r\nwhich we ordinarily call their expression or consequence; and the more\r\nit seems to me that, if I were to become corporeally anæsthetic, I\r\nshould be excluded from the life of the affections, harsh and tender\r\nalike, and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or intellectual\r\nform. Such an existence, although it seems to have been the ideal of\r\nancient sages, is too apathetic to be keenly sought after by those born\r\nafter the revival of the worship of sensibility, a few generations ago.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLet not this view be called materialistic.\u003c/b\u003e It is neither more nor less\r\nmaterialistic than any other view which says that our emotions are\r\nconditioned by nervous processes. No reader of this hook is likely to\r\nrebel against such a saying so long as it is expressed in general terms;\r\nand if any one still finds materialism in the thesis now defended, that\r\nmust be because of the special processes invoked.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_381\" id=\"page_381\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{381}\u003c/span\u003e They are\r\n\u003ci\u003esensational\u003c/i\u003e processes, processes due to inward currents set up by\r\nphysical happenings. Such processes have, it is true, always been\r\nregarded by the platonizers in psychology as having something peculiarly\r\nbase about them. But our emotions must always be \u003ci\u003einwardly\u003c/i\u003e what they\r\nare, whatever be the physiological ground of their apparition. If they\r\nare deep, pure, worthy, spiritual facts on any conceivable theory of\r\ntheir physiological source, they remain no less deep, pure, spiritual,\r\nand worthy of regard on this present sensational theory. They carry\r\ntheir own inner measure of worth with them; and it is just as logical to\r\nuse the present theory of the emotions for proving that sensational\r\nprocesses need not be vile and material, as to use their vileness and\r\nmateriality as a proof that such a theory cannot be true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThis view explains the great variability of emotion.\u003c/b\u003e If such a theory is\r\ntrue, then each emotion is the resultant of a sum of elements, and each\r\nelement is caused by a physiological process of a sort already well\r\nknown. The elements are all organic changes, and each of them is the\r\nreflex effect of the exciting object. Definite questions now immediately\r\narise\u0026mdash;questions very different from those which were the only possible\r\nones without this view. Those were questions of classification: \"Which\r\nare the proper genera of emotion, and which the species under each?\"\u0026mdash;or\r\nof description: \"By what expression is each emotion characterized?\" The\r\nquestions now are \u003ci\u003ecausal\u003c/i\u003e: \"Just what changes does this object and what\r\nchanges does that object excite?\" and \"How come they to excite these\r\nparticular changes and not others?\" We step from a superficial to a deep\r\norder of inquiry. Classification and description are the lowest stage of\r\nscience. They sink into the background the moment questions of causation\r\nare formulated, and remain important only so far as they facilitate our\r\nanswering these. Now the moment an emotion is causally accounted for, as\r\nthe arousal by an object of a lot of reflex acts which are forthwith\r\nfelt, \u003ci\u003ewe immediately\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_382\" id=\"page_382\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{382}\u003c/span\u003e see why there is no limit to the number of\r\npossible different emotions which may exist, and why the emotions of\r\ndifferent individuals may vary indefinitely\u003c/i\u003e, both as to their\r\nconstitution and as to the objects which call them forth. For there is\r\nnothing sacramental or eternally fixed in reflex action. Any sort of\r\nreflex effect is possible, and reflexes actually vary indefinitely, as\r\nwe know.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, \u003ci\u003eany classification of the emotions is seen to be as true and\r\nas \u0027natural\u0027 as any other\u003c/i\u003e, if it only serves some purpose; and such a\r\nquestion as \"What is the \u0027real\u0027 or \u0027typical\u0027 expression of anger, or\r\nfear?\" is seen to have no objective meaning at all. Instead of it we now\r\nhave the question as to how any given \u0027expression\u0027 of anger or fear may\r\nhave come to exist; and that is a real question of physiological\r\nmechanics on the one hand, and of history on the other, which (like all\r\nreal questions) is in essence answerable, although the answer may be\r\nhard to find. On a later page I shall mention the attempts to answer it\r\nwhich have been made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eA Corollary verified.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If our theory be true, a necessary corollary of\r\nit ought to be this: that any voluntary and cold-blooded arousal of the\r\nso-called manifestations of a special emotion should give us the emotion\r\nitself. Now within the limits in which it can be verified, experience\r\ncorroborates rather than disproves this inference. Everyone knows how\r\npanic is increased by flight, and how the giving way to the symptoms of\r\ngrief or anger increases those passions themselves. Each fit of sobbing\r\nmakes the sorrow more acute, and calls forth another fit stronger still,\r\nuntil at last repose only ensues with lassitude and with the apparent\r\nexhaustion of the machinery. In rage, it is notorious how we \u0027work\r\nourselves up\u0027 to a climax by repeated outbreaks of expression. Refuse to\r\nexpress a passion, and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger, and\r\nits occasion seems ridiculous. Whistling to keep up courage is no mere\r\nfigure of speech. On the other hand, sit all day in a moping posture,\r\nsigh, and reply to everything\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_383\" id=\"page_383\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{383}\u003c/span\u003e with a dismal voice, and your melancholy\r\nlingers. There is no more valuable precept in moral education than this,\r\nas all who have experience know: if we wish to conquer undesirable\r\nemotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first\r\ninstance cold-bloodedly, go through the \u003ci\u003eoutward movements\u003c/i\u003e of those\r\ncontrary dispositions which we prefer to cultivate. The reward of\r\npersistency will infallibly come, in the fading out of the sullenness or\r\ndepression, and the advent of real cheerfulness and kindliness in their\r\nstead. Smooth the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather\r\nthan the ventral aspect of the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the\r\ngenial compliment, and your heart must be frigid indeed if it do not\r\ngradually thaw!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgainst this it is to be said that many actors who perfectly mimic the\r\noutward appearances of emotion in face, gait, and voice declare that\r\nthey feel no emotion at all. Others, however, according to Mr. Wm.\r\nArcher, who has made a very instructive statistical inquiry among them,\r\nsay that the emotion of the part masters them whenever they play it\r\nwell. The explanation for the discrepancy amongst actors is probably\r\nsimple. The \u003ci\u003evisceral and organic\u003c/i\u003e part of the expression can be\r\nsuppressed in some men, but not in others, and on this it must be that\r\nthe chief part of the felt emotion depends. Those actors who feel the\r\nemotion are probably unable, those who are inwardly cold are probably\r\nable, to affect the dissociation in a complete way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAn Objection replied to.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It may be objected to the general theory which\r\nI maintain that stopping the expression of an emotion often makes it\r\nworse. The funniness becomes quite excruciating when we are forbidden by\r\nthe situation to laugh, and anger pent in by fear turns into tenfold\r\nhate. Expressing either emotion freely, however, gives relief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis objection is more specious than real. \u003ci\u003eDuring\u003c/i\u003e the expression the\r\nemotion is always felt. \u003ci\u003eAfter\u003c/i\u003e it, the centres having normally\r\ndischarged themselves, we feel it no\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_384\" id=\"page_384\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{384}\u003c/span\u003e more. But where the facial part of\r\nthe discharge is suppressed the thoracic and visceral may be all the\r\nmore violent and persistent, as in suppressed laughter; or the original\r\nemotion may be changed, by the combination of the provoking object with\r\nthe restraining pressure, into \u003ci\u003eanother emotion altogether\u003c/i\u003e, in which\r\ndifferent and possibly profounder organic disturbance occurs. If I would\r\nkill my enemy but dare not, my emotion is surely altogether other than\r\nthat which would possess me if I let my anger explode.\u0026mdash;On the whole,\r\ntherefore this objection has no weight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Subtler Emotions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the æsthetic emotions the bodily reverberation\r\nand the feeling may both be faint. A connoisseur is apt to judge a work\r\nof art dryly and intellectually, and with no bodily thrill. On the other\r\nhand, works of art may arouse intense emotion; and whenever they do so,\r\nthe experience is completely covered by the terms of our theory. Our\r\ntheory requires that \u003ci\u003eincoming currents\u003c/i\u003e be the basis of emotion. But,\r\nwhether secondary organic reverberations be or be not aroused by it, the\r\nperception of a work of art (music, decoration, etc.) is always in the\r\nfirst instance at any rate an affair of incoming currents. The work\r\nitself is an object of sensation; and, the perception of an object of\r\nsensation being a \u0027coarse\u0027 or vivid experience, what pleasure goes with\r\nit will partake of the \u0027coarse\u0027 or vivid form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat there may be subtle pleasure too, I do not deny. In other words,\r\nthere may be purely cerebral emotion, independent of all currents from\r\noutside. Such feelings as moral satisfaction, thankfulness, curiosity,\r\nrelief at getting a problem solved, may be of this sort. But the\r\nthinness and paleness of these feelings, when unmixed with bodily\r\neffects, is in very striking contrast to the coarser emotions. In all\r\nsentimental and impressionable people the bodily effects mix in: the\r\nvoice breaks and the eyes moisten when the moral truth is felt, etc.\r\nWherever there is anything like \u003ci\u003erapture\u003c/i\u003e, however intellectual its\r\nground, we find these\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_385\" id=\"page_385\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{385}\u003c/span\u003e secondary processes ensue. Unless we actually\r\nlaugh at the neatness of the demonstration or witticism; unless we\r\nthrill at the case of justice, or tingle at the act of magnanimity, our\r\nstate of mind can hardly be called emotional at all. It is in fact a\r\nmere intellectual perception of how certain things are to be\r\ncalled\u0026mdash;neat, right, witty, generous, and the like. Such a judicial\r\nstate of mind as this is to be classed among cognitive rather than among\r\nemotional acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDescription of Fear.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;For the reasons given on \u003ca href=\"#page_374\"\u003ep. 374\u003c/a\u003e, I will append no\r\ninventory or classification of emotions or description of their\r\nsymptoms. The reader has practically almost all the facts in his own\r\nhand. As an example, however, of the best sort of descriptive work on\r\nthe symptoms, I will quote Darwin\u0027s account of them in fear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Fear is often preceded by astonishment, and is so far akin to it that\r\nboth lead to the senses of sight and hearing being instantly aroused. In\r\nboth cases the eyes and mouth are widely opened and the eyebrows raised.\r\nThe frightened man at first stands like a statue, motionless and\r\nbreathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation.\r\nThe heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks\r\nagainst the ribs; but it is very doubtful if it then works more\r\nefficiently than usual, so as to send a greater supply of blood to all\r\nparts of the body; for the skin instantly becomes pale as during\r\nincipient faintness. This paleness of the surface, however, is probably\r\nin large part, or is exclusively, due to the vaso-motor centre being\r\naffected in such a manner as to cause the contraction of the small\r\narteries of the skin. That the skin is much affected under the sense of\r\ngreat fear, we see in the marvellous manner in which perspiration\r\nimmediately exudes from it. This exudation is all the more remarkable,\r\nas the surface is then cold, and hence the term, a cold sweat; whereas\r\nthe sudorific glands are properly excited into action when the surface\r\nis heated. The hairs also on the skin stand erect, and the superficial\r\nmuscles shiver.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_386\" id=\"page_386\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{386}\u003c/span\u003e In connection with the disturbed action of the heart\r\nthe breathing is hurried. The salivary glands act imperfectly; the mouth\r\nbecomes dry and is often opened and shut. I have also noticed that under\r\nslight fear there is strong tendency to yawn. One of the best marked\r\nsymptoms is the trembling of all the muscles of the body; and this is\r\noften first seen in the lips. From this cause, and from the dryness of\r\nthe mouth, the voice becomes husky or indistinct or may altogether fail.\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eObstupui steteruntque comæ, et vox faucibus hæsit.\u003c/i\u003e\u0027… As fear\r\nincreases into an agony of terror, we behold, as under all violent\r\nemotions, diversified results. The heart beats wildly or must fail to\r\nact and faintness ensue; there is a death-like pallor; the breathing is\r\nlabored; the wings of the nostrils are widely dilated; there is a\r\ngasping and convulsive motion of the lips, a tremor on the hollow cheek,\r\na gulping and catching of the throat; the uncovered and protruding\r\neyeballs are fixed on the object of terror; or they may roll restlessly\r\nfrom side to side, \u003ci\u003ehuc illuc volens oculos totumque pererrat\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\npupils are said to be enormously dilated. All the muscles of the body\r\nmay become rigid or may be thrown into convulsive movements. The hands\r\nare alternately clenched and opened, often with a twitching movement.\r\nThe arms may be protruded as if to avert some dreadful danger, or may be\r\nthrown wildly over the head. The Rev. Mr. Hagenauer has seen this latter\r\naction in a terrified Australian. In other cases there is a sudden and\r\nuncontrollable tendency to headlong flight; and so strong is this that\r\nthe boldest soldiers may be seized with a sudden panic.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_48_48\" id=\"FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_48_48\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGenesis of the Emotional Reactions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;How come the various objects which\r\nexcite emotion to produce such special and different bodily effects?\r\nThis question was not asked till quite recently, but already some\r\ninteresting suggestions towards answering it have been made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome movements of expression can be accounted for as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_387\" id=\"page_387\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{387}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eweakened\r\nrepetitions of movements which formerly\u003c/i\u003e (when they were stronger) \u003ci\u003ewere\r\nof utility to the subject\u003c/i\u003e. Others are similarly weakened repetitions of\r\nmovements which under other conditions were \u003ci\u003ephysiologically necessary\r\nconcomitants of the useful movements\u003c/i\u003e. Of the latter reactions the\r\nrespiratory disturbances in anger and fear might be taken as\r\nexamples\u0026mdash;organic reminiscences, as it were, reverberations in\r\nimagination of the blowings of the man making a series of combative\r\nefforts, of the pantings of one in precipitate flight. Such at least is\r\na suggestion made by Mr. Spencer which has found approval. And he also\r\nwas the first, so far as I know, to suggest that other movements in\r\nanger and fear could be explained by the nascent excitation of formerly\r\nuseful acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"To have in a slight degree,\" he says, \"such psychical states as\r\naccompany the reception of wounds, and are experienced during flight, is\r\nto be in a state of what we call fear. And to have in a slight degree\r\nsuch psychical states as the processes of catching, killing, and eating\r\nimply, is to have the desires to catch, kill, and eat. That the\r\npropensities to the acts are nothing else than nascent excitations of\r\nthe psychical state involved in the acts, is proved by the natural\r\nlanguage of the propensities. Fear, when strong, expresses itself in\r\ncries, in efforts to escape, in palpitations, in tremblings; and these\r\nare just the manifestations that go along with an actual suffering of\r\nthe evil feared. The destructive passion is shown in a general tension\r\nof the muscular system, in gnashing of teeth and protrusion of the\r\nclaws, in dilated eyes and nostrils in growls; and these are weaker\r\nforms of the actions that accompany the killing of prey. To such\r\nobjective evidences every one can add subjective evidences. Everyone can\r\ntestify that the psychical state called fear consists of mental\r\nrepresentations of certain painful results; and that the one called\r\nanger consists of mental representations of the actions and impressions\r\nwhich would occur while inflicting some kind of pain.\"\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_388\" id=\"page_388\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{388}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe principle of \u003ci\u003erevival, in weakened form, of reactions useful in more\r\nviolent dealings with the object inspiring the emotion\u003c/i\u003e, has found many\r\napplications. So slight a symptom as the snarl or sneer, the one-sided\r\nuncovering of the upper teeth, is accounted for by Darwin as a survival\r\nfrom the time when our ancestors had large canines, and unfleshed them\r\n(as dogs now do) for attack. Similarly the raising of the eyebrows in\r\noutward attention, the opening of the mouth in astonishment, come,\r\naccording to the same author, from the utility of these movements in\r\nextreme cases. The raising of the eyebrows goes with the opening of the\r\neye for better vision; the opening of the mouth with the intensest\r\nlistening, and with the rapid catching of the breath which precedes\r\nmuscular effort. The distention of the nostrils in anger is interpreted\r\nby Spencer as an echo of the way in which our ancestors had to breathe\r\nwhen, during combat, their \"mouth was filled up by a part of an\r\nantagonist\u0027s body that had been seized\" (!). The trembling of fear is\r\nsupposed by Mantegazza to be for the sake of warming the blood (!). The\r\nreddening of the face and neck is called by Wundt a compensatory\r\narrangement for relieving the brain of the blood-pressure which the\r\nsimultaneous excitement of the heart brings with it. The effusion of\r\ntears is explained both by this author and by Darwin to be a\r\nblood-withdrawing agency of a similar sort. The contraction of the\r\nmuscles around the eyes, of which the primitive use is to protect those\r\norgans from being too much gorged with blood during the screaming fits\r\nof infancy, survives in adult life in the shape of the frown, which\r\ninstantly comes over the brow when anything difficult or displeasing\r\npresents itself either to thought or action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"As the habit of contracting the brows has been followed by infants\r\nduring innumerable generations, at the commencement of every crying or\r\nscreaming fit,\" says Darwin, \"it has become firmly associated with the\r\nincipient sense of something distressing or disagreeable. Hence,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_389\" id=\"page_389\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{389}\u003c/span\u003e under\r\nsimilar circumstances, it would be apt to be continued during maturity,\r\nalthough never then developed, into a crying fit. Screaming or weeping\r\nbegins to be voluntarily restrained at an early period of life, whereas\r\nfrowning is hardly ever restrained at any age.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother principle, to which Darwin perhaps hardly does sufficient\r\njustice, may be called the principle of \u003ci\u003ereacting similarly to\r\nanalogous-feeling stimuli\u003c/i\u003e. There is a whole vocabulary of descriptive\r\nadjectives common to impressions belonging to different sensible\r\nspheres\u0026mdash;experiences of all classes are \u003ci\u003esweet\u003c/i\u003e, impressions of all\r\nclasses \u003ci\u003erich\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003esolid\u003c/i\u003e, sensations of all classes \u003ci\u003esharp\u003c/i\u003e. Wundt and\r\nPiderit accordingly explain many of our most expressive reactions upon\r\nmoral causes as symbolic gustatory movements. As soon as any experience\r\narises which has an affinity with the feeling of sweet, or bitter, or\r\nsour, the same movements are executed which would result from the taste\r\nin point. \"All the states of mind which language designates by the\r\nmetaphors bitter, harsh, sweet, combine themselves, therefore, with the\r\ncorresponding mimetic movements of the mouth.\" Certainly the emotions of\r\ndisgust and satisfaction do express themselves in this mimetic way.\r\nDisgust is an incipent regurgitation or retching, limiting its\r\nexpression often to the grimace of the lips and nose; satisfaction goes\r\nwith a sucking smile, or tasting motion of the lips. The ordinary\r\ngesture of negation\u0026mdash;among us, moving the head about its axis from side\r\nto side\u0026mdash;is a reaction originally used by babies to keep disagreeables\r\nfrom getting into their mouth, and may be observed in perfection in any\r\nnursery. It is now evoked where the stimulus is only an unwelcome idea.\r\nSimilarly the nod forward in affirmation is after the analogy of taking\r\nfood into the mouth. The connection of the expression of moral or social\r\ndisdain or dislike, especially in women, with movements having a\r\nperfectly definite original olfactory function, is too obvious for\r\ncomment. Winking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_390\" id=\"page_390\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{390}\u003c/span\u003e is the effect of any threatening surprise, not only of\r\nwhat puts the eyes in danger; and a momentary aversion of the eyes is\r\nvery apt to be one\u0027s first symptom of response to an unexpectedly\r\nunwelcome proposition.\u0026mdash;These may suffice as examples of movements\r\nexpressive from analogy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if certain of our emotional reactions can be explained by the two\r\nprinciples invoked\u0026mdash;and the reader will himself have felt how\r\nconjectural and fallible in some of the instances the explanation\r\nis\u0026mdash;there remain many reactions which cannot so be explained at all, and\r\nthese we must write down for the present as purely idiopathic effects of\r\nthe stimulus. Amongst them are the effects on the viscera and internal\r\nglands, the dryness of the mouth and diarrhœa and nausea of fear, the\r\nliver-disturbances which sometimes produce jaundice after excessive\r\nrage, the urinary secretion of sanguine excitement, and the\r\nbladder-contraction of apprehension, the gaping of expectancy, the \u0027lump\r\nin the throat\u0027 of grief, the tickling there and the swallowing of\r\nembarrassment, the \u0027precordial anxiety\u0027 of dread, the changes in the\r\npupil, the various sweatings of the skin, cold or hot, local or general,\r\nand its flushings, together with other symptoms which probably exist but\r\nare too hidden to have been noticed or named. Trembling, which is found\r\nin many excitements besides that of terror, is, \u003ci\u003epace\u003c/i\u003e Mr. Spencer and\r\nSig. Mantegazza, quite pathological. So are terror\u0027s other strong\r\nsymptoms: they are harmful to the creature who presents them. In an\r\norganism as complex as the nervous system there must be many\r\n\u003ci\u003eincidental\u003c/i\u003e reactions which would never themselves have been evolved\r\nindependently, for any utility they might possess. Sea-sickness,\r\nticklishness, shyness, the love of music, of the various intoxicants,\r\nnay, the entire æsthetic life of man, must be traced to this accidental\r\norigin. It would be foolish to suppose that none of the reactions called\r\nemotional could have arisen in this \u003ci\u003equasi\u003c/i\u003e-accidental way.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_391\" id=\"page_391\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{391}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XXV\" id=\"CHAPTER_XXV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXV.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eINSTINCT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIts Definition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eInstinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting\r\nin such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends,\r\nand without previous education in the performance.\u003c/i\u003e Instincts are the\r\nfunctional correlatives of structure. With the presence of a certain\r\norgan goes, one may say, almost always a native aptitude for its use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe actions we call instinctive all conform to the general reflex type;\r\nthey are called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the\r\nanimal\u0027s body, or at a distance in his environment. The cat runs after\r\nthe mouse, runs or shows fight before the dog, avoids falling from walls\r\nand trees, shuns fire and water, etc., not because he has any notion\r\neither of life or of death, or of self, or of preservation. He has\r\nprobably attained to no one of these conceptions in such a way as to\r\nreact definitely upon it. He acts in each case separately, and simply\r\nbecause he cannot help it; being so framed that when that particular\r\nrunning thing called a mouse appears in his field of vision he \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e\r\npursue; that when that particular barking and obstreperous thing called\r\na dog appears there he \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e retire, if at a distance, and scratch if\r\nclose by; that he \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e withdraw his feet from water and his face from\r\nflame, etc. His nervous system is to a great extent a preorganized\r\nbundle of such reactions\u0026mdash;they are as fatal as sneezing, and as exactly\r\ncorrelated to their special excitants as it is to its own. Although the\r\nnaturalist may, for his own convenience, class these reactions under\r\ngeneral heads, he must not forget that in the animal it is a particular\r\nsensation or perception or image which calls them forth.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_392\" id=\"page_392\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{392}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt first this view astounds us by the enormous number of special\r\nadjustments it supposes animals to possess ready-made in anticipation of\r\nthe outer things among which they are to dwell. \u003ci\u003eCan\u003c/i\u003e mutual dependence\r\nbe so intricate and go so far? Is each thing born fitted to particular\r\nother things, and to them exclusively, as locks are fitted to their\r\nkeys? Undoubtedly this must be believed to be so. Each nook and cranny\r\nof creation, down to our very skin and entrails, has its living\r\ninhabitants, with organs suited to the place, to devour and digest the\r\nfood it harbors and to meet the dangers it conceals; and the minuteness\r\nof adaptation thus shown in the way of \u003ci\u003estructure\u003c/i\u003e knows no bounds. Even\r\nso are there no bounds to the minuteness of adaptation in the way of\r\n\u003ci\u003econduct\u003c/i\u003e which the several inhabitants display.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe older writings on instinct are ineffectual wastes of words, because\r\ntheir authors never came down to this definite and simple point of view,\r\nbut smothered everything in vague wonder at the clairvoyant and\r\nprophetic power of the animals\u0026mdash;so superior to anything in man\u0026mdash;and at\r\nthe beneficence of God in endowing them with such a gift. But God\u0027s\r\nbeneficence endows them, first of all, with a nervous system; and,\r\nturning our attention to this, makes instinct immediately appear neither\r\nmore nor less wonderful than all the other facts of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEvery instinct is an impulse.\u003c/b\u003e Whether we shall call such impulses as\r\nblushing, sneezing, coughing, smiling, or dodging, or keeping time to\r\nmusic, instincts or not, is a mere matter of terminology. The process is\r\nthe same throughout. In his delightfully fresh and interesting work,\r\n\u0027Der Thierische Wille,\u0027 Herr G. H. Schneider subdivides impulses\r\n(\u003ci\u003eTriebe\u003c/i\u003e) into sensation-impulses, perception-impulses, and\r\nidea-impulses. To crouch from cold is a sensation-impulse; to turn and\r\nfollow, if we see people running one way, is a perception-impulse; to\r\ncast about for cover, if it begins to blow and rain, is an\r\nimagination-impulse. A single complex instinctive action may involve\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_393\" id=\"page_393\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{393}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuccessively the awakening of impulses of all three classes. Thus a\r\nhungry lion starts to \u003ci\u003eseek\u003c/i\u003e prey by the awakening in him of imagination\r\ncoupled with desire; he begins to \u003ci\u003estalk\u003c/i\u003e it when, on eye, ear, or\r\nnostril, he gets an impression of its presence at a certain distance; he\r\n\u003ci\u003esprings\u003c/i\u003e upon it, either when the booty takes alarm and flees, or when\r\nthe distance is sufficiently reduced; he proceeds to \u003ci\u003etear\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003edevour\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit the moment he gets a sensation of its contact with his claws and\r\nfangs. Seeking, stalking, springing, and devouring are just so many\r\ndifferent kinds of muscular contraction, and neither kind is called\r\nforth by the stimulus appropriate to the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eNow, why do the various animals do what seem to us such strange\r\nthings\u003c/i\u003e, in the presence of such outlandish stimuli? Why does the hen,\r\nfor example, submit herself to the tedium of incubating such a fearfully\r\nuninteresting set of objects as a nestful of eggs, unless she have some\r\nsort of a prophetic inkling of the result? The only answer is \u003ci\u003ead\r\nhominem\u003c/i\u003e. We can only interpret the instincts of brutes by what we know\r\nof instincts in ourselves. Why do men always lie down, when they can, on\r\nsoft beds rather than on hard floors? Why do they sit round the stove on\r\na cold day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety-nine times\r\nout of a hundred, with their faces towards its middle rather than to the\r\nwall? Why do they prefer saddle of mutton and champagne to hard-tack and\r\nditch-water? Why does the maiden interest the youth so that everything\r\nabout her seems more important and significant than anything else in the\r\nworld? Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that\r\nevery creature \u003ci\u003elikes\u003c/i\u003e its own ways, and takes to the following them as\r\na matter of course. Science may come and consider these ways, and find\r\nthat most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their\r\nutility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following\r\nthem we feel that that is the only appropriate and natural thing to do.\r\nNot one man in a billion, when taking his dinner,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_394\" id=\"page_394\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{394}\u003c/span\u003e ever thinks of\r\nutility. He eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more.\r\nIf you ask him \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e he should want to eat more of what tastes like\r\nthat, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at\r\nyou for a fool. The connection between the savory sensation and the act\r\nit awakens is for him absolute and \u003ci\u003eselbstverständlich\u003c/i\u003e, an \u0027\u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsynthesis\u0027 of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own\r\nevidence. It takes, in short, what Berkeley calls a mind debauched by\r\nlearning to carry the process of making the natural seem strange, so far\r\nas to ask for the \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e of any instinctive human act. To the\r\nmetaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when\r\npleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk\r\nto a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so\r\nupside-down? The common man can only say, \"\u003ci\u003eOf course\u003c/i\u003e we smile, \u003ci\u003eof\r\ncourse\u003c/i\u003e our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, \u003ci\u003eof course\u003c/i\u003e we\r\nlove the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so\r\npalpably and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved!\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd so, probably, does each animal feel about the particular things it\r\ntends to do in presence of particular objects. They, too, are \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsyntheses. To the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to\r\nthe bear, the she-bear. To the broody hen the notion would probably seem\r\nmonstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful\r\nof eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and\r\nnever-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object which it is to her.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus we may be sure that, however mysterious some animals\u0027 instincts may\r\nappear to us, our instincts will appear no less mysterious to them. And\r\nwe may conclude that, to the animal which obeys it, every impulse and\r\nevery step of every instinct shines with its own sufficient light, and\r\nseems at the moment the only eternally right and proper thing to do. It\r\nis done for its own sake exclusively. What voluptuous thrill may not\r\nshake a fly, when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_395\" id=\"page_395\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{395}\u003c/span\u003e she at last discovers the one particular leaf, or\r\ncarrion, or bit of dung, that out of all the world can stimulate her\r\novipositor to its discharge? Does not the discharge then seem to her the\r\nonly fitting thing? And need she care or know anything about the future\r\nmaggot and its food?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eInstincts are not always blind or invariable.\u003c/b\u003e Nothing is commoner than\r\nthe remark that man differs from lower creatures by the almost total\r\nabsence of instincts, and the assumption of their work in him by\r\n\u0027reason.\u0027 A fruitless discussion might be waged on this point by two\r\ntheorizers who were careful not to define their terms. We must of course\r\navoid a quarrel about words, and the facts of the case are really\r\ntolerably plain. Man has a far greater variety of \u003ci\u003eimpulses\u003c/i\u003e than any\r\nlower animal; and any one of these impulses, taken in itself, is as\r\n\u0027blind\u0027 as the lowest instinct can be; but, owing to man\u0027s memory, power\r\nof reflection, and power of inference, they come each one to be felt by\r\nhim, after he has once yielded to them and experienced their results, in\r\nconnection with a \u003ci\u003eforesight\u003c/i\u003e of those results. In this condition an\r\nimpulse acted out may be said to be acted out, in part at least, \u003ci\u003efor\r\nthe sake\u003c/i\u003e of its results. It is obvious that \u003ci\u003eevery instinctive act, in\r\nan animal with memory, must cease to be \u0027blind\u0027 after being once\r\nrepeated\u003c/i\u003e, and must be accompanied with foresight of its \u0027end\u0027 just so\r\nfar as that end may have fallen under the animal\u0027s cognizance. An insect\r\nthat lays her eggs in a place where she never sees them hatched must\r\nalways do so \u0027blindly\u0027; but a hen who has already hatched a brood can\r\nhardly be assumed to sit with perfect \u0027blindness\u0027 on her second nest.\r\nSome expectation of consequences must in every case like this be\r\naroused; and this expectation, according as it is that of something\r\ndesired or of something disliked, must necessarily either re-enforce or\r\ninhibit the mere impulse. The hen\u0027s idea of the chickens would probably\r\nencourage her to sit; a rat\u0027s memory, on the other hand, of a former\r\nescape from a trap would neutralize his impulse to take bait from\r\nanything\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_396\" id=\"page_396\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{396}\u003c/span\u003e that reminded him of that trap. If a boy sees a fat\r\nhopping-toad, he probably has incontinently an impulse (especially if\r\nwith other boys) to smash the creature with a stone, which impulse we\r\nmay suppose him blindly to obey. But something in the expression of the\r\ndying toad\u0027s clasped hands suggests the meanness of the act, or reminds\r\nhim of sayings he has heard about the sufferings of animals being like\r\nhis own; so that, when next he is tempted by a toad, an idea arises\r\nwhich, far from spurring him again to the torment, prompts kindly\r\nactions, and may even make him the toad\u0027s champion against less\r\nreflecting boys.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is plain, then, that, \u003ci\u003eno matter how well endowed an animal may\r\noriginally be in the way of instincts, his resultant actions will be\r\nmuch modified if the instincts combine with experience\u003c/i\u003e, if in addition\r\nto impulses he have memories, associations, inferences, and\r\nexpectations, on any considerable scale. An object O, on which he has an\r\ninstinctive impulse to react in the manner A, would \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e provoke\r\nhim to that reaction. But O has meantime become for him a \u003ci\u003esign\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nnearness of P, on which he has an equally strong impulse to react in the\r\nmanner B, quite unlike A. So that when he meets O, the immediate impulse\r\nA and the remote impulse B struggle in his breast for the mastery. The\r\nfatality and uniformity said to be characteristic of instinctive actions\r\nwill be so little manifest that one might be tempted to deny to him\r\naltogether the possession of any instinct about the object O. Yet how\r\nfalse this judgment would be! The instinct about O is there; only by the\r\ncomplication of the associative machinery it has come into conflict with\r\nanother instinct about P.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere we immediately reap the good fruits of our simple physiological\r\nconception of what an instinct is. If it be a mere excito-motor impulse,\r\ndue to the preëxistence of a certain \u0027reflex arc\u0027 in the nerve-centres\r\nof the creature, of course it must follow the law of all such reflex\r\narcs. One\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_397\" id=\"page_397\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{397}\u003c/span\u003e liability of such arcs is to have their activity \u0027inhibited\u0027\r\nby other processes going on at the same time. It makes no difference\r\nwhether the arc be organized at birth, or ripen spontaneously later, or\r\nbe due to acquired habit; it must take its chances with all the other\r\narcs, and sometimes succeed, and sometimes fail, in drafting off the\r\ncurrents through itself. The mystical view of an instinct would make it\r\ninvariable. The physiological view would require it to show occasional\r\nirregularities in any animal in whom the number of separate instincts,\r\nand the possible entrance of the same stimulus into several of them,\r\nwere great. And such irregularities are what every superior animal\u0027s\r\ninstincts do show in abundance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWherever the mind is elevated enough to discriminate; wherever several\r\ndistinct sensory elements must combine to discharge the reflex arc;\r\nwherever, instead of plumping into action instantly at the first rough\r\nintimation of what \u003ci\u003esort\u003c/i\u003e of a thing is there, the agent waits to see\r\nwhich \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e of its kind it is and what the \u003ci\u003ecircumstances\u003c/i\u003e are of its\r\nappearance; wherever different individuals and different circumstances\r\ncan impel him in different ways; wherever these are the conditions\u0026mdash;we\r\nhave a masking of the elementary constitution of the instinctive life.\r\nThe whole story of our dealings with the lower wild animals is the\r\nhistory of our taking advantage of the way in which they judge of\r\neverything by its mere label, as it were, so as to ensnare or kill them.\r\nNature, in them, has left matters in this rough way, and made them act\r\n\u003ci\u003ealways\u003c/i\u003e in the manner which would be \u003ci\u003eoftenest\u003c/i\u003e right. There are more\r\nworms unattached to hooks than impaled upon them; therefore, on the\r\nwhole, says Nature to her fishy children, bite at \u003ci\u003eevery\u003c/i\u003e worm and take\r\nyour chances. But as her children get higher, and their lives more\r\nprecious, she reduces the risks. Since what seems to be the same object\r\nmay be now a genuine food and now a bait; since in gregarious species\r\neach individual may prove to be either the friend or the rival,\r\naccording to the circumstances, of another;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_398\" id=\"page_398\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{398}\u003c/span\u003e since any entirely unknown\r\nobject may be fraught with weal or woe. \u003ci\u003eNature implants contrary\r\nimpulses to act on many classes of things\u003c/i\u003e, and leaves it to slight\r\nalterations in the conditions of the individual case to decide which\r\nimpulse shall carry the day. Thus, greediness and suspicion, curiosity\r\nand timidity, coyness and desire, bashfulness and vanity, sociability\r\nand pugnacity, seem to shoot over into each other as quickly, and to\r\nremain in as unstable an equilibrium, in the higher birds and mammals as\r\nin man. All are impulses, congenital, blind at first, and productive of\r\nmotor reactions of a rigorously determinate sort. \u003ci\u003eEach one of them then\r\nis an instinct\u003c/i\u003e, as instincts are commonly defined. \u003ci\u003eBut they contradict\r\neach other\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;\u0027experience\u0027 in each particular opportunity of application\r\nusually deciding the issue. \u003ci\u003eThe animal that exhibits them loses the\r\n\u0027instinctive\u0027 demeanor\u003c/i\u003e and appears to lead a life of hesitation and\r\nchoice, an intellectual life; \u003ci\u003enot, however, because he has no\r\ninstincts\u0026mdash;rather because he has so many that they block each other\u0027s\r\npath\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus we may confidently say that however uncertain man\u0027s reactions upon\r\nhis environment may sometimes seem in comparison with those of lower\r\nmammals, the uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any\r\nprinciples of action which he lacks. \u003ci\u003eOn the contrary, man possesses all\r\nthe impulses that they have, and a great many more besides.\u003c/i\u003e In other\r\nwords, there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason.\r\nReason, \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can\r\nneutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may, however,\r\nmake an \u003ci\u003einference which will excite the imagination so as to let loose\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe impulse the other way; and thus, though the animal richest in reason\r\nis also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he never seems\r\nthe fatal automaton which a \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e instinctive animal must be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwo Principles of Non-uniformity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Instincts may be masked in the mature\r\nanimal\u0027s life by two other causes. These are:\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_399\" id=\"page_399\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{399}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e The \u003ci\u003einhibition of instincts by habits\u003c/i\u003e; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e The \u003ci\u003etransitoriness of instincts\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e The law of \u003cb\u003einhibition of instincts by habits\u003c/b\u003e is this: \u003ci\u003eWhen objects\r\nof a certain class elicit from an animal a certain sort of reaction, it\r\noften happens that the animal becomes partial to the first specimen of\r\nthe class on which it has reacted, and will not afterward react on any\r\nother specimen.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe selection of a particular hole to live in, of a particular mate, of\r\na particular feeding-ground, a particular variety of diet, a particular\r\nanything, in short, out of a possible multitude, is a very wide-spread\r\ntendency among animals, even those low down in the scale. The limpet\r\nwill return to the same sticking-place in its rock, and the lobster to\r\nits favorite nook on the sea-bottom. The rabbit will deposit its dung in\r\nthe same corner; the bird makes its nest on the same bough. But each of\r\nthese preferences carries with it an insensibility to \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e\r\nopportunities and occasions\u0026mdash;an insensibility which can only be\r\ndescribed physiologically as an inhibition of new impulses by the habit\r\nof old ones already formed. The possession of homes and wives of our own\r\nmakes us strangely insensible to the charms of those of other people.\r\nFew of us are adventurous in the matter of food; in fact, most of us\r\nthink there is something disgusting in a bill of fare to which we are\r\nunused. Strangers, we are apt to think, cannot be worth knowing,\r\nespecially if they come from distant cities, etc. The original impulse\r\nwhich got us homes, wives, dietaries, and friends at all, seems to\r\nexhaust itself in its first achievements and to leave no surplus energy\r\nfor reacting on new cases. And so it comes about that, witnessing this\r\ntorpor, an observer of mankind might say that no \u003ci\u003einstinctive\u003c/i\u003e\r\npropensity toward certain objects existed at all. It existed, but it\r\nexisted \u003ci\u003emiscellaneously\u003c/i\u003e, or as an instinct pure and simple, only\r\nbefore habit was formed. A habit, once grafted on an instinctive\r\ntendency, restricts the range of the tendency itself, and keeps us from\r\nreacting on any\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_400\" id=\"page_400\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{400}\u003c/span\u003e but the habitual object, although other objects might\r\njust as well have been chosen had they been the first-comers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother sort of arrest of instinct by habit is where the same class of\r\nobjects awakens contrary instinctive impulses. Here the impulse first\r\nfollowed toward a given individual of the class is apt to keep him from\r\never awakening the opposite impulse in us. In fact, the whole class may\r\nbe protected by this individual specimen from the application to it of\r\nthe other impulse. Animals, for example, awaken in a child the opposite\r\nimpulses of fearing and fondling. But if a child, in his first attempts\r\nto pat a dog, gets snapped at or bitten, so that the impulse of fear is\r\nstrongly aroused, it may be that for years to come no dog will excite in\r\nhim the impulse to fondle again. On the other hand, the greatest natural\r\nenemies, if carefully introduced to each other when young and guided at\r\nthe outset by superior authority, settle down into those \u0027happy\r\nfamilies\u0027 of friends which we see in our menageries. Young animals,\r\nimmediately after birth, have no instinct of fear, but show their\r\ndependence by allowing themselves to be freely handled. Later, however,\r\nthey grow \u0027wild\u0027 and, if left to themselves, will not let man approach\r\nthem. I am told by farmers in the Adirondack wilderness that it is a\r\nvery serious matter if a cow wanders off and calves in the woods and is\r\nnot found for a week or more. The calf, by that time, is as wild and\r\nalmost as fleet as a deer, and hard to capture without violence. But\r\ncalves rarely show any wildness to the men who have been in contact with\r\nthem during the first days of their life, when the instinct to attach\r\nthemselves is uppermost, nor do they dread strangers as they would if\r\nbrought up wild.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eChickens give a curious illustration of the same law. Mr. Spalding\u0027s\r\nwonderful article on instinct shall supply us with the facts. These\r\nlittle creatures show opposite instincts of attachment and fear, either\r\nof which may be aroused by the same object, man. If a chick is born in\r\nthe absence of the hen, it \"will follow any moving object.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_401\" id=\"page_401\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{401}\u003c/span\u003e And when\r\nguided by sight alone, they seem to have no more disposition to follow a\r\nhen than to follow a duck or a human being. Unreflecting lookers-on,\r\nwhen they saw chickens a day old running after me,\" says Mr. Spalding,\r\n\"and older ones following me for miles, and answering to my whistle,\r\nimagined that I must have some occult power over the creatures: whereas\r\nI had simply allowed them to follow me from the first. There is the\r\ninstinct to follow; and the ear, prior to experience, attaches them to\r\nthe right object.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_49_49\" id=\"FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_49_49\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if a man presents himself for the first time when the instinct of\r\n\u003ci\u003efear\u003c/i\u003e is strong, the phenomena are altogether reversed. Mr. Spalding\r\nkept three chickens hooded until they were nearly four days old, and\r\nthus describes their behavior:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Each of them, on being unhooded, evinced the greatest terror to me,\r\ndashing off in the opposite direction whenever I sought to approach it.\r\nThe table on which they were unhooded stood before a window, and each in\r\nits turn beat against the window like a wild bird. One of them darted\r\nbehind some books, and, squeezing itself into a corner, remained\r\ncowering for a length of time. We might guess at the meaning of this\r\nstrange and exceptional wildness; but the odd fact is enough for my\r\npresent purpose. Whatever might have been the meaning of this marked\r\nchange in their mental constitution\u0026mdash;had they been unhooded on the\r\nprevious day they would have run to me instead of from me\u0026mdash;it could not\r\nhave been the effect of experience; it must have resulted wholly from\r\nchanges in their own organizations.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_50_50\" id=\"FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_50_50\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTheir case was precisely analogous to that of the Adirondack calves. The\r\ntwo opposite instincts relative to the same object ripen in succession.\r\nIf the first one engenders a habit, that habit will inhibit the\r\napplication of the second\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_402\" id=\"page_402\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{402}\u003c/span\u003e instinct to that object. All animals are tame\r\nduring the earliest phase of their infancy. Habits formed then limit the\r\neffects of whatever instincts of wildness may later be evolved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e This leads us to the \u003cb\u003elaw of transitoriness\u003c/b\u003e, which is this: \u003ci\u003eMany\r\ninstincts ripen at a certain age and then fade away\u003c/i\u003e. A consequence of\r\nthis law is that if, during the time of such an instinct\u0027s vivacity,\r\nobjects adequate to arouse it are met with, a \u003ci\u003ehabit\u003c/i\u003e of acting on them\r\nis formed, which remains when the original instinct has passed away; but\r\nthat if no such objects are met with, then no habit will be formed; and,\r\nlater on in life, when the animal meets the objects, he will altogether\r\nfail to react, as at the earlier epoch he would instinctively have done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo doubt such a law is restricted. Some instincts are far less transient\r\nthan others\u0026mdash;those connected with feeding and \u0027self-preservation\u0027 may\r\nhardly be transient at all,\u0026mdash;and some, after fading out for a time,\r\nrecur as strong as ever; e.g., the instincts of pairing and rearing\r\nyoung. The law, however, though not absolute, is certainly very\r\nwidespread, and a few examples will illustrate just what it means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the chickens and calves above mentioned it is obvious that the\r\ninstinct to follow and become attached fades out after a few days, and\r\nthat the instinct of flight then take its place, the conduct of the\r\ncreature toward man being decided by the formation or non-formation of a\r\ncertain habit during those days. The transiency of the chicken\u0027s\r\ninstinct to follow is also proved by its conduct toward the hen. Mr.\r\nSpalding kept some chickens shut up till they were comparatively old,\r\nand, speaking of these, he says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A chicken that has not heard the call of the mother until eight or ten\r\ndays old then hears it as if it heard it not. I regret to find that on\r\nthis point my notes are not so full as I could wish, or as they might\r\nhave been. There is, however, an account of one chicken that could not\r\nbe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_403\" id=\"page_403\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{403}\u003c/span\u003e returned to the mother when ten days old. The hen followed it, and\r\ntried to entice it in every way; still, it continually left her and ran\r\nto the house or to any person of whom it caught sight. This it persisted\r\nin doing, though beaten back with a small branch dozens of times, and,\r\nindeed, cruelly maltreated. It was also placed under the mother at\r\nnight, but it again left her in the morning.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe instinct of sucking is ripe in all mammals at birth, and leads to\r\nthat habit of taking the breast which, in the human infant, may be\r\nprolonged by daily exercise long beyond its usual term of a year or a\r\nyear and a half. But the instinct itself is transient, in the sense that\r\nif, for any reason, the child be fed by spoon during the first few days\r\nof its life and not put to the breast, it may be no easy matter after\r\nthat to make it suck at all. So of calves. If their mother die, or be\r\ndry, or refuse to let them suck for a day or two, so that they are fed\r\nby hand, it becomes hard to get them to suck at all when a new nurse is\r\nprovided. The ease with which sucking creatures are weaned, by simply\r\nbreaking the habit and giving them food in a new way, shows that the\r\ninstinct, purely as such, must be entirely extinct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAssuredly the simple fact that instincts are transient, and that the\r\neffect of later ones may be altered by the habits which earlier ones\r\nhave left behind, is a far more philosophical explanation than the\r\nnotion of an instinctive constitution vaguely \u0027deranged\u0027 or \u0027thrown out\r\nof gear.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have observed a Scotch terrier, born on the floor of a stable in\r\nDecember, and transferred six weeks later to a carpeted house, make,\r\nwhen he was less than four months old, a very elaborate pretence of\r\nburying things, such as gloves, etc., with which he had played till he\r\nwas tired. He scratched the carpet with his forefeet, dropped the object\r\nfrom his mouth upon the spot, then scratched all about it, and finally\r\nwent away and let it lie. Of course, the act was entirely useless. I saw\r\nhim perform it at that age some four or five times, and never again in\r\nhis life.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_404\" id=\"page_404\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{404}\u003c/span\u003e The conditions were not present to fix a habit which should\r\nlast when the prompting instinct died away. But suppose meat instead of\r\na glove, earth instead of a carpet, hunger-pangs instead of a fresh\r\nsupper a few hours later, and it is easy to see how this dog might have\r\ngot into a habit of burying superfluous food, which might have lasted\r\nall his life. Who can swear that the strictly instinctive part of the\r\nfood-burying propensity in the wild \u003ci\u003eCanidæ\u003c/i\u003e may not be as short-lived\r\nas it was in this terrier?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeaving lower animals aside, and turning to human instincts, we see the\r\nlaw of transiency corroborated on the widest scale by the alternation of\r\ndifferent interests and passions as human life goes on. With the child,\r\nlife is all play and fairy-tales and learning the external properties of\r\n\u0027things\u0027; with the youth, it is bodily exercises of a more systematic\r\nsort, novels of the real world, boon-fellowship and song, friendship and\r\nlove, nature, travel and adventure, science and philosophy; with the\r\nman, ambition and policy, acquisitiveness, responsibility to others, and\r\nthe selfish zest of the battle of life. If a boy grows up alone at the\r\nage of games and sports, and learns neither to play ball, nor row, nor\r\nsail, nor ride, nor skate, nor fish, nor shoot, probably he will be\r\nsedentary to the end of his days; and, though the best of opportunities\r\nbe afforded him for learning these things later, it is a hundred to one\r\nbut he will pass them by and shrink back from the effort of taking those\r\nnecessary first steps the prospect of which, at an earlier age, would\r\nhave filled him with eager delight. The sexual passion expires after a\r\nprotracted reign; but it is well known that its peculiar manifestations\r\nin a given individual depend almost entirely on the habits he may form\r\nduring the early period of its activity. Exposure to bad company then\r\nmakes him a loose liver all his days; chastity kept at first makes the\r\nsame easy later on. In all pedagogy the great thing is to strike the\r\niron while hot, and to seize the wave of the pupil\u0027s interest in each\r\nsuccessive subject before its ebb has come, so that knowledge\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_405\" id=\"page_405\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{405}\u003c/span\u003e may be\r\ngot and a habit of skill acquired\u0026mdash;a headway of interest, in short,\r\nsecured, on which afterward the individual may float. There is a happy\r\nmoment for fixing skill in drawing, for making boys collectors in\r\nnatural history, and presently dissectors and botanists; then for\r\ninitiating them into the harmonies of mechanics and the wonders of\r\nphysical and chemical law. Later, introspective psychology and the\r\nmetaphysical and religious mysteries take their turn; and, last of all,\r\nthe drama of human affairs and worldly wisdom in the widest sense of the\r\nterm. In each of us a saturation-point is soon reached in all these\r\nthings; the impetus of our purely intellectual zeal expires, and unless\r\nthe topic be one associated with some urgent personal need that keeps\r\nour wits constantly whetted about it, we settle into an equilibrium, and\r\nlive on what we learned when our interest was fresh and instinctive,\r\nwithout adding to the store. Outside of their own business, the ideas\r\ngained by men before they are twenty-five are practically the only ideas\r\nthey shall have in their lives. They \u003ci\u003ecannot\u003c/i\u003e get anything new.\r\nDisinterested curiosity is past, the mental grooves and channels set,\r\nthe power of assimilation gone. If by chance we ever do learn anything\r\nabout some entirely new topic, we are afflicted with a strange sense of\r\ninsecurity, and we fear to advance a resolute opinion. But with things\r\nlearned in the plastic days of instinctive curiosity we never lose\r\nentirely our sense of being at home. There remains a kinship, a\r\nsentiment of intimate acquaintance, which, even when we know we have\r\nfailed to keep abreast of the subject, flatters us with a sense of power\r\nover it, and makes us feel not altogether out of the pale.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhatever individual exceptions to this might be cited are of the sort\r\nthat \u0027prove the rule.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo detect the moment of the instinctive readiness for the subject is,\r\nthen, the first duty of every educator. As for the pupils, it would\r\nprobably lead to a more earnest temper on the part of college students\r\nif they had less\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_406\" id=\"page_406\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{406}\u003c/span\u003e belief in their unlimited future intellectual\r\npotentialities, and could be brought to realize that whatever physics\r\nand political economy and philosophy they are now acquiring are, for\r\nbetter or worse, the physics and political economy and philosophy that\r\nwill have to serve them to the end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEnumeration of Instincts in Man.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Professor Preyer, in his careful\r\nlittle work, \u0027Die Seele des Kindes,\u0027 says \"instinctive acts are in man\r\nfew in number, and, apart from those connected with the sexual passion,\r\ndifficult to recognize after early youth is past.\" And he adds, \"so much\r\nthe more attention should we pay to the instinctive movements of\r\nnew-born babies, sucklings, and small children.\" That instinctive acts\r\nshould be easiest \u003ci\u003erecognized\u003c/i\u003e in childhood would be a very natural\r\neffect of our principles of transitoriness, and of the restrictive\r\ninfluence of habits once acquired; but they are far indeed from being\r\n\u0027few in number\u0027 in man. Professor Preyer divides the movements of\r\ninfants into \u003ci\u003eimpulsive\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ereflex\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003einstinctive\u003c/i\u003e. By impulsive\r\nmovements he means \u003ci\u003erandom\u003c/i\u003e movements of limbs, body, and voice, with no\r\naim, and before perception is aroused. Among the first reflex movements\r\nare crying on contact with the air, \u003ci\u003esneezing, snuffling, snoring,\r\ncoughing, sighing, sobbing, gagging, vomiting, hiccuping, starting,\r\nmoving the limbs when touched, and sucking\u003c/i\u003e. To these may now be added\r\n\u003ci\u003ehanging by the hands\u003c/i\u003e (see \u003ci\u003eNineteenth Century\u003c/i\u003e, Nov. 1891). Later on\r\ncome \u003ci\u003ebiting\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eclasping objects\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ecarrying them to the mouth\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003esitting up\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003estanding\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecreeping\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ewalking\u003c/i\u003e. It is probable that\r\nthe centres for executing these three latter acts ripen spontaneously,\r\njust as those for flight have been proved to do in birds, and that the\r\nappearance of \u003ci\u003elearning\u003c/i\u003e to stand and walk, by trial and failure, is due\r\nto the exercise beginning in most children before the centres are ripe.\r\nChildren vary enormously in the rate and manner in which they learn to\r\nwalk. With the first impulses to \u003ci\u003eimitation\u003c/i\u003e, those to significant\r\n\u003ci\u003evocalization\u003c/i\u003e are born. \u003ci\u003eEmulation\u003c/i\u003e rapidly ensues, with \u003ci\u003epugnacity\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nits train. \u003ci\u003eFear\u003c/i\u003e of definite\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_407\" id=\"page_407\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{407}\u003c/span\u003e objects comes in early, \u003ci\u003esympathy\u003c/i\u003e much\r\nlater, though on the instinct (or emotion?\u0026mdash;see \u003ca href=\"#page_373\"\u003ep. 373\u003c/a\u003e) of sympathy so\r\nmuch in human life depends. \u003ci\u003eShyness\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esociability\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eplay\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ecuriosity\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eacquisitiveness\u003c/i\u003e, all begin very early in life. The\r\n\u003ci\u003ehunting instinct\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003emodesty\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003elove\u003c/i\u003e, the \u003ci\u003eparental instinct\u003c/i\u003e, etc.,\r\ncome later. By the age of 15 or 16 the whole array of human instincts is\r\ncomplete. It will be observed that \u003ci\u003eno other mammal, not even the\r\nmonkey, shows so large a list\u003c/i\u003e. In a perfectly-rounded development every\r\none of these instincts would start a habit toward certain objects and\r\ninhibit a habit towards certain others. Usually this is the case; but,\r\nin the one-sided development of civilized life, it happens that the\r\ntimely age goes by in a sort of starvation of objects, and the\r\nindividual then grows up with gaps in his psychic constitution which\r\nfuture experiences can never fill. Compare the accomplished gentleman\r\nwith the poor artisan or tradesman of a city: during the adolescence of\r\nthe former, objects appropriate to his growing interests, bodily and\r\nmental, were offered as fast as the interests awoke, and, as a\r\nconsequence, he is armed and equipped at every angle to meet the world.\r\nSport came to the rescue and completed his education where real things\r\nwere lacking. He has tasted of the essence of every side of human life,\r\nbeing sailor, hunter, athlete, scholar, fighter, talker, dandy, man of\r\naffairs, etc., all in one. Over the city poor boy\u0027s youth no such golden\r\nopportunities were hung, and in his manhood no desires for most of them\r\nexist. Fortunate it is for him if gaps are the only anomalies his\r\ninstinctive life presents; perversions are too often the fruit of his\r\nunnatural bringing-up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDescription of Fear.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In order to treat at least one instinct at greater\r\nlength, I will take the instance of \u003ci\u003efear\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFear is a reaction aroused by the same objects that arouse ferocity. The\r\nantagonism of the two is an interesting study in instinctive dynamics.\r\nWe both fear, and wish to kill, anything that may kill us; and the\r\nquestion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_408\" id=\"page_408\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{408}\u003c/span\u003e which of the two impulses we shall follow is usually decided\r\nby some one of those collateral circumstances of the particular case, to\r\nbe moved by which is the mark of superior mental natures. Of course this\r\nintroduces uncertainty into the reaction; but it is an uncertainty found\r\nin the higher brutes as well as in men, and ought not to be taken as\r\nproof that we are less instinctive than they. Fear has bodily\r\nexpressions of an extremely energetic kind, and stands, beside lust and\r\nanger, as one of the three most exciting emotions of which our nature is\r\nsusceptible. The progress from brute to man is characterized by nothing\r\nso much as by the decrease in frequency of proper occasions for fear. In\r\ncivilized life, in particular, it has at last become possible for large\r\nnumbers of people to pass from the cradle to the grave without ever\r\nhaving had a pang of genuine fear. Many of us need an attack of mental\r\ndisease to teach us the meaning of the word. Hence the possibility of so\r\nmuch blindly optimistic philosophy and religion. The atrocities of life\r\nbecome \u0027like a tale of little meaning though the words are strong\u0027; we\r\ndoubt if anything like \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e ever really was within the tiger\u0027s jaws, and\r\nconclude that the horrors we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry\r\nfor the chambers in which we lie so comfortably at peace with ourselves\r\nand with the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBe this as it may, fear is a genuine instinct, and one of the earliest\r\nshown by the human child. \u003ci\u003eNoises\u003c/i\u003e seem especially to call it forth.\r\nMost noises from the outer world, to a child bred in the house, have no\r\nexact significance. They are simply startling. To quote a good observer,\r\nM. Perez:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Children between three and ten months are less often alarmed by visual\r\nthan by auditory impressions. In cats, from the fifteenth day, the\r\ncontrary is the case. A child, three and a half months old, in the midst\r\nof the turmoil of a conflagration, in presence of the devouring flames\r\nand ruined walls, showed neither astonishment nor fear, but\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_409\" id=\"page_409\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{409}\u003c/span\u003e smiled at\r\nthe woman who was taking care of him, while his parents were busy. The\r\nnoise, however, of the trumpet of the firemen, who were approaching, and\r\nthat of the wheels of the engine, made him start and cry. At this age I\r\nhave never yet seen an infant startled at a flash of lightning, even\r\nwhen intense; but I have seen many of them alarmed at the voice of the\r\nthunder…. Thus fear comes rather by the ears than by the eyes, to the\r\nchild without experience.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_51_51\" id=\"FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_51_51\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe effect of noise in heightening any terror we may feel in adult years\r\nis very marked. The \u003ci\u003ehowling\u003c/i\u003e of the storm, whether on sea or land, is a\r\nprincipal cause of our anxiety when exposed to it. The writer has been\r\ninterested in noticing in his own person, while lying in bed, and kept\r\nawake by the wind outside, how invariably each loud gust of it arrested\r\nmomentarily his heart. A dog attacking us is much more dreadful by\r\nreason of the noises he makes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eStrange men\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003estrange animals\u003c/i\u003e, either large or small, excite\r\nfear, but especially men or animals advancing toward us in a threatening\r\nway. This is entirely instinctive and antecedent to experience. Some\r\nchildren will cry with terror at their very first sight of a cat or dog,\r\nand it will often be impossible for weeks to make them touch it. Others\r\nwill wish to fondle it almost immediately. Certain kinds of \u0027vermin,\u0027\r\nespecially spiders and snakes, seem to excite a fear unusually difficult\r\nto overcome. It is impossible to say how much of this difference is\r\ninstinctive and how much the result of stories heard about these\r\ncreatures. That the fear of \u0027vermin\u0027 ripens gradually seemed to me to be\r\nproved in a child of my own to whom I gave a live frog once, at the age\r\nof six to eight months, and again when he was a year and a half old. The\r\nfirst time, he seized it promptly, and holding it in spite of its\r\nstruggling, at last got its head into his mouth. He then let\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_410\" id=\"page_410\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{410}\u003c/span\u003e it crawl\r\nup his breast, and get upon his face, without showing alarm. But the\r\nsecond time, although he had seen no frog and heard no story about a\r\nfrog betweenwhiles, it was almost impossible to induce him to touch it.\r\nAnother child, a year old, eagerly took some very large spiders into his\r\nhand. At present he is afraid, but has been exposed meanwhile to the\r\nteachings of the nursery. One of my children from her birth upwards saw\r\ndaily the pet pug-dog of the house, and never betrayed the slightest\r\nfear until she was (if I recollect rightly) about eight months old. Then\r\nthe instinct suddenly seemed to develop, and with such intensity that\r\nfamiliarity had no mitigating effect. She screamed whenever the dog\r\nentered the room, and for many months remained afraid to touch him. It\r\nis needless to say that no change in the pug\u0027s unfailingly friendly\r\nconduct had anything to do with this change of feeling in the child. Two\r\nof my children were afraid, when babies, of \u003ci\u003efur\u003c/i\u003e: Richet reports a\r\nsimilar observation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePreyer tells of a young child screaming with fear on being carried near\r\nto the \u003ci\u003esea\u003c/i\u003e. The great source of terror to infancy is solitude. The\r\nteleology of this is obvious, as is also that of the infant\u0027s expression\r\nof dismay\u0026mdash;the never-failing cry\u0026mdash;on waking up and finding himself\r\nalone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eBlack things\u003c/i\u003e, and especially \u003ci\u003edark places\u003c/i\u003e, holes, caverns, etc.,\r\narouse a peculiarly gruesome fear. This fear, as well as that of\r\nsolitude, of being \u0027lost,\u0027 are explained after a fashion by ancestral\r\nexperience. Says Schneider:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is a fact that men, especially in childhood, fear to go into a dark\r\ncavern or a gloomy wood. This feeling of fear arises, to be sure, partly\r\nfrom the fact that we easily suspect that dangerous beasts may lurk in\r\nthese localities\u0026mdash;a suspicion due to stories we have heard and read.\r\nBut, on the other hand, it is quite sure that this fear at a certain\r\nperception is also directly inherited. Children who have been carefully\r\nguarded from all ghost-stories\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_411\" id=\"page_411\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{411}\u003c/span\u003e are nevertheless terrified and cry if\r\nled into a dark place, especially if sounds are made there. Even an\r\nadult can easily observe that an uncomfortable timidity steals over him\r\nin a lonely wood at night, although he may have the fixed conviction\r\nthat not the slightest danger is near.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"This feeling of fear occurs in many men even in their own house after\r\ndark, although it is much stronger in a dark cavern or forest. The fact\r\nof such instinctive fear is easily explicable when we consider that our\r\nsavage ancestors through innumerable generations were accustomed to meet\r\nwith dangerous beasts in caverns, especially bears, and were for the\r\nmost part attacked by such beasts during the night and in the woods, and\r\nthat thus an inseparable association between the perceptions of\r\ndarkness, caverns, woods, and fear took place, and was inherited.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_52_52\" id=\"FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_52_52\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eHigh places\u003c/i\u003e cause fear of a peculiarly sickening sort, though here,\r\nagain, individuals differ enormously. The utterly blind instinctive\r\ncharacter of the motor impulses here is shown by the fact that they are\r\nalmost always entirely unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to\r\nsuppress them. That they are a mere incidental peculiarity of the\r\nnervous system, like liability to sea-sickness, or love of music, with\r\nno teleological significance, seems more than probable. The fear in\r\nquestion varies so much from one person to another, and its detrimental\r\neffects are so much more obvious than its uses, that it is hard to see\r\nhow it could be a selected instinct. Man is anatomically one of the best\r\nfitted of animals for climbing about high places. The best psychical\r\ncomplement to this equipment would seem to be a \u0027level head\u0027 when there,\r\nnot a dread of going there at all. In fact, the teleology of fear,\r\nbeyond a certain point, is more than dubious. A certain amount of\r\ntimidity obviously adapts us to the world we live in, but the\r\n\u003ci\u003efear-paroxysm\u003c/i\u003e is surely altogether harmful to him who is its prey.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_412\" id=\"page_412\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{412}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFear of the supernatural is one variety of fear. It is difficult to\r\nassign any normal object for this fear, unless it were a genuine ghost.\r\nBut, in spite of psychical-research societies, science has not yet\r\nadopted ghosts; so we can only say that certain \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e of supernatural\r\nagency, associated with real circumstances, produce a peculiar kind of\r\nhorror. This horror is probably explicable as the result of a\r\ncombination of simpler horrors. To bring the ghostly terror to its\r\nmaximum, many usual elements of the dreadful must combine, such as\r\nloneliness, darkness, inexplicable sounds, especially of a dismal\r\ncharacter, moving figures half discerned (or, if discerned, of dreadful\r\naspect), and a vertiginous baffling of the expectation. This last\r\nelement, which is \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e, is very important. It produces a\r\nstrange emotional \u0027curdle\u0027 in our blood to see a process with which we\r\nare familiar deliberately taking an unwonted course. Anyone\u0027s heart\r\nwould stop beating if he perceived his chair sliding unassisted across\r\nthe floor. The lower animals appear to be sensitive to the mysteriously\r\nexceptional as well as ourselves. My friend Professor W. K. Brooks told\r\nme of his large and noble dog being frightened into a sort of epileptic\r\nfit by a bone being drawn across the floor by a thread which the dog did\r\nnot see. Darwin and Romanes have given similar experiences. The idea of\r\nthe supernatural involves that the usual should be set at naught. In the\r\nwitch and hobgoblin supernatural, other elements still of fear are\r\nbrought in\u0026mdash;caverns, slime and ooze, vermin, corpses, and the like. A\r\nhuman corpse seems normally to produce an instinctive dread, which is no\r\ndoubt somewhat due to its mysteriousness, and which familiarity rapidly\r\ndispels. But, in view of the fact that cadaveric, reptilian, and\r\nunderground horrors play so specific and constant a part in many\r\nnightmares and forms of delirium, it seems not altogether unwise to ask\r\nwhether these forms of dreadful circumstance may not at a former period\r\nhave been more normal objects of the environment than now. The ordinary\r\ncock-sure\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_413\" id=\"page_413\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{413}\u003c/span\u003e evolutionist ought to have no difficulty in explaining these\r\nterrors, and the scenery that provokes them, as relapses into the\r\nconsciousness of the cave-men, a consciousness usually overlaid in us by\r\nexperiences of more recent date.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are certain other pathological fears, and certain peculiarities in\r\nthe expression of ordinary fear, which might receive an explanatory\r\nlight from ancestral conditions, even infra-human ones. In ordinary\r\nfear, one may either run, or remain semi-paralyzed. The latter condition\r\nreminds us of the so-called death-shamming instinct shown by many\r\nanimals. Dr. Lindsay, in his work \u0027Mind in Animals,\u0027 says this must\r\nrequire great self-command in those that practise it. But it is really\r\nno feigning of death at all, and requires no self-command. It is simply\r\na terror-paralysis which has been so useful as to become hereditary. The\r\nbeast of prey does not think the motionless bird, insect, or crustacean\r\ndead. He simply fails to notice them at all; because his senses, like\r\nours, are much more strongly excited by a moving object than by a still\r\none. It is the same instinct which leads a boy playing \u0027I spy\u0027 to hold\r\nhis very breath when the seeker is near, and which makes the beast of\r\nprey himself in many cases motionlessly lie in wait for his victim or\r\nsilently \u0027stalk\u0027 it, by stealthy advances alternated with periods of\r\nimmobility. It is the opposite of the instinct which makes us jump up\r\nand down and move our arms when we wish to attract the notice of someone\r\npassing far away, and makes the shipwrecked sailor upon the raft where\r\nhe is floating frantically wave a cloth when a distant sail appears.\r\nNow, may not the statue-like, crouching immobility of some\r\nmelancholiacs, insane with general anxiety and fear of everything, be in\r\nsome way connected with this old instinct? They can give no \u003ci\u003ereason\u003c/i\u003e for\r\ntheir fear to move; but immobility makes them feel safer and more\r\ncomfortable. Is not this the mental state of the \u0027feigning\u0027 animal?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, take the strange symptom which has been described\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_414\" id=\"page_414\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{414}\u003c/span\u003e of late years\r\nby the rather absurd name of \u003ci\u003eagoraphobia\u003c/i\u003e. The patient is seized with\r\npalpitation and terror at the sight of any open place or broad street\r\nwhich he has to cross alone. He trembles, his knees bend, he may even\r\nfaint at the idea. Where he has sufficient self-command he sometimes\r\naccomplishes the object by keeping safe under the lee of a vehicle going\r\nacross, or joining himself to a knot of other people. But usually he\r\nslinks round the sides of the square, hugging the houses as closely as\r\nhe can. This emotion has no utility in a civilized man, but when we\r\nnotice the chronic agoraphobia of our domestic cats, and see the\r\ntenacious way in which many wild animals, especially rodents, cling to\r\ncover, and only venture on a dash across the open as a desperate\r\nmeasure\u0026mdash;even then making for every stone or bunch of weeds which may\r\ngive a momentary shelter\u0026mdash;when we see this we are strongly tempted to\r\nask whether such an odd kind of fear in us be not due to the accidental\r\nresurrection, through disease, of a sort of instinct which may in some\r\nof our remote ancestors have had a permanent and on the whole a useful\r\npart to play?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_415\" id=\"page_415\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{415}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_XXVI\" id=\"CHAPTER_XXVI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXVI.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eWILL.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVoluntary Acts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Desire, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone\r\nknows, and which no definition can make plainer. We desire to feel, to\r\nhave, to do, all sorts of things which at the moment are not felt, had,\r\nor done. If with the desire there goes a sense that attainment is not\r\npossible, we simply \u003ci\u003ewish\u003c/i\u003e; but if we believe that the end is in our\r\npower, we \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e that the desired feeling, having, or doing shall be\r\nreal; and real it presently becomes, either immediately upon the willing\r\nor after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only ends which follow \u003ci\u003eimmediately\u003c/i\u003e upon our willing seem to be\r\nmovements of our own bodies. Whatever \u003ci\u003efeelings\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ehavings\u003c/i\u003e we may\r\nwill to get come in as results of preliminary movements which we make\r\nfor the purpose. This fact is too familiar to need illustration; so that\r\nwe may start with the proposition that the only \u003ci\u003edirect\u003c/i\u003e outward effects\r\nof our will are bodily movements. The mechanism of production of these\r\nvoluntary movements is what befalls us to study now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThey are secondary performances.\u003c/b\u003e The movements we have studied hitherto\r\nhave been automatic and reflex, and (on the first occasion of their\r\nperformance, at any rate) unforeseen by the agent. The movements to the\r\nstudy of which we now address ourselves, being desired and intended\r\nbeforehand, are of course done with full prevision of what they are to\r\nbe. It follows from this that \u003ci\u003evoluntary movements must be secondary,\r\nnot primary, functions of our organism\u003c/i\u003e. This is the first point to\r\nunderstand in the psychology of Volition. Reflex, instinctive, and\r\nemotional\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_416\" id=\"page_416\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{416}\u003c/span\u003e movements are all primary performances. The nerve-centres are\r\nso organized that certain stimuli pull the trigger of certain explosive\r\nparts; and a creature going through one of these explosions for the\r\nfirst time undergoes an entirely novel experience. The other day I was\r\nstanding at a railroad station with a little child, when an\r\nexpress-train went thundering by. The child, who was near the edge of\r\nthe platform, started, winked, had his breathing convulsed, turned pale,\r\nburst out crying, and ran frantically towards me and hid his face. I\r\nhave no doubt that this youngster was almost as much astonished by his\r\nown behavior as he was by the train, and more than I was, who stood by.\r\nOf course if such a reaction has many times occurred we learn what to\r\nexpect of ourselves, and can then foresee our conduct, even though it\r\nremain as involuntary and uncontrollable as it was before. But if, in\r\nvoluntary action properly so called, the act must be foreseen, it\r\nfollows that no creature not endowed with prophetic power can perform an\r\nact voluntarily for the first time. Well, we are no more endowed with\r\nprophetic vision of what movements lie in our power than we are endowed\r\nwith prophetic vision of what sensations we are capable of receiving. As\r\nwe must wait for the sensations to be given us, so we must wait for the\r\nmovements to be performed involuntarily, before we can frame ideas of\r\nwhat either of these things are. We learn all our possibilities by the\r\nway of experience. When a particular movement, having once occurred in a\r\nrandom, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the\r\nmemory, then the movement can be desired again, and deliberately willed.\r\nBut it is impossible to see how it could be willed before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eA supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible, left in\r\nthe memory by experiences of their involuntary performance, is thus the\r\nfirst prerequisite of the voluntary life.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwo Kinds of Ideas of Movement.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Now these ideas may be either\r\n\u003ci\u003eresident\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eremote\u003c/i\u003e. That is, they may be of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_417\" id=\"page_417\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{417}\u003c/span\u003e movement as it\r\nfeels, when taking place, in the moving parts; or they may be of the\r\nmovement as it feels in some other part of the body which it affects\r\n(strokes, presses, scratches, etc.), or as it sounds, or as it looks.\r\nThe resident sensations in the parts that move have been called\r\n\u003ci\u003ekinæsthetic\u003c/i\u003e feelings, the memories of them are kinæsthetic ideas. It\r\nis by these kinæsthetic sensations that we are made conscious of\r\n\u003ci\u003epassive movements\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;movements communicated to our limbs by others. If\r\nyou lie with closed eyes, and another person noiselessly places your arm\r\nor leg in any arbitrarily chosen attitude, you receive a feeling of what\r\nattitude it is, and can reproduce it yourself in the arm or leg of the\r\nopposite side. Similarly a man waked suddenly from sleep in the dark is\r\naware of how he finds himself lying. At least this is what happens in\r\nnormal cases. But when the feelings of passive movement as well as all\r\nthe other feelings of a limb are lost, we get such results as are given\r\nin the following account by Prof. A. Strümpell of his wonderful\r\nanæsthetic boy, whose only sources of feeling were the right eye and the\r\nleft ear:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_53_53\" id=\"FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_53_53\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Passive movements could be imprinted on all the extremities to the\r\ngreatest extent, without attracting the patient\u0027s notice. Only in\r\nviolent forced hyperextension of the joints, especially of the knees,\r\nthere arose a dull vague feeling of strain, but this was seldom\r\nprecisely localized. We have often, after bandaging the eyes of the\r\npatient, carried him about the room, laid him on a table, given to his\r\narms and legs the most fantastic and apparently the most inconvenient\r\nattitudes without his having a suspicion of it. The expression of\r\nastonishment in his face, when all at once the removal of the\r\nhandkerchief revealed his situation, is indescribable in words. Only\r\nwhen his head was made to hang away down he immediately spoke of\r\ndizziness, but could not assign its ground. Later he sometimes inferred\r\nfrom the sounds\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_418\" id=\"page_418\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{418}\u003c/span\u003e connected with the manipulation that something special\r\nwas being done with him…. He had no feelings of muscular fatigue. If,\r\nwith his eyes shut, we told him to raise his arm and to keep it up, he\r\ndid so without trouble. After one or two minutes, however, the arm began\r\nto tremble and sink without his being aware of it. He asserted still his\r\nability to keep it up…. Passively holding still his fingers did not\r\naffect him. He thought constantly that he opened and shut his hand,\r\nwhereas it was really fixed.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eNo third kind of idea is called for.\u003c/i\u003e We need, then, when we perform a\r\nmovement, either a kinæsthetic or a remote idea of which special\r\nmovement it is to be. In addition to this it has often been supposed\r\nthat we need an \u003ci\u003eidea of the amount of innervation\u003c/i\u003e required for the\r\nmuscular contraction. The discharge from the motor centre into the motor\r\nnerve is supposed to give a sensation \u003ci\u003esui generis\u003c/i\u003e, opposed to all our\r\nother sensations. These accompany incoming currents, whilst that, it is\r\nsaid, accompanies an outgoing current, and no movement is supposed to be\r\ntotally defined in our mind, unless an anticipation of this feeling\r\nenter into our idea. The movement\u0027s degree of strength, and the effort\r\nrequired to perform it, are supposed to be specially revealed by the\r\nfeeling of innervation. Many authors deny that this feeling exists, and\r\nthe proofs given of its existence are certainly insufficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe various degrees of \u0027effort\u0027 actually felt in making the same\r\nmovement against different resistances are all accounted for by the\r\nincoming feelings from our chest, jaws, abdomen, and other parts\r\nsympathetically contracted whenever the effort is great. There is no\r\nneed of a consciousness of the amount of outgoing current required. If\r\nanything be obvious to introspection, it is that the degree of strength\r\nput forth is completely revealed to us by incoming feelings from the\r\nmuscles themselves and their insertions, from the vicinity of the\r\njoints, and from the general fixation of the larynx, chest, face, and\r\nbody.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_419\" id=\"page_419\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{419}\u003c/span\u003e When a certain degree of energy of contraction rather than\r\nanother is thought of by us, this complex aggregate of afferent\r\nfeelings, forming the material of our thought, renders absolutely\r\nprecise and distinctive our mental image of the exact strength of\r\nmovement to be made, and the exact amount of resistance to be overcome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet the reader try to direct his will towards a particular movement, and\r\nthen notice what \u003ci\u003econstituted\u003c/i\u003e the direction of the will. Was it\r\nanything over and above the notion of the different feelings to which\r\nthe movement when effected would give rise? If we abstract from these\r\nfeelings, will any sign, principle, or means of orientation be left by\r\nwhich the will may innervate the proper muscles with the right\r\nintensity, and not go astray into the wrong ones? Strip off these images\r\nanticipative of the results of the motion, and so far from leaving us\r\nwith a complete assortment of directions into which our will may launch\r\nitself, you leave our consciousness in an absolute and total vacuum. If\r\nI will to write \u003ci\u003ePeter\u003c/i\u003e rather than \u003ci\u003ePaul\u003c/i\u003e, it is the thought of certain\r\ndigital sensations, of certain alphabetic sounds, of certain appearances\r\non the paper, and of no others, which immediately precedes the motion of\r\nmy pen. If I will to utter the word \u003ci\u003ePaul\u003c/i\u003e rather than \u003ci\u003ePeter\u003c/i\u003e, it is\r\nthe thought of my voice falling on my ear, and of certain muscular\r\nfeelings in my tongue, lips, and larynx, which guide the utterance. All\r\nthese are incoming feelings, and between the thought of them, by which\r\nthe act is mentally specified with all possible completeness, and the\r\nact itself, there is no room for any third order of mental phenomenon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is indeed the \u003ci\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e, the element of consent, or resolve that the\r\nact shall ensue. This, doubtless, to the reader\u0027s mind, as to my own,\r\nconstitutes the essence of the voluntariness of the act. This \u003ci\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwill be treated of in detail farther on. It may be entirely neglected\r\nhere, for it is a constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary actions\r\nalike, and incapable of serving to distinguish them. No\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_420\" id=\"page_420\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{420}\u003c/span\u003e one will\r\npretend that its quality varies according as the right arm, for example,\r\nor the left is used.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAn anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial consequences of a\r\nmovement, plus (on certain occasions) the fiat that these consequences\r\nshall become actual, is the only psychic state which introspection lets\r\nus discern as the forerunner of our voluntary acts.\u003c/i\u003e There is no\r\ncoercive evidence of any feeling attached to the efferent discharge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe entire content and material of our consciousness\u0026mdash;consciousness of\r\nmovement, as of all things else\u0026mdash;seems thus to be of peripheral origin,\r\nand to come to us in the first instance through the peripheral nerves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Motor-cue.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Let us call the last idea which in the mind precedes\r\nthe motor discharge the \u0027motor-cue.\u0027 Now do \u0027resident\u0027 images form the\r\nonly motor-cue, or will \u0027remote\u0027 ones equally suffice?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThere can be no doubt whatever that the cue may be an image either of\r\nthe resident or of the remote kind.\u003c/i\u003e Although, at the outset of our\r\nlearning a movement, it would seem that the resident feelings must come\r\nstrongly before consciousness, later this need not be the case. The\r\nrule, in fact, would seem to be that they tend to lapse more and more\r\nfrom consciousness, and that the more practised we become in a movement,\r\nthe more \u0027remote\u0027 do the ideas become which form its mental cue. What we\r\nare \u003ci\u003einterested\u003c/i\u003e in is what sticks in our consciousness; everything else\r\nwe get rid of as quickly as we can. Our resident feelings of movement\r\nhave no substantive interest for us at all, as a rule. What interest us\r\nare the ends which the movement is to attain. Such an end is generally a\r\nremote sensation, an impression which the movement produces on the eye\r\nor ear, or sometimes on the skin, nose, or palate. Now let the idea of\r\nsuch an end associate itself definitely with the right discharge, and\r\nthe thought of the innervation\u0027s \u003ci\u003eresident\u003c/i\u003e effects will become as great\r\nan encumbrance as we have already concluded that the feeling of the\r\ninnervation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_421\" id=\"page_421\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{421}\u003c/span\u003e itself is. The mind does not need it; the end alone is\r\nenough.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe idea of the end, then, tends more and more to make itself\r\nall-sufficient. Or, at any rate, if the kinæsthetic ideas are called up\r\nat all, they are so swamped in the vivid kinæsthetic feelings by which\r\nthey are immediately overtaken that we have no time to be aware of their\r\nseparate existence. As I write, I have no anticipation, as a thing\r\ndistinct from my sensation, of either the look or the digital feel of\r\nthe letters which flow from my pen. The words chime on my mental \u003ci\u003eear\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nas it were, before I write them, but not on my mental eye or hand. This\r\ncomes from the rapidity with which the movements follow on their mental\r\ncue. An end consented to as soon as conceived innervates directly the\r\ncentre of the first movement of the chain which leads to its\r\naccomplishment, and then the whole chain rattles off \u003ci\u003equasi\u003c/i\u003e-reflexly,\r\nas was described on \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003ep 115-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reader will certainly recognize this to be true in all fluent and\r\nunhesitating voluntary acts. The only special fiat there is at the\r\noutset of the performance. A man says to himself, \"I must change my\r\nclothes,\" and involuntarily he has taken off his coat, and his fingers\r\nare at work in their accustomed manner on his waistcoat-buttons, etc.;\r\nor we say, \"I must go downstairs,\" and ere we know it we have risen,\r\nwalked, and turned the handle of the door;\u0026mdash;all through the idea of an\r\nend coupled with a series of guiding sensations which successively\r\narise. It would seem indeed that we fail of accuracy and certainty in\r\nour attainment of the end whenever we are preoccupied with the way in\r\nwhich the movement will feel. We walk a beam the better the less we\r\nthink of the position of our feet upon it. We pitch or catch, we shoot\r\nor chop the better the less tactile and muscular (the less resident),\r\nand the more exclusively optical (the more remote), our consciousness\r\nis. Keep your \u003ci\u003eeye\u003c/i\u003e on the place aimed at, and your hand will fetch it;\r\nthink of your hand, and you will very likely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_422\" id=\"page_422\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{422}\u003c/span\u003e miss your aim. Dr.\r\nSouthard found that he could touch a spot with a pencil-point more\r\naccurately with a visual than with a tactile mental cue. In the former\r\ncase he looked at a small object and closed his eyes before trying to\r\ntouch it. In the latter case he \u003ci\u003eplaced\u003c/i\u003e it with closed eyes, and then\r\nafter removing his hand tried to touch it again. The average error with\r\ntouch (when the results were most favorable) was 17.13 mm. With sight it\r\nwas only 12.37 mm.\u0026mdash;All these are plain results of introspection and\r\nobservation. By what neural machinery they are made possible we do not\r\nknow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIX\"\u003eChapter XIX\u003c/a\u003e we saw how enormously individuals differ in respect to\r\ntheir mental imagery. In the type of imagination called \u003ci\u003etactile\u003c/i\u003e by the\r\nFrench authors, it is probable that the kinæsthetic ideas are more\r\nprominent than in my account. We must not expect too great a uniformity\r\nin individual accounts, nor wrangle overmuch as to which one \u0027truly\u0027\r\nrepresents the process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI trust that I have now made clear what that \u0027idea of a movement\u0027 is\r\nwhich must precede it in order that it be voluntary. It is not the\r\nthought of the innervation which the movement requires. It is the\r\nanticipation of the movement\u0027s sensible effects, resident or remote, and\r\nsometimes very remote indeed. Such anticipations, to say the least,\r\ndetermine \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e our movements shall be. I have spoken all along as if\r\nthey also might determine \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e they shall be. This, no doubt, has\r\ndisconcerted many readers, for it certainly seems as if a special fiat,\r\nor consent to the movement, were required in addition to the mere\r\nconception of it, in many cases of volition; and this fiat I have\r\naltogether left out of my account. This leads us to the next point in\r\nour discussion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIdeo-motor Action.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The question is this: \u003ci\u003eIs the bare idea of a\r\nmovement\u0027s sensible effects its sufficient motor-cue, or must there be\r\nan additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision,\r\nconsent, volitional mandate, or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_423\" id=\"page_423\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{423}\u003c/span\u003e other synonymous phenomenon of\r\nconsciousness, before the movement can follow?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI answer: Sometimes the bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes an\r\nadditional conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or\r\nexpress consent, has to intervene and precede the movement. The cases\r\nwithout a fiat constitute the more fundamental, because the more simple,\r\nvariety. The others involve a special complication, which must be fully\r\ndiscussed at the proper time. For the present let us turn to \u003ci\u003eideo-motor\r\naction\u003c/i\u003e, as it has been termed, or the sequence of movement upon the\r\nmere thought of it, without a special fiat, as the type of the process\r\nof volition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWherever a movement \u003ci\u003eunhesitatingly and immediately\u003c/i\u003e follows upon the\r\nidea of it, we have ideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing\r\nbetween the conception and the execution. All sorts of neuro-muscular\r\nprocesses come between, of course, but we know absolutely nothing of\r\nthem. We think the act, and it is done; and that is all that\r\nintrospection tells us of the matter. Dr. Carpenter, who first used, I\r\nbelieve, the name of ideo-motor action, placed it, if I mistake not,\r\namong the curiosities of our mental life. The truth is that it is no\r\ncuriosity, but simply the normal process stripped of disguise. Whilst\r\ntalking I become conscious of a pin on the floor, or of some dust on my\r\nsleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I brush away the dust or\r\npick up the pin. I make no express resolve, but the mere perception of\r\nthe object and the fleeting notion of the act seem of themselves to\r\nbring the latter about. Similarly, I sit at table after dinner and find\r\nmyself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the dish and\r\neating them. My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the\r\nconversation I am hardly aware of what I do; but the perception of the\r\nfruit, and the fleeting notion that I may eat it, seem fatally to bring\r\nthe act about. There is certainly no express fiat here; any more than\r\nthere is in all those habitual goings and comings and rearrangements of\r\nourselves which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_424\" id=\"page_424\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{424}\u003c/span\u003e fill every hour of the day, and which incoming\r\nsensations instigate so immediately that it is often difficult to decide\r\nwhether not to call them reflex rather than voluntary acts. As Lotze\r\nsays:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"We see in writing or piano-playing a great number of very complicated\r\nmovements following quickly one upon the other, the instigative\r\nrepresentations of which remained scarcely a second in consciousness,\r\ncertainly not long enough to awaken any other volition than the general\r\none of resigning one\u0027s self without reserve to the passing over of\r\nrepresentation into action. All the acts of our daily life happen in\r\nthis wise: Our standing up, walking, talking, all this never demands a\r\ndistinct impulse of the will, but is adequately brought about by the\r\npure flux of thought.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_54_54\" id=\"FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_54_54\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all this the determining condition of the unhesitating and resistless\r\nsequence of the act seems to be \u003ci\u003ethe absence of any conflicting notion\r\nin the mind\u003c/i\u003e. Either there is nothing else at all in the mind, or what\r\nis there does not conflict. We know what it is to get out of bed on a\r\nfreezing morning in a room without a fire, and how the very vital\r\nprinciple within us protests against the ordeal. Probably most persons\r\nhave lain on certain mornings for an hour at a time unable to brace\r\nthemselves to the resolve. We think how late we shall be, how the duties\r\nof the day will suffer; we say, \"I \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e get up, this is ignominious,\"\r\netc.; but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the cold outside too\r\ncruel, and resolutions faints away and postpones itself again and again\r\njust as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing\r\nover into the decisive act. Now how do we \u003ci\u003eever\u003c/i\u003e get up under such\r\ncircumstances? If I may generalize from my own experience, we more often\r\nthan not get up without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly\r\nfind that we \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e got up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs;\r\nwe forget both\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_425\" id=\"page_425\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{425}\u003c/span\u003e the warmth and the cold; we fall into some revery\r\nconnected with the day\u0027s life, in the course of which the idea flashes\r\nacross us, \"Hollo! I must lie here no longer\"\u0026mdash;an idea which at that\r\nlucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, and\r\nconsequently produces immediately its appropriate motor effects. It was\r\nour acute consciousness of both the warmth and the cold during the\r\nperiod of struggle, which paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea\r\nof rising in the condition of \u003ci\u003ewish\u003c/i\u003e and not of \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e. The moment these\r\ninhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea exerted its effects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis case seems to me to contain in miniature form the data for an\r\nentire psychology of volition. It was in fact through meditating on the\r\nphenomenon in my own person that I first became convinced of the truth\r\nof the doctrine which these pages present, and which I need here\r\nillustrate by no farther examples. The reason why that doctrine is not a\r\nself-evident truth is that we have so many ideas which \u003ci\u003edo not\u003c/i\u003e result\r\nin action. But it will be seen that in every such case, without\r\nexception, that is because other ideas simultaneously present rob them\r\nof their impulsive power. But even here, and when a movement is\r\ninhibited from \u003ci\u003ecompletely\u003c/i\u003e taking place by contrary ideas, it will\r\n\u003ci\u003eincipiently\u003c/i\u003e take place. To quote Lotze once more:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The spectator accompanies the throwing of a billiard-ball, or the\r\nthrust of the swordsman, with slight movements of his arm; the untaught\r\nnarrator tells his story with many gesticulations; the reader while\r\nabsorbed in the perusal of a battle-scene feels a slight tension run\r\nthrough his muscular system, keeping time as it were with the actions he\r\nis reading of. These results become the more marked the more we are\r\nabsorbed in thinking of the movements which suggest them; they grow\r\nfainter exactly in proportion as a complex consciousness, under the\r\ndominion of a crowd of other representations, withstands the passing\r\nover of mental contemplation into outward action.\"\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_426\" id=\"page_426\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{426}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0027willing-game,\u0027 the exhibitions of so-called \u0027mind-reading,\u0027 or more\r\nproperly muscle-reading, which have lately grown so fashionable, are\r\nbased on this incipient obedience of muscular contraction to idea, even\r\nwhen the deliberate intention is that no contraction shall occur.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may then lay it down for certain that \u003ci\u003eevery representation of a\r\nmovement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object;\r\nand awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing\r\nby an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe express fiat, or act of mental consent to the movement, comes in\r\nwhen the neutralization of the antagonistic and inhibitory idea is\r\nrequired. But that there is no express fiat needed when the conditions\r\nare simple, the reader ought now to be convinced. Lest, however, he\r\nshould still share the common prejudice that voluntary action without\r\n\u0027exertion of will-power\u0027 is Hamlet with the prince\u0027s part left out, I\r\nwill make a few farther remarks. The first point to start from, in\r\nunderstanding voluntary action and the possible occurrence of it with no\r\nfiat or express resolve, is the fact that consciousness is \u003ci\u003ein its very\r\nnature impulsive\u003c/i\u003e. We do not first have a sensation or thought, and then\r\nhave to \u003ci\u003eadd\u003c/i\u003e something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of\r\nfeeling which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is\r\nalready on its way to instigate a movement. Our sensations and thoughts\r\nare but cross-sections, as it were, of currents whose essential\r\nconsequence is motion, and which have no sooner run in at one nerve than\r\nthey are ready to run out by another. The popular notion that\r\nconsciousness is not essentially a forerunner of activity, but that the\r\nlatter must result from some superadded \u0027will-force,\u0027 is a very natural\r\ninference from those special cases in which we think of an act for an\r\nindefinite length of time without the action taking place. These cases,\r\nhowever, are not the norm; they are cases of inhibition by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_427\" id=\"page_427\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{427}\u003c/span\u003e antagonistic\r\nthoughts. When the blocking is released we feel as if an inward spring\r\nwere let loose, and this is the additional impulse or \u003ci\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e upon which\r\nthe act effectively succeeds. We shall study anon the blocking and its\r\nrelease. Our higher thought is full of it. But where there is no\r\nblocking, there is naturally no hiatus between the thought-process and\r\nthe motor discharge. \u003ci\u003eMovement is the natural immediate effect of the\r\nprocess of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may\r\nbe. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is\r\nso in the voluntary life.\u003c/i\u003e Ideo-motor action is thus no paradox, to be\r\nsoftened or explained away. It obeys the type of all conscious action,\r\nand from it one must start to explain the sort of action in which a\r\nspecial fiat is involved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt may be remarked in passing, that the inhibition of a movement no more\r\ninvolves an express effort or command than its execution does. Either of\r\nthem \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e require it. But in all simple and ordinary cases, just as the\r\nbare presence of one idea prompts a movement, so the bare presence of\r\nanother idea will prevent its taking place. Try to feel as if you were\r\ncrooking your finger, whilst keeping it straight. In a minute it will\r\nfairly tingle with the imaginary change of position; yet it will not\r\nsensibly move, because \u003ci\u003eits not really moving\u003c/i\u003e is also a part of what\r\nyou have in mind. Drop \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e idea, think purely and simply of the\r\nmovement, and nothing else, and, presto! it takes place with no effort\r\nat all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA waking man\u0027s behavior is thus at all times the resultant of two\r\nopposing neural forces. With unimaginable fineness some currents among\r\nthe cells and fibres of his brain are playing on his motor nerves,\r\nwhilst other currents, as unimaginably fine, are playing on the first\r\ncurrents, damming or helping them, altering their direction or their\r\nspeed. The upshot of it all is, that whilst the currents must always end\r\nby being drained off through \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e motor nerves, they are drained off\r\nsometimes through one set and sometimes through another; and sometimes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_428\" id=\"page_428\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{428}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey keep each other in equilibrium so long that a superficial observer\r\nmay think they are not drained off at all. Such an observer must\r\nremember, however, that from the physiological point of view a gesture,\r\nan expression of the brow, or an expulsion of the breath are movements\r\nas much as an act of locomotion is. A king\u0027s breath slays as well as an\r\nassassin\u0027s blow; and the outpouring of those currents which the magic\r\nimponderable streaming of our ideas accompanies need not always be of an\r\nexplosive or otherwise physically conspicuous kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAction after Deliberation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We are now in a position to describe \u003ci\u003ewhat\r\nhappens in deliberate action\u003c/i\u003e, or when the mind has many objects before\r\nit, related to each other in antagonistic or in favorable ways. One of\r\nthese objects of its thought may be an act. By itself this would prompt\r\na movement; some of the additional objects or considerations, however,\r\nblock the motor discharge, whilst others, on the contrary, solicit it to\r\ntake place. The result is that peculiar feeling of inward unrest known\r\nas \u003ci\u003eindecision\u003c/i\u003e. Fortunately it is too familiar to need description, for\r\nto describe it would be impossible. As long as it lasts, with the\r\nvarious objects before the attention, we are said to \u003ci\u003edeliberate\u003c/i\u003e; and\r\nwhen finally the original suggestion either prevails and makes the\r\nmovement take place, or gets definitively quenched by its antagonists,\r\nwe are said to \u003ci\u003edecide\u003c/i\u003e, or to \u003ci\u003eutter our voluntary fiat\u003c/i\u003e, in favor of\r\none or the other course. The reinforcing and inhibiting objects\r\nmeanwhile are termed the \u003ci\u003ereasons\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003emotives\u003c/i\u003e by which the decision is\r\nbrought about.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe process of deliberation contains endless degrees of complication. At\r\nevery moment of it our consciousness is of an extremely complex thing,\r\nnamely, the whole set of motives and their conflict. Of this complicated\r\nobject, the totality of which is realized more or less dimly all the\r\nwhile by consciousness, certain parts stand out more or less sharply at\r\none moment in the foreground, and at another moment other parts, in\r\nconsequence of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_429\" id=\"page_429\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{429}\u003c/span\u003e oscillations of our attention, and of the\r\n\u0027associative\u0027 flow of our ideas. But no matter how sharp the\r\nforeground-reasons may be, or how imminently close to bursting through\r\nthe dam and carrying the motor consequences their own way, the\r\nbackground, however dimly felt, is always there as a fringe (\u003ca href=\"#page_163\"\u003ep. 163\u003c/a\u003e);\r\nand its presence (so long as the indecision actually lasts) serves as an\r\neffective check upon the irrevocable discharge. The deliberation may\r\nlast for weeks or months, occupying at intervals the mind. The motives\r\nwhich yesterday seemed full of urgency and blood and life to-day feel\r\nstrangely weak and pale and dead. But as little to-day as to-morrow is\r\nthe question finally resolved. Something tells us that all this is\r\nprovisional; that the weakened reasons will wax strong again, and the\r\nstronger weaken; that equilibrium is unreached; that testing our\r\nreasons, not obeying them, is still the order of the day, and that we\r\nmust wait awhile, patiently or impatiently, until our mind is made up\r\n\u0027for good and all.\u0027 This inclining first to one, then to another future,\r\nboth of which we represent as possible, resembles the oscillations to\r\nand fro of a material body within the limits of its elasticity. There is\r\ninward strain, but no outward rupture. And this condition, plainly\r\nenough, is susceptible of indefinite continuance, as well in the\r\nphysical mass as in the mind. If the elasticity give way, however, if\r\nthe dam ever do break, and the currents burst the crust, vacillation is\r\nover and decision is irrevocably there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe decision may come in either of many modes. I will try briefly to\r\nsketch the most characteristic types of it, merely warning the reader\r\nthat this is only an introspective account of symptoms and phenomena,\r\nand that all questions of causal agency, whether neural or spiritual,\r\nare relegated to a later page.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFive Chief Types of Decision.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Turning now to the form of the decision\r\nitself, we may distinguish five chief types. \u003ci\u003eThe first may be called\r\nthe reasonable type.\u003c/i\u003e It is that of those cases in which the arguments\r\nfor and against a given\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_430\" id=\"page_430\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{430}\u003c/span\u003e course seem gradually and almost insensibly to\r\nsettle themselves in the mind and to end by leaving a clear balance in\r\nfavor of one alternative, which alternative we then adopt without effort\r\nor constraint. Until this rational balancing of the books is consummated\r\nwe have a calm feeling that the evidence is not yet all in, and this\r\nkeeps action in suspense. But some day we wake with the sense that we\r\nsee the matter rightly, that no new light will be thrown on it by\r\nfarther delay, and that it had better be settled \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e. In this easy\r\ntransition from doubt to assurance we seem to ourselves almost passive;\r\nthe \u0027reasons\u0027 which decide us appearing to flow in from the nature of\r\nthings, and to owe nothing to our will. We have, however, a perfect\r\nsense of being \u003ci\u003efree\u003c/i\u003e, in that we are devoid of any feeling of coercion.\r\nThe conclusive reason for the decision in these cases usually is the\r\ndiscovery that we can refer the case to a \u003ci\u003eclass\u003c/i\u003e upon which we are\r\naccustomed to act unhesitatingly in a certain stereotyped way. It may be\r\nsaid in general that a great part of every deliberation consists in the\r\nturning over of all the possible modes of \u003ci\u003econceiving\u003c/i\u003e the doing or not\r\ndoing of the act in point. The moment we hit upon a conception which\r\nlets us apply some principle of action which is a fixed and stable part\r\nof our Ego, our state of doubt is at an end. Persons of authority, who\r\nhave to make many decisions in the day, carry with them a set of heads\r\nof classification, each bearing its volitional consequence, and under\r\nthese they seek as far as possible to range each new emergency as it\r\noccurs. It is where the emergency belongs to a species without\r\nprecedent, to which consequently no cut-and-dried maxim will apply, that\r\nwe feel most at a loss, and are distressed at the indeterminateness of\r\nour task. As soon, however, as we see our way to a familiar\r\nclassification, we are at ease again. \u003ci\u003eIn action as in reasoning, then,\r\nthe great thing is the quest of the right conception.\u003c/i\u003e The concrete\r\ndilemmas do not come to us with labels gummed upon their backs. We may\r\nname them by many names. The wise man is he\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_431\" id=\"page_431\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{431}\u003c/span\u003e who succeeds in finding the\r\nname which suits the needs of the particular occasion best (\u003ca href=\"#page_357\"\u003ep. 357\u003c/a\u003e ff.).\r\nA \u0027reasonable\u0027 character is one who has a store of stable and worthy\r\nends, and who does not decide about an action till he has calmly\r\nascertained whether it be ministerial or detrimental to any one of\r\nthese.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the next two types of decision, the final fiat occurs before the\r\nevidence is all \u0027in.\u0027 It often happens that no paramount and\r\nauthoritative reason for either course will come. Either seems a good,\r\nand there is no umpire to decide which should yield its place to the\r\nother. We grow tired of long hesitation and inconclusiveness, and the\r\nhour may come when we feel that even a bad decision is better than no\r\ndecision at all. Under these conditions it will often happen that some\r\naccidental circumstance, supervening at a particular movement upon our\r\nmental weariness, will upset the balance in the direction of one of the\r\nalternatives, to which then we feel ourselves committed, although an\r\nopposite accident at the same time might have produced the opposite\r\nresult.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003ci\u003esecond type\u003c/i\u003e our feeling is to a great extent that of letting\r\nourselves drift with a certain indifferent acquiescence in a direction\r\naccidentally determined \u003ci\u003efrom without\u003c/i\u003e, with the conviction that, after\r\nall, we might as well stand by this course as by the other, and that\r\nthings are in any event sure to turn out sufficiently right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn the third type\u003c/i\u003e the determination seems equally accidental, but it\r\ncomes from within, and not from without. It often happens, when the\r\nabsence of imperative principle is perplexing and suspense distracting,\r\nthat we find ourselves acting, as it were, automatically, and as if by a\r\nspontaneous discharge of our nerves, in the direction of one of the\r\nhorns of the dilemma. But so exciting is this sense of motion after our\r\nintolerable pent-up state that we eagerly throw ourselves into it.\r\n\u0027Forward now!\u0027 we inwardly cry, \u0027though the heavens fall.\u0027 This reckless\r\nand exultant espousal of an energy so little premeditated by us\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_432\" id=\"page_432\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{432}\u003c/span\u003e that we\r\nfeel rather like passive spectators cheering on the display of some\r\nextraneous force than like voluntary agents is a type of decision too\r\nabrupt and tumultuous to occur often in humdrum and cool-blooded\r\nnatures. But it is probably frequent in persons of strong emotional\r\nendowment and unstable or vacillating character. And in men of the\r\nworld-shaking type, the Napoleons, Luthers, etc., in whom tenacious\r\npassion combines with ebullient activity, when by any chance the\r\npassion\u0027s outlet has been dammed by scruples or apprehensions, the\r\nresolution is probably often of this catastrophic kind. The flood breaks\r\nquite unexpectedly through the dam. That it should so often do so is\r\nquite sufficient to account for the tendency of these characters to a\r\nfatalistic mood of mind. And the fatalistic mood itself is sure to\r\nreinforce the strength of the energy just started on its exciting path\r\nof discharge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a \u003ci\u003efourth form\u003c/i\u003e of decision, which often ends deliberation as\r\nsuddenly as the third form does. It comes when, in consequence of some\r\nouter experience or some inexplicable inward change, \u003ci\u003ewe suddenly pass\r\nfrom the easy and careless to the sober and strenuous mood\u003c/i\u003e, or possibly\r\nthe other way. The whole scale of values of our motives and impulses\r\nthen undergoes a change like that which a change of the observer\u0027s level\r\nproduces on a view. The most sobering possible agents are objects of\r\ngrief and fear. When one of these affects us, all \u0027light fantastic\u0027\r\nnotions lose their motive power, all solemn ones find theirs multiplied\r\nmany-fold. The consequence is an instant abandonment of the more trivial\r\nprojects with which we had been dallying, and an instant practical\r\nacceptance of the more grim and earnest alternative which till then\r\ncould not extort our mind\u0027s consent. All those \u0027changes of heart,\u0027\r\n\u0027awakenings of conscience,\u0027 etc., which make new men of so many of us\r\nmay be classed under this head. The character abruptly rises to another\r\n\u0027level,\u0027 and deliberation comes to an immediate end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003ci\u003efifth and final type\u003c/i\u003e of decision, the feeling that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_433\" id=\"page_433\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{433}\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nevidence is all in, and that reason has balanced the books, may be\r\neither present or absent. But in either case we feel, in deciding, as if\r\nwe ourselves by our own wilful act inclined the beam: in the former case\r\nby adding our living effort to the weight of the logical reason which,\r\ntaken alone, seems powerless to make the act discharge; in the latter by\r\na kind of creative contribution of something instead of a reason which\r\ndoes a reason\u0027s work. The slow dead heave of the will that is felt in\r\nthese instances makes of them a class altogether different subjectively\r\nfrom all the four preceding classes. What the heave of the will betokens\r\nmetaphysically, what the effort might lead us to infer about a\r\nwill-power distinct from motives, are not matters that concern us yet.\r\nSubjectively and phenomenally, the \u003ci\u003efeeling of effort\u003c/i\u003e, absent from the\r\nformer decisions, accompanies these. Whether it be the dreary\r\nresignation for the sake of austere and naked duty of all sorts of rich\r\nmundane delights; or whether it be the heavy resolve that of two\r\nmutually exclusive trains of future fact, both sweet and good and with\r\nno strictly objective or imperative principle of choice between them,\r\none shall forevermore become impossible, while the other shall become\r\nreality; it is a desolate and acrid sort of act, an entrance into a\r\nlonesome moral wilderness. If examined closely, its chief difference\r\nfrom the former cases appears to be that in those cases the mind at the\r\nmoment of deciding on the triumphant alternative dropped the other one\r\nwholly or nearly out of sight, whereas here both alternatives are\r\nsteadily held in view, and in the very act of murdering the vanquished\r\npossibility the chooser realizes how much in that instant he is making\r\nhimself lose. It is deliberately driving a thorn into one\u0027s flesh; and\r\nthe sense of \u003ci\u003einward effort\u003c/i\u003e with which the act is accompanied is an\r\nelement which sets this fifth type of decision in strong contrast with\r\nthe previous four varieties, and makes of it an altogether peculiar sort\r\nof mental phenomenon. The immense majority of human decisions are\r\ndecisions\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_434\" id=\"page_434\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{434}\u003c/span\u003e without effort. In comparatively few of them, in most people,\r\ndoes effort accompany the final act. We are, I think, misled into\r\nsupposing that effort is more frequent than it is by the fact that\r\n\u003ci\u003eduring deliberation\u003c/i\u003e we so often have a feeling of how great an effort\r\nit would take to make a decision \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e. Later, after the decision has\r\nmade itself with ease, we recollect this and erroneously suppose the\r\neffort also to have been made then.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe existence of the effort as a phenomenal fact in our consciousness\r\ncannot of course be doubted or denied. Its significance, on the other\r\nhand, is a matter about which the gravest difference of opinion\r\nprevails. Questions as momentous as that of the very existence of\r\nspiritual causality, as vast as that of universal predestination or\r\nfree-will, depend on its interpretation. It therefore becomes essential\r\nthat we study with some care the conditions under which the feeling of\r\nvolitional effort is found.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Feeling of Effort.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When I said, awhile back, that \u003ci\u003econsciousness\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(or the neural process which goes with it) \u003ci\u003eis in its very nature\r\nimpulsive\u003c/i\u003e, I should have added the proviso that \u003ci\u003eit must be\r\nsufficiently intense\u003c/i\u003e. Now there are remarkable differences in the power\r\nof different sorts of consciousness to excite movement. The intensity of\r\nsome feelings is practically apt to be below the discharging point,\r\nwhilst that of others is apt to be above it. By practically apt, I mean\r\napt under ordinary circumstances. These circumstances may be habitual\r\ninhibitions, like that comfortable feeling of the \u003ci\u003edolce far niente\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich gives to each and all of us a certain dose of laziness only to be\r\novercome by the acuteness of the impulsive spur; or they may consist in\r\nthe native inertia, or internal resistance, of the motor centres\r\nthemselves, making explosion impossible until a certain inward tension\r\nhas been reached and over-passed. These conditions may vary from one\r\nperson to another, and in the same person from time to time. The neural\r\ninertia may wax or wane, and the habitual inhibitions dwindle or\r\naugment. The intensity of particular\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_435\" id=\"page_435\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{435}\u003c/span\u003e thought-processes and stimulations\r\nmay also change independently, and particular paths of association grow\r\nmore pervious or less so. There thus result great possibilities of\r\nalteration in the actual impulsive efficacy of particular motives\r\ncompared with others. It is where the normally less efficacious motive\r\nbecomes more efficacious, and the normally more efficacious one less so,\r\nthat actions ordinarily effortless, or abstinences ordinarily easy,\r\neither become impossible, or are effected (if at all) by the expenditure\r\nof effort. A little more description will make it plainer what these\r\ncases are.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHealthiness of Will.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eThere is a certain normal ratio in the impulsive\r\npower of different mental objects, which characterizes what may be\r\ncalled ordinary healthiness of will\u003c/i\u003e, and which is departed from only at\r\nexceptional times or by exceptional individuals. The states of mind\r\nwhich normally possess the most impulsive quality are either those which\r\nrepresent objects of passion, appetite, or emotion\u0026mdash;objects of\r\ninstinctive reaction, in short; or they are feelings or ideas of\r\npleasure or of pain; or ideas which for any reason we have grown\r\naccustomed to obey, so that the habit of reacting on them is ingrained;\r\nor finally, in comparison with ideas of remoter objects, they are ideas\r\nof objects present or near in space and time. Compared with these\r\nvarious objects, all far-off considerations, all highly abstract\r\nconceptions, unaccustomed reasons, and motives foreign to the\r\ninstinctive history of the race, have little or no impulsive power. They\r\nprevail, when they ever do prevail, \u003ci\u003ewith effort\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eand the normal\u003c/i\u003e, as\r\ndistinguished from the pathological, \u003ci\u003esphere of effort is thus found\r\nwherever non-instinctive motives to behavior must be reinforced so as to\r\nrule the day\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHealthiness of will moreover requires a certain amount of complication\r\nin the process which precedes the fiat or the act. Each stimulus or\r\nidea, at the same time that it wakens its own impulse, must also arouse\r\nother ideas along with \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e characteristic impulses, and action must\r\nfinally\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_436\" id=\"page_436\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{436}\u003c/span\u003e follow, neither too slowly nor too rapidly, as the resultant of\r\nall the forces thus engaged. Even when the decision is pretty prompt,\r\nthe normal thing is thus a sort of preliminary survey of the field and a\r\nvision of which course is best before the fiat comes. And where the will\r\nis healthy, \u003ci\u003ethe vision must be right\u003c/i\u003e (i.e., the motives must be on the\r\nwhole in a normal or not too unusual ratio to each other), \u003ci\u003eand the\r\naction must obey the vision\u0027s lead\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eUnhealthiness of will\u003c/b\u003e may thus come about in many ways. The action may\r\nfollow the stimulus or idea too rapidly, leaving no time for the arousal\r\nof restraining associates\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ewe then have a precipitate will\u003c/i\u003e. Or,\r\nalthough the associates may come, the ratio which the impulsive and\r\ninhibitive forces normally bear to each other may be distorted, and we\r\nthen have \u003ci\u003ea will which is perverse\u003c/i\u003e. The perversity, in turn, may be\r\ndue to either of many causes\u0026mdash;too much intensity, or too little, here;\r\ntoo much or too little inertia there; or elsewhere too much or too\r\nlittle inhibitory power. \u003ci\u003eIf we compare the outward symptoms of\r\nperversity together, they fall into two groups\u003c/i\u003e, in one of which normal\r\nactions are impossible, and in the other abnormal ones are\r\nirrepressible. Briefly, \u003ci\u003ewe may call them respectively the obstructed\r\nand the explosive will\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be kept in mind, however, that since the resultant action is\r\nalways due to the \u003ci\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e between the obstructive and the explosive\r\nforces which are present, we never can tell by the mere outward symptoms\r\nto what \u003ci\u003eelementary\u003c/i\u003e cause the perversion of a man\u0027s will may be due,\r\nwhether to an increase of one component or a diminution of the other.\r\nOne may grow explosive as readily by losing the usual brakes as by\r\ngetting up more of the impulsive steam; and one may find things\r\nimpossible as well through the enfeeblement of the original desire as\r\nthrough the advent of new lions in the path. As Dr. Clouston says, \"the\r\ndriver may be so weak that he cannot control well-broken horses, or the\r\nhorses may be so hard-mouthed that no driver can pull them up.\"\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_437\" id=\"page_437\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{437}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Explosive Will.\u003c/b\u003e 1.) \u003cb\u003eFrom Defective Inhibition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is a normal\r\ntype of character, for example, in which impulses seem to discharge so\r\npromptly into movements that inhibitions get no time to arise. These are\r\nthe \u0027dare-devil\u0027 and \u0027mercurial\u0027 temperaments, overflowing with\r\nanimation and fizzling with talk, which are so common in the Slavic and\r\nCeltic races, and with which the cold-blooded and long-headed English\r\ncharacter forms so marked a contrast. Simian these people seem to us,\r\nwhilst we seem to them reptilian. It is quite impossible to judge, as\r\nbetween an obstructed and an explosive individual, which has the greater\r\nsum of vital energy. An explosive Italian with good perception and\r\nintellect will cut a figure as a perfectly tremendous fellow, on an\r\ninward capital that could be tucked away inside of an obstructed Yankee\r\nand hardly let you know that it was there. He will be the king of his\r\ncompany, sing the songs and make the speeches, lead the parties, carry\r\nout the practical jokes, kiss the girls, fight the men, and, if need be,\r\nlead the forlorn hopes and enterprises, so that an onlooker would think\r\nhe has more life in his little finger than can exist in the whole body\r\nof a correct judicious fellow. But the judicious fellow all the while\r\nmay have all these possibilities and more besides, ready to break out in\r\nthe same or even a more violent way, if only the brakes were taken off.\r\nIt is the absence of scruples, of consequences, of considerations, the\r\nextraordinary simplification of each moment\u0027s mental outlook, that gives\r\nto the explosive individual such motor energy and ease; it need not be\r\nthe greater intensity of any of his passions, motives, or thoughts. As\r\nmental evolution goes on, the complexity of human consciousness grows\r\never greater, and with it the multiplication of the inhibitions to which\r\nevery impulse is exposed. How much freedom of discourse we English folk\r\nlose because we feel obliged always to speak the truth! This\r\npredominance of inhibition has a bad as well as a good side; and if a\r\nman\u0027s impulses are in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_438\" id=\"page_438\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{438}\u003c/span\u003e the main orderly as well as prompt, if he has\r\ncourage to accept their consequences, and intellect to lead them to a\r\nsuccessful end, he is all the better for his hair-trigger organization,\r\nand for not being \u0027sicklied o\u0027er with the pale cast of thought.\u0027 Many of\r\nthe most successful military and revolutionary characters in history\r\nhave belonged to this simple but quick-witted impulsive type. Problems\r\ncome much harder to reflective and inhibitive minds. They can, it is\r\ntrue, solve much vaster problems; and they can avoid many a mistake to\r\nwhich the men of impulse are exposed. But when the latter do not make\r\nmistakes, or when they are always able to retrieve them, theirs is one\r\nof the most engaging and indispensable of human types.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn infancy, and in certain conditions of exhaustion, as well as in\r\npeculiar pathological states, the inhibitory power may fail to arrest\r\nthe explosions of the impulsive discharge. We have then an explosive\r\ntemperament temporarily realized in an individual who at other times may\r\nbe of a relatively obstructed type. In other persons, again, hysterics,\r\nepileptics, criminals of the neurotic class called \u003ci\u003edégénérés\u003c/i\u003e by French\r\nauthors, there is such a native feebleness in the mental machinery that\r\nbefore the inhibitory ideas can arise the impulsive ones have already\r\ndischarged into act. In persons healthy-willed by nature bad habits can\r\nbring about this condition, especially in relation to particular sorts\r\nof impulse. Ask half the common drunkards you know why it is that they\r\nfall so often a prey to temptation, and they will say that most of the\r\ntime they cannot tell. It is a sort of vertigo with them. Their nervous\r\ncentres have become a sluice-way pathologically unlocked by every\r\npassing conception of a bottle and a glass. They do not thirst for the\r\nbeverage; the taste of it may even appear repugnant; and they perfectly\r\nforesee the morrow\u0027s remorse. But when they think of the liquor or see\r\nit, they find themselves preparing to drink, and do not stop themselves:\r\nand more than this they cannot say. Similarly a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_439\" id=\"page_439\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{439}\u003c/span\u003e man may lead a life of\r\nincessant love-making or sexual indulgence, though what spurs him\r\nthereto seems to be trivial suggestions and notions of possibility\r\nrather than any real solid strength of passion or desire. Such\r\ncharacters are too flimsy even to be bad in any deep sense of the word.\r\nThe paths of natural (or it may be unnatural) impulse are so pervious in\r\nthem that the slightest rise in the level of innervation produces an\r\noverflow. It is the condition recognized in pathology as \u0027irritable\r\nweakness.\u0027 The phase known as nascency or latency is so short in the\r\nexcitement of the neural tissues that there is no opportunity for strain\r\nor tension to accumulate within them; and the consequence is that with\r\nall the agitation and activity, the amount of real feeling engaged may\r\nbe very small. The hysterical temperament is the playground \u003ci\u003epar\r\nexcellence\u003c/i\u003e of this unstable equilibrium. One of these subjects will be\r\nfilled with what seems the most genuine and settled aversion to a\r\ncertain line of conduct, and the very next \u003ci\u003einstant\u003c/i\u003e follow the stirring\r\nof temptation and plunge in it up to the neck.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2.) \u003cb\u003eFrom Exaggerated Impulsion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Disorderly and impulsive conduct may,\r\non the other hand, come about where the neural tissues preserve their\r\nproper inward tone, and where the inhibitory power is normal or even\r\nunusually great. In such cases \u003ci\u003ethe strength of the impulsive idea is\r\npreternaturally exalted\u003c/i\u003e, and what would be for most people the passing\r\nsuggestion of a possibility becomes a gnawing, craving urgency to act.\r\nWorks on insanity are full of examples of these morbid insistent ideas,\r\nin obstinately struggling against which the unfortunate victim\u0027s soul\r\noften sweats with agony ere at last it gets swept away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe craving for drink in real dipsomaniacs, or for opium or chloral in\r\nthose subjugated, is of a strength of which normal persons can form no\r\nconception. \"Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room and were a cannon\r\nconstantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_440\" id=\"page_440\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{440}\u003c/span\u003e refrain\r\nfrom passing before that cannon in order to get the rum;\" \"If a bottle\r\nof brandy stood at one hand and the pit of hell yawned at the other, and\r\nI were convinced that I should be pushed in as sure as I took one glass,\r\nI could not refrain:\" such statements abound in dipsomaniacs\u0027 mouths.\r\nDr. Mussey of Cincinnati relates this case:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A few years ago a tippler was put into an almshouse in this State.\r\nWithin a few days he had devised various expedients to procure rum, but\r\nfailed. At length, however, he hit upon one which was successful. He\r\nwent into the wood-yard of the establishment, placed one hand upon the\r\nblock, and with an axe in the other struck it off at a single blow. With\r\nthe stump raised and streaming he ran into the house and cried, \u0027Get\r\nsome rum! get some rum! My hand is off!\u0027 In the confusion and bustle of\r\nthe occasion a bowl of rum was brought, into which he plunged the\r\nbleeding member of his body, then raising the bowl to his mouth, drank\r\nfreely, and exultingly exclaimed, \u0027Now I am satisfied.\u0027 Dr. J. E. Turner\r\ntells of a man who, while under treatment for inebriety, during four\r\nweeks secretly drank the alcohol from six jars containing morbid\r\nspecimens. On asking him why he had committed this loathsome act, he\r\nreplied: \u0027Sir, it is as impossible for me to control this diseased\r\nappetite as it is for me to control the pulsations of my heart.\u0027\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOften the insistent idea is of a trivial sort, but it may wear the\r\npatient\u0027s life out. His hands feel dirty, they must be washed. He\r\n\u003ci\u003eknows\u003c/i\u003e they are not dirty; yet to get rid of the teasing idea he washes\r\nthem. The idea, however, returns in a moment, and the unfortunate\r\nvictim, who is not in the least deluded \u003ci\u003eintellectually\u003c/i\u003e, will end by\r\nspending the whole day at the wash-stand. Or his clothes are not\r\n\u0027rightly\u0027 put on; and to banish the thought he takes them off and puts\r\nthem on again, till his toilet consumes two or three hours of time. Most\r\npeople have the potentiality of this disease. To few has it not\r\nhappened\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_441\" id=\"page_441\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{441}\u003c/span\u003e to conceive, after getting into bed, that they may have\r\nforgotten to lock the front door, or to turn out the entry gas. And few\r\nof us have not on some occasion got up to repeat the performance, less\r\nbecause we believed in the reality of its omission than because only so\r\ncould we banish the worrying doubt and get to sleep.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Obstructed Will.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In striking contrast with the cases in which\r\ninhibition is insufficient or impulsion in excess are those in which\r\nimpulsion is insufficient or inhibition in excess. We all know the\r\ncondition described on \u003ca href=\"#page_218\"\u003ep. 218\u003c/a\u003e, in which the mind for a few moments seems\r\nto lose its focussing power and to be unable to rally its attention to\r\nany determinate thing. At such times we sit blankly staring and do\r\nnothing. The objects of consciousness fail to touch the quick or break\r\nthe skin. They are there, but do not reach the level of effectiveness.\r\nThis state of non-efficacious presence is the normal condition of \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e\r\nobjects, in all of us. Great fatigue or exhaustion may make it the\r\ncondition of almost all objects; and an apathy resembling that then\r\nbrought about is recognized in asylums under the name of \u003ci\u003eabulia\u003c/i\u003e as a\r\nsymptom of mental disease. The healthy state of the will requires, as\r\naforesaid, both that vision should be right, and that action should obey\r\nits lead. But in the morbid condition in question the vision may be\r\nwholly unaffected, and the intellect clear, and yet the act either fails\r\nto follow or follows in some other way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u003ci\u003eVideo meliora proboque, deteriora sequor\u003c/i\u003e\" is the classic expression\r\nof this latter condition of mind. The moral tragedy of human life comes\r\nalmost wholly from the fact that the link is ruptured which normally\r\nshould hold between vision of the truth and action, and that this\r\npungent sense of effective reality will not attach to certain ideas. Men\r\ndo not differ so much in their mere feelings and conceptions. Their\r\nnotions of possibility and their ideals are not as far apart as might be\r\nargued from their differing fates. No class of them have better\r\nsentiments\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_442\" id=\"page_442\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{442}\u003c/span\u003e or feel more constantly the difference between the higher\r\nand the lower path in life than the hopeless failures, the\r\nsentimentalists, the drunkards, the schemers, the \u0027deadbeats,\u0027 whose\r\nlife is one long contradiction between knowledge and action, and who,\r\nwith full command of theory, never get to holding their limp characters\r\nerect. No one eats of the fruit of the tree of knowledge as they do; as\r\nfar as moral insight goes, in comparison with them, the orderly and\r\nprosperous philistines whom they scandalize are sucking babes. And yet\r\ntheir moral knowledge, always there grumbling and rumbling in the\r\nbackground,\u0026mdash;discerning, commenting, protesting, longing, half\r\nresolving,\u0026mdash;never wholly resolves, never gets its voice out of the minor\r\ninto the major key, or its speech out of the subjunctive into the\r\nimperative mood, never breaks the spell, never takes the helm into its\r\nhands. In such characters as Rousseau and Restif it would seem as if the\r\nlower motives had all the impulsive efficacy in their hands. Like trains\r\nwith the right of way, they retain exclusive possession of the track.\r\nThe more ideal motives exist alongside of them in profusion, but they\r\nnever get switched on, and the man\u0027s conduct is no more influenced by\r\nthem than an express train is influenced by a wayfarer standing by the\r\nroadside and calling to be taken aboard. They are an inert accompaniment\r\nto the end of time; and the consciousness of inward hollowness that\r\naccrues from habitually seeing the better only to do the worse, is one\r\nof the saddest feelings one can bear with him through this vale of\r\ntears.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEffort feels like an original force.\u003c/b\u003e We now see at one view when it is\r\nthat effort complicates volition. It does so whenever a rarer and more\r\nideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive\r\nand habitual kind; it does so whenever strongly explosive tendencies are\r\nchecked, or strongly obstructive conditions overcome. The \u003ci\u003eâme bien\r\nnée\u003c/i\u003e, the child of the sunshine, at whose birth the fairies made their\r\ngifts, does not need much of it in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_443\" id=\"page_443\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{443}\u003c/span\u003e his life. The hero and the neurotic\r\nsubject, on the other hand, do. Now our spontaneous way of conceiving\r\nthe effort, under all these circumstances, is as an active force adding\r\nits strength to that of the motives which ultimately prevail. When outer\r\nforces impinge upon a body, we say that the resultant motion is in the\r\nline of least resistance, or of greatest traction. But it is a curious\r\nfact that our spontaneous language never speaks of volition with effort\r\nin this way. Of course if we proceed \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and define the line of\r\nleast resistance as the line that is followed, the physical law must\r\nalso hold good in the mental sphere. But we \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e, in all hard cases of\r\nvolition, as if the line taken, when the rarer and more ideal motives\r\nprevail, were the line of greater resistance, and as if the line of\r\ncoarser motivation were the more pervious and easy one, even at the very\r\nmoment when we refuse to follow it. He who under the surgeon\u0027s knife\r\nrepresses cries of pain, or he who exposes himself to social obloquy for\r\nduty\u0027s sake, feels as if he were following the line of greatest\r\ntemporary resistance. He speaks of conquering and overcoming his\r\nimpulses and temptations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the sluggard, the drunkard, the coward, never talk of their conduct\r\nin that way, or say they resist their energy, overcome their sobriety,\r\nconquer their courage, and so forth. If in general we class all springs\r\nof action as propensities on the one hand and ideals on the other, the\r\nsensualist never says of his behavior that it results from a victory\r\nover his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of his as a victory over\r\nhis propensities. The sensualist uses terms of inactivity, says he\r\nforgets his ideals, is deaf to duty, and so forth; which terms seem to\r\nimply that the ideal motives \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e can be annulled without energy or\r\neffort, and that the strongest mere traction lies in the line of the\r\npropensities. The ideal impulse appears, in comparison with this, a\r\nstill small voice which must be artificially reinforced to prevail.\r\nEffort is what reinforces it, making things seem as if, while the force\r\nof propensity\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_444\" id=\"page_444\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{444}\u003c/span\u003e were essentially a fixed quantity, the ideal force might\r\nbe of various amount. But what determines the amount of the effort when,\r\nby its aid, an ideal motive becomes victorious over a great sensual\r\nresistance? The very greatness of the resistance itself. If the sensual\r\npropensity is small, the effort is small. The latter is \u003ci\u003emade great\u003c/i\u003e by\r\nthe presence of a great antagonist to overcome. And if a brief\r\ndefinition of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given\r\nwhich would better fit the appearances than this: \u003ci\u003eIt is action in the\r\nline of the greatest resistance\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe facts may be most briefly symbolized thus, P standing for the\r\npropensity, I for the ideal impulse, and E for the effort:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eI \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u0026lt;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e P.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003eI\u0026nbsp; +\u0026nbsp; E\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u0026gt;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e P.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003eIn other words, if E adds itself to I, P immediately offers the least\r\nresistance, and motion occurs in spite of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the E does not seem to form an integral part of the I. It appears\r\nadventitious and indeterminate in advance. We can make more or less as\r\nwe please, and \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e we make enough we can convert the greatest mental\r\nresistance into the least. Such, at least, is the impression which the\r\nfacts spontaneously produce upon us. But we will not discuss the truth\r\nof this impression at present; let us rather continue our descriptive\r\ndetail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePleasure and Pain as Springs of Action.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Objects and thoughts of objects\r\nstart our action, but the pleasures and pains which action brings modify\r\nits course and regulate it; and later the thoughts of the pleasures and\r\nthe pains acquire themselves impulsive and inhibitive power. Not that\r\nthe thought of a pleasure need be itself a pleasure, usually it is the\r\nreverse\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003enessun maggior dolore\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;as Dante says\u0026mdash;and not that the\r\nthought of pain need be a pain, for, as Homer says, \"griefs are often\r\nafterwards an entertainment.\" But as present pleasures are tremendous\r\nreinforcers, and present pains tremendous inhibitors of whatever\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_445\" id=\"page_445\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{445}\u003c/span\u003e action\r\nleads to them, so the thoughts of pleasures and pains take rank amongst\r\nthe thoughts which have most impulsive and inhibitive power. The precise\r\nrelation which these thoughts hold to other thoughts is thus a matter\r\ndemanding some attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf a movement feels agreeable, we repeat and repeat it as long as the\r\npleasure lasts. If it hurts us, our muscular contractions at the instant\r\nstop. So complete is the inhibition in this latter case that it is\r\nalmost impossible for a man to cut or mutilate himself slowly and\r\ndeliberately\u0026mdash;his hand invincibly refusing to bring on the pain. And\r\nthere are many pleasures which, when once we have begun to taste them,\r\nmake it all but obligatory to keep up the activity to which they are\r\ndue. So widespread and searching is this influence of pleasures and\r\npains upon our movements that a premature philosophy has decided that\r\nthese are our only spurs to action, and that wherever they seem to be\r\nabsent, it is only because they are so far on among the \u0027remoter\u0027 images\r\nthat prompt the action that they are overlooked.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is a great mistake, however. Important as is the influence of\r\npleasures and pains upon our movements, they are far from being our only\r\nstimuli. With the manifestations of instinct and emotional expression,\r\nfor example, they have absolutely nothing to do. Who smiles for the\r\npleasure of the smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown? Who\r\nblushes to escape the discomfort of not blushing? Or who in anger,\r\ngrief, or fear is actuated to the movements which he makes by the\r\npleasures which they yield? In all these cases the movements are\r\ndischarged fatally by the \u003ci\u003evis a tergo\u003c/i\u003e which the stimulus exerts upon a\r\nnervous system framed to respond in just that way. The objects of our\r\nrage, love, or terror, the occasions of our tears and smiles, whether\r\nthey be present to our senses, or whether they be merely represented in\r\nidea, have this peculiar sort of impulsive power. The\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_446\" id=\"page_446\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{446}\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eimpulsive\r\nquality\u003c/i\u003e of mental states is an attribute behind which we cannot go.\r\nSome states of mind have more of it than others, some have it in this\r\ndirection and some in that. Feelings of pleasure and pain have it, and\r\nperceptions and imaginations of fact have it, but neither have it\r\nexclusively or peculiarly. It is of the essence of all consciousness (or\r\nof the neural process which underlies it) to instigate movement of some\r\nsort. That with one creature and object it should be of one sort, with\r\nothers of another sort, is a problem for evolutionary history to\r\nexplain. However the actual impulsions may have arisen, they must now be\r\ndescribed as they exist; and those persons obey a curiously narrow\r\nteleological superstition who think themselves bound to interpret them\r\nin every instance as effects of the secret solicitancy of pleasure and\r\nrepugnancy of pain. If the thought of pleasure can impel to action,\r\nsurely other thoughts may. Experience only can decide which thoughts do.\r\nThe chapters on Instinct and Emotion have shown us that their name is\r\nlegion; and with this verdict we ought to remain contented, and not seek\r\nan illusory simplification at the cost of half the facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf in these our \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e acts pleasures and pains bear no part, as little\r\ndo they bear in our last acts, or those artificially acquired\r\nperformances which have become habitual. All the daily routine of life,\r\nour dressing and undressing, the coming and going from our work or\r\ncarrying through of its various operations, is utterly without mental\r\nreference to pleasure and pain, except under rarely realized conditions.\r\nIt is ideo-motor action. As I do not breathe for the pleasure of the\r\nbreathing, but simply find that I \u003ci\u003eam\u003c/i\u003e breathing, so I do not write for\r\nthe pleasure of the writing, but simply because I have once begun, and\r\nbeing in a state of intellectual excitement which keeps venting itself\r\nin that way, find that I \u003ci\u003eam\u003c/i\u003e writing still. Who will pretend that when\r\nhe idly fingers his knife-handle at the table, it is for the sake of any\r\npleasure which it gives him, or pain which he thereby avoids? We do all\r\nthese things\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_447\" id=\"page_447\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{447}\u003c/span\u003e because at the moment we cannot help it; our nervous\r\nsystems are so shaped that they overflow in just that way; and for many\r\nof our idle or purely \u0027nervous\u0027 and fidgety performances we can assign\r\nabsolutely no \u003ci\u003ereason\u003c/i\u003e at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr what shall be said of a shy and unsociable man who receives\r\npoint-blank an invitation to a small party? The thing is to him an\r\nabomination; but your presence exerts a compulsion on him, he can think\r\nof no excuse, and so says yes, cursing himself the while for what he\r\ndoes. He is unusually \u003ci\u003esui compos\u003c/i\u003e who does not every week of his life\r\nfall into some such blundering act as this. Such instances of \u003ci\u003evoluntas\r\ninvita\u003c/i\u003e show not only that our acts cannot all be conceived as effects\r\nof represented pleasure, but that they cannot even be classed as cases\r\nof represented \u003ci\u003egood\u003c/i\u003e. The class \u0027goods\u0027 contains many more generally\r\ninfluential motives to action than the class \u0027pleasants.\u0027 But almost as\r\nlittle as under the form of pleasures do our acts invariably appear to\r\nus under the form of \u003ci\u003egoods\u003c/i\u003e. All diseased impulses and pathological\r\nfixed ideas are instances to the contrary. It is the very badness of the\r\nact that gives it then its vertiginous fascination. Remove the\r\nprohibition, and the attraction stops. In my university days a student\r\nthrew himself from an upper entry window of one of the college buildings\r\nand was nearly killed. Another student, a friend of my own, had to pass\r\nthe window daily in coming and going from his room, and experienced a\r\ndreadful temptation to imitate the deed. Being a Catholic, he told his\r\ndirector, who said, \u0027All right! if you must, you must,\u0027 and added, \u0027Go\r\nahead and do it,\u0027 thereby instantly quenching his desire. This director\r\nknew how to minister to a mind diseased. But we need not go to minds\r\ndiseased for examples of the occasional tempting-power of simple badness\r\nand unpleasantness as such. Every one who has a wound or hurt anywhere,\r\na sore tooth, e.g., will ever and anon press it just to bring out the\r\npain. If we are near a new sort of stink, we must sniff it again just to\r\nverify once more how bad it is.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_448\" id=\"page_448\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{448}\u003c/span\u003e This very day I have been repeating\r\nover and over to myself a verbal jingle whose mawkish silliness was the\r\nsecret of its haunting power. I loathed yet could not banish it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhat holds attention determines action.\u003c/b\u003e If one must have a single name\r\nfor the condition upon which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of\r\nobjects depends, one had better call it their \u003ci\u003einterest\u003c/i\u003e. \u0027The\r\ninteresting\u0027 is a title which covers not only the pleasant and the\r\npainful, but also the morbidly fascinating, the tediously haunting, and\r\neven the simply habitual, inasmuch as the attention usually travels on\r\nhabitual lines, and what-we-attend-to and what-interests-us are\r\nsynonymous terms. It seems as if we ought to look for the secret of an\r\nidea\u0027s impulsiveness, not in any peculiar relations which it may have\r\nwith paths of motor discharge,\u0026mdash;for \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e ideas have relations with some\r\nsuch paths,\u0026mdash;but rather in a preliminary phenomenon, the \u003ci\u003eurgency,\r\nnamely, with which it is able to compel attention and dominate in\r\nconsciousness\u003c/i\u003e. Let it once so dominate, let no other ideas succeed in\r\ndisplacing it, and whatever motor effects belong to it by nature will\r\ninevitably occur\u0026mdash;its impulsion, in short, will be given to boot, and\r\nwill manifest itself as a matter of course. This is what we have seen in\r\ninstinct, in emotion, in common ideo-motor action, in hypnotic\r\nsuggestion, in morbid impulsion, and in \u003ci\u003evoluntas invita\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026mdash;the\r\nimpelling idea is simply the one which possesses the attention. It is\r\nthe same where pleasure and pain are the motor spurs\u0026mdash;they drive other\r\nthoughts from consciousness at the same time that they instigate their\r\nown characteristic \u0027volitional\u0027 effects. And this is also what happens\r\nat the moment of the \u003ci\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e, in all the five types of \u0027decision\u0027 which\r\nwe have described. In short, one does not see any case in which the\r\nsteadfast occupancy of consciousness does not appear to be the prime\r\ncondition of impulsive power. It is still more obviously the prime\r\ncondition of inhibitive power. What checks our impulses is the mere\r\nthinking of reasons to the contrary\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_449\" id=\"page_449\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{449}\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;it is their bare presence to the\r\nmind which gives the veto, and makes acts, otherwise seductive,\r\nimpossible to perform. If we could only \u003ci\u003eforget\u003c/i\u003e our scruples, our\r\ndoubts, our fears, what exultant energy we should for a while display!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWill is a relation between the mind and its \u0027ideas.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e In closing in,\r\ntherefore, after all these preliminaries, upon the more \u003ci\u003eintimate\u003c/i\u003e\r\nnature of the volitional process, we find ourselves driven more and more\r\nexclusively to consider the conditions which make ideas prevail in the\r\nmind. With the prevalence, once there as a fact, of the motive idea, the\r\n\u003ci\u003epsychology\u003c/i\u003e of volition properly stops. The movements which ensue are\r\nexclusively physiological phenomena, following according to\r\nphysiological laws upon the neural events to which the idea corresponds.\r\nThe \u003ci\u003ewilling\u003c/i\u003e terminates with the prevalence of the idea; and whether\r\nthe act then follows or not is a matter quite immaterial, so far as the\r\nwilling itself goes. I will to write, and the act follows. I will to\r\nsneeze, and it does not. I will that the distant table slide over the\r\nfloor towards me; it also does not. My willing representation can no\r\nmore instigate my sneezing-centre than it can instigate the table to\r\nactivity. But in both cases it is as true and good willing as it was\r\nwhen I willed to write. In a word, volition is a psychic or moral fact\r\npure and simple, and is absolutely completed when the stable state of\r\nthe idea is there. The supervention of motion is a supernumerary\r\nphenomenon depending on executive ganglia whose function lies outside\r\nthe mind. If the ganglia work duly, the act occurs perfectly. If they\r\nwork, but work wrongly, we have St. Vitus\u0027s dance, locomotor ataxy,\r\nmotor aphasia, or minor degrees of awkwardness. If they don\u0027t work at\r\nall, the act fails altogether, and we say the man is paralyzed. He may\r\nmake a tremendous effort, and contract the other muscles of the body,\r\nbut the paralyzed limb fails to move. In all these cases, however, the\r\nvolition considered as a psychic process is intact.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_450\" id=\"page_450\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{450}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVolitional effort is effort of attention.\u003c/b\u003e We thus find that \u003ci\u003ewe reach\r\nthe heart of our inquiry into volition when we ask by what process it is\r\nthat the thought of any given action comes to prevail stably in the\r\nmind\u003c/i\u003e. Where thoughts prevail without effort, we have sufficiently\r\nstudied in the several chapters on Sensation, Association, and\r\nAttention, the laws of their advent before consciousness and of their\r\nstay. We shall not go over that ground again, for we know that interest\r\nand association are the words, let their worth be what it may, on which\r\nour explanations must perforce rely. Where, on the other hand, the\r\nprevalence of the thought is accompanied by the phenomenon of effort,\r\nthe case is much less clear. Already in the chapter on Attention we\r\npostponed the final consideration of voluntary attention with effort to\r\na later place. We have now brought things to a point at which we see\r\nthat attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most\r\n\u0027voluntary,\u0027 is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before\r\nthe mind.\u003c/i\u003e The so-doing \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the \u003ci\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e; and it is a mere physiological\r\nincident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor\r\nconsequences should ensue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eEffort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_55_55\" id=\"FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_55_55\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nEvery reader must know by his own experience\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_451\" id=\"page_451\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{451}\u003c/span\u003e that this is so, for every\r\nreader must have felt some fiery passion\u0027s grasp. What constitutes the\r\ndifficulty for a man laboring under an unwise passion of acting as if\r\nthe passion were wise? Certainly there is no physical difficulty. It is\r\nas easy physically to avoid a fight as to begin one, to pocket one\u0027s\r\nmoney as to squander it on one\u0027s cupidities, to walk away from as\r\ntowards a coquette\u0027s door. The difficulty is mental: it is that of\r\ngetting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all. When\r\nany strong emotional state whatever is upon us, the tendency is for no\r\nimages but such as are congruous with it to come up. If others by chance\r\noffer themselves, they are instantly smothered and crowded out. If we be\r\njoyous, we cannot keep thinking of those uncertainties and risks of\r\nfailure which abound upon our path; if lugubrious, we cannot think of\r\nnew triumphs, travels, loves, and joys; nor if vengeful, of our\r\noppressor\u0027s community of nature with ourselves. The cooling advice which\r\nwe get from others when the fever-fit is on us is the most jarring and\r\nexasperating thing in life. Reply we cannot, so we get angry; for by a\r\nsort of self-preserving instinct which our passion has, it feels that\r\nthese chill objects, if they once but gain a lodgment, will work and\r\nwork until they have frozen the very vital spark from out of all our\r\nmood and brought our airy castles in ruin to the ground. Such is the\r\ninevitable effect of reasonable ideas over others\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eif they can once get\r\na quiet hearing\u003c/i\u003e; and passion\u0027s cue accordingly is always and everywhere\r\nto prevent their still small voice from being heard at all. \"Let me not\r\nthink of that! Don\u0027t speak to me of that!\" This is the sudden cry of all\r\nthose who in a passion perceive some sobering considerations about to\r\ncheck them in mid-career. There is something so icy in this cold-water\r\nbath, something which seems so hostile to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_452\" id=\"page_452\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{452}\u003c/span\u003e the movement of our life, so\r\npurely negative, in Reason, when she lays her corpse-like finger on our\r\nheart and says, \"Halt! give up! leave off! go back! sit down!\" that it\r\nis no wonder that to most men the steadying influence seems, for the\r\ntime being, a very minister of death.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe strong-willed man, however, is the man who hears the still small\r\nvoice unflinchingly, and who, when the death-bringing consideration\r\ncomes, looks at its face, consents to its presence, clings to it,\r\naffirms it, and holds it fast, in spite of the host of exciting mental\r\nimages which rise in revolt against it and would expel it from the mind.\r\nSustained in this way by a resolute effort of attention, the difficult\r\nobject erelong begins to call up its own congeners and associates and\r\nends by changing the disposition of the man\u0027s consciousness altogether.\r\nAnd with his consciousness his action changes, for the new object, once\r\nstably in possession of the field of his thoughts, infallibly produces\r\nits own motor effects. The difficulty lies in the gaining possession of\r\nthat field. Though the spontaneous drift of thought is all the other\r\nway, the attention must be kept strained on that one object until at\r\nlast it \u003ci\u003egrows\u003c/i\u003e, so as to maintain itself before the mind with ease.\r\nThis strain of the attention is the fundamental act of will. And the\r\nwill\u0027s work is in most cases practically ended when the bare presence to\r\nour thought of the naturally unwelcome object has been secured. For the\r\nmysterious tie between the thought and the motor centres next comes into\r\nplay, and, in a way which we cannot even guess at, the obedience of the\r\nbodily organs follows as a matter of course.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all this one sees how the immediate point of application of the\r\nvolitional effort lies exclusively in the mental world. The whole drama\r\nis a mental drama. The whole difficulty is a mental difficulty, a\r\ndifficulty with an ideal object of our thought. It is, in one word, an\r\n\u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e to which our will applies itself, an idea which if we let it go\r\nwould slip away, but which we will not let go. \u003ci\u003eConsent to the idea\u0027s\r\nundivided presence, this is effort\u0027s sole achievement.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_453\" id=\"page_453\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{453}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/i\u003e Its only\r\nfunction is to get this feeling of consent into the mind. And for this\r\nthere is but one way. The idea to be consented to must be kept from\r\nflickering and going out. It must be held steadily before the mind until\r\nit \u003ci\u003efills\u003c/i\u003e the mind. Such filling of the mind by an idea, with its\r\ncongruous associates, \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e consent to the idea and to the fact which the\r\nidea represents. If the idea be that, or include that, of a bodily\r\nmovement of our own, then we call the consent thus laboriously gained a\r\nmotor volition. For Nature here \u0027backs\u0027 us instantaneously and follows\r\nup our inward willingness by outward changes on her own part. She does\r\nthis in no other instance. Pity she should not have been more generous,\r\nnor made a world whose other parts were as immediately subject to our\r\nwill!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn \u003ca href=\"#page_430\"\u003epage 430\u003c/a\u003e, in describing the \u0027reasonable type\u0027 of decision, it was\r\nsaid that it usually came when the right conception of the case was\r\nfound. Where, however, the right conception is an anti-impulsive one,\r\nthe whole intellectual ingenuity of the man usually goes to work to\r\ncrowd it out of sight, and to find for the emergency names by the help\r\nof which the dispositions of the moment may sound sanctified, and sloth\r\nor passion may reign unchecked. How many excuses does the drunkard find\r\nwhen each new temptation comes! It is a new brand of liquor which the\r\ninterests of intellectual culture in such matters oblige him to test;\r\nmoreover it is poured out and it is sin to waste it; also others are\r\ndrinking and it would be churlishness to refuse. Or it is but to enable\r\nhim to sleep, or just to get through this job of work; or it isn\u0027t\r\ndrinking, it is because he feels so cold; or it is Christmas-day; or it\r\nis a means of stimulating him to make a more powerful resolution in\r\nfavor of abstinence than any he has hitherto made; or it is just this\r\nonce, and once doesn\u0027t count, etc., etc., \u003ci\u003ead libitum\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;it is, in fact,\r\nanything you like except \u003ci\u003ebeing a drunkard\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eThat\u003c/i\u003e is the conception\r\nthat will not stay before the poor soul\u0027s attention. But if he once gets\r\nable to pick out that way of conceiving, from all the other possible\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_454\" id=\"page_454\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{454}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nways of conceiving the various opportunities which occur, if through\r\nthick and thin he holds to it that this is being a drunkard and is\r\nnothing else, he is not likely to remain one long. The effort by which\r\nhe succeeds in keeping the right \u003ci\u003ename\u003c/i\u003e unwaveringly present to his mind\r\nproves to be his saving moral act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEverywhere, then, the function of the effort is the same: to keep\r\naffirming and adopting a thought which, if left to itself, would slip\r\naway. It may be cold and flat when the spontaneous mental drift is\r\ntowards excitement, or great and arduous when the spontaneous drift is\r\ntowards repose. In the one case the effort has to inhibit an explosive,\r\nin the other to arouse an obstructed will. The exhausted sailor on a\r\nwreck has a will which is obstructed. One of his ideas is that of his\r\nsore hands, of the nameless exhaustion of his whole frame which the act\r\nof farther pumping involves, and of the deliciousness of sinking into\r\nsleep. The other is that of the hungry sea ingulfing him. \"Rather the\r\naching toil!\" he says; and it becomes reality then, in spite of the\r\ninhibiting influence of the relatively luxurious sensations which he\r\ngets from lying still. Often again it may be the thought of sleep and\r\nwhat leads to it which is the hard one to keep before the mind. If a\r\npatient afflicted with insomnia can only control the whirling chase of\r\nhis ideas so far as to think of \u003ci\u003enothing at all\u003c/i\u003e (which can be done), or\r\nso far as to imagine one letter after another of a verse of Scripture or\r\npoetry spelt slowly and monotonously out, it is almost certain that\r\nhere, too, specific bodily effects will follow, and that sleep will\r\ncome. The trouble is to keep the mind upon a train of objects naturally\r\nso insipid. \u003ci\u003eTo sustain a representation, to think\u003c/i\u003e, is, in short, the\r\nonly moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and\r\nlunatics alike. Most maniacs know their thoughts to be crazy, but find\r\nthem too pressing to be withstood. Compared with them the sane truths\r\nare so deadly sober, so cadaverous, that the lunatic cannot bear to look\r\nthem in the face and say,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_455\" id=\"page_455\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{455}\u003c/span\u003e \"Let these alone be my reality!\" But with\r\nsufficient effort, as Dr. Wigan says, \"Such a man can for a time \u003ci\u003ewind\r\nhimself up\u003c/i\u003e, as it were, and determine that the notions of the\r\ndisordered brain shall not be manifested. Many instances are on record\r\nsimilar to that told by Pinel, where an inmate of the Bicêtre, having\r\nstood a long cross-examination, and given every mark of restored reason,\r\nsigned his name to the paper authorizing his discharge \u0027Jesus Christ,\u0027\r\nand then went off into all the vagaries connected with that delusion. In\r\nthe phraseology of the gentleman whose case is related in an early part\r\nof this [Wigan\u0027s] work he had \u0027held himself tight\u0027 during the\r\nexamination in order to attain his object; this once accomplished he\r\n\u0027let himself down\u0027 again, and, if even \u003ci\u003econscious\u003c/i\u003e of his delusion,\r\ncould not control it. I have observed with such persons that it requires\r\na considerable time to wind themselves up to the pitch of complete\r\nself-control, that the effort is a painful tension of the mind…. When\r\nthrown off their guard by any accidental remark or worn out by the\r\nlength of the examination, they \u003ci\u003elet themselves go\u003c/i\u003e, and cannot gather\r\nthemselves up again without preparation.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo sum it all up in a word, \u003ci\u003ethe terminus of the psychological process\r\nin volition, the point to which the will is directly applied, is always\r\nan idea\u003c/i\u003e. There are at all times some ideas from which we shy away like\r\nfrightened horses the moment we get a glimpse of their forbidding\r\nprofile upon the threshold of our thought. \u003ci\u003eThe only resistance which\r\nour will can possibly experience is the resistance which such an idea\r\noffers to being attended to at all.\u003c/i\u003e To attend to it is the volitional\r\nact, and the only inward volitional act which we ever perform.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Question of \u0027Free-will.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;As was remarked on \u003ca href=\"#page_443\"\u003ep. 443\u003c/a\u003e, in the\r\nexperience of effort we feel as if we might make more or less than we\r\nactually at any moment are making.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe effort appears, in other words, not as a fixed reaction on our part\r\nwhich the object that resists us necessarily calls forth, but as what\r\nthe mathematicians call an \u0027independent\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_456\" id=\"page_456\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{456}\u003c/span\u003e variable\u0027 amongst the fixed\r\ndata of the case, our motives, character, etc. If it be really so, if\r\nthe amount of our effort is not a determinate function of those other\r\ndata, then, in common parlance, \u003ci\u003eour wills are free\u003c/i\u003e. If, on the\r\ncontrary, the amount of effort be a fixed function, so that whatever\r\nobject at any time fills our consciousness was from eternity bound to\r\nfill it then and there, and compel from us the exact effort, neither\r\nmore nor less, which we bestow upon it,\u0026mdash;then our wills are not free,\r\nand all our acts are foreordained. \u003ci\u003eThe question of fact in the\r\nfree-will controversy is thus extremely simple. It relates solely to the\r\namount of effort of attention which we can at any time put forth.\u003c/i\u003e Are\r\nthe duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object,\r\nor are they not? Now, as I just said, it \u003ci\u003eseems\u003c/i\u003e as if we might exert\r\nmore or less in any given case. When a man has let his thoughts go for\r\ndays and weeks until at last they culminate in some particularly dirty\r\nor cowardly or cruel act, it is hard to persuade him, in the midst of\r\nhis remorse, that he might not have reined them in; hard to make him\r\nbelieve that this whole goodly universe (which his act so jars upon)\r\nrequired and exacted it of him at that fatal moment, and from eternity\r\nmade aught else impossible. But, on the other hand, there is the\r\ncertainty that all his \u003ci\u003eeffortless\u003c/i\u003e volitions are resultants of\r\ninterests and associations whose strength and sequence are mechanically\r\ndetermined by the structure of that physical mass, his brain; and the\r\ngeneral continuity of things and the monistic conception of the world\r\nmay lead one irresistibly to postulate that a little fact like effort\r\ncan form no real exception to the overwhelming reign of deterministic\r\nlaw. Even in effortless volition we have the consciousness of the\r\nalternative being also possible. This is surely a delusion here; why is\r\nit not a delusion everywhere?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe fact is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly\r\npsychologic grounds.\u003c/i\u003e After a certain amount of effort of attention has\r\nbeen given to an idea, it is manifestly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_457\" id=\"page_457\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{457}\u003c/span\u003e impossible to tell whether\r\neither more or less of it \u003ci\u003emight\u003c/i\u003e have been given or not. To tell that,\r\nwe should have to ascend to the antecedents of the effort, and defining\r\nthem with mathematical exactitude, prove, by laws of which we have not\r\nat present even an inkling, that the only amount of sequent effort which\r\ncould \u003ci\u003epossibly\u003c/i\u003e comport with them was the precise amount that actually\r\ncame. Such measurements, whether of psychic or of neural quantities, and\r\nsuch deductive reasonings as this method of proof implies, will surely\r\nbe forever beyond human reach. No serious psychologist or physiologist\r\nwill venture even to suggest a notion of how they might be practically\r\nmade. Had one no motives drawn from elsewhere to make one partial to\r\neither solution, one might easily leave the matter undecided. But a\r\npsychologist cannot be expected to be thus impartial, having a great\r\nmotive in favor of determinism. He wants to build a \u003ci\u003eScience\u003c/i\u003e; and a\r\nScience is a system of fixed relations. Wherever there are independent\r\nvariables, there Science stops. So far, then, as our volitions may be\r\nindependent variables, a scientific psychology must ignore that fact,\r\nand treat of them only so far as they are fixed functions. In other\r\nwords, she must deal with the \u003ci\u003egeneral laws\u003c/i\u003e of volition exclusively;\r\nwith the impulsive and inhibitory character of ideas; with the nature of\r\ntheir appeals to the attention; with the conditions under which effort\r\nmay arise, etc.; but not with the precise amounts of effort, for these,\r\nif our wills be free, are impossible to compute. She thus abstracts from\r\nfree-will, without necessarily denying its existence. Practically,\r\nhowever, such abstraction is not distinguished from rejection; and most\r\nactual psychologists have no hesitation in denying that free-will\r\nexists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor ourselves, we can hand the free-will controversy over to\r\nmetaphysics. Psychology will surely never grow refined enough to\r\ndiscover, in the case of any individual\u0027s decision, a discrepancy\r\nbetween her scientific calculations and the fact. Her prevision will\r\nnever foretell, whether the effort\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_458\" id=\"page_458\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{458}\u003c/span\u003e be completely predestinate or not,\r\nthe way in which each individual emergency is resolved. Psychology will\r\nbe psychology, and Science science, as much as ever (as much and no\r\nmore) in this world, whether free-will be true in it or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe can thus ignore the free-will question in psychology. As we said on\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_452\"\u003ep. 452\u003c/a\u003e, the operation of free effort, if it existed, could only be to\r\nhold some one ideal object, or part of an object, a little longer or a\r\nlittle more intensely before the mind. Amongst the alternatives which\r\npresent themselves as \u003ci\u003egenuine possibles\u003c/i\u003e, it would thus make one\r\neffective. And although such quickening of one idea might be morally and\r\nhistorically momentous, yet, if considered \u003ci\u003edynamically\u003c/i\u003e, it would be an\r\noperation amongst those physiological infinitesimals which an actual\r\nscience must forever neglect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEthical Importance of the Phenomenon of Effort.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But whilst eliminating\r\nthe question about the amount of our effort as one which psychology will\r\nnever have a practical call to decide, I must say one word about the\r\nextraordinarily intimate and important character which the phenomenon of\r\neffort assumes in our own eyes as individual men. Of course we measure\r\nourselves by many standards. Our strength and our intelligence, our\r\nwealth and even our good luck, are things which warm our heart and make\r\nus feel ourselves a match for life. But deeper than all such things, and\r\nable to suffice unto itself without them, is the sense of the amount of\r\neffort which we can put forth. Those are, after all, but effects,\r\nproducts, and reflections of the outer world within. But the effort\r\nseems to belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the\r\nsubstantive thing which we \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e, and those were but externals which we\r\n\u003ci\u003ecarry\u003c/i\u003e. If the \u0027searching of our heart and reins\u0027 be the purpose of\r\nthis human drama, then what is sought seems to be what effort we can\r\nmake. He who can make none is but a shadow; he who can make much is a\r\nhero. The huge world that girdles us about\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_459\" id=\"page_459\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{459}\u003c/span\u003e puts all sorts of questions\r\nto us, and tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we meet by\r\nactions that are easy, and some of the questions we answer in\r\narticulately formulated words. But the deepest question that is ever\r\nasked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening\r\nof our heart-strings as we say, \"\u003ci\u003eYes, I will even have it so!\u003c/i\u003e\" When a\r\ndreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up its dark\r\nabysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their hold on\r\nthe situation altogether, and either escape from its difficulties by\r\naverting their attention, or if they cannot do that, collapse into\r\nyielding masses of plaintiveness and fear. The effort required for\r\nfacing and consenting to such objects is beyond their power to make. But\r\nthe heroic mind does differently. To it, too, the objects are sinister\r\nand dreadful, unwelcome, incompatible with wished-for things. But it can\r\nface them if necessary, without for that losing its hold upon the rest\r\nof life. The world thus finds in the heroic man its worthy match and\r\nmate; and the effort which he is able to put forth to hold himself erect\r\nand keep his heart unshaken is the direct measure of his worth and\r\nfunction in the game of human life. He can \u003ci\u003estand\u003c/i\u003e this Universe. He can\r\nmeet it and keep up his faith in it in presence of those same features\r\nwhich lay his weaker brethren low. He can still find a zest in it, not\r\nby \u0027ostrich-like forgetfulness,\u0027 but by pure inward willingness to face\r\nit with those deterrent objects there. And hereby he makes himself one\r\nof the masters and the lords of life. He must be counted with\r\nhenceforth; he forms a part of human destiny. Neither in the theoretic\r\nnor in the practical sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those who\r\nhave no head for risks, or sense for living on the perilous edge. Our\r\nreligious life lies more, our practical life lies less, than it used to,\r\non the perilous edge. But just as our courage is so often a reflex of\r\nanother\u0027s courage, so our faith is apt to be a faith in some one else\u0027s\r\nfaith. We draw new life from the heroic example. The prophet has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_460\" id=\"page_460\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{460}\u003c/span\u003e drunk\r\nmore deeply than anyone of the cup of bitterness, but his countenance is\r\nso unshaken and he speaks such mighty words of cheer that his will\r\nbecomes our will, and our life is kindled at his own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus not only our morality but our religion, so far as the latter is\r\ndeliberate, depend on the effort which we can make. \"\u003ci\u003eWill you or won\u0027t\r\nyou have it so?\u003c/i\u003e\" is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are\r\nasked it every hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the\r\nsmallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical, things. We\r\nanswer by \u003ci\u003econsents or non-consents\u003c/i\u003e and not by words. What wonder that\r\nthese dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication\r\nwith the nature of things! What wonder if the effort demanded by them be\r\nthe measure of our worth as men! What wonder if the amount which we\r\naccord of it were the one strictly underived and original contribution\r\nwhich we make to the world!\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_461\" id=\"page_461\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{461}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"EPILOGUE\" id=\"EPILOGUE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEPILOGUE.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003ePSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhat the Word Metaphysics means.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the last chapter we handed the\r\nquestion of free-will over to \u0027metaphysics.\u0027 It would indeed have been\r\nhasty to settle the question absolutely, inside the limits of\r\npsychology. Let psychology frankly admit that \u003ci\u003efor her scientific\r\npurposes\u003c/i\u003e determinism may be \u003ci\u003eclaimed\u003c/i\u003e, and no one can find fault. If,\r\nthen, it turn out later that the claim has only a relative purpose, and\r\nmay be crossed by counter-claims, the readjustment can be made. Now\r\nethics makes a counterclaim; and the present writer, for one, has no\r\nhesitation in regarding her claim as the stronger, and in assuming that\r\nour wills are \u0027free.\u0027 For him, then, the deterministic assumption of\r\npsychology is merely provisional and methodological. This is no place to\r\nargue the ethical point; and I only mention the conflict to show that\r\nall these special sciences, marked off for convenience from the\r\nremaining body of truth (cf. \u003ca href=\"#page_001\"\u003ep. 1\u003c/a\u003e), must hold their assumptions and\r\nresults subject to revision in the light of each others\u0027 needs. The\r\nforum where they hold discussion is called metaphysics. Metaphysics\r\nmeans only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and\r\nconsistently. The special sciences all deal with data that are full of\r\nobscurity and contradiction; but from the point of view of their limited\r\npurposes these defects may be overlooked. Hence the disparaging use of\r\nthe name metaphysics which is so common. To a man with a limited purpose\r\nany discussion that is over-subtle for that purpose is branded as\r\n\u0027metaphysical.\u0027 A geologist\u0027s purposes fall short of understanding Time\r\nitself. A mechanist need\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_462\" id=\"page_462\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{462}\u003c/span\u003e not know how action and reaction are possible\r\nat all. A psychologist has enough to do without asking how both he and\r\nthe mind which he studies are able to take cognizance of the same outer\r\nworld. But it is obvious that problems irrelevant from one standpoint\r\nmay be essential from another. And as soon as one\u0027s purpose is the\r\nattainment of the maximum of possible insight into the world as a whole,\r\nthe metaphysical puzzles become the most urgent ones of all. Psychology\r\ncontributes to general philosophy her full share of these; and I propose\r\nin this last chapter to indicate briefly which of them seem the more\r\nimportant. And first, of the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelation of Consciousness to the Brain.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When psychology is treated as a\r\nnatural science (after the fashion in which it has been treated in this\r\nbook), \u0027states of mind\u0027 are taken for granted, as data immediately given\r\nin experience; and the working hypothesis (see \u003ca href=\"#page_006\"\u003ep. 6\u003c/a\u003e) is the mere\r\nempirical law that to the entire state of the brain at any moment one\r\nunique state of mind always \u0027corresponds.\u0027 This does very well till we\r\nbegin to be metaphysical and ask ourselves just what we mean by such a\r\nword as \u0027corresponds.\u0027 This notion appears dark in the extreme, the\r\nmoment we seek to translate it into something more intimate than mere\r\nparallel variation. Some think they make the notion of it clearer by\r\ncalling the mental state and the brain the inner and outer \u0027aspects,\u0027\r\nrespectively, of \u0027One and the Same Reality.\u0027 Others consider the mental\r\nstate as the \u0027reaction\u0027 of a unitary being, the Soul, upon the multiple\r\nactivities which the brain presents. Others again comminute the mystery\r\nby supposing each brain-cell to be separately conscious, and the\r\nempirically given mental state to be the appearance of all the little\r\nconsciousnesses fused into one, just as the \u0027brain\u0027 itself is the\r\nappearance of all the cells together, when looked at from one point of\r\nview.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may call these three metaphysical attempts the \u003ci\u003emonistic\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\n\u003ci\u003espiritualistic\u003c/i\u003e, and the \u003ci\u003eatomistic\u003c/i\u003e theories respectively.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_463\" id=\"page_463\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{463}\u003c/span\u003e Each has\r\nits difficulties, of which it seems to me that those of the\r\nspiritualistic theory are \u003ci\u003elogically\u003c/i\u003e much the least grave. But the\r\nspiritualistic theory is quite out of touch with the facts of multiple\r\nconsciousness, alternate personality, etc. (pp. \u003ca href=\"#page_207\"\u003e207-214\u003c/a\u003e). These lend\r\nthemselves more naturally to the atomistic formulation, for it seems\r\neasier to think of a lot of minor consciousnesses now gathering together\r\ninto one large mass, and now into several smaller ones, than of a Soul\r\nnow reacting totally, now breaking into several disconnected\r\nsimultaneous reactions. The localization of brain-functions also makes\r\nfor the atomistic view. If in my experience, say of a bell, it is my\r\noccipital lobes which are the condition of its being seen, and my\r\ntemporal lobes which are the condition of its being heard, what is more\r\nnatural than to say that the former \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e it and the latter \u003ci\u003ehear\u003c/i\u003e it,\r\nand then \u0027combine their information\u0027? In view of the extreme naturalness\r\nof such a way of representing the well-established fact that the\r\nappearance of the several parts of an object to consciousness at any\r\nmoment does depend on as many several parts of the brain being then\r\nactive, all such objections as were urged, on pp. \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_057\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e, and elsewhere,\r\nto the notion that \u0027parts\u0027 of consciousness \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e \u0027combine\u0027 will be\r\nrejected as far-fetched, unreal, and \u0027metaphysical\u0027 by the atomistic\r\nphilosopher. His \u0027purpose\u0027 is to gain a formula which shall unify things\r\nin a natural and easy manner, and for such a purpose the atomistic\r\ntheory seems expressly made to his hand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the difficulty with the problem of \u0027correspondence\u0027 is not only that\r\nof solving it, it is that of even stating it in elementary terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"L\u0027ombre en ce lieu s\u0027amasse, et la nuit est la toute.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore we can know just what sort of goings-on occur when thought\r\ncorresponds to a change in the brain, we must know the \u003ci\u003esubjects\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\ngoings-on. We must know which sort of mental fact and which sort of\r\ncerebral fact are, so to speak, in immediate juxtaposition. We must\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_464\" id=\"page_464\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{464}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfind the minimal mental fact whose being reposes directly on a\r\nbrain-fact; and we must similarly find the minimal brain-event which can\r\nhave a mental counterpart at all. Between the mental and the physical\r\nminima thus found there will be an immediate relation, the expression of\r\nwhich, if we had it, would be the elementary psycho-physic law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur own formula has escaped the metempiric assumption of psychic atoms\r\nby \u003ci\u003etaking the entire thought\u003c/i\u003e (even of a complex object) \u003ci\u003eas the\r\nminimum with which it deals on the mental\u003c/i\u003e side, and the entire brain as\r\nthe minimum on the physical side. But the \u0027entire brain\u0027 is not a\r\nphysical fact at all! It is nothing but our name for the way in which a\r\nbillion of molecules arranged in certain positions may affect our sense.\r\nOn the principles of the corpuscular or mechanical philosophy, the only\r\nrealities are the separate molecules, or at most the cells. Their\r\naggregation into a \u0027brain\u0027 is a fiction of popular speech. Such a\r\nfigment cannot serve as the objectively real counterpart to any psychic\r\nstate whatever. Only a genuinely physical fact can so serve, and the\r\nmolecular fact is the only genuine physical fact. Whereupon we seem, if\r\nwe are to have an elementary psycho-physic law at all, thrust right back\r\nupon something like the mental-atom-theory, for the molecular fact,\r\nbeing an element of the \u0027brain,\u0027 would seem naturally to correspond, not\r\nto total thoughts, but to elements of thoughts. Thus the real in\r\npsychics seems to \u0027correspond\u0027 to the unreal in physics, and \u003ci\u003evice\r\nversa\u003c/i\u003e; and our perplexity is extreme.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Relation of States of Mind to their \u0027Objects.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The perplexity is\r\nnot diminished when we reflect upon our assumption that states of\r\nconsciousness can \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e (pp. \u003ca href=\"#page_002\"\u003e2-13\u003c/a\u003e). From the common-sense point of view\r\n(which is that of all the natural sciences) knowledge is an ultimate\r\nrelation between two mutually external entities, the knower and the\r\nknown. The world first exists, and then the states of mind; and these\r\ngain a cognizance of the world which gets gradually more and more\r\ncomplete. But it is hard\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_465\" id=\"page_465\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{465}\u003c/span\u003e to carry through this simple dualism, for\r\nidealistic reflections will intrude. Take the states of mind called pure\r\nsensations (so far as such may exist), that for example of \u003ci\u003eblue\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\nwe may get from looking into the zenith on a clear day. Is the blue a\r\ndetermination of the feeling itself, or of its \u0027object\u0027? Shall we\r\ndescribe the experience as a quality of our feeling or as our feeling of\r\na quality? Ordinary speech vacillates incessantly on this point. The\r\nambiguous word \u0027content\u0027 has been recently invented instead of \u0027object,\u0027\r\nto escape a decision; for \u0027content\u0027 suggests something not exactly out\r\nof the feeling, nor yet exactly identical with the feeling, since the\r\nlatter remains suggested as the container or vessel. Yet of our feelings\r\nas vessels apart from their content we really have no clear notion\r\nwhatever. The fact is that such an experience as \u003ci\u003eblue\u003c/i\u003e, as it is\r\nimmediately given, can only be called by some such neutral name as that\r\nof \u003ci\u003ephenomenon\u003c/i\u003e. It does not \u003ci\u003ecome\u003c/i\u003e to us \u003ci\u003eimmediately\u003c/i\u003e as a relation\r\nbetween two realities, one mental and one physical. It is only when,\r\nstill thinking of it as the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e blue (cf. \u003ca href=\"#page_239\"\u003ep. 239\u003c/a\u003e), we trace relations\r\nbetween it and other things, that it doubles itself, so to speak, and\r\ndevelops in two directions; and, taken in connection with some\r\nassociates, figures as a physical quality, whilst with others it figures\r\nas a feeling in the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur non-sensational, or conceptual, states of mind, on the other hand,\r\nseem to obey a different law. They present themselves immediately as\r\nreferring beyond themselves. Although they also possess an immediately\r\ngiven \u0027content,\u0027 they have a \u0027fringe\u0027 beyond it (\u003ca href=\"#page_168\"\u003ep. 168\u003c/a\u003e), and claim to\r\n\u0027represent\u0027 something else than it. The \u0027blue\u0027 we have just spoken of,\r\nfor instance, was, substantively considered, a \u003ci\u003eword\u003c/i\u003e; but it was a word\r\nwith a \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e. The quality blue was the \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of the thought, the\r\nword was its \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e. The mental state, in short, was not\r\nself-sufficient as sensations are, but expressly pointed at something\r\nmore in which it meant to terminate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the moment when, as in sensations, object and conscious\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_466\" id=\"page_466\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{466}\u003c/span\u003e state seem\r\nto be different ways of considering one and the same fact, it becomes\r\nhard to justify our denial that mental states consist of parts. The blue\r\nsky, considered physically, is a sum of mutually external parts; why is\r\nit not such a sum, when considered as a content of sensation?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only result that is plain from all this is that the relations of the\r\nknown and the knower are infinitely complicated, and that a genial,\r\nwhole-hearted, popular-science way of formulating them will not suffice.\r\nThe only possible path to understanding them lies through metaphysical\r\nsubtlety; and Idealism and \u003ci\u003eErkenntnisstheorie\u003c/i\u003e must say their say\r\nbefore the natural-science assumption that thoughts \u0027know\u0027 things grows\r\nclear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe changing character of consciousness\u003c/b\u003e presents another puzzle. We\r\nfirst assumed conscious \u0027states\u0027 as the units with which psychology\r\ndeals, and we said later that they were in constant change. Yet any\r\nstate must have a certain duration to be \u003ci\u003eeffective\u003c/i\u003e at all\u0026mdash;a pain\r\nwhich lasted but a hundredth of a second would practically be no\r\npain\u0026mdash;and the question comes up, how long may a state last and still be\r\ntreated as \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e state? In time-perception for example, if the \u0027present\u0027\r\nas known (the \u0027specious present,\u0027 as we called it) may be a dozen\r\nseconds long (\u003ca href=\"#page_281\"\u003ep. 281\u003c/a\u003e), how long need the present as knower be? That is,\r\nwhat is the minimum duration of the consciousness in which those twelve\r\nseconds can be apprehended as just past, the minimum which can be called\r\na \u0027state,\u0027 for such a cognitive purpose? Consciousness, as a process in\r\ntime, offers the paradoxes which have been found in all continuous\r\nchange. There are no \u0027states\u0027 in such a thing, any more than there are\r\nfacets in a circle, or places where an arrow \u0027is\u0027 when it flies. The\r\nvertical raised upon the time-line on which (\u003ca href=\"#page_285\"\u003ep. 285\u003c/a\u003e) we represented the\r\npast to be \u0027projected\u0027 at any given instant of memory, is only an ideal\r\nconstruction. Yet anything broader than that vertical \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e not, for the\r\n\u003ci\u003eactual\u003c/i\u003e present is only the joint between\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_467\" id=\"page_467\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{467}\u003c/span\u003e the past and future and has\r\nno breadth of its own. Where everything is change and process, how can\r\nwe talk of \u0027state\u0027? Yet how can we do without \u0027states,\u0027 in describing\r\nwhat the vehicles of our knowledge seem to be?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eStates of consciousness themselves are not verifiable facts.\u003c/b\u003e But \u0027worse\r\nremains behind.\u0027 Neither common-sense, nor psychology so far as it has\r\nyet been written, has ever doubted that the states of consciousness\r\nwhich that science studies are immediate data of experience. \u0027Things\u0027\r\nhave been doubted, but thoughts and feelings have never been doubted.\r\nThe outer world, but never the inner world, has been denied. Everyone\r\nassumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking\r\nactivity as such, with our consciousness as something inward and\r\ncontrasted with the outer objects which it knows. Yet I must confess\r\nthat for my part I cannot feel sure of this conclusion. Whenever I try\r\nto become sensible of my thinking activity as such, what I catch is some\r\nbodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or\r\nnose. It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity were rather a\r\n\u003ci\u003epostulate\u003c/i\u003e than a sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, of a\r\n\u003ci\u003eknower\u003c/i\u003e as correlative to all this known; and as if \u0027\u003ci\u003escious\u003c/i\u003eness\u0027\r\nmight be a better word by which to describe it. But \u0027sciousness\r\npostulated as an hypothesis\u0027 is practically a very different thing from\r\n\u0027states of consciousness apprehended with infallible certainty by an\r\ninner sense.\u0027 For one thing, it throws the question of \u003ci\u003ewho the knower\r\nreally is\u003c/i\u003e wide open again, and makes the answer which we gave to it at\r\nthe end of \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\"\u003eChapter XII\u003c/a\u003e a mere provisional statement from a popular and\r\nprejudiced point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConclusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When, then, we talk of \u0027psychology as a natural science,\u0027\r\nwe must not assume that that means a sort of psychology that stands at\r\nlast on solid ground. It means just the reverse; it means a psychology\r\nparticularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical\r\ncriticism leak at every joint, a psychology all of whose elementary\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_468\" id=\"page_468\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{468}\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassumptions and data must be reconsidered in wider connections and\r\ntranslated into other terms. It is, in short, a phrase of diffidence,\r\nand not of arrogance; and it is indeed strange to hear people talk\r\ntriumphantly of \u0027the New Psychology,\u0027 and write \u0027Histories of\r\nPsychology,\u0027 when into the real elements and forces which the word\r\ncovers not the first glimpse of clear insight exists. A string of raw\r\nfacts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little\r\nclassification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a\r\nstrong prejudice that we \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e states of mind, and that our brain\r\nconditions them: but not a single law in the sense in which physics\r\nshows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence can\r\ncausally be deduced. We don\u0027t even know the terms between which the\r\nelementary laws would obtain if we had them (\u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003ep. 464\u003c/a\u003e). This is no\r\nscience, it is only the hope of a science. The matter of a science is\r\nwith us. Something definite happens when to a certain brain-state a\r\ncertain \u0027sciousness\u0027 corresponds. A genuine glimpse into what it is\r\nwould be \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e scientific achievement, before which all past\r\nachievements would pale. But at present psychology is in the condition\r\nof physics before Galileo and the laws of motion, of chemistry before\r\nLavoisier and the notion that mass is preserved in all reactions. The\r\nGalileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when\r\nthey come, as come they some day surely will, or past successes are no\r\nindex to the future. When they do come, however, the necessities of the\r\ncase will make them \u0027metaphysical.\u0027 Meanwhile the best way in which we\r\ncan facilitate their advent is to understand how great is the darkness\r\nin which we grope, and never to forget that the natural-science\r\nassumptions with which we started are provisional and revisable things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003eTHE END.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"page_469\" id=\"page_469\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e{469}\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"INDEX\" id=\"INDEX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINDEX.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"c\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#A\"\u003eA\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#B\"\u003eB\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#C\"\u003eC\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#D\"\u003eD\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#E\"\u003eE\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#F\"\u003eF\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#G\"\u003eG\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#H\"\u003eH\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#I-i\"\u003eI\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#J\"\u003eJ\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#K\"\u003eK\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#L\"\u003eL\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#M\"\u003eM\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#N\"\u003eN\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#O\"\u003eO\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#P\"\u003eP\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Q\"\u003eQ\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#R\"\u003eR\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#S\"\u003eS\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#T\"\u003eT\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#U\"\u003eU\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#V-i\"\u003eV\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#W\"\u003eW\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"nind\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"A\" id=\"A\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAbstract ideas, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echaracters, \u003ca href=\"#page_353\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epropositions, \u003ca href=\"#page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAbstraction, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee \u003ci\u003eDistraction\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eAccommodation\u003c/i\u003e, of crystalline lens, \u003ca href=\"#page_032\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof ear, \u003ca href=\"#page_049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAcquaintance, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAcquisitiveness, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAction, what holds attention determines, \u003ca href=\"#page_448\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAfter-images, \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAgassiz\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAlexia, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAllen, Grant\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAlternating personality, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAmidon\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAnalysis, \u003ca href=\"#page_056\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_362\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAnger, \u003ca href=\"#page_374\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAphasia, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eloss of images in, \u003ca href=\"#page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nApperception, \u003ca href=\"#page_326\"\u003e326\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAqueduct of Silvius, \u003ca href=\"#page_080\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nArachnoid membrane, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nArbor vitæ, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAristotle\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_318\"\u003e318\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nArticular sensibility, \u003ca href=\"#page_074\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAssociation, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVI\"\u003eChapter XVI\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe order of our ideas, \u003ca href=\"#page_253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edetermined by cerebral laws, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis not of ideas, but of things thought of, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe elementary principle of, \u003ca href=\"#page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe ultimate cause of is habit, \u003ca href=\"#page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindeterminateness of its results, \u003ca href=\"#page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etotal recall, \u003ca href=\"#page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epartial recall and the law of interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efrequency, recency, vividness, and emotional congruity tend to determine the object recalled,\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efocalized recall or by similarity, \u003ca href=\"#page_267\"\u003e267\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary trains of thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblems, \u003ca href=\"#page_273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAtomistic theories of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_462\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAttention, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIII\"\u003eChapter XIII\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits relation to interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits physiological ground, \u003ca href=\"#page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enarrowness of field of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto how many things possible, \u003ca href=\"#page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto simultaneous sight and sound, \u003ca href=\"#page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits varieties, \u003ca href=\"#page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary, \u003ca href=\"#page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvoluntary, \u003ca href=\"#page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echange necessary to, \u003ca href=\"#page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits relation to genius, \u003ca href=\"#page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ephysiological conditions of, \u003ca href=\"#page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe sense-organ must be adapted, \u003ca href=\"#page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe idea of the object must be aroused, \u003ca href=\"#page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epedagogic remarks, \u003ca href=\"#page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eattention and free-will, \u003ca href=\"#page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat holds attention determines action, \u003ca href=\"#page_448\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evolitional effort is effort of attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_450\"\u003e450\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAuditory centre in brain, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAuditory type of imagination, \u003ca href=\"#page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAusten\u003c/span\u003e, Miss, \u003ca href=\"#page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nAutomaton theory, \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAzam\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"B\" id=\"B\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eBahnsen\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBain\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_367\"\u003e367\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerklev\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_347\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBinet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_318\"\u003e318\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_332\"\u003e332\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBlack, \u003ca href=\"#page_045\"\u003e45-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBlind Spot, \u003ca href=\"#page_031\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBlix\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_068\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBlood-supply, cerebral, \u003ca href=\"#page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBodily expression, cause of emotions, \u003ca href=\"#page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrace, Julia\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBrain, the functions of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VIII\"\u003eChapter VIII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eBrain\u003c/i\u003e, its connection with mind, \u003ca href=\"#page_005\"\u003e5-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits relations to outer forces, \u003ca href=\"#page_009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations of consciousness to, \u003ca href=\"#page_462\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBrain, structure of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VII\"\u003eChapter VII\u003c/a\u003e, 7\u003ca href=\"#page_008\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evesicles, \u003ca href=\"#page_078\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edissection of sheep\u0027s, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow to preserve, \u003ca href=\"#page_083\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunctions of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VIII\"\u003eChapter VIII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBridgman, Laura\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBroca\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBroca\u0027s convolution, \u003ca href=\"#page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrodhun\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_046\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrooks\u003c/span\u003e, Prof. W. K., \u003ca href=\"#page_412\"\u003e412\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nBrutes, reasoning of, \u003ca href=\"#page_367\"\u003e367\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"C\" id=\"C\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCalamus scriptorius, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eCanals\u003c/i\u003e, semicircular, \u003ca href=\"#page_050\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCarpenter\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCattell\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCaudate nucleus, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCentres, nerve, \u003ca href=\"#page_092\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCerebellum, its relation to equilibrium, \u003ca href=\"#page_076\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits anatomy, \u003ca href=\"#page_079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCerebral laws, of association, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCerebral process, see \u003ci\u003eNeural Process\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCerebrum, see \u003ci\u003eBrain\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eHemisphere\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nChanging character of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_466\"\u003e466\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharcot\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nChoice, see \u003ci\u003eInterest\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCoalescence of different sensations into the same \u0027thing,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eCochlea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_051\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCognition, see \u003ci\u003eReasoning\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCold, sensations of, \u003ca href=\"#page_063\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enerves of, \u003ca href=\"#page_064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eColor\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_040\"\u003e40-3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCommissures, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCommissure, middle, \u003ca href=\"#page_088\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanterior, \u003ca href=\"#page_088\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eposterior, \u003ca href=\"#page_088\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nComparison of magnitudes, \u003ca href=\"#page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eCompounding\u003c/i\u003e of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_057\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCompound objects, analysis of, \u003ca href=\"#page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConcatenated acts, dependent on habit, \u003ca href=\"#page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConceiving, mode of, what is meant by, \u003ca href=\"#page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConceptions, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIV\"\u003eChapter XIV\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir permanence, \u003ca href=\"#page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferent states of mind can mean the same, \u003ca href=\"#page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eabstract, universal, and problematic, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe thought of \u0027the same\u0027 is not the same thought over again, \u003ca href=\"#page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConceptual order different from perceptual, \u003ca href=\"#page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConsciousness, stream of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\"\u003eChapter XI\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efour characters in, \u003ca href=\"#page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epersonal, \u003ca href=\"#page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis in constant change, \u003ca href=\"#page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_466\"\u003e466\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esame state of mind never occurs twice, \u003ca href=\"#page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econsciousness is continuous, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubstantive and transitive states of, \u003ca href=\"#page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einterested in one part of its object more than another, \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edouble consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enarrowness of field of, \u003ca href=\"#page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations of to brain, \u003ca href=\"#page_462\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConsciousness and Movement, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXIII\"\u003eChapter XXIII\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eall consciousness is motor, \u003ca href=\"#page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConcomitants, law of varying, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConsent, in willing, \u003ca href=\"#page_452\"\u003e452\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nContinuity of object of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eContrast\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_044\"\u003e44-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eConvergence\u003c/i\u003e of eyeballs, \u003ca href=\"#page_031\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_033\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nConvolutions, motor, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCorpora fimbriata, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCorpora quadrigemma, \u003ca href=\"#page_079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCorpus albicans, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCorpus callosum, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCorpus striatum, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eCortex\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, note\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCortex, localization in, \u003ca href=\"#page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emotor region of, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eCorti\u0027s\u003c/i\u003e organ, \u003ca href=\"#page_052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCramming, \u003ca href=\"#page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCrura of brain, \u003ca href=\"#page_079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCuriosity, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCurrents, in nerves, \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCzermak\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"D\" id=\"D\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDarwin\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_388\"\u003e388\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_389\"\u003e389\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDeafness, mental, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDelage\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_076\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDeliberation, \u003ca href=\"#page_448\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDelusions of insane, \u003ca href=\"#page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDermal senses, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDeterminism and psychology, \u003ca href=\"#page_461\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDecision, five types, \u003ca href=\"#page_429\"\u003e429\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDifferences, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edirectly felt, \u003ca href=\"#page_245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot resolvable into composition, \u003ca href=\"#page_245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einferred, \u003ca href=\"#page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDiffusion of movements, the law of, \u003ca href=\"#page_371\"\u003e371\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDimension, third, \u003ca href=\"#page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDischarge, nervous, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDiscord, \u003ca href=\"#page_058\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDiscrimination, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XV\"\u003eChapter XV\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_059\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etouch, \u003ca href=\"#page_062\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions which favor, \u003ca href=\"#page_245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esensation of difference, \u003ca href=\"#page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferences inferred, \u003ca href=\"#page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of compound objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_249\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto be easily singled out a quality should already be separately known, \u003ca href=\"#page_250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edissociation by varying concomitants, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractice improves discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof space, \u003ca href=\"#page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSee \u003ci\u003eDifference\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027Disparate\u0027 retinal points, \u003ca href=\"#page_035\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDissection, of sheep\u0027s brain, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eDistance\u003c/i\u003e, as seen, \u003ca href=\"#page_039\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebetween members of series, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein space, see \u003ci\u003eThird dimension\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDistraction, \u003ca href=\"#page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDivision of space, \u003ca href=\"#page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDonaldson\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDouble consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDouble images, \u003ca href=\"#page_036\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDouble personality, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDuality of brain, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDumont\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDura mater, \u003ca href=\"#page_082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nDuration, the primitive object in time-perception, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eour estimation of short, \u003ca href=\"#page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"E\" id=\"E\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEar, \u003ca href=\"#page_047\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEffort, feeling of, \u003ca href=\"#page_434\"\u003e434\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efeels like an original force, \u003ca href=\"#page_442\"\u003e442\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evolitional effort is effort of attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_450\"\u003e450\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical importance of the phenomena of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_458\"\u003e458\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEgo, see \u003ci\u003eSelf\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEmbryological sketch, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VII\"\u003eChapter VII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_078\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEmotion, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXIV\"\u003eChapter XXIV\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with instincts, \u003ca href=\"#page_373\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evarieties of, innumerable, \u003ca href=\"#page_374\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecauses of varieties, \u003ca href=\"#page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_381\"\u003e381\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eresults from bodily expression, \u003ca href=\"#page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethis view not materialistic, \u003ca href=\"#page_380\"\u003e380\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe subtler emotions, \u003ca href=\"#page_384\"\u003e384\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efear, \u003ca href=\"#page_385\"\u003e385\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egenesis of reactions, \u003ca href=\"#page_388\"\u003e388\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEmotional congruity, determines association, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEmpirical self, see \u003ci\u003eSelf\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEmulation, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEnd-organs, \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof touch, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof temperature, \u003ca href=\"#page_064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof pressure, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof pain, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEnvironment, \u003ca href=\"#page_003\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEssence of reason, always for subjective interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_358\"\u003e358\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEssential characters, in reason, \u003ca href=\"#page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEthical importance of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_458\"\u003e458\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExaggerated impulsion, causes an explosive will, \u003ca href=\"#page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExner\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExperience, \u003ca href=\"#page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExplosive will, from defective inhibition, \u003ca href=\"#page_437\"\u003e437\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efrom exaggerated impulsion, \u003ca href=\"#page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExpression, bodily, cause of emotions, \u003ca href=\"#page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExtensity, primitive to all sensation, \u003ca href=\"#page_335\"\u003e335\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExteriority of objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExternal world, \u003ca href=\"#page_015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nExtirpation of higher nerve-centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEye, its anatomy, \u003ca href=\"#page_028\"\u003e28-30\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"F\" id=\"F\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eFamiliarity, sense of, see \u003ci\u003eRecognition\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFear, \u003ca href=\"#page_385\"\u003e385\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFechner\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_021\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFeeling of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_434\"\u003e434\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFéré\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFerrier\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFissure of Rolando, seat of motor incitations, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFissure of Sylvius, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nForamen of Monro, \u003ca href=\"#page_088\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nForce, original, effort feels like, \u003ca href=\"#page_442\"\u003e442\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nForgetting, \u003ca href=\"#page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFornix, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_087\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFovea centralis, \u003ca href=\"#page_031\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFranklin\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFranz\u003c/span\u003e, Dr., \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFreedom of the will, \u003ca href=\"#page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFree-will and attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelates solely to effort of attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_455\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einsoluble on strictly psychologic grounds, \u003ca href=\"#page_456\"\u003e456\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical importance of the phenomena of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_458\"\u003e458\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFrequency, determines association, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\"Fringes\" of mental objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFrogs\u0027 lower centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFunctions of the Brain, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VIII\"\u003eChapter VIII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enervous functions, general idea of, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFusion of mental states, \u003ca href=\"#page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFusion, of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_057\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"G\" id=\"G\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eGalton\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nGenius, \u003ca href=\"#page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_327\"\u003e327\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGoethe\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGoldscheider\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_068\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGoltz\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGuiteau\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGurney, Edmund\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_331\"\u003e331\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_334\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"H\" id=\"H\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHabit, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_X\"\u003eChapter X\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehas a physical basis, \u003ca href=\"#page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edue to plasticity, \u003ca href=\"#page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edue to pathways through nerve-centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffects of, \u003ca href=\"#page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractical use of, \u003ca href=\"#page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edepends on sensations not attended to, \u003ca href=\"#page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical and pedagogical importance of \u003ca href=\"#page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehabit the ultimate cause of association, \u003ca href=\"#page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHagenauer\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_386\"\u003e386\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHall, Robert\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHallucinations, \u003ca href=\"#page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHamilton\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_268\"\u003e268\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHarmony, \u003ca href=\"#page_058\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHartley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHearing, \u003ca href=\"#page_047\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecentre of, in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHeat-sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_063\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enerves of, \u003ca href=\"#page_064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHelmholtz\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_026\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_042\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_055\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_056\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_058\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_321\"\u003e321\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHemispheres, general notion of, \u003ca href=\"#page_097\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echief seat of memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_098\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffects of deprivation of, on frogs, \u003ca href=\"#page_092\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon pigeons, \u003ca href=\"#page_096\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerbart\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_326\"\u003e326\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerbartian School\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHering\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_026\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerzen\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_124\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHippocampi\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_088\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHodgson\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_262\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHolbrook\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_297\"\u003e297\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHorsley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHume\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHunger, sensations of, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHuxley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_143\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHypnotic conditions, \u003ca href=\"#page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"I-i\" id=\"I-i\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIdeas, the theory of, \u003ca href=\"#page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enever come twice the same, \u003ca href=\"#page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethey do not permanently exist, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eabstract ideas, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euniversal \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorder of ideas by association, \u003ca href=\"#page_253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027Identical retinal points,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_035\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIdentity, personal, \u003ca href=\"#page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emutations of, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealternating personality, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIdeo-motor action the type of all volition, \u003ca href=\"#page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIllusions, \u003ca href=\"#page_317\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nImages, mental, compared with sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edouble, in vision, \u003ca href=\"#page_036\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u0027after-images,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_043\"\u003e43-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evisual, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauditory, \u003ca href=\"#page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emotor, \u003ca href=\"#page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etactile, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nImagination, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XIX\"\u003eChapter XIX\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ediffers in individuals, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGalton\u0027s statistics of, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evisual, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauditory, \u003ca href=\"#page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emotor, \u003ca href=\"#page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etactile, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epathological\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ndifferences, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecerebral process of, \u003ca href=\"#page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot locally distinct from that of sensation, \u003ca href=\"#page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nImitation, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInattention, \u003ca href=\"#page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIncrease of stimulus, \u003ca href=\"#page_020\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eserial, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInfundibulum, \u003ca href=\"#page_082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_088\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInhibition, defective, causes an Explosive Will, \u003ca href=\"#page_437\"\u003e437\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInhibition of instincts by habits, \u003ca href=\"#page_399\"\u003e399\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInsane delusions, \u003ca href=\"#page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInstinct, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXV\"\u003eChapter XXV\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eemotions compared with, \u003ca href=\"#page_373\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinition of, \u003ca href=\"#page_391\"\u003e391\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eevery instinct is an impulse, \u003ca href=\"#page_392\"\u003e392\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot always blind or invariable, \u003ca href=\"#page_395\"\u003e395\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodified by experience, \u003ca href=\"#page_396\"\u003e396\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etwo principles of non-uniformity, \u003ca href=\"#page_398\"\u003e398\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eman has more than beasts, \u003ca href=\"#page_398\"\u003e398\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etransitory, \u003ca href=\"#page_402\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof children, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efear, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIntellect, part played by, in space-perception, \u003ca href=\"#page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIntensity of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nInterest, selects certain objects and determines thoughts \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einfluence in association, \u003ca href=\"#page_262\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nIntrospection, \u003ca href=\"#page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"J\" id=\"J\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eJanet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJackson, Hughlings\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nJoints, their sensibility, \u003ca href=\"#page_074\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"K\" id=\"K\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eKadinsky\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nKnowledge, theory of, \u003ca href=\"#page_002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_467\"\u003e467\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etwo kinds of, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKönig\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_046\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKrishaber\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"L\" id=\"L\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eLabyrinth, \u003ca href=\"#page_047\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_049\"\u003e49-52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLange, K.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLaws, cerebral, of association, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLaw, Weber\u0027s, \u003ca href=\"#page_017\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u0026mdash;, Fechner\u0027s \u003ca href=\"#page_021\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u0026mdash;, of relativity, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLazarus\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_323\"\u003e323\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLenticular nucleus, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLewes\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_326\"\u003e326\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLikeness, \u003ca href=\"#page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLindsay\u003c/span\u003e, Dr., \u003ca href=\"#page_413\"\u003e413\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLocalization of Functions in the hemispheres, \u003ca href=\"#page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLocalization, Skin, \u003ca href=\"#page_061\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLocations, in environment, \u003ca href=\"#page_340\"\u003e340\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eserial order of, \u003ca href=\"#page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLocke\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_357\"\u003e357\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLockean School\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLocomotion, instinct of, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLombard\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLongituditional fissure, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLove, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nLower Centres, of frogs and pigeons, \u003ca href=\"#page_095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLudwig\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"M\" id=\"M\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eMach\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMamillary bodies, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMan\u0027s intellectual distinction from brutes, \u003ca href=\"#page_367\"\u003e367\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMantegazza\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_390\"\u003e390\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMartin\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_040\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_044\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_045\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_053\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_061\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_065\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMartineau\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMaterialism and emotion, \u003ca href=\"#page_380\"\u003e380\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMatteuci\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaudsley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMeasurement, of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_022\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof space, \u003ca href=\"#page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027Mediumships,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMedulla oblongata, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMemory, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVIII\"\u003eChapter XVIII\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehemispheres physical seat of, \u003ca href=\"#page_098\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of the phenomenon of memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereturn of a mental image is not memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eassociation explains recall and retention, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebrain-scheme of, \u003ca href=\"#page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions of good memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_292\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emultiple associations favor, \u003ca href=\"#page_294\"\u003e294\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffects of cramming on, \u003ca href=\"#page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow to improve memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erecognition, \u003ca href=\"#page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eforgetting, \u003ca href=\"#page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehypnotics, \u003ca href=\"#page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMental blindness, \u003ca href=\"#page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMental images, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMental operations, simultaneous, \u003ca href=\"#page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMental states, cannot fuse, \u003ca href=\"#page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of, to their objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMerkel\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_059\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMetaphysics, what the word means, \u003ca href=\"#page_461\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeyer, G. H.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeynert\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, James\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, J. S.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMimicry, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMind depends on brain conditions, \u003ca href=\"#page_003\"\u003e3-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003estates of, their relation to their objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee \u003ci\u003eConsciousness\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nModesty, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMonistic theories of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_462\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMorgan, Lloyd\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_368\"\u003e368\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMosso\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMotion, sensations of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_VI\"\u003eChapter VI\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efeeling of motion over surfaces, \u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMotor aphasia, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMotor region of cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMotor type of imagination, \u003ca href=\"#page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMovement, consciousness and, II, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_I\"\u003eChapter I\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimages of movement, \u003ca href=\"#page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eall consciousness is motor, \u003ca href=\"#page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMunk\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMünsterberg\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nMuscular sensation, \u003ca href=\"#page_065\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations to space, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_074\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emuscular centre in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMussey, Dr.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_440\"\u003e440\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"N\" id=\"N\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eNaunyn\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eNerve-currents\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNervous discharge, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNerve-endings in the skin, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein muscles and tendons, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66-67\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePain, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enerve-centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_092\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNerves, general functions of, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNeural activity, general conditions of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_IX\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enervous discharge, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNeural functions, general idea of, \u003ca href=\"#page_091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNeural process, in habit, \u003ca href=\"#page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein association, \u003ca href=\"#page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein imagination, \u003ca href=\"#page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein perception, \u003ca href=\"#page_329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nNucleus lenticularis, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecaudatus, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"O\" id=\"O\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eObject, the, of sensation, \u003ca href=\"#page_013\"\u003e13-15\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eone part of, more interesting than another, \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobject must change to hold attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjects as signs and as realities, \u003ca href=\"#page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of states of mind to their object, \u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOccipitel lobes, seat of visual centre, \u003ca href=\"#page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOld-fogyism vs. genius, \u003ca href=\"#page_327\"\u003e327\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOlfactory lobes, \u003ca href=\"#page_082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOlivary bodies, \u003ca href=\"#page_085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOptic nerve, \u003ca href=\"#page_082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOptic tracts, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOriginal force, effort feels like one, \u003ca href=\"#page_442\"\u003e442\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nOvertones, \u003ca href=\"#page_055\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"P\" id=\"P\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePain, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epain and pleasure as springs of action, \u003ca href=\"#page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePascal\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPast time, known in a present feeling, \u003ca href=\"#page_285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe immediate past is a portion of the present duration-block, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePaulhan\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPedagogic remarks on habit, \u003ca href=\"#page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPeduncles, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPerception, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XX\"\u003eChapter XX\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with sensation, \u003ca href=\"#page_312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves reproductive processes, \u003ca href=\"#page_312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe perceptive state of mind is not a compound, \u003ca href=\"#page_313\"\u003e313\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eperception is of definite and probable things, \u003ca href=\"#page_316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eillusory perceptions, \u003ca href=\"#page_317\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ephysiological process of perception, \u003ca href=\"#page_329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPerception of Space, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXI\"\u003eChapter XXI\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerez, M.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_408\"\u003e408\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPersonal Identity, \u003ca href=\"#page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emutations of, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealternating personality, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPersonality, alterations of, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPhilosophy, Psychology and, Epilogue, \u003ca href=\"#page_461\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPhosphorus and thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPia mater, \u003ca href=\"#page_082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPigeons\u0027 lower centres, \u003ca href=\"#page_096\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPitch, \u003ca href=\"#page_054\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPituitary body, \u003ca href=\"#page_082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPlace, a series of positions, \u003ca href=\"#page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPlasticity, as basis of habit, defined, \u003ca href=\"#page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePlato\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPlay, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPleasure, and pain, as springs of action, \u003ca href=\"#page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPsychology and Philosophy, Epilogue, \u003ca href=\"#page_461\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPons Varolii, \u003ca href=\"#page_079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPositions, place a series of, \u003ca href=\"#page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPractice, improves discrimination, \u003ca href=\"#page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPresent, the present moment, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPressure sense, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePreyer\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nProbability determines what object shall be perceived, \u003ca href=\"#page_316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nProblematic conceptions, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nProblems, solution of, \u003ca href=\"#page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nProjection of sensations, eccentric, \u003ca href=\"#page_015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPsychology, defined, \u003ca href=\"#page_001\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea natural science, \u003ca href=\"#page_002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat data it assumes, \u003ca href=\"#page_002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePsychology and Philosophy, Chapter XXVII\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPsycho-physic law, \u003ca href=\"#page_017\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_046\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_059\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPugnacity, \u003ca href=\"#page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePurkinje\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPyramids, \u003ca href=\"#page_085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Q\" id=\"Q\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eQuality, \u003ca href=\"#page_013\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_056\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"R\" id=\"R\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eRaehlmann, \u003ca href=\"#page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRationality, \u003ca href=\"#page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReaction-time, \u003ca href=\"#page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReal magnitude, determined by æsthetic and practical interests, \u003ca href=\"#page_344\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReal space, \u003ca href=\"#page_337\"\u003e337\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReason, \u003ca href=\"#page_254\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReasoning, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXIII\"\u003eChapter XXIII\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat it is, \u003ca href=\"#page_351\"\u003e351\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves use of abstract characters, \u003ca href=\"#page_353\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat is meant by an essential character, \u003ca href=\"#page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe essence is always for a subjective interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_358\"\u003e358\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etwo great points in reasoning, \u003ca href=\"#page_360\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esagacity, \u003ca href=\"#page_362\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehelp from association by similarity, \u003ca href=\"#page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereasoning power of brutes, \u003ca href=\"#page_367\"\u003e367\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRecall, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRecency, determines association, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027Recepts,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_368\"\u003e368\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRecognition, \u003ca href=\"#page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRecollection, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRedintegration, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReflex acts, defined, \u003ca href=\"#page_092\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereaction-time measures one, \u003ca href=\"#page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econcatenated habits are constituted by a chain of, \u003ca href=\"#page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReid\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_313\"\u003e313\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRelations, between objects, \u003ca href=\"#page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efeelings of, \u003ca href=\"#page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027\u003ci\u003eRelativity\u003c/i\u003e of knowledge,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nReproduction in memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary, \u003ca href=\"#page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nResemblance, \u003ca href=\"#page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRetention in memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRetentiveness, organic, \u003ca href=\"#page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eit is unchangeable, \u003ca href=\"#page_296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRetina, peripheral parts of, act as sentinels, \u003ca href=\"#page_073\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRevival in memory, \u003ca href=\"#page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRibot\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRichet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_410\"\u003e410\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRivalry of selves, \u003ca href=\"#page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRobertson\u003c/span\u003e, Prof. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCroom\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_318\"\u003e318\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRolando, fissure of, \u003ca href=\"#page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRomanes\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_322\"\u003e322\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_367\"\u003e367\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRosenthal\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRousseau\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nRotation, sense of, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"S\" id=\"S\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSagacity, \u003ca href=\"#page_362\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSameness, \u003ca href=\"#page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchaefer\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchiff\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchneider\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_072\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_372\"\u003e372\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_392\"\u003e392\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ci\u003eScience\u003c/i\u003e, natural, \u003ca href=\"#page_001\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eScott\u003c/span\u003e, Prof., \u003ca href=\"#page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSea-sickness, accidental origin, \u003ca href=\"#page_390\"\u003e390\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSeat of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_005\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSelection, \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea cardinal function of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSelf, The, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XII\"\u003eChapter XII\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot primary, \u003ca href=\"#page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe empirical self, \u003ca href=\"#page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits constituents, \u003ca href=\"#page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe material self, \u003ca href=\"#page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe social self, \u003ca href=\"#page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe spiritual self, \u003ca href=\"#page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-appreciation, \u003ca href=\"#page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-seeking, bodily, social, and spiritual, \u003ca href=\"#page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erivalry of the mes. \u003ca href=\"#page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir hierarchy, \u003ca href=\"#page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eteleology of self-interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe I, or \u0027pure ego,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethoughts are not compounded of \u0027fused\u0027 sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe soul as a combining medium, \u003ca href=\"#page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe sense of personal identity, \u003ca href=\"#page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexplained by identity of function in successive passing thoughts, \u003ca href=\"#page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emutations of the self, \u003ca href=\"#page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einsane delusions, \u003ca href=\"#page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealternating personalities, \u003ca href=\"#page_210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emedium-ships, \u003ca href=\"#page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewho is the thinker? \u003ca href=\"#page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSelf-appreciation, \u003ca href=\"#page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSelf-interest, theological uses of, \u003ca href=\"#page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eteleological character of, \u003ca href=\"#page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSelves, their rivalry, \u003ca href=\"#page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSemicircular canals, \u003ca href=\"#page_050\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSemicircular canals, their relation to sensations of rotation, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSensations, in General, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_II\"\u003eChapter II\u003c/a\u003e, p. \u003ca href=\"#page_009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from perceptions, \u003ca href=\"#page_012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efrom images, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e things in consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emake us acquainted with qualities, \u003ca href=\"#page_014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir exteriority, \u003ca href=\"#page_015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintensity of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir measurement, \u003ca href=\"#page_021\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethey are not compounds, \u003ca href=\"#page_023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSensations, of touch, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof skin, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof smell, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof pain, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof heat, \u003ca href=\"#page_063\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof cold, \u003ca href=\"#page_063\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof hunger, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof thirst, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof motion, \u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emuscular, \u003ca href=\"#page_065\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof taste, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof pressure, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof joints, \u003ca href=\"#page_074\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof movement through space, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof rotation, \u003ca href=\"#page_075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof translation, \u003ca href=\"#page_076\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSense of time, see \u003ci\u003eTime\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSensory centres in the cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSeptum lucidum, \u003ca href=\"#page_087\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSerial order of locations, \u003ca href=\"#page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nShame, \u003ca href=\"#page_374\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSheep\u0027s brain, dissection of, \u003ca href=\"#page_081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSight, \u003ca href=\"#page_028\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee \u003ci\u003eVision\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSigns, \u003ca href=\"#page_040\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esensations are, to us of other sensations, whose space-value is held to be more real, \u003ca href=\"#page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSimilarity, association by, \u003ca href=\"#page_267\"\u003e267\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee \u003ci\u003eLikeness\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSize, \u003ca href=\"#page_040\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSkin\u0026mdash;senses, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elocalizing power of, \u003ca href=\"#page_061\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ediscrimination of points on, \u003ca href=\"#page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSmell, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecentre of, in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSmith, T. C.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSociability, \u003ca href=\"#page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSoul, the, as ego or thinker, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a combining medium, \u003ca href=\"#page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSound, \u003ca href=\"#page_053\"\u003e53-59\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimages of, \u003ca href=\"#page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpace, Perception of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXI\"\u003eChapter XXI\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eextensity in three dimensions primitive to all sensation, \u003ca href=\"#page_335\"\u003e335\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econstruction of real space, \u003ca href=\"#page_337\"\u003e337\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe processes which it involves: (1) Subdivision, \u003ca href=\"#page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(2) Coalescence of different sensible data into one \u0027thing,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(3) Location in an environment, \u003ca href=\"#page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjects which are signs, and objects which are realities, \u003ca href=\"#page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe third dimension, \u003ca href=\"#page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBerkeley\u0027s theory of distance, \u003ca href=\"#page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epart played by intellect in space-perception, \u003ca href=\"#page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpace, relation of muscular sense to, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_074\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpalding\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_401\"\u003e401\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpan of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpecific energies, \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpeech, centres of, in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought possible without it, \u003ca href=\"#page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee \u003ci\u003eAphasia\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpencer\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_387\"\u003e387\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_390\"\u003e390\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpinal cord, conduction of pain by, \u003ca href=\"#page_068\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecentre of defensive movements, \u003ca href=\"#page_093\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpiritual substance, see \u003ci\u003eSoul\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpiritualistic theories of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_462\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSpontaneous trains of thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexamples, \u003ca href=\"#page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStarr\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSteinthal\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_327\"\u003e327\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nStream of Consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XI\"\u003eChapter XI\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStricker\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSubdivision of space, \u003ca href=\"#page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSubstantive states of mind, \u003ca href=\"#page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSuccession \u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e duration, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot known by successive feelings, \u003ca href=\"#page_285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSummation of stimuli, \u003ca href=\"#page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSurfaces, feeling of motion over, \u003ca href=\"#page_070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"T\" id=\"T\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTactile centre in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTactile images, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaine\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTaste, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecentre of, in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTeleological character of consciousness, \u003ca href=\"#page_004\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof self-interest, \u003ca href=\"#page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTemperature-sense, \u003ca href=\"#page_063\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTerminal organs, \u003ca href=\"#page_010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_030\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nThalami, \u003ca href=\"#page_080\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nThermometry, cerebral, \u003ca href=\"#page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027Thing,\u0027 coalescence of sensations to form the same, \u003ca href=\"#page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nThinking principle, see \u003ci\u003eSoul\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nThird dimension of space, \u003ca href=\"#page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nThirst, sensations of, \u003ca href=\"#page_069\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThomson\u003c/span\u003e, Dr. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAllen\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nThought, the \u0027Topic\u0027 of, \u003ca href=\"#page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003estream of, \u003ca href=\"#page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecan be carried on in any terms, \u003ca href=\"#page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eunity of, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003espontaneous trains of, \u003ca href=\"#page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe entire thought the minimum, \u003ca href=\"#page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u0027Timbre,\u0027 \u003ca href=\"#page_055\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTime, sense of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XVII\"\u003eChapter XVII\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebegins with duration, \u003ca href=\"#page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eno sense of empty time, \u003ca href=\"#page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with perception of space, \u003ca href=\"#page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ediscrete flow of time, \u003ca href=\"#page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elong intervals conceived symbolically, \u003ca href=\"#page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewe measure duration by events that succeed in it, \u003ca href=\"#page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evariations in our estimations of its length, \u003ca href=\"#page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecerebral processes of, \u003ca href=\"#page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTouch, \u003ca href=\"#page_060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecentre of, in cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimages of, \u003ca href=\"#page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTranscendental self or ego, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTransitive states of mind, \u003ca href=\"#page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTranslation, sense of, \u003ca href=\"#page_076\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTrapezium, \u003ca href=\"#page_085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTurner\u003c/span\u003e, Dr. J. E., \u003ca href=\"#page_440\"\u003e440\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTympanum, \u003ca href=\"#page_048\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTypes of decision, \u003ca href=\"#page_429\"\u003e429\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"U\" id=\"U\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eUnity of the passing thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nUniversal conceptions, \u003ca href=\"#page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUrbantschitch\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"V-i\" id=\"V-i\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eValve of Vieussens, \u003ca href=\"#page_080\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVariability of the emotions, \u003ca href=\"#page_381\"\u003e381\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVarying concomitants, law of disassociation by, \u003ca href=\"#page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVentricles, \u003ca href=\"#page_079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVierordt\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_071\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVision, \u003ca href=\"#page_028\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebinocular, \u003ca href=\"#page_033\"\u003e33-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof solidity, \u003ca href=\"#page_037\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVisual centre of cortex, \u003ca href=\"#page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVisual imagination, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVisualizing power, \u003ca href=\"#page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVividness, determines association, \u003ca href=\"#page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVolition, see \u003ci\u003eWill\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVolkmann\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVoluminousness, primitive, of sensations, \u003ca href=\"#page_335\"\u003e335\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nVoluntary acts, defined, \u003ca href=\"#page_092\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary trains of thought, \u003ca href=\"#page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"W\" id=\"W\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWeber\u0027s law, \u003ca href=\"#page_017\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_046\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_059\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nWeber\u0027s law\u0026mdash;weight, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epain, \u003ca href=\"#page_067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nWeight, sensibility to, \u003ca href=\"#page_066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWernicke\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWesley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWheatstone\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_347\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWigan\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nWill, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_XXVI\"\u003eChapter XXVI\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evoluntary acts, \u003ca href=\"#page_415\"\u003e415\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethey are secondary performances, \u003ca href=\"#page_415\"\u003e415\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eno third kind of idea is called for, \u003ca href=\"#page_418\"\u003e418\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe motor-cue, \u003ca href=\"#page_420\"\u003e420\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eideo-motor action, \u003ca href=\"#page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eaction after deliberation, \u003ca href=\"#page_428\"\u003e428\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efive types of decision, \u003ca href=\"#page_429\"\u003e429\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efeeling of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_434\"\u003e434\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehealthiness of will, \u003ca href=\"#page_435\"\u003e435\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefects of, \u003ca href=\"#page_436\"\u003e436\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe explosive will: (1) from defective inhibition, \u003ca href=\"#page_437\"\u003e437\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(2) from exaggerated impulsion, \u003ca href=\"#page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe obstructed will, \u003ca href=\"#page_441\"\u003e441\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffort feels like an original force, \u003ca href=\"#page_442\"\u003e442\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epleasure and pain as springs of action, \u003ca href=\"#page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhat holds attention determines action, \u003ca href=\"#page_448\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewill is a relation between the mind and its ideas, \u003ca href=\"#page_449\"\u003e449\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evolitional effort is effort of attention, \u003ca href=\"#page_450\"\u003e450\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efree-will, \u003ca href=\"#page_455\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical importance of effort, \u003ca href=\"#page_458\"\u003e458\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nWilling terminates with the prevalence of the idea, \u003ca href=\"#page_449\"\u003e449\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWundt\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_058\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_122\"\u003e122\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"cb\"\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_1\" id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the present volume I have given so much extension to the\r\ndetails of \u0027Sensation\u0027 that I have obeyed custom and put that subject\r\nfirst, although by no means persuaded that such order intrinsically is\r\nthe best. I feel now (when it is too late for the change to be made)\r\nthat the chapters on the Production of Motion, on Instinct, and on\r\nEmotion ought, for purposes of teaching, to follow immediately upon that\r\non Habit, and that the chapter on Reasoning ought to come in very early,\r\nperhaps immediately after that upon the Self. I advise teachers to adopt\r\nthis modified order, in spite of the fact that with the change of place\r\nof \u0027Reasoning\u0027 there ought properly to go a slight amount of\r\nre-writing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_2\" id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The subject may feel \u003ci\u003epain\u003c/i\u003e, however, in this experiment;\r\nand it must be admitted that nerve-fibres of every description, terminal\r\norgans as well, are to some degree excitable by mechanical violence and\r\nby the electric current.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_3\" id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus the optic nerve-fibres are traced to the occipital\r\nlobes, the olfactory tracts go to the lower part of the temporal lobe\r\n(hippocampal convolution), the auditory nerve-fibres pass first to the\r\ncerebellum, and probably from thence to the upper part of the temporal\r\nlobe. These anatomical terms used in this chapter will be explained\r\nlater. The \u003ci\u003ecortex\u003c/i\u003e is the gray surface of the convolutions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_4\" id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vorlesungen über Menschen u. Thierseele, Lecture VII.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_5\" id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In other words, \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e standing for the sensation in general,\r\nand \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e for its noticeable increment, we have the equation \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e\u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e =\r\nconst. The increment of stimulus which produces \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e\u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e (call it \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nmeanwhile varies. Fechner calls it the \u0027differential threshold\u0027; and as\r\nits \u003ci\u003erelative\u003c/i\u003e value to \u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e is always the same, we have the equation\r\n\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e/\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e = const.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_6\" id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Beiträge zur exp. Psychol., Heft 3, p. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_7\" id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I borrow it from Ziehen: Leitfaden d. Physiologischen\r\nPsychologie, 1891, p. 36, who quotes Hering\u0027s version of it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_8\" id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Successive ones also; but I consider simultaneous ones\r\nonly, for simplicity\u0027s sake.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_9\" id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The extreme case is where green light and red, \u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e light\r\nfalling simultaneously on the retina, give a sensation of yellow. But I\r\nabstract from this because it is not certain that the incoming currents\r\nhere affect different fibres of the optic nerve.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_10_10\" id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The student can easily verify the coarser features of the\r\neye\u0027s anatomy upon a bullock\u0027s eye, which any butcher will furnish.\r\nClean it first from fat and muscles and study its shape, etc., and then\r\n(following Golding Bird\u0027s method) make an incision with a pointed\r\nscalpel into the sclerotic half an inch from the edge of the cornea, so\r\nthat the black choroid membrane comes into view. Next with one blade of\r\na pair of scissors inserted into this aperature, cut through sclerotic,\r\nchoroid, and retina (avoid wounding the membrane of the vitreous body!)\r\nall round the eyeball parallel to the cornea\u0027s edge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe eyeball is thus divided into two parts, the anterior one containing\r\nthe iris, lens, vitreous body, etc., whilst the posterior one contains\r\nmost of the retina. The two parts can be separated by immersing the\r\neyeball in water, cornea downwards, and simply pulling off the portion\r\nto which the optic nerve is attached. Floating this detached posterior\r\ncap in water, the delicate retina will be seen spread out over the\r\nchoroid (which is partly iridescent in the ox tribe); and by turning the\r\ncup inside out, and working under water with a camel\u0027s-hair brush, the\r\nvessels and nerves of the eyeball may be detected.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe anterior part of the eyeball can then be attacked. Seize with\r\nforceps on each side the edge of the sclerotic and choroid (not\r\nincluding the retina), raise the eye with the forceps thus applied and\r\nshake it gently till the vitreous body, lens, capsule, ligament, etc.,\r\ndrop out by their weight, and separate from the iris, ciliary processes,\r\ncornea, and sclerotic, which remains in the forceps. Examine these\r\nlatter parts, and get a view of the ciliary muscle which appears as a\r\nwhite line, when with camel\u0027s-hair brush and scalpel the choroid\r\nmembrane is detached from the sclerotic as far forward as it will go.\r\nTurning to the parts that cling to the vitreous body observe the clear\r\nring around the lens, and radiating outside of it the marks made by the\r\nciliary processes before they were torn away from its suspensory\r\nligament. A fine capillary tube may now be used to insufflate the clear\r\nring, just below the letter \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e in \u003ca href=\"#ill_3\"\u003eFig. 3\u003c/a\u003e, and thus to reveal the\r\nsuspensory ligament itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll these parts can be seen in section in a frozen eye or one hardened\r\nin alcohol.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_11_11\" id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This vertical partition is introduced into stereoscopes,\r\nwhich otherwise would give us three pictures instead of one.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_12_12\" id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The simplest form of stereoscope is two tin tubes about\r\none and one-half inches calibre, dead black inside and (for normal eyes)\r\nten inches long. Close each end with paper not too opaque, on which an\r\ninch-long thick black line is drawn. The tubes can be looked through,\r\none by each eye, and held either parallel or with their farther ends\r\nconverging. When properly rotated, their images will show every variety\r\nof fusion and non-fusion, and stereoscopic effect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_13_13\" id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: The Human Body, p. 530.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_14_14\" id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ibid.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_15_15\" id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The ordinary mixing of \u003ci\u003epigments\u003c/i\u003e is not an addition, but\r\nrather, as Helmholtz has shown, a subtraction, of lights. To \u003ci\u003eadd\u003c/i\u003e one\r\ncolor to another we must either by appropriate glasses throw differently\r\ncolored beams upon the same reflecting surface; or we must let the eye\r\nlook at one color through an inclined plate of glass beneath which it\r\nlies, whilst the upper surface of the glass reflects into the same eye\r\nanother color placed alongside\u0026mdash;the two lights then mix on the retina;\r\nor, finally, we must let the differently colored lights fall in\r\nsuccession upon the retina, so fast that the second is there before the\r\nimpression made by the first has died away. This is best done by looking\r\nat a rapidly rotating disk whose sectors are of the several colors to be\r\nmixed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_16_16\" id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_17_17\" id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin, pp. 525-8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_18_18\" id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In teaching the anatomy of the ear, great assistance will\r\nbe yielded by the admirable model made by Dr. Auzoux, 56 Rue de\r\nVaugirard, Paris, described in the catalogue of the firm as \"No.\r\n21\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eOreille, temporal de\u003c/i\u003e 60 cm., nouvelle édition,\" etc.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_19_19\" id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This description is abridged from Martin\u0027s \u0027Human Body\u0027.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_20_20\" id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_21_21\" id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_22_22\" id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_23_23\" id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_24_24\" id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_25_25\" id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, with omissions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_26_26\" id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Martin: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_27_27\" id=\"Footnote_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vierteljahrsch. für wiss. Philos., \u003csmall\u003eII.\u003c/small\u003e 377.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_28_28\" id=\"Footnote_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This chapter will be understood as a mere sketch for\r\nbeginners. Models will be found of assistance. The best is the \u0027Cerveau\r\nde Texture de Grande Dimension,\u0027 made by Auzoux, 56 Rue de Vaugirard,\r\nParis. It is a wonderful work of art, and costs 300 francs. M. Jules\r\nTalrich of No. 97 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, makes a series of five\r\nlarge plaster models, which I have found very useful for class-room\r\npurposes. They cost 350 francs, and are far better than any German\r\nmodels which I have seen.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_29_29\" id=\"Footnote_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e All the places in the brain at which the cavities come\r\nthrough are filled in during life by prolongations of the membrane\r\ncalled \u003ci\u003epia mater\u003c/i\u003e, carrying rich plexuses of blood-vessels in their\r\nfolds.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_30_30\" id=\"Footnote_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Physiology of Mind, p. 155.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_31_31\" id=\"Footnote_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e J. Bahnsen: \u0027Beiträge zu Charakterologie\u0027 (1867), vol. I.\r\np. 209.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_32_32\" id=\"Footnote_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e De l\u0027Intelligence, 3\u003csup\u003eme\u003c/sup\u003e édition (1878), vol. \u003csmall\u003eII.\u003c/small\u003e p. 461,\r\nnote.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_33_33\" id=\"Footnote_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[33]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Some of the evidence for this medium\u0027s supernormal powers\r\nis given in The Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, vol.\r\n\u003csmall\u003eVI.\u003c/small\u003e p. 436, and in the last Part of vol. \u003csmall\u003eVII.\u003c/small\u003e (1892).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_34_34\" id=\"Footnote_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[34]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mental Physiol., § 124. The oft-cited case of soldiers in\r\nbattle not perceiving that they are wounded is of an analogous sort.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_35_35\" id=\"Footnote_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[35]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Physiol. Optik, p. 741.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_36_36\" id=\"Footnote_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[36]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I refer to a recency of a few hours. Mr. Galton found that\r\nexperiences from boyhood and youth were more likely to be suggested by\r\nwords seen at random than experiences of later years. See his highly\r\ninteresting account of experiments in his Inquiries into Human Faculty,\r\npp. 191-203.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_37_37\" id=\"Footnote_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[37]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Miss M. W. Calkins (Philosophical Review, I. 389, 1892)\r\npoints out that the persistent feature of the going thought, on which\r\nthe association in cases of similarity hinges, is by no means always so\r\nslight as to warrant the term \u0027focalized.\u0027 \"If the sight of the whole\r\nbreakfast-room be followed by the visual image of yesterday\u0027s\r\nbreakfast-table, with the same setting and in the same surroundings, the\r\nassociation is practically total,\" and yet the case is one of\r\nsimilarity. For Miss Calkins, accordingly, the more important\r\ndistinction is that between what she calls \u003ci\u003edesistent\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003epersistent\u003c/i\u003e\r\nassociation. In \u0027desistent\u0027 association all parts of the going thought\r\nfade out and are replaced. In \u0027persistent\u0027 association some of them\r\nremain, and form a bond of similarity between the mind\u0027s successive\r\nobjects; but only where this bond is extremely delicate (as in the case\r\nof an abstract relation or quality) is there need to call the persistent\r\nprocess \u0027focalized.\u0027 I must concede the justice of Miss Calkins\u0027s\r\ncriticism, and think her new pair of terms a useful contribution.\r\nWundt\u0027s division of associations into the two classes of \u003ci\u003eexternal\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003einternal\u003c/i\u003e is congruent with Miss Calkins\u0027s division. Things associated\r\ninternally must have some element in common; and Miss Calkins\u0027s word\r\n\u0027persistent\u0027 suggests how this may cerebrally come to pass. \u0027Desistent,\u0027\r\non the other hand, suggests the process by which the successive ideas\r\nbecome external to each other or preserve no inner tie.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_38_38\" id=\"Footnote_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[38]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A common figure-alphabet is this:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e1\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e2\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e3\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e4\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e5\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e6\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e7\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e8\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e9\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e0\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003et\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003en\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003em\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003er\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003el\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003esh\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eg\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ef\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eb\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003es\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ed\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ej\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ek\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ev\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ep\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ec\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ech\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ec\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ez\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr class=\"c\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eg\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003equ\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_39_39\" id=\"Footnote_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[39]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In Mind, \u003csmall\u003eIX.\u003c/small\u003e 206, M. Binet points out the fact that what\r\nis fallaciously inferred is always an object of some other sense than\r\nthe \u0027this.\u0027 \u0027Optical illusions\u0027 are generally errors of touch and\r\nmuscular sensibility, and the fallaciously perceived object and the\r\nexperiences which correct it are both tactile in these cases.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_40_40\" id=\"Footnote_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[40]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 324.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_41_41\" id=\"Footnote_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[41]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M. Lazarus: Das Leben d. Seele (1857), \u003csmall\u003eII.\u003c/small\u003e p. 32. In the\r\nordinary hearing of speech half the words we seem to hear are supplied\r\nout of our own head. A language with which we are familiar is understood\r\neven when spoken in low tones and far off. An unfamiliar language is\r\nunintelligible under these conditions. The \u0027ideas\u0027 for interpreting the\r\nsounds by not being ready-made in our minds, as they are in our familiar\r\nmother-tongue, do not start up at so faint a cue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_42_42\" id=\"Footnote_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[42]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Einleitung in die Psychologie u. Sprachwissenschaft\r\n(1881), p. 171.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_43_43\" id=\"Footnote_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[43]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The great maxim in pedagogy is to knit every new piece of\r\nknowledge on to a preëxisting curiosity\u0026mdash;i.e., to assimilate its matter\r\nin some way to what is already known. Hence the advantage of \"comparing\r\nall that is far off and foreign to something that is near home, of\r\nmaking the unknown plain by the example of the known, and of connecting\r\nall the instruction with the personal experience of the pupil…. If the\r\nteacher is to explain the distance of the sun from the earth, let him\r\nask … \u0027If anyone there in the sun fired off a cannon straight at you,\r\nwhat should you do?\u0027 \u0027Get out of the way,\u0027 would be the answer. \u0027No need\r\nof that,\u0027 the teacher might reply. \u0027You may quietly go to sleep in your\r\nroom, and get up again, you may wait till your confirmation-day, you may\r\nlearn a trade, and grow as old as I am,\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e only will the\r\ncannon-ball be getting near, \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e you may jump to one side! See, so\r\ngreat as that is the sun\u0027s distance!\u0027\u003cspan class=\"lftspc\"\u003e\"\u003c/span\u003e (K. Lange, Ueber Apperception,\r\n1879, p. 76.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_44_44\" id=\"Footnote_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[44]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The writer of the present work is Agent of the Census for\r\nAmerica, and will thankfully receive accounts of cases of hallucination\r\nof vision, hearing, etc., of which the reader may have knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_45_45\" id=\"Footnote_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[45]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Raehlmann in Zeitschrift für Psychol. und Physiol. der\r\nSinnesorgane, \u003csmall\u003eII.\u003c/small\u003e 79.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_46_46\" id=\"Footnote_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[46]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Readers brought up on Popular Science may think that the\r\nmolecular structure of things is their real essence in an absolute\r\nsense, and that water is H-O-H more deeply and truly than it is a\r\nsolvent of sugar or a slaker of thirst. Not a whit! It is \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e of these\r\nthings with equal reality, and the only reason why \u003ci\u003efor the chemist\u003c/i\u003e it\r\nis H-O-H primarily, and only secondarily the other things, is that \u003ci\u003efor\r\nhis purpose\u003c/i\u003e of laboratory analysis and synthesis, and inclusion in the\r\nscience which treats of compositions and decompositions, the H-O-H\r\naspect of it is the more important one to bear in mind.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_47_47\" id=\"Footnote_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[47]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mental Evolution in Man, p. 74.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_48_48\" id=\"Footnote_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[48]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Origin of the Emotions (N. Y. ed.), p. 292.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_49_49\" id=\"Footnote_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[49]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Spalding, Macmillan\u0027s Magazine, Feb. 1873, p. 287.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_50_50\" id=\"Footnote_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[50]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 289.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_51_51\" id=\"Footnote_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[51]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psychologie de l\u0027Enfant, p. 72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_52_52\" id=\"Footnote_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[52]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Der Menschliche Wille, p. 224.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_53_53\" id=\"Footnote_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[53]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Deutsches Archiv f. Klin. Medicin, xxii. 321.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_54_54\" id=\"Footnote_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[54]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Medicinische Psychologie, p. 293.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_55_55\" id=\"Footnote_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[55]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This \u003ci\u003evolitional\u003c/i\u003e effort pure and simple must be carefully\r\ndistinguished from the \u003ci\u003emuscular\u003c/i\u003e effort with which it is usually\r\nconfounded. The latter consists of all those peripheral feelings to\r\nwhich a muscular \u0027exertion\u0027 may give rise. These feelings, whenever they\r\nare massive and the body is not \u0027fresh,\u0027 are rather disagreeable,\r\nespecially when accompanied by stopped breath, congested head, bruised\r\nskin of fingers, toes, or shoulders, and strained joints. And it is only\r\n\u003ci\u003eas thus disagreeable\u003c/i\u003e that the mind must make its \u003ci\u003evolitional\u003c/i\u003e effort\r\nin stably representing their reality and consequently bringing it about.\r\nThat they happen to be made real by muscular activity is a purely\r\naccidental circumstance. There are instances where the fiat demands\r\ngreat volitional effort though the muscular exertion be insignificant,\r\ne.g. the getting out of bed and bathing one\u0027s self on a cold morning.\r\nAgain, a soldier standing still to be fired at expects disagreeable\r\nsensations from his muscular passivity. The action of his will, in\r\nsustaining the expectation, is identical with that required for a\r\npainful muscular effort. What is hard for both is \u003ci\u003efacing an idea as\r\nreal\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"full\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}