Radical Empiricism Essays / Does Consciousness Exist? and A World of Pure Experience
{"WorkMasterId":7520,"WpPageId":288905,"ParentWpPageId":193821,"Slug":"radical-empiricism-essays","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/radical-empiricism-essays/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/radical-empiricism-essays/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":512071,"CleanHtmlLength":456373,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Radical Empiricism Essays / Does Consciousness Exist? and A World of Pure Experience","Deck":"James develops pure experience, relations as experienced, and a non-dualist account of consciousness and world.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/william-james-01-alice-boughton-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"William James by Alice M. Boughton","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"William James","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","Copies":["1842 CE – 1910 CE","New York City, New York","American philosopher and psychologist whose pragmatism, radical empiricism, stream-of-consciousness psychology, pluralism, and philosophy of religion reshaped modern philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1905 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1905 CE for the lifetime radical-empiricism essay cluster, with notes that the book title Essays in Radical Empiricism is posthumous.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"Essays in Radical Empiricism","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #32547 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["James develops pure experience, relations as experienced, and a non-dualist account of consciousness and world."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Does Consciousness Exist?; A World of Pure Experience; Radical Empiricism","KeyConcepts":"radical empiricism; pure experience; relations; consciousness; pluralism; nondualism","Methodology":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. 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No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["James develops pure experience, relations as experienced, and a non-dualist account of consciousness and world."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, phenomenology of experience, philosophy of religion, pluralism, moral psychology, process thought, analytic pragmatism, and modern discussions of consciousness."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct James work-cluster because the promoted row represents the lifetime essays, not the later posthumous collected title alone.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct James work-cluster because the promoted row represents the lifetime essays, not the later posthumous collected title alone."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/32547\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #32547\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003e\r\nESSAYS IN\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRADICAL EMPIRICISM\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eBY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eWILLIAM JAMES\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"padding\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 50px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-radical-empiricism-essays-decoration.png\" width=\"50\" height=\"58\" alt=\"\" title=\"\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"padding\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eLONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFOURTH AVENUE \u0026amp; 30TH STREET, NEW YORK\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLONDON, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n1912\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nCOPYRIGHT, 1912, BY HENRY JAMES JR.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nALL RIGHTS RESERVED\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_iii\" id=\"Page_iii\"\u003e[Pg iii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"EDITORS_PREFACE\" id=\"EDITORS_PREFACE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEDITOR\u0026rsquo;S PREFACE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe present volume is an attempt to carry out a plan which William James\r\nis known to have formed several years before his death. In 1907 he\r\ncollected reprints in an envelope which he inscribed with the title\r\n\u0026lsquo;Essays in Radical Empiricism\u0026rsquo;; and he also had duplicate sets of these\r\nreprints bound, under the same title, and deposited for the use of\r\nstudents in the general Harvard Library, and in the Philosophical\r\nLibrary in Emerson Hall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo years later Professor James published \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eA\r\nPluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, and inserted in these volumes several of the\r\narticles which he had intended to use in the \u0026lsquo;Essays in Radical\r\nEmpiricism.\u0026rsquo; Whether he would nevertheless have carried out his original\r\nplan, had he lived, cannot be certainly known. Several facts, however,\r\nstand out very clearly. In the first place, the articles included in the\r\noriginal plan but omitted from his later volumes are indispensable to\r\nthe understanding\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_iv\" id=\"Page_iv\"\u003e[Pg iv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of his other writings. To these articles he repeatedly\r\nalludes. Thus, in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e (p. 127), he says: \u0026ldquo;This\r\nstatement is probably excessively obscure to any one who has not read my\r\ntwo articles \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;A World of Pure\r\nExperience.\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo; Other allusions have been indicated in the present text.\r\nIn the second place, the articles originally brought together as \u0026lsquo;Essays\r\nin Radical Empiricism\u0026rsquo; form a connected whole. Not only were most of\r\nthem written consecutively within a period of two years, but they\r\ncontain numerous cross-references. In the third place, Professor James\r\nregarded \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; as an \u003ci\u003eindependent\u003c/i\u003e doctrine. This he\r\nasserted expressly: \u0026ldquo;Let me say that there is no logical connexion\r\nbetween pragmatism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have\r\nrecently set forth as \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism.\u0026rsquo; The latter stands on its own\r\nfeet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist.\u0026rdquo;\r\n(\u003ci\u003ePragmatism\u003c/i\u003e, 1907, Preface, p. ix.) Finally, Professor James came\r\ntoward the end of his life to regard \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; as more\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_v\" id=\"Page_v\"\u003e[Pg v]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003efundamental and more important than \u0026lsquo;pragmatism.\u0026rsquo; In the Preface to \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e (1909), the author gives the following explanation of\r\nhis desire to continue, and if possible conclude, the controversy over\r\npragmatism: \u0026ldquo;I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which\r\nI give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the\r\nestablishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate\r\nimportance in making radical empiricism prevail\u0026rdquo; (p. xii).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn preparing the present volume, the editor has therefore been governed\r\nby two motives. On the one hand, he has sought to preserve and make\r\naccessible certain important articles not to be found in Professor\r\nJames\u0026rsquo;s other books. This is true of Essays \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#I\"\u003ei\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#II\"\u003eii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#IV\"\u003eiv\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#V\"\u003ev\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#VIII\"\u003eviii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#IX\"\u003eix\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#X\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e,\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XI\"\u003exi\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XII\"\u003exii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. On the other hand, he has sought to bring together in one\r\nvolume a set of essays treating systematically of one independent,\r\ncoherent, and fundamental doctrine. To this end it has seemed best to\r\ninclude three essays (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eiii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#VI\"\u003evi\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#VII\"\u003evii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), which, although included in the\r\noriginal plan, were afterwards reprinted elsewhere; \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_vi\" id=\"Page_vi\"\u003e[Pg vi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eand one essay, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XII\"\u003exii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nnot included in the original plan. Essays \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eiii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#VI\"\u003evi\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#VII\"\u003evii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are\r\nindispensable to the consecutiveness of the series, and are so\r\ninterwoven with the rest that it is necessary that the student should\r\nhave them at hand for ready consultation. Essay \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XII\"\u003exii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e throws an important\r\nlight on the author\u0026rsquo;s general \u0026lsquo;empiricism,\u0026rsquo; and forms an important link\r\nbetween \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; and the author\u0026rsquo;s other doctrines.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the present volume is designed not as a collection but rather\r\nas a treatise. It is intended that another volume shall be issued which\r\nshall contain papers having biographical or historical importance which\r\nhave not yet been reprinted in book form. The present volume is intended\r\nnot only for students of Professor James\u0026rsquo;s philosophy, but for students\r\nof metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. It sets forth systematically\r\nand within brief compass the doctrine of \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism.\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA word more may be in order concerning the general meaning of this\r\ndoctrine. In the Preface to the \u003ci\u003eWill to Believe\u003c/i\u003e (1898), Professor\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_vii\" id=\"Page_vii\"\u003e[Pg vii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eJames gives the name \u0026ldquo;\u003ci\u003eradical empiricism\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rdquo; to his \u0026ldquo;philosophic\r\nattitude,\u0026rdquo; and adds the following explanation: \u0026ldquo;I say \u0026lsquo;empiricism,\u0026rsquo;\r\nbecause it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions\r\nconcerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the\r\ncourse of future experience; and I say \u0026lsquo;radical,\u0026rsquo; because it treats the\r\ndoctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the\r\nhalfway empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or\r\nagnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm\r\nmonism as something with which all experience has got to square\u0026rdquo; (pp.\r\nvii-viii). An \u0026lsquo;empiricism\u0026rsquo; of this description is a \u0026ldquo;philosophic\r\nattitude\u0026rdquo; or temper of mind rather than a doctrine, and characterizes\r\nall of Professor James\u0026rsquo;s writings. It is set forth in Essay \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XII\"\u003exii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the\r\npresent volume.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a narrower sense, \u0026lsquo;empiricism\u0026rsquo; is the method of resorting to\r\n\u003ci\u003eparticular experiences\u003c/i\u003e for the solution of philosophical problems.\r\nRationalists are the men of principles, empiricists the men of facts.\r\n(\u003ci\u003eSome Problems of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_viii\" id=\"Page_viii\"\u003e[Pg viii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ep. 35; cf. also, \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 44; and\r\n\u003ci\u003ePragmatism\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 9, 51.) Or, \u0026ldquo;since principles are universals, and\r\nfacts are particulars, perhaps the best way of characterizing the two\r\ntendencies is to say that rationalist thinking proceeds most willingly\r\nby going from wholes to parts, while empiricist thinking proceeds by\r\ngoing from parts to wholes.\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eSome Problems of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, p. 35; cf.\r\nalso \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 98; and \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, p. 7.) Again,\r\nempiricism \u0026ldquo;remands us to sensation.\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 264.) The\r\n\u0026ldquo;empiricist view\u0026rdquo; insists that, \u0026ldquo;as reality is created temporally day by\r\nday, concepts … can never fitly supersede perception…. The deeper\r\nfeatures of reality are found only in perceptual experience.\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eSome\r\nProblems of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 100, 97.) Empiricism in this sense is as\r\nyet characteristic of Professor James\u0026rsquo;s philosophy \u003ci\u003eas a whole\u003c/i\u003e. It is\r\nnot the distinctive and independent doctrine set forth in the present\r\nbook.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only summary of \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; in this last and narrowest\r\nsense appears in the Preface to \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e (pp. xii-xiii);\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_ix\" id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e[Pg ix]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eand it must be reprinted here as the key to the text that follows.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_1_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Radical empiricism consists (1) first of a postulate, (2) next of a\r\nstatement of fact, (3) and finally of a generalized conclusion.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) \u0026ldquo;The postulate is that \u003ci\u003ethe only things that shall be debatable\r\namong philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from\r\nexperience\u003c/i\u003e. (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum,\r\nbut they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.)\u0026rdquo; This is\r\n\u0026ldquo;the principle of pure experience\u0026rdquo; as \u0026ldquo;a methodical postulate.\u0026rdquo; (Cf.\r\nbelow, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e.) This postulate corresponds to the notion which the\r\nauthor repeatedly attributes to Shadworth Hodgson, the notion \u0026ldquo;that\r\nrealities are only what they are \u0026lsquo;known as.\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003ePragmatism\u003c/i\u003e, p. 50;\r\n\u003ci\u003eVarieties of Religious Experience\u003c/i\u003e, p. 443; \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp.\r\n43, 118.) In this sense \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; and pragmatism are closely\r\nallied. Indeed, if pragmatism be defined as the assertion that \u0026ldquo;the\r\nmeaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_x\" id=\"Page_x\"\u003e[Pg x]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eparticular\r\nconsequence in our future practical experience, … the point lying in\r\nthe fact that the experience must be particular rather than in the fact\r\nthat it must be active\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, p. 210); then pragmatism\r\nand the above postulate come to the same thing. The present book,\r\nhowever, consists not so much in the assertion of this postulate as in\r\nthe \u003ci\u003euse\u003c/i\u003e of it. And the method is successful in special applications by\r\nvirtue of a certain \u0026ldquo;statement of fact\u0026rdquo; concerning relations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) \u0026ldquo;The statement of fact is that \u003ci\u003ethe relations between things,\r\nconjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct\r\nparticular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things\r\nthemselves\u003c/i\u003e.\u0026rdquo; (Cf. also \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, p. 280; \u003ci\u003eThe Will to\r\nBelieve\u003c/i\u003e, p. 278.) This is the central doctrine of the present book. It\r\ndistinguishes \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; from the \u0026ldquo;ordinary empiricism\u0026rdquo; of\r\nHume, J. S. Mill, etc., with which it is otherwise allied. (Cf. below,\r\npp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e42-44\u003c/a\u003e.) It provides an empirical and relational version of\r\n\u0026lsquo;activity,\u0026rsquo; \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xi\" id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e[Pg xi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eand so distinguishes the author\u0026rsquo;s voluntarism from a view\r\nwith which it is easily confused\u0026mdash;the view which upholds a pure or\r\ntranscendent activity. (Cf. below, Essay \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#VI\"\u003evi\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e) It makes it possible to\r\nescape the vicious disjunctions that have thus far baffled philosophy:\r\nsuch disjunctions as those between consciousness and physical nature,\r\nbetween thought and its object, between one mind and another, and\r\nbetween one \u0026lsquo;thing\u0026rsquo; and another. These disjunctions need not be\r\n\u0026lsquo;overcome\u0026rsquo; by calling in any \u0026ldquo;extraneous trans-empirical connective\r\nsupport\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, Preface, p. xiii); they may now be\r\n\u003ci\u003eavoided\u003c/i\u003e by regarding the dualities in question as only \u003ci\u003edifferences of\r\nempirical relationship among common empirical terms\u003c/i\u003e. The pragmatistic\r\naccount of \u0026lsquo;meaning\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;truth,\u0026rsquo; shows only how a vicious disjunction\r\nbetween \u0026lsquo;idea\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;object\u0026rsquo; may thus be avoided. The present volume not\r\nonly presents pragmatism in this light; but adds similar accounts of the\r\nother dualities mentioned above.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus while pragmatism and radical empiricism \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xii\" id=\"Page_xii\"\u003e[Pg xii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003edo not differ essentially\r\nwhen regarded as \u003ci\u003emethods\u003c/i\u003e, they are independent when regarded as\r\ndoctrines. For it would be possible to hold the pragmatistic theory of\r\n\u0026lsquo;meaning\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;truth,\u0026rsquo; without basing it on any fundamental theory of\r\nrelations, and without extending such a theory of relations to residual\r\nphilosophical problems; without, in short, holding either to the above\r\n\u0026lsquo;statement of fact,\u0026rsquo; or to the following \u0026lsquo;generalized conclusion.\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) \u0026ldquo;The generalized conclusion is that therefore \u003ci\u003ethe parts of\r\nexperience hold together from next to next by relations that are\r\nthemselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs,\r\nin short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but\r\npossesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure\u003c/i\u003e.\u0026rdquo;\r\nWhen thus generalized, \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; is not only a theory of\r\nknowledge comprising pragmatism as a special chapter, but a metaphysic\r\nas well. It excludes \u0026ldquo;the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality\u0026rdquo; (Cf.\r\nbelow, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e). It is the author\u0026rsquo;s most rigorous statement of his theory\r\nthat reality is an \u0026ldquo;experience-continuum.\u0026rdquo; \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xiii\" id=\"Page_xiii\"\u003e[Pg xiii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e(\u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, p. 152;\r\n\u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, Lect. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ev\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evii\u003c/span\u003e.) It is that positive and\r\nconstructive \u0026lsquo;empiricism\u0026rsquo; of which Professor James said: \u0026ldquo;Let empiricism\r\nonce become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange\r\nmisunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe\r\nthat a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to\r\nbegin.\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 314; cf. \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, Lect. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eviii\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e; and \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nVarieties of Religious Experience\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 515-527.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe editor desires to acknowledge his obligations to the periodicals\r\nfrom which these essays have been reprinted, and to the many friends of\r\nProfessor James who have rendered valuable advice and assistance in the\r\npreparation of the present volume.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRalph Barton Perry.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCambridge, Massachusetts.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;January 8, 1912.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_1\" id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The use of numerals and italics is introduced by the\r\neditor.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xiv\" id=\"Page_xiv\"\u003e[Pg xiv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CONTENTS\" id=\"CONTENTS\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCONTENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eI.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDoes \u0026lsquo;Consciousness\u0026rsquo; Exist?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA World of Pure Experience\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eIII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Thing and its Relations\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eIV.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHow Two Minds Can Know One Thing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eV.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_137\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eVI.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Experience of Activity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eVII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Essence of Humanism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eVIII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLa Notion de Conscience\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eIX.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIs Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eX.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Pitkin\u0026rsquo;s Refutation of \u0026lsquo;Radical Empiricism\u0026rsquo;\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eXI.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHumanism and Truth Once More\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003eXII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAbsolutism and Empiricism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIndex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_1\" id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[Pg 1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"I\" id=\"I\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eDOES \u0026lsquo;CONSCIOUSNESS\u0026rsquo; EXIST?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026lsquo;Thoughts\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;things\u0026rsquo; are names for two sorts of object, which common\r\nsense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to\r\neach other. Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has varied in the\r\npast in her explanations of it, and may be expected to vary in the\r\nfuture. At first, \u0026lsquo;spirit and matter,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;soul and body,\u0026rsquo; stood for a pair\r\nof equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one\r\nday Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and\r\never since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance.\r\nThe transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand\r\nfor everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing. In the hands\r\nof such writers as Schuppe, Rehmke, Natorp, M\u0026uuml;nsterberg\u0026mdash;at any rate in\r\nhis earlier writings, Schubert-Soldern and others, the spiritual\r\nprinciple attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being\r\nonly a name for the fact that the \u0026lsquo;content\u0026rsquo; of experience \u003ci\u003eis known\u003c/i\u003e. It\r\nloses personal form and activity\u0026mdash;these passing over to the content\u0026mdash;and\r\nbecomes a bare \u003ci\u003eBewusstheit\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eBewusstsein \u0026uuml;berhaupt\u003c/i\u003e, of which in its\r\nown right absolutely nothing can be said.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_2\" id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[Pg 2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI believe that \u0026lsquo;consciousness,\u0026rsquo; when once it has evaporated to this\r\nestate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether.\r\nIt is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first\r\nprinciples. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the\r\nfaint rumor left behind by the disappearing \u0026lsquo;soul\u0026rsquo; upon the air of\r\nphilosophy. During the past year, I have read a number of articles whose\r\nauthors seemed just on the point of abandoning the notion of\r\nconsciousness,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e and substituting for it that of an absolute experience\r\nnot due to two factors. But they were not quite radical enough, not\r\nquite daring enough in their negations. For twenty years past I have\r\nmistrusted \u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo; as an entity; for seven or eight years past I\r\nhave suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them\r\nits pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that\r\nthe hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_3\" id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[Pg 3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo deny plumply that \u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo; exists seems so absurd on the face\r\nof it\u0026mdash;for undeniably \u0026lsquo;thoughts\u0026rsquo; do exist\u0026mdash;that I fear some readers will\r\nfollow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only\r\nto deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most\r\nemphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no\r\naboriginal stuff or quality of being,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_4_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e contrasted with that of which\r\nmaterial objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made;\r\nbut there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for\r\nthe performance of which this\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_4\" id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[Pg 4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e quality of being is invoked. That\r\nfunction is \u003ci\u003eknowing\u003c/i\u003e. \u0026lsquo;Consciousness\u0026rsquo; is supposed necessary to explain\r\nthe fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known. Whoever\r\nblots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles\r\nmust still provide in some way for that function\u0026rsquo;s being carried on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only\r\none primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything\r\nis composed, and if we call that stuff \u0026lsquo;pure experience,\u0026rsquo; then knowing\r\ncan easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one\r\nanother into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation\r\nitself is a part of pure experience; one of its \u0026lsquo;terms\u0026rsquo; becomes the\r\nsubject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e the other becomes the\r\nobject known. This will need much explanation before it can be\r\nunderstood. The best way to get it understood is to contrast it with the\r\nalternative view; and for that we may take the recentest alternative,\r\nthat in which the evaporation of the definite soul-substance has\r\nproceeded as far as it can go without being yet complete. If neo-Kantism\r\nhas expelled earlier forms of dualism, we shall have expelled all forms\r\nif we are able to expel neo-Kantism in its turn.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_5\" id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[Pg 5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the thinkers I call neo-Kantian, the word consciousness to-day does\r\nno more than signalize the fact that experience is indefeasibly\r\ndualistic in structure. It means that not subject, not object, but\r\nobject-plus-subject is the minimum that can actually be. The\r\nsubject-object distinction meanwhile is entirely different from that\r\nbetween mind and matter, from that between body and soul. Souls were\r\ndetachable, had separate destinies; things could happen to them. To\r\nconsciousness as such nothing can happen, for, timeless itself, it is\r\nonly a witness of happenings in time, in which it plays no part. It is,\r\nin a word, but the logical correlative of \u0026lsquo;content\u0026rsquo; in an Experience of\r\nwhich the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_6\" id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[Pg 6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e peculiarity is that \u003ci\u003efact comes to light\u003c/i\u003e in it, that\r\n\u003ci\u003eawareness of content\u003c/i\u003e takes place. Consciousness as such is entirely\r\nimpersonal\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;self\u0026rsquo; and its activities belong to the content. To say that\r\nI am self-conscious, or conscious of putting forth volition, means only\r\nthat certain contents, for which \u0026lsquo;self\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;effort of will\u0026rsquo; are the\r\nnames, are not without witness as they occur.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, for these belated drinkers at the Kantian spring, we should have\r\nto admit consciousness as an \u0026lsquo;epistemological\u0026rsquo; necessity, even if we had\r\nno direct evidence of its being there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in addition to this, we are supposed by almost every one to have an\r\nimmediate consciousness of consciousness itself. When the world of outer\r\nfact ceases to be materially present, and we merely recall it in memory,\r\nor fancy it, the consciousness is believed to stand out and to be felt\r\nas a kind of impalpable inner flowing, which, once known in this sort of\r\nexperience, may equally be detected in presentations of the outer world.\r\n\u0026ldquo;The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e, distinctly, it is,\u0026rdquo; says a recent writer,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_7\" id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[Pg 7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u0026ldquo;it seems to vanish.\r\nIt seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to\r\nintrospect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; the other\r\nelement is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be distinguished, if\r\nwe look attentively enough, and know that there is something to look\r\nfor.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e \u0026ldquo;Consciousness\u0026rdquo; (Bewusstheit), says another philosopher, \u0026ldquo;is\r\ninexplicable and hardly describable, yet all conscious experiences have\r\nthis in common that what we call their content has this peculiar\r\nreference to a centre for which \u0026lsquo;self\u0026rsquo; is the name, in virtue of which\r\nreference alone the content is subjectively given, or appears … While\r\nin this way consciousness, or reference to a self, is the only thing\r\nwhich distinguishes a conscious content from any sort of being that\r\nmight be there with no one conscious of it, yet this only ground of the\r\ndistinction defies all closer explanations. The existence of\r\nconsciousness, although it is the fundamental fact of psychology, can\r\nindeed be laid down as certain, can be brought out by analysis, but can\r\nneither be defined nor deduced from anything but itself.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_7_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_8\" id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[Pg 8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026lsquo;Can be brought out by analysis,\u0026rsquo; this author says. This supposes that\r\nthe consciousness is one element, moment, factor\u0026mdash;call it what you\r\nlike\u0026mdash;of an experience of essentially dualistic inner constitution, from\r\nwhich, if you abstract the content, the consciousness will remain\r\nrevealed to its own eye. Experience, at this rate, would be much like a\r\npaint of which the world pictures were made. Paint has a dual\r\nconstitution, involving, as it does, a menstruum\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e (oil, size or what\r\nnot) and a mass of content in the form of pigment suspended therein. We\r\ncan get the pure menstruum by letting the pigment settle, and the pure\r\npigment by pouring off the size or oil. We operate here by physical\r\nsubtraction; and the usual view is, that by mental subtraction we can\r\nseparate the two factors of experience in an analogous way\u0026mdash;not\r\nisolating them entirely, but distinguishing them enough to know that\r\nthey are two.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_9\" id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[Pg 9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow my contention is exactly the reverse of this. \u003ci\u003eExperience, I\r\nbelieve, has no such inner duplicity; and the separation of it into\r\nconsciousness and content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by way\r\nof addition\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;the addition, to a given concrete piece of it, of other\r\nsets of experiences, in connection with which severally its use or\r\nfunction may be of two different kinds. The paint will also serve here\r\nas an illustration. In a pot in a paint-shop, along with other paints,\r\nit serves in its entirety as so much saleable matter. Spread on a\r\ncanvas, with other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a\r\nfeature in a picture and performs a spiritual function. Just so, I\r\nmaintain, does a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one\r\ncontext of associates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of\r\n\u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo;; while in a different context the same undivided bit of\r\nexperience plays the part of a thing known, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_10\" id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[Pg 10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e an objective \u0026lsquo;content.\u0026rsquo;\r\nIn a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a\r\nthing. And, since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have\r\nevery right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once. The\r\ndualism connoted by such double-barrelled terms as \u0026lsquo;experience,\u0026rsquo;\r\n\u0026lsquo;phenomenon,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;datum,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003eVorfindung\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;terms which, in philosophy at any\r\nrate, tend more and more to replace the single-barrelled terms of\r\n\u0026lsquo;thought\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;thing\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;that dualism, I say, is still preserved in this\r\naccount, but reinterpreted, so that, instead of being mysterious and\r\nelusive, it becomes verifiable and concrete. It is an affair of\r\nrelations, it falls outside, not inside, the single experience\r\nconsidered, and can always be particularized and defined.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding the\r\ndualism was fashioned by Locke when he made the word \u0026lsquo;idea\u0026rsquo; stand\r\nindifferently for thing and thought, and by Berkeley when he said that\r\nwhat common sense means by realities is exactly what the philosopher\r\nmeans by ideas. Neither Locke\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_11\" id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[Pg 11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e nor Berkeley thought his truth out into\r\nperfect clearness, but it seems to me that the conception I am defending\r\ndoes little more than consistently carry out the \u0026lsquo;pragmatic\u0026rsquo; method\r\nwhich they were the first to use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the reader will take his own experiences, he will see what I mean.\r\nLet him begin with a perceptual experience, the \u0026lsquo;presentation,\u0026rsquo; so\r\ncalled, of a physical object, his actual field of vision, the room he\r\nsits in, with the book he is reading as its centre; and let him for the\r\npresent treat this complex object in the common-sense way as being\r\n\u0026lsquo;really\u0026rsquo; what it seems to be, namely, a collection of physical things\r\ncut out from an environing world of other physical things with which\r\nthese physical things have actual or potential relations. Now at the\r\nsame time it is just \u003ci\u003ethose self-same things\u003c/i\u003e which his mind, as we say,\r\nperceives; and the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus\u0026rsquo;s time\r\ndownwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is\r\nevidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer\r\nspace and in a person\u0026rsquo;s mind. \u0026lsquo;Representative\u0026rsquo;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_12\" id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[Pg 12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e theories of perception\r\navoid the logical paradox, but on the other hand they violate the\r\nreader\u0026rsquo;s sense of life, which knows no intervening mental image but\r\nseems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically\r\nexist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe puzzle of how the one identical room can be in two places is at\r\nbottom just the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two lines.\r\nIt can, if it be situated at their intersection; and similarly, if the\r\n\u0026lsquo;pure experience\u0026rsquo; of the room were a place of intersection of two\r\nprocesses, which connected it with different groups of associates\r\nrespectively, it could be counted twice over, as belonging to either\r\ngroup, and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, although it\r\nwould remain all the time a numerically single thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, the experience is a member of diverse processes that can be\r\nfollowed away from it along entirely different lines. The one\r\nself-identical thing has so many relations to the rest of experience\r\nthat you can take it in disparate systems of association, and treat it\r\nas\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_13\" id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[Pg 13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e belonging with opposite contexts.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e In one of these contexts it is\r\nyour \u0026lsquo;field of consciousness\u0026rsquo;; in another it is \u0026lsquo;the room in which you\r\nsit,\u0026rsquo; and it enters both contexts in its wholeness, giving no pretext\r\nfor being said to attach itself to consciousness by one of its parts or\r\naspects, and to outer reality by another. What are the two processes,\r\nnow, into which the room-experience simultaneously enters in this way?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_14\" id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[Pg 14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of them is the reader\u0026rsquo;s personal biography, the other is the history\r\nof the house of which the room is part. The presentation, the\r\nexperience, the \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e in short (for until we have decided \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e it is\r\nit must be a mere \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e) is the last term of a train of sensations,\r\nemotions, decisions, movements, classifications, expectations, etc.,\r\nending in the present, and the first term of a series of similar \u0026lsquo;inner\u0026rsquo;\r\noperations extending into the future, on the reader\u0026rsquo;s part. On the other\r\nhand, the very same \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e is the \u003ci\u003eterminus ad quem\u003c/i\u003e of a lot of\r\nprevious physical operations, carpentering, papering, furnishing,\r\nwarming, etc., and the \u003ci\u003eterminus a quo\u003c/i\u003e of a lot of future ones, in\r\nwhich it will be concerned when undergoing the destiny of a physical\r\nroom. The physical and the mental operations form curiously incompatible\r\ngroups. As a room, the experience has occupied that spot and had that\r\nenvironment for thirty years. As your field of consciousness it may\r\nnever have existed until now. As a room, attention will go on to\r\ndiscover endless new details in it. As your mental state merely, few new\r\nones will emerge under attention\u0026rsquo;s eye. As a room, it will take an\r\nearthquake, or a gang of men, and in any case a certain amount of time,\r\nto destroy it. As your subjective state, the closing of your eyes, or\r\nany instantaneous play of your fancy will suffice. In the real world,\r\nfire will consume it. In your mind, you can let fire play over it\r\nwithout effect. As an outer object, you must pay so much a month to\r\ninhabit it. As an inner content, you may occupy it for any length of\r\ntime rent-free. If, in short, you follow it in the mental\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_15\" id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[Pg 15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e direction,\r\ntaking it along with events of personal biography solely, all sorts of\r\nthings are true of it which are false, and false of it which are true if\r\nyou treat it as a real thing experienced, follow it in the physical\r\ndirection, and relate it to associates in the outer world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far, all seems plain sailing, but my thesis will probably grow less\r\nplausible to the reader when I pass from percepts to concepts, or from\r\nthe case of things presented to that of things remote. I believe,\r\nnevertheless, that here also the same law holds good. If we take\r\nconceptual manifolds, or memories, or fancies, they also are in their\r\nfirst intention mere bits of pure experience, and, as such, are single\r\n\u003ci\u003ethats\u003c/i\u003e which act in one context as objects, and in another context\r\nfigure as mental states. By taking them in their first intention, I mean\r\nignoring their relation to possible perceptual experiences with which\r\nthey may be connected, which they may lead to and terminate in, and\r\nwhich then they may be supposed to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_16\" id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[Pg 16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u0026lsquo;represent.\u0026rsquo; Taking them in this way\r\nfirst, we confine the problem to a world merely \u0026lsquo;thought-of\u0026rsquo; and not\r\ndirectly felt or seen.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_10_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_10_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e This world, just like the world of percepts,\r\ncomes to us at first as a chaos of experiences, but lines of order soon\r\nget traced. We find that any bit of it which we may cut out as an\r\nexample is connected with distinct groups of associates, just as our\r\nperceptual experiences are, that these associates link themselves with\r\nit by different relations,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_11_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e and that one forms the inner history of a\r\nperson, while the other acts as an impersonal \u0026lsquo;objective\u0026rsquo; world, either\r\nspatial and temporal, or else merely logical or mathematical, or\r\notherwise \u0026lsquo;ideal.\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_17\" id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[Pg 17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe first obstacle on the part of the reader to seeing that these\r\nnon-perceptual experiences have objectivity as well as subjectivity will\r\nprobably be due to the intrusion into his mind of \u003ci\u003epercepts\u003c/i\u003e, that third\r\ngroup of associates with which the non-perceptual experiences have\r\nrelations, and which, as a whole, they \u0026lsquo;represent,\u0026rsquo; standing to them as\r\nthoughts to things. This important function of the non-perceptual\r\nexperiences complicates the question and confuses it; for, so used are\r\nwe to treat percepts as the sole genuine realities that, unless we keep\r\nthem out of the discussion, we tend altogether to overlook the\r\nobjectivity that lies in non-perceptual experiences by themselves. We\r\ntreat them, \u0026lsquo;knowing\u0026rsquo; percepts as they do, as through and through\r\nsubjective, and say that they are wholly constituted of the stuff called\r\nconsciousness, using this term now for a kind of entity, after the\r\nfashion which I am seeking to refute.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_12_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_18\" id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[Pg 18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAbstracting, then, from percepts altogether, what I maintain is, that\r\nany single non-perceptual experience tends to get counted twice over,\r\njust as a perceptual experience does, figuring in one context as an\r\nobject or field of objects, in another as a state of mind: and all this\r\nwithout the least internal self-diremption on its own part into\r\nconsciousness and content. It is all consciousness in one taking; and,\r\nin the other, all content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI find this objectivity of non-perceptual experiences, this complete\r\nparallelism in point of reality between the presently felt and the\r\nremotely thought, so well set forth in a page of M\u0026uuml;nsterberg\u0026rsquo;s\r\n\u003ci\u003eGrundz\u0026uuml;ge\u003c/i\u003e, that I will quote it as it stands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I may only think of my objects,\u0026rdquo; says Professor M\u0026uuml;nsterberg; \u0026ldquo;yet, in\r\nmy living thought they stand before me exactly as perceived objects\r\nwould do, no matter how different the two ways of apprehending them may\r\nbe in their genesis. The book here lying on the table before me, and the\r\nbook in the next room of which I think and which I mean to get, are both\r\nin the same sense given realities for me, realities which I acknowledge\r\nand of which I take\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_19\" id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[Pg 19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e account. If you agree that the perceptual object is\r\nnot an idea within me, but that percept and thing, as indistinguishably\r\none, are really experienced \u003ci\u003ethere, outside\u003c/i\u003e, you ought not to believe\r\nthat the merely thought-of object is hid away inside of the thinking\r\nsubject. The object of which I think, and of whose existence I take\r\ncognizance without letting it now work upon my senses, occupies its\r\ndefinite place in the outer world as much as does the object which I\r\ndirectly see.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;What is true of the here and the there, is also true of the now and the\r\nthen. I know of the thing which is present and perceived, but I know\r\nalso of the thing which yesterday was but is no more, and which I only\r\nremember. Both can determine my present conduct, both are parts of the\r\nreality of which I keep account. It is true that of much of the past I\r\nam uncertain, just as I am uncertain of much of what is present if it be\r\nbut dimly perceived. But the interval of time does not in principle\r\nalter my relation to the object, does not transform it from an object\r\nknown into a mental state….\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_20\" id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[Pg 20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The things in the room here which I\r\nsurvey, and those in my distant home of which I think, the things of\r\nthis minute and those of my long-vanished boyhood, influence and decide\r\nme alike, with a reality which my experience of them directly feels.\r\nThey both make up my real world, they make it directly, they do not have\r\nfirst to be introduced to me and mediated by ideas which now and here\r\narise within me…. This not-me character of my recollections and\r\nexpectations does not imply that the external objects of which I am\r\naware in those experiences should necessarily be there also for others.\r\nThe objects of dreamers and hallucinated persons are wholly without\r\ngeneral validity. But even were they centaurs and golden mountains, they\r\nstill would be \u0026lsquo;off there,\u0026rsquo; in fairy land, and not \u0026lsquo;inside\u0026rsquo; of\r\nourselves.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_13_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_21\" id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[Pg 21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis certainly is the immediate, primary, na\u0026iuml;f, or practical way of\r\ntaking our thought-of world. Were there no perceptual world to serve as\r\nits \u0026lsquo;reductive,\u0026rsquo; in Taine\u0026rsquo;s sense, by being \u0026lsquo;stronger\u0026rsquo; and more\r\ngenuinely \u0026lsquo;outer\u0026rsquo; (so that the whole merely thought-of world seems weak\r\nand inner in comparison), our world of thought would be the only world,\r\nand would enjoy complete reality in our belief. This actually happens in\r\nour dreams, and in our day-dreams so long as percepts do not interrupt\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd yet, just as the seen room (to go back to our late example) is\r\n\u003ci\u003ealso\u003c/i\u003e a field of consciousness, so the conceived or recollected room is\r\n\u003ci\u003ealso\u003c/i\u003e a state of mind; and the doubling-up of the experience has in\r\nboth cases similar grounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe room thought-of, namely, has many thought-of couplings with many\r\nthought-of things. Some of these couplings are inconstant, others are\r\nstable. In the reader\u0026rsquo;s personal history the room occupies a single\r\ndate\u0026mdash;he saw it only once perhaps, a year ago. Of the house\u0026rsquo;s history,\r\non the other hand, it forms a permanent ingredient. Some couplings have\r\nthe curious stubbornness, to borrow Royce\u0026rsquo;s term, of fact; others show\r\nthe fluidity of fancy\u0026mdash;we let them come and go as we please. Grouped\r\nwith\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_22\" id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[Pg 22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the rest of its house, with the name of its town, of its owner,\r\nbuilder, value, decorative plan, the room maintains a definite foothold,\r\nto which, if we try to loosen it, it tends to return, and to reassert\r\nitself with force.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_14_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e With these associates, in a word, it coheres,\r\nwhile to other houses, other towns, other owners, etc., it shows no\r\ntendency to cohere at all. The two collections, first of its cohesive,\r\nand, second, of its loose associates, inevitably come to be contrasted.\r\nWe call the first collection the system of external realities, in the\r\nmidst of which the room, as \u0026lsquo;real,\u0026rsquo; exists; the other we call the stream\r\nof our internal thinking, in which, as a \u0026lsquo;mental image,\u0026rsquo; it for a moment\r\nfloats.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_15_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e The room thus again gets counted twice over. It plays two\r\ndifferent r\u0026ocirc;les, being \u003ci\u003eGedanke\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eGedachtes\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nthought-of-an-object, and the object-thought-of, both in one; and all\r\nthis without paradox or mystery, just as the same material thing may be\r\nboth low and high, or small and great, or bad and good, because of its\r\nrelations to opposite parts of an environing world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_23\" id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[Pg 23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs \u0026lsquo;subjective\u0026rsquo; we say that the experience represents; as \u0026lsquo;objective\u0026rsquo;\r\nit is represented. What represents and what is represented is here\r\nnumerically the same; but we must remember that no dualism of being\r\nrepresented and representing resides in the experience \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e. In its\r\npure state, or when isolated, there is no self-splitting of it into\r\nconsciousness and what the consciousness is \u0026lsquo;of.\u0026rsquo; Its subjectivity and\r\nobjectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the\r\nexperience is \u0026lsquo;taken,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, talked-of, twice, considered along with\r\nits two differing contexts respectively, by a new retrospective\r\nexperience, of which that whole past complication now forms the fresh\r\ncontent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe instant field of the present is at all times what I call the \u0026lsquo;pure\u0026rsquo;\r\nexperience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject\r\nas yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or\r\nexistence, a simple \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e. In this\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_24\" id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[Pg 24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ena\u0026iuml;f\u003c/i\u003e immediacy it is of course\r\n\u003ci\u003evalid\u003c/i\u003e; it is \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e, we \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e upon it; and the doubling of it in\r\nretrospection into a state of mind and a reality intended thereby, is\r\njust one of the acts. The \u0026lsquo;state of mind,\u0026rsquo; first treated explicitly as\r\nsuch in retrospection, will stand corrected or confirmed, and the\r\nretrospective experience in its turn will get a similar treatment; but\r\nthe immediate experience in its passing is always \u0026lsquo;truth,\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_16_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e practical\r\ntruth, \u003ci\u003esomething to act on\u003c/i\u003e, at its own movement. If the world were\r\nthen and there to go out like a candle, it would remain truth absolute\r\nand objective, for it would be \u0026lsquo;the last word,\u0026rsquo; would have no critic,\r\nand no one would ever oppose the thought in it to the reality\r\nintended.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_17_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_25\" id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[Pg 25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI think I may now claim to have made my thesis clear. Consciousness\r\nconnotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special\r\nstuff or way of being. \u003ci\u003eThe peculiarity of our experiences, that they\r\nnot only are, but are known, which their \u0026lsquo;conscious\u0026rsquo; quality is invoked\r\nto explain, is better explained by their relations\u0026mdash;these relations\r\nthemselves being experiences\u0026mdash;to one another.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere I now to go on to treat of the knowing of perceptual by conceptual\r\nexperiences, it would again prove to be an affair of external relations.\r\nOne experience would be the knower, the other the reality known; and I\r\ncould perfectly well define, without the notion of \u0026lsquo;consciousness,\u0026rsquo; what\r\nthe knowing actually and practically amounts to\u0026mdash;leading-towards,\r\nnamely, and terminating-in percepts, through a series of transitional\r\nexperiences which the world supplies. But I will not treat of this,\r\nspace being insufficient.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_18_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e I will rather consider a few objections\r\nthat are sure to be urged against the entire theory as it stands.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_26\" id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[Pg 26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, this will be asked: \u0026ldquo;If experience has not \u0026lsquo;conscious\u0026rsquo;\r\nexistence, if it be not partly made of \u0026lsquo;consciousness,\u0026rsquo; of what then is\r\nit made? Matter we know, and thought we know, and conscious content we\r\nknow, but neutral and simple \u0026lsquo;pure experience\u0026rsquo; is something we know not\r\nat all. Say \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e it consists of\u0026mdash;for it must consist of something\u0026mdash;or\r\nbe willing to give it up!\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo this challenge the reply is easy. Although for fluency\u0026rsquo;s sake I\r\nmyself spoke early in this article of a stuff of pure experience, I have\r\nnow to say that there is no \u003ci\u003egeneral\u003c/i\u003e stuff of which experience at large\r\nis made. There are as many stuffs as there are \u0026lsquo;natures\u0026rsquo; in the things\r\nexperienced. If you ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of,\r\nthe answer is always the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_27\" id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[Pg 27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e same: \u0026ldquo;It is made of \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e, of just what\r\nappears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or\r\nwhat not.\u0026rdquo; Shadworth Hodgson\u0026rsquo;s analysis here leaves nothing to be\r\ndesired.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_19_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_19_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e Experience is only a collective name for all these sensible\r\nnatures, and save for time and space (and, if you like, for \u0026lsquo;being\u0026rsquo;)\r\nthere appears no universal element of which all things are made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next objection is more formidable, in fact it sounds quite crushing\r\nwhen one hears it first.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_28\" id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[Pg 28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;If it be the self-same piece of pure experience, taken twice over, that\r\nserves now as thought and now as thing\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;so the objection runs\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;how\r\ncomes it that its attributes should differ so fundamentally in the two\r\ntakings. As thing, the experience is extended; as thought, it occupies\r\nno space or place. As thing, it is red, hard, heavy; but who ever heard\r\nof a red, hard or heavy thought? Yet even now you said that an\r\nexperience is made of just what appears, and what appears is just such\r\nadjectives. How can the one experience in its thing-function be made of\r\nthem, consist of them, carry them as its own attributes, while in its\r\nthought-function it disowns them and attributes them elsewhere. There is\r\na self-contradiction here from which the radical dualism of thought and\r\nthing is the only truth that can save us. Only if the thought is one\r\nkind of being can the adjectives exist in it \u0026lsquo;intentionally\u0026rsquo; (to use the\r\nscholastic term); only if the thing is another kind, can they exist in\r\nit constitutively and energetically. No simple subject can take the same\r\nadjectives and at one time be qualified by it, and at another time be\r\nmerely \u0026lsquo;of\u0026rsquo; it, as of something only meant or known.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe solution insisted on by this objector, like many other common-sense\r\nsolutions, grows the less satisfactory the more one turns it in one\u0026rsquo;s\r\nmind. To begin with, \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e thought and thing as heterogeneous as is\r\ncommonly said?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_29\" id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[Pg 29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo one denies that they have some categories in common. Their relations\r\nto time are identical. Both, moreover, may have parts (for psychologists\r\nin general treat thoughts as having them); and both may be complex or\r\nsimple. Both are of kinds, can be compared, added and subtracted and\r\narranged in serial orders. All sorts of adjectives qualify our thoughts\r\nwhich appear incompatible with consciousness, being as such a bare\r\ndiaphaneity. For instance, they are natural and easy, or laborious. They\r\nare beautiful, happy, intense, interesting, wise, idiotic, focal,\r\nmarginal, insipid, confused, vague, precise, rational, casual, general,\r\nparticular, and many things besides. Moreover, the chapters on\r\n\u0026lsquo;Perception\u0026rsquo; in the psychology-books are full of facts that make for the\r\nessential homogeneity of thought with thing. How, if \u0026lsquo;subject\u0026rsquo; and\r\n\u0026lsquo;object\u0026rsquo; were separated \u0026lsquo;by the whole diameter of being,\u0026rsquo; and had no\r\nattributes in common, could it be so hard to tell, in a presented and\r\nrecognized material object, what part comes in through the sense-organs\r\nand what part comes \u0026lsquo;out of one\u0026rsquo;s own\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_30\" id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[Pg 30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e head\u0026rsquo;? Sensations and\r\napperceptive ideas fuse here so intimately that you can no more tell\r\nwhere one begins and the other ends, than you can tell, in those cunning\r\ncircular panoramas that have lately been exhibited, where the real\r\nforeground and the painted canvas join together.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_20_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes for the first time defined thought as the absolutely\r\nunextended, and later philosophers have accepted the description as\r\ncorrect. But what possible meaning has it to say that, when we think of\r\na foot-rule or a square yard, extension is not attributable to our\r\nthought? Of every extended object the \u003ci\u003eadequate\u003c/i\u003e mental picture must\r\nhave all the extension of the object itself. The difference between\r\nobjective and subjective extension is one of relation to a context\r\nsolely. In the mind the various extents maintain no necessarily stubborn\r\norder relatively to each other, while \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_31\" id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[Pg 31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ein the physical world they bound\r\neach other stably, and, added together, make the great enveloping Unit\r\nwhich we believe in and call real Space. As \u0026lsquo;outer,\u0026rsquo; they carry\r\nthemselves adversely, so to speak, to one another, exclude one another\r\nand maintain their distances; while, as \u0026lsquo;inner,\u0026rsquo; their order is loose,\r\nand they form a \u003ci\u003edurcheinander\u003c/i\u003e in which unity is lost.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_21_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_21_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e But to argue\r\nfrom this that inner experience is absolutely inextensive seems to me\r\nlittle short of absurd. The two worlds differ, not by the presence or\r\nabsence of extension, but by the relations of the extensions which in\r\nboth worlds exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDoes not this case of extension now put us on the track of truth in the\r\ncase of other qualities? It does; and I am surprised that the facts\r\nshould not have been noticed long ago. Why, for example, do we call a\r\nfire hot, and water wet, and yet refuse to say that our mental state,\r\nwhen it is \u0026lsquo;of\u0026rsquo; these objects, is either wet or hot? \u0026lsquo;Intentionally,\u0026rsquo; at\r\nany rate, and \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_32\" id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[Pg 32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ewhen the mental state is a vivid image, hotness and\r\nwetness are in it just as much as they are in the physical experience.\r\nThe reason is this, that, as the general chaos of all our experiences\r\ngets sifted, we find that there are some fires that will always burn\r\nsticks and always warm our bodies, and that there are some waters that\r\nwill always put out fires; while there are other fires and waters that\r\nwill not act at all. The general group of experiences that \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e, that\r\ndo not only possess their natures intrinsically, but wear them\r\nadjectively and energetically, turning them against one another, comes\r\ninevitably to be contrasted with the group whose members, having\r\nidentically the same natures, fail to manifest them in the \u0026lsquo;energetic\u0026rsquo;\r\nway.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_22_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e I make for myself now an experience of blazing fire; I place it\r\nnear my body; but it does not warm me in the least. I lay a stick upon\r\nit, and the stick either burns or remains green, as I please. I call up\r\nwater, and pour it on the fire, and absolutely no difference ensues. I\r\naccount\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_33\" id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[Pg 33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for all such facts by calling this whole train of experiences\r\nunreal, a mental train. Mental fire is what won\u0026rsquo;t burn real sticks;\r\nmental water is what won\u0026rsquo;t necessarily (though of course it may) put out\r\neven a mental fire. Mental knives may be sharp, but they won\u0026rsquo;t cut real\r\nwood. Mental triangles are pointed, but their points won\u0026rsquo;t wound. With\r\n\u0026lsquo;real\u0026rsquo; objects, on the contrary, consequences always accrue; and thus\r\nthe real experiences get sifted from the mental ones, the things from\r\nour thoughts of them, fanciful or true, and precipitated together as the\r\nstable part of the whole experience-chaos, under the name of the\r\nphysical world. Of this our perceptual experiences are the nucleus, they\r\nbeing the originally strong experiences. We add a lot of conceptual\r\nexperiences to them, making these strong also in imagination, and\r\nbuilding out the remoter parts of the physical world by their means; and\r\naround this core of reality the world of laxly connected fancies and\r\nmere rhapsodical objects floats like a bank of clouds. In the clouds,\r\nall sorts of rules are violated\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_34\" id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[Pg 34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which in the core are kept. Extensions\r\nthere can be indefinitely located; motion there obeys no Newton\u0026rsquo;s laws.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a peculiar class of experiences to which, whether we take them\r\nas subjective or as objective, we \u003ci\u003eassign\u003c/i\u003e their several natures as\r\nattributes, because in both contexts they affect their associates\r\nactively, though in neither quite as \u0026lsquo;strongly\u0026rsquo; or as sharply as things\r\naffect one another by their physical energies. I refer here to\r\n\u003ci\u003eappreciations\u003c/i\u003e, which form an ambiguous sphere of being, belonging with\r\nemotion on the one hand, and having objective \u0026lsquo;value\u0026rsquo; on the other, yet\r\nseeming not quite inner nor quite outer, as if a diremption had begun\r\nbut had not made itself complete.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_23_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_23_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_35\" id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[Pg 35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExperiences of painful objects, for example, are usually also painful\r\nexperiences; perceptions of loveliness, of ugliness, tend to pass muster\r\nas lovely or as ugly perceptions; intuitions of the morally lofty are\r\nlofty intuitions. Sometimes the adjective wanders as if uncertain where\r\nto fix itself. Shall we speak of seductive visions or of visions of\r\nseductive things? Of wicked desires or of desires for wickedness? Of\r\nhealthy thoughts or of thoughts of healthy objects? Of good impulses, or\r\nof impulses towards the good? Of feelings of anger, or of angry\r\nfeelings? Both in the mind and in the thing, these natures modify their\r\ncontext, exclude certain associates and determine others, have their\r\nmates and incompatibles. Yet not as stubbornly as in the case of\r\nphysical qualities, for beauty and ugliness, love and hatred, pleasant\r\nand painful can, in certain complex experiences, coexist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf one were to make an evolutionary construction of how a lot of\r\noriginally chaotic pure experiences became gradually differentiated into\r\nan orderly inner and outer world, the whole theory would turn upon one\u0026rsquo;s\r\nsuccess in explaining how or why the quality of an experience, once\r\nactive, could become less so, and, from being an energetic attribute in\r\nsome cases, elsewhere lapse into the status of an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_36\" id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[Pg 36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e inert or merely\r\ninternal \u0026lsquo;nature.\u0026rsquo; This would be the \u0026lsquo;evolution\u0026rsquo; of the psychical from\r\nthe bosom of the physical, in which the esthetic, moral and otherwise\r\nemotional experiences would represent a halfway stage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut a last cry of \u003ci\u003enon possumus\u003c/i\u003e will probably go up from many readers.\r\n\u0026ldquo;All very pretty as a piece of ingenuity,\u0026rdquo; they will say, \u0026ldquo;but our\r\nconsciousness itself intuitively contradicts you. We, for our part,\r\n\u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e that we are conscious. We \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e our thought, flowing as a life\r\nwithin us, in absolute contrast with the objects which it so\r\nunremittingly escorts. We can not be faithless to this immediate\r\nintuition. The dualism is a fundamental \u003ci\u003edatum\u003c/i\u003e: Let no man join what\r\nGod has put asunder.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy reply to this is my last word, and I greatly grieve that to many it\r\nwill sound materialistic. I can not help that, however, for I, too, have\r\nmy intuitions and I must obey them. Let the case be what it may in\r\nothers, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_37\" id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[Pg 37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e myself, the\r\nstream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is\r\nonly a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to\r\nconsist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The \u0026lsquo;I think\u0026rsquo; which Kant\r\nsaid must be able to accompany all my objects, is the \u0026lsquo;I breathe\u0026rsquo; which\r\nactually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides\r\nbreathing (intracephalic muscular adjustments, etc., of which I have\r\nsaid a word in my larger Psychology), and these increase the assets of\r\n\u0026lsquo;consciousness,\u0026rsquo; so far as the latter is subject to immediate\r\nperception;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_24_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e but breath, which was ever the original of \u0026lsquo;spirit,\u0026rsquo;\r\nbreath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am\r\npersuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the\r\nentity known to them as consciousness. \u003ci\u003eThat entity is fictitious, while\r\nthoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete\r\nare made of the same stuff as things are.\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_38\" id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[Pg 38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI wish I might believe myself to have made that plausible in this\r\narticle. In another article I shall try to make the general notion of a\r\nworld composed of pure experiences still more clear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_2\" id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, No. 18, September 1, 1904. For the relation\r\nbetween this essay and those which follow, cf. below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53-54\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_3\" id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Articles by Baldwin, Ward, Bawden, King, Alexander and\r\nothers. Dr. Perry is frankly over the border.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_4\" id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Similarly, there is no \u0026ldquo;activity of \u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo; as\r\nsuch.\u0026rdquo; See below, pp. 170 ff., \u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_98_98\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_5\" id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In my \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e I have tried to show that we need no\r\nknower other than the \u0026lsquo;passing thought.\u0026rsquo; [\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nvol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 338 ff.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_6\" id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e G. E. Moore: \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e, N. S., [1903], p. 450.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_7\" id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Paul Natorp: \u003ci\u003eEinleitung in die Psychologie\u003c/i\u003e, 1888, pp. 14,\r\n112.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_8\" id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0026ldquo;Figuratively speaking, consciousness may be said to be the\r\none universal solvent, or menstruum, in which the different concrete\r\nkinds of psychic acts and facts are contained, whether in concealed or\r\nin obvious form.\u0026rdquo; G. T. Ladd: \u003ci\u003ePsychology, Descriptive and Explanatory\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1894, p. 30.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_9\" id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [For a parallel statement of this view, cf. the author\u0026rsquo;s\r\n\u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, p. 49, note. Cf. also below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\"\u003e196-197\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_10_10\" id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [For the author\u0026rsquo;s recognition of \u0026ldquo;concepts as a\r\nco-ordinate realm\u0026rdquo; of reality, cf. his \u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 42, 195,\r\nnote; \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 339-340; \u003ci\u003eSome Problems of\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 50-57, 67-70; and below, p. 16, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e. Giving this view\r\nthe name \u0026lsquo;logical realism,\u0026rsquo; he remarks elsewhere that his philosophy\r\n\u0026ldquo;may be regarded as somewhat eccentric in its attempt to combine logical\r\nrealism with an otherwise empiricist mode of thought\u0026rdquo; (\u003ci\u003eSome Problems of\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, p. 106). \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_11_11\" id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Here as elsewhere the relations are of course\r\n\u003ci\u003eexperienced\u003c/i\u003e relations, members of the same originally chaotic manifold\r\nof non-perceptual experience of which the related terms themselves are\r\nparts. [Cf. below, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_12_12\" id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of the representative function of non-perceptual\r\nexperience as a whole, I will say a word in a subsequent article: it\r\nleads too far into the general theory of knowledge for much to be said\r\nabout it in a short paper like this. [Cf. below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e ff.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_13_13\" id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M\u0026uuml;nsterberg: \u003ci\u003eGrundz\u0026uuml;ge der Psychologie\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, p. 48.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_14_14\" id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. A. L. Hodder: \u003ci\u003eThe Adversaries of the Sceptic\u003c/i\u003e, pp.\r\n94-99.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_15_15\" id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For simplicity\u0026rsquo;s sake I confine my exposition to\r\n\u0026lsquo;external\u0026rsquo; reality. But there is also the system of ideal reality in\r\nwhich the room plays its part. Relations of comparison, of\r\nclassification, serial order, value, also are stubborn, assign a\r\ndefinite place to the room, unli\r\nke the incoherence of its places in the\r\nmere rhapsody of our successive thoughts. [Cf. above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_16_16\" id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Note the ambiguity of this term, which is taken sometimes\r\nobjectively and sometimes subjectively.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_17_17\" id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e for July [1904], Dr. R. B.\r\nPerry has published a view of Consciousness which comes nearer to mine\r\nthan any other with which I am acquainted. At present, Dr. Perry thinks,\r\nevery field of experience is so much \u0026lsquo;fact.\u0026rsquo; It becomes \u0026lsquo;opinion\u0026rsquo; or\r\n\u0026lsquo;thought\u0026rsquo; only in retrospection, when a fresh experience, thinking the\r\nsame object, alters and corrects it. But the corrective experience\r\nbecomes itself in turn corrected, and thus experience as a whole is a\r\nprocess in which what is objective originally forever turns subjective,\r\nturns into our apprehension of the object. I strongly recommend Dr.\r\nPerry\u0026rsquo;s admirable article to my readers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_18_18\" id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have given a partial account of the matter in \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nvol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e, p. 27, 1885 [reprinted in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 1-42], and\r\nin the \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, p. 105, 1895 [partly reprinted\r\nin \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 43-50]. See also C. A. Strong\u0026rsquo;s article\r\nin the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, p. 253, May 12, 1904. I hope myself very soon to recur to the matter.\r\n[See below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e ff.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_19_19\" id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. Shadworth Hodgson: \u003ci\u003eThe Metaphysic of Experience\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nvol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e. \u003ci\u003epassim;\u003c/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Philosophy of Reflection\u003c/i\u003e, bk. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026sect; 3.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_20_20\" id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Spencer\u0026rsquo;s proof of his \u0026lsquo;Transfigured Realism\u0026rsquo; (his\r\ndoctrine that there is an absolutely non-mental reality) comes to mind\r\nas a splendid instance of the impossibility of establishing radical\r\nheterogeneity between thought and thing. All his painfully accumulated\r\npoints of difference run gradually into their opposites, and are full of\r\nexceptions. [Cf. Spencer: \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evii\u003c/span\u003e, ch.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exix\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_21_21\" id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I speak here of the complete inner life in which the mind\r\nplays freely with its materials. Of course the mind\u0026rsquo;s free play is\r\nrestricted when it seeks to copy real things in real space.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_22_22\" id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [But there are also \u0026ldquo;mental activity trains,\u0026rdquo; in which\r\nthoughts do \u0026ldquo;work on each other.\u0026rdquo; Cf. below, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e, note. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_23_23\" id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [This topic is resumed below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e ff. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_24_24\" id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 299-305. Cf.\r\nbelow, pp. 169-171 (\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_98_98\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e).]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_39\" id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[Pg 39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"II\" id=\"II\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eA WORLD OF PURE EXPERIENCE\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_25_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_25_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic\r\natmosphere of the time, a loosening of old landmarks, a softening of\r\noppositions, a mutual borrowing from one another on the part of systems\r\nanciently closed, and an interest in new suggestions, however vague, as\r\nif the one thing sure were the inadequacy of the extant\r\nschool-solutions. The dissatisfaction with these seems due for the most\r\npart to a feeling that they are too abstract and academic. Life is\r\nconfused and superabundant, and what the younger generation appears to\r\ncrave is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy, even though\r\nit were at some cost of logical rigor and of formal purity.\r\nTranscendental idealism is inclining to let the world wag\r\nincomprehensibly, in spite of its Absolute Subject and his unity of\r\npurpose. Berkeleyan idealism is abandoning the principle of parsimony\r\nand dabbling in panpsychic speculations. Empiricism flirts with\r\nteleology; and, strangest of all, natural realism, so long decently\r\nburied, raises its head above the turf, and finds glad hands\r\noutstretched from the most unlikely quarters to help it to its feet\r\nagain. We are all biased by our personal feelings, I know, and I am\r\npersonally discontented with extant solutions; so I seem to read the\r\nsigns of a great unsettlement, as if the upheaval of more real\r\nconceptions and more fruitful methods were imminent, as if a true\r\nlandscape might result, less clipped, straight-edged and artificial.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_40\" id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[Pg 40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf philosophy be really on the eve of any considerable rearrangement,\r\nthe time should be propitious for any one who has suggestions of his own\r\nto bring forward. For many years past my mind has been growing into a\r\ncertain type of \u003ci\u003eWeltanschauung\u003c/i\u003e. Rightly or wrongly, I have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_41\" id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[Pg 41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e got to the\r\npoint where I can hardly see things in any other pattern. I propose,\r\ntherefore, to describe the pattern as clearly as I can consistently with\r\ngreat brevity, and to throw my description into the bubbling vat of\r\npublicity where, jostled by rivals and torn by critics, it will\r\neventually either disappear from notice, or else, if better luck befall\r\nit, quietly subside to the profundities, and serve as a possible ferment\r\nof new growths or a nucleus of new crystallization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRadical Empiricism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI give the name of \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; to my \u003ci\u003eWeltanschauung\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nEmpiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism. Rationalism tends to\r\nemphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of\r\nlogic as well as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the\r\nexplanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and\r\ntreats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. My\r\ndescription of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of\r\nthe whole\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_42\" id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[Pg 42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a being of the second order. It is essentially a mosaic\r\nphilosophy, a philosophy of plural facts, like that of Hume and his\r\ndescendants, who refer these facts neither to Substances in which they\r\ninhere nor to an Absolute Mind that creates them as its objects. But it\r\ndiffers from the Humian type of empiricism in one particular which makes\r\nme add the epithet radical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions\r\nany element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any\r\nelement that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, \u003ci\u003ethe\r\nrelations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced\r\nrelations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as\r\n\u0026lsquo;real\u0026rsquo; as anything else in the system\u003c/i\u003e. Elements may indeed be\r\nredistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a\r\nreal place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether\r\nterm or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that conjunctive and\r\ndisjunctive relations\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_43\" id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[Pg 43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e present themselves as being fully co-ordinate\r\nparts of experience, has always shown a tendency to do away with the\r\nconnections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions.\r\nBerkeley\u0026rsquo;s nominalism, Hume\u0026rsquo;s statement that whatever things we\r\ndistinguish are as \u0026lsquo;loose and separate\u0026rsquo; as if they had \u0026lsquo;no manner of\r\nconnection,\u0026rsquo; James Mill\u0026rsquo;s denial that similars have anything \u0026lsquo;really\u0026rsquo; in\r\ncommon, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John\r\nMill\u0026rsquo;s account of both physical things and selves as composed of\r\ndiscontinuous possibilities, and the general pulverization of all\r\nExperience by association and the mind-dust theory, are examples of what\r\nI mean.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_26_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_44\" id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[Pg 44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe natural result of such a world-picture has been the efforts of\r\nrationalism to correct its incoherencies by the addition of\r\ntrans-experiential agents of unification, substances, intellectual\r\ncategories and powers, or Selves; whereas, if empiricism had only been\r\nradical and taken everything that comes without disfavor, conjunction as\r\nwell as separation, each at its face value, the results would have\r\ncalled for no such artificial correction. \u003ci\u003eRadical empiricism\u003c/i\u003e, as I\r\nunderstand it, \u003ci\u003edoes full justice to conjunctive relations\u003c/i\u003e, without,\r\nhowever, treating them as rationalism always tends to treat them, as\r\nbeing true in some supernal way, as if the unity of things and their\r\nvariety belonged to different orders of truth and vitality altogether.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConjunctive Relations\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRelations are of different degrees of intimacy. Merely to be \u0026lsquo;with\u0026rsquo; one\r\nanother in a universe of discourse is the most external relation that\r\nterms can have, and seems to involve nothing whatever as to farther\r\nconsequences. Simultaneity and time-interval come next, and then\r\nspace-adjacency and distance. After them, similarity and difference,\r\ncarrying the possibility of many inferences. Then relations of activity,\r\ntying terms into series involving\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_45\" id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[Pg 45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e change, tendency, resistance, and the\r\ncausal order generally. Finally, the relation experienced between terms\r\nthat form states of mind, and are immediately conscious of continuing\r\neach other. The organization of the Self as a system of memories,\r\npurposes, strivings, fulfilments or disappointments, is incidental to\r\nthis most intimate of all relations, the terms of which seem in many\r\ncases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other\u0026rsquo;s being.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_27_27\" id=\"FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_27_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhilosophy has always turned on grammatical particles. With, near, next,\r\nlike, from, towards, against, because, for, through, my\u0026mdash;these words\r\ndesignate types of conjunctive relation arranged in a roughly ascending\r\norder of intimacy and inclusiveness. \u003ci\u003eA priori\u003c/i\u003e, we can imagine a\r\nuniverse of withness but no nextness; or one of nextness but no\r\nlikeness, or of likeness with no activity, or of activity with no\r\npurpose, or of purpose with no ego. These would be universes, each with\r\nits own grade of unity. The universe of human experience is, by one or\r\nanother of its parts, of each and all these grades. Whether or not it\r\npossibly enjoys some still more absolute grade of union does not appear\r\nupon the surface.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_46\" id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[Pg 46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaken as it does appear, our universe is to a large extent chaotic. No\r\none single type of connection runs through all the experiences that\r\ncompose it. If we take space-relations, they fail to connect minds into\r\nany regular system. Causes and purposes obtain only among special series\r\nof facts. The self-relation seems extremely limited and does not link\r\ntwo different selves together. \u003ci\u003ePrima facie\u003c/i\u003e, if you should liken the\r\nuniverse of absolute idealism to an aquarium, a crystal globe in which\r\ngoldfish are swimming, you would have to compare the empiricist universe\r\nto something more like one of those dried human heads with which the\r\nDyaks of Borneo deck their lodges. The skull forms a solid nucleus; but\r\ninnumerable feathers, leaves, strings, beads, and loose appendices of\r\nevery description float and dangle from it, and, save that they\r\nterminate in it, seem to have nothing to do with one another. Even so my\r\nexperiences and yours float and dangle,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_47\" id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[Pg 47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e terminating, it is true, in a\r\nnucleus of common perception, but for the most part out of sight and\r\nirrelevant and unimaginable to one another. This imperfect intimacy,\r\nthis bare relation of \u003ci\u003ewithness\u003c/i\u003e between some parts of the sum total of\r\nexperience and other parts, is the fact that ordinary empiricism\r\nover-emphasizes against rationalism, the latter always tending to ignore\r\nit unduly. Radical empiricism, on the contrary, is fair to both the\r\nunity and the disconnection. It finds no reason for treating either as\r\nillusory. It allots to each its definite sphere of description, and\r\nagrees that there appear to be actual forces at work which tend, as time\r\ngoes on, to make the unity greater.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conjunctive relation that has given most trouble to philosophy is\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eco-conscious transition\u003c/i\u003e, so to call it, by which one experience\r\npasses into another when both belong to the same self. About the facts\r\nthere is no question. My experiences and your experiences are \u0026lsquo;with\u0026rsquo;\r\neach other in various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours\r\npass into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_48\" id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[Pg 48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e into one\r\nanother. Within each of our personal histories, subject, object,\r\ninterest and purpose \u003ci\u003eare continuous or may be continuous\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_28_28\" id=\"FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_28_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e Personal\r\nhistories are processes of change in time, and \u003ci\u003ethe change itself is one\r\nof the things immediately experienced\u003c/i\u003e. \u0026lsquo;Change\u0026rsquo; in this case means\r\ncontinuous as opposed to discontinuous transition. But continuous\r\ntransition is one sort of a conjunctive relation; and to be a radical\r\nempiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all\r\nothers, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if\r\na hole be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the\r\nmetaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy. The holding fast to this\r\nrelation means taking it at its face value, neither less nor more; and\r\nto take it at its face value means first of all to take it just as we\r\nfeel it, and not to confuse ourselves with abstract talk \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e it,\r\ninvolving words that drive us to invent secondary conceptions in order\r\nto neutralize their suggestions and to make our actual experience again\r\nseem rationally possible.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_49\" id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[Pg 49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat I do feel simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an\r\nearlier one is that though they are two moments, the transition from the\r\none to the other is \u003ci\u003econtinuous\u003c/i\u003e. Continuity here is a definite sort of\r\nexperience; just as definite as is the \u003ci\u003ediscontinuity-experience\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nI find it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition from an\r\nexperience of my own to one of yours. In this latter case I have to get\r\non and off again, to pass from a thing lived to another thing only\r\nconceived, and the break is positively experienced and noted. Though the\r\nfunctions exerted by my experience and by yours may be the same (\u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe same objects known and the same purposes followed), yet the sameness\r\nhas in this case to be ascertained expressly (and often with difficulty\r\nand uncertainty) after the break has been felt; whereas in passing from\r\none of my own moments to another the sameness of object and interest is\r\nunbroken, and both the earlier and the later experience are of things\r\ndirectly lived.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_50\" id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[Pg 50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no other \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e, no other whatness than this absence of break\r\nand this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive\r\nrelations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong\r\nto the same self. And this whatness is real empirical \u0026lsquo;content,\u0026rsquo; just as\r\nthe whatness of separation and discontinuity is real content in the\r\ncontrasted case. Practically to experience one\u0026rsquo;s personal continuum in\r\nthis living way is to know the originals of the ideas of continuity and\r\nof sameness, to know what the words stand for concretely, to own all\r\nthat they can ever mean. But all experiences have their conditions; and\r\nover-subtle intellects, thinking about the facts here, and asking how\r\nthey are possible, have ended by substituting a lot of static objects of\r\nconception for the direct perceptual experiences. \u0026ldquo;Sameness,\u0026rdquo; they have\r\nsaid, \u0026ldquo;must be a stark numerical identity; it can\u0026rsquo;t run on from next to\r\nnext. Continuity can\u0026rsquo;t mean mere absence of gap; for if you say two\r\nthings are in immediate contact, \u003ci\u003eat\u003c/i\u003e the contact how can they be two?\r\nIf, on the other hand, you put a relation of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_51\" id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[Pg 51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e transition between them,\r\nthat itself is a third thing, and needs to be related or hitched to its\r\nterms. An infinite series is involved,\u0026rdquo; and so on. The result is that\r\nfrom difficulty to difficulty, the plain conjunctive experience has been\r\ndiscredited by both schools, the empiricists leaving things permanently\r\ndisjoined, and the rationalist remedying the looseness by their\r\nAbsolutes or Substances, or whatever other fictitious agencies of union\r\nthey may have employed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_29_29\" id=\"FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_29_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e From all which artificiality we can be saved\r\nby a couple of simple reflections: first, that conjunctions and\r\nseparations are, at all events, co-ordinate phenomena which, if we take\r\nexperiences at their face value, must be accounted equally real; and\r\nsecond, that if we insist on treating things as really separate when\r\nthey are given as continuously joined, invoking, when union is required,\r\ntranscendental principles to overcome the separateness we have assumed,\r\nthen we ought to stand ready to perform the converse act. We ought to\r\ninvoke higher principles of \u003ci\u003edis\u003c/i\u003eunion, also, to make our merely\r\nexperienced disjunctions more truly real. Failing thus, we ought to let\r\nthe originally given continuities stand on their own bottom. We have no\r\nright to be lopsided or to blow capriciously hot and cold.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_52\" id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[Pg 52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Cognitive Relation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by experience\r\nwill save us is an artificial conception of the \u003ci\u003erelations between\r\nknower and known\u003c/i\u003e. Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and\r\nits object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities; and\r\nthereupon the presence of the latter to the former, or the\r\n\u0026lsquo;apprehension\u0026rsquo; by the former of the latter, has assumed a paradoxical\r\ncharacter which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome.\r\nRepresentative theories put a mental \u0026lsquo;representation,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;image,\u0026rsquo; or\r\n\u0026lsquo;content\u0026rsquo; into the gap, as a sort of intermediary. Common-sense theories\r\nleft the gap untouched, declaring our mind able to clear it by a\r\nself-transcending leap. Transcendentalist theories left it impossible to\r\ntraverse by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_53\" id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[Pg 53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e finite knowers, and brought an Absolute in to perform the\r\nsaltatory act. All the while, in the very bosom of the finite\r\nexperience, every conjunction required to make the relation intelligible\r\nis given in full. Either the knower and the known are:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different\r\ncontexts; or they are\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) two pieces of \u003ci\u003eactual\u003c/i\u003e experience belonging to the same subject,\r\nwith definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between\r\nthem; or\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) the known is a \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e experience either of that subject or\r\nanother, to which the said conjunctive transitions \u003ci\u003ewould\u003c/i\u003e lead, if\r\nsufficiently prolonged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo discuss all the ways in which one experience may function as the\r\nknower of another, would be incompatible with the limits of this\r\nessay.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_30_30\" id=\"FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_30_30\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e I have just treated of type 1, the kind of knowledge called\r\nperception.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_31_31\" id=\"FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_31_31\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e This is the type of case in which the mind enjoys direct\r\n\u0026lsquo;acquaintance\u0026rsquo; with a present object. In the other types the mind has\r\n\u0026lsquo;knowledge-about\u0026rsquo; an object not immediately there. Of type 2, the\r\nsimplest sort of conceptual knowledge, I have given some account in two\r\n[earlier] articles.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_32_32\" id=\"FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_32_32\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e Type 3 can always formally and hypothetically be\r\nreduced to type 2, so that a brief description of that type will put the\r\npresent reader sufficiently at my point of view, and make him see what\r\nthe actual meanings of the mysterious cognitive relation may be.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_54\" id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[Pg 54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose me to be sitting here in my library at Cambridge, at ten\r\nminutes\u0026rsquo; walk from \u0026lsquo;Memorial Hall,\u0026rsquo; and to be thinking truly of the\r\nlatter object. My mind may have before it only the name, or it may have\r\na clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such\r\nintrinsic differences in the image make no difference in its cognitive\r\nfunction. Certain \u003ci\u003eextrinsic\u003c/i\u003e phenomena, special experiences of\r\nconjunction, are what impart to the image, be it what it may, its\r\nknowing office.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_55\" id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[Pg 55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor instance, if you ask me what hall I mean by my image, and I can\r\ntell you nothing; or if I fail to point or lead you towards the Harvard\r\nDelta; or if, being led by you, I am uncertain whether the Hall I see be\r\nwhat I had in mind or not; you would rightly deny that I had \u0026lsquo;meant\u0026rsquo;\r\nthat particular hall at all, even though my mental image might to some\r\ndegree have resembled it. The resemblance would count in that case as\r\ncoincidental merely, for all sorts of things of a kind resemble one\r\nanother in this world without being held for that reason to take\r\ncognizance of one another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, if I can lead you to the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_56\" id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[Pg 56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e hall, and tell you of its\r\nhistory and present uses; if in its presence I feel my idea, however\r\nimperfect it may have been, to have led hither and to be now\r\n\u003ci\u003eterminated;\u003c/i\u003e if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run\r\nparallel, so that each term of the one context corresponds serially, as\r\nI walk, with an answering term of the others; why then my soul was\r\nprophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called\r\ncognizant of reality. That percept was what I \u003ci\u003emeant\u003c/i\u003e, for into it my\r\nidea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled\r\nintention. Nowhere is there jar, but every later moment continues and\r\ncorroborates an earlier one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this continuing and corroborating, taken in no transcendental sense,\r\nbut denoting definitely felt transitions, \u003ci\u003elies all that the knowing of\r\na percept by an idea can possibly contain or signify\u003c/i\u003e. Wherever such\r\ntransitions are felt, the first experience \u003ci\u003eknows\u003c/i\u003e the last one. Where\r\nthey do not, or where even as possibles they can not, intervene, there\r\ncan be no pretence of knowing. In this latter case the extremes will be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_57\" id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[Pg 57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003econnected, if connected at all, by inferior relations\u0026mdash;bare likeness or\r\nsuccession, or by \u0026lsquo;withness\u0026rsquo; alone. Knowledge of sensible realities thus\r\ncomes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is \u003ci\u003emade\u003c/i\u003e; and made by\r\nrelations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain\r\nintermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their\r\nterminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction\r\nfollowed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that\r\n\u003ci\u003etheir starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an\r\nobject meant or known\u003c/i\u003e. That is all that knowing (in the simple case\r\nconsidered) can be known-as, that is the whole of its nature, put into\r\nexperiential terms. Whenever such is the sequence of our experiences we\r\nmay freely say that we had the terminal object \u0026lsquo;in mind\u0026rsquo; from the\r\noutset, even although \u003ci\u003eat\u003c/i\u003e the outset nothing was there in us but a flat\r\npiece of substantive experience like any other, with no\r\nself-transcendency about it, and no mystery save the mystery of coming\r\ninto existence and of being gradually followed by other pieces of\r\nsubstantive experience, with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_58\" id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[Pg 58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e conjunctively transitional experiences\r\nbetween. That is what we \u003ci\u003emean\u003c/i\u003e here by the object\u0026rsquo;s being \u0026lsquo;in mind.\u0026rsquo; Of\r\nany deeper more real way of being in mind we have no positive\r\nconception, and we have no right to discredit our actual experience by\r\ntalking of such a way at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI know that many a reader will rebel at this. \u0026ldquo;Mere intermediaries,\u0026rdquo; he\r\nwill say, \u0026ldquo;even though they be feelings of continuously growing\r\nfulfilment, only \u003ci\u003eseparate\u003c/i\u003e the knower from the known, whereas what we\r\nhave in knowledge is a kind of immediate touch of the one by the other,\r\nan \u0026lsquo;apprehension\u0026rsquo; in the etymological sense of the word, a leaping of\r\nthe chasm as by lightning, an act by which two terms are smitten into\r\none, over the head of their distinctness. All these dead intermediaries\r\nof yours are out of each other, and outside of their termini still.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut do not such dialectic difficulties remind us of the dog dropping his\r\nbone and snapping at its image in the water? If we knew any more real\r\nkind of union \u003ci\u003ealiunde\u003c/i\u003e, we might be entitled\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_59\" id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[Pg 59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to brand all our\r\nempirical unions as a sham. But unions by continuous transition are the\r\nonly ones we know of, whether in this matter of a knowledge-about that\r\nterminates in an acquaintance, whether in personal identity, in logical\r\npredication through the copula \u0026lsquo;is,\u0026rsquo; or elsewhere. If anywhere there\r\nwere more absolute unions realized, they could only reveal themselves to\r\nus by just such conjunctive results. These are what the unions are\r\n\u003ci\u003eworth\u003c/i\u003e, these are all that \u003ci\u003ewe can ever practically mean\u003c/i\u003e by union, by\r\ncontinuity. Is it not time to repeat what Lotze said of substances, that\r\nto \u003ci\u003eact like\u003c/i\u003e one is to \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e one?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_33_33\" id=\"FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_33_33\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e Should we not say here that to be\r\nexperienced as continuous is to be really continuous, in a world where\r\nexperience and reality come to the same thing? In a picture gallery a\r\npainted hook will serve to hang a painted chain by, a painted cable will\r\nhold a painted ship. In a world where both the terms and their\r\ndistinctions are affairs of experience, conjunctions that are\r\nexperienced must be at least as real as anything else. They will be\r\n\u0026lsquo;absolutely\u0026rsquo; real conjunctions, if we have no transphenomenal Absolute\r\nready, to derealize the whole experienced world by, at a stroke. If, on\r\nthe other hand, we had such an Absolute, not one of our opponents\u0026rsquo;\r\ntheories of knowledge could remain standing any better than ours could;\r\nfor the distinctions as well as the conjunctions of experience would\r\nimpartially fall its prey. The whole question of how \u0026lsquo;one\u0026rsquo; thing can\r\nknow \u0026lsquo;another\u0026rsquo; would cease to be a real one at all in a world where\r\notherness itself was an illusion.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_34_34\" id=\"FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_34_34\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_60\" id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[Pg 60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the essentials of the cognitive relation, where the\r\nknowledge is conceptual in type, or forms knowledge \u0026lsquo;about\u0026rsquo; an object.\r\nIt consists in intermediary experiences (possible, if not actual) of\r\ncontinuously developing progress, and, finally, of fulfilment, when the\r\nsensible percept, which is the object, is reached. The percept here not\r\nonly \u003ci\u003everifies\u003c/i\u003e the concept, proves its function of knowing that percept\r\nto be true, but the percept\u0026rsquo;s existence as the terminus of the chain of\r\nintermediaries \u003ci\u003ecreates\u003c/i\u003e the function. Whatever terminates that chain\r\nwas, because it now proves itself to be, what the concept \u0026lsquo;had in mind.\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_61\" id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[Pg 61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in\r\nthe fact that an experience that knows another can figure as its\r\n\u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e, not in any quasi-miraculous \u0026lsquo;epistemological\u0026rsquo; sense,\r\nbut in the definite practical sense of being its \u003ci\u003esubstitute\u003c/i\u003e in various\r\noperations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, which lead us to\r\nits associates and results. By experimenting on our ideas of reality, we\r\nmay save ourselves the trouble of experimenting on the real experiences\r\nwhich they severally mean. The ideas form related systems, corresponding\r\npoint for point to the systems which the realities form; and by letting\r\nan ideal term call up its associates systematically, we may be led to a\r\nterminus which the corresponding real term would have led to in case we\r\nhad operated on the real world. And this brings us to the general\r\nquestion of substitution.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_62\" id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[Pg 62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubstitution\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Taine\u0026rsquo;s brilliant book on \u0026lsquo;Intelligence,\u0026rsquo; substitution was for the\r\nfirst time named as a cardinal logical function, though of course the\r\nfacts had always been familiar enough. What, exactly, in a system of\r\nexperiences, does the \u0026lsquo;substitution\u0026rsquo; of one of them for another mean?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to my view, experience as a whole is a process in time,\r\nwhereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others\r\nthat follow upon them by transitions which, whether disjunctive or\r\nconjunctive in content, are themselves experiences, and must in general\r\nbe accounted at least as real as the terms which they relate. What the\r\nnature of the event called \u0026lsquo;superseding\u0026rsquo; signifies, depends altogether\r\non the kind of transition that obtains. Some experiences simply abolish\r\ntheir predecessors without continuing them in any way. Others are felt\r\nto increase or to enlarge their meaning, to carry out their purpose, or\r\nto bring us nearer to their goal. They\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_63\" id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[Pg 63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u0026lsquo;represent\u0026rsquo; them, and may fulfil\r\ntheir function better than they fulfilled it themselves. But to \u0026lsquo;fulfil\r\na function\u0026rsquo; in a world of pure experience can be conceived and defined\r\nin only one possible way. In such a world transitions and arrivals (or\r\nterminations) are the only events that happen, though they happen by so\r\nmany sorts of path. The only function that one experience can perform is\r\nto lead into another experience; and the only fulfilment we can speak of\r\nis the reaching of a certain experienced end. When one experience leads\r\nto (or can lead to) the same end as another, they agree in function. But\r\nthe whole system of experiences as they are immediately given presents\r\nitself as a quasi-chaos through which one can pass out of an initial\r\nterm in many directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from\r\nnext to next by a great many possible paths.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEither one of these paths might be a functional substitute for another,\r\nand to follow one rather than another might on occasion be an\r\nadvantageous thing to do. As a matter of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_64\" id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[Pg 64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e fact, and in a general way,\r\nthe paths that run through conceptual experiences, that is, through\r\n\u0026lsquo;thoughts\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;ideas\u0026rsquo; that \u0026lsquo;know\u0026rsquo; the things in which they terminate,\r\nare highly advantageous paths to follow. Not only do they yield\r\ninconceivably rapid transitions; but, owing to the \u0026lsquo;universal\u0026rsquo;\r\ncharacter\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_35_35\" id=\"FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_35_35\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e which they frequently possess, and to their capacity for\r\nassociation with one another in great systems, they outstrip the tardy\r\nconsecutions of the things themselves, and sweep us on towards our\r\nultimate termini in a far more labor-saving way than the following of\r\ntrains of sensible perception ever could. Wonderful are the new cuts and\r\nthe short-circuits which the thought-paths make. Most thought-paths, it\r\nis true, are substitutes for nothing actual; they end outside the real\r\nworld altogether, in wayward fancies, utopias, fictions or mistakes. But\r\nwhere they do re-enter reality and terminate therein, we substitute them\r\nalways; and with these substitutes we pass the greater number of our\r\nhours.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_65\" id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[Pg 65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is why I called our experiences, taken all together, a quasi-chaos.\r\nThere is vastly more discontinuity in the sum total of experiences than\r\nwe commonly suppose. The objective nucleus of every man\u0026rsquo;s experience,\r\nhis own body, is, it is true, a continuous percept; and equally\r\ncontinuous as a percept (though we may be inattentive to it) is the\r\nmaterial environment of that body, changing by gradual transition when\r\nthe body moves. But the distant parts of the physical world are at all\r\ntimes absent from us, and form conceptual objects merely, into the\r\nperceptual reality of which our life inserts itself at points discrete\r\nand relatively rare. Round their several objective nuclei, partly shared\r\nand common and partly discrete, of the real physical world, innumerable\r\nthinkers, pursuing their several lines of physically true cogitation,\r\ntrace paths that intersect one another only at discontinuous perceptual\r\npoints, and the rest of the time are quite incongruent; and around all\r\nthe nuclei\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_66\" id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[Pg 66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of shared \u0026lsquo;reality,\u0026rsquo; as around the Dyak\u0026rsquo;s head of my late\r\nmetaphor, floats the vast cloud of experiences that are wholly\r\nsubjective, that are non-substitutional, that find not even an eventual\r\nending for themselves in the perceptual world\u0026mdash;the mere day-dreams and\r\njoys and sufferings and wishes of the individual minds. These exist\r\n\u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e one another, indeed, and with the objective nuclei, but out of\r\nthem it is probable that to all eternity no interrelated system of any\r\nkind will ever be made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis notion of the purely substitutional or conceptual physical world\r\nbrings us to the most critical of all the steps in the development of a\r\nphilosophy of pure experience. The paradox of self-transcendency in\r\nknowledge comes back upon us here, but I think that our notions of pure\r\nexperience and of substitution, and our radically empirical view of\r\nconjunctive transitions, are \u003ci\u003eDenkmittel\u003c/i\u003e that will carry us safely\r\nthrough the pass.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_67\" id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[Pg 67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eV. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWhat Objective Reference Is.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhosoever feels his experience to be something substitutional even while\r\nhe has it, may be said to have an experience that reaches beyond itself.\r\nFrom inside of its own entity it says \u0026lsquo;more,\u0026rsquo; and postulates reality\r\nexisting elsewhere. For the transcendentalist, who holds knowing to\r\nconsist in a \u003ci\u003esalto mortale\u003c/i\u003e across an \u0026lsquo;epistemological chasm,\u0026rsquo; such an\r\nidea presents no difficulty; but it seems at first sight as if it might\r\nbe inconsistent with an empiricism like our own. Have we not explained\r\nthat conceptual knowledge is made such wholly by the existence of things\r\nthat fall outside of the knowing experience itself\u0026mdash;by intermediary\r\nexperiences and by a terminus that fulfils? Can the knowledge be there\r\nbefore these elements that constitute its being have come? And, if\r\nknowledge be not there, how can objective reference occur?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe key to this difficulty lies in the distinction between knowing as\r\nverified and completed, and the same knowing as in transit\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_68\" id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[Pg 68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and on its\r\nway. To recur to the Memorial Hall example lately used, it is only when\r\nour idea of the Hall has actually terminated in the percept that we know\r\n\u0026lsquo;for certain\u0026rsquo; that from the beginning it was truly cognitive of \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nUntil established by the end of the process, its quality of knowing\r\nthat, or indeed of knowing anything, could still be doubted; and yet the\r\nknowing really was there, as the result now shows. We were \u003ci\u003evirtual\u003c/i\u003e\r\nknowers of the Hall long before we were certified to have been its\r\nactual knowers, by the percept\u0026rsquo;s retroactive validating power. Just so\r\nwe are \u0026lsquo;mortal\u0026rsquo; all the time, by reason of the virtuality of the\r\ninevitable event which will make us so when it shall have come.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the immensely greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond this\r\nvirtual stage. It never is completed or nailed down. I speak not merely\r\nof our ideas of imperceptibles like ether-waves or dissociated \u0026lsquo;ions,\u0026rsquo;\r\nor of \u0026lsquo;ejects\u0026rsquo; like the contents of our neighbors\u0026rsquo; minds; I speak also\r\nof ideas which we might verify if we would take the trouble, but which\r\nwe hold for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_69\" id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[Pg 69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e true although unterminated perceptually, because nothing\r\nsays \u0026lsquo;no\u0026rsquo; to us, and there is no contradicting truth in sight. \u003ci\u003eTo\r\ncontinue thinking unchallenged is, ninety-nine times out of a hundred,\r\nour practical substitute for knowing in the completed sense.\u003c/i\u003e As each\r\nexperience runs by cognitive transition into the next one, and we\r\nnowhere feel a collision with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact,\r\nwe commit ourselves to the current as if the port were sure. We live, as\r\nit were, upon the front edge of an advancing wave-crest, and our sense\r\nof a determinate direction in falling forward is all we cover of the\r\nfuture of our path. It is as if a differential quotient should be\r\nconscious and treat itself as an adequate substitute for a traced-out\r\ncurve. Our experience, \u003ci\u003einter alia\u003c/i\u003e, is of variations of rate and of\r\ndirection, and lives in these transitions more than in the journey\u0026rsquo;s\r\nend. The experiences of tendency are sufficient to act upon\u0026mdash;what more\r\ncould we have \u003ci\u003edone\u003c/i\u003e at those moments even if the later verification\r\ncomes complete?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is what, as a radical empiricist, I say to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_70\" id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[Pg 70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the charge that the\r\nobjective reference which is so flagrant a character of our experiences\r\ninvolves a chasm and a mortal leap. A positively conjunctive transition\r\ninvolves neither chasm nor leap. Being the very original of what we mean\r\nby continuity, it makes a continuum wherever it appears. I know full\r\nwell that such brief words as these will leave the hardened\r\ntranscendentalist unshaken. Conjunctive experiences \u003ci\u003eseparate\u003c/i\u003e their\r\nterms, he will still say: they are third things interposed, that have\r\nthemselves to be conjoined by new links, and to invoke them makes our\r\ntrouble infinitely worse. To \u0026lsquo;feel\u0026rsquo; our motion forward is impossible.\r\nMotion implies terminus; and how can terminus be felt before we have\r\narrived? The barest start and sally forwards, the barest tendency to\r\nleave the instant, involves the chasm and the leap. Conjunctive\r\ntransitions are the most superficial of appearances, illusions of our\r\nsensibility which philosophical reflection pulverizes at a touch.\r\nConception is our only trustworthy instrument, conception and the\r\nAbsolute working hand in hand. Conception\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_71\" id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[Pg 71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e disintegrates experience\r\nutterly, but its disjunctions are easily overcome again when the\r\nAbsolute takes up the task.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch transcendentalists I must leave, provisionally at least, in full\r\npossession of their creed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_36_36\" id=\"FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_36_36\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e I have no space for polemics in this\r\narticle, so I shall simply formulate the empiricist doctrine as my\r\nhypothesis, leaving it to work or not work as it may.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObjective reference, I say then, is an incident of the fact that so much\r\nof our experience comes as an insufficient and consists of process and\r\ntransition. Our fields of experience have no more definite boundaries\r\nthan have our fields of view. Both are fringed forever by a \u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e that\r\ncontinuously develops, and that continuously supersedes them as life\r\nproceeds. The relations, generally speaking, are as real here as the\r\nterms are, and the only complaint of the transcendentalist\u0026rsquo;s with which\r\nI could at all sympathize would be his charge that, by first making\r\nknowledge to consist in external relations as I have done, and by then\r\nconfessing that nine-tenths of the time these are not actually but only\r\nvirtually there, I have knocked the solid bottom out of the whole\r\nbusiness, and palmed off a substitute of knowledge for the genuine\r\nthing. Only the admission, such a critic might say, that our ideas are\r\nself-transcendent and \u0026lsquo;true\u0026rsquo; already, in advance of the experiences that\r\nare to terminate them, can bring solidity back to knowledge in a world\r\nlike this, in which transitions and terminations are only by exception\r\nfulfilled.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_72\" id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[Pg 72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis seems to me an excellent place for applying the pragmatic method.\r\nWhen a dispute arises, that method consists in auguring what practical\r\nconsequences would be different if one side rather than the other were\r\ntrue. If no difference can be thought of, the dispute is a quarrel over\r\nwords. What then would the self-transcendency affirmed to exist in\r\nadvance of all experiential mediation or termination, be \u003ci\u003eknown-as\u003c/i\u003e?\r\nWhat would it practically result in for \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e, were it true?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our\r\nexpectations and practical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_73\" id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[Pg 73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e tendencies into the right path; and the\r\nright path here, so long as we and the object are not yet face to face\r\n(or can never get face to face, as in the case of ejects), would be the\r\npath that led us into the object\u0026rsquo;s nearest neighborhood. Where direct\r\nacquaintance is lacking, \u0026lsquo;knowledge about\u0026rsquo; is the next best thing, and\r\nan acquaintance with what actually lies about the object, and is most\r\nclosely related to it, puts such knowledge within our grasp. Ether-waves\r\nand your anger, for example, are things in which my thoughts will never\r\n\u003ci\u003eperceptually\u003c/i\u003e terminate, but my concepts of them lead me to their very\r\nbrink, to the chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which\r\nare their really next effects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven if our ideas did in themselves carry the postulated\r\nself-transcendency, it would still remain true that their putting us\r\ninto possession of such effects \u003ci\u003ewould be the sole cash-value of the\r\nself-transcendency for us\u003c/i\u003e. And this cash-value, it is needless to say,\r\nis \u003ci\u003everbatim et literatim\u003c/i\u003e what our empiricist account pays in. On\r\npragmatist principles therefore, a dispute\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_74\" id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[Pg 74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e over self-transcendency is a\r\npure logomachy. Call our concepts of ejective things self-transcendent\r\nor the reverse, it makes no difference, so long as we don\u0026rsquo;t differ about\r\nthe nature of that exalted virtue\u0026rsquo;s fruits\u0026mdash;fruits for us, of course,\r\nhumanistic fruits. If an Absolute were proved to exist for other\r\nreasons, it might well appear that \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e knowledge is terminated in\r\ninnumerable cases where ours is still incomplete. That, however, would\r\nbe a fact indifferent to our knowledge. The latter would grow neither\r\nworse nor better, whether we acknowledged such an Absolute or left him\r\nout.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo the notion of a knowledge still \u003ci\u003ein transitu\u003c/i\u003e and on its way joins\r\nhands here with that notion of a \u0026lsquo;pure experience\u0026rsquo; which I tried to\r\nexplain in my [essay] entitled \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo; The instant\r\nfield of the present is always experience in its \u0026lsquo;pure\u0026rsquo; state, plain\r\nunqualified actuality, a simple \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e, as yet undifferentiated into\r\nthing and thought, and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or\r\nas some one\u0026rsquo;s opinion about fact. This is as true\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_75\" id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[Pg 75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e when the field is\r\nconceptual as when it is perceptual. \u0026lsquo;Memorial Hall\u0026rsquo; is \u0026lsquo;there\u0026rsquo; in my\r\nidea as much as when I stand before it. I proceed to act on its account\r\nin either case. Only in the later experience that supersedes the present\r\none is this \u003ci\u003ena\u0026iuml;f\u003c/i\u003e immediacy retrospectively split into two parts, a\r\n\u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo; and its \u0026lsquo;content,\u0026rsquo; and the content corrected or\r\nconfirmed. While still pure, or present, any experience\u0026mdash;mine, for\r\nexample, of what I write about in these very lines\u0026mdash;passes for \u0026lsquo;truth.\u0026rsquo;\r\nThe morrow may reduce it to \u0026lsquo;opinion.\u0026rsquo; The transcendentalist in all his\r\nparticular knowledges is as liable to this reduction as I am: his\r\nAbsolute does not save him. Why, then, need he quarrel with an account\r\nof knowing that merely leaves it liable to this inevitable condition?\r\nWhy insist that knowing is a static relation out of time when it\r\npractically seems so much a function of our active life? For a thing to\r\nbe valid, says Lotze, is the same as to make itself valid. When the\r\nwhole universe seems only to be making itself valid and to be still\r\nincomplete (else why its ceaseless changing?) why, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_76\" id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[Pg 76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e all things,\r\nshould knowing be exempt? Why should it not be making itself valid like\r\neverything else? That some parts of it may be already valid or verified\r\nbeyond dispute, the empirical philosopher, of course, like any one else,\r\nmay always hope.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVI. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Conterminousness of Different Minds\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_37_37\" id=\"FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_37_37\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith transition and prospect thus enthroned in pure experience, it is\r\nimpossible to subscribe to the idealism of the English school. Radical\r\nempiricism has, in fact, more affinities with natural realism than with\r\nthe views of Berkeley or of Mill, and this can be easily shown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the Berkeleyan school, ideas (the verbal equivalent of what I term\r\nexperiences) are discontinuous. The content of each is wholly immanent,\r\nand there are no transitions with which they are consubstantial and\r\nthrough which their beings may unite. Your Memorial Hall and mine, even\r\nwhen both are percepts, are wholly out of connection with each other.\r\nOur lives are a congeries of solipsisms, out of which in strict logic\r\nonly a God could compose a universe even of discourse. No dynamic\r\ncurrents run between my objects and your objects. Never can our minds\r\nmeet in the \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_77\" id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[Pg 77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe incredibility of such a philosophy is flagrant. It is \u0026lsquo;cold,\r\nstrained, and unnatural\u0026rsquo; in a supreme degree; and it may be doubted\r\nwhether even Berkeley himself, who took it so religiously, really\r\nbelieved, when walking through the streets of London, that his spirit\r\nand the spirits of his fellow wayfarers had absolutely different towns\r\nin view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo me the decisive reason in favor of our minds meeting in \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e common\r\nobjects at least is that, unless I make that supposition, I have no\r\nmotive for assuming that your mind exists at all. Why do I postulate\r\nyour mind? Because I see your body acting in a certain way. Its\r\ngestures, facial movements, words and conduct generally, are\r\n\u0026lsquo;expressive,\u0026rsquo; so I deem it actuated as my own is, by an inner life like\r\nmine. This argument from analogy is my\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_78\" id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[Pg 78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ereason\u003c/i\u003e, whether an instinctive\r\nbelief runs before it or not. But what is \u0026lsquo;your body\u0026rsquo; here but a percept\r\nin \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e field? It is only as animating \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e object, \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e object, that\r\nI have any occasion to think of you at all. If the body that you actuate\r\nbe not the very body that I see there, but some duplicate body of your\r\nown with which that has nothing to do, we belong to different universes,\r\nyou and I, and for me to speak of you is folly. Myriads of such\r\nuniverses even now may coexist, irrelevant to one another; my concern is\r\nsolely with the universe with which my own life is connected.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn that perceptual part of \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e universe which I call \u003ci\u003eyour\u003c/i\u003e body, your\r\nmind and my mind meet and may be called conterminous. Your mind actuates\r\nthat body and mine sees it; my thoughts pass into it as into their\r\nharmonious cognitive fulfilment; your emotions and volitions pass into\r\nit as causes into their effects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut that percept hangs together with all our other physical percepts.\r\nThey are of one stuff with it; and if it be our common possession, they\r\nmust be so likewise. For instance, your\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_79\" id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[Pg 79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e hand lays hold of one end of a\r\nrope and my hand lays hold of the other end. We pull against each other.\r\nCan our two hands be mutual objects in this experience, and the rope not\r\nbe mutual also? What is true of the rope is true of any other percept.\r\nYour objects are over and over again the same as mine. If I ask you\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhere\u003c/i\u003e some object of yours is, our old Memorial Hall, for example, you\r\npoint to \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e Memorial Hall with \u003ci\u003eyour\u003c/i\u003e hand which \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e see. If you alter\r\nan object in your world, put out a candle, for example, when I am\r\npresent, \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e candle \u003ci\u003eipso facto\u003c/i\u003e goes out. It is only as altering my\r\nobjects that I guess you to exist. If your objects do not coalesce with\r\nmy objects, if they be not identically where mine are, they must be\r\nproved to be positively somewhere else. But no other location can be\r\nassigned for them, so their place must be what it seems to be, the\r\nsame.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_38_38\" id=\"FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_38_38\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_80\" id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[Pg 80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePractically, then, our minds meet in a world of objects which they share\r\nin common, which would still be there, if one or several of the minds\r\nwere destroyed. I can see no formal objection to this supposition\u0026rsquo;s\r\nbeing literally true. On the principles which I am defending, a \u0026lsquo;mind\u0026rsquo;\r\nor \u0026lsquo;personal consciousness\u0026rsquo; is the name for a series of experiences run\r\ntogether by certain definite transitions, and an objective reality is a\r\nseries of similar experiences knit by different transitions. If one and\r\nthe same experience can figure twice, once in a mental and once in a\r\nphysical context (as I have tried, in my article on \u0026lsquo;Consciousness,\u0026rsquo; to\r\nshow that it can), one does not see why it might not figure thrice, or\r\nfour times, or any number of times, by running into as many different\r\nmental contexts, just as the same point, lying at their intersection,\r\ncan be continued into many different lines. Abolishing any number of\r\ncontexts would not destroy the experience itself or its other contexts,\r\nany more than abolishing some of the point\u0026rsquo;s linear continuations would\r\ndestroy the others, or destroy the point itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI well know the subtle dialectic which insists\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_81\" id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[Pg 81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that a term taken in\r\nanother relation must needs be an intrinsically different term. The crux\r\nis always the old Greek one, that the same man can\u0026rsquo;t be tall in relation\r\nto one neighbor, and short in relation to another, for that would make\r\nhim tall and short at once. In this essay I can not stop to refute this\r\ndialectic, so I pass on, leaving my flank for the time exposed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_39_39\" id=\"FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e But\r\nif my reader will only allow that the same \u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo; both ends his past\r\nand begins his future; or that, when he buys an acre of land from his\r\nneighbor, it is the same acre that successively figures in the two\r\nestates; or that when I pay him a dollar, the same dollar goes into his\r\npocket that came out of mine; he will also in consistency have to allow\r\nthat the same object may conceivably play a part in, as being related to\r\nthe rest of, any number of otherwise entirely different minds. This is\r\nenough for my present point: the common-sense notion of minds sharing\r\nthe same object offers no special logical or epistemological\r\ndifficulties of its own; it stands or falls with the general possibility\r\nof things being in conjunctive relation with other things at all.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_82\" id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[Pg 82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn principle, then, let natural realism pass for possible. Your mind and\r\nmine \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e terminate in the same percept, not merely against it, as if\r\nit were a third external thing, but by inserting themselves into it and\r\ncoalescing with it, for such is the sort of conjunctive union that\r\nappears to be experienced when a perceptual terminus \u0026lsquo;fulfils.\u0026rsquo; Even so,\r\ntwo hawsers may embrace the same pile, and yet neither one of them touch\r\nany other part except that pile, of what the other hawser is attached\r\nto.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is therefore not a formal question, but a question of empirical fact\r\nsolely, whether, when you and I are said to know the \u0026lsquo;same\u0026rsquo; Memorial\r\nHall, our minds do terminate at or in a numerically identical percept.\r\nObviously, as a plain matter of fact, they do \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e. Apart from\r\ncolor-blindness and such possibilities, we see the Hall in different\r\nperspectives. You may be on one side of it and I on another. The percept\r\nof each of us, as he sees the surface of the Hall, is moreover only his\r\nprovisional terminus. The\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_83\" id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[Pg 83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e next thing beyond my percept is not your\r\nmind, but more percepts of my own into which my first percept develops,\r\nthe interior of the Hall, for instance, or the inner structure of its\r\nbricks and mortar. If our minds were in a literal sense \u003ci\u003econ\u003c/i\u003eterminous,\r\nneither could get beyond the percept which they had in common, it would\r\nbe an ultimate barrier between them\u0026mdash;unless indeed they flowed over it\r\nand became \u0026lsquo;co-conscious\u0026rsquo; over a still larger part of their content,\r\nwhich (thought-transference apart) is not supposed to be the case. In\r\npoint of fact the ultimate common barrier can always be pushed, by both\r\nminds, farther than any actual percept of either, until at last it\r\nresolves itself into the mere notion of imperceptibles like atoms or\r\nether, so that, where we do terminate in percepts, our knowledge is only\r\nspeciously completed, being, in theoretic strictness, only a virtual\r\nknowledge of those remoter objects which conception carries out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIs natural realism, permissible in logic, refuted then by empirical\r\nfact? Do our minds have no object in common after all?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_84\" id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[Pg 84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYes, they certainly have \u003ci\u003eSpace\u003c/i\u003e in common. On pragmatic principles we\r\nare obliged to predicate sameness wherever we can predicate no\r\nassignable point of difference. If two named things have every quality\r\nand function indiscernible, and are at the same time in the same place,\r\nthey must be written down as numerically one thing under two different\r\nnames. But there is no test discoverable, so far as I know, by which it\r\ncan be shown that the place occupied by your percept of Memorial Hall\r\ndiffers from the place occupied by mine. The percepts themselves may be\r\nshown to differ; but if each of us be asked to point out where his\r\npercept is, we point to an identical spot. All the relations, whether\r\ngeometrical or causal, of the Hall originate or terminate in that spot\r\nwherein our hands meet, and where each of us begins to work if he wishes\r\nto make the Hall change before the other\u0026rsquo;s eyes. Just so it is with our\r\nbodies. That body of yours which you actuate and feel from within must\r\nbe in the same spot as the body of yours which I see or touch from\r\nwithout. \u0026lsquo;There\u0026rsquo; for me means\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_85\" id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[Pg 85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e where I place my finger. If you do not\r\nfeel my finger\u0026rsquo;s contact to be \u0026lsquo;there\u0026rsquo; in \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e sense, when I place it on\r\nyour body, where then do you feel it? Your inner actuations of your body\r\nmeet my finger \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e: it is \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e that you resist its push, or\r\nshrink back, or sweep the finger aside with your hand. Whatever farther\r\nknowledge either of us may acquire of the real constitution of the body\r\nwhich we thus feel, you from within and I from without, it is in that\r\nsame place that the newly conceived or perceived constituents have to be\r\nlocated, and it is \u003ci\u003ethrough\u003c/i\u003e that space that your and my mental\r\nintercourse with each other has always to be carried on, by the\r\nmediation of impressions which I convey thither, and of the reactions\r\nthence which those impressions may provoke from you.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn general terms, then, whatever differing contents our minds may\r\neventually fill a place with, the place itself is a numerically\r\nidentical content of the two minds, a piece of common property in which,\r\nthrough which, and over which they join. The receptacle of certain of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_86\" id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[Pg 86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour experiences being thus common, the experiences themselves might some\r\nday become common also. If that day ever did come, our thoughts would\r\nterminate in a complete empirical identity, there would be an end, so\r\nfar as \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e experiences went, to our discussions about truth. No\r\npoints of difference appearing, they would have to count as the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVII. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConclusion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith this we have the outlines of a philosophy of pure experience before\r\nus. At the outset of my essay, I called it a mosaic philosophy. In\r\nactual mosaics the pieces are held together by their bedding, for which\r\nbedding the Substances, transcendental Egos, or Absolutes of other\r\nphilosophies may be taken to stand. In radical empiricism there is no\r\nbedding; it is as if the pieces clung together by their edges, the\r\ntransitions experienced between them forming their cement. Of course\r\nsuch a metaphor is misleading, for in actual experience the more\r\nsubstantive and the more transitive parts run into each other\r\ncontinuously, there is in general\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_87\" id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[Pg 87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e no separateness needing to be\r\novercome by an external cement; and whatever separateness is actually\r\nexperienced is not overcome, it stays and counts as separateness to the\r\nend. But the metaphor serves to symbolize the fact that Experience\r\nitself, taken at large, can grow by its edges. That one moment of it\r\nproliferates into the next by transitions which, whether conjunctive or\r\ndisjunctive, continue the experiential tissue, can not, I contend, be\r\ndenied. Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected;\r\noften, indeed, it seems to be there more emphatically, as if our spurts\r\nand sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle, were like\r\nthe thin line of flame advancing across the dry autumnal field which the\r\nfarmer proceeds to burn. In this line we live prospectively as well as\r\nretrospectively. It is \u0026lsquo;of\u0026rsquo; the past, inasmuch as it comes expressly as\r\nthe past\u0026rsquo;s continuation; it is \u0026lsquo;of\u0026rsquo; the future in so far as the future,\r\nwhen it comes, will have continued \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese relations of continuous transition experienced are what make our\r\nexperiences\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_88\" id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[Pg 88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e cognitive. In the simplest and completest cases the\r\nexperiences are cognitive of one another. When one of them terminates a\r\nprevious series of them with a sense of fulfilment, it, we say, is what\r\nthose other experiences \u0026lsquo;had in view.\u0026rsquo; The knowledge, in such a case, is\r\nverified; the truth is \u0026lsquo;salted down.\u0026rsquo; Mainly, however, we live on\r\nspeculative investments, or on our prospects only. But living on things\r\n\u003ci\u003ein posse\u003c/i\u003e is as good as living in the actual, so long as our credit\r\nremains good. It is evident that for the most part it is good, and that\r\nthe universe seldom protests our drafts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this sense we at every moment can continue to believe in an existing\r\n\u003ci\u003ebeyond\u003c/i\u003e. It is only in special cases that our confident rush forward\r\ngets rebuked. The beyond must, of course, always in our philosophy be\r\nitself of an experiential nature. If not a future experience of our own\r\nor a present one of our neighbor, it must be a thing in itself in Dr.\r\nPrince\u0026rsquo;s and Professor Strong\u0026rsquo;s sense of the term\u0026mdash;that is, it must be\r\nan experience \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e itself whose relation to other things we translate\r\ninto the action\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_89\" id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[Pg 89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of molecules, ether-waves, or whatever else the\r\nphysical symbols may be.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_40_40\" id=\"FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_40_40\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e This opens the chapter of the relations of\r\nradical empiricism to panpsychism, into which I can not enter now.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_41_41\" id=\"FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_41_41\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe beyond can in any case exist simultaneously\u0026mdash;for it can be\r\nexperienced \u003ci\u003eto have existed\u003c/i\u003e simultaneously\u0026mdash;with the experience that\r\npractically postulates it by looking in its direction, or by turning or\r\nchanging in the direction of which it is the goal. Pending that\r\nactuality of union, in the virtuality of which the \u0026lsquo;truth,\u0026rsquo; even now, of\r\nthe postulation consists, the beyond and its knower are entities split\r\noff from each other. The world is in so far forth a pluralism of which\r\nthe unity is not fully experienced as yet. But, as fast as verifications\r\ncome, trains of experience, once separate, run into one another; and\r\nthat is why I said, earlier in my article, that the unity of the world\r\nis on the whole undergoing increase. The universe continually grows in\r\nquantity by new experiences that graft themselves upon the older mass;\r\nbut these very new experiences often help the mass to a more\r\nconsolidated form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_90\" id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[Pg 90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese are the main features of a philosophy of pure experience. It has\r\ninnumerable other aspects and arouses innumerable questions, but the\r\npoints I have touched on seem enough to make an entering wedge. In my\r\nown mind such a philosophy harmonizes best with a radical pluralism,\r\nwith novelty and indeterminism, moralism and theism, and with the\r\n\u0026lsquo;humanism\u0026rsquo; lately sprung upon us by the Oxford and the Chicago\r\nschools.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_42_42\" id=\"FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_42_42\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e I can not, however, be sure that all these doctrines are\r\nits necessary and indispensable allies. It presents so many points of\r\ndifference, both from the common sense and from the idealism that have\r\nmade our philosophic language, that it is almost as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_91\" id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[Pg 91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e difficult to state\r\nit as it is to think it out clearly, and if it is ever to grow into a\r\nrespectable system, it will have to be built up by the contributions of\r\nmany co-operating minds. It seems to me, as I said at the outset of this\r\nessay, that many minds are, in point of fact, now turning in a direction\r\nthat points towards radical empiricism. If they are carried farther by\r\nmy words, and if then they add their stronger voices to my feebler one,\r\nthe publication of this essay will have been worth while.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_25_25\" id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. I, 1904, No. 20, September 29, and No. 21,\r\nOctober 13. Pp. 52-76 have also been reprinted, with some omissions,\r\nalterations and additions, in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 102-120. The\r\nalterations have been adopted in the present text. This essay is\r\nreferred to in \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, p. 280, note 5. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_26_26\" id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. Berkeley: \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Human Knowledge\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nIntroduction; Hume: \u003ci\u003eAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding\u003c/i\u003e, sect.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evii\u003c/span\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e (Selby-Bigge\u0026rsquo;s edition, p. 74); James Mill: \u003ci\u003eAnalysis of\r\nthe Phenomena of the Human Mind\u003c/i\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eviii\u003c/span\u003e; J. S. Mill: \u003ci\u003eAn Examination\r\nof Sir William Hamilton\u0026rsquo;s Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exi\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e; W. K. Clifford:\r\n\u003ci\u003eLectures and Essays\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 274 ff.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_27_27\" id=\"Footnote_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See \u0026ldquo;The Experience of Activity,\u0026rdquo; below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155-189\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_28_28\" id=\"Footnote_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The psychology books have of late described the facts here\r\nwith approximate adequacy. I may refer to the chapters on \u0026lsquo;The Stream of\r\nThought\u0026rsquo; and on the Self in my own \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, as well\r\nas to S. H. Hodgson\u0026rsquo;s \u003ci\u003eMetaphysic of Experience\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evii\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eviii\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_29_29\" id=\"Footnote_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See \u0026ldquo;The Thing and its Relations,\u0026rdquo; below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92-122\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_30_30\" id=\"Footnote_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For brevity\u0026rsquo;s sake I altogether omit mention of the type\r\nconstituted by knowledge of the truth of general propositions. This type\r\nhas been thoroughly and, so far as I can see, satisfactorily, elucidated\r\nin Dewey\u0026rsquo;s \u003ci\u003eStudies in Logical Theory\u003c/i\u003e. Such propositions are reducible\r\nto the \u003ci\u003eS\u003c/i\u003e-is-\u003ci\u003eP\u003c/i\u003e form; and the \u0026lsquo;terminus\u0026rsquo; that verifies and fulfils is\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eSP\u003c/i\u003e in combination. Of course percepts may be involved in the\r\nmediating experiences, or in the \u0026lsquo;satisfactoriness\u0026rsquo; of the \u003ci\u003eP\u003c/i\u003e in its\r\nnew position.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_31_31\" id=\"Footnote_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9-15\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_32_32\" id=\"Footnote_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u0026ldquo;On the Function of Cognition,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e, 1885, and\r\n\u0026ldquo;The Knowing of Things Together,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, 1895.\r\nThese articles are reprinted, the former in full, the latter in part, in\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 1-50. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e] These articles and their\r\ndoctrine, unnoticed apparently by any one else, have lately gained\r\nfavorable comment from Professor Strong. [\u0026ldquo;A Naturalistic Theory of the\r\nReference of Thought to Reality,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, 1904.] Dr. Dickinson S. Miller has\r\nindependently thought out the same results [\u0026ldquo;The Meaning of Truth and\r\nError,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, 1893; \u0026ldquo;The Confusion of\r\nFunction and Content in Mental Analysis,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, 1895], which Strong accordingly dubs the James-Miller theory of\r\ncognition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_33_33\" id=\"Footnote_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[33]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. H. Lotze: \u003ci\u003eMetaphysik\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026sect;\u0026sect; 37-39, 97, 98, 243.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_34_34\" id=\"Footnote_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[34]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mr. Bradley, not professing to know his absolute\r\n\u003ci\u003ealiunde\u003c/i\u003e, nevertheless derealizes Experience by alleging it to be\r\neverywhere infected with self-contradiction. His arguments seem almost\r\npurely verbal, but this is no place for arguing that point out. [Cf. F.\r\nH. Bradley; \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality, passim;\u003c/i\u003e and below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106-122\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_35_35\" id=\"Footnote_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[35]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of which all that need be said in this essay is that it\r\nalso can be conceived as functional, and defined in terms of\r\ntransitions, or of the possibility of such. [Cf. \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nPsychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 473-480, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 337-340; \u003ci\u003ePragmatism\u003c/i\u003e, p.\r\n265; \u003ci\u003eSome Problems of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 63-74; \u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp.\r\n246-247, etc. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_36_36\" id=\"Footnote_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[36]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e ff.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_37_37\" id=\"Footnote_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[37]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. \u0026ldquo;How Two Minds Can Know One Thing,\u0026rdquo; below, pp.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_123\"\u003e123-136\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_38_38\" id=\"Footnote_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[38]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The notion that our objects are inside of our respective\r\nheads is not seriously defensible, so I pass it by.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_39_39\" id=\"Footnote_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[39]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [The argument is resumed below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e sq. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_40_40\" id=\"Footnote_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[40]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Our minds and these ejective realities would still have\r\nspace (or pseudo-space, as I believe Professor Strong calls the medium\r\nof interaction between \u0026lsquo;things-in-themselves\u0026rsquo;) in common. These would\r\nexist \u003ci\u003ewhere\u003c/i\u003e, and begin to act \u003ci\u003ewhere\u003c/i\u003e, we locate the molecules, etc.,\r\nand \u003ci\u003ewhere\u003c/i\u003e we perceive the sensible phenomena explained thereby. [Cf.\r\nMorton Prince: \u003ci\u003eThe Nature of Mind, and Human Automatism\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, ch.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e; C. A. Strong: \u003ci\u003eWhy the Mind Has a Body\u003c/i\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_41_41\" id=\"Footnote_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[41]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. below, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, Lect.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv-vii\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_42_42\" id=\"Footnote_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[42]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have said something of this latter alliance in an\r\narticle entitled \u0026lsquo;Humanism and Truth,\u0026rsquo; in \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, October, 1904.\r\n[Reprinted in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 51-101. Cf. also \u0026ldquo;Humanism and\r\nTruth Once More,\u0026rdquo; below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_244\"\u003e244-265\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_92\" id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[Pg 92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"III\" id=\"III\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE THING AND ITS RELATIONS\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_43_43\" id=\"FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_43_43\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExperience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent. The active sense of\r\nliving which we all enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive\r\nworld for us, is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes. Its\r\ndifficulties are disappointments and uncertainties. They are not\r\nintellectual contradictions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the reflective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers\r\nincomprehensibilities in the flowing process. Distinguishing its\r\nelements and parts, it gives them separate names, and what it thus\r\ndisjoins it can not easily put together. Pyrrhonism accepts the\r\nirrationality and revels in its dialectic elaboration. Other\r\nphilosophies try, some by ignoring, some by resisting, and some by\r\nturning the dialectic procedure against itself, negating its first\r\nnegations, to restore the fluent sense of life again, and let redemption\r\ntake the place of innocence. The perfection with which any philosophy\r\nmay do this is the measure of its human success and of its importance in\r\nphilosophic history. In [the last essay], \u0026lsquo;A World of Pure Experience,\u0026rsquo;\r\nI tried my own hand sketchily at the problem, resisting certain first\r\nsteps of dialectics by insisting in a general way that the immediately\r\nexperienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else. If my\r\nsketch is not to appear too \u003ci\u003ena\u0026iuml;f\u003c/i\u003e, I must come closer to details, and\r\nin the present essay I propose to do so.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_93\" id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[Pg 93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026lsquo;Pure experience\u0026rsquo; is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life\r\nwhich furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual\r\ncategories. Only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs,\r\nillnesses, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the\r\nliteral sense of a \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e which is not yet any definite \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e, tho\u0026rsquo;\r\nready to be all sorts of whats; full both of oneness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_94\" id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[Pg 94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and of manyness,\r\nbut in respects that don\u0026rsquo;t appear; changing throughout, yet so\r\nconfusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of\r\ndistinction or of identity, can be caught. Pure experience in this state\r\nis but another name for feeling or sensation. But the flux of it no\r\nsooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these\r\nsalient parts become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that\r\nexperience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and\r\nprepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a relative term,\r\nmeaning the proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which it still\r\nembodies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFar back as we go, the flux, both as a whole and in its parts, is that\r\nof things conjunct and separated. The great continua of time, space, and\r\nthe self envelope everything, betwixt them, and flow together without\r\ninterfering. The things that they envelope come as separate in some ways\r\nand as continuous in others. Some sensations coalesce with some ideas,\r\nand others are irreconcilable. Qualities\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_95\" id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[Pg 95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e compenetrate one space, or\r\nexclude each other from it. They cling together persistently in groups\r\nthat move as units, or else they separate. Their changes are abrupt or\r\ndiscontinuous; and their kinds resemble or differ; and, as they do so,\r\nthey fall into either even or irregular series.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all this the continuities and the discontinuities are absolutely\r\nco-ordinate matters of immediate feeling. The conjunctions are as\r\nprimordial elements of \u0026lsquo;fact\u0026rsquo; as are the distinctions and disjunctions.\r\nIn the same act by which I feel that this passing minute is a new pulse\r\nof my life, I feel that the old life continues into it, and the feeling\r\nof continuance in no wise jars upon the simultaneous feeling of a\r\nnovelty. They, too, compenetrate harmoniously. Prepositions, copulas,\r\nand conjunctions, \u0026lsquo;is,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;isn\u0026rsquo;t,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;then,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;before,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;in,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;on,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;beside,\u0026rsquo;\r\n\u0026lsquo;between,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;next,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;like,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;unlike,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;as,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;but,\u0026rsquo; flower out of the\r\nstream of pure experience, the stream of concretes or the sensational\r\nstream, as naturally as nouns and adjectives do, and they melt into it\r\nagain as fluidly when we apply them to a new portion of the stream.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_96\" id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[Pg 96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf now we ask why we must thus translate experience from a more concrete\r\nor pure into a more intellectualized form, filling it with ever more\r\nabounding conceptual distinctions, rationalism and naturalism give\r\ndifferent replies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe rationalistic answer is that the theoretic life is absolute and its\r\ninterests imperative; that to understand is simply the duty of man; and\r\nthat who questions this need not be argued with, for by the fact of\r\narguing he gives away his case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe naturalist answer is that the environment kills as well as sustains\r\nus, and that the tendency of raw experience to extinguish the experient\r\nhimself is lessened just in the degree in which the elements in it that\r\nhave a practical bearing upon life are analyzed out of the continuum and\r\nverbally fixed and coupled together, so that we may know what is in the\r\nwind for us and get ready to react in time. Had pure experience, the\r\nnaturalist says, been always perfectly healthy, there would never\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_97\" id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[Pg 97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e have\r\narisen the necessity of isolating or verbalizing any of its terms. We\r\nshould just have experienced inarticulately and unintellectually\r\nenjoyed. This leaning on \u0026lsquo;reaction\u0026rsquo; in the naturalist account implies\r\nthat, whenever we intellectualize a relatively pure experience, we ought\r\nto do so for the sake of redescending to the purer or more concrete\r\nlevel again; and that if an intellect stays aloft among its abstract\r\nterms and generalized relations, and does not reinsert itself with its\r\nconclusions into some particular point of the immediate stream of life,\r\nit fails to finish out its function and leaves its normal race unrun.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost rationalists nowadays will agree that naturalism gives a true\r\nenough account of the way in which our intellect arose at first, but\r\nthey will deny these latter implications. The case, they will say,\r\nresembles that of sexual love. Originating in the animal need of getting\r\nanother generation born, this passion has developed secondarily such\r\nimperious spiritual needs that, if you ask why another generation ought\r\nto be born at all, the answer is: \u0026lsquo;Chiefly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_98\" id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[Pg 98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that love may go on.\u0026rsquo; Just\r\nso with our intellect: it originated as a practical means of serving\r\nlife; but it has developed incidentally the function of understanding\r\nabsolute truth; and life itself now seems to be given chiefly as a means\r\nby which that function may be prosecuted. But truth and the\r\nunderstanding of it lie among the abstracts and universals, so the\r\nintellect now carries on its higher business wholly in this region,\r\nwithout any need of redescending into pure experience again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the contrasted tendencies which I thus designate as naturalistic and\r\nrationalistic are not recognized by the reader, perhaps an example will\r\nmake them more concrete. Mr. Bradley, for instance, is an\r\nultra-rationalist. He admits that our intellect is primarily practical,\r\nbut says that, for philosophers, the practical need is simply Truth.\r\nTruth, moreover, must be assumed \u0026lsquo;consistent.\u0026rsquo; Immediate experience has\r\nto be broken into subjects and qualities, terms and relations, to be\r\nunderstood as truth at all. Yet when so broken it is less consistent\r\nthan ever. Taken raw, it is all\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_99\" id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[Pg 99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e un-distinguished. Intellectualized, it\r\nis all distinction without oneness. \u0026lsquo;Such an arrangement may \u003ci\u003ework\u003c/i\u003e, but\r\nthe theoretic problem is not solved.\u0026rsquo; The question is \u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e the\r\ndiversity can exist in harmony with the oneness.\u0026rsquo; To go back to pure\r\nexperience is unavailing. \u0026lsquo;Mere feeling gives no answer to our riddle.\u0026rsquo;\r\nEven if your intuition is a fact, it is not an \u003ci\u003eunderstanding\u003c/i\u003e. \u0026lsquo;It is a\r\nmere experience, and furnishes no consistent view.\u0026rsquo; The experience\r\noffered as facts or truths \u0026lsquo;I find that my intellect rejects because\r\nthey contradict themselves. They offer a complex of diversities\r\nconjoined in a way which it feels is not its way and which it can not\r\nrepeat as its own…. For to be satisfied, my intellect must understand,\r\nand it can not understand by taking a congeries in the lump.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_44_44\" id=\"FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_44_44\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e So Mr.\r\nBradley, in the sole interests of \u0026lsquo;understanding\u0026rsquo; (as he conceives that\r\nfunction), turns his back on finite experience forever. Truth must lie\r\nin the opposite direction, the direction of the Absolute; and this kind\r\nof rationalism and naturalism, or (as I will now call it) pragmatism,\r\nwalk thenceforward upon opposite paths. For the one, those intellectual\r\nproducts are most true which, turning their face towards the Absolute,\r\ncome nearest to symbolizing its ways of uniting the many and the one.\r\nFor the other, those are most true which most successfully dip back into\r\nthe finite stream of feeling and grow most easily confluent with some\r\nparticular wave or wavelet. Such confluence not only proves the\r\nintellectual operation to have been true (as an addition may \u0026lsquo;prove\u0026rsquo;\r\nthat a subtraction is already rightly performed), but it constitutes,\r\naccording to pragmatism, all that we mean by calling it true. Only in so\r\nfar as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, back into sensible\r\nexperience again, are our abstracts and universals true or false at\r\nall.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_45_45\" id=\"FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_45_45\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_100\" id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[Pg 100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Section VI of [the last essay], I adopted in a general way the\r\ncommon-sense belief that one and the same world is cognized by our\r\ndifferent minds; but I left undiscussed the dialectical arguments which\r\nmaintain that this is logically absurd. The usual reason given for its\r\nbeing absurd is that it assumes one object (to wit, the world) to stand\r\nin two relations at once; to my mind, namely, and again to yours;\r\nwhereas a term taken in a second relation can not logically be the same\r\nterm which it was at first.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_101\" id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[Pg 101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have heard this reason urged so often in discussing with absolutists,\r\nand it would destroy my radical empiricism so utterly, if it were valid,\r\nthat I am bound to give it an attentive ear, and seriously to search its\r\nstrength.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor instance, let the matter in dispute be term \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, asserted to be on\r\nthe one hand related to \u003ci\u003eL\u003c/i\u003e, and on the other to \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e; and let the two\r\ncases of relation be symbolized by \u003ci\u003eL\u0026mdash;M\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eM\u0026mdash;N\u003c/i\u003e respectively. When,\r\nnow, I assume that the experience may immediately come and be given in\r\nthe shape \u003ci\u003eL\u0026mdash;M\u0026mdash;N\u003c/i\u003e, with no trace of doubling or internal fission in\r\nthe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_102\" id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[Pg 102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, I am told that this is all a popular delusion; that \u003ci\u003eL\u0026mdash;M\u0026mdash;N\u003c/i\u003e\r\nlogically means two different experiences, \u003ci\u003eL\u0026mdash;M\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eM\u0026mdash;N\u003c/i\u003e, namely;\r\nand that although the Absolute may, and indeed must, from its superior\r\npoint of view, read its own kind of unity into \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo;s two editions, yet\r\nas elements in finite experience the two \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo;s lie irretrievably\r\nasunder, and the world between them is broken and unbridged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn arguing this dialectic thesis, one must avoid slipping from the\r\nlogical into the physical point of view. It would be easy, in taking a\r\nconcrete example to fix one\u0026rsquo;s ideas by, to choose one in which the\r\nletter \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e should stand for a collective noun of some sort, which noun,\r\nbeing related to \u003ci\u003eL\u003c/i\u003e by one of its parts and to \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e by another, would\r\ninwardly be two things when it stood outwardly in both relations. Thus,\r\none might say: \u0026lsquo;David Hume, who weighed so many stone by his body,\r\ninfluences posterity by his doctrine.\u0026rsquo; The body and the doctrine are two\r\nthings, between which our finite minds can discover no real sameness,\r\nthough the same name covers both of them.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_103\" id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[Pg 103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e And then, one might continue:\r\n\u0026lsquo;Only an Absolute is capable of uniting such a non-identity.\u0026rsquo; We must, I\r\nsay, avoid this sort of example, for the dialectic insight, if true at\r\nall, must apply to terms and relations universally. It must be true of\r\nabstract units as well as of nouns collective; and if we prove it by\r\nconcrete examples we must take the simplest, so as to avoid irrelevant\r\nmaterial suggestions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaken thus in all its generality, the absolutist contention seems to use\r\nas its major premise Hume\u0026rsquo;s notion \u0026lsquo;that all our distinct perceptions\r\nare distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real\r\nconnexion among distinct existences.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_46_46\" id=\"FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_46_46\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e Undoubtedly, since we use two\r\nphrases in talking first about \u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo;s relation to \u003ci\u003eL\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo; and then about\r\n\u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rsquo;s relation to \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026rsquo; we must be having, or must have had, two\r\ndistinct perceptions;\u0026mdash;and the rest would then seem to follow duly. But\r\nthe starting-point of the reasoning here seems to be the fact of the two\r\n\u003ci\u003ephrases\u003c/i\u003e; and this suggests that the argument may be merely verbal. Can\r\nit be that the whole dialectic consists in attributing to the experience\r\ntalked-about a constitution similar to that of the language in which we\r\ndescribe it? Must we assert the objective double-ness of the \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e merely\r\nbecause we have to name it twice over when we name its two relations?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_104\" id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[Pg 104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCandidly, I can think of no other reason than this for the dialectic\r\nconclusion;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_47_47\" id=\"FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_47_47\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e for, if we think, not of our words, but of any simple\r\nconcrete matter which they may be held to signify, the experience itself\r\nbelies the paradox asserted. We use indeed two separate concepts in\r\nanalyzing our object, but we know them all the while to be but\r\nsubstitutional, and that the \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e in \u003ci\u003eL\u0026mdash;M\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e in \u003ci\u003eM\u0026mdash;N mean\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, are capable of leading to and terminating in) one self-same\r\npiece, \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, of sensible experience. This persistent identity of certain\r\nunits (or emphases, or points, or objects, or members\u0026mdash;call them what\r\nyou will) of the experience-continuum, is just one of those conjunctive\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_105\" id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[Pg 105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfeatures of it, on which I am obliged to insist so emphatically.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_48_48\" id=\"FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_48_48\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e For\r\nsamenesses are parts of experience\u0026rsquo;s indefeasible structure. When I hear\r\na bell-stroke and, as life flows on, its after image dies away, I still\r\nhark back to it as \u0026lsquo;that same bell-stroke.\u0026rsquo; When I see a thing \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e, with\r\n\u003ci\u003eL\u003c/i\u003e to the left of it and \u003ci\u003eN\u003c/i\u003e to the right of it, I see it \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e one \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand if you tell me I have had to \u0026lsquo;take\u0026rsquo; it twice, I reply that if I\r\n\u0026lsquo;took\u0026rsquo; it a thousand times I should still \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e it as a unit.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_49_49\" id=\"FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_49_49\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e Its\r\nunity is aboriginal, just as the multiplicity of my successive takings\r\nis aboriginal. It comes unbroken as \u003ci\u003ethat M\u003c/i\u003e, as a singular which I\r\nencounter; they come broken, as \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e takings, as my plurality of\r\noperations. The unity and the separateness are strictly co-ordinate. I\r\ndo not easily fathom why my opponents should find the separateness so\r\nmuch more easily understandable that they must needs infect the whole of\r\nfinite experience with it, and relegate the unity (now taken as a bare\r\npostulate and no longer as a thing positively perceivable) to the region\r\nof the Absolute\u0026rsquo;s mysteries. I do not easily fathom this, I say, for the\r\nsaid opponents are above mere verbal quibbling; yet all that I can catch\r\nin their talk is the substitution of what is true of certain words for\r\nwhat is true of what they signify. They stay with the words,\u0026mdash;not\r\nreturning to the stream of life whence all the meaning of them came, and\r\nwhich is always ready to reabsorb them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_106\" id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[Pg 106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor aught this argument proves, then, we may continue to believe that\r\none thing can be known by many knowers. But the denial of one thing in\r\nmany relations is but one application of a still profounder dialectic\r\ndifficulty. Man can\u0026rsquo;t be good, said the sophists, for man is \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003egood\u003c/i\u003e is good; and Hegel\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_50_50\" id=\"FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_50_50\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e and Herbart in their day, more recently A.\r\nSpir,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_51_51\" id=\"FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_51_51\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e and most recently and elaborately of all, Mr. Bradley, informs\r\nus that a term can logically only be a punctiform unit, and that not one\r\nof the conjunctive relations between things, which experience seems to\r\nyield, is rationally possible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_107\" id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[Pg 107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOf course, if true, this cuts off radical empiricism without even a\r\nshilling. Radical empiricism takes conjunctive relations at their face\r\nvalue, holding them to be as real as the terms united by them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_52_52\" id=\"FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_52_52\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nworld it represents as a collection, some parts of which are\r\nconjunctively and others disjunctively related. Two parts, themselves\r\ndisjoined, may nevertheless hang together by intermediaries with which\r\nthey are severally connected, and the whole world eventually may hang\r\ntogether similarly, inasmuch as \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e path of conjunctive transition by\r\nwhich to pass from one of its parts to another may always be\r\ndiscernible. Such determinately various hanging-together may be called\r\n\u003ci\u003econcatenated\u003c/i\u003e union, to distinguish it from the \u0026lsquo;through-and-through\u0026rsquo;\r\ntype of union,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_108\" id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[Pg 108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u0026lsquo;each in all and all in each\u0026rsquo; (union of \u003ci\u003etotal conflux\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nas one might call it), which monistic systems hold to obtain when things\r\nare taken in their absolute reality. In a concatenated world a partial\r\nconflux often is experienced. Our concepts and our sensations are\r\nconfluent; successive states of the same ego, and feelings of the same\r\nbody are confluent. Where the experience is not of conflux, it may be of\r\nconterminousness (things with but one thing between); or of\r\ncontiguousness (nothing between); or of likeness; or of nearness; or of\r\nsimultaneousness; or of in-ness; or of on-ness; or of for-ness; or of\r\nsimple with-ness; or even of mere and-ness, which last relation would\r\nmake of however disjointed a world otherwise, at any rate for that\r\noccasion a universe \u0026lsquo;of discourse.\u0026rsquo; Now Mr. Bradley tells us that none\r\nof these relations, as we actually experience them, can possibly be\r\nreal.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_53_53\" id=\"FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_53_53\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e My next duty, accordingly, must be to rescue radical\r\nempiricism from Mr. Bradley. Fortunately, as it seems to me, his general\r\ncontention, that the very notion of relation is unthinkable clearly, has\r\nbeen successfully met by many critics.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_54_54\" id=\"FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_54_54\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_109\" id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[Pg 109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is a burden to the flesh, and an injustice both to readers and to\r\nthe previous writers, to repeat good arguments already printed. So, in\r\nnoticing Mr. Bradley, I will confine myself to the interests of radical\r\nempiricism solely.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first duty of radical empiricism, taking given conjunctions at their\r\nface-value, is to class some of them as more intimate and some as more\r\nexternal. When two terms are \u003ci\u003esimilar\u003c/i\u003e, their very natures enter into\r\nthe relation.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_110\" id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[Pg 110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Being \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e they are, no matter where or when, the\r\nlikeness never can be denied, if asserted. It continues predicable as\r\nlong as the terms continue. Other relations, the \u003ci\u003ewhere\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003ewhen\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nfor example, seem adventitious. The sheet of paper may be \u0026lsquo;off\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;on\u0026rsquo;\r\nthe table, for example; and in either case the relation involves only\r\nthe outside of its terms. Having an outside, both of them, they\r\ncontribute by it to the relation. It is external: the term\u0026rsquo;s inner\r\nnature is irrelevant to it. Any book, any table, may fall into the\r\nrelation, which is created \u003ci\u003epro hac vice\u003c/i\u003e, not by their existence, but\r\nby their casual situation. It is just because so many of the\r\nconjunctions of experience seem so external that a philosophy of pure\r\nexperience must tend to pluralism in its ontology. So far as things have\r\nspace-relations, for example, we are free to imagine them with different\r\norigins even. If they could get to \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e, and get into space at all, then\r\nthey may have done so separately. Once there, however, they are\r\n\u003ci\u003eadditives\u003c/i\u003e to one another, and, with no prejudice to their natures, all\r\nsorts of space-relations may supervene\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_111\" id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[Pg 111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e between them. The question of\r\nhow things could come to be anyhow, is wholly different from the\r\nquestion what their relations, once the being accomplished, may consist\r\nin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Bradley now affirms that such external relations as the\r\nspace-relations which we here talk of must hold of entirely different\r\nsubjects from those of which the absence of such relations might a\r\nmoment previously have been plausibly asserted. Not only is the\r\n\u003ci\u003esituation\u003c/i\u003e different when the book is on the table, but the \u003ci\u003ebook\r\nitself\u003c/i\u003e is different as a book, from what it was when it was off the\r\ntable.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_55_55\" id=\"FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_55_55\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e He admits that \u0026ldquo;such external relations seem possible and\r\neven existing…. That you do not alter what you compare or rearrange in\r\nspace seems to common sense quite obvious, and that on\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_112\" id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[Pg 112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the other side\r\nthere are as obvious difficulties does not occur to common sense at all.\r\nAnd I will begin by pointing out these difficulties…. There is a\r\nrelation in the result, and this relation, we hear, is to make no\r\ndifference in its terms. But, if so, to what does it make a difference?\r\n[\u003ci\u003eDoesn\u0026rsquo;t it make a difference to us onlookers, at least?\u003c/i\u003e] and what is\r\nthe meaning and sense of qualifying the terms by it? [\u003ci\u003eSurely the\r\nmeaning is to tell the truth about their relative position.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_56_56\" id=\"FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_56_56\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e] If, in\r\nshort, it is external to the terms, how can it possibly be true of them?\r\n[\u003ci\u003eIs it the \u0026lsquo;intimacy\u0026rsquo; suggested by the little word \u0026lsquo;of,\u0026rsquo; here, which I\r\nhave underscored, that is the root of Mr. Bradley\u0026rsquo;s trouble?\u003c/i\u003e] … If\r\nthe terms from their inner nature do not enter into the relation, then,\r\nso far as they are concerned, they seem related for no reason at all….\r\nThings are spatially related, first in one way, and then become related\r\nin another way, and yet in no way themselves are altered; for the\r\nrelations, it is said, are but external. But I reply that, if\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_113\" id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[Pg 113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e so, I can\r\nnot \u003ci\u003eunderstand\u003c/i\u003e the leaving by the terms of one set of relations and\r\ntheir adoption of another fresh set. The process and its result to the\r\nterms, if they contribute nothing to it [\u003ci\u003eSurely they contribute to it\r\nall there is \u0026lsquo;of\u0026rsquo; it!\u003c/i\u003e] seem irrational throughout. [\u003ci\u003eIf \u0026lsquo;irrational\u0026rsquo;\r\nhere means simply \u0026lsquo;non-rational,\u0026rsquo; or nondeductible from the essence of\r\neither term singly, it is no reproach; if it means \u0026lsquo;contradicting\u0026rsquo; such\r\nessence, Mr. Bradley should show wherein and how.\u003c/i\u003e] But, if they\r\ncontribute anything, they must surely be affected internally. [\u003ci\u003eWhy so,\r\nif they contribute only their surface? In such relations as \u0026lsquo;on\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;a foot\r\naway,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;between,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;next,\u0026rsquo; etc., only surfaces are in question.\u003c/i\u003e] … If\r\nthe terms contribute anything whatever, then the terms are affected\r\n[\u003ci\u003einwardly altered?\u003c/i\u003e] by the arrangement…. That for working purposes\r\nwe treat, and do well to treat, some relations as external merely I do\r\nnot deny, and that of course is not the question at issue here. That\r\nquestion is … whether in the end and in principle a mere external\r\nrelation [\u003ci\u003ei.e., a relation which can change without forcing its terms\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_114\" id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[Pg 114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto change their nature simultaneously\u003c/i\u003e] is possible and forced on us by\r\nthe facts.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_57_57\" id=\"FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_57_57\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Bradley next reverts to the antinomies of space, which, according to\r\nhim, prove it to be unreal, although it appears as so prolific a medium\r\nof external relations; and he then concludes that \u0026ldquo;Irrationality and\r\nexternality can not be the last truth about things. Somewhere there must\r\nbe a reason why this and that appear together. And this reason and\r\nreality must reside in the whole from which terms and relations are\r\nabstractions, a whole in which their internal connection must lie, and\r\nout of which from the background appear those fresh results which never\r\ncould have come from the premises.\u0026rdquo; And he adds that \u0026ldquo;Where the whole is\r\ndifferent, the terms that qualify and contribute to it must so far be\r\ndifferent…. They are altered so far only [\u003ci\u003eHow far? farther than\r\nexternally, yet not through and through?\u003c/i\u003e] but still they are\r\naltered…. I must insist that in each case the terms are qualified by\r\ntheir whole [\u003ci\u003eQualified how?\u0026mdash;Do their external\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_115\" id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[Pg 115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e relations, situations,\r\ndates, etc., changed as these are in the new whole, fail to qualify them\r\n\u0026lsquo;far\u0026rsquo; enough?\u003c/i\u003e], and that in the second case there is a whole which\r\ndiffers both logically and psychologically from the first whole; and I\r\nurge that in contributing to the change the terms so far are altered.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot merely the relations, then, but the terms are altered: \u003ci\u003eund zwar\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u0026lsquo;so far.\u0026rsquo; But just \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e far is the whole problem; and\r\n\u0026lsquo;through-and-through\u0026rsquo; would seem (in spite of Mr. Bradley\u0026rsquo;s somewhat\r\nundecided utterances\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_58_58\" id=\"FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_58_58\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e) to be the full Bradleyan answer. The \u0026lsquo;whole\u0026rsquo;\r\nwhich he here treats as primary and determinative of each part\u0026rsquo;s manner\r\nof \u0026lsquo;contributing,\u0026rsquo; simply \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e, when it alters, alter in its entirety.\r\nThere \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be total conflux of its parts, each into and through each\r\nother. The \u0026lsquo;must\u0026rsquo; appears here as a \u003ci\u003eMachtspruch\u003c/i\u003e, as an \u003ci\u003eipse dixit\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nMr. Bradley\u0026rsquo;s absolutistically tempered \u0026lsquo;understanding,\u0026rsquo; for he candidly\r\nconfesses that how the parts \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e differ as they contribute to different\r\nwholes, is unknown to him.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_59_59\" id=\"FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_59_59\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_116\" id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[Pg 116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough I have every wish to comprehend the authority by which Mr.\r\nBradley\u0026rsquo;s understanding speaks, his words leave me wholly unconverted.\r\n\u0026lsquo;External relations\u0026rsquo; stand with their withers all unwrung, and remain,\r\nfor aught he proves to the contrary, not only practically workable, but\r\nalso perfectly intelligible factors of reality.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_117\" id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[Pg 117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Bradley\u0026rsquo;s understanding shows the most extraordinary power of\r\nperceiving separations and the most extraordinary impotence in\r\ncomprehending conjunctions. One would naturally say \u0026lsquo;neither or both,\u0026rsquo;\r\nbut not so Mr. Bradley. When a common man analyzes certain \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e from\r\nout the stream of experience, he understands their distinctness \u003ci\u003eas thus\r\nisolated\u003c/i\u003e. But this does not prevent him from equally well understanding\r\ntheir combination with each other \u003ci\u003eas originally experienced in the\r\nconcrete\u003c/i\u003e, or their confluence with new sensible experiences in which\r\nthey recur as \u0026lsquo;the same.\u0026rsquo; Returning into the stream of sensible\r\npresentation, nouns and adjectives, and \u003ci\u003ethats\u003c/i\u003e and abstract \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ngrow confluent again, and the word \u0026lsquo;is\u0026rsquo; names all these experiences of\r\nconjunction. Mr. Bradley understands the isolation of the abstracts, but\r\nto understand the combination is to him impossible.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_60_60\" id=\"FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_60_60\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e \u0026ldquo;To under\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_118\" id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[Pg 118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estand\r\na complex \u003ci\u003eAB\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026rdquo; he says, \u0026ldquo;I must begin with \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e. And beginning,\r\nsay with \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, if I then merely find \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, I have either lost \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, or I\r\nhave got beside \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, [\u003ci\u003ethe word \u0026lsquo;beside\u0026rsquo; seems here vital, as meaning a\r\nconjunction \u0026lsquo;external\u0026rsquo; and therefore unintelligible\u003c/i\u003e] something else,\r\nand in neither case have I understood.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_61_61\" id=\"FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_61_61\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e For my intellect can not\r\nsimply unite a diversity, nor has it in itself any form or way of\r\ntogetherness, and you gain nothing if, beside \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, you offer me\r\ntheir conjunction in fact. For to my intellect that is no more than\r\nanother external element. And \u0026lsquo;facts,\u0026rsquo; once for all, are for my\r\nintellect not true unless they satisfy it…. The intellect has in its\r\nnature no principle of mere togetherness.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_62_62\" id=\"FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_62_62\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_119\" id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[Pg 119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOf course Mr. Bradley has a right to define \u0026lsquo;intellect\u0026rsquo; as the power by\r\nwhich we perceive separations but not unions\u0026mdash;provided he give due\r\nnotice to the reader. But why then claim that such a maimed and\r\namputated power must reign supreme in philosophy, and accuse on its\r\nbehoof the whole empirical world of irrationality? It is true that he\r\nelsewhere attributes to the intellect a \u003ci\u003eproprius motus\u003c/i\u003e of transition,\r\nbut says that when he looks for \u003ci\u003ethese\u003c/i\u003e transitions in the detail of\r\nliving experience, he \u0026lsquo;is unable to verify such a solution.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_63_63\" id=\"FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_63_63\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet he never explains what the intellectual transitions would be like in\r\ncase we had them. He only defines them negatively\u0026mdash;they are not spatial,\r\ntemporal, predicative, or causal; or qualitatively or otherwise serial;\r\nor in any way relational as we na\u0026iuml;vely trace relations, for relations\r\n\u003ci\u003eseparate\u003c/i\u003e terms, and need themselves to be hooked on \u003ci\u003ead infinitum\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe nearest approach he makes to describing a truly intellectual\r\ntransition is where he speaks of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_120\" id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[Pg 120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e as being \u0026lsquo;united, each\r\nfrom its own nature, in a whole which is the nature of both alike.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_64_64\" id=\"FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_64_64\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut this (which, \u003ci\u003epace\u003c/i\u003e Mr. Bradley, seems exquisitely analogous to\r\n\u0026lsquo;taking\u0026rsquo; a congeries in a \u0026lsquo;lump,\u0026rsquo; if not to \u0026lsquo;swamping\u0026rsquo;) suggests nothing\r\nbut that \u003ci\u003econflux\u003c/i\u003e which pure experience so abundantly offers, as when\r\n\u0026lsquo;space,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;white\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;sweet\u0026rsquo; are confluent in a \u0026lsquo;lump of sugar,\u0026rsquo; or\r\nkinesthetic, dermal, and optical sensations confluent in \u0026lsquo;my hand.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_65_65\" id=\"FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_65_65\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAll that I can verify in the transitions which Mr. Bradley\u0026rsquo;s intellect\r\ndesiderates as its \u003ci\u003eproprius motus\u003c/i\u003e is a reminiscence of these and other\r\nsensible conjunctions (especially space-conjunctions), but a\r\nreminiscence so vague that its originals are not recognized. Bradley in\r\nshort repeats the fable of the dog, the bone, and its image in the\r\nwater. With a world of particulars, given in loveliest union, in\r\nconjunction definitely various, and variously de\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_121\" id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[Pg 121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003efinite, the \u0026lsquo;how\u0026rsquo; of\r\nwhich you \u0026lsquo;understand\u0026rsquo; as soon as you see the fact of them,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_66_66\" id=\"FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_66_66\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e for\r\nthere is no \u0026lsquo;how\u0026rsquo; except the constitution of the fact as given; with all\r\nthis given him, I say, in pure experience, he asks for some ineffable\r\nunion in the abstract instead, which, if he gained it, would only be a\r\nduplicate of what he has already in his full possession. Surely he\r\nabuses the privilege which society grants to all us philosophers, of\r\nbeing puzzle-headed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePolemic writing like this is odious; but with absolutism in possession\r\nin so many quarters, omission to defend my radical empiricism against\r\nits best known champion would count as either superficiality or\r\ninability. I have to conclude that its dialectic has not invalidated in\r\nthe least degree the usual conjunctions by which the world, as\r\nexperienced, hangs so variously together. In particular it leaves an\r\nempirical theory of knowledge\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_67_67\" id=\"FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_67_67\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e intact, and lets us continue to\r\nbelieve with common sense that one object \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be known, if we have any\r\nground for thinking that it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e known, to many knowers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_122\" id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[Pg 122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn [the next essay] I shall return to this last supposition, which\r\nseems to me to offer other difficulties much harder for a philosophy of\r\npure experience to deal with than any of absolutism\u0026rsquo;s dialectic\r\nobjections.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_43_43\" id=\"Footnote_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[43]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 2, January 19, 1905. Reprinted also as\r\nAppendix A in \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 347-369. The author\u0026rsquo;s\r\ncorrections have been adopted in the present text. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_44_44\" id=\"Footnote_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[44]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [F. H. Bradley: \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e, second edition,\r\npp. 152-153, 23, 118, 104, 108-109, 570.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_45_45\" id=\"Footnote_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[45]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare Professor MacLennan\u0026rsquo;s admirable\r\n\u003ci\u003eAuseinandersetzung\u003c/i\u003e with Mr. Bradley, in \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy,\r\nPsychology and Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. I, [1904], pp. 403 ff.,\r\nespecially pp. 405-407.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_46_46\" id=\"Footnote_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[46]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Hume: \u003ci\u003eTreatise of Human Nature\u003c/i\u003e, Appendix, Selby-Bigge\u0026rsquo;s\r\nedition, p. 636.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_47_47\" id=\"Footnote_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[47]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Technically, it seems classable as a \u0026lsquo;fallacy of\r\ncomposition.\u0026rsquo; A duality, predicable of the two wholes, \u003ci\u003eL\u0026mdash;M\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003eM\u0026mdash;N\u003c/i\u003e, is forthwith predicated of one of their parts, \u003ci\u003eM\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_48_48\" id=\"Footnote_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[48]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_49_49\" id=\"Footnote_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[49]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I may perhaps refer here to my \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nvol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 459 ff. It really seems \u0026lsquo;weird\u0026rsquo; to have to argue (as I am\r\nforced now to do) for the notion that it is one sheet of paper (with its\r\ntwo surfaces and all that lies between) which is both under my pen and\r\non the table while I write\u0026mdash;the \u0026lsquo;claim\u0026rsquo; that it is two sheets seems so\r\nbrazen. Yet I sometimes suspect the absolutists of sincerity!\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_50_50\" id=\"Footnote_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[50]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [For the author\u0026rsquo;s criticism of Hegel\u0026rsquo;s view of relations,\r\ncf. \u003ci\u003eWill to Believe\u003c/i\u003e, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\"\u003e278-279\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_51_51\" id=\"Footnote_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[51]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. A. Spir: \u003ci\u003eDenken und Wirklichkeit\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, bk. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e (containing also account of Herbart). \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_52_52\" id=\"Footnote_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[52]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_53_53\" id=\"Footnote_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[53]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Here again the reader must beware of slipping from logical\r\ninto phenomenal considerations. It may well be that we \u003ci\u003eattribute\u003c/i\u003e a\r\ncertain relation falsely, because the circumstances of the case, being\r\ncomplex, have deceived us. At a railway station we may take our own\r\ntrain, and not the one that fills our window, to be moving. We here put\r\nmotion in the wrong place in the world, but in its original place the\r\nmotion is a part of reality. What Mr. Bradley means is nothing like\r\nthis, but rather that such things as motion are nowhere real, and that,\r\neven in their aboriginal and empirically incorrigible seats, relations\r\nare impossible of comprehension.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_54_54\" id=\"Footnote_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[54]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Particularly so by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, in his\r\n\u003ci\u003eMan and the Cosmos\u003c/i\u003e; by L. T. Hobhouse, in chapter \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e (\u0026ldquo;The Validity\r\nof Judgment\u0026rdquo;) of his \u003ci\u003eTheory of Knowledge\u003c/i\u003e; and by F. C. S. Schiller, in\r\nhis \u003ci\u003eHumanism\u003c/i\u003e, essay \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XI\"\u003exi\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Other fatal reviews (in my opinion) are\r\nHodder\u0026rsquo;s, in the \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, [1894], p. 307; Stout\u0026rsquo;s\r\nin the \u003ci\u003eProceedings of the Aristotelian Society\u003c/i\u003e, 1901-2, p. 1; and\r\nMacLennan\u0026rsquo;s in [\u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific\r\nMethods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, 1904, p. 403].\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_55_55\" id=\"Footnote_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[55]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Once more, don\u0026rsquo;t slip from logical into physical\r\nsituations. Of course, if the table be wet, it will moisten the book, or\r\nif it be slight enough and the book heavy enough, the book will break it\r\ndown. But such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue. The\r\npoint is whether the successive relations \u0026lsquo;on\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;not-on\u0026rsquo; can\r\nrationally (not physically) hold of the same constant terms, abstractly\r\ntaken. Professor A. E. Taylor drops from logical into material\r\nconsiderations when he instances color-contrast as a proof that \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026lsquo;as\r\ncontra-distinguished from \u003ci\u003eB\u003c/i\u003e, is not the same thing as mere \u003ci\u003eA\u003c/i\u003e not in\r\nany way affected\u0026rsquo; (\u003ci\u003eElements of Metaphysics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 145). Note the\r\nsubstitution, for \u0026lsquo;related\u0026rsquo; of the word \u0026lsquo;affected,\u0026rsquo; which begs the whole\r\nquestion.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_56_56\" id=\"Footnote_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[56]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But \u0026ldquo;is there any sense,\u0026rdquo; asks Mr. Bradley, peevishly, on\r\np. 579, \u0026ldquo;and if so, what sense in truth that is only outside and \u0026lsquo;about\u0026rsquo;\r\nthings?\u0026rdquo; Surely such a question may be left unanswered.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_57_57\" id=\"Footnote_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[57]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e, second edition, pp. 575-576.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_58_58\" id=\"Footnote_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[58]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I say \u0026lsquo;undecided,\u0026rsquo; because, apart from the \u0026lsquo;so far,\u0026rsquo; which\r\nsounds terribly half-hearted, there are passages in these very pages in\r\nwhich Mr. Bradley admits the pluralistic thesis. Read, for example, what\r\nhe says, on p. 578, of a billiard ball keeping its \u0026lsquo;character\u0026rsquo;\r\nunchanged, though, in its change of place, its \u0026lsquo;existence\u0026rsquo; gets altered;\r\nor what he says, on p. 579, of the possibility that an abstract quality\r\nA, B, or C, in a thing, \u0026lsquo;may throughout remain unchanged\u0026rsquo; although the\r\nthing be altered; or his admission that in red-hairedness, both as\r\nanalyzed out of a man and when given with the rest of him, there may be\r\n\u0026lsquo;no change\u0026rsquo; (p. 580). Why does he immediately add that for the pluralist\r\nto plead the non-mutation of such abstractions would be an \u003ci\u003eignoratio\r\nelenchi\u003c/i\u003e? It is impossible to admit it to be such. The entire \u003ci\u003eelenchus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand inquest is just as to whether parts which you can abstract from\r\nexisting wholes can also contribute to other wholes without changing\r\ntheir inner nature. If they can thus mould various wholes into new\r\n\u003ci\u003egestaltqualit\u0026auml;ten\u003c/i\u003e, then it follows that the same elements are\r\nlogically able to exist in different wholes [whether physically able\r\nwould depend on additional hypotheses]; that partial changes are\r\nthinkable, and through-and-through change not a dialectic necessity;\r\nthat monism is only an hypothesis; and that an additively constituted\r\nuniverse is a rationally respectable hypothesis also. All the theses of\r\nradical empiricism, in short, follow.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_59_59\" id=\"Footnote_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[59]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 577-579.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_60_60\" id=\"Footnote_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[60]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e So far as I catch his state of mind, it is somewhat like\r\nthis: \u0026lsquo;Book,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;table,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;on\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;how does the existence of these three\r\nabstract elements result in \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e book being livingly on \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e table.\r\nWhy isn\u0026rsquo;t the table on the book? Or why doesn\u0026rsquo;t the \u0026lsquo;on\u0026rsquo; connect itself\r\nwith another book, or something that is not a table? Mustn\u0026rsquo;t something\r\n\u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e each of the three elements already determine the two others to\r\n\u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e, so that they do not settle elsewhere or float vaguely? Mustn\u0026rsquo;t the\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhole fact be pre-figured in each part\u003c/i\u003e, and exist \u003ci\u003ede jure\u003c/i\u003e before it\r\ncan exist \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e? But, if so, in what can the jural existence\r\nconsist, if not in a spiritual miniature of the whole fact\u0026rsquo;s\r\nconstitution actuating every partial factor as its purpose? But is this\r\nanything but the old metaphysical fallacy of looking behind a fact \u003ci\u003ein\r\nesse\u003c/i\u003e for the ground of the fact, and finding it in the shape of the\r\nvery same fact \u003ci\u003ein posse\u003c/i\u003e? Somewhere we must leave off with a\r\n\u003ci\u003econstitution\u003c/i\u003e behind which there is nothing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_61_61\" id=\"Footnote_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[61]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Apply this to the case of \u0026lsquo;book-on-table\u0026rsquo;! W. J.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_62_62\" id=\"Footnote_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[62]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 570, 572.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_63_63\" id=\"Footnote_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[63]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 568, 569.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_64_64\" id=\"Footnote_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[64]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 570.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_65_65\" id=\"Footnote_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[65]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e How meaningless is the contention that in such wholes (or\r\nin \u0026lsquo;book-on-table,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;watch-in-pocket,\u0026rsquo; etc.) the relation is an\r\nadditional entity \u003ci\u003ebetween\u003c/i\u003e the terms, needing itself to be related\r\nagain to each! Both Bradley (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 32-33) and Royce (\u003ci\u003eThe\r\nWorld and the Individual\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, p. 128) lovingly repeat this piece of\r\nprofundity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_66_66\" id=\"Footnote_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[66]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The \u0026lsquo;why\u0026rsquo; and the \u0026lsquo;whence\u0026rsquo; are entirely other questions,\r\nnot under discussion, as I understand Mr. Bradley. Not how experience\r\ngets itself born, but how it can be what it is after it is born, is the\r\npuzzle.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_67_67\" id=\"Footnote_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[67]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_123\" id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[Pg 123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"IV\" id=\"IV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIV\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eHOW TWO MINDS CAN KNOW ONE THING\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_68_68\" id=\"FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_68_68\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn [the essay] entitled \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo; I have tried to show\r\nthat when we call an experience \u0026lsquo;conscious,\u0026rsquo; that does not mean that it\r\nis suffused throughout with a peculiar modality of being (\u0026lsquo;psychic\u0026rsquo;\r\nbeing) as stained glass may be suffused with light, but rather that it\r\nstands in certain determinate relations to other portions of experience\r\nextraneous to itself. These form one peculiar \u0026lsquo;context\u0026rsquo; for it; while,\r\ntaken in another context of experiences, we class it as a fact in the\r\nphysical world. This \u0026lsquo;pen,\u0026rsquo; for example, is, in the first instance, a\r\nbald \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e, a datum, fact, phenomenon, content, or whatever other\r\nneutral or ambiguous name you may prefer to apply. I called it in that\r\narticle a \u0026lsquo;pure experience.\u0026rsquo; To get classed either as a physical pen or\r\nas some one\u0026rsquo;s percept of a pen, it must assume a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_124\" id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[Pg 124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003efunction\u003c/i\u003e, and that\r\ncan only happen in a more complicated world. So far as in that world it\r\nis a stable feature, holds ink, marks paper and obeys the guidance of a\r\nhand, it is a physical pen. That is what we mean by being \u0026lsquo;physical,\u0026rsquo; in\r\na pen. So far as it is instable, on the contrary, coming and going with\r\nthe movements of my eyes, altering with what I call my fancy, continuous\r\nwith subsequent experiences of its \u0026lsquo;having been\u0026rsquo; (in the past tense), it\r\nis the percept of a pen in my mind. Those peculiarities are what we mean\r\nby being \u0026lsquo;conscious,\u0026rsquo; in a pen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Section VI of another [essay]\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_69_69\" id=\"FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_69_69\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e I tried to show that the same\r\n\u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e, the same numerically identical pen of pure experience, can enter\r\nsimultaneously into many conscious contexts, or, in other words, be an\r\nobject for many different minds. I admitted that I had not space to\r\ntreat of certain possible objections in that article; but in [the last\r\nessay] I took some of the objections up. At the end of that [essay] I\r\nsaid that still more formidable-sounding objections remained; so, to\r\nleave my pure-experience theory in as strong a state as possible, I\r\npropose to consider those objections now.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_125\" id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[Pg 125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe objections I previously tried to dispose of were purely logical or\r\ndialectical. No one identical term, whether physical or psychical, it\r\nhad been said, could be the subject of two relations at once. This\r\nthesis I sought to prove unfounded. The objections that now confront us\r\narise from the nature supposed to inhere in psychic facts specifically.\r\nWhatever may be the case with physical objects, a fact of consciousness,\r\nit is alleged (and indeed very plausibly), can not, without\r\nself-contradiction, be treated as a portion of two different minds, and\r\nfor the following reasons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the physical world we make with impunity the assumption that one and\r\nthe same material object can figure in an indefinitely large number of\r\ndifferent processes at once. When, for instance, a sheet of rubber is\r\npulled at its four corners, a unit of rubber in the middle of the sheet\r\nis affected by all four of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_126\" id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[Pg 126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e pulls. It \u003ci\u003etransmits\u003c/i\u003e them each, as if\r\nit pulled in four different ways at once itself. So, an air-particle or\r\nan ether-particle \u0026lsquo;compounds\u0026rsquo; the different directions of movement\r\nimprinted on it without obliterating their several individualities. It\r\ndelivers them distinct, on the contrary, at as many several \u0026lsquo;receivers\u0026rsquo;\r\n(ear, eye or what not) as may be \u0026lsquo;tuned\u0026rsquo; to that effect. The apparent\r\nparadox of a distinctness like this surviving in the midst of\r\ncompounding is a thing which, I fancy, the analyses made by physicists\r\nhave by this time sufficiently cleared up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if, on the strength of these analogies, one should ask: \u0026ldquo;Why, if two\r\nor more lines can run through one and the same geometrical point, or if\r\ntwo or more distinct processes of activity can run through one and the\r\nsame physical thing so that it simultaneously plays a r\u0026ocirc;le in each and\r\nevery process, might not two or more streams of personal consciousness\r\ninclude one and the same unit of experience so that it would\r\nsimultaneously be a part of the experience of all the different minds?\u0026rdquo;\r\none would be checked by thinking of a certain peculiarity by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_127\" id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[Pg 127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which\r\nphenomena of consciousness differ from physical things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile physical things, namely, are supposed to be permanent and to have\r\ntheir \u0026lsquo;states,\u0026rsquo; a fact of consciousness exists but once and \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e a\r\nstate. Its \u003ci\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e is \u003ci\u003esentiri\u003c/i\u003e; it is only so far as it is felt; and it\r\nis unambiguously and unequivocally exactly \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e is felt. The\r\nhypothesis under consideration would, however, oblige it to be felt\r\nequivocally, felt now as part of my mind and again at the same time\r\n\u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e as a part of my mind, but of yours (for my mind is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e yours),\r\nand this would seem impossible without doubling it into two distinct\r\nthings, or, in other words, without reverting to the ordinary dualistic\r\nphilosophy of insulated minds each knowing its object representatively\r\nas a third thing,\u0026mdash;and that would be to give up the pure-experience\r\nscheme altogether.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCan we see, then, any way in which a unit of pure experience might enter\r\ninto and figure in two diverse streams of consciousness without turning\r\nitself into the two units which, on our hypothesis, it must not be?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_128\" id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[Pg 128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a way; and the first step towards it is to see more precisely\r\nhow the unit enters into either one of the streams of consciousness\r\nalone. Just what, from being \u0026lsquo;pure,\u0026rsquo; does its becoming \u0026lsquo;conscious\u0026rsquo;\r\n\u003ci\u003eonce\u003c/i\u003e mean?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt means, first, that new experiences have supervened; and, second, that\r\nthey have borne a certain assignable relation to the unit supposed.\r\nContinue, if you please, to speak of the pure unit as \u0026lsquo;the pen.\u0026rsquo; So far\r\nas the pen\u0026rsquo;s successors do but repeat the pen or, being different from\r\nit, are \u0026lsquo;energetically\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_70_70\" id=\"FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_70_70\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e related to it, it and they will form a group\r\nof stably existing physical things. So far, however, as its successors\r\ndiffer from it in another well-determined way, the pen will figure in\r\ntheir context, not as a physical, but as a mental fact. It will become a\r\npassing \u0026lsquo;percept,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003emy\u003c/i\u003e percept of that pen. What now is that decisive\r\nwell-determined way?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the chapter on \u0026lsquo;The Self,\u0026rsquo; in my \u003ci\u003ePrinciples\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_129\" id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[Pg 129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, I\r\nexplained the continuous identity of each personal consciousness as a\r\nname for the practical fact that new experiences\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_71_71\" id=\"FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_71_71\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e come which look\r\nback on the old ones, find them \u0026lsquo;warm,\u0026rsquo; and greet and appropriate them\r\nas \u0026lsquo;mine.\u0026rsquo; These operations mean, when analyzed empirically, several\r\ntolerably definite things, viz.:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. That the new experience has past time for its \u0026lsquo;content,\u0026rsquo; and in that\r\ntime a pen that \u0026lsquo;was\u0026rsquo;;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. That \u0026lsquo;warmth\u0026rsquo; was also about the pen, in the sense of a group of\r\nfeelings (\u0026lsquo;interest\u0026rsquo; aroused, \u0026lsquo;attention\u0026rsquo; turned, \u0026lsquo;eyes\u0026rsquo; employed, etc.)\r\nthat were closely connected with it and that now recur and evermore\r\nrecur with unbroken vividness, though from the pen of now, which may be\r\nonly an image, all such vividness may have gone;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. That these feelings are the nucleus of \u0026lsquo;me\u0026rsquo;;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. That whatever once was associated with them was, at least for that\r\none moment, \u0026lsquo;mine\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;my implement if associated with hand-feelings, my\r\n\u0026lsquo;percept\u0026rsquo; only, if only eye-feelings and attention-feelings were\r\ninvolved.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_130\" id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[Pg 130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe pen, realized in this retrospective way as my percept, thus figures\r\nas a fact of \u0026lsquo;conscious\u0026rsquo; life. But it does so only so far as\r\n\u0026lsquo;appropriation\u0026rsquo; has occurred; and appropriation is \u003ci\u003epart of the content\r\nof a later experience\u003c/i\u003e wholly additional to the originally \u0026lsquo;pure\u0026rsquo; pen.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThat\u003c/i\u003e pen, virtually both objective and subjective, is at its own\r\nmoment actually and intrinsically neither. It has to be looked back upon\r\nand \u003ci\u003eused\u003c/i\u003e, in order to be classed in either distinctive way. But its\r\nuse, so called, is in the hands of the other experience, while \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e\r\nstands, throughout the operation, passive and unchanged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf this pass muster as an intelligible account of how an experience\r\noriginally pure can enter into one consciousness, the next question is\r\nas to how it might conceivably enter into two.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObviously no new kind of condition would have to be supplied. All that\r\nwe should have to postulate would be a second subsequent\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_131\" id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[Pg 131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e experience,\r\ncollateral and contemporary with the first subsequent one, in which a\r\nsimilar act of appropriation should occur. The two acts would interfere\r\nneither with one another nor with the originally pure pen. It would\r\nsleep undisturbed in its own past, no matter how many such successors\r\nwent through their several appropriative acts. Each would know it as\r\n\u0026lsquo;my\u0026rsquo; percept, each would class it as a \u0026lsquo;conscious\u0026rsquo; fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor need their so classing it interfere in the least with their classing\r\nit at the same time as a physical pen. Since the classing in both cases\r\ndepends upon the taking of it in one group or another of associates, if\r\nthe superseding experience were of wide enough \u0026lsquo;span\u0026rsquo; it could think the\r\npen in both groups simultaneously, and yet distinguish the two groups.\r\nIt would then see the whole situation conformably to what we call \u0026lsquo;the\r\nrepresentative theory of cognition,\u0026rsquo; and that is what we all\r\nspontaneously do. As a man philosophizing \u0026lsquo;popularly,\u0026rsquo; I believe that\r\nwhat I see myself writing with is double\u0026mdash;I think it in its relations to\r\nphysical nature, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_132\" id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[Pg 132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e also in its relations to my personal life; I see\r\nthat it is in my mind, but that it also is a physical pen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe paradox of the same experience figuring in two consciousnesses seems\r\nthus no paradox at all. To be \u0026lsquo;conscious\u0026rsquo; means not simply to be, but to\r\nbe reported, known, to have awareness of one\u0026rsquo;s being added to that\r\nbeing; and this is just what happens when the appropriative experience\r\nsupervenes. The pen-experience in its original immediacy is not aware of\r\nitself, it simply \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, and the second experience is required for what\r\nwe call awareness of it to occur.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_72_72\" id=\"FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_72_72\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e The difficulty of understanding\r\nwhat happens here is, therefore, not a logical difficulty: there is no\r\ncontradiction involved. It is an ontological difficulty rather.\r\nExperiences come on an enormous scale, and if we take\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_133\" id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[Pg 133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e them all\r\ntogether, they come in a chaos of incommensurable relations that we can\r\nnot straighten out. We have to abstract different groups of them, and\r\nhandle these separately if we are to talk of them at all. But how the\r\nexperiences ever \u003ci\u003eget themselves made\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e their characters and\r\nrelations are just such as appear, we can not begin to understand.\r\nGranting, however, that, by hook or crook, they \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e get themselves\r\nmade, and can appear in the successions that I have so schematically\r\ndescribed, then we have to confess that even although (as I began by\r\nquoting from the adversary) \u0026lsquo;a feeling only is as it is felt,\u0026rsquo; there is\r\nstill nothing absurd in the notion of its being felt in two different\r\nways at once, as yours, namely, and as mine. It is, indeed, \u0026lsquo;mine\u0026rsquo; only\r\nas it is felt as mine, and \u0026lsquo;yours\u0026rsquo; only as it is felt as yours. But it\r\nis felt as neither \u003ci\u003eby itself\u003c/i\u003e, but only when \u0026lsquo;owned\u0026rsquo; by our two several\r\nremembering experiences, just as one undivided estate is owned by\r\nseveral heirs.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_134\" id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[Pg 134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne word, now, before I close, about the corollaries of the views set\r\nforth. Since the acquisition of conscious quality on the part of an\r\nexperience depends upon a context coming to it, it follows that the sum\r\ntotal of all experiences, having no context, can not strictly be called\r\nconscious at all. It is a \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e, an Absolute, a \u0026lsquo;pure\u0026rsquo; experience on an\r\nenormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and\r\nthing. This the post-Kantian idealists have always practically\r\nacknowledged by calling their doctrine an \u003ci\u003eIdentit\u0026auml;tsphilosophie\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nquestion of the \u003ci\u003eBeseelung\u003c/i\u003e of the All of things ought not, then, even\r\nto be asked. No more ought the question of its \u003ci\u003etruth\u003c/i\u003e to be asked, for\r\ntruth is a relation inside of the sum total, obtaining between thoughts\r\nand something else, and thoughts, as we have seen, can only be\r\ncontextual things. In these respects the pure experiences of our\r\nphilosophy are, in themselves considered, so many little absolutes, the\r\nphilosophy of pure experience\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_135\" id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[Pg 135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e being only a more comminuted\r\n\u003ci\u003eIdentit\u0026auml;tsphilosophie\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_73_73\" id=\"FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_73_73\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeanwhile, a pure experience can be postulated with any amount whatever\r\nof span or field. If it exert the retrospective and appropriative\r\nfunction on any other piece of experience, the latter thereby enters\r\ninto its own conscious stream. And in this operation time intervals make\r\nno essential difference. After sleeping, my retrospection is as perfect\r\nas it is between two successive waking moments of my time. Accordingly\r\nif, millions of years later, a similarly retrospective experience should\r\nanyhow come to birth, my present thought would form a genuine portion of\r\nits long-span conscious life. \u0026lsquo;Form a portion,\u0026rsquo; I say, but not in the\r\nsense that the two things could be entitatively or substantively\r\none\u0026mdash;they cannot, for they are numerically discrete facts\u0026mdash;but only in\r\nthe sense that the \u003ci\u003efunctions\u003c/i\u003e of my present thought, its knowledge, its\r\npurpose, its content and \u0026lsquo;consciousness,\u0026rsquo; in short, being inherited,\r\nwould be continued practically\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_136\" id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[Pg 136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e unchanged. Speculations like Fechner\u0026rsquo;s,\r\nof an Earth-soul, of wider spans of consciousness enveloping narrower\r\nones throughout the cosmos, are, therefore, philosophically quite in\r\norder, provided they distinguish the functional from the entitative\r\npoint of view, and do not treat the minor consciousness under discussion\r\nas a kind of standing material of which the wider ones \u003ci\u003econsist\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_74_74\" id=\"FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_74_74\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_68_68\" id=\"Footnote_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[68]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 7, March 30, 1905.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_69_69\" id=\"Footnote_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[69]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0026ldquo;A World of Pure Experience,\u0026rdquo; above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39-91\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_70_70\" id=\"Footnote_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[70]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [For an explanation of this expression, see above, p.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_71_71\" id=\"Footnote_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[71]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I call them \u0026lsquo;passing thoughts\u0026rsquo; in the book\u0026mdash;the passage in\r\npoint goes from pages 330 to 342 of vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_72_72\" id=\"Footnote_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[72]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Shadworth Hodgson has laid great stress on the fact that\r\nthe minimum of consciousness demands two subfeelings, of which the\r\nsecond retrospects the first. (Cf. the section \u0026lsquo;Analysis of Minima\u0026rsquo; in\r\nhis \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Reflection\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, p. 248; also the chapter\r\nentitled \u0026lsquo;The Moment of Experience\u0026rsquo; in his \u003ci\u003eMetaphysic of Experience\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nvol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, p. 34.) \u0026lsquo;We live forward, but we understand backward\u0026rsquo; is a\r\nphrase of Kierkegaard\u0026rsquo;s which H\u0026ouml;ffding quotes. [H. H\u0026ouml;ffding: \u0026ldquo;A\r\nPhilosophical Confession,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, 1905, p. 86.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_73_73\" id=\"Footnote_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[73]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_74_74\" id=\"Footnote_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[74]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, Lect. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026lsquo;Concerning\r\nFechner,\u0026rsquo; and Lect. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ev\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026lsquo;The Compounding of Consciousness.\u0026rsquo;]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_137\" id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[Pg 137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"V\" id=\"V\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eV\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE PLACE OF AFFECTIONAL FACTS IN A WORLD OF PURE EXPERIENCE\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_75_75\" id=\"FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_75_75\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCommon sense and popular philosophy are as dualistic as it is possible\r\nto be. Thoughts, we all naturally think, are made of one kind of\r\nsubstance, and things of another. Consciousness, flowing inside of us in\r\nthe forms of conception or judgment, or concentrating itself in the\r\nshape of passion or emotion, can be directly felt as the spiritual\r\nactivity which it is, and known in contrast with the space-filling\r\nobjective \u0026lsquo;content\u0026rsquo; which it envelopes and accompanies. In opposition to\r\nthis dualistic philosophy, I tried, in [the first essay] to show that\r\nthoughts and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material, and\r\nthat their opposition is only one of relation and of function. There is\r\nno thought-stuff different from thing-stuff, I said; but the same\r\nidentical piece\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_138\" id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[Pg 138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u0026lsquo;pure experience\u0026rsquo; (which was the name I gave to the\r\n\u003ci\u003emateria prima\u003c/i\u003e of everything) can stand alternately for a \u0026lsquo;fact of\r\nconsciousness\u0026rsquo; or for a physical reality, according as it is taken in\r\none context or in another. For the right understanding of what follows,\r\nI shall have to presuppose that the reader will have read that\r\n[essay].\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_76_76\" id=\"FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_76_76\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe commonest objection which the doctrine there laid down runs up\r\nagainst is drawn from the existence of our \u0026lsquo;affections.\u0026rsquo; In our\r\npleasures and pains, our loves and fears and angers, in the beauty,\r\ncomicality, importance or preciousness of certain objects and\r\nsituations, we have, I am told by many critics, a great realm of\r\nexperience intuitively recognized as spiritual, made, and felt to be\r\nmade, of consciousness exclusively, and different in nature from the\r\nspace-filling kind of being which is enjoyed by physical objects. In\r\nSection VII. of [the first essay], I treated of this class of\r\nexperiences very inadequately,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_139\" id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[Pg 139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e because I had to be so brief. I now\r\nreturn to the subject, because I believe that, so far from invalidating\r\nmy general thesis, these phenomena, when properly analyzed, afford it\r\npowerful support.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe central point of the pure-experience theory is that \u0026lsquo;outer\u0026rsquo; and\r\n\u0026lsquo;inner\u0026rsquo; are names for two groups into which we sort experiences\r\naccording to the way in which they act upon their neighbors. Any one\r\n\u0026lsquo;content,\u0026rsquo; such as \u003ci\u003ehard\u003c/i\u003e, let us say, can be assigned to either group.\r\nIn the outer group it is \u0026lsquo;strong,\u0026rsquo; it acts \u0026lsquo;energetically\u0026rsquo; and\r\naggressively. Here whatever is hard interferes with the space its\r\nneighbors occupy. It dents them; is impenetrable by them; and we call\r\nthe hardness then a physical hardness. In the mind, on the contrary, the\r\nhard thing is nowhere in particular, it dents nothing, it suffuses\r\nthrough its mental neighbors, as it were, and interpenetrates them.\r\nTaken in this group we call both it and them \u0026lsquo;ideas\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;sensations\u0026rsquo;;\r\nand the basis of the two groups respectively is the different type of\r\ninterrelation, the mutual impenetrability,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_140\" id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[Pg 140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on the one hand, and the\r\nlack of physical interference and interaction, on the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat what in itself is one and the same entity should be able to\r\nfunction thus differently in different contexts is a natural consequence\r\nof the extremely complex reticulations in which our experiences come. To\r\nher offspring a tigress is tender, but cruel to every other living\r\nthing\u0026mdash;both cruel and tender, therefore, at once. A mass in movement\r\nresists every force that operates contrariwise to its own direction, but\r\nto forces that pursue the same direction, or come in at right angles, it\r\nis absolutely inert. It is thus both energetic and inert; and the same\r\nis true (if you vary the associates properly) of every other piece of\r\nexperience. It is only towards certain specific groups of associates\r\nthat the physical energies, as we call them, of a content are put forth.\r\nIn another group it may be quite inert.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is possible to imagine a universe of experiences in which the only\r\nalternative between neighbors would be either physical interaction or\r\ncomplete inertness. In such a world the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_141\" id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[Pg 141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e mental or the physical \u003ci\u003estatus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof any piece of experience would be unequivocal. When active, it would\r\nfigure in the physical, and when inactive, in the mental group.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the universe we live in is more chaotic than this, and there is room\r\nin it for the hybrid or ambiguous group of our affectional experiences,\r\nof our emotions and appreciative perceptions. In the paragraphs that\r\nfollow I shall try to show:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) That the popular notion that these experiences are intuitively given\r\nas purely inner facts is hasty and erroneous; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) That their ambiguity illustrates beautifully my central thesis that\r\nsubjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is\r\naboriginally made of, but of its classification. Classifications depend\r\non our temporary purposes. For certain purposes it is convenient to take\r\nthings in one set of relations, for other purposes in another set. In\r\nthe two cases their contexts are apt to be different. In the case of our\r\naffectional experiences we have no permanent and steadfast purpose that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_142\" id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[Pg 142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobliges us to be consistent, so we find it easy to let them float\r\nambiguously, sometimes classing them with our feelings, sometimes with\r\nmore physical realities, according to caprice or to the convenience of\r\nthe moment. Thus would these experiences, so far from being an obstacle\r\nto the pure experience philosophy, serve as an excellent corroboration\r\nof its truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, then, it is a mistake to say, with the objectors whom I\r\nbegan by citing, that anger, love and fear are affections purely of the\r\nmind. That, to a great extent at any rate, they are simultaneously\r\naffections of the body is proved by the whole literature of the\r\nJames-Lange theory of emotion.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_77_77\" id=\"FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_77_77\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e All our pains, moreover, are local,\r\nand we are always free to speak of them in objective as well as in\r\nsubjective terms. We can say that we are aware of a painful place,\r\nfilling a certain bigness in our organism, or we can say that we are\r\ninwardly in a \u0026lsquo;state\u0026rsquo; of pain. All our adjectives of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_143\" id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[Pg 143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e worth are\r\nsimilarly ambiguous\u0026mdash;I instanced some of the ambiguities [in the first\r\nessay].\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_78_78\" id=\"FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_78_78\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e Is the preciousness of a diamond a quality of the gem? or is\r\nit a feeling in our mind? Practically we treat it as both or as either,\r\naccording to the temporary direction of our thought. \u0026lsquo;Beauty,\u0026rsquo; says\r\nProfessor Santayana, \u0026lsquo;is pleasure objectified\u0026rsquo;; and in Sections 10 and\r\n11 of his work, \u003ci\u003eThe Sense of Beauty\u003c/i\u003e, he treats in a masterly way of\r\nthis equivocal realm. The various pleasures we receive from an object\r\nmay count as \u0026lsquo;feelings\u0026rsquo; when we take them singly, but when they combine\r\nin a total richness, we call the result the \u0026lsquo;beauty\u0026rsquo; of the object, and\r\ntreat it as an outer attribute which our mind perceives. We discover\r\nbeauty just as we discover the physical properties of things. Training\r\nis needed to make us expert in either line. Single sensations also may\r\nbe ambiguous. Shall we say an \u0026lsquo;agreeable degree of heat,\u0026rsquo; or an\r\n\u0026lsquo;agreeable feeling\u0026rsquo; occasioned by the degree of heat? Either will do;\r\nand language would lose most of its esthetic and rhetorical value\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_144\" id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[Pg 144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e were\r\nwe forbidden to project words primarily connoting our affections upon\r\nthe objects by which the affections are aroused. The man is really\r\nhateful; the action really mean; the situation really tragic\u0026mdash;all in\r\nthemselves and quite apart from our opinion. We even go so far as to\r\ntalk of a weary road, a giddy height, a jocund morning or a sullen sky;\r\nand the term \u0026lsquo;indefinite\u0026rsquo; while usually applied only to our\r\napprehensions, functions as a fundamental physical qualification of\r\nthings in Spencer\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;law of evolution,\u0026rsquo; and doubtless passes with most\r\nreaders for all right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychologists, studying our perceptions of movement, have unearthed\r\nexperiences in which movement is felt in general but not ascribed\r\ncorrectly to the body that really moves. Thus in optical vertigo, caused\r\nby unconscious movements of our eyes, both we and the external universe\r\nappear to be in a whirl. When clouds float by the moon, it is as if both\r\nclouds and moon and we ourselves shared in the motion. In the\r\nextraordinary case of amnesia of the Rev. Mr. Hanna, pub\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_145\" id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[Pg 145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elished by Sidis\r\nand Goodhart in their important work on \u003ci\u003eMultiple Personality\u003c/i\u003e, we read\r\nthat when the patient first recovered consciousness and \u0026ldquo;noticed an\r\nattendant walk across the room, he identified the movement with that of\r\nhis own. He did not yet discriminate between his own movements and those\r\noutside himself.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_79_79\" id=\"FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_79_79\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e Such experiences point to a primitive stage of\r\nperception in which discriminations afterwards needful have not yet been\r\nmade. A piece of experience of a determinate sort is there, but there at\r\nfirst as a \u0026lsquo;pure\u0026rsquo; fact. Motion originally simply \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e; only later is it\r\nconfined to this thing or to that. Something like this is true of every\r\nexperience, however complex, at the moment of its actual presence. Let\r\nthe reader arrest himself in the act of reading this article now. \u003ci\u003eNow\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthis is a pure experience, a phenomenon, or datum, a mere \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e or\r\ncontent of fact. \u003ci\u003e\u0026lsquo;Reading\u0026rsquo; simply is, is there\u003c/i\u003e; and whether there for\r\nsome one\u0026rsquo;s consciousness, or there for physical nature, is a question\r\nnot yet put. At the moment, it is there for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_146\" id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[Pg 146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e neither; later we shall\r\nprobably judge it to have been there for both.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the affectional experiences which we are considering, the\r\nrelatively \u0026lsquo;pure\u0026rsquo; condition lasts. In practical life no urgent need has\r\nyet arisen for deciding whether to treat them as rigorously mental or as\r\nrigorously physical facts. So they remain equivocal; and, as the world\r\ngoes, their equivocality is one of their great conveniences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe shifting place of \u0026lsquo;secondary qualities\u0026rsquo; in the history of\r\nphilosophy\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_80_80\" id=\"FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_80_80\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e is another excellent proof of the fact that \u0026lsquo;inner\u0026rsquo; and\r\n\u0026lsquo;outer\u0026rsquo; are not coefficients with which experiences come to us\r\naboriginally stamped, but are rather results of a later classification\r\nperformed by us for particular needs. The common-sense stage of thought\r\nis a perfectly definite practical halting-place, the place where we\r\nourselves can proceed to act unhesitatingly. On this stage of thought\r\nthings act on each other as well as on us by means of their secondary\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_147\" id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[Pg 147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nqualities. Sound, as such, goes through the air and can be intercepted.\r\nThe heat of the fire passes over, as such, into the water which it sets\r\na-boiling. It is the very light of the arc-lamp which displaces the\r\ndarkness of the midnight street, etc. By engendering and translocating\r\njust these qualities, actively efficacious as they seem to be, we\r\nourselves succeed in altering nature so as to suit us; and until more\r\npurely intellectual, as distinguished from practical, needs had arisen,\r\nno one ever thought of calling these qualities subjective. When,\r\nhowever, Galileo, Descartes, and others found it best for philosophic\r\npurposes to class sound, heat, and light along with pain and pleasure as\r\npurely mental phenomena, they could do so with impunity.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_81_81\" id=\"FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_81_81\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven the primary qualities are undergoing the same fate. Hardness and\r\nsoftness are effects on us of atomic interactions, and the atoms\r\nthemselves are neither hard nor soft, nor solid nor liquid. Size and\r\nshape are deemed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_148\" id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[Pg 148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e subjective by Kantians; time itself is subjective\r\naccording to many philosophers;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_82_82\" id=\"FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_82_82\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e and even the activity and causal\r\nefficacy which lingered in physics long after secondary qualities were\r\nbanished are now treated as illusory projections outwards of phenomena\r\nof our own consciousness. There are no activities or effects in nature,\r\nfor the most intellectual contemporary school of physical speculation.\r\nNature exhibits only \u003ci\u003echanges\u003c/i\u003e, which habitually coincide with one\r\nanother so that their habits are describable in simple \u0026lsquo;laws.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_83_83\" id=\"FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_83_83\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no original spirituality or materiality of being, intuitively\r\ndiscerned, then; but only a translocation of experiences from one world\r\nto another; a grouping of them with one set or another of associates for\r\ndefinitely practical or intellectual ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI will say nothing here of the persistent ambiguity of \u003ci\u003erelations\u003c/i\u003e. They\r\nare undeniable parts of pure experience; yet, while common sense and\r\nwhat I call radical empiricism stand\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_149\" id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[Pg 149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for their being objective, both\r\nrationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are exclusively the\r\n\u0026lsquo;work of the mind\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;the finite mind or the absolute mind, as the case\r\nmay be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 45%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTurn now to those affective phenomena which more directly concern us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe soon learn to separate the ways in which things appeal to our\r\ninterests and emotions from the ways in which they act upon one another.\r\nIt does not \u003ci\u003ework\u003c/i\u003e to assume that physical objects are going to act\r\noutwardly by their sympathetic or antipathetic qualities. The beauty of\r\na thing or its value is no force that can be plotted in a polygon of\r\ncompositions, nor does its \u0026lsquo;use\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;significance\u0026rsquo; affect in the\r\nminutest degree its vicissitudes or destiny at the hands of physical\r\nnature. Chemical \u0026lsquo;affinities\u0026rsquo; are a purely verbal metaphor; and, as I\r\njust said, even such things as forces, tensions, and activities can at a\r\npinch be regarded as anthropomorphic projections. So far, then, as the\r\nphysical world means the collection of contents that determine in each\r\nother certain\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_150\" id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[Pg 150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e regular changes, the whole collection of our appreciative\r\nattributes has to be treated as falling outside of it. If we mean by\r\nphysical nature whatever lies beyond the surface of our bodies, these\r\nattributes are inert throughout the whole extent of physical nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy then do men leave them as ambiguous as they do, and not class them\r\ndecisively as purely spiritual?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reason would seem to be that, although they are inert as regards the\r\nrest of physical nature, they are not inert as regards that part of\r\nphysical nature which our own skin covers. It is those very appreciative\r\nattributes of things, their dangerousness, beauty, rarity, utility,\r\netc., that primarily appeal to our attention. In our commerce with\r\nnature these attributes are what give \u003ci\u003eemphasis\u003c/i\u003e to objects; and for an\r\nobject to be emphatic, whatever spiritual fact it may mean, means also\r\nthat it produces immediate bodily effects upon us, alterations of tone\r\nand tension, of heart-beat and breathing, of vascular and visceral\r\naction. The \u0026lsquo;interesting\u0026rsquo; aspects of things are thus\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_151\" id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[Pg 151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e not wholly inert\r\nphysically, though they be active only in these small corners of\r\nphysical nature which our bodies occupy. That, however, is enough to\r\nsave them from being classed as absolutely non-objective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe attempt, if any one should make it, to sort experiences into two\r\nabsolutely discrete groups, with nothing but inertness in one of them\r\nand nothing but activities in the other, would thus receive one check.\r\nIt would receive another as soon as we examined the more distinctively\r\nmental group; for though in that group it be true that things do not act\r\non one another by their physical properties, do not dent each other or\r\nset fire to each other, they yet act on each other in the most energetic\r\nway by those very characters which are so inert extracorporeally. It is\r\nby the interest and importance that experiences have for us, by the\r\nemotions they excite, and the purposes they subserve, by their affective\r\nvalues, in short, that their consecution in our several conscious\r\nstreams, as \u0026lsquo;thoughts\u0026rsquo; of ours, is mainly ruled. Desire introduces them;\r\ninterest\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_152\" id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[Pg 152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e holds them; fitness fixes their order and connection. I need\r\nonly refer for this aspect of our mental life, to Wundt\u0026rsquo;s article \u0026lsquo;Ueber\r\npsychische Causalit\u0026auml;t,\u0026rsquo; which begins Volume X. of his \u003ci\u003ePhilosophische\r\nStudien\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_84_84\" id=\"FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_84_84\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt thus appears that the ambiguous or amphibious \u003ci\u003estatus\u003c/i\u003e which we find\r\nour epithets of value occupying is the most natural thing in the world.\r\nIt would, however, be an unnatural status if the popular opinion which I\r\ncited at the outset were correct. If \u0026lsquo;physical\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;mental\u0026rsquo; meant two\r\ndifferent kinds of intrinsic nature, immediately, intuitively, and\r\ninfallibly discernible, and each fixed forever in whatever bit of\r\nexperience it qualified, one does not see how there could ever have\r\narisen any room for doubt or ambiguity. But if, on the contrary, these\r\nwords are words of sorting, ambiguity is natural. For then, as soon as\r\nthe relations of a thing are sufficiently various it can be sorted\r\nvariously.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_153\" id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[Pg 153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Take a mass of carrion, for example, and the\r\n\u0026lsquo;disgustingness\u0026rsquo; which for us is part of the experience. The sun\r\ncaresses it, and the zephyr wooes it as if it were a bed of roses. So\r\nthe disgustingness fails to \u003ci\u003eoperate\u003c/i\u003e within the realm of suns and\r\nbreezes,\u0026mdash;it does not function as a physical quality. But the carrion\r\n\u0026lsquo;turns our stomach\u0026rsquo; by what seems a direct operation\u0026mdash;it \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e function\r\nphysically, therefore, in that limited part of physics. We can treat it\r\nas physical or as non-physical according as we take it in the narrower\r\nor in the wider context, and conversely, of course, we must treat it as\r\nnon-mental or as mental.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur body itself is the palmary instance of the ambiguous. Sometimes I\r\ntreat my body purely as a part of outer nature. Sometimes, again, I\r\nthink of it as \u0026lsquo;mine,\u0026rsquo; I sort it with the \u0026lsquo;me,\u0026rsquo; and then certain local\r\nchanges and determinations in it pass for spiritual happenings. Its\r\nbreathing is my \u0026lsquo;thinking,\u0026rsquo; its sensorial adjustments are my\r\n\u0026lsquo;attention,\u0026rsquo; its kinesthetic alterations are my \u0026lsquo;efforts,\u0026rsquo; its visceral\r\nperturbations are my \u0026lsquo;emotions.\u0026rsquo;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_154\" id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[Pg 154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The obstinate controversies that have\r\narisen over such statements as these (which sound so paradoxical, and\r\nwhich can yet be made so seriously) prove how hard it is to decide by\r\nbare introspection what it is in experiences that shall make them either\r\nspiritual or material. It surely can be nothing intrinsic in the\r\nindividual experience. It is their way of behaving towards each other,\r\ntheir system of relations, their function; and all these things vary\r\nwith the context in which we find it opportune to consider them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI think I may conclude, then (and I hope that my readers are now ready\r\nto conclude with me), that the pretended spirituality of our emotions\r\nand of our attributes of value, so far from proving an objection to the\r\nphilosophy of pure experience, does, when rightly discussed and\r\naccounted for, serve as one of its best corroborations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_75_75\" id=\"Footnote_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[75]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 11, May 25, 1905.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_76_76\" id=\"Footnote_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[76]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It will be still better if he shall have also read the\r\n[essay] entitled \u0026lsquo;A World of Pure Experience,\u0026rsquo; which follows [the first]\r\nand develops its ideas still farther.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_77_77\" id=\"Footnote_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[77]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. \u003ci\u003eThe Principles of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxv\u003c/span\u003e; and\r\n\u0026ldquo;The Physical Basis of Emotion,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eThe Psychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n1894, p. 516.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_78_78\" id=\"Footnote_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[78]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_79_79\" id=\"Footnote_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[79]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Page \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_80_80\" id=\"Footnote_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[80]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. Janet and S\u0026eacute;ailles: \u003ci\u003eHistory of the Problems of\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, trans. by Monahan, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_81_81\" id=\"Footnote_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[81]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. Descartes: \u003ci\u003eMeditation\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e; \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eXLVIII\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_82_82\" id=\"Footnote_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[82]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. A. E. Taylor: \u003ci\u003eElements of Metaphysics\u003c/i\u003e, bk. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, ch.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_83_83\" id=\"Footnote_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[83]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. K. Pearson: \u003ci\u003eGrammar of Science\u003c/i\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_84_84\" id=\"Footnote_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[84]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is enough for my present purpose if the appreciative\r\ncharacters but \u003ci\u003eseem\u003c/i\u003e to act thus. Believers in an activity \u003ci\u003ean sich\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nother than our mental experiences of activity, will find some farther\r\nreflections on the subject in my address on \u0026lsquo;The Experience of\r\nActivity.\u0026rsquo; [The next essay. Cf. especially, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_155\" id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[Pg 155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"VI\" id=\"VI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVI\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE EXPERIENCE OF ACTIVITY\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_85_85\" id=\"FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_85_85\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrethren of the Psychological Association\u003c/span\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn casting about me for a subject for your President this year to talk\r\nabout it has seemed to me that our experiences of activity would form a\r\ngood one; not only because the topic is so naturally interesting, and\r\nbecause it has lately led to a good deal of rather inconclusive\r\ndiscussion, but because I myself am growing more and more interested in\r\na certain systematic way of handling questions, and want to get others\r\ninterested also, and this question strikes me as one in which, although\r\nI am painfully aware of my inability to communicate new discoveries or\r\nto reach definitive conclusions, I yet can show, in a rather definite\r\nmanner, how the method works.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_156\" id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[Pg 156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe way of handling things I speak of, is, as you already will have\r\nsuspected, that known sometimes as the pragmatic method, sometimes as\r\nhumanism, sometimes as Deweyism, and in France, by some of the disciples\r\nof Bergson, as the Philosophie nouvelle. Professor Woodbridge\u0026rsquo;s \u003ci\u003eJournal\r\nof Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_86_86\" id=\"FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_86_86\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e seems unintentionally to have become a sort of\r\nmeeting place for those who follow these tendencies in America. There is\r\nonly a dim identity among them; and the most that can be said at present\r\nis that some sort of gestation seems to be in the atmosphere, and that\r\nalmost any day a man with a genius for finding the right word for things\r\nmay hit upon some unifying and conciliating formula that will make so\r\nmuch vaguely similar aspiration crystallize into more definite form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI myself have given the name of \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; to that version of\r\nthe tendency in question which I prefer; and I propose, if you will now\r\nlet me, to illustrate what I mean by radical empiricism, by applying it\r\nto activity\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_157\" id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[Pg 157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as an example, hoping at the same time incidentally to\r\nleave the general problem of activity in a slightly\u0026mdash;I fear very\r\nslightly\u0026mdash;more manageable shape than before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Bradley calls the question of activity a scandal to philosophy, and\r\nif one turns to the current literature of the subject\u0026mdash;his own writings\r\nincluded\u0026mdash;one easily gathers what he means. The opponents cannot even\r\nunderstand one another. Mr. Bradley says to Mr. Ward: \u0026ldquo;I do not care\r\nwhat your oracle is, and your preposterous psychology may here be gospel\r\nif you please; … but if the revelation does contain a meaning, I will\r\ncommit myself to this: either the oracle is so confused that its\r\nsignification is not discoverable, or, upon the other hand, if it can be\r\npinned down to any definite statement, then that statement will be\r\nfalse.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_87_87\" id=\"FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_87_87\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e Mr. Ward in turn says of Mr. Bradley: \u0026ldquo;I cannot even imagine\r\nthe state of mind to which his description applies…. [It] reads like\r\nan unintentional travesty\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_158\" id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[Pg 158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of Herbartian psychology by one who has tried\r\nto improve upon it without being at the pains to master it.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_88_88\" id=\"FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_88_88\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nM\u0026uuml;nsterberg excludes a view opposed to his own by saying that with any\r\none who holds it a \u003ci\u003eVerst\u0026auml;ndigung\u003c/i\u003e with him is \u0026ldquo;\u003ci\u003egrunds\u0026auml;tzlich\r\nausgeschlossen\u003c/i\u003e\u0026rdquo;; and Royce, in a review of Stout,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_89_89\" id=\"FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_89_89\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e hauls him over\r\nthe coals at great length for defending \u0026lsquo;efficacy\u0026rsquo; in a way which I, for\r\none, never gathered from reading him, and which I have heard Stout\r\nhimself say was quite foreign to the intention of his text.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn these discussions distinct questions are habitually jumbled and\r\ndifferent points of view are talked of \u003ci\u003edurcheinander\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) There is a psychological question: \u0026ldquo;Have we perceptions of activity?\r\nand if so, what are they like, and when and where do we have them?\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) There is a metaphysical question: \u0026ldquo;Is there a \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e of activity?\r\nand if so, what idea must we frame of it? What is it like? and what\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_159\" id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[Pg 159]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoes it do, if it does anything?\u0026rdquo; And finally there is a logical\r\nquestion:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) \u0026ldquo;Whence do we \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e activity? By our own feelings of it solely? or\r\nby some other source of information?\u0026rdquo; Throughout page after page of the\r\nliterature one knows not which of these questions is before one; and\r\nmere description of the surface-show of experience is proferred as if it\r\nimplicitly answered every one of them. No one of the disputants,\r\nmoreover, tries to show what pragmatic consequences his own view would\r\ncarry, or what assignable particular differences in any one\u0026rsquo;s experience\r\nit would make if his adversary\u0026rsquo;s were triumphant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt seems to me that if radical empiricism be good for anything, it\r\nought, with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience,\r\nto be able to avoid such tangles, or at least to simplify them somewhat.\r\nThe pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no\r\ndifference of truth that doesn\u0026rsquo;t make a difference of fact somewhere;\r\nand it seeks to determine the meaning of all differences of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_160\" id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[Pg 160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e opinion by\r\nmaking the discussion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or\r\nparticular issue. The principle of pure experience is also a methodical\r\npostulate. Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it says, except what can\r\nbe experienced at some definite time by some experient; and for every\r\nfeature of fact ever so experienced, a definite place must be found\r\nsomewhere in the final system of reality. In other words: Everything\r\nreal must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing\r\nexperienced must somewhere be real.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eArmed with these rules of method let us see what face the problems of\r\nactivity present to us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the principle of pure experience, either the word \u0026lsquo;activity\u0026rsquo; must\r\nhave no meaning at all, or else the original type and model of what it\r\nmeans must lie in some concrete kind of experience that can be\r\ndefinitely pointed out. Whatever ulterior judgments we may eventually\r\ncome to make regarding activity, \u003ci\u003ethat sort\u003c/i\u003e of thing will be what the\r\njudgments are about. The first step to take, then, is to ask where in\r\nthe stream of experience we seem to find what\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_161\" id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[Pg 161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e we speak of as activity.\r\nWhat we are to think of the activity thus found will be a later\r\nquestion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is obvious that we are tempted to affirm activity wherever we\r\nfind anything \u003ci\u003egoing on\u003c/i\u003e. Taken in the broadest sense, any apprehension\r\nof something \u003ci\u003edoing\u003c/i\u003e, is an experience of activity. Were our world\r\ndescribable only by the words \u0026lsquo;nothing happening,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;nothing changing,\u0026rsquo;\r\n\u0026lsquo;nothing doing,\u0026rsquo; we should unquestionably call it an \u0026lsquo;inactive\u0026rsquo; world.\r\nBare activity then, as we may call it, means the bare fact of event or\r\nchange. \u0026lsquo;Change taking place\u0026rsquo; is a unique content of experience, one of\r\nthose \u0026lsquo;conjunctive\u0026rsquo; objects which radical empiricism seeks so earnestly\r\nto rehabilitate and preserve. The sense of activity is thus in the\r\nbroadest and vaguest way synonymous with the sense of \u0026lsquo;life.\u0026rsquo; We should\r\nfeel our own subjective life at least, even in noticing and proclaiming\r\nan otherwise inactive world. Our own reaction on its monotony would be\r\nthe one thing experienced there in the form of something coming to\r\npass.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_162\" id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[Pg 162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis seems to be what certain writers have in mind when they insist that\r\nfor an experient to be at all is to be active. It seems to justify, or\r\nat any rate to explain, Mr. Ward\u0026rsquo;s expression that we \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e only as we\r\nare active,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_90_90\" id=\"FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_90_90\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e for we \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e only as experients; and it rules out Mr.\r\nBradley\u0026rsquo;s contention that \u0026ldquo;there is no original experience of anything\r\nlike activity.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_91_91\" id=\"FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_91_91\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e What we ought to say about activities thus\r\nelementary, whose they are, what they effect, or whether indeed they\r\neffect anything at all\u0026mdash;these are later questions, to be answered only\r\nwhen the field of experience is enlarged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBare activity would thus be predicable, though there were no definite\r\ndirection, no actor, and no aim. Mere restless zigzag movement, or a\r\nwild \u003ci\u003eIdeenflucht\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003eRhapsodie der Wahrnehmungen\u003c/i\u003e, as Kant would\r\nsay,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_92_92\" id=\"FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_92_92\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e would constitute an active as distinguished from an inactive\r\nworld.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_163\" id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[Pg 163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut in this actual world of ours, as it is given, a part at least of\r\nthe activity comes with definite direction; it comes with desire and\r\nsense of goal; it comes complicated with resistances which it overcomes\r\nor succumbs to, and with the efforts which the feeling of resistance so\r\noften provokes; and it is in complex experiences like these that the\r\nnotions of distinct agents, and of passivity as opposed to activity\r\narise. Here also the notion of causal efficacy comes to birth. Perhaps\r\nthe most elaborate work ever done in descriptive psychology has been the\r\nanalysis by various recent writers of the more complex\r\nactivity-situations.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_93_93\" id=\"FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_93_93\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e In their descriptions, exquisitely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_164\" id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[Pg 164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e subtle some\r\nof them,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_94_94\" id=\"FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_94_94\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e the activity appears as the \u003ci\u003egestaltqualit\u0026auml;t\u003c/i\u003e or the\r\n\u003ci\u003efundirte inhalt\u003c/i\u003e (or as whatever else you may please to call the\r\nconjunctive form) which the content falls into when we experience it in\r\nthe ways which the describers set forth. Those factors in those\r\nrelations are what we mean by activity-situations; and to the possible\r\nenumeration and accumulation of their circumstances and ingredients\r\nthere would seem to be no natural bound. Every hour of human life could\r\ncontribute to the picture gallery; and this is the only fault that one\r\ncan find with such descriptive industry\u0026mdash;where is it going to stop?\r\nOught we to listen forever to verbal pictures of what we have already in\r\nconcrete form in our own breasts?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_95_95\" id=\"FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_95_95\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e They never take us off the\r\nsuperficial plane. We knew the facts already\u0026mdash;less spread out and\r\nseparated, to be sure\u0026mdash;but we knew them still. We always felt our own\r\nactivity, for example, as \u0026lsquo;the expansion of an idea with which our Self\r\nis identified, against an obstacle\u0026rsquo;;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_96_96\" id=\"FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_96_96\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e and the following out of such a\r\ndefinition through a multitude of cases elaborates the obvious so as to\r\nbe little more than an exercise in synonymic speech.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_165\" id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[Pg 165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAll the descriptions have to trace familiar outlines, and to use\r\nfamiliar terms. The activity is, for example, attributed either to a\r\nphysical or to a mental agent, and is either aimless or directed. If\r\ndirected it shows tendency. The tendency may or may not be resisted. If\r\nnot, we call the activity immanent, as when a body moves in empty space\r\nby its momentum, or our thoughts wander at their own sweet will. If\r\nresistance is met, \u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e agent complicates the situation. If now, in\r\nspite of resistance, the original tendency continues, effort makes its\r\nappearance, and along with effort, strain or squeeze. Will, in the\r\nnarrower sense of the word, then comes upon the scene, when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_166\" id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[Pg 166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eever, along\r\nwith the tendency, the strain and squeeze are sustained. But the\r\nresistance may be great enough to check the tendency, or even to reverse\r\nits path. In that case, we (if \u0026lsquo;we\u0026rsquo; were the original agents or subjects\r\nof the tendency) are overpowered. The phenomenon turns into one of\r\ntension simply, or of necessity succumbed-to, according as the opposing\r\npower is only equal, or is superior to ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhosoever describes an experience in such terms as these describes an\r\nexperience \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e activity. If the word have any meaning, it must denote\r\nwhat there is found. \u003ci\u003eThere\u003c/i\u003e is complete activity in its original and\r\nfirst intention. What it is \u0026lsquo;known-as\u0026rsquo; is what there appears. The\r\nexperiencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He\r\nfeels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or\r\nthe passive giving up, just as he feels the time, the space, the\r\nswiftness or intensity, the movement, the weight and color, the pain and\r\npleasure, the complexity, or whatever remaining characters the situation\r\nmay involve. He goes through all that ever can be imagined where\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_167\" id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[Pg 167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nactivity is supposed. If we suppose activities to go on outside of our\r\nexperience, it is in forms like these that we must suppose them, or else\r\ngive them some other name; for the word \u0026lsquo;activity\u0026rsquo; has no imaginable\r\ncontent whatever save these experiences of process, obstruction,\r\nstriving, strain, or release, ultimate \u003ci\u003equalia\u003c/i\u003e as they are of the life\r\ngiven us to be known.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere this the end of the matter, one might think that whenever we had\r\nsuccessfully lived through an activity-situation we should have to be\r\npermitted, without provoking contradiction, to say that we had been\r\nreally active, that we had met real resistance and had really prevailed.\r\nLotze somewhere says that to be an entity all that is necessary is to\r\n\u003ci\u003egelten\u003c/i\u003e as an entity, to operate, or be felt, experienced, recognized,\r\nor in any way realized, as such.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_97_97\" id=\"FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_97_97\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e In our activity-experiences the\r\nactivity assuredly fulfils Lotze\u0026rsquo;s demand. It makes itself \u003ci\u003egelten\u003c/i\u003e. It\r\nis witnessed at its work. No matter what activities there may really be\r\nin this extraordinary universe of ours, it is impossible\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_168\" id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[Pg 168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for us to\r\nconceive of any one of them being either lived through or authentically\r\nknown otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a\r\nfelt purpose against felt obstacles and overcoming or being overcome.\r\nWhat \u0026lsquo;sustaining\u0026rsquo; means here is clear to anyone who has lived through\r\nthe experience, but to no one else; just as \u0026lsquo;loud,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;red,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;sweet,\u0026rsquo; mean\r\nsomething only to beings with ears, eyes, and tongues. The \u003ci\u003epercipi\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nthese originals of experience is the \u003ci\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e; the curtain is the picture.\r\nIf there is anything hiding in the background, it ought not to be called\r\nactivity, but should get itself another name.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_169\" id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[Pg 169]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis seems so obviously true that one might well experience astonishment\r\nat finding so many of the ablest writers on the subject flatly denying\r\nthat the activity we live through in these situations is real. Merely to\r\nfeel active is not to be active, in their sight. The agents that appear\r\nin the experience are not real agents, the resistances do not really\r\nresist, the effects that appear are not really effects at all.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_98_98\" id=\"FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_98_98\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e It\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_170\" id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[Pg 170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis evident from this that mere descriptive analysis of any one of our\r\nactivity-experiences is not the whole story, that there is something\r\nstill to tell \u003ci\u003eabout\u003c/i\u003e them that has led such able writers to conceive of\r\na \u003ci\u003eSimon-pure\u003c/i\u003e activity, of an activity \u003ci\u003ean sich\u003c/i\u003e, that does, and\r\ndoesn\u0026rsquo;t\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_171\" id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[Pg 171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e merely appear to us to do, and compared with whose real doing\r\nall this phenomenal activity is but a specious sham.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe metaphysical question opens here; and I think that the state of mind\r\nof one possessed by it is often something like this: \u0026ldquo;It is all very\r\nwell,\u0026rdquo; we may imagine him saying, \u0026ldquo;to talk about certain\r\nexperience-series taking on the form of feelings of activity, just as\r\nthey might take on musical or geometric forms. Suppose that they do so;\r\nsuppose we feel a will to stand a strain. Does our feeling do more than\r\n\u003ci\u003erecord\u003c/i\u003e the fact that the strain is sustained? The \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e activity,\r\nmeanwhile, is the \u003ci\u003edoing\u003c/i\u003e of the fact; and what is the doing made of\r\nbefore the record is made. What in the will \u003ci\u003eenables\u003c/i\u003e it to act thus?\r\nAnd these trains of experience themselves, in which activities appear,\r\nwhat makes them \u003ci\u003ego\u003c/i\u003e at all? Does the activity in one bit of experience\r\nbring the next bit into being? As an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_172\" id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[Pg 172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e empiricist you cannot say so, for\r\nyou have just declared activity to be only a kind of synthetic object,\r\nor conjunctive relation experienced between bits of experience already\r\nmade. But what made them at all? What propels experience \u003ci\u003e\u0026uuml;berhaupt\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninto being? \u003ci\u003eThere\u003c/i\u003e is the activity that \u003ci\u003eoperates\u003c/i\u003e; the activity \u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis only its superficial sign.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo the metaphysical question, popped upon us in this way, I must pay\r\nserious attention ere I end my remarks; but, before doing so, let me\r\nshow that without leaving the immediate reticulations of experience, or\r\nasking what makes activity itself act, we still find the distinction\r\nbetween less real and more real activities forced upon us, and are\r\ndriven to much soul-searching on the purely phenomenal plane.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe must not forget, namely, in talking of the ultimate character of our\r\nactivity-experiences, that each of them is but a portion of a wider\r\nworld, one link in the vast chain of processes of experience out of\r\nwhich history is made. Each partial process, to him who lives through\r\nit, defines itself by its origin and its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_173\" id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[Pg 173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e goal; but to an observer with\r\na wider mind-span who should live outside of it, that goal would appear\r\nbut as a provisional halting-place, and the subjectively felt activity\r\nwould be seen to continue into objective activities that led far beyond.\r\nWe thus acquire a habit, in discussing activity-experiences, of defining\r\nthem by their relation to something more. If an experience be one of\r\nnarrow span, it will be mistaken as to what activity it is and whose.\r\nYou think that \u003ci\u003eyou\u003c/i\u003e are acting while you are only obeying someone\u0026rsquo;s\r\npush. You think you are doing \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e, but you are doing something of\r\nwhich you do not dream. For instance, you think you are but drinking\r\nthis glass; but you are really creating the liver-cirrhosis that will\r\nend your days. You think you are just driving this bargain, but, as\r\nStevenson says somewhere, you are laying down a link in the policy of\r\nmankind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGenerally speaking, the onlooker, with his wider field of vision,\r\nregards the \u003ci\u003eultimate outcome\u003c/i\u003e of an activity as what it is more really\r\ndoing; and \u003ci\u003ethe most previous agent\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_174\" id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[Pg 174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e ascertainable, being the first\r\nsource of action, he regards as the most real agent in the field. The\r\nothers but transmit that agent\u0026rsquo;s impulse; on him we put responsibility;\r\nwe name him when one asks us \u0026lsquo;Who\u0026rsquo;s to blame?\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the most previous agents ascertainable, instead of being of longer\r\nspan, are often of much shorter span than the activity in view.\r\nBrain-cells are our best example. My brain-cells are believed to excite\r\neach other from next to next (by contiguous transmission of katabolic\r\nalteration, let us say) and to have been doing so long before this\r\npresent stretch of lecturing-activity on my part began. If any one\r\ncell-group stops its activity, the lecturing will cease or show disorder\r\nof form. \u003ci\u003eCessante causa, cessat et effectus\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;does not this look as if\r\nthe short-span brain activities were the more real activities, and the\r\nlecturing activities on my part only their effects? Moreover, as Hume so\r\nclearly pointed out,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_99_99\" id=\"FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_99_99\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e in my mental activity-situation the words\r\nphysically to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_175\" id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[Pg 175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e uttered are represented as the activity\u0026rsquo;s immediate\r\ngoal. These words, however, cannot be uttered without intermediate\r\nphysical processes in the bulb and vagi nerves, which processes\r\nnevertheless fail to figure in the mental activity-series at all. That\r\nseries, therefore, since it leaves out vitally real steps of action,\r\ncannot represent the real activities. It is something purely subjective;\r\nthe \u003ci\u003efacts\u003c/i\u003e of activity are elsewhere. They are something far more\r\ninterstitial, so to speak, than what my feelings record.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e facts of activity that have in point of fact been\r\nsystematically pleaded for by philosophers have, so far as my\r\ninformation goes, been of three principal types.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first type takes a consciousness of wider time-span than ours to be\r\nthe vehicle of the more real activity. Its will is the agent, and its\r\npurpose is the action done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second type assumes that \u0026lsquo;ideas\u0026rsquo; struggling with one another are the\r\nagents, and that the prevalence of one set of them is the action.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_176\" id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[Pg 176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe third type believes that nerve-cells are the agents, and that\r\nresultant motor discharges are the acts achieved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow if we must de-realize our immediately felt activity-situations for\r\nthe benefit of either of these types of substitute, we ought to know\r\nwhat the substitution practically involves. \u003ci\u003eWhat practical difference\r\nought it to make if\u003c/i\u003e, instead of saying na\u0026iuml;vely that \u0026lsquo;I\u0026rsquo; am active now\r\nin delivering this address, I say that \u003ci\u003ea wider thinker is active\u003c/i\u003e, or\r\nthat \u003ci\u003ecertain ideas are active\u003c/i\u003e, or that \u003ci\u003ecertain nerve-cells are\r\nactive\u003c/i\u003e, in producing the result?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis would be the pragmatic meaning of the three hypotheses. Let us take\r\nthem in succession in seeking a reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we assume a wider thinker, it is evident that his purposes envelope\r\nmine. I am really lecturing \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e him; and although I cannot surely know\r\nto what end, yet if I take him religiously, I can trust it to be a good\r\nend, and willingly connive. I can be happy in thinking that my activity\r\ntransmits his impulse, and that his ends prolong my own. So long as I\r\ntake him\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_177\" id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[Pg 177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e religiously, in short, he does not de-realize my activities.\r\nHe tends rather to corroborate the reality of them, so long as I believe\r\nboth them and him to be good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen now we turn to ideas, the case is different, inasmuch as ideas are\r\nsupposed by the association psychology to influence each other only from\r\nnext to next. The \u0026lsquo;span\u0026rsquo; of an idea or pair of ideas, is assumed to be\r\nmuch smaller instead of being larger than that of my total conscious\r\nfield. The same results may get worked out in both cases, for this\r\naddress is being given anyhow. But the ideas supposed to \u0026lsquo;really\u0026rsquo; work\r\nit out had no prevision of the whole of it; and if I was lecturing for\r\nan absolute thinker in the former case, so, by similar reasoning, are my\r\nideas now lecturing for me, that is, accomplishing unwittingly a result\r\nwhich I approve and adopt. But, when this passing lecture is over, there\r\nis nothing in the bare notion that ideas have been its agents that would\r\nseem to guarantee that my present purposes in lecturing will be\r\nprolonged. \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e may have ulterior developments in view; but there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_178\" id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[Pg 178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is no\r\ncertainty that my ideas as such will wish to, or be able to, work them\r\nout.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe like is true if nerve-cells be the agents. The activity of a\r\nnerve-cell must be conceived of as a tendency of exceedingly short\r\nreach, an \u0026lsquo;impulse\u0026rsquo; barely spanning the way to the next cell\u0026mdash;for surely\r\nthat amount of actual \u0026lsquo;process\u0026rsquo; must be \u0026lsquo;experienced\u0026rsquo; by the cells if\r\nwhat happens between them is to deserve the name of activity at all. But\r\nhere again the gross resultant, as \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e perceive it, is indifferent to\r\nthe agents, and neither wished or willed or foreseen. Their being agents\r\nnow congruous with my will gives me no guarantee that like results will\r\nrecur again from their activity. In point of fact, all sorts of other\r\nresults do occur. My mistakes, impotencies, perversions, mental\r\nobstructions, and frustrations generally, are also results of the\r\nactivity of cells. Although these are letting me lecture now, on other\r\noccasions they make me do things that I would willingly not do.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question \u003ci\u003eWhose is the real activity?\u003c/i\u003e is thus tantamount to the\r\nquestion \u003ci\u003eWhat will be the actual results?\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_179\" id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[Pg 179]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Its interest is dramatic;\r\nhow will things work out? If the agents are of one sort, one way; if of\r\nanother sort, they may work out very differently. The pragmatic meaning\r\nof the various alternatives, in short, is great. It makes no merely\r\nverbal difference which opinion we take up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYou see it is the old dispute come back! Materialism and teleology;\r\nelementary short-span actions summing themselves \u0026lsquo;blindly,\u0026rsquo; or far\r\nforeseen ideals coming with effort into act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNa\u0026iuml;vely we believe, and humanly and dramatically we like to believe,\r\nthat activities both of wider and of narrower span are at work in life\r\ntogether, that both are real, and that the long-span tendencies yoke the\r\nothers in their service, encouraging them in the right direction, and\r\ndamping them when they tend in other ways. But how to represent clearly\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of such steering of small tendencies by large ones\r\nis a problem which metaphysical thinkers will have to ruminate upon for\r\nmany years to come. Even if such control should eventually grow clearly\r\npicturable,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_180\" id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[Pg 180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the question how far it is successfully exerted in this\r\nactual world can be answered only by investigating the details of fact.\r\nNo philosophic knowledge of the general nature and constitution of\r\ntendencies, or of the relation of larger to smaller ones, can help us to\r\npredict which of all the various competing tendencies that interest us\r\nin this universe are likeliest to prevail. We know as an empirical fact\r\nthat far-seeing tendencies often carry out their purpose, but we know\r\nalso that they are often defeated by the failure of some contemptibly\r\nsmall process on which success depends. A little thrombus in a\r\nstatesman\u0026rsquo;s meningeal artery will throw an empire out of gear. I can\r\ntherefore not even hint at any solution of the pragmatic issue. I have\r\nonly wished to show you that that issue is what gives the real interest\r\nto all inquiries into what kinds of activity may be real. Are the forces\r\nthat really act in the world more foreseeing or more blind? As between\r\n\u0026lsquo;our\u0026rsquo; activities as \u0026lsquo;we\u0026rsquo; experience them, and those of our ideas, or of\r\nour brain-cells, the issue is well-defined.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_181\" id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[Pg 181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI said a while back\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_100_100\" id=\"FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_100_100\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e that I should return to the \u0026lsquo;metaphysical\u0026rsquo;\r\nquestion before ending; so, with a few words about that, I will now\r\nclose my remarks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn whatever form we hear this question propounded, I think that it\r\nalways arises from two things, a belief that \u003ci\u003ecausality\u003c/i\u003e must be exerted\r\nin activity, and a wonder as to how causality is made. If we take an\r\nactivity-situation at its face-value, it seems as if we caught \u003ci\u003ein\r\nflagrante delicto\u003c/i\u003e the very power that makes facts come and be. I now am\r\neagerly striving, for example, to get this truth which I seem half to\r\nperceive, into words which shall make it show more clearly. If the words\r\ncome, it will seem as if the striving itself had drawn or pulled them\r\ninto actuality out from the state of merely possible being in which they\r\nwere. How is this feat performed? How does the pulling \u003ci\u003epull\u003c/i\u003e? How do I\r\nget my hold on words not yet existent, and when they come by what means\r\nhave I \u003ci\u003emade\u003c/i\u003e them come? Really it is the problem of creation; for in\r\nthe end the question is: How do\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_182\" id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[Pg 182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e I make them \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e? Real activities are\r\nthose that really make things be, without which the things are not, and\r\nwith which they are there. Activity, so far as we merely feel it, on the\r\nother hand, is only an impression of ours, it may be maintained; and an\r\nimpression is, for all this way of thinking, only a shadow of another\r\nfact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eArrived at this point, I can do little more than indicate the principles\r\non which, as it seems to me, a radically empirical philosophy is obliged\r\nto rely in handling such a dispute.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf there \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e real creative activities in being, radical empiricism must\r\nsay, somewhere they must be immediately lived. Somewhere the \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nefficacious causing and the \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e of it must be experienced in one,\r\njust as the what and the that of \u0026lsquo;cold\u0026rsquo; are experienced in one whenever\r\na man has the sensation of cold here and now. It boots not to say that\r\nour sensations are fallible. They are indeed; but to see the thermometer\r\ncontradict us when we say \u0026lsquo;it is cold\u0026rsquo; does not abolish cold as a\r\nspecific nature from the universe. Cold is in the arctic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_183\" id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[Pg 183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e circle if not\r\nhere. Even so, to feel that our train is moving when the train beside\r\nour window moves, to see the moon through a telescope come twice as\r\nnear, or to see two pictures as one solid when we look through a\r\nstereoscope at them, leaves motion, nearness, and solidity still in\r\nbeing\u0026mdash;if not here, yet each in its proper seat elsewhere. And wherever\r\nthe seat of real causality \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, as ultimately known \u0026lsquo;for true\u0026rsquo; (in\r\nnerve-processes, if you will, that cause our feelings of activity as\r\nwell as the movements which these seem to prompt), a philosophy of pure\r\nexperience can consider the real causation as no other \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e of thing\r\nthan that which even in our most erroneous experiences appears to be at\r\nwork. Exactly what appears there is what we \u003ci\u003emean\u003c/i\u003e by working, though we\r\nmay later come to learn that working was not exactly \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging\r\non, and finally achieving our intention\u0026mdash;this \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e action, this \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\r\neffectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure\r\nexperience-philosophy, the whereabouts of it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_184\" id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[Pg 184]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e anywhere can be discussed.\r\nHere is creation in its first intention, here is causality at work.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_101_101\" id=\"FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_101_101\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTo treat this offhand as the bare illusory surface of a world whose real\r\ncausality is an unimaginable ontological principle hidden in the cubic\r\ndeeps, is, for the more empirical way of thinking, only animism in\r\nanother shape. You explain your given fact by your \u0026lsquo;principle,\u0026rsquo; but the\r\nprinciple itself, when you look clearly at it, turns out to be nothing\r\nbut a previous little spiritual copy of the fact. Away from that one and\r\nonly kind of fact your mind, considering causality, can never get.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_102_102\" id=\"FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_102_102\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_185\" id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[Pg 185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI conclude, then, that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature,\r\nas a \u0026lsquo;category,\u0026rsquo; if you like, of reality, is \u003ci\u003ejust what we feel it to\r\nbe\u003c/i\u003e, just that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal.\r\nWe have the whole butt and being of it in our hands; and the healthy\r\nthing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_186\" id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[Pg 186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for philosophy is to leave off grubbing underground for what\r\neffects effectuation, or what makes action act, and to try to solve the\r\nconcrete questions of where effectuation in this world is located, of\r\nwhich things are the true causal agents there, and of what the more\r\nremote effects consist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this point of view the greater sublimity traditionally attributed\r\nto the metaphysical inquiry, the grubbing inquiry, entirely disappears.\r\nIf we could know what causation really and transcendentally is in\r\nitself, the only \u003ci\u003euse\u003c/i\u003e of the knowledge would be to help us to recognize\r\nan actual cause when we had one, and so to track the future course of\r\noperations more intelligently out. The mere abstract inquiry into\r\ncausation\u0026rsquo;s hidden nature is not more sublime than any other inquiry\r\nequally abstract. Causation inhabits no more sublime level than anything\r\nelse. It lives, apparently, in the dirt of the world as well as in the\r\nabsolute, or in man\u0026rsquo;s unconquerable mind. The worth and interest of the\r\nworld consists not in its elements, be these elements\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_187\" id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[Pg 187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e things, or be\r\nthey the conjunctions of things; it exists rather in the dramatic\r\noutcome in the whole process, and in the meaning of the succession\r\nstages which the elements work out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy colleague and master, Josiah Royce, in a page of his review of\r\nStout\u0026rsquo;s \u003ci\u003eAnalytic Psychology\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_103_103\" id=\"FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_103_103\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e has some fine words on this point\r\nwith which I cordially agree. I cannot agree with his separating the\r\nnotion of efficacy from that of activity altogether (this I understand\r\nto be one contention of his) for activities are efficacious whenever\r\nthey are real activities at all. But the inner nature both of efficacy\r\nand of activity are superficial problems, I understand Royce to say; and\r\nthe only point for us in solving them would be their possible use in\r\nhelping us to solve the far deeper problem of the course and meaning of\r\nthe world of life. Life, says our colleague, is full of significance, of\r\nmeaning, of success and of defeat, of hoping and of striving, of\r\nlonging, of desire, and of inner value. It is a total presence that\r\nembodies worth. To live our own lives better in this presence is the\r\ntrue reason why we wish to know the elements of things; so even we\r\npsychologists must end on this pragmatic note.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_188\" id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[Pg 188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe urgent problems of activity are thus more concrete. They are all\r\nproblems of the true relation of longer-span to shorter-span activities.\r\nWhen, for example, a number of \u0026lsquo;ideas\u0026rsquo; (to use the name traditional in\r\npsychology) grow confluent in a larger field of consciousness, do the\r\nsmaller activities still co-exist with the wider activities then\r\nexperienced by the conscious subject? And, if so, do the wide activities\r\naccompany the narrow ones inertly, or do they exert control? Or do they\r\nperhaps utterly supplant and replace them and short-circuit their\r\neffects? Again, when a mental activity-process and a brain-cell series\r\nof activities both terminate in the same muscular movement, does the\r\nmental process steer the neural processes or not? Or, on the other hand,\r\ndoes it independently short-circuit their effects? Such are the\r\nquestions that we must begin with. But so far am I from suggesting any\r\ndefinitive answer to such\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_189\" id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[Pg 189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e questions, that I hardly yet can put them\r\nclearly. They lead, however, into that region of panpsychic and\r\nontologic speculation of which Professors Bergson and Strong have lately\r\nenlarged the literature in so able and interesting a way.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_104_104\" id=\"FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_104_104\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nresults of these authors seem in many respects dissimilar, and I\r\nunderstand than as yet but imperfectly; but I cannot help suspecting\r\nthat the direction of their work is very promising, and that they have\r\nthe hunter\u0026rsquo;s instinct for the fruitful trails.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_85_85\" id=\"Footnote_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[85]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e President\u0026rsquo;s Address before the American Psychological\r\nAssociation, Philadelphia Meeting, December, 1904. [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nPsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 1, Jan., 1905. Also reprinted, with\r\nsome omissions, as Appendix B, \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 370-394.\r\nPp. 166-167 have also been reprinted in \u003ci\u003eSome Problems of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 212. The present essay is referred to in \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e, note. The\r\nauthor\u0026rsquo;s corrections have been adopted for the present text. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_86_86\" id=\"Footnote_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[86]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific\r\nMethods.\u003c/i\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_87_87\" id=\"Footnote_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[87]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e, second edition, pp.\r\n116-117.\u0026mdash;Obviously written \u003ci\u003eat\u003c/i\u003e Ward, though Ward\u0026rsquo;s name is not\r\nmentioned.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_88_88\" id=\"Footnote_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[88]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e, 1887, pp. 573-574.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_89_89\" id=\"Footnote_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[89]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e, [1897], p. 379.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_90_90\" id=\"Footnote_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[90]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eNaturalism and Agnosticism\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, p. 245. One thinks\r\nnaturally of the peripatetic \u003ci\u003eactus primus\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eactus secundus\u003c/i\u003e here.\r\n[\u0026ldquo;Actus autem est \u003ci\u003eduplex\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003eprimus\u003c/i\u003e et \u003ci\u003esecundus\u003c/i\u003e. Actus quidem primus\r\nest forma, et integritas sei. Actus autem secundus est operatio.\u0026rdquo; Thomas\r\nAquinas: \u003ci\u003eSumma Theologica\u003c/i\u003e, edition of Leo XIII, (1894), vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, p.\r\n391. Cf. also Blanc: \u003ci\u003eDictionnaire de Philosophie\u003c/i\u003e, under \u0026lsquo;acte.\u0026rsquo; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_91_91\" id=\"Footnote_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[91]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e, second edition, p. 116.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_92_92\" id=\"Footnote_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[92]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003eKritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke\u003c/i\u003e, (1905), vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, p.\r\n110 (trans. by Max M\u0026uuml;ller, second edition, p. 128).]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_93_93\" id=\"Footnote_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[93]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I refer to such descriptive work as Ladd\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003ePsychology,\r\nDescriptive and Explanatory\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, chap. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ev\u003c/span\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, chap. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exi\u003c/span\u003e, part\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, chaps. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxv\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxvi\u003c/span\u003e); as Sully\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eThe Human Mind\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ev\u003c/span\u003e); as\r\nStout\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eAnalytic Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, book \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, chap. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e, and book \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, chaps. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e); as Bradley\u0026rsquo;s (in his long series of analytic articles on\r\nPsychology in \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e); as Titchener\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eOutline of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nchap. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e); as Shand\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, 449; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, 450; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e, 289); as\r\nWard\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e, 67; 564); as Loveday\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e, 455); as\r\nLipps\u0026rsquo;s (Vom F\u0026uuml;hlen, Wollen und Denken, 1902, chaps. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e); and as\r\nBergson\u0026rsquo;s (\u003ci\u003eRevue Philosophique\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLIII\u003c/span\u003e, 1)\u0026mdash;to mention only a few\r\nwritings which I immediately recall.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_94_94\" id=\"Footnote_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[94]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Their existence forms a curious commentary on Prof.\r\nM\u0026uuml;nsterberg\u0026rsquo;s dogma that will-attitudes are not describable. He himself\r\nhas contributed in a superior way to their description, both in his\r\n\u003ci\u003eWillenshandlung\u003c/i\u003e, and in his \u003ci\u003eGrundz\u0026uuml;ge\u003c/i\u003e [\u003ci\u003eder Psychologie\u003c/i\u003e], part \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nchap. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eix\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026sect; 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_95_95\" id=\"Footnote_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[95]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I ought myself to cry \u003ci\u003epeccavi\u003c/i\u003e, having been a voluminous\r\nsinner in my own chapter on the will. [\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, chap. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxvi\u003c/span\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_96_96\" id=\"Footnote_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[96]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. F. H. Bradley, \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e, second\r\nedition, pp. 96-97.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_97_97\" id=\"Footnote_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[97]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. above, p. 59, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_33_33\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_98_98\" id=\"Footnote_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[98]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eVerborum grati\u0026acirc;\u003c/i\u003e: \u0026ldquo;The feeling of activity is not able,\r\n\u003ci\u003equ\u0026acirc;\u003c/i\u003e feeling, to tell us anything about activity\u0026rdquo; (Loveday: \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N.\r\nS., vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e, [1901], p. 463); \u0026ldquo;A sensation or feeling or sense \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e\r\nactivity … is not, looked at in another way, an experience \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e\r\nactivity at all. It is a mere sensation shut up within which you could\r\nby no reflection get the idea of activity…. Whether this experience is\r\nor is not later on a character essential to our perception and our idea\r\nof activity, it, as it comes first, is not in itself an experience of\r\nactivity at all. It, as it comes first, is only so for extraneous\r\nreasons and only so for an outside observer\u0026rdquo; (Bradley, \u003ci\u003eAppearance and\r\nReality\u003c/i\u003e, second edition, p. 605); \u0026ldquo;In dem T\u0026auml;tigkeitsgef\u0026uuml;hle liegt an\r\nsich nicht der geringste Beweis f\u0026uuml;r das Vorhandensein einer psychischen\r\nT\u0026auml;tigkeit\u0026rdquo; (M\u0026uuml;nsterberg: \u003ci\u003eGrundz\u0026uuml;ge der Psychologie\u003c/i\u003e). I could multiply\r\nsimilar quotations and would have introduced some of them into my text\r\nto make it more concrete, save that the mingling of different points of\r\nview in most of these author\u0026rsquo;s discussions (not in M\u0026uuml;nsterberg\u0026rsquo;s) make\r\nit impossible to disentangle exactly what they mean. I am sure in any\r\ncase, to be accused of misrepresenting them totally, even in this note,\r\nby omission of the context, so the less I name names and the more I\r\nstick to abstract characterization of a merely possible style of\r\nopinion, the safer it will be. And apropos of misunderstandings, I may\r\nadd to this note a complaint on my own account. Professor Stout, in the\r\nexcellent chapter on \u0026lsquo;Mental Activity,\u0026rsquo; in vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e of his \u003ci\u003eAnalytic\r\nPsychology\u003c/i\u003e, takes me to task for identifying spiritual activity with\r\ncertain muscular feelings and gives quotations to bear him out. They are\r\nfrom certain paragraphs on \u0026lsquo;the Self,\u0026rsquo; in which my attempt was to show\r\nwhat the central nucleus of the activities that we call \u0026lsquo;ours\u0026rsquo; is.\r\n[\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 299-305.] I found it in certain\r\nintracephalic movements which we habitually oppose, as \u0026lsquo;subjective,\u0026rsquo; to\r\nthe activities of the transcorporeal world. I sought to show that there\r\nis no direct evidence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual\r\nagent as such (I should now say the activity of \u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo; as such,\r\nsee [the first essay], \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo;). There are, in fact,\r\nthree distinguishable \u0026lsquo;activities\u0026rsquo; in the field of discussion: the\r\nelementary activity involved in the mere \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e of experience, in the\r\nfact that \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e is going on, and the farther specification of this\r\n\u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e into two \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e, an activity felt as \u0026lsquo;ours,\u0026rsquo; and an\r\nactivity ascribed to objects. Stout, as I apprehend him, identifies\r\n\u0026lsquo;our\u0026rsquo; activity with that of the total experience-process, and when I\r\ncircumscribe it as a part thereof, accuses me of treating it as a sort\r\nof external appendage to itself (Stout: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, pp.\r\n162-163), as if I \u0026lsquo;separated the activity from the process which is\r\nactive.\u0026rsquo; But all the processes in question are active, and their\r\nactivity is inseparable from their being. My book raised only the\r\nquestion of \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e activity deserved the name of \u0026lsquo;ours.\u0026rsquo; So far as we\r\nare \u0026lsquo;persons,\u0026rsquo; and contrasted and opposed to an \u0026lsquo;environment,\u0026rsquo; movements\r\nin our body figure as our activities; and I am unable to find any other\r\nactivities that are ours in this strictly personal sense. There is a\r\nwider sense in which the whole \u0026lsquo;choir of heaven and furniture of the\r\nearth,\u0026rsquo; and their activities, are ours, for they are our \u0026lsquo;objects.\u0026rsquo; But\r\n\u0026lsquo;we\u0026rsquo; are here only another name for the total process of experience,\r\nanother name for all that is, in fact; and I was dealing with the\r\npersonal and individualized self exclusively in the passages with which\r\nProfessor Stout finds fault.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly\r\ncalled self, is a part of the content of the world experienced. The\r\nworld experienced (otherwise called the \u0026lsquo;field of consciousness\u0026rsquo;) comes\r\nat all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision, centre of\r\naction, centre of interest. Where the body is is \u0026lsquo;here\u0026rsquo;; when the body\r\nacts is \u0026lsquo;now\u0026rsquo;; what the body touches is \u0026lsquo;this\u0026rsquo;; all other things are\r\n\u0026lsquo;there\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;then\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;that.\u0026rsquo; These words of emphasized position imply\r\na systematization of things with reference to a focus of action and\r\ninterest which lies in the body; and the systematization is now so\r\ninstinctive (was it ever not so?) that no developed or active experience\r\nexists for us at all except in that ordered form. So far as \u0026lsquo;thoughts\u0026rsquo;\r\nand \u0026lsquo;feelings\u0026rsquo; can be active, their activity terminates in the activity\r\nof the body, and only through first arousing its activities can they\r\nbegin to change those of the rest of the world. [Cf. also \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic\r\nUniverse\u003c/i\u003e, p. 344, note 8. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e] The body is the storm centre, the origin\r\nof co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that\r\nexperience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its\r\npoint of view. The word \u0026lsquo;I,\u0026rsquo; then, is primarily a noun of position, just\r\nlike \u0026lsquo;this\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;here.\u0026rsquo; Activities attached to \u0026lsquo;this\u0026rsquo; position have\r\nprerogative emphasis, and, if activities have feelings, must be felt in\r\na peculiar way. The word \u0026lsquo;my\u0026rsquo; designates the kind of emphasis. I see no\r\ninconsistency whatever in defending, on the one hand, \u0026lsquo;my\u0026rsquo; activities as\r\nunique and opposed to those of outer nature, and, on the other hand, in\r\naffirming, after introspection, that they consist in movements in the\r\nhead. The \u0026lsquo;my\u0026rsquo; of them is the emphasis, the feeling of\r\nperspective-interest in which they are dyed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_99_99\" id=\"Footnote_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[99]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003eEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding\u003c/i\u003e, sect. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evii\u003c/span\u003e, part\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, Selby-Bigge\u0026rsquo;s edition, pp. 65 ff.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_100_100\" id=\"Footnote_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[100]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Page \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_101_101\" id=\"Footnote_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[101]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Let me not be told that this contradicts [the first\r\nessay], \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo; (see especially page \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e), in which\r\nit was said that while \u0026lsquo;thoughts\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;things\u0026rsquo; have the same natures,\r\nthe natures work \u0026lsquo;energetically\u0026rsquo; on each other in the things (fire\r\nburns, water wets, etc.) but not in the thoughts. Mental activity-trains\r\nare composed of thoughts, yet their members do work on each other, they\r\ncheck, sustain, and introduce. They do so when the activity is merely\r\nassociational as well as when effort is there. But, and this is my\r\nreply, they do so by other parts of their nature than those that\r\nenergize physically. One thought in every developed activity-series is a\r\ndesire or thought of purpose, and all the other thoughts acquire a\r\nfeeling tone from their relation of harmony or oppugnancy to this. The\r\ninterplay of these secondary tones (among which \u0026lsquo;interest,\u0026rsquo;\r\n\u0026lsquo;difficulty,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;effort\u0026rsquo; figure) runs the drama in the mental series.\r\nIn what we term the physical drama these qualities play absolutely no\r\npart. The subject needs careful working out; but I can see no\r\ninconsistency.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_102_102\" id=\"Footnote_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[102]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have found myself more than once accused in print of\r\nbeing the assertor of a metaphysical principle of activity. Since\r\nliterary misunderstandings retard the settlement of problems, I should\r\nlike to say that such an interpretation of the pages I have published on\r\nEffort and on Will is absolutely foreign to what I meant to express.\r\n[\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxvi\u003c/span\u003e.] I owe all my doctrines\r\non this subject to Renouvier; and Renouvier, as I understand him, is (or\r\nat any rate then was) an out and out phenomenist, a denier of \u0026lsquo;forces\u0026rsquo;\r\nin the most strenuous sense. [Cf. Ch. Renouvier: \u003ci\u003eEsquisse d\u0026rsquo;une\r\nClassification Syst\u0026eacute;matique des Doctrines Philosophiques\u003c/i\u003e (1885), vol.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 390-392; \u003ci\u003eEssais de Critique G\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;rale\u003c/i\u003e (1859), vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026sect;\u0026sect; ix,\r\nxiii. For an acknowledgment of the author\u0026rsquo;s general indebtedness to\r\nRenouvier, cf. \u003ci\u003eSome Problems of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, p. 165, note. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e] Single\r\nclauses in my writing, or sentences read out of their connection, may\r\npossibly have been compatible with a transphenomenal principle of\r\nenergy; but I defy anyone to show a single sentence which, taken with\r\nits context, should be naturally held to advocate that view. The\r\nmisinterpretation probably arose at first from my defending (after\r\nRenouvier) the indeterminism of our efforts. \u0026lsquo;Free will\u0026rsquo; was supposed by\r\nmy critics to involve a supernatural agent. As a matter of plain history\r\nthe only \u0026lsquo;free will\u0026rsquo; I have ever thought of defending is the character\r\nof novelty in fresh activity-situations. If an activity-process is the\r\nform of a whole \u0026lsquo;field of consciousness,\u0026rsquo; and if each field of\r\nconsciousness is not only in its totality unique (as is now commonly\r\nadmitted) but has its elements unique (since in that situation they are\r\nall dyed in the total) then novelty is perpetually entering the world\r\nand what happens there is not pure \u003ci\u003erepetition\u003c/i\u003e, as the dogma of the\r\nliteral uniformity of nature requires. Activity-situations come, in\r\nshort, each with an original touch. A \u0026lsquo;principle\u0026rsquo; of free will if there\r\nwere one, would doubtless manifest itself in such phenomena, but I never\r\nsaw, nor do I now see, what the principle could do except rehearse the\r\nphenomenon beforehand, or why it ever should be invoked.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_103_103\" id=\"Footnote_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[103]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e, 1897; cf. pp. 392-393.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_104_104\" id=\"Footnote_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[104]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. \u003ci\u003eA Pluralistic Universe\u003c/i\u003e, Lect. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e (on Bergson); H.\r\nBergson: \u003ci\u003eCreative Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, trans. by A. Mitchell; C. A. Strong: \u003ci\u003eWhy\r\nthe Mind has a Body\u003c/i\u003e, ch. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exii\u003c/span\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_190\" id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[Pg 190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"VII\" id=\"VII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE ESSENCE OF HUMANISM\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_105_105\" id=\"FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_105_105\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHumanism is a ferment that has \u0026lsquo;come to stay.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_106_106\" id=\"FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_106_106\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e It is not a single\r\nhypothesis or theorem, and it dwells on no new facts. It is rather a\r\nslow shifting in the philosophic perspective, making things appear as\r\nfrom a new centre of interest or point of sight. Some writers are\r\nstrongly conscious of the shifting, others half unconscious, even though\r\ntheir own vision may have undergone much change. The result is no small\r\nconfusion in debate, the half-conscious humanists often taking part\r\nagainst the radical ones, as if they wished to count upon the other\r\nside.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_107_107\" id=\"FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_107_107\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_191\" id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[Pg 191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf humanism really be the name for such a shifting of perspective, it\r\nis obvious that the whole scene of the philosophic stage will change in\r\nsome degree if humanism prevails. The emphasis of things, their\r\nforeground and background distribution, their sizes and values, will not\r\nkeep just the same.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_108_108\" id=\"FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_108_108\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e If such pervasive consequences be involved in\r\nhumanism, it is clear that no pains which philosophers may take, first\r\nin defining it, and then in furthering, checking, or steering its\r\nprogress, will be thrown away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt suffers badly at present from incomplete definition. Its most\r\nsystematic advocates, Schiller and Dewey, have published fragment\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_192\" id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[Pg 192]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eary\r\nprograms only; and its bearing on many vital philosophic problems has\r\nnot been traced except by adversaries who, scenting heresies in advance,\r\nhave showered blows on doctrines\u0026mdash;subjectivism and scepticism, for\r\nexample\u0026mdash;that no good humanist finds it necessary to entertain. By their\r\nstill greater reticences, the anti-humanists have, in turn, perplexed\r\nthe humanists. Much of the controversy has involved the word \u0026lsquo;truth.\u0026rsquo; It\r\nis always good in debate to know your adversary\u0026rsquo;s point of view\r\nauthentically. But the critics of humanism never define exactly what the\r\nword \u0026lsquo;truth\u0026rsquo; signifies when they use it themselves. The humanists have\r\nto guess at their view; and the result has doubtless been much beating\r\nof the air. Add to all this, great individual differences in both camps,\r\nand it becomes clear that nothing is so urgently needed, at the stage\r\nwhich things have reached at present, as a sharper definition by each\r\nside of its central point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhoever will contribute any touch of sharpness will help us to make sure\r\nof what\u0026rsquo;s\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_193\" id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[Pg 193]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e what and who is who. Anyone can contribute such a definition,\r\nand, without it, no one knows exactly where he stands. If I offer my own\r\nprovisional definition of humanism\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_109_109\" id=\"FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_109_109\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e now and here, others may improve\r\nit, some adversary may be led to define his own creed more sharply by\r\nthe contrast, and a certain quickening of the crystallization of general\r\nopinion may result.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe essential service of humanism, as I conceive the situation, is to\r\nhave seen that \u003ci\u003ethough one part of our experience may lean upon another\r\npart to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may\r\nbe considered, experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on\r\nnothing\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince this formula also expresses the main contention of transcendental\r\nidealism, it needs abundant explication to make it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_194\" id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[Pg 194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e unambiguous. It\r\nseems, at first sight, to confine itself to denying theism and\r\npantheism. But, in fact, it need not deny either; everything would\r\ndepend on the exegesis; and if the formula ever became canonical, it\r\nwould certainly develop both right-wing and left-wing interpreters. I\r\nmyself read humanism theistically and pluralistically. If there be a\r\nGod, he is no absolute all-experiencer, but simply the experiencer of\r\nwidest actual conscious span. Read thus, humanism is for me a religion\r\nsusceptible of reasoned defence, though I am well aware how many minds\r\nthere are to whom it can appeal religiously only when it has been\r\nmonistically translated. Ethically the pluralistic form of it takes for\r\nme a stronger hold on reality than any other philosophy I know of\u0026mdash;it\r\nbeing essentially a \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e philosophy, a philosophy of \u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003eco\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026rsquo; in\r\nwhich conjunctions do the work. But my primary reason for advocating it\r\nis its matchless intellectual economy. It gets rid, not only of the\r\nstanding \u0026lsquo;problems\u0026rsquo; that monism engenders (\u0026lsquo;problem of evil,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;problem\r\nof freedom,\u0026rsquo; and the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_195\" id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[Pg 195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e like), but of other metaphysical mysteries and\r\nparadoxes as well.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt gets rid, for example, of the whole agnostic controversy, by refusing\r\nto entertain the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality at all. It gets\r\nrid of any need for an absolute of the Bradleyan type (avowedly sterile\r\nfor intellectual purposes) by insisting that the conjunctive relations\r\nfound within experience are faultlessly real. It gets rid of the need of\r\nan absolute of the Roycean type (similarly sterile) by its pragmatic\r\ntreatment of the problem of knowledge [a treatment of which I have\r\nalready given a version in two very inadequate articles].\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_110_110\" id=\"FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_110_110\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e As the\r\nviews of knowledge, reality and truth imputed to humanism have been\r\nthose so far most fiercely attacked, it is in regard to these ideas that\r\na sharpening of focus seems most urgently required. I proceed therefore\r\nto bring the views which \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e impute to humanism in these respects into\r\nfocus as briefly as I can.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_196\" id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[Pg 196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the central humanistic thesis, printed above in italics, be accepted,\r\nit will follow that, if there be any such thing at all as knowing, the\r\nknower and the object known must both be portions of experience. One\r\npart of experience must, therefore, either\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) Know another part of experience\u0026mdash;in other words, parts must, as\r\nProfessor Woodbridge says,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_111_111\" id=\"FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_111_111\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e represent \u003ci\u003eone another\u003c/i\u003e instead of\r\nrepresenting realities outside of \u0026lsquo;consciousness\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;this case is that of\r\nconceptual knowledge; or else\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) They must simply exist as so many ultimate \u003ci\u003ethats\u003c/i\u003e or facts of\r\nbeing, in the first instance; and then, as a secondary complication, and\r\nwithout doubling up its entitative single-ness, any one and the same\r\n\u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e must figure alternately as a thing known and as a knowledge of\r\nthe thing, by reason of two divergent kinds of context into which, in\r\nthe general course of experience, it gets woven.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_112_112\" id=\"FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_112_112\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_197\" id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[Pg 197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis second case is that of sense-perception. There is a stage of\r\nthought that goes beyond common sense, and of it I shall say more\r\npresently; but the common-sense stage is a perfectly definite\r\nhalting-place of thought, primarily for purposes of action; and, so long\r\nas we remain on the common-sense stage of thought, object and subject\r\n\u003ci\u003efuse\u003c/i\u003e in the fact of \u0026lsquo;presentation\u0026rsquo; or sense-perception\u0026mdash;the pen and\r\nhand which I now \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e writing, for example, \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e the physical\r\nrealities which those words designate. In this case there is no\r\nself-transcendency implied in the knowing. Humanism, here, is only a\r\nmore comminuted \u003ci\u003eIdentit\u0026auml;tsphilosophie\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_113_113\" id=\"FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_113_113\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn case (1), on the contrary, the representative experience does\r\ntranscend itself in knowing the other experience that is its object. No\r\none can talk of the knowledge of the one by the other without seeing\r\nthem as numerically distinct entities, of which the one lies beyond the\r\nother and away from it, along some direction\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_198\" id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[Pg 198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and with some interval,\r\nthat can be definitely named. But, if the talker be a humanist, he must\r\nalso see this distance-interval concretely and pragmatically, and\r\nconfess it to consist of other intervening experiences\u0026mdash;of possible\r\nones, at all events, if not of actual. To call my present idea of my\r\ndog, for example, cognitive of the real dog means that, as the actual\r\ntissue of experience is constituted, the idea is capable of leading into\r\na chain of other experiences on my part that go from next to next and\r\nterminate at last in vivid sense-perceptions of a jumping, barking,\r\nhairy body. Those \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e the real dog, the dog\u0026rsquo;s full presence, for my\r\ncommon sense. If the supposed talker is a profound philosopher, although\r\nthey may not \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e the real dog for him, they \u003ci\u003emean\u003c/i\u003e the real dog, are\r\npractical substitutes for the real dog, as the representation was a\r\npractical substitute for them, that real dog being a lot of atoms, say,\r\nor of mind-stuff, that lie \u003ci\u003ewhere\u003c/i\u003e the sense-perceptions lie in his\r\nexperience as well as in my own.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_199\" id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[Pg 199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe philosopher here stands for the stage of thought that goes beyond\r\nthe stage of common sense; and the difference is simply that he\r\n\u0026lsquo;interpolates\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;extrapolates,\u0026rsquo; where common sense does not. For\r\ncommon sense, two men see the same identical real dog. Philosophy,\r\nnoting actual differences in their perceptions, points out the duality\r\nof these latter, and interpolates something between them as a more real\r\nterminus\u0026mdash;first, organs, viscera, etc.; next, cells; then, ultimate\r\natoms; lastly, mind-stuff perhaps. The original sense-termini of the two\r\nmen, instead of coalescing with each other and with the real dog-object,\r\nas at first supposed, are thus held by philosophers to be separated by\r\ninvisible realities with which, at most, they are conterminous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAbolish, now, one of the percipients, and the interpolation changes into\r\n\u0026lsquo;extrapolation.\u0026rsquo; The sense-terminus of the remaining percipient is\r\nregarded by the philosopher as not quite reaching reality. He has only\r\ncarried the procession of experiences, the philosopher thinks,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_200\" id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[Pg 200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to a\r\ndefinite, because practical, halting-place somewhere on the way towards\r\nan absolute truth that lies beyond.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe humanist sees all the time, however, that there is no absolute\r\ntranscendency even about the more absolute realities thus conjectured or\r\nbelieved in. The viscera and cells are only possible percepts following\r\nupon that of the outer body. The atoms again, though we may never attain\r\nto human means of perceiving them, are still defined perceptually. The\r\nmind-stuff itself is conceived as a kind of experience; and it is\r\npossible to frame the hypothesis (such hypotheses can by no logic be\r\nexcluded from philosophy) of two knowers of a piece of mind-stuff and\r\nthe mind-stuff itself becoming \u0026lsquo;confluent\u0026rsquo; at the moment at which our\r\nimperfect knowing might pass into knowing of a completed type. Even so\r\ndo you and I habitually represent our two perceptions and the real dog\r\nas confluent, though only provisionally, and for the common-sense stage\r\nof thought. If my pen be inwardly made of mind-stuff, there is no\r\nconfluence \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e between\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_201\" id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[Pg 201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that mind-stuff and my visual perception of\r\nthe pen. But conceivably there might come to be such confluence; for, in\r\nthe case of my hand, the visual sensations and the inward feelings of\r\nthe hand, its mind-stuff, so to speak, are even now as confluent as any\r\ntwo things can be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, thus, no breach in humanistic epistemology. Whether knowledge\r\nbe taken as ideally perfected, or only as true enough to pass muster for\r\npractice, it is hung on one continuous scheme. Reality, howsoever\r\nremote, is always defined as a terminus within the general possibilities\r\nof experience; and what knows it is defined as an experience \u003ci\u003ethat\r\n\u0026lsquo;represents\u0026rsquo; it, in the sense of being substitutable for it in our\r\nthinking\u003c/i\u003e because it leads to the same associates, \u003ci\u003eor in the sense of\r\n\u0026lsquo;pointing to it\u0026rsquo;\u003c/i\u003e through a chain of other experiences that either\r\nintervene or may intervene.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAbsolute reality here bears the same relation to sensation as sensation\r\nbears to conception or imagination. Both are provisional or final\r\ntermini, sensation being only the terminus at which the practical man\r\nhabitually stops,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_202\" id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[Pg 202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e while the philosopher projects a \u0026lsquo;beyond\u0026rsquo; in the\r\nshape of more absolute reality. These termini, for the practical and the\r\nphilosophical stages of thought respectively, are self-supporting. They\r\nare not \u0026lsquo;true\u0026rsquo; of anything else, they simply \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e, are \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e. They\r\n\u0026lsquo;lean on nothing,\u0026rsquo; as my italicized formula said. Rather does the whole\r\nfabric of experience lean on them, just as the whole fabric of the solar\r\nsystem, including many relative positions, leans, for its absolute\r\nposition in space, on any one of its constituent stars. Here, again, one\r\ngets a new \u003ci\u003eIdentit\u0026auml;tsphilosophie\u003c/i\u003e in pluralistic form.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_114_114\" id=\"FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_114_114\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf I have succeeded in making this at all clear (though I fear that\r\nbrevity and abstractness between them may have made me fail), the reader\r\nwill see that the \u0026lsquo;truth\u0026rsquo; of our mental operations must always be an\r\nintra-experiential affair. A conception is reckoned true by common sense\r\nwhen it can be made to lead to a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_203\" id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[Pg 203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e sensation. The sensation, which for\r\ncommon sense is not so much \u0026lsquo;true\u0026rsquo; as \u0026lsquo;real,\u0026rsquo; is held to be\r\n\u003ci\u003eprovisionally\u003c/i\u003e true by the philosopher just in so far as it \u003ci\u003ecovers\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(abuts at, or occupies the place of) a still more absolutely real\r\nexperience, in the possibility of which to some remoter experient the\r\nphilosopher finds reason to believe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeanwhile what actually \u003ci\u003edoes\u003c/i\u003e count for true to any individual trower,\r\nwhether he be philosopher or common man, is always a result of his\r\n\u003ci\u003eapperceptions\u003c/i\u003e. If a novel experience, conceptual or sensible,\r\ncontradict too emphatically our pre-existent system of beliefs, in\r\nninety-nine cases out of a hundred it is treated as false. Only when the\r\nolder and the newer experiences are congruous enough to mutually\r\napperceive and modify each other, does what we treat as an advance in\r\ntruth result. [Having written of this point in an article in reply to\r\nMr. Joseph\u0026rsquo;s criticism of my humanism, I will say no more about truth\r\nhere, but refer the reader to that review.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_115_115\" id=\"FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_115_115\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e] In no case, however,\r\nneed truth\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_204\" id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[Pg 204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e consist in a relation between our experiences and something\r\narchetypal or trans-experiential. Should we ever reach absolutely\r\nterminal experiences, experiences in which we all agreed, which were\r\nsuperseded by no revised continuations, these would not be \u003ci\u003etrue\u003c/i\u003e, they\r\nwould be \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e, they would simply \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e, and be indeed the angles,\r\ncorners, and linchpins of all reality, on which the truth of everything\r\nelse would be stayed. Only such \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e things as led to these by\r\nsatisfactory conjunctions would be \u0026lsquo;true.\u0026rsquo; Satisfactory connection of\r\nsome sort with such termini is all that the word \u0026lsquo;truth\u0026rsquo; means. On the\r\ncommon-sense stage of thought sense-presentations serve as such termini.\r\nOur ideas and concepts and scientific theories pass for true only so far\r\nas they harmoniously lead back to the world of sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI hope that many humanists will endorse this attempt of mine to trace\r\nthe more essential features of that way of viewing things. I feel almost\r\ncertain that Messrs. Dewey and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_205\" id=\"Page_205\"\u003e[Pg 205]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Schiller will do so. If the attackers\r\nwill also take some slight account of it, it may be that discussion will\r\nbe a little less wide of the mark than it has hitherto been.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_105_105\" id=\"Footnote_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[105]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology\r\nand Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 5, March 2, 1905. Also reprinted,\r\nwith slight changes in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 121-135. The author\u0026rsquo;s\r\ncorrections have been adopted for the present text. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_106_106\" id=\"Footnote_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[106]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Written \u003ci\u003eapropos\u003c/i\u003e of the appearance of three articles in\r\n\u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exiv\u003c/span\u003e, No. 53, January, 1905: \u0026ldquo;\u0026lsquo;Absolute\u0026rsquo; and\r\n\u0026lsquo;Relative\u0026rsquo; Truth,\u0026rdquo; H. H. Joachim; \u0026ldquo;Professor James on \u0026lsquo;Humanism and\r\nTruth,\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo; H. W. B. Joseph; \u0026ldquo;Applied Axioms,\u0026rdquo; A. Sidgwick. Of these\r\narticles the second and third \u0026ldquo;continue the humanistic (or pragmatistic)\r\ncontroversy,\u0026rdquo; the first \u0026ldquo;deeply connects with it.\u0026rdquo; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_107_107\" id=\"Footnote_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[107]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor Baldwin, for example. His address \u0026lsquo;On Selective\r\nThinking\u0026rsquo; (\u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, [vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ev\u003c/span\u003e], 1898, reprinted in his\r\nvolume, \u003ci\u003eDevelopment and Evolution\u003c/i\u003e) seems to me an unusually\r\nwell-written pragmatic manifesto. Nevertheless in \u0026lsquo;The Limits of\r\nPragmatism\u0026rsquo; (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, [vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exi\u003c/span\u003e], 1904), he (much less clearly) joins in\r\nthe attack.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_108_108\" id=\"Footnote_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[108]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The ethical changes, it seems to me, are beautifully made\r\nevident in Professor Dewey\u0026rsquo;s series of articles, which will never get\r\nthe attention they deserve till they are printed in a book. I mean: \u0026lsquo;The\r\nSignificance of Emotions,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, [1895], p.\r\n13; \u0026lsquo;The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, [1896],\r\np. 357; \u0026lsquo;Psychology and Social Practice,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evii\u003c/span\u003e, [1900], p.\r\n105; \u0026lsquo;Interpretation of Savage Mind,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eix\u003c/span\u003e, [1902], p. 217;\r\n\u0026lsquo;Green\u0026rsquo;s Theory of the Moral Motive,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n[1892], p. 593; \u0026lsquo;Self-realization as the Moral Ideal,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n[1893], p. 652; \u0026lsquo;The Psychology of Effort,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003evi\u003c/span\u003e, [1897], p.\r\n43; \u0026lsquo;The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exi\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n[1902], pp. 107, 353; \u0026lsquo;Evolution and Ethics,\u0026rsquo; \u003ci\u003eMonist\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eviii\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n[1898], p. 321; to mention only a few.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_109_109\" id=\"Footnote_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[109]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [The author employs the term \u0026lsquo;humanism\u0026rsquo; either as a\r\nsynonym for \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; (cf. \u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e, above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e); or as that\r\ngeneral philosophy of life of which \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo; is the\r\ntheoretical ground (cf. below, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e). For other discussions of\r\n\u0026lsquo;humanism,\u0026rsquo; cf. below, essay \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#XI\"\u003exi\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, essay \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eiii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_110_110\" id=\"Footnote_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[110]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Omitted from reprint in \u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e. The articles\r\nreferred to are \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;A World of Pure\r\nExperience,\u0026rsquo; reprinted above.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_111_111\" id=\"Footnote_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[111]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In \u003ci\u003eScience\u003c/i\u003e, November 4, 1904, p. 599.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_112_112\" id=\"Footnote_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[112]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This statement is probably excessively obscure to any one\r\nwho has not read my two articles, \u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;A\r\nWorld of Pure Experience.\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_113_113\" id=\"Footnote_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[113]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e; and below, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_114_114\" id=\"Footnote_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[114]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_115_115\" id=\"Footnote_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[115]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Omitted from reprint in \u003ci\u003eMeaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e. The review\r\nreferred to is reprinted below, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_244\"\u003e244-265\u003c/a\u003e, under the title \u0026ldquo;Humanism\r\nand Truth Once More.\u0026rdquo; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_206\" id=\"Page_206\"\u003e[Pg 206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"VIII\" id=\"VIII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVIII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLA NOTION DE CONSCIENCE\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_116_116\" id=\"FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_116_116\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJe voudrais vous communiquer quelques doutes qui me sont venus au sujet\r\nde la notion de Conscience qui r\u0026egrave;gne dans tous nos trait\u0026eacute;s de\r\npsychologie.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn d\u0026eacute;finit habituellement la Psychologie comme la Science des faits de\r\nConscience, ou des \u003ci\u003eph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;nes\u003c/i\u003e, ou encore des \u003ci\u003e\u0026eacute;tats\u003c/i\u003e de la Conscience.\r\nQu\u0026rsquo;on admette qu\u0026rsquo;elle se rattache \u0026agrave; des \u003ci\u003emoi\u003c/i\u003e personnels, ou bien qu\u0026rsquo;on\r\nla croie impersonnelle \u0026agrave; la fa\u0026ccedil;on du \u0026ldquo;moi transcendental\u0026rdquo; de Kant, de la\r\n\u003ci\u003eBewusstheit\u003c/i\u003e ou du \u003ci\u003eBewusstsein \u0026uuml;berhaupt\u003c/i\u003e de nos contemporains en\r\nAllemagne, cette conscience est toujours regard\u0026eacute;e comme poss\u0026eacute;dant une\r\nessence propre, absolument distincte de l\u0026rsquo;essence des choses\r\nmat\u0026eacute;rielles, qu\u0026rsquo;elle a le don myst\u0026eacute;rieux de repr\u0026eacute;senter et de\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_207\" id=\"Page_207\"\u003e[Pg 207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconna\u0026icirc;tre. Les faits mat\u0026eacute;riels, pris dans leur mat\u0026eacute;rialit\u0026eacute;, ne sont pas\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u0026eacute;prouv\u0026eacute;s\u003c/i\u003e, ne sont pas objets \u003ci\u003ed\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience\u003c/i\u003e, ne se \u003ci\u003erapportent\u003c/i\u003e pas.\r\nPour qu\u0026rsquo;ils prennent la forme du syst\u0026egrave;me dans lequel nous nous sentons\r\nvivre, il faut qu\u0026rsquo;ils \u003ci\u003eapparaissent\u003c/i\u003e, et ce fait d\u0026rsquo;appara\u0026icirc;tre, surajout\u0026eacute;\r\n\u0026agrave; leur existence brute, s\u0026rsquo;appelle la conscience que nous en avons, ou\r\npeut-\u0026ecirc;tre, selon l\u0026rsquo;hypoth\u0026egrave;se panpsychiste, qu\u0026rsquo;ils ont d\u0026rsquo;eux-m\u0026ecirc;mes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVoil\u0026agrave; ce dualisme inv\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute; qu\u0026rsquo;il semble impossible de chasser de notre\r\nvue du monde. Ce monde peut bien exister en soi, mais nous n\u0026rsquo;en savons\r\nrien, car pour nous il est exclusivement un objet d\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience; et la\r\ncondition indispensable \u0026agrave; cet effet, c\u0026rsquo;est qu\u0026rsquo;il soit rapport\u0026eacute; \u0026agrave; des\r\nt\u0026eacute;moins, qu\u0026rsquo;il soit connu par un sujet ou par des sujets spirituels.\r\nObjet et sujet, voil\u0026agrave; les deux jambes sans lesquelles il semble que la\r\nphilosophie ne saurait faire un pas en avant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eToutes les \u0026eacute;coles sont d\u0026rsquo;accord l\u0026agrave;-dessus, scolastique, cart\u0026eacute;sianisme,\r\nkantisme, n\u0026eacute;o-kantisme, tous admettent le dualisme fondamental. Le\r\npositivisme ou agnosticisme de nos\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_208\" id=\"Page_208\"\u003e[Pg 208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e jours, qui se pique de relever des\r\nsciences naturelles, se donne volontiers, il est vrai, le nom de\r\nmonisme. Mais ce n\u0026rsquo;est qu\u0026rsquo;un monisme verbal. Il pose une r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute;\r\ninconnue, mais nous dit que cette r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; se pr\u0026eacute;sente toujours sous deux\r\n\u0026ldquo;aspects,\u0026rdquo; un c\u0026ocirc;t\u0026eacute; conscience et un c\u0026ocirc;t\u0026eacute; mati\u0026egrave;re, et ces deux c\u0026ocirc;t\u0026eacute;s\r\ndemeurent aussi irr\u0026eacute;ductibles que les attributs fondamentaux, \u0026eacute;tendue et\r\npens\u0026eacute;e, du Dieu de Spinoza. Au fond, le monisme contemporain est du\r\nspinozisme pur.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr, comment se repr\u0026eacute;sente-t-on cette conscience dont nous sommes tous si\r\nport\u0026eacute;s \u0026agrave; admettre l\u0026rsquo;existence? Impossible de la d\u0026eacute;finir, nous dit-on,\r\nmais nous en avons tous une intuition imm\u0026eacute;diate: tout d\u0026rsquo;abord la\r\nconscience a conscience d\u0026rsquo;elle-m\u0026ecirc;me. Demandez \u0026agrave; la premi\u0026egrave;re personne que\r\nvous rencontrerez, homme ou femme, psychologue ou ignorant, et elle vous\r\nr\u0026eacute;pondra qu\u0026rsquo;elle \u003ci\u003ese sent\u003c/i\u003e penser, jouir, souffrir, vouloir, tout comme\r\nelle se sent respirer. Elle per\u0026ccedil;oit directement sa vie spirituelle comme\r\nune esp\u0026egrave;ce de courant int\u0026eacute;rieur, actif, l\u0026eacute;ger, fluide, d\u0026eacute;licat, diaphane\r\npour ainsi\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_209\" id=\"Page_209\"\u003e[Pg 209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e dire, et absolument oppos\u0026eacute; \u0026agrave; quoi que ce soit de mat\u0026eacute;riel.\r\nBref, la vie subjective ne para\u0026icirc;t pas seulement \u0026ecirc;tre une condition\r\nlogiquement indispensable pour qu\u0026rsquo;il y ait un monde objectif qui\r\n\u003ci\u003eapparaisse\u003c/i\u003e, c\u0026rsquo;est encore un \u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ment de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience m\u0026ecirc;me que nous\r\n\u0026eacute;prouvons directement, au m\u0026ecirc;me titre que nous \u0026eacute;prouvons notre propre\r\ncorps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eId\u0026eacute;es et Choses, comment donc ne pas reconna\u0026icirc;tre leur dualisme?\r\nSentiments et Objets, comment douter de leur h\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;rog\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;it\u0026eacute; absolue?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLa psychologie soi-disant scientifique admet cette h\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;rog\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;it\u0026eacute; comme\r\nl\u0026rsquo;ancienne psychologie spiritualiste l\u0026rsquo;admettait. Comment ne pas\r\nl\u0026rsquo;admettre? Chaque science d\u0026eacute;coupe arbitrairement dans la trame des\r\nfaits un champ o\u0026ugrave; elle se parque, et dont elle d\u0026eacute;crit et \u0026eacute;tudie le\r\ncontenu. La psychologie prend justement pour son domaine le champ des\r\nfaits de conscience. Elle les postule sans les critiquer, elle les\r\noppose aux faits mat\u0026eacute;riels; et sans critiquer non plus la notion de ces\r\nderniers, elle les rattache \u0026agrave; la conscience par le lien myst\u0026eacute;rieux de la\r\n\u003ci\u003econnaissance\u003c/i\u003e, de, l\u0026rsquo;\u003ci\u003eaperception\u003c/i\u003e qui, pour elle, est\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_210\" id=\"Page_210\"\u003e[Pg 210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e un troisi\u0026egrave;me\r\ngenre de fait fondamental et ultime. En suivant cette voie, la\r\npsychologie contemporaine a f\u0026ecirc;t\u0026eacute; de grands triomphes. Elle a pu faire\r\nune esquisse de l\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;volution de la vie consciente, en concevant cette\r\nderni\u0026egrave;re comme s\u0026rsquo;adaptant de plus en plus compl\u0026egrave;tement au milieu\r\nphysique environnant. Elle a pu \u0026eacute;tablir un parall\u0026eacute;lisme dans le\r\ndualisme, celui des faits psychiques et des \u0026eacute;v\u0026eacute;nements c\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;braux. Elle a\r\nexpliqu\u0026eacute; les illusions, les hallucinations, et jusqu\u0026rsquo;\u0026agrave; un certain point,\r\nles maladies mentales. Ce sont de beaux progr\u0026egrave;s; mais il reste encore\r\nbien des probl\u0026egrave;mes. La philosophie g\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;rale surtout, qui a pour devoir\r\nde scruter tous les postulats, trouve des paradoxes et des emp\u0026ecirc;chements\r\nl\u0026agrave; o\u0026ugrave; la science passe outre; et il n\u0026rsquo;y a que les amateurs de science\r\npopulaire qui ne sont jamais perplexes. Plus on va au fond des choses,\r\nplus on trouve d\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;nigmes; et j\u0026rsquo;avoue pour ma part que depuis que je\r\nm\u0026rsquo;occupe s\u0026eacute;rieusement de psychologie, ce vieux dualisme de mati\u0026egrave;re et de\r\npens\u0026eacute;e, cette h\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;rog\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;it\u0026eacute; pos\u0026eacute;e comme absolue des deux essences, m\u0026rsquo;a\r\ntoujours pr\u0026eacute;sent\u0026eacute; des\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_211\" id=\"Page_211\"\u003e[Pg 211]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e difficult\u0026eacute;s. C\u0026rsquo;est de quelques-unes de ces\r\ndifficult\u0026eacute;s que je voudrais maintenant vous entretenir.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eD\u0026rsquo;abord il y en a une, laquelle, j\u0026rsquo;en suis convaincu, vous aura frapp\u0026eacute;s\r\ntous. Prenons la perception ext\u0026eacute;rieure, la sensation directe que nous\r\ndonnent par exemple les murs de cette salle. Peut-on dire ici que le\r\npsychique et le physique sont absolument h\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;rog\u0026egrave;nes? Au contraire, ils\r\nsont si peu h\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;rog\u0026egrave;nes que si nous nous pla\u0026ccedil;ons au point de vue du sens\r\ncommun; si nous faisons abstraction de toutes les inventions\r\nexplicatives, des mol\u0026eacute;cules et des ondulations \u0026eacute;th\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;es, par exemple,\r\nqui au fond sont des entit\u0026eacute;s m\u0026eacute;taphysiques; si, en un mot, nous prenons\r\nla r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; na\u0026iuml;vement et telle qu\u0026rsquo;elle nous est donn\u0026eacute;e tout d\u0026rsquo;abord,\r\ncette r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; sensible d\u0026rsquo;o\u0026ugrave; d\u0026eacute;pendent nos int\u0026eacute;r\u0026ecirc;ts vitaux, et sur\r\nlaquelle se portent toutes nos actions; eh bien, cette r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; sensible\r\net la sensation que nous en avons sont, au moment o\u0026ugrave; la sensation se\r\nproduit, absolument identiques l\u0026rsquo;une \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;autre. La r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; est\r\nl\u0026rsquo;aperception m\u0026ecirc;me. Les mots \u0026ldquo;murs de cette salle\u0026rdquo; ne signifient que\r\ncette blancheur fra\u0026icirc;che et sonore\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_212\" id=\"Page_212\"\u003e[Pg 212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e qui nous entoure, coup\u0026eacute;e par ces\r\nfen\u0026ecirc;tres, born\u0026eacute;e par ces lignes et ces angles. Le physique ici n\u0026rsquo;a pas\r\nd\u0026rsquo;autre contenu que le psychique. Le sujet et l\u0026rsquo;objet se confondent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eC\u0026rsquo;est Berkeley qui le premier a mis cette v\u0026eacute;rit\u0026eacute; en honneur. \u003ci\u003eEsse est\r\npercipi.\u003c/i\u003e Nos sensations ne sont pas de petits duplicats int\u0026eacute;rieurs des\r\nchoses, elles sont les choses m\u0026ecirc;mes en tant que les choses nous sont\r\npr\u0026eacute;sentes. Et quoi que l\u0026rsquo;on veuille penser de la vie absente, cach\u0026eacute;e, et\r\npour ainsi dire priv\u0026eacute;e, des choses, et quelles que soient les\r\nconstructions hypoth\u0026eacute;tiques qu\u0026rsquo;on en fasse, il reste vrai que la vie\r\npublique des choses, cette actualit\u0026eacute; pr\u0026eacute;sente par laquelle elles nous\r\nconfrontent, d\u0026rsquo;o\u0026ugrave; d\u0026eacute;rivent toutes nos constructions th\u0026eacute;oriques, et \u0026agrave;\r\nlaquelle elles doivent toutes revenir et se rattacher sous peine de\r\nflotter dans l\u0026rsquo;air et dans l\u0026rsquo;irr\u0026eacute;el; cette actualit\u0026eacute;, dis-je, est\r\nhomog\u0026egrave;ne, et non pas seulement homog\u0026egrave;ne, mais num\u0026eacute;riquement une, avec\r\nune certaine partie de notre vie int\u0026eacute;rieure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVoil\u0026agrave; pour la perception ext\u0026eacute;rieure. Quand on s\u0026rsquo;adresse \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;imagination,\r\n\u0026agrave; la m\u0026eacute;moire ou\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_213\" id=\"Page_213\"\u003e[Pg 213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e aux facult\u0026eacute;s de repr\u0026eacute;sentation abstraite, bien que les\r\nfaits soient ici beaucoup plus compliqu\u0026eacute;s, je crois que la m\u0026ecirc;me\r\nhomog\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;it\u0026eacute; essentielle se d\u0026eacute;gage. Pour simplifier le probl\u0026egrave;me, excluons\r\nd\u0026rsquo;abord toute r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; sensible. Prenons la pens\u0026eacute;e pure, telle qu\u0026rsquo;elle\r\ns\u0026rsquo;effectue dans le r\u0026ecirc;ve ou la r\u0026ecirc;verie, ou dans la m\u0026eacute;moire du pass\u0026eacute;. Ici\r\nencore, l\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;toffe de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience ne fait-elle pas double emploi, le\r\nphysique et le psychique ne se confondent-ils pas? Si je r\u0026ecirc;ve d\u0026rsquo;une\r\nmontagne d\u0026rsquo;or, elle n\u0026rsquo;existe sans doute pas en dehors du r\u0026ecirc;ve, mais\r\n\u003ci\u003edans\u003c/i\u003e le r\u0026ecirc;ve elle est de nature ou d\u0026rsquo;essence parfaitement physique,\r\nc\u0026rsquo;est \u003ci\u003ecomme\u003c/i\u003e physique qu\u0026rsquo;elle m\u0026rsquo;appara\u0026icirc;t. Si en ce moment je me permets\r\nde me souvenir de ma maison en Am\u0026eacute;rique, et des d\u0026eacute;tails de mon\r\nembarquement r\u0026eacute;cent pour l\u0026rsquo;Italie, le ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne pur, le fait qui se\r\nproduit, qu\u0026rsquo;est-il? C\u0026rsquo;est, dit-on, ma pens\u0026eacute;e, avec son contenu. Mais\r\nencore ce contenu, qu\u0026rsquo;est-il? Il porte la forme d\u0026rsquo;une partie du monde\r\nr\u0026eacute;el, partie distante, il est vrai, de six mille kilom\u0026egrave;tres d\u0026rsquo;espace et\r\nde six semaines de temps, mais reli\u0026eacute;e \u0026agrave; la salle o\u0026ugrave; nous sommes par une\r\nfoule de choses, objets\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_214\" id=\"Page_214\"\u003e[Pg 214]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e et \u0026eacute;v\u0026eacute;nements, homog\u0026egrave;nes d\u0026rsquo;une part avec la\r\nsalle et d\u0026rsquo;autre part avec l\u0026rsquo;objet de mes souvenirs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCe contenu ne se donne pas comme \u0026eacute;tant d\u0026rsquo;abord un tout petit fait\r\nint\u0026eacute;rieur que je projetterais ensuite au loin, il se pr\u0026eacute;sente d\u0026rsquo;embl\u0026eacute;e\r\ncomme le fait \u0026eacute;loign\u0026eacute; m\u0026ecirc;me. Et l\u0026rsquo;acte de penser ce contenu, la\r\nconscience que j\u0026rsquo;en ai, que sont-ils? Sont-ce au fond autre chose que\r\ndes mani\u0026egrave;res r\u0026eacute;trospectives de nommer le contenu lui-m\u0026ecirc;me, lorsqu\u0026rsquo;on\r\nl\u0026rsquo;aura s\u0026eacute;par\u0026eacute; de tous ces interm\u0026eacute;diaires physiques, et reli\u0026eacute; \u0026agrave; un\r\nnouveau groupe d\u0026rsquo;associ\u0026eacute;s qui le font rentrer dans ma vie mentale, les\r\n\u0026eacute;motions par exemple qu\u0026rsquo;il a \u0026eacute;veill\u0026eacute;es en moi, l\u0026rsquo;attention que j\u0026rsquo;y\r\nporte, mes id\u0026eacute;es de tout \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;heure qui l\u0026rsquo;ont suscit\u0026eacute; comme souvenir? Ce\r\nn\u0026rsquo;est qu\u0026rsquo;en se rapportant \u0026agrave; ces derniers associ\u0026eacute;s que le ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne\r\narrive \u0026agrave; \u0026ecirc;tre class\u0026eacute; comme \u003ci\u003epens\u0026eacute;e\u003c/i\u003e; tant qu\u0026rsquo;il ne se rapporte qu\u0026rsquo;aux\r\npremiers il demeure ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne \u003ci\u003eobjectif\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIl est vrai que nous opposons habituellement nos images int\u0026eacute;rieures aux\r\nobjets, et que nous les consid\u0026eacute;rons comme de petites copies,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_215\" id=\"Page_215\"\u003e[Pg 215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e comme des\r\ncalques ou doubles, affaiblis, de ces derniers. C\u0026rsquo;est qu\u0026rsquo;un objet\r\npr\u0026eacute;sent a une vivacit\u0026eacute; et une nettet\u0026eacute; sup\u0026eacute;rieures \u0026agrave; celles de l\u0026rsquo;image.\r\nIl lui fait ainsi contraste; et pour me servir de l\u0026rsquo;excellent mot de\r\nTaine, il lui sert de \u003ci\u003er\u0026eacute;ducteur\u003c/i\u003e. Quand les deux sont pr\u0026eacute;sents\r\nensemble, l\u0026rsquo;objet prend le premier plan et l\u0026rsquo;image \u0026ldquo;recule,\u0026rdquo; devient une\r\nchose \u0026ldquo;absente.\u0026rdquo; Mais cet objet pr\u0026eacute;sent, qu\u0026rsquo;est-il en lui-m\u0026ecirc;me? De\r\nquelle \u0026eacute;toffe est-il fait? De la m\u0026ecirc;me \u0026eacute;toffe que l\u0026rsquo;image. Il est fait de\r\n\u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e; il est chose per\u0026ccedil;ue. Son \u003ci\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e est \u003ci\u003epercipi\u003c/i\u003e, et lui et\r\nl\u0026rsquo;image sont g\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;riquement homog\u0026egrave;nes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSi je pense en ce moment \u0026agrave; mon chapeau que j\u0026rsquo;ai laiss\u0026eacute; tout \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;heure au\r\nvestiaire, o\u0026ugrave; est le dualisme, le discontinu, entre le chapeau pens\u0026eacute; et\r\nle chapeau r\u0026eacute;el? C\u0026rsquo;est d\u0026rsquo;un vrai \u003ci\u003echapeau absent\u003c/i\u003e que mon esprit\r\ns\u0026rsquo;occupe. J\u0026rsquo;en tiens compte pratiquement comme d\u0026rsquo;une r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute;. S\u0026rsquo;il \u0026eacute;tait\r\npr\u0026eacute;sent sur cette table, le chapeau d\u0026eacute;terminerait un mouvement de ma\r\nmain: je l\u0026rsquo;enl\u0026egrave;verais. De m\u0026ecirc;me ce chapeau con\u0026ccedil;u, ce chapeau en id\u0026eacute;e,\r\nd\u0026eacute;terminera tant\u0026ocirc;t la direction de mes pas. J\u0026rsquo;irai le prendre.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_216\" id=\"Page_216\"\u003e[Pg 216]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e L\u0026rsquo;id\u0026eacute;e\r\nque j\u0026rsquo;en ai se continuera jusqu\u0026rsquo;\u0026agrave; la pr\u0026eacute;sence sensible du chapeau, et\r\ns\u0026rsquo;y fondra harmonieusement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJe conclus donc que,\u0026mdash;bien qu\u0026rsquo;il y ait un dualisme pratique\u0026mdash;puisque les\r\nimages se distinguent des objets, en tiennent lieu, et nous y m\u0026egrave;nent, il\r\nn\u0026rsquo;y a pas lieu de leur attribuer une diff\u0026eacute;rence de nature essentielle.\r\nPens\u0026eacute;e et actualit\u0026eacute; sont faites d\u0026rsquo;une seule et m\u0026ecirc;me \u0026eacute;toffe, qui est\r\nl\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;toffe de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience en g\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;ral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLa psychologie de la perception ext\u0026eacute;rieure nous m\u0026egrave;ne \u0026agrave; la m\u0026ecirc;me\r\nconclusion. Quand j\u0026rsquo;aper\u0026ccedil;ois l\u0026rsquo;objet devant moi comme une table de telle\r\nforme, \u0026agrave; telle distance, on m\u0026rsquo;explique que ce fait est d\u0026ucirc; \u0026agrave; deux\r\nfacteurs, \u0026agrave; une mati\u0026egrave;re de sensation qui me p\u0026eacute;n\u0026egrave;tre par la voie des yeux\r\net qui donne l\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ment d\u0026rsquo;ext\u0026eacute;riorit\u0026eacute; r\u0026eacute;elle, et \u0026agrave; des id\u0026eacute;es qui se\r\nr\u0026eacute;veillent, vont \u0026agrave; la rencontre de cette r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute;, la classent et\r\nl\u0026rsquo;interpr\u0026egrave;tent. Mais qui peut faire la part, dans la table concr\u0026egrave;tement\r\naper\u0026ccedil;ue, de ce qui est sensation et de ce qui est id\u0026eacute;e? L\u0026rsquo;externe et\r\nl\u0026rsquo;interne, l\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;tendu et l\u0026rsquo;in\u0026eacute;tendu, se fusionnent\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_217\" id=\"Page_217\"\u003e[Pg 217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e et font un mariage\r\nindissoluble. Cela rappelle ces panoramas circulaires, o\u0026ugrave; des objets\r\nr\u0026eacute;els, rochers, herbe, chariots bris\u0026eacute;s, etc., qui occupent l\u0026rsquo;avant-plan,\r\nsont si ing\u0026eacute;nieusement reli\u0026eacute;s \u0026agrave; la toile qui fait le fond, et qui\r\nrepr\u0026eacute;sente une bataille ou un vaste paysage, que l\u0026rsquo;on ne sait plus\r\ndistinguer ce qui est objet de ce qui est peinture. Les coutures et les\r\njoints sont imperceptibles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCela pourrait-il advenir si l\u0026rsquo;objet et l\u0026rsquo;id\u0026eacute;e \u0026eacute;taient absolument\r\ndissemblables de nature?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 45%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJe suis convaincu que des consid\u0026eacute;rations pareilles \u0026agrave; celles que je viens\r\nd\u0026rsquo;exprimer auront d\u0026eacute;j\u0026agrave; suscit\u0026eacute;, chez vous aussi, des doutes au sujet du\r\ndualisme pr\u0026eacute;tendu.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEt d\u0026rsquo;autres raisons de douter surgissent encore. Il y a toute une sph\u0026egrave;re\r\nd\u0026rsquo;adjectifs et d\u0026rsquo;attributs qui ne sont ni objectifs, ni subjectifs d\u0026rsquo;une\r\nmani\u0026egrave;re exclusive, mais que nous employons tant\u0026ocirc;t d\u0026rsquo;une mani\u0026egrave;re et\r\ntant\u0026ocirc;t d\u0026rsquo;une autre, comme si nous nous complaisions dans leur ambigu\u0026iuml;t\u0026eacute;.\r\nJe parle des qualit\u0026eacute;s que nous \u003ci\u003eappr\u0026eacute;cions\u003c/i\u003e, pour ainsi dire, dans les\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_218\" id=\"Page_218\"\u003e[Pg 218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchoses, leur c\u0026ocirc;t\u0026eacute; esth\u0026eacute;tique, moral, leur valeur pour nous. La beaut\u0026eacute;,\r\npar exemple, o\u0026ugrave; r\u0026eacute;side-t-elle? Est-elle dans la statue, dans la sonate,\r\nou dans notre esprit? Mon coll\u0026egrave;gue \u0026agrave; Harvard, George Santayana, a \u0026eacute;crit\r\nun livre d\u0026rsquo;esth\u0026eacute;tique,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_117_117\" id=\"FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_117_117\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e o\u0026ugrave; il appelle la beaut\u0026eacute; \u0026ldquo;le plaisir\r\nobjectifi\u0026eacute;\u0026rdquo;; et en v\u0026eacute;rit\u0026eacute;, c\u0026rsquo;est bien ici qu\u0026rsquo;on pourrait parler de\r\nprojection au dehors. On dit indiff\u0026eacute;remment une chaleur agr\u0026eacute;able, ou une\r\nsensation agr\u0026eacute;able de chaleur. La raret\u0026eacute;, le pr\u0026eacute;cieux du diamant nous en\r\nparaissent des qualit\u0026eacute;s essentielles. Nous parlons d\u0026rsquo;un orage affreux,\r\nd\u0026rsquo;un homme ha\u0026iuml;ssable, d\u0026rsquo;une action indigne, et nous croyons parler\r\nobjectivement, bien que ces termes n\u0026rsquo;expriment que des rapports \u0026agrave; notre\r\nsensibilit\u0026eacute; \u0026eacute;motive propre. Nous disons m\u0026ecirc;me un chemin p\u0026eacute;nible, un ciel\r\ntriste, un coucher de soleil superbe. Toute cette mani\u0026egrave;re animiste de\r\nregarder les choses qui para\u0026icirc;t avoir \u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute; la fa\u0026ccedil;on primitive de penser\r\ndes hommes, peut tr\u0026egrave;s bien s\u0026rsquo;expliquer (et M. Santayana, dans un autre\r\nlivre tout r\u0026eacute;cent,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_118_118\" id=\"FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_118_118\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_219\" id=\"Page_219\"\u003e[Pg 219]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e l\u0026rsquo;a bien expliqu\u0026eacute;e ainsi) par l\u0026rsquo;habitude\r\nd\u0026rsquo;attribuer \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;objet \u003ci\u003etout\u003c/i\u003e ce que nous ressentons en sa pr\u0026eacute;sence. Le\r\npartage du subjectif et de l\u0026rsquo;objectif est le fait d\u0026rsquo;une r\u0026eacute;flexion tr\u0026egrave;s\r\navanc\u0026eacute;e, que nous aimons encore ajourner dans beaucoup d\u0026rsquo;endroits. Quand\r\nles besoins pratiques ne nous en tirent pas forc\u0026eacute;ment, il semble que\r\nnous aimons \u0026agrave; nous bercer dans le vague.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLes qualit\u0026eacute;s secondes elles-m\u0026ecirc;mes, chaleur, son, lumi\u0026egrave;re, n\u0026rsquo;ont encore\r\naujourd\u0026rsquo;hui qu\u0026rsquo;une attribution vague. Pour le sens commun, pour la vie\r\npratique, elles sont absolument objectives, physiques. Pour le\r\nphysicien, elles sont subjectives. Pour lui, il n\u0026rsquo;y a que la forme, la\r\nmasse, le mouvement, qui aient une r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; ext\u0026eacute;rieure. Pour le\r\nphilosophe id\u0026eacute;aliste, au contraire, forme et mouvement sont tout aussi\r\nsubjectifs que lumi\u0026egrave;re et chaleur, et il n\u0026rsquo;y a que la chose-en-soi\r\ninconnue, le \u0026ldquo;noum\u0026egrave;ne,\u0026rdquo; qui jouisse d\u0026rsquo;une r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; extramentale compl\u0026egrave;te.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNos sensations intimes conservent encore de cette ambigu\u0026iuml;t\u0026eacute;. Il y a des\r\nillusions de mouvement qui prouvent que nos premi\u0026egrave;res\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_220\" id=\"Page_220\"\u003e[Pg 220]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e sensations de\r\nmouvement \u0026eacute;taient g\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;ralis\u0026eacute;es. C\u0026rsquo;est le monde entier, avec nous, qui se\r\nmouvait. Maintenant nous distinguons notre propre mouvement de celui des\r\nobjets qui nous entourent, et parmi les objets nous en distinguons qui\r\ndemeurent en repos. Mais il est des \u0026eacute;tats de vertige o\u0026ugrave; nous retombons\r\nencore aujourd\u0026rsquo;hui dans l\u0026rsquo;indiff\u0026eacute;renciation premi\u0026egrave;re.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVous connaissez tous sans doute cette th\u0026eacute;orie qui a voulu faire des\r\n\u0026eacute;motions des sommes de sensations visc\u0026eacute;rales et musculaires. Elle a\r\ndonn\u0026eacute; lieu \u0026agrave; bien des controverses, et aucune opinion n\u0026rsquo;a encore conquis\r\nl\u0026rsquo;unanimit\u0026eacute; des suffrages. Vous connaissez aussi les controverses sur la\r\nnature de l\u0026rsquo;activit\u0026eacute; mentale. Les uns soutiennent qu\u0026rsquo;elle est une force\r\npurement spirituelle que nous sommes en \u0026eacute;tat d\u0026rsquo;apercevoir imm\u0026eacute;diatement\r\ncomme telle. Les autres pr\u0026eacute;tendent que ce que nous nommons activit\u0026eacute;\r\nmentale (effort, attention, par exemple) n\u0026rsquo;est que le reflet senti de\r\ncertains effets dont notre organisme est le si\u0026egrave;ge, tensions musculaires\r\nau cr\u0026acirc;ne et au gosier, arr\u0026ecirc;t ou passage de la respiration, afflux de\r\nsang, etc.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_221\" id=\"Page_221\"\u003e[Pg 221]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDe quelque mani\u0026egrave;re que se r\u0026eacute;solvent ces controverses, leur existence\r\nprouve bien clairement une chose, c\u0026rsquo;est qu\u0026rsquo;il est tr\u0026egrave;s difficile, ou\r\nm\u0026ecirc;me absolument impossible de savoir, par la seule inspection intime de\r\ncertains ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;nes, s\u0026rsquo;ils sont de nature physique, occupant de\r\nl\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;tendue, etc., ou s\u0026rsquo;ils sont de nature purement psychique et\r\nint\u0026eacute;rieure. Il nous faut toujours trouver des raisons pour appuyer notre\r\navis; il nous faut chercher la classification la plus probable du\r\nph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne; et en fin de compte il pourrait bien se trouver que toutes\r\nnos classifications usuelles eussent eu leurs motifs plut\u0026ocirc;t dans les\r\nbesoins de la pratique que dans quelque facult\u0026eacute; que nous aurions\r\nd\u0026rsquo;apercevoir deux essences ultimes et diverses qui composeraient\r\nensemble la trame des choses. Le corps de chacun de nous offre un\r\ncontraste pratique presque violent \u0026agrave; tout le reste du milieu ambiant.\r\nTout ce qui arrive au dedans de ce corps nous est plus intime et\r\nimportant que ce qui arrive ailleurs. Il s\u0026rsquo;identifie avec notre moi, il\r\nse classe avec lui. Ame, vie, souffle, qui saurait bien les distinguer\r\nexactement? M\u0026ecirc;me nos images et nos\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_222\" id=\"Page_222\"\u003e[Pg 222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e souvenirs, qui n\u0026rsquo;agissent sur le\r\nmonde physique que par le moyen de notre corps, semblent appartenir \u0026agrave; ce\r\ndernier. Nous les traitons comme internes, nous les classons avec nos\r\nsentiments affectifs. Il faut bien avouer, en somme, que la question du\r\ndualisme de la pens\u0026eacute;e et de la mati\u0026egrave;re est bien loin d\u0026rsquo;\u0026ecirc;tre finalement\r\nr\u0026eacute;solue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEt voil\u0026agrave; termin\u0026eacute;e la premi\u0026egrave;re partie de mon discours. J\u0026rsquo;ai voulu vous\r\np\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;trer, Mesdames et Messieurs, de mes doutes et de la r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute;, aussi\r\nbien que de l\u0026rsquo;importance, du probl\u0026egrave;me.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eQuant \u0026agrave; moi, apr\u0026egrave;s de longues ann\u0026eacute;es d\u0026rsquo;h\u0026eacute;sitation, j\u0026rsquo;ai fini par prendre\r\nmon parti carr\u0026eacute;ment. Je crois que la conscience, telle qu\u0026rsquo;on se la\r\nrepr\u0026eacute;sente commun\u0026eacute;ment, soit comme entit\u0026eacute;, soit comme activit\u0026eacute; pure,\r\nmais en tout cas comme fluide, in\u0026eacute;tendue, diaphane, vide de tout contenu\r\npropre, mais se connaissant directement elle-m\u0026ecirc;me, spirituelle enfin, je\r\ncrois, dis-je, que cette conscience est une pure chim\u0026egrave;re, et que la\r\nsomme de r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute;s concr\u0026egrave;tes que le mot conscience devrait couvrir,\r\nm\u0026eacute;rite une toute autre description, description, du reste, qu\u0026rsquo;une\r\nphilosophie attentive aux faits et\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_223\" id=\"Page_223\"\u003e[Pg 223]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e sachant faire un peu d\u0026rsquo;analyse,\r\nserait d\u0026eacute;sormais en \u0026eacute;tat de fournir ou plut\u0026ocirc;t de commencer \u0026agrave; fournir. Et\r\nces mots m\u0026rsquo;am\u0026egrave;nent \u0026agrave; la seconde partie de mon discours. Elle sera\r\nbeaucoup plus courte que la premi\u0026egrave;re, parce que si je la d\u0026eacute;veloppais sur\r\nla m\u0026ecirc;me \u0026eacute;chelle, elle serait beaucoup trop longue. Il faut, par\r\ncons\u0026eacute;quent, que je me restreigne aux seules indications indispensables.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 45%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdmettons que la conscience, la \u003ci\u003eBewusstheit\u003c/i\u003e, con\u0026ccedil;ue comme essence,\r\nentit\u0026eacute;, activit\u0026eacute;, moiti\u0026eacute; irr\u0026eacute;ductible de chaque exp\u0026eacute;rience, soit\r\nsupprim\u0026eacute;e, que le dualisme fondamental et pour ainsi dire ontologique\r\nsoit aboli et que ce que nous supposions exister soit seulement ce qu\u0026rsquo;on\r\na appel\u0026eacute; jusqu\u0026rsquo;ici le \u003ci\u003econtenu\u003c/i\u003e, le \u003ci\u003eInhalt\u003c/i\u003e, de la conscience; comment\r\nla philosophie va-t-elle se tirer d\u0026rsquo;affaire avec l\u0026rsquo;esp\u0026egrave;ce de monisme\r\nvague qui en r\u0026eacute;sultera? Je vais t\u0026acirc;cher de vous insinuer quelques\r\nsuggestions positives l\u0026agrave;-dessus, bien que je craigne que, faute du\r\nd\u0026eacute;veloppement n\u0026eacute;cessaire, mes id\u0026eacute;es ne r\u0026eacute;pandront pas une clart\u0026eacute; tr\u0026egrave;s\r\ngrande. Pourvu que j\u0026rsquo;indique un\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_224\" id=\"Page_224\"\u003e[Pg 224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e commencement de sentier, ce sera\r\npeut-\u0026ecirc;tre assez.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAu fond, pourquoi nous accrochons-nous d\u0026rsquo;une mani\u0026egrave;re si tenace \u0026agrave; cette\r\nid\u0026eacute;e d\u0026rsquo;une conscience surajout\u0026eacute;e \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;existence du contenu des choses?\r\nPourquoi la r\u0026eacute;clamons-nous si fortement, que celui qui la nierait nous\r\nsemblerait plut\u0026ocirc;t un mauvais plaisant qu\u0026rsquo;un penseur? N\u0026rsquo;est-ce pas pour\r\nsauver ce fait ind\u0026eacute;niable que le contenu de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience n\u0026rsquo;a pas\r\nseulement une existence propre et comme immanente et intrins\u0026egrave;que, mais\r\nque chaque partie de ce contenu d\u0026eacute;teint pour ainsi dire sur ses\r\nvoisines, rend compte d\u0026rsquo;elle-m\u0026ecirc;me \u0026agrave; d\u0026rsquo;autres, sort en quelque sorte de\r\nsoi pour \u0026ecirc;tre sue et qu\u0026rsquo;ainsi tout le champ de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience se trouve\r\n\u0026ecirc;tre transparent de part en part, ou constitu\u0026eacute; comme un espace qui\r\nserait rempli de miroirs?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCette bilat\u0026eacute;ralit\u0026eacute; des parties de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience,\u0026mdash;\u0026agrave; savoir d\u0026rsquo;une part,\r\nqu\u0026rsquo;elles \u003ci\u003esont\u003c/i\u003e avec des qualit\u0026eacute;s propres; d\u0026rsquo;autre part, qu\u0026rsquo;elles sont\r\nrapport\u0026eacute;es \u0026agrave; d\u0026rsquo;autres parties et \u003ci\u003esues\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;l\u0026rsquo;opinion r\u0026eacute;gnante la constate\r\net l\u0026rsquo;explique par un dualisme fondamental de constitution\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_225\" id=\"Page_225\"\u003e[Pg 225]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e appartenant \u0026agrave;\r\nchaque morceau d\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience en propre. Dans cette feuille de papier il\r\nn\u0026rsquo;y a pas seulement, dit-on, le contenu, blancheur, minceur, etc., mais\r\nil y a ce second fait de la conscience de cette blancheur et de cette\r\nminceur. Cette fonction d\u0026rsquo;\u0026ecirc;tre \u0026ldquo;rapport\u0026eacute;,\u0026rdquo; de faire partie de la trame\r\nenti\u0026egrave;re d\u0026rsquo;une exp\u0026eacute;rience plus compr\u0026eacute;hensive, on l\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;rige en fait\r\nontologique, et on loge ce fait dans l\u0026rsquo;int\u0026eacute;rieur m\u0026ecirc;me du papier, en\r\nl\u0026rsquo;accouplant \u0026agrave; sa blancheur et \u0026agrave; sa minceur. Ce n\u0026rsquo;est pas un rapport\r\nextrins\u0026egrave;que qu\u0026rsquo;on suppose, c\u0026rsquo;est une moiti\u0026eacute; du ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne m\u0026ecirc;me.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJe crois qu\u0026rsquo;en somme on se repr\u0026eacute;sente la r\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; comme constitu\u0026eacute;e de la\r\nfa\u0026ccedil;on dont sont faites les \u0026ldquo;couleurs\u0026rdquo; qui nous servent \u0026agrave; la peinture. Il\r\ny a d\u0026rsquo;abord des mati\u0026egrave;res colorantes qui r\u0026eacute;pondent au contenu, et il y a\r\nun v\u0026eacute;hicule, huile ou colle, qui les tient en suspension et qui r\u0026eacute;pond \u0026agrave;\r\nla conscience. C\u0026rsquo;est un dualisme complet, o\u0026ugrave;, en employant certains\r\nproc\u0026eacute;d\u0026eacute;s, on peut s\u0026eacute;parer chaque \u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ment de l\u0026rsquo;autre par voie de\r\nsoustraction. C\u0026rsquo;est ainsi qu\u0026rsquo;on nous assure qu\u0026rsquo;en faisant un grand\r\neffort d\u0026rsquo;abstraction introspective, nous pouvons\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_226\" id=\"Page_226\"\u003e[Pg 226]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e saisir notre\r\nconscience sur le vif, comme une activit\u0026eacute; spirituelle pure, en\r\nn\u0026eacute;gligeant \u0026agrave; peu pr\u0026egrave;s compl\u0026egrave;tement les mati\u0026egrave;res qu\u0026rsquo;\u0026agrave; un moment donn\u0026eacute;\r\nelle \u0026eacute;claire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMaintenant je vous demande si on ne pourrait pas tout aussi bien\r\nrenverser absolument cette mani\u0026egrave;re de voir. Supposons, en effet, que la\r\nr\u0026eacute;alit\u0026eacute; premi\u0026egrave;re soit de nature neutre, et appelons-la par quelque nom\r\nencore ambigu, comme \u003ci\u003eph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edonn\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eVorfindung\u003c/i\u003e. Moi-m\u0026ecirc;me j\u0026rsquo;en\r\nparle volontiers au pluriel, et je lui donne le nom d\u0026rsquo;\u003ci\u003eexp\u0026eacute;riences\r\npures\u003c/i\u003e. Ce sera un monisme, si vous voulez, mais un monisme tout \u0026agrave; fait\r\nrudimentaire et absolument oppos\u0026eacute; au soi-disant monisme bilat\u0026eacute;ral du\r\npositivisme scientifique ou spinoziste.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCes exp\u0026eacute;riences pures existent et se succ\u0026egrave;dent, entrent dans des\r\nrapports infiniment vari\u0026eacute;s les unes avec les autres, rapports qui sont\r\neux-m\u0026ecirc;mes des parties essentielles de la trame des exp\u0026eacute;riences. Il y a\r\n\u0026ldquo;Conscience\u0026rdquo; de ces rapports au m\u0026ecirc;me titre qu\u0026rsquo;il y a \u0026ldquo;Conscience\u0026rdquo; de\r\nleurs termes. Il en r\u0026eacute;sulte que des \u003ci\u003egroupes\u003c/i\u003e d\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;riences se font\r\nremarquer et\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_227\" id=\"Page_227\"\u003e[Pg 227]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e distinguer, et qu\u0026rsquo;une seule et m\u0026ecirc;me exp\u0026eacute;rience, vu la\r\ngrande vari\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute; de ses rapports, peut jouer un r\u0026ocirc;le dans plusieurs\r\ngroupes \u0026agrave; la fois. C\u0026rsquo;est ainsi que dans un certain contexte de voisins,\r\nelle serait class\u0026eacute;e comme un ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne physique, tandis que dans un\r\nautre entourage elle figurerait comme un fait de conscience, \u0026agrave; peu pr\u0026egrave;s\r\ncomme une m\u0026ecirc;me particule d\u0026rsquo;encre peut appartenir simultan\u0026eacute;ment \u0026agrave; deux\r\nlignes, l\u0026rsquo;une verticale, l\u0026rsquo;autre horizontale, pourvu qu\u0026rsquo;elle soit situ\u0026eacute;e\r\n\u0026agrave; leur intersection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrenons, pour fixer nos id\u0026eacute;es, l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience que nous avons \u0026agrave; ce moment\r\ndu local o\u0026ugrave; nous sommes, de ces murailles, de cette table, de ces\r\nchaises, de cet espace. Dans cette exp\u0026eacute;rience pleine, concr\u0026egrave;te et\r\nindivise, telle qu\u0026rsquo;elle est l\u0026agrave;, donn\u0026eacute;e, le monde physique objectif et le\r\nmonde int\u0026eacute;rieur et personnel de chacun de nous se rencontrent et se\r\nfusionnent comme des lignes se fusionnent \u0026agrave; leur intersection. Comme\r\nchose physique, cette salle a des rapports avec tout le reste du\r\nb\u0026acirc;timent, b\u0026acirc;timent que nous autres nous ne connaissons et ne conna\u0026icirc;trons\r\npas.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_228\" id=\"Page_228\"\u003e[Pg 228]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Elle doit son existence \u0026agrave; toute une histoire de financiers,\r\nd\u0026rsquo;architectes, d\u0026rsquo;ouvriers. Elle p\u0026egrave;se sur le sol; elle durera\r\nind\u0026eacute;finiment dans le temps; si le feu y \u0026eacute;clatait, les chaises et la\r\ntable qu\u0026rsquo;elle contient seraient vite r\u0026eacute;duites en cendres.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eComme exp\u0026eacute;rience personnelle, au contraire, comme chose \u0026ldquo;rapport\u0026eacute;e,\u0026rdquo;\r\nconnue, consciente, cette salle a de tout autres tenants et\r\naboutissants. Ses ant\u0026eacute;c\u0026eacute;dents ne sont pas des ouvriers, ce sont nos\r\npens\u0026eacute;es respectives de tout \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;heure. Bient\u0026ocirc;t elle ne figurera que\r\ncomme un fait fugitif dans nos biographies, associ\u0026eacute; \u0026agrave; d\u0026rsquo;agr\u0026eacute;ables\r\nsouvenirs. Comme exp\u0026eacute;rience psychique, elle n\u0026rsquo;a aucun poids, son\r\nameublement n\u0026rsquo;est pas combustible. Elle n\u0026rsquo;exerce de force physique que\r\nsur nos seuls cerveaux, et beaucoup d\u0026rsquo;entre nous nient encore cette\r\ninfluence; tandis que la salle physique est en rapport d\u0026rsquo;influence\r\nphysique avec tout le reste du monde.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEt pourtant c\u0026rsquo;est de la m\u0026ecirc;me salle absolument qu\u0026rsquo;il s\u0026rsquo;agit dans les deux\r\ncas. Tant que nous ne faisons pas de physique sp\u0026eacute;culative,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_229\" id=\"Page_229\"\u003e[Pg 229]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e tant que\r\nnous nous pla\u0026ccedil;ons dans le sens commun, c\u0026rsquo;est la salle vue et sentie qui\r\nest bien la salle physique. De quoi parlons-nous donc si ce n\u0026rsquo;est de\r\n\u003ci\u003ecela\u003c/i\u003e, de cette m\u0026ecirc;me partie de la nature mat\u0026eacute;rielle que tous nos\r\nesprits, \u0026agrave; ce m\u0026ecirc;me moment, embrassent, qui entre telle quelle dans\r\nl\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience actuelle et intime de chacun de nous, et que notre souvenir\r\nregardera toujours comme une partie int\u0026eacute;grante de notre histoire. C\u0026rsquo;est\r\nabsolument une m\u0026ecirc;me \u0026eacute;toffe qui figure simultan\u0026eacute;ment, selon le contexte\r\nque l\u0026rsquo;on consid\u0026egrave;re, comme fait mat\u0026eacute;riel et physique, ou comme fait de\r\nconscience intime.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJe crois donc qu\u0026rsquo;on ne saurait traiter conscience et mati\u0026egrave;re comme \u0026eacute;tant\r\nd\u0026rsquo;essence disparate. On n\u0026rsquo;obtient ni l\u0026rsquo;une ni l\u0026rsquo;autre par soustraction,\r\nen n\u0026eacute;gligeant chaque fois l\u0026rsquo;autre moiti\u0026eacute; d\u0026rsquo;une exp\u0026eacute;rience de composition\r\ndouble. Les exp\u0026eacute;riences sont au contraire primitivement de nature plut\u0026ocirc;t\r\nsimple. Elles \u003ci\u003edeviennent\u003c/i\u003e conscientes dans leur entier, elles\r\n\u003ci\u003edeviennent\u003c/i\u003e physiques dans leur entier; et c\u0026rsquo;est \u003ci\u003epar voie d\u0026rsquo;addition\u003c/i\u003e\r\nque ce r\u0026eacute;sultat se r\u0026eacute;alise. Pour\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_230\" id=\"Page_230\"\u003e[Pg 230]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e autant que des exp\u0026eacute;riences se\r\nprolongent dans le temps, entrent dans des rapports d\u0026rsquo;influence\r\nphysique, se brisant, se chauffant, s\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;clairant, etc., mutuellement,\r\nnous en faisons un groupe \u0026agrave; part que nous appelons le monde physique.\r\nPour autant, au contraire, qu\u0026rsquo;elles sont fugitives, inertes\r\nphysiquement, que leur succession ne suit pas d\u0026rsquo;ordre d\u0026eacute;termin\u0026eacute;, mais\r\nsemble plut\u0026ocirc;t ob\u0026eacute;ir \u0026agrave; des caprices \u0026eacute;motifs, nous en faisons un autre\r\ngroupe que nous appelons le monde psychique. C\u0026rsquo;est en entrant \u0026agrave; pr\u0026eacute;sent\r\ndans un grand nombre de ces groupes psychiques que cette salle devient\r\nmaintenant chose consciente, chose rapport\u0026eacute;e, chose sue. En faisant\r\nd\u0026eacute;sormais partie de nos biographies respectives, elle ne sera pas suivie\r\nde cette sotte et monotone r\u0026eacute;p\u0026eacute;tition d\u0026rsquo;elle-m\u0026ecirc;me dans le temps qui\r\ncaract\u0026eacute;rise son existence physique. Elle sera suivie, au contraire, par\r\nd\u0026rsquo;autres exp\u0026eacute;riences qui seront discontinues avec elle, ou qui auront ce\r\ngenre tout particulier de continuit\u0026eacute; que nous appelons souvenir. Demain,\r\nelle aura eu sa place dans chacun de nos pass\u0026eacute;s; mais les pr\u0026eacute;sents\r\ndivers auxquels tous\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_231\" id=\"Page_231\"\u003e[Pg 231]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e ces pass\u0026eacute;s seront li\u0026eacute;s demain seront bien\r\ndiff\u0026eacute;rents du pr\u0026eacute;sent dont cette salle jouira demain comme entit\u0026eacute;\r\nphysique.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLes deux genres de groupes sont form\u0026eacute;s d\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;riences, mais les rapports\r\ndes exp\u0026eacute;riences entre elles diff\u0026egrave;rent d\u0026rsquo;un groupe \u0026agrave; l\u0026rsquo;autre. C\u0026rsquo;est donc\r\npar addition d\u0026rsquo;autres ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;nes qu\u0026rsquo;un ph\u0026eacute;nom\u0026egrave;ne donn\u0026eacute; devient conscient\r\nou connu, ce n\u0026rsquo;est pas par un d\u0026eacute;doublement d\u0026rsquo;essence int\u0026eacute;rieure. La\r\nconnaissance des choses leur \u003ci\u003esurvient\u003c/i\u003e, elle ne leur est pas immanente.\r\nCe n\u0026rsquo;est le fait ni d\u0026rsquo;un moi transcendental, ni d\u0026rsquo;une \u003ci\u003eBewusstheit\u003c/i\u003e ou\r\nacte de conscience qui les animerait chacune. \u003ci\u003eElles se connaissent\r\nl\u0026rsquo;une l\u0026rsquo;autre\u003c/i\u003e, ou plut\u0026ocirc;t il y en a qui connaissent les autres; et le\r\nrapport que nous nommons connaissance n\u0026rsquo;est lui-m\u0026ecirc;me, dans beaucoup de\r\ncas, qu\u0026rsquo;une suite d\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;riences interm\u0026eacute;diaires parfaitement susceptibles\r\nd\u0026rsquo;\u0026ecirc;tre d\u0026eacute;crites en termes concrets. Il n\u0026rsquo;est nullement le myst\u0026egrave;re\r\ntranscendant o\u0026ugrave; se sont complus tant de philosophes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMais ceci nous m\u0026egrave;nerait beaucoup trop loin. Je ne puis entrer ici dans\r\ntous les replis de la\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_232\" id=\"Page_232\"\u003e[Pg 232]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e th\u0026eacute;orie de la connaissance, ou de ce que, vous\r\nautres Italiens, vous appelez la gnos\u0026eacute;ologie. Je dois me contenter de\r\nces remarques \u0026eacute;court\u0026eacute;es, ou simples suggestions, qui sont, je le crains,\r\nencore bien obscures faute des d\u0026eacute;veloppements n\u0026eacute;cessaires.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePermettez donc que je me r\u0026eacute;sume\u0026mdash;trop sommairement, et en style\r\ndogmatique\u0026mdash;dans les six th\u0026egrave;ses suivantes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 45%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e1\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e La Conscience, telle qu\u0026rsquo;on l\u0026rsquo;entend ordinairement, n\u0026rsquo;existe pas,\r\npas plus que la Mati\u0026egrave;re, \u0026agrave; laquelle Berkeley a donn\u0026eacute; le coup de gr\u0026acirc;ce;\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e2\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e Ce qui existe et forme la part de v\u0026eacute;rit\u0026eacute; que le mot de \u0026ldquo;Conscience\u0026rdquo;\r\nrecouvre, c\u0026rsquo;est la susceptibilit\u0026eacute; que poss\u0026egrave;dent les parties de\r\nl\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience d\u0026rsquo;\u0026ecirc;tre rapport\u0026eacute;es ou connues;\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e3\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e Cette susceptibilit\u0026eacute; s\u0026rsquo;explique par le fait que certaines\r\nexp\u0026eacute;riences peuvent mener les unes aux autres par des exp\u0026eacute;riences\r\ninterm\u0026eacute;diaires nettement caract\u0026eacute;ris\u0026eacute;es, de telle sorte que les unes se\r\ntrouvent jouer le r\u0026ocirc;le de choses connues, les autres celui de sujets\r\nconnaissants;\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e4\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e On peut parfaitement d\u0026eacute;finir ces deux r\u0026ocirc;les\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_233\" id=\"Page_233\"\u003e[Pg 233]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e sans sortir de la\r\ntrame de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience m\u0026ecirc;me, et sans invoquer rien de transcendant;\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e5\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e Les attributions sujet et objet, repr\u0026eacute;sent\u0026eacute; et repr\u0026eacute;sentatif, chose\r\net pens\u0026eacute;e, signifient donc une distinction pratique qui est de la\r\nderni\u0026egrave;re importance, mais qui est d\u0026rsquo;ordre\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFONCTIONNEL\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eseulement, et\r\nnullement ontologique comme le dualisme classique se la repr\u0026eacute;sente;\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e6\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e En fin de compte, les choses et les pens\u0026eacute;es ne sont point\r\nfonci\u0026egrave;rement h\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;rog\u0026egrave;nes, mais elles sont faites d\u0026rsquo;une m\u0026ecirc;me \u0026eacute;toffe,\r\n\u0026eacute;toffe qu\u0026rsquo;on ne peut d\u0026eacute;finir comme telle, mais seulement \u0026eacute;prouver, et\r\nque l\u0026rsquo;on peut nommer, si on veut, l\u0026rsquo;\u0026eacute;toffe de l\u0026rsquo;exp\u0026eacute;rience en g\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;ral.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_116_116\" id=\"Footnote_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[116]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [A communication made (in French) at the Fifth\r\nInternational Congress of Psychology, in Rome, April 30, 1905. It is\r\nreprinted from the \u003ci\u003eArchives de Psychologie\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ev\u003c/span\u003e, No. 17, June,\r\n1905.] Cette communication est le r\u0026eacute;sum\u0026eacute;, forc\u0026eacute;ment tr\u0026egrave;s condens\u0026eacute;, de\r\nvues que l\u0026rsquo;auteur a expos\u0026eacute;es, au cours de ces derniers mois, en une\r\ns\u0026eacute;rie d\u0026rsquo;articles publi\u0026eacute;s dans le \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and\r\nScientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, 1904 et 1905. [The series of articles referred to\r\nis reprinted above. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_117_117\" id=\"Footnote_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[117]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Sense of Beauty\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 44 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_118_118\" id=\"Footnote_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[118]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Life of Reason\u003c/i\u003e [vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026ldquo;Reason in Common Sense,\u0026rdquo;\r\np. 142].\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_234\" id=\"Page_234\"\u003e[Pg 234]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"IX\" id=\"IX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIS RADICAL EMPIRICISM SOLIPSISTIC?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_119_119\" id=\"FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_119_119\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf all the criticisms which the humanistic \u003ci\u003eWeltanschauung\u003c/i\u003e is receiving\r\nwere as \u003ci\u003esachgem\u0026auml;ss\u003c/i\u003e as Mr. Bode\u0026rsquo;s,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_120_120\" id=\"FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_120_120\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e the truth of the matter would\r\nmore rapidly clear up. Not only is it excellently well written, but it\r\nbrings its own point of view out clearly, and admits of a perfectly\r\nstraight reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument (unless I fail to catch it) can be expressed as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf a series of experiences be supposed, no one of which is endowed\r\nimmediately with the self-transcendent function of reference to a\r\nreality beyond itself, no motive will occur within the series for\r\nsupposing anything beyond it to exist. It will remain subjective, and\r\ncontentedly subjective, both as a whole and in its several parts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_235\" id=\"Page_235\"\u003e[Pg 235]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRadical empiricism, trying, as it does, to account for objective\r\nknowledge by means of such a series, egregiously fails. It can not\r\nexplain how the notion of a physical order, as distinguished from a\r\nsubjectively biographical order, of experiences, ever arose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt pretends to explain the notion of a physical order, but does so by\r\nplaying fast and loose with the concept of objective reference. On the\r\none hand, it denies that such reference implies self-transcendency on\r\nthe part of any one experience; on the other hand, it claims that\r\nexperiences \u003ci\u003epoint\u003c/i\u003e. But, critically considered, there can be no\r\npointing unless self-transcendency be also allowed. The conjunctive\r\nfunction of pointing, as I have assumed it, is, according to my critic,\r\nvitiated by the fallacy of attaching a bilateral relation to a term \u003ci\u003ea\r\nquo\u003c/i\u003e, as if it could stick out substantively and maintain itself in\r\nexistence in advance of the term \u003ci\u003ead quem\u003c/i\u003e which is equally required for\r\nit to be a concretely experienced fact. If the relation be made\r\nconcrete, the term \u003ci\u003ead quem\u003c/i\u003e is involved, which would mean (if I succeed\r\nin\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_236\" id=\"Page_236\"\u003e[Pg 236]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e apprehending Mr. Bode rightly) that this latter term, although not\r\nempirically there, is yet \u003ci\u003enoetically\u003c/i\u003e there, in advance\u0026mdash;in other words\r\nit would mean that any experience that \u0026lsquo;points\u0026rsquo; must already have\r\ntranscended itself, in the ordinary \u0026lsquo;epistemological\u0026rsquo; sense of the word\r\ntranscend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSomething like this, if I understand Mr. Bode\u0026rsquo;s text, is the upshot of\r\nhis state of mind. It is a reasonable sounding state of mind, but it is\r\nexactly the state of mind which radical empiricism, by its doctrine of\r\nthe reality of conjunctive relations, seeks to dispel. I very much\r\nfear\u0026mdash;so difficult does mutual understanding seem in these exalted\r\nregions\u0026mdash;that my able critic has failed to understand that doctrine as\r\nit is meant to be understood. I suspect that he performs on all these\r\nconjunctive relations (of which the aforesaid \u0026lsquo;pointing\u0026rsquo; is only one)\r\nthe usual rationalistic act of substitution\u0026mdash;he takes them not as they\r\nare given in their first intention, as parts constitutive of\r\nexperience\u0026rsquo;s living flow, but only as they appear in retrospect, each\r\nfixed as a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_237\" id=\"Page_237\"\u003e[Pg 237]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e determinate object of conception, static, therefore, and\r\ncontained within itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgainst this rationalistic tendency to treat experience as chopped up\r\ninto discontinuous static objects, radical empiricism protests. It\r\ninsists on taking conjunctions at their \u0026lsquo;face-value,\u0026rsquo; just as they come.\r\nConsider, for example, such conjunctions as \u0026lsquo;and,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;with,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;near,\u0026rsquo;\r\n\u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003eplus\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;towards.\u0026rsquo; While we live in such conjunctions our state is one\r\nof \u003ci\u003etransition\u003c/i\u003e in the most literal sense. We are expectant of a \u0026lsquo;more\u0026rsquo;\r\nto come, and before the more \u003ci\u003ehas\u003c/i\u003e come, the transition, nevertheless,\r\nis directed \u003ci\u003etowards\u003c/i\u003e it. I fail otherwise to see how, if one kind of\r\nmore comes, there should be satisfaction and feeling of fulfilment; but\r\ndisappointment if the more comes in another shape. One more will\r\ncontinue, another more will arrest or deflect the direction, in which\r\nour experience is moving even now. We can not, it is true, \u003ci\u003ename\u003c/i\u003e our\r\ndifferent living \u0026lsquo;ands\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;withs\u0026rsquo; except by naming the different terms\r\ntowards which they are moving us, but we \u003ci\u003elive\u003c/i\u003e their specifications and\r\ndifferences before those\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_238\" id=\"Page_238\"\u003e[Pg 238]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e terms explicitly arrive. Thus, though the\r\nvarious \u0026lsquo;ands\u0026rsquo; are all bilateral relations, each requiring a term \u003ci\u003ead\r\nquem\u003c/i\u003e to define it when viewed in retrospect and articulately conceived,\r\nyet in its living moment any one of them may be treated as if it \u0026lsquo;stuck\r\nout\u0026rsquo; from its term \u003ci\u003ea quo\u003c/i\u003e and pointed in a special direction, much as a\r\ncompass-needle (to use Mr. Bode\u0026rsquo;s excellent simile) points at the pole,\r\neven though it stirs not from its box.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Professor H\u0026ouml;ffding\u0026rsquo;s massive little article in \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of\r\nPhilosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_121_121\" id=\"FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_121_121\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e he quotes a saying\r\nof Kierkegaard\u0026rsquo;s to the effect that we live forwards, but we understand\r\nbackwards. Understanding backwards is, it must be confessed, a very\r\nfrequent weakness of philosophers, both of the rationalistic and of the\r\nordinary empiricist type. Radical empiricism alone insists on\r\nunderstanding forwards also, and refuses to substitute static concepts\r\nof the understanding for transitions in our moving life. A logic similar\r\nto that which my critic seems to employ\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_239\" id=\"Page_239\"\u003e[Pg 239]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e here should, it seems to me,\r\nforbid him to say that our present is, while present, directed towards\r\nour future, or that any physical movement can have direction until its\r\ngoal is actually reached.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt this point does it not seem as if the quarrel about\r\nself-transcendency in knowledge might drop? Is it not a purely verbal\r\ndispute? Call it self-transcendency or call it pointing, whichever you\r\nlike\u0026mdash;it makes no difference so long as real transitions towards real\r\ngoals are admitted as things given \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e experience, and among\r\nexperience\u0026rsquo;s most indefeasible parts. Radical empiricism, unable to\r\nclose its eyes to the transitions caught \u003ci\u003ein actu\u003c/i\u003e, accounts for the\r\nself-transcendency or the pointing (whichever you may call it) as a\r\nprocess that occurs within experience, as an empirically mediated thing\r\nof which a perfectly definite description can be given. \u0026lsquo;Epistemology,\u0026rsquo;\r\non the other hand, denies this; and pretends that the self-transcendency\r\nis unmediated or, if mediated, then mediated in a super-empirical world.\r\nTo justify this pretension, epistemology has first to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_240\" id=\"Page_240\"\u003e[Pg 240]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e transform all our\r\nconjunctions into static objects, and this, I submit, is an absolutely\r\narbitrary act. But in spite of Mr. Bode\u0026rsquo;s mal-treatment of conjunctions,\r\nas I understand them\u0026mdash;and as I understand him\u0026mdash;I believe that at bottom\r\nwe are fighting for nothing different, but are both defending the same\r\ncontinuities of experience in different forms of words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are other criticisms in the article in question, but, as this\r\nseems the most vital one, I will for the present, at any rate, leave\r\nthem untouched.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_119_119\" id=\"Footnote_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[119]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eThe Journal of Philosophy, Psychology\r\nand Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 9, April 27, 1905.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_120_120\" id=\"Footnote_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[120]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [B. H. Bode: \u0026ldquo;\u0026lsquo;Pure Experience\u0026rsquo; and the External World,\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n1905, p. 128.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_121_121\" id=\"Footnote_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[121]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, [1905], pp. 85-92.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_241\" id=\"Page_241\"\u003e[Pg 241]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"X\" id=\"X\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eMR. PITKIN\u0026rsquo;S REFUTATION OF \u0026lsquo;RADICAL EMPIRICISM\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_122_122\" id=\"FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_122_122\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough Mr. Pitkin does not name me in his acute article on radical\r\nempiricism,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_123_123\" id=\"FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_123_123\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e […] I fear that some readers, knowing me to have\r\napplied that name to my own doctrine, may possibly consider themselves\r\nto have been in at my death.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn point of fact my withers are entirely unwrung. I have, indeed,\r\nsaid\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_124_124\" id=\"FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_124_124\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e that \u0026lsquo;to be radical, an empiricism must not admit into its\r\nconstructions any element that is not directly experienced.\u0026rsquo; But in my\r\nown radical empiricism this is only a \u003ci\u003emethodological postulate\u003c/i\u003e, not a\r\nconclusion supposed to flow from the intrinsic absurdity of\r\ntransempirical objects. I have never felt the slightest respect for the\r\nidealistic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_242\" id=\"Page_242\"\u003e[Pg 242]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e arguments which Mr. Pitkin attacks and of which Ferrier made\r\nsuch striking use; and I am perfectly willing to admit any number of\r\nnoumenal beings or events into philosophy if only their pragmatic value\r\ncan be shown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRadical empiricism and pragmatism have so many misunderstandings to\r\nsuffer from, that it seems my duty not to let this one go any farther,\r\nuncorrected.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 45%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Pitkin\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;reply\u0026rsquo; to me,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_125_125\" id=\"FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_125_125\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e […] perplexes me by the obscurity of\r\nstyle which I find in almost all our younger philosophers. He asks me,\r\nhowever, two direct questions which I understand, so I take the liberty\r\nof answering.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst he asks: Do not experience and science show \u0026lsquo;that countless things\r\nare\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_126_126\" id=\"FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_126_126\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e experienced as that which they are not or are only partially?\u0026rsquo;\r\nI reply: Yes, assuredly, as, for example, \u0026lsquo;things\u0026rsquo; distorted by\r\nrefractive media, \u0026lsquo;molecules,\u0026rsquo; or whatever else is taken to be more\r\nultimately real than the immediate content of the perceptive moment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_243\" id=\"Page_243\"\u003e[Pg 243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecondly: \u0026ldquo;If experience is self-supporting\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_127_127\" id=\"FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_127_127\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e (in \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e intelligible\r\nsense) does this fact preclude the possibility of (a) something not\r\nexperienced and (b) action of experience upon a noumenon?\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy reply is: Assuredly not the possibility of either\u0026mdash;how could it? Yet\r\nin my opinion we should be wise not to \u003ci\u003econsider\u003c/i\u003e any thing or action of\r\nthat nature, and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to\r\nwhat is experienced or, at least, experienceable.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_128_128\" id=\"FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_128_128\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_122_122\" id=\"Footnote_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[122]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology\r\nand Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 26, December 20, 1906; and\r\n\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, No. 4, February 14, 1907, where the original is\r\nentitled \u0026ldquo;A Reply to Mr. Pitkin.\u0026rdquo; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_123_123\" id=\"Footnote_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[123]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [W. B. Pitkin: \u0026ldquo;A Problem of Evidence in Radical\r\nEmpiricism,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 24, November 22, 1906. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_124_124\" id=\"Footnote_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[124]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_125_125\" id=\"Footnote_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[125]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u0026ldquo;In Reply to Professor James,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy,\r\nPsychology and Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eiv\u003c/span\u003e, No. 2, January 17, 1907.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_126_126\" id=\"Footnote_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[126]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mr. Pitkin inserts the clause: \u0026lsquo;by reason of the very\r\nnature of experience itself.\u0026rsquo; Not understanding just what reason is\r\nmeant, I do not include this clause in my answer.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_127_127\" id=\"Footnote_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[127]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [See above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_128_128\" id=\"Footnote_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[128]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Elsewhere, in speaking of \u0026lsquo;reality\u0026rsquo; as \u0026ldquo;conceptual or\r\nperceptual experiences,\u0026rdquo; the author says: \u0026ldquo;This is meant merely to\r\nexclude reality of an \u0026lsquo;unknowable\u0026rsquo; sort, of which no account in either\r\nperceptual or conceptual terms can be given. It includes, of course, any\r\namount of empirical reality independent of the knower.\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eMeaning of\r\nTruth\u003c/i\u003e, p. 100, note. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_244\" id=\"Page_244\"\u003e[Pg 244]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"XI\" id=\"XI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eXI\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eHUMANISM AND TRUTH ONCE MORE.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_129_129\" id=\"FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_129_129\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Joseph\u0026rsquo;s criticism of my article \u0026lsquo;Humanism and Truth\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_130_130\" id=\"FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_130_130\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e is a\r\nuseful contribution to the general clearing up. He has seriously tried\r\nto comprehend what the pragmatic movement may intelligibly mean; and if\r\nhe has failed, it is the fault neither of his patience nor of his\r\nsincerity, but rather of stubborn tricks of thought which he could not\r\neasily get rid of. Minute polemics, in which the parties try to rebut\r\nevery detail of each of the other\u0026rsquo;s charges, are a useful exercise only\r\nto the disputants. They can but breed confusion in a reader. I will\r\ntherefore ignore as much as possible the text of both our articles (mine\r\nwas inadequate enough) and treat once more the general objective\r\nsituation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_245\" id=\"Page_245\"\u003e[Pg 245]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs I apprehend the movement towards humanism, it is based on no\r\nparticular discovery or principle that can be driven into one precise\r\nformula which thereupon can be impaled upon a logical skewer. It is much\r\nmore like one of those secular changes that come upon public opinion\r\nover-night, as it were, borne upon tides \u0026lsquo;too full for sound or foam,\u0026rsquo;\r\nthat survive all the crudities and extravagances of their advocates,\r\nthat you can pin to no one absolutely essential statement, nor kill by\r\nany one decisive stab.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch have been the changes from aristocracy to democracy, from classic\r\nto romantic taste, from theistic to pantheistic feeling, from static to\r\nevolutionary ways of understanding life\u0026mdash;changes of which we all have\r\nbeen spectators. Scholasticism still opposes to such changes the method\r\nof confutation by single decisive reasons, showing that the new view\r\ninvolves self-contradiction, or traverses some fundamental principle.\r\nThis is like stopping\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_246\" id=\"Page_246\"\u003e[Pg 246]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a river by planting a stick in the middle of its\r\nbed. Round your obstacle flows the water and \u0026lsquo;gets there all the same.\u0026rsquo;\r\nIn reading Mr. Joseph, I am not a little reminded of those Catholic\r\nwriters who refute Darwinism by telling us that higher species can not\r\ncome from lower because \u003ci\u003eminus nequit gignere plus\u003c/i\u003e, or that the notion\r\nof transformation is absurd, for it implies that species tend to their\r\nown destruction, and that would violate the principle that every reality\r\ntends to persevere in its own shape. The point of view is too myopic,\r\ntoo tight and close to take in the inductive argument. You can not\r\nsettle questions of fact by formal logic. I feel as if Mr. Joseph almost\r\npounced on my words singly, without giving the sentences time to get out\r\nof my mouth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe one condition of understanding humanism is to become\r\ninductive-minded oneself, to drop rigorous definitions, and follow lines\r\nof least resistance \u0026lsquo;on the whole.\u0026rsquo; \u0026ldquo;In other words,\u0026rdquo; Mr. Joseph may\r\nprobably say, \u0026ldquo;resolve your intellect into a kind of slush.\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;Even so,\u0026rdquo;\r\nI make reply,\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;if you will\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_247\" id=\"Page_247\"\u003e[Pg 247]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e consent to use no politer word.\u0026rdquo; For\r\nhumanism, conceiving the more \u0026lsquo;true\u0026rsquo; as the more \u0026lsquo;satisfactory\u0026rsquo; (Dewey\u0026rsquo;s\r\nterm) has to renounce sincerely rectilinear arguments and ancient ideals\r\nof rigor and finality. It is in just this temper of renunciation, so\r\ndifferent from that of pyrrhonistic scepticism, that the spirit of\r\nhumanism essentially consists. Satisfactoriness has to be measured by a\r\nmultitude of standards, of which some, for aught we know, may fail in\r\nany given case; and what is \u0026lsquo;more\u0026rsquo; satisfactory than any alternative in\r\nsight, may to the end be a sum of \u003ci\u003epluses\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eminuses\u003c/i\u003e, concerning\r\nwhich we can only trust that by ulterior corrections and improvements a\r\nmaximum of the one and a minimum of the other may some day be\r\napproached. It means a real change of heart, a break with absolutistic\r\nhopes, when one takes up this view of the conditions of belief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat humanism\u0026rsquo;s critics have never imagined this attitude inwardly, is\r\nshown by their invariable tactics. They do not get into it far enough to\r\nsee objectively and from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_248\" id=\"Page_248\"\u003e[Pg 248]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e without what their own opposite notion of\r\ntruth is. Mr. Joseph is possessed by some such notion; he thinks his\r\nreaders to be full of it, he obeys it, works from it, but never even\r\nessays to tell us what it is. The nearest he comes to doing so is\r\nwhere\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_131_131\" id=\"FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_131_131\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e he says it is the way \u0026ldquo;we ought to think,\u0026rdquo; whether we be\r\npsychologically compelled to or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course humanism agrees to this: it is only a manner of calling truth\r\nan ideal. But humanism explicates the summarizing word \u0026lsquo;ought\u0026rsquo; into a\r\nmass of pragmatic motives from the midst of which our critics think that\r\ntruth itself takes flight. Truth is a name of double meaning. It stands\r\nnow for an abstract something defined only as that to which our thought\r\nought to conform; and again it stands for the concrete propositions\r\nwithin which we believe that conformity already reigns\u0026mdash;they being so\r\nmany \u0026lsquo;truths.\u0026rsquo; Humanism sees that the only conformity we ever have to\r\ndeal with concretely is that between our subjects and our predicates,\r\nusing these words in a very\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_249\" id=\"Page_249\"\u003e[Pg 249]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e broad sense. It sees moreover that this\r\nconformity is \u0026lsquo;validated\u0026rsquo; (to use Mr. Schiller\u0026rsquo;s term) by an indefinite\r\nnumber of pragmatic tests that vary as the predicates and subjects vary.\r\nIf an S gets superseded by an SP that gives our mind a completer sum of\r\nsatisfactions, we always say, humanism points out, that we have advanced\r\nto a better position in regard to truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow many of our judgments thus attained are retrospective. The S\u0026rsquo;es, so\r\nthe judgment runs, were SP\u0026rsquo;s already ere the fact was humanly recorded.\r\nCommon sense, struck by this state of things, now rearranges the whole\r\nfield; and traditional philosophy follows her example. The general\r\nrequirement that predicates must conform to their subject, they\r\ntranslate into an ontological theory. A most previous Subject of all is\r\nsubstituted for the lesser subjects and conceived of as an archetypal\r\nReality; and the conformity required of predicates in detail is\r\nreinterpreted as a relation which our whole mind, with all its subjects\r\nand predicates together, must get into\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_250\" id=\"Page_250\"\u003e[Pg 250]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with respect to this Reality.\r\nIt, meanwhile, is conceived as eternal, static, and unaffected by our\r\nthinking. Conformity to a non-human Archetype like this is probably the\r\nnotion of truth which my opponent shares with common sense and\r\nphilosophic rationalism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen now Humanism, fully admitting both the naturalness and the grandeur\r\nof this hypothesis, nevertheless points to its sterility, and declines\r\nto chime in with the substitution, keeping to the concrete and still\r\nlodging truth between the subjects and the predicates in detail, it\r\nprovokes the outcry which we hear and which my critic echoes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the commonest parts of the outcry is that humanism is\r\nsubjectivistic altogether\u0026mdash;it is supposed to labor under a necessity of\r\n\u0026lsquo;denying trans-perceptual reality.\u0026rsquo;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_132_132\" id=\"FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_132_132\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e It is not hard to see how this\r\nmisconception of humanism may have arisen; and humanistic writers,\r\npartly from not having sufficiently guarded their expressions, and\r\npartly from not having yet \u0026ldquo;got round\u0026rdquo; (in the poverty of their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_251\" id=\"Page_251\"\u003e[Pg 251]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nliterature) to a full discussion of the subject, are doubtless in some\r\ndegree to blame. But I fail to understand how any one with a working\r\ngrasp of their principles can charge them wholesale with subjectivism. I\r\nmyself have never thought of humanism as being subjectivistic farther\r\nthan to this extent, that, inasmuch as it treats the thinker as being\r\nhimself one portion of reality, it must also allow that \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nrealities that he declares for true are created by his being there. Such\r\nrealities of course are either acts of his, or relations between other\r\nthings and him, or relations between things, which, but for him, would\r\nnever have been traced. Humanists are subjectivistic, also in this,\r\nthat, unlike rationalists (who think they carry a warrant for the\r\nabsolute truth of what they now believe in in their present pocket),\r\nthey hold all present beliefs as subject to revision in the light of\r\nfuture experience. The future experience, however, may be of things\r\noutside the thinker; and that this is so the humanist may believe as\r\nfreely as any other kind of empiricist philosopher.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_252\" id=\"Page_252\"\u003e[Pg 252]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe critics of humanism (though here I follow them but darkly) appear to\r\nobject to any infusion whatever of subjectivism into truth. All must be\r\narchetypal; every truth must pre-exist to its perception. Humanism sees\r\nthat an enormous quantity of truth must be written down as having\r\npre-existed to its perception by us humans. In countless instances we\r\nfind it most satisfactory to believe that, though we were always\r\nignorant of the fact, it always \u003ci\u003ewas\u003c/i\u003e a fact that S was SP. But humanism\r\nseparates this class of cases from those in which it is more\r\nsatisfactory to believe the opposite, e.g., that S is ephemeral, or P a\r\npassing event, or SP created by the perceiving act. Our critics seem on\r\nthe other hand, to wish to universalize the retrospective type of\r\ninstance. Reality must pre-exist to every assertion for which truth is\r\nclaimed. And, not content with this overuse of one particular type of\r\njudgment, our critics claim its monopoly. They appear to wish to cut off\r\nHumanism from its rights to any retrospection at all.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_253\" id=\"Page_253\"\u003e[Pg 253]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHumanism says that satisfactoriness is what distinguishes the true from\r\nthe false. But satisfactoriness is both a subjective quality, and a\r\npresent one. \u003ci\u003eErgo\u003c/i\u003e (the critics appear to reason) an object, \u003ci\u003equ\u0026acirc;\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntrue, must always for humanism be both present and subjective, and a\r\nhumanist\u0026rsquo;s belief can never be in anything that lives outside of the\r\nbelief itself or ante-dates it. Why so preposterous a charge should be\r\nso current, I find it hard to say. Nothing is more obvious than the fact\r\nthat both the objective and the past existence of the object may be the\r\nvery things about it that most seem satisfactory, and that most invite\r\nus to believe them. The past tense can figure in the humanist\u0026rsquo;s world,\r\nas well of belief as of representation, quite as harmoniously as in the\r\nworld of any one else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Joseph gives a special turn to this accusation. He charges me\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_133_133\" id=\"FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_133_133\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwith being self-contradictory when I say that the main categories of\r\nthought were evolved in the course of experience itself. For I use these\r\nvery\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_254\" id=\"Page_254\"\u003e[Pg 254]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e categories to define the course of experience by. Experience, as I\r\ntalk about it, is a product of their use; and yet I take it as true\r\nanteriorly to them. This seems to Mr. Joseph to be an absurdity. I hope\r\nit does not seem such to his readers; for if experiences can suggest\r\nhypotheses at all (and they notoriously do so) I can see no absurdity\r\nwhatever in the notion of a retrospective hypothesis having for its\r\nobject the very train of experiences by which its own being, along with\r\nthat of other things, has been brought about. If the hypothesis is\r\n\u0026lsquo;satisfactory\u0026rsquo; we must, of course, believe it to have been true\r\nanteriorly to its formulation by ourselves. Every explanation of a\r\npresent by a past seems to involve this kind of circle, which is not a\r\nvicious circle. The past is \u003ci\u003ecausa existendi\u003c/i\u003e of the present, which in\r\nturn is \u003ci\u003ecausa cognoscendi\u003c/i\u003e of the past. If the present were treated as\r\n\u003ci\u003ecausa existendi\u003c/i\u003e of the past, the circle might indeed be vicious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eClosely connected with this pseudo-difficulty is another one of wider\r\nscope and greater\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_255\" id=\"Page_255\"\u003e[Pg 255]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e complication\u0026mdash;more excusable therefore.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_134_134\" id=\"FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_134_134\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHumanism, namely, asking how truth in point of fact is reached, and\r\nseeing that it is by ever substituting more satisfactory for less\r\nsatisfactory opinions, is thereby led into a vague historic sketch of\r\ntruth\u0026rsquo;s development. The earliest \u0026lsquo;opinions,\u0026rsquo; it thinks, must have been\r\ndim, unconnected \u0026lsquo;feelings,\u0026rsquo; and only little by little did more and more\r\norderly views of things replace them. Our own retrospective view of this\r\nwhole evolution is now, let us say, the latest candidate for \u0026lsquo;truth\u0026rsquo; as\r\nyet reached in the process. To be a satisfactory candidate, it must give\r\nsome definite sort of a picture of what forces keep the process going.\r\nOn the subjective side we have a fairly definite picture\u0026mdash;sensation,\r\nassociation, interest, hypothesis, these account in a general way for\r\nthe growth into a cosmos of the relative chaos with which the mind\r\nbegan.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut on the side of the object, so to call it roughly, our view is much\r\nless satisfactory.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_256\" id=\"Page_256\"\u003e[Pg 256]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Of which of our many objects are we to believe that\r\nit truly \u003ci\u003ewas\u003c/i\u003e there and at work before the human mind began? Time,\r\nspace, kind, number, serial order, cause, consciousness, are hard things\r\nnot to objectify\u0026mdash;even transcendental idealism leaves them standing as\r\n\u0026lsquo;empirically real.\u0026rsquo; Substance, matter, force, fall down more easily\r\nbefore criticism, and secondary qualities make almost no resistance at\r\nall. Nevertheless, when we survey the field of speculation, from\r\nScholasticism through Kantism to Spencerism, we find an ever-recurring\r\ntendency to convert the pre-human into a merely logical object, an\r\nunknowable \u003ci\u003eding-an-sich\u003c/i\u003e, that but starts the process, or a vague\r\n\u003ci\u003emateria prima\u003c/i\u003e that but receives our forms.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_135_135\" id=\"FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_135_135\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reasons for this are not so much logical as they are material. We\r\ncan postulate an extra-mental \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e freely enough (though some\r\nidealists have denied us the privilege), but when we have done so, the\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e of it is hard\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_257\" id=\"Page_257\"\u003e[Pg 257]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to determine satisfactorily, because of the\r\noppositions and entanglements of the variously proposed \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e with one\r\nanother and with the history of the human mind. The literature of\r\nspeculative cosmology bears witness to this difficulty. Humanism suffers\r\nfrom it no more than any other philosophy suffers, but it makes all our\r\ncosmogonic theories so unsatisfactory that some thinkers seek relief in\r\nthe denial of any primal dualism. Absolute Thought or \u0026lsquo;pure experience\u0026rsquo;\r\nis postulated, and endowed with attributes calculated to justify the\r\nbelief that it may \u0026lsquo;run itself.\u0026rsquo; Both these truth-claiming hypotheses\r\nare non-dualistic in the old mind-and-matter sense; but the one is\r\nmonistic and the other pluralistic as to the world process itself. Some\r\nhumanists are non-dualists of this sort\u0026mdash;I myself am one \u003ci\u003eund zwar\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe pluralistic brand. But doubtless dualistic humanists also exist, as\r\nwell as non-dualistic ones of the monistic wing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Joseph pins these general philosophic difficulties on humanism\r\nalone, or possibly on me alone. My article spoke vaguely of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_258\" id=\"Page_258\"\u003e[Pg 258]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u0026lsquo;most\r\nchaotic pure experience\u0026rsquo; coming first, and building up the mind.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_136_136\" id=\"FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_136_136\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut how can two structureless things interact so as to produce a\r\nstructure? my critic triumphantly asks. Of course they can\u0026rsquo;t, as purely\r\nso-named entities. We must make additional hypotheses. We must beg a\r\nminimum of structure for them. The \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e of minimum that \u003ci\u003emight\u003c/i\u003e have\r\ntended to increase towards what we now find actually developed is the\r\nphilosophical desideratum here. The question is that of the most\r\nmaterially satisfactory hypothesis. Mr. Joseph handles it by formal\r\nlogic purely, as if he had no acquaintance with the logic of hypothesis\r\nat all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Joseph again is much bewildered as to what a humanist can mean when\r\nhe uses the word knowledge. He tries to convict me\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_137_137\" id=\"FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_137_137\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e of vaguely\r\nidentifying it with any kind of good. Knowledge is a difficult thing to\r\ndefine briefly, and Mr. Joseph shows his own constructive hand here even\r\nless than in the rest of his\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_259\" id=\"Page_259\"\u003e[Pg 259]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e article. I have myself put forth on\r\nseveral occasions a radically pragmatist account of knowledge,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_138_138\" id=\"FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_138_138\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e the\r\nexistence of which account my critic probably does not know of\u0026mdash;so\r\nperhaps I had better not say anything about knowledge until he reads and\r\nattacks that. I will say, however, that whatever the relation called\r\nknowing may itself prove to consist in, I can think of no conceivable\r\nkind of \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e which may not become an object of knowledge on\r\nhumanistic principles as well as on the principles of any other\r\nphilosophy.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_139_139\" id=\"FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_139_139\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI confess that I am pretty steadily hampered by the habit, on the part\r\nof humanism\u0026rsquo;s critics, of assuming that they have truer ideas than mine\r\nof truth and knowledge, the nature of which I must know of and can not\r\nneed to have re-defined. I have consequently to reconstruct these ideas\r\nin order to carry on the discussion (I have e.g. had to do so in some\r\nparts\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_260\" id=\"Page_260\"\u003e[Pg 260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of this article) and I thereby expose myself to charges of\r\ncaricature. In one part of Mr. Joseph\u0026rsquo;s attack, however, I rejoice that\r\nwe are free from this embarrassment. It is an important point and covers\r\nprobably a genuine difficulty, so I take it up last.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen, following Schiller and Dewey, I define the true as that which\r\ngives the maximal combination of satisfactions, and say that\r\nsatisfaction is a many-dimensional term that can be realized in various\r\nways, Mr. Joseph replies, rightly enough, that the chief satisfaction of\r\na rational creature must always be his thought that what he believes is\r\n\u003ci\u003etrue\u003c/i\u003e, whether the truth brings him the satisfaction of collateral\r\nprofits or not. This would seem, however, to make of truth the prior\r\nconcept, and to relegate satisfaction to a secondary place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, if to be satisfactory is what is meant by being true, \u003ci\u003ewhose\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsatisfactions, and \u003ci\u003ewhich\u003c/i\u003e of his satisfactions, are to count?\r\nDiscriminations notoriously have to be made; and the upshot is that only\r\nrational candidates and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_261\" id=\"Page_261\"\u003e[Pg 261]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e intellectual satisfactions stand the test. We\r\nare then driven to a purely theoretic notion of truth, and get out of\r\nthe pragmatic atmosphere altogether. And with this Mr. Joseph leaves\r\nus\u0026mdash;truth is truth, and there is an end of the matter. But he makes a\r\nvery pretty show of convicting me of self-stultification in according to\r\nour purely theoretic satisfactions any place in the humanistic scheme.\r\nThey crowd the collateral satisfactions out of house and home, he\r\nthinks, and pragmatism has to go into bankruptcy if she recognizes them\r\nat all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no room for disagreement about the facts here; but the\r\ndestructive force of the reasoning disappears as soon as we talk\r\nconcretely instead of abstractly, and ask, in our quality of good\r\npragmatists, just what the famous theoretic needs are known as and in\r\nwhat the intellectual satisfactions consist. Mr. Joseph, faithful to the\r\nhabits of his party, makes no attempt at characterizing them, but\r\nassumes that their nature is self-evident to all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAre they not all mere matters of \u003ci\u003econsistency\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;and emphatically \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof consistency\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_262\" id=\"Page_262\"\u003e[Pg 262]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e between an Absolute Reality and the mind\u0026rsquo;s copies of it,\r\nbut of actually felt consistency among judgments, objects, and manners\r\nof reacting, in the mind? And are not both our need of such consistency\r\nand our pleasure in it conceivable as outcomes of the natural fact that\r\nwe are beings that develop mental \u003ci\u003ehabits\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;habit itself proving\r\nadaptively beneficial in an environment where the same objects, or the\r\nsame kinds of objects, recur and follow \u0026lsquo;law\u0026rsquo;? If this were so, what\r\nwould have come first would have been the collateral profits of habit,\r\nand the theoretic life would have grown up in aid of these. In point of\r\nfact this seems to have been the probable case. At life\u0026rsquo;s origin, any\r\npresent perception may have been \u0026lsquo;true\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;if such a word could then be\r\napplicable. Later, when reactions became organized, the reactions became\r\n\u0026lsquo;true\u0026rsquo; whenever expectation was fulfilled by them. Otherwise they were\r\n\u0026lsquo;false\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;mistaken\u0026rsquo; reactions. But the same class of objects needs the\r\nsame kind of reaction, so the impulse to react consistently must\r\ngradually have been established, with a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_263\" id=\"Page_263\"\u003e[Pg 263]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e disappointment felt whenever\r\nthe results frustrated expectation. Here is a perfectly plausible germ\r\nfor all our higher consistencies. Nowadays, if an object claims from us\r\na reaction of the kind habitually accorded only to the opposite class of\r\nobjects, our mental machinery refuses to run smoothly. The situation is\r\nintellectually unsatisfactory. To gain relief we seek either to preserve\r\nthe reaction by re-interpreting the object, or, leaving the object as it\r\nis, we react in a way contrary to the way claimed of us. Neither\r\nsolution is easy. Such a situation might be that of Mr. Joseph, with me\r\nclaiming assent to humanism from him. He can not apperceive it so as to\r\npermit him to gratify my claim; but there is enough appeal in the claim\r\nto induce him to write a whole article in justification of his refusal.\r\nIf he should assent to humanism, on the other hand, that would drag\r\nafter it an unwelcome, yea incredible, alteration of his previous mental\r\nbeliefs. Whichever alternative he might adopt, however, a new\r\nequilibrium of intellectual consistency would in the end be reached. He\r\nwould feel,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_264\" id=\"Page_264\"\u003e[Pg 264]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e whichever way he decided, that he was now thinking truly.\r\nBut if, with his old habits unaltered, he should simply add to them the\r\nnew one of advocating humanism quietly or noisily, his mind would be\r\nrent into two systems, each of which would accuse the other of\r\nfalsehood. The resultant situation, being profoundly unsatisfactory,\r\nwould also be instable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTheoretic truth is thus no relation between our mind and archetypal\r\nreality. It falls \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e the mind, being the accord of some of its\r\nprocesses and objects with other processes and objects\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;accord\u0026rsquo;\r\nconsisting here in well-definable relations. So long as the satisfaction\r\nof feeling such an accord is denied us, whatever collateral profits may\r\nseem to inure from what we believe in are but as dust in the\r\nbalance\u0026mdash;provided always that we are highly organized intellectually,\r\nwhich the majority of us are not. The amount of accord which satisfies\r\nmost men and women is merely the absence of violent clash between their\r\nusual thoughts and statements and the limited sphere of\r\nsense-perceptions in which their lives\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_265\" id=\"Page_265\"\u003e[Pg 265]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are cast. The theoretic truth\r\nthat most of us think we \u0026lsquo;ought\u0026rsquo; to attain to is thus the possession of\r\na set of predicates that do not contradict their subjects. We preserve\r\nit as often as not by leaving other predicates and subjects out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn some men theory is a passion, just as music is in others. The form of\r\ninner consistency is pursued far beyond the line at which collateral\r\nprofits stop. Such men systematize and classify and schematize and make\r\nsynoptical tables and invent ideal objects for the pure love of\r\nunifying. Too often the results, glowing with \u0026lsquo;truth\u0026rsquo; for the inventors,\r\nseem pathetically personal and artificial to bystanders. Which is as\r\nmuch as to say that the purely theoretic criterion of truth can leave us\r\nin the lurch as easily as any other criterion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI think that if Mr. Joseph will but consider all these things a little\r\nmore concretely, he may find that the humanistic scheme and the notion\r\nof theoretic truth fall into line consistently enough to yield him also\r\nintellectual satisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_129_129\" id=\"Footnote_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[129]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted without change from \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exiv\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nNo. 54, April, 1905, pp. 190-198. Pages \u003ca href=\"#Page_245\"\u003e245-247\u003c/a\u003e, and pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261-265\u003c/a\u003e, have\r\nalso been reprinted in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 54-57, and pp.\r\n97-100. The present essay is referred to above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_130_130\" id=\"Footnote_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[130]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u0026lsquo;Humanism and Truth\u0026rsquo; first appeared in \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S.,\r\nvol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exiii\u003c/span\u003e, No. 52, October, 1904. It is reprinted in \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of\r\nTruth\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 51-101. Cf. this article \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e. Mr. H. W. B. Joseph\u0026rsquo;s\r\ncriticism, entitled \u0026ldquo;Professor James on \u0026lsquo;Humanism and Truth,\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo; appeared\r\nin \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, N. S., vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exiv\u003c/span\u003e, No. 53, January, 1905. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_131_131\" id=\"Footnote_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[131]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 37.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_132_132\" id=\"Footnote_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[132]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241-243\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_133_133\" id=\"Footnote_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[133]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 32.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_134_134\" id=\"Footnote_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[134]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [This] Mr. Joseph deals with (though in much too\r\npettifogging and logic-chopping a way) on pp. 33-34 of his article.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_135_135\" id=\"Footnote_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[135]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare some elaborate articles by M. Le Roy and M.\r\nWilbois in the \u003ci\u003eRevue de M\u0026eacute;taphysique et de Morale\u003c/i\u003e, vols. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eviii\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eix\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e, [1900, 1901, and 1902.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_136_136\" id=\"Footnote_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[136]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Cf. \u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Truth\u003c/i\u003e, p. 64.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_137_137\" id=\"Footnote_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[137]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Joseph: \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 36.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_138_138\" id=\"Footnote_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[138]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Most recently in two articles, \u0026ldquo;Does \u0026lsquo;Consciousness\u0026rsquo;\r\nExist?\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;A World of Pure Experience.\u0026rdquo; [See above, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1-91\u003c/a\u003e.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_139_139\" id=\"Footnote_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[139]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For a recent attempt, effective on the whole, at squaring\r\nhumanism with knowing, I may refer to Prof. Woodbridge\u0026rsquo;s very able\r\naddress at the Saint Louis Congress, \u0026ldquo;The Field of Logic,\u0026rdquo; printed in\r\n\u003ci\u003eScience\u003c/i\u003e, N. Y., November 4, 1904.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_266\" id=\"Page_266\"\u003e[Pg 266]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"XII\" id=\"XII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eXII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eABSOLUTISM AND EMPIRICISM\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_140_140\" id=\"FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_140_140\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo seeker of truth can fail to rejoice at the terre-\u0026agrave;-terre sort of\r\ndiscussion of the issues between Empiricism and Transcendentalism (or,\r\nas the champions of the latter would probably prefer to say, between\r\nIrrationalism and Rationalism) that seems to have begun in \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_141_141\" id=\"FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_141_141\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt would seem as if, over concrete examples like Mr. J. S. Haldane\u0026rsquo;s,\r\nboth parties ought inevitably to come to a better understanding. As a\r\nreader with a strong bias towards Irrationalism, I have studied his\r\narticle\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_142_142\" id=\"FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_142_142\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e with the liveliest admiration of its temper and its\r\npainstaking effort to be clear. But the cases discussed failed to\r\nsatisfy me, and I was at first tempted to write a Note animadverting\r\nupon them in detail. The growth of the limb, the sea\u0026rsquo;s contour, the\r\nvicarious functioning of the nerve-centre, the digitalis curing the\r\nheart, are unfortunately\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_267\" id=\"Page_267\"\u003e[Pg 267]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e cases where we can \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e any\r\n\u003ci\u003ethrough-and-through\u003c/i\u003e conditioning of the parts by the whole. They are\r\nall cases of reciprocity where subjects, supposed independently to\r\nexist, acquire certain attributes through their relations to other\r\nsubjects. That they also \u003ci\u003eexist\u003c/i\u003e through similar relations is only an\r\nideal supposition, not verified to our understanding in these or any\r\nother concrete cases whatsoever.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, however, one were to urge this solemnly, Mr. Haldane\u0026rsquo;s friends could\r\neasily reply that he only gave us such examples on account of the\r\nhardness of our hearts. He knew full well their imperfection, but he\r\nhoped that to those who would not spontaneously ascend to the Notion of\r\nthe Totality, these cases might prove a spur and suggest and symbolize\r\nsomething better than themselves. No particular case that can be brought\r\nforward is a real concrete. They are all abstractions from the Whole,\r\nand of course the \u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo; character can not be found in\r\nthem. Each of them still contains among its elements what we call\r\n\u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e, grammatical subjects,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_268\" id=\"Page_268\"\u003e[Pg 268]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e forming a sort of residual \u003ci\u003ecaput\r\nmortuum\u003c/i\u003e of Existence after all the relations that figure in the\r\nexamples have been told off. On this \u0026ldquo;existence,\u0026rdquo; thinks popular\r\nphilosophy, things may live on, like the winter bears on their own fat,\r\nnever entering relations at all, or, if entering them, entering an\r\nentirely different set of them from those treated of in Mr. Haldane\u0026rsquo;s\r\nexamples. Thus \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e the digitalis were to weaken instead of\r\nstrengthening the heart, and to produce death (as sometimes happens), it\r\nwould determine itself, through determining the organism, to the\r\nfunction of \u0026ldquo;kill\u0026rdquo; instead of that of \u0026ldquo;cure.\u0026rdquo; The function and relation\r\nseem adventitious, depending on what kind of a heart the digitalis gets\r\nhold of, the digitalis and the heart being facts external and, so to\r\nspeak, accidental to each other. But this popular view, Mr. Haldane\u0026rsquo;s\r\nfriends will continue, is an illusion. What seems to us the \u0026ldquo;existence\u0026rdquo;\r\nof digitalis and heart outside of the relations of killing or curing, is\r\nbut a function in a wider system of relations, of which, \u003ci\u003epro hac vice\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwe take no account. The larger system\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_269\" id=\"Page_269\"\u003e[Pg 269]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e determines the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e just\r\nas absolutely as the system \u0026ldquo;kill,\u0026rdquo; or the system \u0026ldquo;cure,\u0026rdquo; determined the\r\n\u003ci\u003efunction\u003c/i\u003e of the digitalis. Ascend to the absolute system, instead of\r\nbiding with these relative and partial ones, and you shall see that the\r\nlaw of through-and-throughness must and does obtain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, this argument is entirely reasonable, and debars us\r\ncompletely from chopping logic about the concrete examples Mr. Haldane\r\nhas chosen. It is not his fault if his categories are so fine an\r\ninstrument that nothing but the sum total of things can be taken to show\r\nus the manner of their use. It is simply our misfortune that he has not\r\nthe sum total of things to show it by. Let us fall back from all\r\nconcrete attempts and see what we can do with his notion of\r\nthrough-and-throughness, avowedly taken \u003ci\u003ein abstracto\u003c/i\u003e. In abstract\r\nsystems the \u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo; Ideal is realized on every hand. In\r\nany system, as such, the members are only \u003ci\u003emembers\u003c/i\u003e in the system.\r\nAbolish the system and you abolish its members, for you have conceived\r\nthem through no\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_270\" id=\"Page_270\"\u003e[Pg 270]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e other property than the abstract one of membership.\r\nNeither rightness nor leftness, except through bi-laterality. Neither\r\nmortgager nor mortgagee, except through mortgage. The logic of these\r\ncases is this:\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eIf\u003c/i\u003e A, then B; but \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e B, then A: wherefore \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e\r\neither, Both; and if not Both, Nothing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt costs nothing, not even a mental effort, to admit that the absolute\r\ntotality of things \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be organized exactly after the pattern of one\r\nof these \u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo; abstractions. In fact, it is the\r\npleasantest and freest of mental movements. Husband makes, and is made\r\nby, wife, through marriage; one makes other, by being itself other;\r\neverything self-created through its opposite\u0026mdash;you go round like a\r\nsquirrel in a cage. But if you stop and reflect upon what you are about,\r\nyou lay bare the exact point at issue between common sense and the\r\n\u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo; school.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat, in fact, is the logic of these abstract systems? It is, as we said\r\nabove: If any Member, then the Whole System; if not the Whole System,\r\nthen Nothing. But how can Logic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_271\" id=\"Page_271\"\u003e[Pg 271]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e possibly do anything more with these\r\ntwo hypotheses than combine them into the single disjunctive\r\nproposition\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Either this Whole System, just as it stands, or Nothing at\r\nall.\u0026rdquo; Is not that disjunction the ultimate word of Logic in the matter,\r\nand can any disjunction, as such, resolve \u003ci\u003eitself\u003c/i\u003e? It may be that Mr.\r\nHaldane sees how one horn, the concept of the Whole System, carries real\r\nexistence with it. But if he has been as unsuccessful as I in\r\nassimilating the Hegelian re-editings of the Anselmian proof,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_143_143\" id=\"FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_143_143\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e he\r\nwill have to say that though Logic may determine \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e the system must\r\nbe, \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e it is, something else than Logic must tell us \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e it is. Mr.\r\nHaldane in this case would probably consciously, or unconsciously, make\r\nan appeal to Fact: the disjunction \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e decided, since nobody can\r\ndispute that now, as a matter of fact, \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e, and not nothing,\r\n\u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e. We must \u003ci\u003etherefore\u003c/i\u003e, he would probably say, go on to admit the\r\nWhole System in the desiderated sense. Is not then the validity of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_272\" id=\"Page_272\"\u003e[Pg 272]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eAnselmian proof the nucleus of the whole question between Logic and\r\nFact? Ought not the efforts of Mr. Haldane and his friends to be\r\nprincipally devoted to its elucidation? Is it not the real door of\r\nseparation between Empiricism and Rationalism? And if the Rationalists\r\nleave that door for a moment off its hinges, can any power keep that\r\nabstract, opaque, unmediated, external, irrational, and irresponsible\r\nmonster, known to the vulgar as bare Fact, from getting in and\r\ncontaminating the whole sanctuary with his presence? Can anything\r\nprevent Faust from changing \u0026ldquo;Am Anfang war das Wort\u0026rdquo; into \u0026ldquo;Am Anfang war\r\ndie That?\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing in earth or heaven. Only the Anselmian proof can keep Fact out\r\nof philosophy. The question, \u0026ldquo;Shall Fact be recognized as an ultimate\r\nprinciple?\u0026rdquo; is the whole issue between the Rationalists and the\r\nEmpiricism of vulgar thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, if so recognized, Fact sets a limit to the\r\n\u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo; character of the world\u0026rsquo;s rationality. That\r\nrationality might\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_273\" id=\"Page_273\"\u003e[Pg 273]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e then mediate between all the members of our\r\nconception of the world, but not between the conception itself and\r\nreality. Reality would have to be given, not by Reason, but by Fact.\r\nFact holds out blankly, brutally and blindly, against that universal\r\ndeliquescence of everything into logical relations which the Absolutist\r\nLogic demands, and it is the only thing that does hold out. Hence the\r\nire of the Absolutist Logic\u0026mdash;hence its non-recognition, its \u0026lsquo;cutting\u0026rsquo; of\r\nFact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reasons it gives for the \u0026lsquo;cutting\u0026rsquo; are that Fact is speechless, a\r\nmere word for the negation of thought, a vacuous unknowability, a\r\ndog-in-the-manger, in truth, which having no rights of its own, can find\r\nnothing else to do than to keep its betters out of theirs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are two points involved here: first the claim that certain things\r\nhave rights that are absolute, ubiquitous and all pervasive, and in\r\nregard to which nothing else can possibly exist in its \u003ci\u003eown\u003c/i\u003e right; and\r\nsecond that anything that denies \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e assertion is \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e negativity\r\nwith no positive context whatsoever.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_274\" id=\"Page_274\"\u003e[Pg 274]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake the latter point first. Is it true that what is negative in one way\r\nis thereby convicted of incapacity to be positive in any other way? The\r\nword \u0026ldquo;Fact\u0026rdquo; is like the word \u0026ldquo;Accident,\u0026rdquo; like the word \u0026ldquo;Absolute\u0026rdquo;\r\nitself. They all have their negative connotation. In truth, their whole\r\nconnotation is negative and relative. All it says is that, whatever the\r\nthing may be that is denoted by the words, \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e things do not control\r\nit. Where fact, where accident is, they must be silent, it alone can\r\nspeak. But that does not prevent its speaking as loudly as you please,\r\nin its own tongue. It may have an inward life, self-transparent and\r\nactive in the maximum degree. An indeterminate future volition on my\r\npart, for example, would be a strict accident as far as my present self\r\nis concerned. But that could not prevent it, \u003ci\u003ein the moment in which it\r\noccurred\u003c/i\u003e, from being possibly the most intensely living and luminous\r\nexperience I ever had. Its quality of being a brute fact \u003ci\u003eab extra\u003c/i\u003e says\r\nnothing whatever as to its inwardness. It simply says to \u003ci\u003eoutsiders\u003c/i\u003e:\r\n\u0026lsquo;Hands off!\u0026rsquo;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_275\" id=\"Page_275\"\u003e[Pg 275]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd this brings us back to the first point of the Absolutist indictment\r\nof Fact. Is that point really anything more than a fantastic dislike to\r\nletting \u003ci\u003eanything\u003c/i\u003e say \u0026lsquo;Hands off\u0026rsquo;? What else explains the contempt the\r\nAbsolutist authors exhibit for a freedom defined simply on its\r\n\u0026ldquo;negative\u0026rdquo; side, as freedom \u0026ldquo;from,\u0026rdquo; etc.? What else prompts them to\r\nderide such freedom? But, dislike for dislike, who shall decide? Why is\r\nnot their dislike at having me \u0026ldquo;from\u0026rdquo; them, entirely on a par with mine\r\nat having them \u0026ldquo;through\u0026rdquo; me?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI know very well that in talking of dislikes to those who never mention\r\nthem, I am doing a very coarse thing, and making a sort of intellectual\r\nOrson of myself. But, for the life of me, I can not help it, because I\r\nfeel sure that likes and dislikes \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be among the ultimate factors\r\nof their philosophy as well as of mine. Would they but admit it! How\r\nsweetly we then could hold converse together! There is something finite\r\nabout us both, as we now stand. We do not know the Absolute Whole \u003ci\u003eyet\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003ci\u003ePart\u003c/i\u003e of it is still negative to us. Among\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_276\" id=\"Page_276\"\u003e[Pg 276]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the \u003ci\u003ewhats\u003c/i\u003e of it still\r\nstalks a mob of opaque \u003ci\u003ethats\u003c/i\u003e, without which we cannot think. But just\r\nas I admit that this is all possibly provisional, that even the\r\nAnselmian proof may come out all right, and creation \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be a rational\r\nsystem through-and-through, why might they not also admit that it may\r\nall be otherwise, and that the shadow, the opacity, the negativity, the\r\n\u0026ldquo;from\u0026rdquo;-ness, the plurality that is ultimate, \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e never be wholly\r\ndriven from the scene. We should both then be avowedly making\r\nhypotheses, playing with Ideals. Ah! Why is the notion of hypothesis so\r\nabhorrent to the Hegelian mind?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd once down on our common level of hypothesis, we might then admit\r\nscepticism, since the Whole is not yet revealed, to be the soundest\r\n\u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e position. But since we are in the main not sceptics, we might\r\ngo on and frankly confess to each other the motives for our several\r\nfaiths. I frankly confess mine\u0026mdash;I can not but think that at bottom they\r\nare of an \u0026aelig;sthetic and not of a logical sort. The \u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo;\r\nuniverse seems to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_277\" id=\"Page_277\"\u003e[Pg 277]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e suffocate me with its infallible impeccable\r\nall-pervasiveness. Its necessity, with no possibilities; its relations,\r\nwith no subjects, make me feel as if I had entered into a contract with\r\nno reserved rights, or rather as if I had to live in a large seaside\r\nboarding-house with no private bed-room in which I might take refuge\r\nfrom the society of the place. I am distinctly aware, moreover, that the\r\nold quarrel of sinner and pharisee has something to do with the matter.\r\nCertainly, to my personal knowledge, all Hegelians are not prigs, but I\r\nsomehow feel as if all prigs ought to end, if developed, by becoming\r\nHegelians. There is a story of two clergymen asked by mistake to conduct\r\nthe same funeral. One came first and had got no farther than \u0026ldquo;I am the\r\nResurrection and the Life,\u0026rdquo; when the other entered. \u0026ldquo;\u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e am the\r\nResurrection and the Life,\u0026rdquo; cried the latter. The \u0026ldquo;through-and-through\u0026rdquo;\r\nphilosophy, as it actually exists, reminds many of us of that clergyman.\r\nIt seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to\r\nspeak for the vast slow-breathing unconscious\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_278\" id=\"Page_278\"\u003e[Pg 278]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Kosmos with its dread\r\nabysses and its unknown tides. The \u0026ldquo;freedom\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003ewe\u003c/i\u003e want to see there is\r\nnot the freedom, with a string tied to its leg and warranted not to fly\r\naway, of that philosophy. \u0026ldquo;Let it fly away,\u0026rdquo; we say, \u0026ldquo;from \u003ci\u003eus\u003c/i\u003e! What\r\nthen?\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, I know I am exhibiting my mental grossness. But again, \u003ci\u003eIch kann\r\nnicht anders.\u003c/i\u003e I show my feelings; why \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e they not show theirs? I\r\nknow they \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e a personal feeling about the through-and-through\r\nuniverse, which is entirely different from mine, and which I should very\r\nlikely be much the better for gaining if they would only show me how.\r\nTheir persistence in telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the\r\nquestion, that it is a pure matter of absolute reason, keeps me for ever\r\nout of the pale. Still seeing a \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e in things which Logic does not\r\nexpel, the most I can do is to \u003ci\u003easpire\u003c/i\u003e to the expulsion. At present I\r\ndo not even aspire. Aspiration is a feeling. What can kindle feeling but\r\nthe example of feeling? And if the Hegelians \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e refuse to set an\r\nexample, what can they expect the rest of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_279\" id=\"Page_279\"\u003e[Pg 279]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e us to do? To speak more\r\nseriously, the one \u003ci\u003efundamental\u003c/i\u003e quarrel Empiricism has with Absolutism\r\nis over this repudiation by Absolutism of the personal and \u0026aelig;sthetic\r\nfactor in the construction of philosophy. That we all of us have\r\nfeelings, Empiricism feels quite sure. That they may be as prophetic and\r\nanticipatory of truth as anything else we have, and some of them more so\r\nthan others, can not possibly be denied. But what hope is there of\r\nsquaring and settling opinions unless Absolutism will hold parley on\r\nthis common ground; and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses,\r\nto which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us, and\r\nthe truest of which will at the final integration of things be found in\r\npossession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the best divining\r\npower?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_140_140\" id=\"Footnote_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[140]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [Reprinted from \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eix\u003c/span\u003e, No. 34, April, 1884.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_141_141\" id=\"Footnote_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[141]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [In 1884.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_142_142\" id=\"Footnote_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[142]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u0026ldquo;Life and Mechanism,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eMind\u003c/i\u003e, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eix\u003c/span\u003e, 1884.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_143_143\" id=\"Footnote_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[143]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e [\u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e P. Janet and G. S\u0026eacute;ailles: \u003ci\u003eHistory of the Problems\r\nof Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, trans. by Monahan, vol. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eii\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 275-278; 305-307. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEd.\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_280\" id=\"Page_280\"\u003e[Pg 280]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 45%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_281\" id=\"Page_281\"\u003e[Pg 281]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"INDEX\" id=\"INDEX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAbsolute Idealism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#XII\"\u003eEssay XII\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eActivity\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#VI\"\u003eEssay VI\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Affectional_Facts\" id=\"Affectional_Facts\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAffectional Facts\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#V\"\u003eEssay\r\nV\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAgnosticism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAppreciations.\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Affectional_Facts\"\u003eAffectional\r\nFacts\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBergson, H.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10-11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBode, B. H.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBody\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley, F. H.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCause\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eChange\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Cognitive_Relation\" id=\"Cognitive_Relation\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCognitive Relation\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e ff. \u003ci\u003eSee\r\nalso\u003c/i\u003e under \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Knowledge\"\u003eKnowledge\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConcepts\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Conjunctive_Relations\" id=\"Conjunctive_Relations\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eConjunctive Relations\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConsciousness\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_xi\"\u003exi\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#I\"\u003eEssay I\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#VIII\"\u003eEssay\r\nVIII\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContinuity\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDemocritus\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDescartes\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDewey, J.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Disjunctive_Relations\" id=\"Disjunctive_Relations\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDisjunctive Relations\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDualism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEmpiricism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_iv\"\u003eiv-v\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_vii\"\u003evii-xiii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46-47\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#XII\"\u003eEssay XII\u003c/a\u003e. \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Radical_Empiricism\"\u003eRadical Empiricism\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEpistemology\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e. \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Knowledge\"\u003eKnowledge\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEthics\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExperience\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_vii\"\u003evii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_xii\"\u003exii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e,\r\nff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e. \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pure_Experience\"\u003ePure\r\nExperience\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExternal Relations\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e ff. \u003ci\u003eSee\r\nalso\u003c/i\u003e under \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Relations\"\u003eRelations\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Disjunctive_Relations\"\u003eDisjunctive\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFeeling.\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e under \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Affectional_Facts\"\u003eAffectional\r\nFacts\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFree Will\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHaldane, J. S.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHegel\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerbart\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHobhouse\u003c/span\u003e, L. T.: \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHodder, A. L.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHodgson, S.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_ix\"\u003eix\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH\u0026ouml;ffding, H.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHumanism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#VII\"\u003eEssay VII\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#XI\"\u003eEssay XI\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHume\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIdealism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIdeas\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIdentity\u003c/span\u003e, Philosophy of: \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIndeterminism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIntellect\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJoseph, H. W. B.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_282\" id=\"Page_282\"\u003e[Pg 282]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKant\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKierkegaard\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Knowledge\" id=\"Knowledge\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eKnowledge\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87-88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e. \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Cognitive_Relation\"\u003eCognitive Relation\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Objective_Reference\"\u003eObjective\r\nReference\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLife\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLocke\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaterialism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, J. S.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, James\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMiller, D.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMinds\u003c/span\u003e, their Conterminousness:\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#IV\"\u003eEssay IV\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMonism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_vii\"\u003evii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_267\"\u003e267\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMoore, G. E.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6-7\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eM\u0026uuml;nsterberg, H.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18-20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNatorp, P.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7-8\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNaturalism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNeo-Kantism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-6\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Objective_Reference\" id=\"Objective_Reference\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eObjective Reference\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eObjectivity\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePanpsychism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eParallelism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerception\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerry, R. B.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePhysical Reality\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e\r\nff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e ff.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePitkin, W. B.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePluralism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePragmatism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_iv\"\u003eiv\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_xi\"\u003exi-xii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePrimary Qualities\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePrince, M.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePringle-Pattison, A. S.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePsychology\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pure_Experience\" id=\"Pure_Experience\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePure Experience\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26-27\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#II\"\u003eEssay II\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Radical_Empiricism\" id=\"Radical_Empiricism\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eRadical Empiricism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_iv\"\u003eiv-v\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_vii\"\u003evii\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_ix\"\u003eix-xiii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRationalism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRealism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRehmke, J.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Relations\" id=\"Relations\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eRelations\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_x\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eEssay III\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_268\"\u003e268\u003c/a\u003e. \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Conjunctive_Relations\"\u003eConjunctive\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Disjunctive_Relations\"\u003eDisjunctive\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReligion\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_xiii\"\u003exiii\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRenouvier\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184-185\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRepresentation\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\r\nff. \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Substitution\"\u003eSubstitution\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoyce, J.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186-187\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSantayana, G.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchiller, F. C. S.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_249\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchubert-Soldern, R. v.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchuppe, W.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSecondary Qualities\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSensation\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSidis, B.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSolipsism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#IX\"\u003eEssay IX\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpace\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30-31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpencer, H.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpinoza\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpir, A.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStout, G. F.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStrong, C. A.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubjectivity\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Substitution\" id=\"Substitution\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSubstitution\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_283\" id=\"Page_283\"\u003e[Pg 283]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaine\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaylor, A. E.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTeleology\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThings\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eEssay\r\nIII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThought\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e under \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Knowledge\"\u003eKnowledge\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTime\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTranscendentalism\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTruth\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWard, J.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWill\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWoodbridge. F. J. E.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWorth\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186-187\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWundt, W.\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eThe Riverside Press\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPRINTED BY H. O. HOUGHTON \u0026amp; CO.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCAMBRIDGE, MASS.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nU. S. A.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 25%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"trnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTranscriber\u0026rsquo;s Note:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome intra-textual cross-references may have remained unlinked.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following changes were made to the text.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPage \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nYet when so broken it is less consistent then ever.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nYet when so broken it is less consistent than ever.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPage \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nsome comtemptibly small process on which success depends.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nsome contemptibly small process on which success depends.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNote \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_93_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxv\u003c/span\u003e aud \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxvi\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxv\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003exxvi\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNote \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_101_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026lsquo;Does Consciousuess Exist?\u0026rsquo;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026lsquo;Does Consciousness Exist?\u0026rsquo;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNote \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_109_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\neither as a syuonym for \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\neither as a synonym for \u0026lsquo;radical empiricism\u0026rsquo;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNote \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_109_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFor other discussions of \u0026lsquo;humauism,\u0026rsquo;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFor other discussions of \u0026lsquo;humanism,\u0026rsquo;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNote \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_130_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026lsquo;Humanism and Truth\u0026rsquo; first appeared iu\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChanged to\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026lsquo;Humanism and Truth\u0026rsquo; first appeared in\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"full\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}