The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
{"WorkMasterId":7516,"WpPageId":288901,"ParentWpPageId":193821,"Slug":"will-to-believe","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/will-to-believe/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/will-to-believe/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":738509,"CleanHtmlLength":682811,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy","Deck":"James argues that passional nature may legitimately decide genuine options where evidence cannot settle a live, forced, momentous choice.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"William James","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/william-james-01-alice-boughton-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"William James by Alice M. Boughton","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"William James","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/william-james/","Copies":["1842 CE – 1910 CE","New York City, New York","American philosopher and psychologist whose pragmatism, radical empiricism, stream-of-consciousness psychology, pluralism, and philosophy of religion reshaped modern philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1897 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1897 CE for the essay collection.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-religion"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #26659 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["James argues that passional nature may legitimately decide genuine options where evidence cannot settle a live, forced, momentous choice."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"The Will to Believe","KeyConcepts":"belief; will; genuine option; faith; evidence; passional nature; risk","Methodology":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported.","Structure":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."},"Arguments":["James argues that passional nature may legitimately decide genuine options where evidence cannot settle a live, forced, momentous choice."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct James work through SEP/IEP, Gutenberg/Wikisource evidence, catalog records, and scholarship.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct James work through SEP/IEP, Gutenberg/Wikisource evidence, catalog records, and scholarship."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #26659\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/26659\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["James argues that passional nature may legitimately decide genuine options where evidence cannot settle a live, forced, momentous choice."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"The Will to Believe"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"belief; will; genuine option; faith; evidence; passional nature; risk"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct William James work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Harvard/Houghton, William James Studies, public edition surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Work page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, source linkage, and no full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["James argues that passional nature may legitimately decide genuine options where evidence cannot settle a live, forced, momentous choice."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Charles Sanders Peirce, British empiricism, Renouvier, Darwinian science, psychical research, medical psychology, religious experience, Henry James Sr., Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Harvard intellectual culture."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, radical empiricism, psychology, phenomenology of experience, philosophy of religion, pluralism, moral psychology, process thought, analytic pragmatism, and modern discussions of consciousness."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct James work through SEP/IEP, Gutenberg/Wikisource evidence, catalog records, and scholarship.","James remains central for pragmatism, truth, belief, experience, pluralism, stream of consciousness, religious experience, psychology, moral choice, and democratic public philosophy."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct James work through SEP/IEP, Gutenberg/Wikisource evidence, catalog records, and scholarship."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/26659\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #26659\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003cH1 ALIGN=\"center\" STYLE=\"color: red\"\u003e\r\nTHE WILL TO BELIEVE\r\n\u003c/H1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nAND OTHER ESSAYS IN\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\nPOPULAR PHILOSOPHY\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nBY WILLIAM JAMES\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH5 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nNEW IMPRESSION\r\n\u003c/H5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nLONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nFOURTH AVENUE \u0026amp; 30TH STREET, NEW YORK\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLONDON, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n1912\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH5 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eCopyright, 1896\u003c/I\u003e\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\nBY WILLIAM JAMES\r\n\u003c/H5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH5 STYLE=\"margin-left: 15%\"\u003e\r\nFirst Edition. February, 1897,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\nReprinted, May, 1897, September, 1897,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMarch, 1898, August, 1899, June, 1902,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nJanuary, 1903, May, 1904, June, 1905,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMarch, 1907, April, 1908,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nSeptember, 1909, December, 1910,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNovember, 1911, November, 1912\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/H5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTo\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMy Old Friend,\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\nCHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE,\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nTo whose philosophic comradeship in old times\u003cBR\u003e\r\nand to whose writings in more recent years\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI owe more incitement and help than\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI can express or repay.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"Pvii\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003evii}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPREFACE.\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAt most of our American Colleges there are Clubs formed by the students\r\ndevoted to particular branches of learning; and these clubs have the\r\nlaudable custom of inviting once or twice a year some maturer scholar\r\nto address them, the occasion often being made a public one. I have\r\nfrom time to time accepted such invitations, and afterwards had my\r\ndiscourse printed in one or other of the Reviews. It has seemed to me\r\nthat these addresses might now be worthy of collection in a volume, as\r\nthey shed explanatory light upon each other, and taken together express\r\na tolerably definite philosophic attitude in a very untechnical way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWere I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I\r\nshould call it that of \u003cI\u003eradical empiricism\u003c/I\u003e, in spite of the fact that\r\nsuch brief nicknames are nowhere more misleading than in philosophy. I\r\nsay \u0027empiricism,\u0027 because it is contented to regard its most assured\r\nconclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to\r\nmodification in the course of future experience; and I say \u0027radical,\u0027\r\nbecause it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"Pviii\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eviii}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nunlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under\r\nthe name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does\r\nnot dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience\r\nhas got to square. The difference between monism and pluralism is\r\nperhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy. \u003cI\u003ePrimâ\r\nfacie\u003c/I\u003e the world is a pluralism; as we find it, its unity seems to be\r\nthat of any collection; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an\r\neffort to redeem it from that first crude form. Postulating more unity\r\nthan the first experiences yield, we also discover more. But absolute\r\nunity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains\r\nundiscovered, still remains a \u003cI\u003eGrenzbegriff\u003c/I\u003e. \"Ever not quite\" must be\r\nthe rationalistic philosopher\u0027s last confession concerning it. After\r\nall that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity\r\nof the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities\r\nmutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the\r\nvarious \u0027points of view\u0027 which the philosopher must distinguish in\r\ndiscussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains\r\na bare externality and datum to the other. The negative, the alogical,\r\nis never wholly banished. Something\u0026mdash;\"call it fate, chance, freedom,\r\nspontaneity, the devil, what you will\"\u0026mdash;is still wrong and other and\r\noutside and unincluded, from \u003cI\u003eyour\u003c/I\u003e point of view, even though you be\r\nthe greatest of philosophers. Something is always mere fact and\r\n\u003cI\u003egivenness\u003c/I\u003e; and there may be in the whole universe no one point of\r\nview extant from which this would not be found to be the case.\r\n\"Reason,\" as a gifted writer says, \"is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"Pix\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eix}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbut one item in the\r\nmystery; and behind the proudest consciousness that ever reigned,\r\nreason and wonder blushed face to face. The inevitable stales, while\r\ndoubt and hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is\r\nwild,\u0026mdash;game-flavored as a hawk\u0027s wing. Nature is miracle all; the same\r\nreturns not save to bring the different. The slow round of the\r\nengraver\u0027s lathe gains but the breadth of a hair, but the difference is\r\ndistributed back over the whole curve, never an instant true,\u0026mdash;ever not\r\nquite.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch00fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch00fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis is pluralism, somewhat rhapsodically expressed. He who takes for\r\nhis hypothesis the notion that it is the permanent form of the world is\r\nwhat I call a radical empiricist. For him the crudity of experience\r\nremains an eternal element thereof. There is no possible point of view\r\nfrom which the world can appear an absolutely single fact. Real\r\npossibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real\r\nevil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real\r\nmoral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in\r\nempiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt\r\neither to \u0027overcome\u0027 or to reinterpret in monistic form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMany of my professionally trained \u003cI\u003econfrères\u003c/I\u003e will smile at the\r\nirrationalism of this view, and at the artlessness of my essays in\r\npoint of technical form. But they should be taken as illustrations of\r\nthe radically empiricist attitude rather than as argumentations for its\r\nvalidity. That admits meanwhile of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{x}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbeing argued in as technical a\r\nshape as any one can desire, and possibly I may be spared to do later a\r\nshare of that work. Meanwhile these essays seem to light up with a\r\ncertain dramatic reality the attitude itself, and make it visible\r\nalongside of the higher and lower dogmatisms between which in the pages\r\nof philosophic history it has generally remained eclipsed from sight.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe first four essays are largely concerned with defending the\r\nlegitimacy of religious faith. To some rationalizing readers such\r\nadvocacy will seem a sad misuse of one\u0027s professional position.\r\nMankind, they will say, is only too prone to follow faith\r\nunreasoningly, and needs no preaching nor encouragement in that\r\ndirection. I quite agree that what mankind at large most lacks is\r\ncriticism and caution, not faith. Its cardinal weakness is to let\r\nbelief follow recklessly upon lively conception, especially when the\r\nconception has instinctive liking at its back. I admit, then, that\r\nwere I addressing the Salvation Army or a miscellaneous popular crowd\r\nit would be a misuse of opportunity to preach the liberty of believing\r\nas I have in these pages preached it. What such audiences most need is\r\nthat their faiths should be broken up and ventilated, that the\r\nnorthwest wind of science should get into them and blow their\r\nsickliness and barbarism away. But academic audiences, fed already on\r\nscience, have a very different need. Paralysis of their native\r\ncapacity for faith and timorous \u003cI\u003eabulia\u003c/I\u003e in the religious field are\r\ntheir special forms of mental weakness, brought about by the notion,\r\ncarefully instilled, that there is something called scientific evidence\r\nby\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{xi}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwaiting upon which they shall escape all danger of shipwreck in\r\nregard to truth. But there is really no scientific or other method by\r\nwhich men can steer safely between the opposite dangers of believing\r\ntoo little or of believing too much. To face such dangers is\r\napparently our duty, and to hit the right channel between them is the\r\nmeasure of our wisdom as men. It does not follow, because recklessness\r\nmay be a vice in soldiers, that courage ought never to be preached to\r\nthem. What \u003cI\u003eshould\u003c/I\u003e be preached is courage weighted with\r\nresponsibility,\u0026mdash;such courage as the Nelsons and Washingtons never\r\nfailed to show after they had taken everything into account that might\r\ntell against their success, and made every provision to minimize\r\ndisaster in case they met defeat. I do not think that any one can\r\naccuse me of preaching reckless faith. I have preached the right of\r\nthe individual to indulge his personal faith at his personal risk. I\r\nhave discussed the kinds of risk; I have contended that none of us\r\nescape all of them; and I have only pleaded that it is better to face\r\nthem open-eyed than to act as if we did not know them to be there.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAfter all, though, you will say, Why such an ado about a matter\r\nconcerning which, however we may theoretically differ, we all\r\npractically agree? In this age of toleration, no scientist will ever\r\ntry actively to interfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy\r\nit quietly with our friends and do not make a public nuisance of it in\r\nthe market-place. But it is just on this matter of the market-place\r\nthat I think the utility of such essays as mine may turn. If\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{xii}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\nreligious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the\r\nactive faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in\r\nlife, are the experimental tests by which they are verified, and the\r\nonly means by which their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The\r\ntruest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, \u0027works\u0027 best;\r\nand it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses. Religious\r\nhistory proves that one hypothesis after another has worked ill, has\r\ncrumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world, and has\r\nlapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have\r\nmaintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more\r\nvitality to-day than ever before: it is for the \u0027science of religions\u0027\r\nto tell us just which hypotheses these are. Meanwhile the freest\r\ncompetition of the various faiths with one another, and their openest\r\napplication to life by their several champions, are the most favorable\r\nconditions under which the survival of the fittest can proceed. They\r\nought therefore not to lie hid each under its bushel, indulged-in\r\nquietly with friends. They ought to live in publicity, vying with each\r\nother; and it seems to me that (the régime of tolerance once granted,\r\nand a fair field shown) the scientist has nothing to fear for his own\r\ninterests from the liveliest possible state of fermentation in the\r\nreligious world of his time. Those faiths will best stand the test\r\nwhich adopt also his hypotheses, and make them integral elements of\r\ntheir own. He should welcome therefore every species of religious\r\nagitation and discussion, so long as he is willing to allow that some\r\nreligious hypothesis \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e be\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{xiii}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ntrue. Of course there are plenty\r\nof scientists who would deny that dogmatically, maintaining that\r\nscience has already ruled all possible religious hypotheses out of\r\ncourt. Such scientists ought, I agree, to aim at imposing privacy on\r\nreligious faiths, the public manifestation of which could only be a\r\nnuisance in their eyes. With all such scientists, as well as with\r\ntheir allies outside of science, my quarrel openly lies; and I hope\r\nthat my book may do something to persuade the reader of their crudity,\r\nand range him on my side. Religious fermentation is always a symptom\r\nof the intellectual vigor of a society; and it is only when they forget\r\nthat they are hypotheses and put on rationalistic and authoritative\r\npretensions, that our faiths do harm. The most interesting and\r\nvaluable things about a man are his ideals and over-beliefs. The same\r\nis true of nations and historic epochs; and the excesses of which the\r\nparticular individuals and epochs are guilty are compensated in the\r\ntotal, and become profitable to mankind in the long run.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe essay \u0027On some Hegelisms\u0027 doubtless needs an apology for the\r\nsuperficiality with which it treats a serious subject. It was written\r\nas a squib, to be read in a college-seminary in Hegel\u0027s logic, several\r\nof whose members, mature men, were devout champions of the dialectical\r\nmethod. My blows therefore were aimed almost entirely at that. I\r\nreprint the paper here (albeit with some misgivings), partly because I\r\nbelieve the dialectical method to be wholly abominable when worked by\r\nconcepts alone, and partly because the essay casts some positive light\r\non the pluralist-empiricist point of view.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{xiv}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe paper on Psychical Research is added to the volume for convenience\r\nand utility. Attracted to this study some years ago by my love of\r\nsportsmanlike fair play in science, I have seen enough to convince me\r\nof its great importance, and I wish to gain for it what interest I can.\r\nThe American Branch of the Society is in need of more support, and if\r\nmy article draws some new associates thereto, it will have served its\r\nturn.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nApology is also needed for the repetition of the same passage in two\r\nessays (pp. 59-61 and 96-7, 100-1). My excuse is that one cannot\r\nalways express the same thought in two ways that seem equally forcible,\r\nso one has to copy one\u0027s former words.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe Crillon-quotation on page 62 is due to Mr. W. M. Salter (who\r\nemployed it in a similar manner in the \u0027Index\u0027 for August 24, 1882),\r\nand the dream-metaphor on p. 174 is a reminiscence from some novel of\r\nGeorge Sand\u0027s\u0026mdash;I forget which\u0026mdash;read by me thirty years ago.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFinally, the revision of the essays has consisted almost entirely in\r\nexcisions. Probably less than a page and a half in all of new matter\r\nhas been added.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nHARVARD UNIVERSITY,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003eCAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 4em\"\u003eDecember, 1896.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch00fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch00fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] B. P. Blood: The Flaw in Supremacy: Published by the Author,\r\nAmsterdam, N. Y., 1893.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{x}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nCONTENTS.\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"right\"\u003e\r\nPAGE\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e THE WILL TO BELIEVE \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nHypotheses and options, \u003cA HREF=\"#P1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e. Pascal\u0027s wager, \u003cA HREF=\"#P5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e. Clifford\u0027s\r\nveto, \u003cA HREF=\"#P8\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e. Psychological causes of belief, \u003cA HREF=\"#P9\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e. Thesis of the\r\nEssay, \u003cA HREF=\"#P11\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e. Empiricism and absolutism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e. Objective certitude\r\nand its unattainability, \u003cA HREF=\"#P13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e. Two different sorts of risks in\r\nbelieving, \u003cA HREF=\"#P17\"\u003e17\u003c/A\u003e. Some risk unavoidable, \u003cA HREF=\"#P19\"\u003e19\u003c/A\u003e. Faith may bring\r\nforth its own verification, \u003cA HREF=\"#P22\"\u003e22\u003c/A\u003e. Logical conditions of religious\r\nbelief, \u003cA HREF=\"#P25\"\u003e25\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e IS LIFE WORTH LIVING \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P32\"\u003e32\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nTemperamental Optimism and Pessimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P33\"\u003e33\u003c/A\u003e. How reconcile\r\nwith life one bent on suicide? \u003cA HREF=\"#P38\"\u003e38\u003c/A\u003e. Religious melancholy and its\r\ncure, \u003cA HREF=\"#P39\"\u003e39\u003c/A\u003e. Decay of Natural Theology, \u003cA HREF=\"#P43\"\u003e43\u003c/A\u003e. Instinctive antidotes\r\nto pessimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P46\"\u003e46\u003c/A\u003e. Religion involves belief in an unseen\r\nextension of the world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P51\"\u003e51\u003c/A\u003e. Scientific positivism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P52\"\u003e52\u003c/A\u003e. Doubt\r\nactuates conduct as much as belief does, \u003cA HREF=\"#P54\"\u003e54\u003c/A\u003e. To deny certain\r\nfaiths is logically absurd, for they make their objects true, \u003cA HREF=\"#P56\"\u003e56\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nConclusion, \u003cA HREF=\"#P61\"\u003e6l\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e THE SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P63\"\u003e63\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nRationality means fluent thinking, \u003cA HREF=\"#P63\"\u003e63\u003c/A\u003e. Simplification, \u003cA HREF=\"#P65\"\u003e65\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nClearness, \u003cA HREF=\"#P66\"\u003e66\u003c/A\u003e. Their antagonism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P66\"\u003e66\u003c/A\u003e. Inadequacy of the\r\nabstract, \u003cA HREF=\"#P68\"\u003e68\u003c/A\u003e. The thought of nonentity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P71\"\u003e71\u003c/A\u003e. Mysticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P74\"\u003e74\u003c/A\u003e. Pure\r\ntheory cannot banish wonder, \u003cA HREF=\"#P75\"\u003e75\u003c/A\u003e. The passage to practice may\r\nrestore the feeling of rationality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P75\"\u003e75\u003c/A\u003e. Familiarity and\r\nexpectancy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P76\"\u003e76\u003c/A\u003e. \u0027Substance,\u0027 \u003cA HREF=\"#P80\"\u003e80\u003c/A\u003e. A rational world must appear\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{xvi}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncongruous with our powers, \u003cA HREF=\"#P82\"\u003e82\u003c/A\u003e. But these differ from man to\r\nman, \u003cA HREF=\"#P88\"\u003e88\u003c/A\u003e. Faith is one of them, \u003cA HREF=\"#P90\"\u003e90\u003c/A\u003e. Inseparable from doubt, \u003cA HREF=\"#P95\"\u003e95\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nMay verify itself, \u003cA HREF=\"#P96\"\u003e96\u003c/A\u003e. Its rôle in ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P98\"\u003e98\u003c/A\u003e. Optimism and\r\npessimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P101\"\u003e101\u003c/A\u003e. Is this a moral universe?\u0026mdash;what does the problem\r\nmean? \u003cA HREF=\"#P103\"\u003e103\u003c/A\u003e. Anaesthesia \u003cI\u003eversus\u003c/I\u003e energy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P107\"\u003e107\u003c/A\u003e. Active assumption\r\nnecessary, \u003cA HREF=\"#P107\"\u003e107\u003c/A\u003e. Conclusion, \u003cA HREF=\"#P110\"\u003e110\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e REFLEX ACTION AND THEISM \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P111\"\u003e111\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nPrestige of Physiology, \u003cA HREF=\"#P112\"\u003e112\u003c/A\u003e. Plan of neural action, \u003cA HREF=\"#P113\"\u003e113\u003c/A\u003e. God\r\nthe mind\u0027s adequate object, \u003cA HREF=\"#P116\"\u003e116\u003c/A\u003e. Contrast between world as\r\nperceived and as conceived, \u003cA HREF=\"#P118\"\u003e118\u003c/A\u003e. God, \u003cA HREF=\"#P120\"\u003e120\u003c/A\u003e. The mind\u0027s three\r\ndepartments, \u003cA HREF=\"#P123\"\u003e123\u003c/A\u003e. Science due to a subjective demand, \u003cA HREF=\"#P129\"\u003e129\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nTheism a mean between two extremes, \u003cA HREF=\"#P134\"\u003e134\u003c/A\u003e. Gnosticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P137\"\u003e137\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nNo intellection except for practical ends, \u003cA HREF=\"#P140\"\u003e140\u003c/A\u003e. Conclusion, \u003cA HREF=\"#P142\"\u003e142\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P145\"\u003e145\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nPhilosophies seek a rational world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P146\"\u003e146\u003c/A\u003e. Determinism and\r\nIndeterminism defined, \u003cA HREF=\"#P149\"\u003e149\u003c/A\u003e. Both are postulates of rationality,\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P152\"\u003e152\u003c/A\u003e. Objections to chance considered, \u003cA HREF=\"#P153\"\u003e153\u003c/A\u003e. Determinism\r\ninvolves pessimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P159\"\u003e159\u003c/A\u003e. Escape \u003cI\u003evia\u003c/I\u003e Subjectivism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P164\"\u003e164\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nSubjectivism leads to corruption, \u003cA HREF=\"#P170\"\u003e170\u003c/A\u003e. A world with chance in\r\nit is morally the less irrational alternative, \u003cA HREF=\"#P176\"\u003e176\u003c/A\u003e. Chance not\r\nincompatible with an ultimate Providence, \u003cA HREF=\"#P180\"\u003e180\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P184\"\u003e184\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nThe moral philosopher postulates a unified system, \u003cA HREF=\"#P185\"\u003e185\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nOrigin of moral judgments, \u003cA HREF=\"#P185\"\u003e185\u003c/A\u003e. Goods and ills are created by\r\njudgment?, \u003cA HREF=\"#P189\"\u003e189\u003c/A\u003e. Obligations are created by demands, \u003cA HREF=\"#P192\"\u003e192\u003c/A\u003e. The\r\nconflict of ideals, \u003cA HREF=\"#P198\"\u003e198\u003c/A\u003e. Its solution, \u003cA HREF=\"#P205\"\u003e205\u003c/A\u003e. Impossibility of an\r\nabstract system of Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P208\"\u003e208\u003c/A\u003e. The easy-going and the\r\nstrenuous mood, \u003cA HREF=\"#P211\"\u003e211\u003c/A\u003e. Connection between Ethics and Religion, \u003cA HREF=\"#P212\"\u003e212\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e GREAT MEN AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P216\"\u003e216\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nSolidarity of causes in the world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P216\"\u003e216\u003c/A\u003e. The human mind abstracts\r\nin order to explain, \u003cA HREF=\"#P219\"\u003e219\u003c/A\u003e. Different cycles of operation in\r\nNature, \u003cA HREF=\"#P220\"\u003e220\u003c/A\u003e. Darwin\u0027s distinction between causes that produce\r\nand causes that preserve a variation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P221\"\u003e221\u003c/A\u003e. Physiological causes\r\nproduce, the environment only adopts or preserves, great men,\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P225\"\u003e225\u003c/A\u003e. When adopted they become social ferments, \u003cA HREF=\"#P226\"\u003e226\u003c/A\u003e. Messrs.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{xvii}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nSpencer and Allen criticised, \u003cA HREF=\"#P232\"\u003e232\u003c/A\u003e. Messrs. Wallace and\r\nGryzanowski quoted, \u003cA HREF=\"#P239\"\u003e239\u003c/A\u003e. The laws of history, \u003cA HREF=\"#P244\"\u003e244\u003c/A\u003e. Mental\r\nevolution, \u003cA HREF=\"#P245\"\u003e245\u003c/A\u003e. Analogy between original ideas and Darwin\u0027s\r\naccidental variations, \u003cA HREF=\"#P247\"\u003e247\u003c/A\u003e. Criticism of Spencer\u0027s views, \u003cA HREF=\"#P251\"\u003e251\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P255\"\u003e255\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nSmall differences may be important, \u003cA HREF=\"#P256\"\u003e256\u003c/A\u003e. Individual\r\ndifferences are important because they are the causes of social\r\nchange, \u003cA HREF=\"#P259\"\u003e259\u003c/A\u003e. Hero-worship justified, \u003cA HREF=\"#P261\"\u003e261\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e ON SOME HEGELISMS \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P263\"\u003e263\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nThe world appears as a pluralism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P264\"\u003e264\u003c/A\u003e. Elements of unity in\r\nthe pluralism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P268\"\u003e268\u003c/A\u003e. Hegel\u0027s excessive claims, \u003cA HREF=\"#P273\"\u003e273\u003c/A\u003e. He makes of\r\nnegation a bond of union, \u003cA HREF=\"#P273\"\u003e273\u003c/A\u003e. The principle of totality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P277\"\u003e277\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nMonism and pluralism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P279\"\u003e279\u003c/A\u003e. The fallacy of accident in Hegel,\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P280\"\u003e280\u003c/A\u003e. The good and the bad infinite, \u003cA HREF=\"#P284\"\u003e284\u003c/A\u003e. Negation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P286\"\u003e286\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nConclusion, \u003cA HREF=\"#P292\"\u003e292\u003c/A\u003e.\u0026mdash;Note on the Anaesthetic revelation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P294\"\u003e294\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e WHAT PSYCHICAL RESEARCH HAS ACCOMPLISHED \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P299\"\u003e299\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"intro\"\u003e\r\nThe unclassified residuum, \u003cA HREF=\"#P299\"\u003e299\u003c/A\u003e. The Society for Psychical\r\nResearch and its history, \u003cA HREF=\"#P303\"\u003e303\u003c/A\u003e. Thought-transference, \u003cA HREF=\"#P308\"\u003e308\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nGurney\u0027s work, \u003cA HREF=\"#P309\"\u003e309\u003c/A\u003e. The census of hallucinations, \u003cA HREF=\"#P312\"\u003e312\u003c/A\u003e.\r\nMediumship, \u003cA HREF=\"#P313\"\u003e313\u003c/A\u003e. The \u0027subliminal self,\u0027 \u003cA HREF=\"#P315\"\u003e315\u003c/A\u003e. \u0027Science\u0027 and her\r\ncounter-presumptions, \u003cA HREF=\"#P317\"\u003e317\u003c/A\u003e. The scientific character of\r\nMr. Myers\u0027s work, \u003cA HREF=\"#P320\"\u003e320\u003c/A\u003e. The mechanical-impersonal view of life\r\nversus the personal-romantic view, \u003cA HREF=\"#P324\"\u003e324\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: left\"\u003e INDEX \u003c/SPAN\u003e \u003cSPAN STYLE=\"float: right\"\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"#P329\"\u003e329\u003c/A\u003e \u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e1}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nESSAYS\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIN\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPOPULAR PHILOSOPHY.\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTHE WILL TO BELIEVE.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the recently published Life by Leslie Stephen of his brother,\r\nFitz-James, there is an account of a school to which the latter went\r\nwhen he was a boy. The teacher, a certain Mr. Guest, used to converse\r\nwith his pupils in this wise: \"Gurney, what is the difference between\r\njustification and sanctification?\u0026mdash;Stephen, prove the omnipotence of\r\nGod!\" etc. In the midst of our Harvard freethinking and indifference\r\nwe are prone to imagine that here at your good old orthodox College\r\nconversation continues to be somewhat upon this order; and to show you\r\nthat we at Harvard have not lost all interest in these vital subjects,\r\nI have brought with me to-night something like a sermon on\r\njustification by faith to read to you,\u0026mdash;I mean an essay in\r\njustification \u003cI\u003eof\u003c/I\u003e faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing\r\nattitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely\r\nlogical\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e2}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nintellect may not have been coerced. \u0027The Will to\r\nBelieve,\u0027 accordingly, is the title of my paper.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have long defended to my own students the lawfulness of voluntarily\r\nadopted faith; but as soon as they have got well imbued with the\r\nlogical spirit, they have as a rule refused to admit my contention to\r\nbe lawful philosophically, even though in point of fact they were\r\npersonally all the time chock-full of some faith or other themselves.\r\nI am all the while, however, so profoundly convinced that my own\r\nposition is correct, that your invitation has seemed to me a good\r\noccasion to make my statements more clear. Perhaps your minds will be\r\nmore open than those with which I have hitherto had to deal. I will be\r\nas little technical as I can, though I must begin by setting up some\r\ntechnical distinctions that will help us in the end.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nI.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet us give the name of \u003cI\u003ehypothesis\u003c/I\u003e to anything that may be proposed\r\nto our belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead\r\nwires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either \u003cI\u003elive\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003edead\u003c/I\u003e. A\r\nlive hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to\r\nwhom it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion\r\nmakes no electric connection with your nature,\u0026mdash;it refuses to\r\nscintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is\r\ncompletely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the\r\nMahdi\u0027s followers), the hypothesis is among the mind\u0027s possibilities:\r\nit is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis\r\nare not intrinsic properties, but relations to the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e3}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nindividual\r\nthinker. They are measured by his willingness to act. The maximum of\r\nliveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably.\r\nPractically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency\r\nwherever there is willingness to act at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNext, let us call the decision between two hypotheses an \u003cI\u003eoption\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nOptions may be of several kinds. They may be\u0026mdash;1, \u003cI\u003eliving\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003edead\u003c/I\u003e;\r\n2, \u003cI\u003eforced\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003eavoidable\u003c/I\u003e; 3, \u003cI\u003emomentous\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003etrivial\u003c/I\u003e; and for our\r\npurposes we may call an option a \u003cI\u003egenuine\u003c/I\u003e option when it is of the\r\nforced, living, and momentous kind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n1. A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If\r\nI say to you: \"Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan,\" it is probably a\r\ndead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive.\r\nBut if I say: \"Be an agnostic or be a Christian,\" it is otherwise:\r\ntrained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small,\r\nto your belief.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n2. Next, if I say to you: \"Choose between going out with your umbrella\r\nor without it,\" I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not\r\nforced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Similarly,\r\nif I say, \"Either love me or hate me,\" \"Either call my theory true or\r\ncall it false,\" your option is avoidable. You may remain indifferent\r\nto me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decline to offer any\r\njudgment as to my theory. But if I say, \"Either accept this truth or\r\ngo without it,\" I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing\r\nplace outside of the alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete\r\nlogical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option\r\nof this forced kind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e4}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n3. Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North\r\nPole expedition, your option would be momentous; for this would\r\nprobably be your only similar opportunity, and your choice now would\r\neither exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether\r\nor put at least the chance of it into your hands. He who refuses to\r\nembrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried\r\nand failed. \u003cI\u003ePer contra\u003c/I\u003e, the option is trivial when the opportunity\r\nis not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is\r\nreversible if it later prove unwise. Such trivial options abound in\r\nthe scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to\r\nspend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent.\r\nBut if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for\r\nhis loss of time, no vital harm being done.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt will facilitate our discussion if we keep all these distinctions\r\nwell in mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe next matter to consider is the actual psychology of human opinion.\r\nWhen we look at certain facts, it seems as if our passional and\r\nvolitional nature lay at the root of all our convictions. When we look\r\nat others, it seems as if they could do nothing when the intellect had\r\nonce said its say. Let us take the latter facts up first.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDoes it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our\r\nopinions being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder\r\nour intellect in its perceptions of truth? Can we, by just willing it,\r\nbelieve that Abraham Lincoln\u0027s existence is a myth,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e5}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nand that the\r\nportraits of him in McClure\u0027s Magazine are all of some one else? Can\r\nwe, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were\r\ntrue, believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with\r\nrheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar\r\nbills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can say any of these\r\nthings, but we are absolutely impotent to believe them; and of just\r\nsuch things is the whole fabric of the truths that we do believe in\r\nmade up,\u0026mdash;matters of fact, immediate or remote, as Hume said, and\r\nrelations between ideas, which are either there or not there for us if\r\nwe see them so, and which if not there cannot be put there by any\r\naction of our own.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn Pascal\u0027s Thoughts there is a celebrated passage known in literature\r\nas Pascal\u0027s wager. In it he tries to force us into Christianity by\r\nreasoning as if our concern with truth resembled our concern with the\r\nstakes in a game of chance. Translated freely his words are these: You\r\nmust either believe or not believe that God is\u0026mdash;which will you do?\r\nYour human reason cannot say. A game is going on between you and the\r\nnature of things which at the day of judgment will bring out either\r\nheads or tails. Weigh what your gains and your losses would be if you\r\nshould stake all you have on heads, or God\u0027s existence: if you win in\r\nsuch case, you gain eternal beatitude; if you lose, you lose nothing at\r\nall. If there were an infinity of chances, and only one for God in\r\nthis wager, still you ought to stake your all on God; for though you\r\nsurely risk a finite loss by this procedure, any finite loss is\r\nreasonable, even a certain one is reasonable, if there is but the\r\npossibility of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e6}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ninfinite gain. Go, then, and take holy water, and\r\nhave masses said; belief will come and stupefy your scruples,\u0026mdash;\u003cI\u003eCela\r\nvous fera croire et vous abêtira\u003c/I\u003e. Why should you not? At bottom,\r\nwhat have you to lose?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou probably feel that when religious faith expresses itself thus, in\r\nthe language of the gaming-table, it is put to its last trumps. Surely\r\nPascal\u0027s own personal belief in masses and holy water had far other\r\nsprings; and this celebrated page of his is but an argument for others,\r\na last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the\r\nunbelieving heart. We feel that a faith in masses and holy water\r\nadopted wilfully after such a mechanical calculation would lack the\r\ninner soul of faith\u0027s reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of\r\nthe Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off\r\nbelievers of this pattern from their infinite reward. It is evident\r\nthat unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses\r\nand holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a\r\nliving option. Certainly no Turk ever took to masses and holy water on\r\nits account; and even to us Protestants these means of salvation seem\r\nsuch foregone impossibilities that Pascal\u0027s logic, invoked for them\r\nspecifically, leaves us unmoved. As well might the Mahdi write to us,\r\nsaying, \"I am the Expected One whom God has created in his effulgence.\r\nYou shall be infinitely happy if you confess me; otherwise you shall be\r\ncut off from the light of the sun. Weigh, then, your infinite gain if\r\nI am genuine against your finite sacrifice if I am not!\" His logic\r\nwould be that of Pascal; but he would vainly use it on us, for the\r\nhypothesis he offers us is dead. No tendency to act on it exists in us\r\nto any degree.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P7\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e7}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe talk of believing by our volition seems, then, from one point of\r\nview, simply silly. From another point of view it is worse than silly,\r\nit is vile. When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical\r\nsciences, and sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested\r\nmoral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations; what patience\r\nand postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to\r\nthe icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar;\r\nhow absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness,\u0026mdash;then how\r\nbesotted and contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes\r\nblowing his voluntary smoke-wreaths, and pretending to decide things\r\nfrom out of his private dream! Can we wonder if those bred in the\r\nrugged and manly school of science should feel like spewing such\r\nsubjectivism out of their mouths? The whole system of loyalties which\r\ngrow up in the schools of science go dead against its toleration; so\r\nthat it is only natural that those who have caught the scientific fever\r\nshould pass over to the opposite extreme, and write sometimes as if the\r\nincorruptibly truthful intellect ought positively to prefer bitterness\r\nand unacceptableness to the heart in its cup.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nIt fortifies my soul to know\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThat, though I perish, Truth is so\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nsings Clough, while Huxley exclaims: \"My only consolation lies in the\r\nreflection that, however bad our posterity may become, so far as they\r\nhold by the plain rule of not pretending to believe what they have no\r\nreason to believe, because it may be to their advantage so to pretend\r\n[the word \u0027pretend\u0027 is surely here redundant], they will not have\r\nreached the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P8\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e8}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nlowest depth of immorality.\" And that delicious\r\n\u003cI\u003eenfant terrible\u003c/I\u003e Clifford writes; \"Belief is desecrated when given to\r\nunproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private\r\npleasure of the believer,… Whoso would deserve well of his fellows\r\nin this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very\r\nfanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an\r\nunworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away….\r\nIf [a] belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence [even though\r\nthe belief be true, as Clifford on the same page explains] the pleasure\r\nis a stolen one…. It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of\r\nour duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs\r\nas from a pestilence which may shortly master our own body and then\r\nspread to the rest of the town…. It is wrong always, everywhere, and\r\nfor every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll this strikes one as healthy, even when expressed, as by Clifford,\r\nwith somewhat too much of robustious pathos in the voice. Free-will\r\nand simple wishing do seem, in the matter of our credences, to be only\r\nfifth wheels to the coach. Yet if any one should thereupon assume that\r\nintellectual insight is what remains after wish and will and\r\nsentimental preference have taken wing, or that pure reason is what\r\nthen settles our opinions, he would fly quite as directly in the teeth\r\nof the facts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is only our already dead hypotheses that our willing nature is\r\nunable to bring to life again But what has made them dead for us is\r\nfor the most part\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P9\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e9}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\na previous action of our willing nature of an\r\nantagonistic kind. When I say \u0027willing nature,\u0027 I do not mean only\r\nsuch deliberate volitions as may have set up habits of belief that we\r\ncannot now escape from,\u0026mdash;I mean all such factors of belief as fear and\r\nhope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the\r\ncircumpressure of our caste and set. As a matter of fact we find\r\nourselves believing, we hardly know how or why. Mr. Balfour gives the\r\nname of \u0027authority\u0027 to all those influences, born of the intellectual\r\nclimate, that make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or\r\ndead. Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the\r\nconservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in\r\nProtestant Christianity and the duty of fighting for \u0027the doctrine of\r\nthe immortal Monroe,\u0027 all for no reasons worthy of the name. We see\r\ninto these matters with no more inner clearness, and probably with much\r\nless, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His\r\nunconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its\r\nconclusions; but for us, not insight, but the \u003cI\u003eprestige\u003c/I\u003e of the\r\nopinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our\r\nsleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied, in nine\r\nhundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can\r\nfind a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is\r\ncriticised by some one else. Our faith is faith in some one else\u0027s\r\nfaith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief\r\nin truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our\r\nminds and it are made for each other,\u0026mdash;what is it but a passionate\r\naffirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want\r\nto have a truth; we want to believe that our\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e10}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nexperiments and\r\nstudies and discussions must put us in a continually better and better\r\nposition towards it; and on this line we agree to fight out our\r\nthinking lives. But if a pyrrhonistic sceptic asks us \u003cI\u003ehow we know\u003c/I\u003e\r\nall this, can our logic find a reply? No! certainly it cannot. It is\r\njust one volition against another,\u0026mdash;we willing to go in for life upon a\r\ntrust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no\r\nuse. Clifford\u0027s cosmic emotions find no use for Christian feelings.\r\nHuxley belabors the bishops because there is no use for sacerdotalism\r\nin his scheme of life. Newman, on the contrary, goes over to Romanism,\r\nand finds all sorts of reasons good for staying there, because a\r\npriestly system is for him an organic need and delight. Why do so few\r\n\u0027scientists\u0027 even look at the evidence for telepathy, so called?\r\nBecause they think, as a leading biologist, now dead, once said to me,\r\nthat even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to band together\r\nto keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of\r\nNature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot\r\ncarry on their pursuits. But if this very man had been shown something\r\nwhich as a scientist he might \u003cI\u003edo\u003c/I\u003e with telepathy, he might not only\r\nhave examined the evidence, but even have found it good enough. This\r\nvery law which the logicians would impose upon us\u0026mdash;if I may give the\r\nname of logicians to those who would rule out our willing nature\r\nhere\u0026mdash;is based on nothing but their own natural wish to exclude all\r\nelements for\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e11}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwhich they, in their professional quality of\r\nlogicians, can find no use.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEvidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our\r\nconvictions. There are passional tendencies and volitions which run\r\nbefore and others which come after belief, and it is only the latter\r\nthat are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when the\r\nprevious passional work has been already in their own direction.\r\nPascal\u0027s argument, instead of being powerless, then seems a regular\r\nclincher, and is the last stroke needed to make our faith in masses and\r\nholy water complete. The state of things is evidently far from simple;\r\nand pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the\r\nonly things that really do produce our creeds.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIV.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOur next duty, having recognized this mixed-up state of affairs, is to\r\nask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, or whether, on\r\nthe contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in making up our\r\nminds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: \u003cI\u003eOur passional\r\nnature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between\r\npropositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature\r\nbe decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such\r\ncircumstances, \"Do not decide, but leave the question open,\" is itself\r\na passional decision,\u0026mdash;just like deciding yes or no,\u0026mdash;and is attended\r\nwith the same risk of losing the truth\u003c/I\u003e. The thesis thus abstractly\r\nexpressed will, I trust, soon become quite clear. But I must first\r\nindulge in a bit more of preliminary work.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e12}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nV.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt will be observed that for the purposes of this discussion we are on\r\n\u0027dogmatic\u0027 ground,\u0026mdash;ground, I mean, which leaves systematic\r\nphilosophical scepticism altogether out of account. The postulate that\r\nthere is truth, and that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it,\r\nwe are deliberately resolving to make, though the sceptic will not make\r\nit. We part company with him, therefore, absolutely, at this point.\r\nBut the faith that truth exists, and that our minds can find it, may be\r\nheld in two ways. We may talk of the \u003cI\u003eempiricist\u003c/I\u003e way and of the\r\n\u003cI\u003eabsolutist\u003c/I\u003e way of believing in truth. The absolutists in this matter\r\nsay that we not only can attain to knowing truth, but we can \u003cI\u003eknow\r\nwhen\u003c/I\u003e we have attained to knowing it; while the empiricists think that\r\nalthough we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know when. To \u003cI\u003eknow\u003c/I\u003e\r\nis one thing, and to know for certain \u003cI\u003ethat\u003c/I\u003e we know is another. One\r\nmay hold to the first being possible without the second; hence the\r\nempiricists and the absolutists, although neither of them is a sceptic\r\nin the usual philosophic sense of the term, show very different degrees\r\nof dogmatism in their lives.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf we look at the history of opinions, we see that the empiricist\r\ntendency has largely prevailed in science, while in philosophy the\r\nabsolutist tendency has had everything its own way. The characteristic\r\nsort of happiness, indeed, which philosophies yield has mainly\r\nconsisted in the conviction felt by each successive school or system\r\nthat by it bottom-certitude had been attained. \"Other philosophies are\r\ncollections of opinions, mostly false; \u003cI\u003emy\u003c/I\u003e philosophy\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P13\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e13}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ngives\r\nstanding-ground forever,\"\u0026mdash;who does not recognize in this the key-note\r\nof every system worthy of the name? A system, to be a system at all,\r\nmust come as a \u003cI\u003eclosed\u003c/I\u003e system, reversible in this or that detail,\r\nperchance, but in its essential features never!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nScholastic orthodoxy, to which one must always go when one wishes to\r\nfind perfectly clear statement, has beautifully elaborated this\r\nabsolutist conviction in a doctrine which it calls that of \u0027objective\r\nevidence.\u0027 If, for example, I am unable to doubt that I now exist\r\nbefore you, that two is less than three, or that if all men are mortal\r\nthen I am mortal too, it is because these things illumine my intellect\r\nirresistibly. The final ground of this objective evidence possessed by\r\ncertain propositions is the \u003cI\u003eadaequatio intellectûs nostri cum rê\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nThe certitude it brings involves an \u003cI\u003eaptitudinem ad extorquendum certum\r\nassensum\u003c/I\u003e on the part of the truth envisaged, and on the side of the\r\nsubject a \u003cI\u003equietem in cognitione\u003c/I\u003e, when once the object is mentally\r\nreceived, that leaves no possibility of doubt behind; and in the whole\r\ntransaction nothing operates but the \u003cI\u003eentitas ipsa\u003c/I\u003e of the object and\r\nthe \u003cI\u003eentitas ipsa\u003c/I\u003e of the mind. We slouchy modern thinkers dislike to\r\ntalk in Latin,\u0026mdash;indeed, we dislike to talk in set terms at all; but at\r\nbottom our own state of mind is very much like this whenever we\r\nuncritically abandon ourselves: You believe in objective evidence, and\r\nI do. Of some things we feel that we are certain: we know, and we know\r\nthat we do know. There is something that gives a click inside of us, a\r\nbell that strikes twelve, when the hands of our mental clock have swept\r\nthe dial and meet over the meridian hour. The greatest empiricists\r\namong us are only empiricists on reflection: when\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P14\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e14}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nleft to their\r\ninstincts, they dogmatize like infallible popes. When the Cliffords\r\ntell us how sinful it is to be Christians on such \u0027insufficient\r\nevidence,\u0027 insufficiency is really the last thing they have in mind.\r\nFor them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other\r\nway. They believe so completely in an anti-christian order of the\r\nuniverse that there is no living option: Christianity is a dead\r\nhypothesis from the start.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nVI.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now, since we are all such absolutists by instinct, what in our\r\nquality of students of philosophy ought we to do about the fact? Shall\r\nwe espouse and indorse it? Or shall we treat it as a weakness of our\r\nnature from which we must free ourselves, if we can?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI sincerely believe that the latter course is the only one we can\r\nfollow as reflective men. Objective evidence and certitude are\r\ndoubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and\r\ndream-visited planet are they found? I am, therefore, myself a\r\ncomplete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. I\r\nlive, to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on\r\nexperiencing and thinking over our experience, for only thus can our\r\nopinions grow more true; but to hold any one of them\u0026mdash;I absolutely do\r\nnot care which\u0026mdash;as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible,\r\nI believe to be a tremendously mistaken attitude, and I think that the\r\nwhole history of philosophy will bear me out. There is but one\r\nindefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhonistic\r\nscepticism itself leaves\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P15\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e15}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nstanding,\u0026mdash;the truth that the present\r\nphenomenon of consciousness exists. That, however, is the bare\r\nstarting-point of knowledge, the mere admission of a stuff to be\r\nphilosophized about. The various philosophies are but so many attempts\r\nat expressing what this stuff really is. And if we repair to our\r\nlibraries what disagreement do we discover! Where is a certainly true\r\nanswer found? Apart from abstract propositions of comparison (such as\r\ntwo and two are the same as four), propositions which tell us nothing\r\nby themselves about concrete reality, we find no proposition ever\r\nregarded by any one as evidently certain that has not either been\r\ncalled a falsehood, or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by\r\nsome one else. The transcending of the axioms of geometry, not in play\r\nbut in earnest, by certain of our contemporaries (as Zöllner and\r\nCharles H. Hinton), and the rejection of the whole Aristotelian logic\r\nby the Hegelians, are striking instances in point.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon.\r\nSome make the criterion external to the moment of perception, putting\r\nit either in revelation, the \u003cI\u003econsensus gentium\u003c/I\u003e, the instincts of the\r\nheart, or the systematized experience of the race. Others make the\r\nperceptive moment its own test,\u0026mdash;Descartes, for instance, with his\r\nclear and distinct ideas guaranteed by the veracity of God; Reid with\r\nhis \u0027common-sense;\u0027 and Kant with his forms of synthetic judgment \u003cI\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/I\u003e. The inconceivability of the opposite; the capacity to be\r\nverified by sense; the possession of complete organic unity or\r\nself-relation, realized when a thing is its own other,\u0026mdash;are standards\r\nwhich, in turn, have been used. The much\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P16\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e16}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nlauded objective\r\nevidence is never triumphantly there, it is a mere aspiration or\r\n\u003cI\u003eGrenzbegriff\u003c/I\u003e, marking the infinitely remote ideal of our thinking\r\nlife. To claim that certain truths now possess it, is simply to say\r\nthat when you think them true and they \u003cI\u003eare\u003c/I\u003e true, then their evidence\r\nis objective, otherwise it is not. But practically one\u0027s conviction\r\nthat the evidence one goes by is of the real objective brand, is only\r\none more subjective opinion added to the lot. For what a contradictory\r\narray of opinions have objective evidence and absolute certitude been\r\nclaimed! The world is rational through and through,\u0026mdash;its existence is\r\nan ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God,\u0026mdash;a personal God is\r\ninconceivable; there is an extra-mental physical world immediately\r\nknown,\u0026mdash;the mind can only know its own ideas; a moral imperative\r\nexists,\u0026mdash;obligation is only the resultant of desires; a permanent\r\nspiritual principle is in every one,\u0026mdash;there are only shifting states of\r\nmind; there is an endless chain of causes,\u0026mdash;there is an absolute first\r\ncause; an eternal necessity,\u0026mdash;a freedom; a purpose,\u0026mdash;no purpose; a\r\nprimal One,\u0026mdash;a primal Many; a universal continuity,\u0026mdash;an essential\r\ndiscontinuity in things; an infinity,\u0026mdash;no infinity. There is\r\nthis,\u0026mdash;there is that; there is indeed nothing which some one has not\r\nthought absolutely true, while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false;\r\nand not an absolutist among them seems ever to have considered that the\r\ntrouble may all the time be essential, and that the intellect, even\r\nwith truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for\r\nknowing whether it be truth or no. When, indeed, one remembers that\r\nthe most striking practical application to life of the doctrine of\r\nobjective certitude has been\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P17\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e17}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe conscientious labors of the Holy\r\nOffice of the Inquisition, one feels less tempted than ever to lend the\r\ndoctrine a respectful ear.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut please observe, now, that when as empiricists we give up the\r\ndoctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or\r\nhope of truth itself. We still pin our faith on its existence, and\r\nstill believe that we gain an ever better position towards it by\r\nsystematically continuing to roll up experiences and think. Our great\r\ndifference from the scholastic lies in the way we face. The strength\r\nof his system lies in the principles, the origin, the \u003cI\u003eterminus a quo\u003c/I\u003e\r\nof his thought; for us the strength is in the outcome, the upshot, the\r\n\u003cI\u003eterminus ad quem\u003c/I\u003e. Not where it comes from but what it leads to is to\r\ndecide. It matters not to an empiricist from what quarter an\r\nhypothesis may come to him: he may have acquired it by fair means or by\r\nfoul; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; but if the\r\ntotal drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means\r\nby its being true.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nVII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOne more point, small but important, and our preliminaries are done.\r\nThere are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of\r\nopinion,\u0026mdash;ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference\r\nthe theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little\r\nconcern. \u003cI\u003eWe must know the truth\u003c/I\u003e; and \u003cI\u003ewe must avoid error\u003c/I\u003e,\u0026mdash;these\r\nare our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are\r\nnot two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two\r\nseparable laws. Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the\r\ntruth \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e, we escape\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P18\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e18}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nas an incidental consequence from believing\r\nthe falsehood \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e, it hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving\r\n\u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e we necessarily believe \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e. We may in escaping \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e fall into\r\nbelieving other falsehoods, \u003cI\u003eC\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003eD\u003c/I\u003e, just as bad as \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e; or we may\r\nescape \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e by not believing anything at all, not even \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBelieve truth! Shun error!\u0026mdash;these, we see, are two materially\r\ndifferent laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring\r\ndifferently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for\r\ntruth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may,\r\non the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and\r\nlet truth take its chance. Clifford, in the instructive passage which\r\nI have quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he\r\ntells us, keep your mind in suspense forever, rather than by closing it\r\non insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of believing lies. You,\r\non the other hand, may think that the risk of being in error is a very\r\nsmall matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be\r\nready to be duped many times in your investigation rather than postpone\r\nindefinitely the chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossible\r\nto go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings of our duty\r\nabout either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our\r\npassional life. Biologically considered, our minds are as ready to\r\ngrind out falsehood as veracity, and he who says, \"Better go without\r\nbelief forever than believe a lie!\" merely shows his own preponderant\r\nprivate horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his\r\ndesires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys. He cannot imagine\r\nany one questioning its binding force. For my own part, I\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P19\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e19}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhave\r\nalso a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than\r\nbeing duped may happen to a man in this world: so Clifford\u0027s\r\nexhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a\r\ngeneral informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle\r\nforever than to risk a single wound. Not so are victories either over\r\nenemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfully\r\nsolemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in\r\nspite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier\r\nthan this excessive nervousness on their behalf. At any rate, it seems\r\nthe fittest thing for the empiricist philosopher.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nVIII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd now, after all this introduction, let us go straight at our\r\nquestion. I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as a matter of\r\nfact do we find our passional nature influencing us in our opinions,\r\nbut that there are some options between opinions in which this\r\ninfluence must be regarded both as an inevitable and as a lawful\r\ndeterminant of our choice.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI fear here that some of you my hearers will begin to scent danger, and\r\nlend an inhospitable ear. Two first steps of passion you have indeed\r\nhad to admit as necessary,\u0026mdash;we must think so as to avoid dupery, and we\r\nmust think so as to gain truth; but the surest path to those ideal\r\nconsummations, you will probably consider, is from now onwards to take\r\nno further passional step.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWell, of course, I agree as far as the facts will allow. Wherever the\r\noption between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can\r\nthrow the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P20\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e20}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nchance of \u003cI\u003egaining truth\u003c/I\u003e away, and at any rate save\r\nourselves from any chance of \u003cI\u003ebelieving falsehood\u003c/I\u003e, by not making up\r\nour minds at all till objective evidence has come. In scientific\r\nquestions, this is almost always the case; and even in human affairs in\r\ngeneral, the need of acting is seldom so urgent that a false belief to\r\nact on is better than no belief at all. Law courts, indeed, have to\r\ndecide on the best evidence attainable for the moment, because a\r\njudge\u0027s duty is to make law as well as to ascertain it, and (as a\r\nlearned judge once said to me) few cases are worth spending much time\r\nover: the great thing is to have them decided on \u003cI\u003eany\u003c/I\u003e acceptable\r\nprinciple, and got out of the way. But in our dealings with objective\r\nnature we obviously are recorders, not makers, of the truth; and\r\ndecisions for the mere sake of deciding promptly and getting on to the\r\nnext business would be wholly out of place. Throughout the breadth of\r\nphysical nature facts are what they are quite independently of us, and\r\nseldom is there any such hurry about them that the risks of being duped\r\nby believing a premature theory need be faced. The questions here are\r\nalways trivial options, the hypotheses are hardly living (at any rate\r\nnot living for us spectators), the choice between believing truth or\r\nfalsehood is seldom forced. The attitude of sceptical balance is\r\ntherefore the absolutely wise one if we would escape mistakes. What\r\ndifference, indeed, does it make to most of us whether we have or have\r\nnot a theory of the Röntgen rays, whether we believe or not in\r\nmind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious\r\nstates? It makes no difference. Such options are not forced on us.\r\nOn every account it is better not to make them, but still keep weighing\r\nreasons \u003cI\u003epro et contra\u003c/I\u003e with an indifferent hand.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P21\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e21}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI speak, of course, here of the purely judging mind. For purposes of\r\ndiscovery such indifference is to be less highly recommended, and\r\nscience would be far less advanced than she is if the passionate\r\ndesires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept\r\nout of the game. See for example the sagacity which Spencer and\r\nWeismann now display. On the other hand, if you want an absolute\r\nduffer in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has\r\nno interest whatever in its results: he is the warranted incapable, the\r\npositive fool. The most useful investigator, because the most\r\nsensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of\r\nthe question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become\r\ndeceived.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] Science has organized this nervousness into a regular\r\n\u003cI\u003etechnique\u003c/I\u003e, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen\r\nso deeply in love with the method that one may even say she has ceased\r\nto care for truth by itself at all. It is only truth as technically\r\nverified that interests her. The truth of truths might come in merely\r\naffirmative form, and she would decline to touch it. Such truth as\r\nthat, she might repeat with Clifford, would be stolen in defiance of\r\nher duty to mankind. Human passions, however, are stronger than\r\ntechnical rules. \"Le coeur a ses raisons,\" as Pascal says, \"que la\r\nraison ne connaît pas;\" and however indifferent to all but the bare\r\nrules of the game the umpire, the abstract intellect, may be, the\r\nconcrete players who furnish him the materials to judge of are usually,\r\neach one of them, in love with some pet \u0027live hypothesis\u0027 of his own.\r\nLet us agree, however, that wherever there is no forced option, the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P22\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e22}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndispassionately judicial intellect with no pet hypothesis, saving\r\nus, as it does, from dupery at any rate, ought to be our ideal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe question next arises: Are there not somewhere forced options in our\r\nspeculative questions, and can we (as men who may be interested at\r\nleast as much in positively gaining truth as in merely escaping dupery)\r\nalways wait with impunity till the coercive evidence shall have\r\narrived? It seems \u003cI\u003ea priori\u003c/I\u003e improbable that the truth should be so\r\nnicely adjusted to our needs and powers as that. In the great\r\nboarding-house of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom\r\ncome out so even and leave the plates so clean. Indeed, we should view\r\nthem with scientific suspicion if they did.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIX.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eMoral questions\u003c/I\u003e immediately present themselves as questions whose\r\nsolution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a\r\nquestion not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be\r\ngood if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare\r\nthe \u003cI\u003eworths\u003c/I\u003e, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we must\r\nconsult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself\r\nconsults her heart when she lays it down that the infinite\r\nascertainment of fact and correction of false belief are the supreme\r\ngoods for man. Challenge the statement, and science can only repeat it\r\noracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment and\r\ncorrection bring man all sorts of other goods which man\u0027s heart in turn\r\ndeclares. The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having\r\nthem is decided by\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P23\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e23}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nour will. Are our moral preferences true or\r\nfalse, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or\r\nbad for \u003cI\u003eus\u003c/I\u003e, but in themselves indifferent? How can your pure\r\nintellect decide? If your heart does not \u003cI\u003ewant\u003c/I\u003e a world of moral\r\nreality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one.\r\nMephistophelian scepticism, indeed, will satisfy the head\u0027s\r\nplay-instincts much better than any rigorous idealism can. Some men\r\n(even at the student age) are so naturally cool-hearted that the\r\nmoralistic hypothesis never has for them any pungent life, and in their\r\nsupercilious presence the hot young moralist always feels strangely ill\r\nat ease. The appearance of knowingness is on their side, of naïveté\r\nand gullibility on his. Yet, in the inarticulate heart of him, he\r\nclings to it that he is not a dupe, and that there is a realm in which\r\n(as Emerson says) all their wit and intellectual superiority is no\r\nbetter than the cunning of a fox. Moral scepticism can no more be\r\nrefuted or proved by logic than intellectual scepticism can. When we\r\nstick to it that there \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e truth (be it of either kind), we do so with\r\nour whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The\r\nsceptic with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which\r\nof us is the wiser, Omniscience only knows.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTurn now from these wide questions of good to a certain class of\r\nquestions of fact, questions concerning personal relations, states of\r\nmind between one man and another. \u003cI\u003eDo you like me or not?\u003c/I\u003e\u0026mdash;for\r\nexample. Whether you do or not depends, in countless instances, on\r\nwhether I meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like\r\nme, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith on my part\r\nin your liking\u0027s existence is in such cases what makes\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P24\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e24}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nyour liking\r\ncome. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have\r\nobjective evidence, until you shall have done something apt, as the\r\nabsolutists say, \u003cI\u003ead extorquendum assensum meum\u003c/I\u003e, ten to one your\r\nliking never comes. How many women\u0027s hearts are vanquished by the mere\r\nsanguine insistence of some man that they \u003cI\u003emust\u003c/I\u003e love him! he will not\r\nconsent to the hypothesis that they cannot. The desire for a certain\r\nkind of truth here brings about that special truth\u0027s existence; and so\r\nit is in innumerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions,\r\nboons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play\r\nthe part of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices other\r\nthings for their sake before they have come, and takes risks for them\r\nin advance? His faith acts on the powers above him as a claim, and\r\ncreates its own verification.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is\r\nbecause each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the\r\nother members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result\r\nis achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its\r\nexistence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in\r\none another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a\r\ncommercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on\r\nthis condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing\r\nis even attempted. A whole train of passengers (individually brave\r\nenough) will be looted by a few highwaymen, simply because the latter\r\ncan count on one another, while each passenger fears that if he makes a\r\nmovement of resistance, he will be shot before any one else backs him\r\nup. If we believed that the whole car-full would rise\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P25\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e25}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nat once\r\nwith us, we should each severally rise, and train-robbing would never\r\neven be attempted. There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at\r\nall unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. \u003cI\u003eAnd where faith\r\nin a fact can help create the fact\u003c/I\u003e, that would be an insane logic\r\nwhich should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the\r\n\u0027lowest kind of immorality\u0027 into which a thinking being can fall. Yet\r\nsuch is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to\r\nregulate our lives!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nX.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn truths dependent on our personal action, then, faith based on desire\r\nis certainly a lawful and possibly an indispensable thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now, it will be said, these are all childish human cases, and have\r\nnothing to do with great cosmical matters, like the question of\r\nreligious faith. Let us then pass on to that. Religions differ so\r\nmuch in their accidents that in discussing the religious question we\r\nmust make it very generic and broad. What then do we now mean by the\r\nreligious hypothesis? Science says things are; morality says some\r\nthings are better than other things; and religion says essentially two\r\nthings.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFirst, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the\r\noverlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last\r\nstone, so to speak, and say the final word. \"Perfection is\r\neternal,\"\u0026mdash;this phrase of Charles Secrétan seems a good way of putting\r\nthis first affirmation of religion, an affirmation which obviously\r\ncannot yet be verified scientifically at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P26\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e26}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now\r\nif we believe her first affirmation to be true.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, let us consider what the logical elements of this situation are\r\n\u003cI\u003ein case the religious hypothesis in both its branches be really true\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n(Of course, we must admit that possibility at the outset. If we are to\r\ndiscuss the question at all, it must involve a living option. If for\r\nany of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living\r\npossibility be true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the\r\n\u0027saving remnant\u0027 alone.) So proceeding, we see, first, that religion\r\noffers itself as a \u003cI\u003emomentous\u003c/I\u003e option. We are supposed to gain, even\r\nnow, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital\r\ngood. Secondly, religion is a \u003cI\u003eforced\u003c/I\u003e option, so far as that good\r\ngoes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting\r\nfor more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way \u003cI\u003eif\r\nreligion be untrue\u003c/I\u003e, we lose the good, \u003cI\u003eif it be true\u003c/I\u003e, just as\r\ncertainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man\r\nshould hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him\r\nbecause he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after\r\nhe brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular\r\nangel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one\r\nelse? Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a\r\ncertain particular kind of risk. \u003cI\u003eBetter risk loss of truth than\r\nchance of error\u003c/I\u003e,\u0026mdash;that is your faith-vetoer\u0027s exact position. He is\r\nactively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing\r\nthe field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is\r\nbacking the religious hypothesis against the field. To preach\r\nscepticism to us as a duty until\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P27\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e27}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u0027sufficient evidence\u0027 for\r\nreligion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in\r\npresence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its\r\nbeing error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may\r\nbe true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only\r\nintellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth,\r\nis the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery,\r\nwhat proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than\r\ndupery through fear? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse\r\nobedience to the scientist\u0027s command to imitate his kind of option, in\r\na case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to\r\nchoose my own form of risk. If religion be true and the evidence for\r\nit be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extinguisher\r\nupon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business\r\nin this matter), to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the\r\nwinning side,\u0026mdash;that chance depending, of course, on my willingness to\r\nrun the risk of acting as if my passional need of taking the world\r\nreligiously might be prophetic and right.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll this is on the supposition that it really may be prophetic and\r\nright, and that, even to us who are discussing the matter, religion is\r\na live hypothesis which may be true. Now, to most of us religion comes\r\nin a still further way that makes a veto on our active faith even more\r\nillogical. The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is\r\nrepresented in our religions as having personal form. The universe is\r\nno longer a mere \u003cI\u003eIt\u003c/I\u003e to us, but a \u003cI\u003eThou\u003c/I\u003e, if we are religious; and any\r\nrelation that may be possible from person to person might be possible\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P28\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e28}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhere. For instance, although in one sense we are passive portions\r\nof the universe, in another we show a curious autonomy, as if we were\r\nsmall active centres on our own account. We feel, too, as if the\r\nappeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if\r\nevidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis\r\nhalf-way. To take a trivial illustration: just as a man who in a\r\ncompany of gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every\r\nconcession, and believed no one\u0027s word without proof, would cut himself\r\noff by such churlishness from all the social rewards that a more\r\ntrusting spirit would earn,\u0026mdash;so here, one who should shut himself up in\r\nsnarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition\r\nwilly-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from\r\nhis only opportunity of making the gods\u0027 acquaintance. This feeling,\r\nforced on us we know not whence, that by obstinately believing that\r\nthere are gods (although not to do so would be so easy both for our\r\nlogic and our life) we are doing the universe the deepest service we\r\ncan, seems part of the living essence of the religious hypothesis. If\r\nthe hypothesis \u003cI\u003ewere\u003c/I\u003e true in all its parts, including this one, then\r\npure intellectualism, with its veto on our making willing advances,\r\nwould be an absurdity; and some participation of our sympathetic nature\r\nwould be logically required. I, therefore, for one cannot see my way\r\nto accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or wilfully agree to\r\nkeep my willing nature out of the game. I cannot do so for this plain\r\nreason, that \u003cI\u003ea rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from\r\nacknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were\r\nreally there, would be an irrational rule\u003c/I\u003e. That for me\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P29\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e29}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nis the\r\nlong and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the\r\nkinds of truth might materially be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI confess I do not see how this logic can be escaped. But sad\r\nexperience makes me fear that some of you may still shrink from\r\nradically saying with me, \u003cI\u003ein abstracto\u003c/I\u003e, that we have the right to\r\nbelieve at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our\r\nwill. I suspect, however, that if this is so, it is because you have\r\ngot away from the abstract logical point of view altogether, and are\r\nthinking (perhaps without realizing it) of some particular religious\r\nhypothesis which for you is dead. The freedom to \u0027believe what we\r\nwill\u0027 you apply to the case of some patent superstition; and the faith\r\nyou think of is the faith defined by the schoolboy when he said, \"Faith\r\nis when you believe something that you know ain\u0027t true.\" I can only\r\nrepeat that this is misapprehension. \u003cI\u003eIn concreto\u003c/I\u003e, the freedom to\r\nbelieve can only cover living options which the intellect of the\r\nindividual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem\r\nabsurdities to him who has them to consider. When I look at the\r\nreligious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and when I\r\nthink of all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically\r\nit involves, then this command that we shall put a stopper on our\r\nheart, instincts, and courage, and wait\u0026mdash;acting of course meanwhile\r\nmore or less as if religion were \u003cI\u003enot\u003c/I\u003e true[\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn4text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e]\u0026mdash;till\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P30\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e30}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndoomsday, or\r\ntill such time as our intellect and senses working together may have\r\nraked in evidence enough,\u0026mdash;this command, I say, seems to me the\r\nqueerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic cave. Were we\r\nscholastic absolutists, there might be more excuse. If we had an\r\ninfallible intellect with its objective certitudes, we might feel\r\nourselves disloyal to such a perfect organ of knowledge in not trusting\r\nto it exclusively, in not waiting for its releasing word. But if we\r\nare empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know\r\nfor certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle\r\nfantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell.\r\nIndeed we \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e wait if we will,\u0026mdash;I hope you do not think that I am\r\ndenying that,\u0026mdash;but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we\r\nbelieved. In either case we \u003cI\u003eact\u003c/I\u003e, taking our life in our hands. No\r\none of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words\r\nof abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to\r\nrespect one another\u0027s mental freedom: then only shall we bring about\r\nthe intellectual republic; then only shall we have that spirit of inner\r\ntolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which\r\nis empiricism\u0027s glory; then only shall we live and let live, in\r\nspeculative as well as in practical things.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI began by a reference to Fitz James Stephen; let me end by a quotation\r\nfrom him. \"What do you think\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P31\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e31}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof yourself? What do you think of\r\nthe world?… These are questions with which all must deal as it seems\r\ngood to them. They are riddles of the Sphinx, and in some way or other\r\nwe must deal with them…. In all important transactions of life we\r\nhave to take a leap in the dark…. If we decide to leave the riddles\r\nunanswered, that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, is\r\na choice: but whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril. If a\r\nman chooses to turn his back altogether on God and the future, no one\r\ncan prevent him; no one can show beyond reasonable doubt that he is\r\nmistaken. If a man thinks otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not\r\nsee that any one can prove that \u003cI\u003ehe\u003c/I\u003e is mistaken. Each must act as he\r\nthinks best; and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand\r\non a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist,\r\nthrough which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be\r\ndeceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take\r\nthe wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know\r\nwhether there is any right one. What must we do? \u0027Be strong and of a\r\ngood courage.\u0027 Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what\r\ncomes…. If death ends all, we cannot meet death better.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn5text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch01fn5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] An Address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown\r\nUniversities. Published in the New World, June, 1896.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] Compare the admirable page 310 in S. H. Hodgson\u0027s \"Time and Space,\"\r\nLondon, 1865.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] Compare Wilfrid Ward\u0027s Essay, \"The Wish to Believe,\" in his\r\n\u003cI\u003eWitnesses to the Unseen\u003c/I\u003e, Macmillan \u0026amp; Co., 1893.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn4text\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] Since belief is measured by action, he who forbids us to believe\r\nreligion to be true, necessarily also forbids us to act as we should if\r\nwe did believe it to be true. The whole defence of religious faith\r\nhinges upon action. If the action required or inspired by the\r\nreligious hypothesis is in no way different from that dictated by the\r\nnaturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure superfluity,\r\nbetter pruned away, and controversy about its legitimacy is a piece of\r\nidle trifling, unworthy of serious minds. I myself believe, of course,\r\nthat the religious hypothesis gives to the world an expression which\r\nspecifically determines our reactions, and makes them in a large part\r\nunlike what they might be on a purely naturalistic scheme of belief.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch01fn5text\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 353, 2d edition. London, 1874.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P32\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e32}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIS LIFE WORTH LIVING?[\u003cA NAME=\"ch02fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch02fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen Mr. Mallock\u0027s book with this title appeared some fifteen years\r\nago, the jocose answer that \"it depends on the \u003cI\u003eliver\u003c/I\u003e\" had great\r\ncurrency in the newspapers. The answer which I propose to give\r\nto-night cannot be jocose. In the words of one of Shakespeare\u0027s\r\nprologues,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"I come no more to make you laugh; things now,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThat bear a weighty and a serious brow,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nSad, high, and working, full of state and woe,\"\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nmust be my theme. In the deepest heart of all of us there is a corner\r\nin which the ultimate mystery of things works sadly; and I know not\r\nwhat such an association as yours intends, nor what you ask of those\r\nwhom you invite to address you, unless it be to lead you from the\r\nsurface-glamour of existence, and for an hour at least to make you\r\nheedless to the buzzing and jigging and vibration of small interests\r\nand excitements that form the tissue of our ordinary consciousness.\r\nWithout further explanation or apology, then, I ask you to join me in\r\nturning an attention, commonly too unwilling, to the profounder\r\nbass-note of life. Let us search the lonely depths for an hour\r\ntogether, and see what answers in the last folds and recesses of things\r\nour question may find.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P33\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e33}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nI\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWith many men the question of life\u0027s worth is answered by a\r\ntemperamental optimism which makes them incapable of believing that\r\nanything seriously evil can exist. Our dear old Walt Whitman\u0027s works\r\nare the standing text-book of this kind of optimism. The mere joy of\r\nliving is so immense in Walt Whitman\u0027s veins that it abolishes the\r\npossibility of any other kind of feeling:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"To breathe the air, how delicious!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nTo speak, to walk, to seize something by the hand!…\u003cBR\u003e\r\nTo be this incredible God I am!…\u003cBR\u003e\r\nO amazement of things, even the least particle!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nO spirituality of things!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI too carol the Sun, usher\u0027d or at noon, or as now, setting;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI too throb to the brain and beauty of the earth and of all the\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003egrowths of the earth….\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nI sing to the last the equalities, modern or old,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI sing the endless finales of things,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI say Nature continues\u0026mdash;glory continues.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI praise with electric voice,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nFor I do not see one imperfection in the universe,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd I do not see one cause or result lamentable at last.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo Rousseau, writing of the nine years he spent at Annecy, with nothing\r\nbut his happiness to tell:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"How tell what was neither said nor done nor even thought, but tasted\r\nonly and felt, with no object of my felicity but the emotion of\r\nfelicity itself! I rose with the sun, and I was happy; I went to walk,\r\nand I was happy; I saw \u0027Maman,\u0027 and I was happy; I left her, and I was\r\nhappy. I rambled through the woods and over the vine-slopes, I\r\nwandered in the valleys, I read, I lounged, I\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P34\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e34}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nworked in the\r\ngarden, I gathered the fruits, I helped at the indoor work, and\r\nhappiness followed me everywhere. It was in no one assignable thing;\r\nit was all within myself; it could not leave me for a single instant.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf moods like this could be made permanent, and constitutions like\r\nthese universal, there would never be any occasion for such discourses\r\nas the present one. No philosopher would seek to prove articulately\r\nthat life is worth living, for the fact that it absolutely is so would\r\nvouch for itself, and the problem disappear in the vanishing of the\r\nquestion rather than in the coming of anything like a reply. But we\r\nare not magicians to make the optimistic temperament universal; and\r\nalongside of the deliverances of temperamental optimism concerning\r\nlife, those of temperamental pessimism always exist, and oppose to them\r\na standing refutation. In what is called \u0027circular insanity,\u0027 phases\r\nof melancholy succeed phases of mania, with no outward cause that we\r\ncan discover; and often enough to one and the same well person life\r\nwill present incarnate radiance to-day and incarnate dreariness\r\nto-morrow, according to the fluctuations of what the older medical\r\nbooks used to call \"the concoction of the humors.\" In the words of the\r\nnewspaper joke, \"it depends on the liver.\" Rousseau\u0027s ill-balanced\r\nconstitution undergoes a change, and behold him in his latter evil days\r\na prey to melancholy and black delusions of suspicion and fear. Some\r\nmen seem launched upon the world even from their birth with souls as\r\nincapable of happiness as Walt Whitman\u0027s was of gloom, and they have\r\nleft us their messages in even more lasting verse than his,\u0026mdash;the\r\nexquisite Leopardi, for example; or our own contemporary,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P35\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e35}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nJames\r\nThomson, in that pathetic book, The City of Dreadful Night, which I\r\nthink is less well-known than it should be for its literary beauty,\r\nsimply because men are afraid to quote its words,\u0026mdash;they are so gloomy,\r\nand at the same time so sincere. In one place the poet describes a\r\ncongregation gathered to listen to a preacher in a great unillumined\r\ncathedral at night. The sermon is too long to quote, but it ends\r\nthus:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027O Brothers of sad lives! they are so brief;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nA few short years must bring us all relief:\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eCan we not bear these years of laboring breath.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nBut if you would not this poor life fulfil,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLo, you are free to end it when you will,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eWithout the fear of waking after death.\u0027\u0026mdash;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"The organ-like vibrations of his voice\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThrilled through the vaulted aisles and died away;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe yearning of the tones which bade rejoice\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eWas sad and tender as a requiem lay:\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOur shadowy congregation rested still,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAs brooding on that \u0027End it when you will.\u0027\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 10%; letter-spacing: 2em\"\u003e*****\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Our shadowy congregation rested still,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eAs musing on that message we had heard,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd brooding on that \u0027End it when you will,\u0027\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003ePerchance awaiting yet some other word;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhen keen as lightning through a muffled sky\u003cBR\u003e\r\nSprang forth a shrill and lamentable cry;\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027The man speaks sooth, alas! the man speaks sooth:\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eWe have no personal life beyond the grave;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThere is no God; Fate knows nor wrath nor ruth:\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eCan I find here the comfort which I crave?\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027In all eternity I had one chance,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eOne few years\u0027 term of gracious human life,\u0026mdash;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe splendors of the intellect\u0027s advance,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThe sweetness of the home with babes and wife;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P36\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e36}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027The social pleasures with their genial wit;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThe fascination of the worlds of art;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe glories of the worlds of Nature lit\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eBy large imagination\u0027s glowing heart;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027The rapture of mere being, full of health;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThe careless childhood and the ardent youth;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe strenuous manhood winning various wealth,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThe reverend age serene with life\u0027s long truth;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027All the sublime prerogatives of Man;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThe storied memories of the times of old,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe patient tracking of the world\u0027s great plan\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eThrough sequences and changes myriadfold.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027This chance was never offered me before;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eFor me the infinite past is blank and dumb;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThis chance recurreth never, nevermore;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eBlank, blank for me the infinite To-come.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027And this sole chance was frustrate from my birth,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eA mockery, a delusion; and my breath\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOf noble human life upon this earth\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eSo racks me that I sigh for senseless death.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027My wine of life is poison mixed with gall,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eMy noonday passes in a nightmare dream,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI worse than lose the years which are my all:\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eWhat can console me for the loss supreme?\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027Speak not of comfort where no comfort is,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eSpeak not at all: can words make foul things fair!\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOur life \u0027s a cheat, our death a black abyss:\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eHush, and be mute, envisaging despair.\u0027\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"This vehement voice came from the northern aisle,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eRapid and shrill to its abrupt harsh close;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd none gave answer for a certain while,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eFor words must shrink from these most wordless woes;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAt last the pulpit speaker simply said,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWith humid eyes and thoughtful, drooping head,\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P37\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e37}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027My Brother, my poor Brothers, it is thus:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThis life holds nothing good for us,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eBut it ends soon and nevermore can be;\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd we knew nothing of it ere our birth,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd shall know nothing when consigned to earth;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 0.5em\"\u003eI ponder these thoughts, and they comfort me.\u0027\"\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"It ends soon, and never more can be,\" \"Lo, you are free to end it when\r\nyou will,\"\u0026mdash;these verses flow truthfully from the melancholy Thomson\u0027s\r\npen, and are in truth a consolation for all to whom, as to him, the\r\nworld is far more like a steady den of fear than a continual fountain\r\nof delight. That life is not worth living the whole army of suicides\r\ndeclare,\u0026mdash;an army whose roll-call, like the famous evening gun of the\r\nBritish army, follows the sun round the world and never terminates.\r\nWe, too, as we sit here in our comfort, must \u0027ponder these things\u0027\r\nalso, for we are of one substance with these suicides, and their life\r\nis the life we share. The plainest intellectual integrity,\u0026mdash;nay, more,\r\nthe simplest manliness and honor, forbid us to forget their case.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"If suddenly,\" says Mr. Ruskin, \"in the midst of the enjoyments of the\r\npalate and lightnesses of heart of a London dinner-party, the walls of\r\nthe chamber were parted, and through their gap the nearest human beings\r\nwho were famishing and in misery were borne into the midst of the\r\ncompany feasting and fancy free; if, pale from death, horrible in\r\ndestitution, broken by despair, body by body they were laid upon the\r\nsoft carpet, one beside the chair of every guest,\u0026mdash;would only the\r\ncrumbs of the dainties be cast to them; would only a passing glance, a\r\npassing thought, be vouchsafed to them? Yet the actual facts, the real\r\nrelation of each Dives and Lazarus, are not altered by the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P38\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e38}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nintervention of the house-wall between the table and the sick-bed,\u0026mdash;by\r\nthe few feet of ground (how few!) which are, indeed, all that separate\r\nthe merriment from the misery.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo come immediately to the heart of my theme, then, what I propose is\r\nto imagine ourselves reasoning with a fellow-mortal who is on such\r\nterms with life that the only comfort left him is to brood on the\r\nassurance, \"You may end it when you will.\" What reasons can we plead\r\nthat may render such a brother (or sister) willing to take up the\r\nburden again? Ordinary Christians, reasoning with would-be suicides,\r\nhave little to offer them beyond the usual negative, \"Thou shalt not.\"\r\nGod alone is master of life and death, they say, and it is a\r\nblasphemous act to anticipate his absolving hand. But can \u003cI\u003ewe\u003c/I\u003e find\r\nnothing richer or more positive than this, no reflections to urge\r\nwhereby the suicide may actually see, and in all sad seriousness feel,\r\nthat in spite of adverse appearances even for him life is still worth\r\nliving? There are suicides and suicides (in the United States about\r\nthree thousand of them every year), and I must frankly confess that\r\nwith perhaps the majority of these my suggestions are impotent to deal.\r\nWhere suicide is the result of insanity or sudden frenzied impulse,\r\nreflection is impotent to arrest its headway; and cases like these\r\nbelong to the ultimate mystery of evil, concerning which I can only\r\noffer considerations tending toward religious patience at the end of\r\nthis hour. My task, let me say now, is practically narrow, and my\r\nwords are to deal only with that metaphysical \u003cI\u003etedium vitae\u003c/I\u003e which is\r\npeculiar to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P39\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e39}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nreflecting men. Most of you are devoted, for good or\r\nill, to the reflective life. Many of you are students of philosophy,\r\nand have already felt in your own persons the scepticism and unreality\r\nthat too much grubbing in the abstract roots of things will breed.\r\nThis is, indeed, one of the regular fruits of the over-studious career.\r\nToo much questioning and too little active responsibility lead, almost\r\nas often as too much sensualism does, to the edge of the slope, at the\r\nbottom of which lie pessimism and the nightmare or suicidal view of\r\nlife. But to the diseases which reflection breeds, still further\r\nreflection can oppose effective remedies; and it is of the melancholy\r\nand \u003cI\u003eWeltschmerz\u003c/I\u003e bred of reflection that I now proceed to speak.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet me say, immediately, that my final appeal is to nothing more\r\nrecondite than religious faith. So far as my argument is to be\r\ndestructive, it will consist in nothing more than the sweeping away of\r\ncertain views that often keep the springs of religious faith\r\ncompressed; and so far as it is to be constructive, it will consist in\r\nholding up to the light of day certain considerations calculated to let\r\nloose these springs in a normal, natural way. Pessimism is essentially\r\na religious disease. In the form of it to which you are most liable,\r\nit consists in nothing but a religious demand to which there comes no\r\nnormal religious reply.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, there are two stages of recovery from this disease, two different\r\nlevels upon which one may emerge from the midnight view to the daylight\r\nview of things, and I must treat of them in turn. The second stage is\r\nthe more complete and joyous, and it corresponds to the freer exercise\r\nof religious\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P40\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e40}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ntrust and fancy. There are, as is well known,\r\npersons who are naturally very free in this regard, others who are not\r\nat all so. There are persons, for instance, whom we find indulging to\r\ntheir heart\u0027s content in prospects of immortality; and there are others\r\nwho experience the greatest difficulty in making such a notion seem\r\nreal to themselves at all. These latter persons are tied to their\r\nsenses, restricted to their natural experience; and many of them,\r\nmoreover, feel a sort of intellectual loyalty to what they call \u0027hard\r\nfacts,\u0027 which is positively shocked by the easy excursions into the\r\nunseen that other people make at the bare call of sentiment. Minds of\r\neither class may, however, be intensely religious. They may equally\r\ndesire atonement and reconciliation, and crave acquiescence and\r\ncommunion with the total soul of things. But the craving, when the\r\nmind is pent in to the hard facts, especially as science now reveals\r\nthem, can breed pessimism, quite as easily as it breeds optimism when\r\nit inspires religious trust and fancy to wing their way to another and\r\na better world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThat is why I call pessimism an essentially religious disease. The\r\nnightmare view of life has plenty of organic sources; but its great\r\nreflective source has at all times been the contradiction between the\r\nphenomena of nature and the craving of the heart to believe that behind\r\nnature there is a spirit whose expression nature is. What philosophers\r\ncall \u0027natural theology\u0027 has been one way of appeasing this craving;\r\nthat poetry of nature in which our English literature is so rich has\r\nbeen another way. Now, suppose a mind of the latter of our two\r\nclasses, whose imagination is pent in consequently, and who takes its\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P41\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e41}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfacts \u0027hard;\u0027 suppose it, moreover, to feel strongly the craving\r\nfor communion, and yet to realize how desperately difficult it is to\r\nconstrue the scientific order of nature either theologically or\r\npoetically,\u0026mdash;and what result can there be but inner discord and\r\ncontradiction? Now, this inner discord (merely as discord) can be\r\nrelieved in either of two ways: The longing to read the facts\r\nreligiously may cease, and leave the bare facts by themselves; or,\r\nsupplementary facts may be discovered or believed-in, which permit the\r\nreligious reading to go on. These two ways of relief are the two\r\nstages of recovery, the two levels of escape from pessimism, to which I\r\nmade allusion a moment ago, and which the sequel will, I trust, make\r\nmore clear.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nStarting then with nature, we naturally tend, if we have the religious\r\ncraving, to say with Marcus Aurelius, \"O Universe! what thou wishest I\r\nwish.\" Our sacred books and traditions tell us of one God who made\r\nheaven and earth, and, looking on them, saw that they were good. Yet,\r\non more intimate acquaintance, the visible surfaces of heaven and earth\r\nrefuse to be brought by us into any intelligible unity at all. Every\r\nphenomenon that we would praise there exists cheek by jowl with some\r\ncontrary phenomenon that cancels all its religious effect upon the\r\nmind. Beauty and hideousness, love and cruelty, life and death keep\r\nhouse together in indissoluble partnership; and there gradually steals\r\nover us, instead of the old warm notion of a man-loving Deity, that of\r\nan awful power that neither hates nor loves, but rolls all things\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P42\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e42}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\ntogether meaninglessly to a common doom. This is an uncanny, a\r\nsinister, a nightmare view of life, and its peculiar \u003cI\u003eunheimlichkeit\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nor poisonousness, lies expressly in our holding two things together\r\nwhich cannot possibly agree,\u0026mdash;in our clinging, on the one hand, to the\r\ndemand that there shall be a living spirit of the whole; and, on the\r\nother, to the belief that the course of nature must be such a spirit\u0027s\r\nadequate manifestation and expression. It is in the contradiction\r\nbetween the supposed being of a spirit that encompasses and owns us,\r\nand with which we ought to have some communion, and the character of\r\nsuch a spirit as revealed by the visible world\u0027s course, that this\r\nparticular death-in-life paradox and this melancholy-breeding puzzle\r\nreside, Carlyle expresses the result in that chapter of his immortal\r\n\u0027Sartor Resartus\u0027 entitled \u0027The Everlasting No.\u0027 \"I lived,\" writes\r\npoor Teufelsdröckh, \"in a continual, indefinite, pining fear;\r\ntremulous, pusillanimous, apprehensive of I knew not what: it seemed as\r\nif all things in the heavens above and the earth beneath would hurt me;\r\nas if the heavens and the earth were but boundless jaws of a devouring\r\nmonster, wherein I, palpitating, lay waiting to be devoured.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis is the first stage of speculative melancholy. No brute can have\r\nthis sort of melancholy; no man who is irreligious can become its prey.\r\nIt is the sick shudder of the frustrated religious demand, and not the\r\nmere necessary outcome of animal experience. Teufelsdröckh himself\r\ncould have made shift to face the general chaos and bedevilment of this\r\nworld\u0027s experiences very well, were he not the victim of an originally\r\nunlimited trust and affection towards them. If he might meet them\r\npiecemeal, with no suspicion\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P43\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e43}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof any whole expressing itself in\r\nthem, shunning the bitter parts and husbanding the sweet ones, as the\r\noccasion served, and as the day was foul or fair, he could have\r\nzigzagged toward an easy end, and felt no obligation to make the air\r\nvocal with his lamentations. The mood of levity, of \u0027I don\u0027t care,\u0027 is\r\nfor this world\u0027s ills a sovereign and practical anaesthetic. But, no!\r\nsomething deep down in Teufelsdröckh and in the rest of us tells us\r\nthat there \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e a Spirit in things to which we owe allegiance, and for\r\nwhose sake we must keep up the serious mood. And so the inner fever\r\nand discord also are kept up; for nature taken on her visible surface\r\nreveals no such Spirit, and beyond the facts of nature we are at the\r\npresent stage of our inquiry not supposing ourselves to look.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, I do not hesitate frankly and sincerely to confess to you that\r\nthis real and genuine discord seems to me to carry with it the\r\ninevitable bankruptcy of natural religion naïvely and simply taken.\r\nThere were times when Leibnitzes with their heads buried in monstrous\r\nwigs could compose Theodicies, and when stall-fed officials of an\r\nestablished church could prove by the valves in the heart and the round\r\nligament of the hip-joint the existence of a \"Moral and Intelligent\r\nContriver of the World.\" But those times are past; and we of the\r\nnineteenth century, with our evolutionary theories and our mechanical\r\nphilosophies, already know nature too impartially and too well to\r\nworship unreservedly any God of whose character she can be an adequate\r\nexpression. Truly, all we know of good and duty proceeds from nature;\r\nbut none the less so all we know of evil. Visible nature is all\r\nplasticity and indifference,\u0026mdash;a moral multiverse, as one might call it,\r\nand not a moral\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P44\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e44}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nuniverse. To such a harlot we owe no allegiance;\r\nwith her as a whole we can establish no moral communion; and we are\r\nfree in our dealings with her several parts to obey or destroy, and to\r\nfollow no law but that of prudence in coming to terms with such other\r\nparticular features as will help us to our private ends. If there be a\r\ndivine Spirit of the universe, nature, such as we know her, cannot\r\npossibly be its \u003cI\u003eultimate word\u003c/I\u003e to man. Either there is no Spirit\r\nrevealed in nature, or else it is inadequately revealed there; and (as\r\nall the higher religions have assumed) what we call visible nature, or\r\n\u003cI\u003ethis\u003c/I\u003e world, must be but a veil and surface-show whose full meaning\r\nresides in a supplementary unseen or \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI cannot help, therefore, accounting it on the whole a gain (though it\r\nmay seem for certain poetic constitutions a very sad loss) that the\r\nnaturalistic superstition, the worship of the God of nature, simply\r\ntaken as such, should have begun to loosen its hold upon the educated\r\nmind. In fact, if I am to express my personal opinion unreservedly, I\r\nshould say (in spite of its sounding blasphemous at first to certain\r\nears) that the initial step towards getting into healthy ultimate\r\nrelations with the universe is the act of rebellion against the idea\r\nthat such a God exists. Such rebellion essentially is that which in\r\nthe chapter I have quoted from Carlyle goes on to describe:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"\u0027Wherefore, like a coward, dost thou forever pip and whimper, and go\r\ncowering and trembling? Despicable biped!… Hast thou not a heart;\r\ncanst thou not suffer whatsoever it be; and, as a Child of Freedom,\r\nthough outcast, trample Tophet itself under thy feet, while it consumes\r\nthee? Let it come, then, I will meet it and defy it!\u0027 And as I so\r\nthought, there rushed like a stream of fire\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P45\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e45}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nover my whole soul;\r\nand I shook base Fear away from me forever….\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"Thus had the Everlasting No pealed authoritatively through all the\r\nrecesses of my being, of my Me, and then was it that my whole Me stood\r\nup, in native God-created majesty, and recorded its Protest. Such a\r\nProtest, the most important transaction in life, may that same\r\nIndignation and Defiance, in a psychological point of view, be fitly\r\ncalled. The Everlasting No had said: \u0027Behold, thou art fatherless,\r\noutcast, and the Universe is mine;\u0027 to which my whole Me now made\r\nanswer: \u0027I am not thine, but Free, and forever hate thee!\u0027 From that\r\nhour,\" Teufelsdröckh-Carlyle adds, \"I began to be a man.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd our poor friend, James Thomson, similarly writes:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eI think myself, yet I would rather be\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eMy miserable self than He, than He\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWho formed such creatures to his own disgrace.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nThe vilest thing must be less vile than Thou\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eFrom whom it had its being, God and Lord!\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eCreator of all woe and sin! abhorred,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMalignant and implacable! I vow\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nThat not for all Thy power furled and unfurled,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eFor all the temples to Thy glory built,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eWould I assume the ignominious guilt\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOf having made such men in such a world.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe are familiar enough in this community with the spectacle of persons\r\nexulting in their emancipation from belief in the God of their\r\nancestral Calvinism,\u0026mdash;him who made the garden and the serpent, and\r\npre-appointed the eternal fires of hell. Some of them have found\r\nhumaner gods to worship, others are simply converts from all theology;\r\nbut, both alike, they\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P46\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e46}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nassure us that to have got rid of the\r\nsophistication of thinking they could feel any reverence or duty toward\r\nthat impossible idol gave a tremendous happiness to their souls. Now,\r\nto make an idol of the spirit of nature, and worship it, also leads to\r\nsophistication; and in souls that are religious and would also be\r\nscientific the sophistication breeds a philosophical melancholy, from\r\nwhich the first natural step of escape is the denial of the idol; and\r\nwith the downfall of the idol, whatever lack of positive joyousness may\r\nremain, there comes also the downfall of the whimpering and cowering\r\nmood. With evil simply taken as such, men can make short work, for\r\ntheir relations with it then are only practical. It looms up no longer\r\nso spectrally, it loses all its haunting and perplexing significance,\r\nas soon as the mind attacks the instances of it singly, and ceases to\r\nworry about their derivation from the \u0027one and only Power.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere, then, on this stage of mere emancipation from monistic\r\nsuperstition, the would-be suicide may already get encouraging answers\r\nto his question about the worth of life. There are in most men\r\ninstinctive springs of vitality that respond healthily when the burden\r\nof metaphysical and infinite responsibility rolls off. The certainty\r\nthat you now \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e step out of life whenever you please, and that to do\r\nso is not blasphemous or monstrous, is itself an immense relief. The\r\nthought of suicide is now no longer a guilty challenge and obsession.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"This little life is all we must endure;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe grave\u0027s most holy peace is ever sure,\"\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nsays Thomson; adding, \"I ponder these thoughts, and they comfort me.\"\r\nMeanwhile we can always\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P47\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e47}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nstand it for twenty-four hours longer, if\r\nonly to see what to-morrow\u0027s newspaper will contain, or what the next\r\npostman will bring.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut far deeper forces than this mere vital curiosity are arousable,\r\neven in the pessimistically-tending mind; for where the loving and\r\nadmiring impulses are dead, the hating and fighting impulses will still\r\nrespond to fit appeals. This evil which we feel so deeply is something\r\nthat we can also help to overthrow; for its sources, now that no\r\n\u0027Substance\u0027 or \u0027Spirit\u0027 is behind them, are finite, and we can deal\r\nwith each of them in turn. It is, indeed, a remarkable fact that\r\nsufferings and hardships do not, as a rule, abate the love of life;\r\nthey seem, on the contrary, usually to give it a keener zest. The\r\nsovereign source of melancholy is repletion. Need and struggle are\r\nwhat excite and inspire us; our hour of triumph is what brings the\r\nvoid. Not the Jews of the captivity, but those of the days of\r\nSolomon\u0027s glory are those from whom the pessimistic utterances in our\r\nBible come. Germany, when she lay trampled beneath the hoofs of\r\nBonaparte\u0027s troopers, produced perhaps the most optimistic and\r\nidealistic literature that the world has seen; and not till the French\r\n\u0027milliards\u0027 were distributed after 1871 did pessimism overrun the\r\ncountry in the shape in which we see it there to-day. The history of\r\nour own race is one long commentary on the cheerfulness that comes with\r\nfighting ills. Or take the Waldenses, of whom I lately have been\r\nreading, as examples of what strong men will endure. In 1483 a papal\r\nbull of Innocent VIII. enjoined their extermination. It absolved those\r\nwho should take up the crusade against them from all ecclesiastical\r\npains and penalties, released them from\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P48\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e48}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nany oath, legitimized\r\ntheir title to all property which they might have illegally acquired,\r\nand promised remission of sins to all who should kill the heretics.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"There is no town in Piedmont,\" says a Vaudois writer, \"where some of\r\nour brethren have not been put to death. Jordan Terbano was burnt\r\nalive at Susa; Hippolite Rossiero at Turin, Michael Goneto, an\r\noctogenarian, at Sarcena; Vilermin Ambrosio hanged on the Col di Meano;\r\nHugo Chiambs, of Fenestrelle, had his entrails torn from his living\r\nbody at Turin; Peter Geymarali of Bobbio in like manner had his\r\nentrails taken out in Lucerna, and a fierce cat thrust in their place\r\nto torture him further; Maria Romano was buried alive at Rocca Patia;\r\nMagdalena Fauno underwent the same fate at San Giovanni; Susanna\r\nMichelini was bound hand and foot, and left to perish of cold and\r\nhunger on the snow at Sarcena; Bartolomeo Fache, gashed with sabres,\r\nhad the wounds filled up with quicklime, and perished thus in agony at\r\nPenile; Daniel Michelini had his tongue torn out at Bobbo for having\r\npraised God; James Baridari perished covered with sulphurous matches\r\nwhich had been forced into his flesh under the nails, between the\r\nfingers, in the nostrils, in the lips, and all over the body, and then\r\nlighted; Daniel Rovelli had his mouth filled with gunpowder, which,\r\nbeing lighted, blew his head to pieces;… Sara Rostignol was slit\r\nopen from the legs to the bosom, and left so to perish on the road\r\nbetween Eyral and Lucerna; Anna Charbonnier was impaled, and carried\r\nthus on a pike from San Giovanni to La Torre.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch02fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch02fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eUnd dergleicken mehr\u003c/I\u003e! In 1630 the plague swept away one-half of the\r\nVaudois population, including fifteen of their seventeen pastors. The\r\nplaces of these were supplied from Geneva and Dauphiny, and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P49\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e49}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe\r\nwhole Vaudois people learned French in order to follow their services.\r\nMore than once their number fell, by unremitting persecution, from the\r\nnormal standard of twenty-five thousand to about four thousand. In\r\n1686 the Duke of Savoy ordered the three thousand that remained to give\r\nup their faith or leave the country. Refusing, they fought the French\r\nand Piedmontese armies till only eighty of their fighting men remained\r\nalive or uncaptured, when they gave up, and were sent in a body to\r\nSwitzerland. But in 1689, encouraged by William of Orange and led by\r\none of their pastor-captains, between eight hundred and nine hundred of\r\nthem returned to conquer their old homes again. They fought their way\r\nto Bobi, reduced to four hundred men in the first half year, and met\r\nevery force sent against them, until at last the Duke of Savoy, giving\r\nup his alliance with that abomination of desolation, Louis XIV.,\r\nrestored them to comparative freedom,\u0026mdash;since which time they have\r\nincreased and multiplied in their barren Alpine valleys to this day.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat are our woes and sufferance compared with these? Does not the\r\nrecital of such a fight so obstinately waged against such odds fill us\r\nwith resolution against our petty powers of darkness,\u0026mdash;machine\r\npoliticians, spoilsmen, and the rest? Life is worth living, no matter\r\nwhat it bring, if only such combats may be carried to successful\r\nterminations and one\u0027s heel set on the tyrant\u0027s throat. To the\r\nsuicide, then, in his supposed world of multifarious and immoral\r\nnature, you can appeal\u0026mdash;and appeal in the name of the very evils that\r\nmake his heart sick there\u0026mdash;to wait and see his part of the battle out.\r\nAnd the consent to live on, which you ask of him under these\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P50\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e50}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncircumstances, is not the sophistical \u0027resignation\u0027 which devotees of\r\ncowering religions preach: it is not resignation in the sense of\r\nlicking a despotic Deity\u0027s hand. It is, on the contrary, a resignation\r\nbased on manliness and pride. So long as your would-be suicide leaves\r\nan evil of his own unremedied, so long he has strictly no concern with\r\nevil in the abstract and at large. The submission which you demand of\r\nyourself to the general fact of evil in the world, your apparent\r\nacquiescence in it, is here nothing but the conviction that evil at\r\nlarge is \u003cI\u003enone of your business\u003c/I\u003e until your business with your private\r\nparticular evils is liquidated and settled up. A challenge of this\r\nsort, with proper designation of detail, is one that need only be made\r\nto be accepted by men whose normal instincts are not decayed; and your\r\nreflective would-be suicide may easily be moved by it to face life with\r\na certain interest again. The sentiment of honor is a very penetrating\r\nthing. When you and I, for instance, realize how many innocent beasts\r\nhave had to suffer in cattle-cars and slaughter-pens and lay down their\r\nlives that we might grow up, all fattened and clad, to sit together\r\nhere in comfort and carry on this discourse, it does, indeed, put our\r\nrelation to the universe in a more solemn light. \"Does not,\" as a\r\nyoung Amherst philosopher (Xenos Clark, now dead) once wrote, \"the\r\nacceptance of a happy life upon such terms involve a point of honor?\"\r\nAre we not bound to take some suffering upon ourselves, to do some\r\nself-denying service with our lives, in return for all those lives upon\r\nwhich ours are built? To hear this question is to answer it in but one\r\npossible way, if one have a normally constituted heart.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P51\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e51}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus, then, we see that mere instinctive curiosity, pugnacity, and\r\nhonor may make life on a purely naturalistic basis seem worth living\r\nfrom day to day to men who have cast away all metaphysics in order to\r\nget rid of hypochondria, but who are resolved to owe nothing as yet to\r\nreligion and its more positive gifts. A poor half-way stage, some of\r\nyou may be inclined to say; but at least you must grant it to be an\r\nhonest stage; and no man should dare to speak meanly of these instincts\r\nwhich are our nature\u0027s best equipment, and to which religion herself\r\nmust in the last resort address her own peculiar appeals.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIV.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd now, in turning to what religion may have to say to the question, I\r\ncome to what is the soul of my discourse. Religion has meant many\r\nthings in human history; but when from now onward I use the word I mean\r\nto use it in the supernaturalist sense, as declaring that the so-called\r\norder of nature, which constitutes this world\u0027s experience, is only one\r\nportion of the total universe, and that there stretches beyond this\r\nvisible world an unseen world of which we now know nothing positive,\r\nbut in its relation to which the true significance of our present\r\nmundane life consists. A man\u0027s religious faith (whatever more special\r\nitems of doctrine it may involve) means for me essentially his faith in\r\nthe existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of\r\nthe natural order may be found explained. In the more developed\r\nreligions the natural world has always been regarded as the mere\r\nscaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world, and affirmed\r\nto be a sphere of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P52\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e52}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\neducation, trial, or redemption. In these\r\nreligions, one must in some fashion die to the natural life before one\r\ncan enter into life eternal. The notion that this physical world of\r\nwind and water, where the sun rises and the moon sets, is absolutely\r\nand ultimately the divinely aimed-at and established thing, is one\r\nwhich we find only in very early religions, such as that of the most\r\nprimitive Jews. It is this natural religion (primitive still, in spite\r\nof the fact that poets and men of science whose good-will exceeds their\r\nperspicacity keep publishing it in new editions tuned to our\r\ncontemporary ears) that, as I said a while ago, has suffered definitive\r\nbankruptcy in the opinion of a circle of persons, among whom I must\r\ncount myself, and who are growing more numerous every day. For such\r\npersons the physical order of nature, taken simply as science knows it,\r\ncannot be held to reveal any one harmonious spiritual intent. It is\r\nmere \u003cI\u003eweather\u003c/I\u003e, as Chauncey Wright called it, doing and undoing without\r\nend.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, I wish to make you feel, if I can in the short remainder of this\r\nhour, that we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a\r\npartial order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen\r\nspiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem\r\nto us better worth living again. But as such a trust will seem to some\r\nof you sadly mystical and execrably unscientific, I must first say a\r\nword or two to weaken the veto which you may consider that science\r\nopposes to our act.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere is included in human nature an ingrained naturalism and\r\nmaterialism of mind which can only admit facts that are actually\r\ntangible. Of this sort of mind the entity called \u0027science\u0027 is the\r\nidol.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P53\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e53}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nFondness for the word \u0027scientist\u0027 is one of the notes by\r\nwhich you may know its votaries; and its short way of killing any\r\nopinion that it disbelieves in is to call it \u0027unscientific.\u0027 It must\r\nbe granted that there is no slight excuse for this. Science has made\r\nsuch glorious leaps in the last three hundred years, and extended our\r\nknowledge of nature so enormously both in general and in detail; men of\r\nscience, moreover, have as a class displayed such admirable\r\nvirtues,\u0026mdash;that it is no wonder if the worshippers of science lose their\r\nhead. In this very University, accordingly, I have heard more than one\r\nteacher say that all the fundamental conceptions of truth have already\r\nbeen found by science, and that the future has only the details of the\r\npicture to fill in. But the slightest reflection on the real\r\nconditions will suffice to show how barbaric such notions are. They\r\nshow such a lack of scientific imagination, that it is hard to see how\r\none who is actively advancing any part of science can make a mistake so\r\ncrude. Think how many absolutely new scientific conceptions have\r\narisen in our own generation, how many new problems have been\r\nformulated that were never thought of before, and then cast an eye upon\r\nthe brevity of science\u0027s career. It began with Galileo, not three\r\nhundred years ago. Four thinkers since Galileo, each informing his\r\nsuccessor of what discoveries his own lifetime had seen achieved, might\r\nhave passed the torch of science into our hands as we sit here in this\r\nroom. Indeed, for the matter of that, an audience much smaller than\r\nthe present one, an audience of some five or six score people, if each\r\nperson in it could speak for his own generation, would carry us away to\r\nthe black unknown of the human species,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P54\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e54}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nto days without a document\r\nor monument to tell their tale. Is it credible that such a mushroom\r\nknowledge, such a growth overnight as this, \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e represent more than\r\nthe minutest glimpse of what the universe will really prove to be when\r\nadequately understood? No! our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea.\r\nWhatever else be certain, this at least is certain,\u0026mdash;that the world of\r\nour present natural knowledge \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e enveloped in a larger world of\r\n\u003cI\u003esome\u003c/I\u003e sort of whose residual properties we at present can frame no\r\npositive idea.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgnostic positivism, of course, admits this principle theoretically in\r\nthe most cordial terms, but insists that we must not turn it to any\r\npractical use. We have no right, this doctrine tells us, to dream\r\ndreams, or suppose anything about the unseen part of the universe,\r\nmerely because to do so may be for what we are pleased to call our\r\nhighest interests. We must always wait for sensible evidence for our\r\nbeliefs; and where such evidence is inaccessible we must frame no\r\nhypotheses whatever. Of course this is a safe enough position \u003cI\u003ein\r\nabstracto\u003c/I\u003e. If a thinker had no stake in the unknown, no vital needs,\r\nto live or languish according to what the unseen world contained, a\r\nphilosophic neutrality and refusal to believe either one way or the\r\nother would be his wisest cue. But, unfortunately, neutrality is not\r\nonly inwardly difficult, it is also outwardly unrealizable, where our\r\nrelations to an alternative are practical and vital. This is because,\r\nas the psychologists tell us, belief and doubt are living attitudes,\r\nand involve conduct on our part. Our only way, for example, of\r\ndoubting, or refusing to believe, that a certain thing \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e, is\r\ncontinuing to act as if it were \u003cI\u003enot\u003c/I\u003e. If, for instance,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P55\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e55}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nI refuse\r\nto believe that the room is getting cold, I leave the windows open and\r\nlight no fire just as if it still were warm. If I doubt that you are\r\nworthy of my confidence, I keep you uninformed of all my secrets just\r\nas if you were \u003cI\u003eun\u003c/I\u003eworthy of the same. If I doubt the need of insuring\r\nmy house, I leave it uninsured as much as if I believed there were no\r\nneed. And so if I must not believe that the world is divine, I can\r\nonly express that refusal by declining ever to act distinctively as if\r\nit were so, which can only mean acting on certain critical occasions as\r\nif it were \u003cI\u003enot\u003c/I\u003e so, or in an irreligious way. There are, you see,\r\ninevitable occasions in life when inaction is a kind of action, and\r\nmust count as action, and when not to be for is to be practically\r\nagainst; and in all such cases strict and consistent neutrality is an\r\nunattainable thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd, after all, is not this duty of neutrality where only our inner\r\ninterests would lead us to believe, the most ridiculous of commands?\r\nIs it not sheer dogmatic folly to say that our inner interests can have\r\nno real connection with the forces that the hidden world may contain?\r\nIn other cases divinations based on inner interests have proved\r\nprophetic enough. Take science itself! Without an imperious inner\r\ndemand on our part for ideal logical and mathematical harmonies, we\r\nshould never have attained to proving that such harmonies be hidden\r\nbetween all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world.\r\nHardly a law has been established in science, hardly a fact\r\nascertained, which was not first sought after, often with sweat and\r\nblood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do not\r\nknow; we find them in us, and biological psychology so far only classes\r\nthem with Darwin\u0027s \u0027accidental variations.\u0027\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P56\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e56}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nBut the inner need of\r\nbelieving that this world of nature is a sign of something more\r\nspiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative\r\nin those who feel it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation\r\never can be in a professionally scientific head. The toil of many\r\ngenerations has proved the latter need prophetic. Why \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e not the\r\nformer one be prophetic, too? And if needs of ours outrun the visible\r\nuniverse, why \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e not that be a sign that an invisible universe is\r\nthere? What, in short, has authority to debar us from trusting our\r\nreligious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, for she\r\ncan only say what is, not what is not; and the agnostic \"thou shalt not\r\nbelieve without coercive sensible evidence\" is simply an expression\r\n(free to any one to make) of private personal appetite for evidence of\r\na certain peculiar kind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, when I speak of trusting our religious demands, just what do I\r\nmean by \u0027trusting\u0027? Is the word to carry with it license to define in\r\ndetail an invisible world, and to anathematize and excommunicate those\r\nwhose trust is different? Certainly not! Our faculties of belief were\r\nnot primarily given us to make orthodoxies and heresies withal; they\r\nwere given us to live by. And to trust our religious demands means\r\nfirst of all to live in the light of them, and to act as if the\r\ninvisible world which they suggest were real. It is a fact of human\r\nnature, that men can live and die by the help of a sort of faith that\r\ngoes without a single dogma or definition. The bare assurance that\r\nthis natural order is not ultimate but a mere sign or vision, the\r\nexternal staging of a many-storied universe, in which spiritual forces\r\nhave the last word and are eternal,\u0026mdash;this bare\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P57\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e57}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nassurance is to\r\nsuch men enough to make life seem worth living in spite of every\r\ncontrary presumption suggested by its circumstances on the natural\r\nplane. Destroy this inner assurance, however, vague as it is, and all\r\nthe light and radiance of existence is extinguished for these persons\r\nat a stroke. Often enough the wild-eyed look at life\u0026mdash;the suicidal\r\nmood\u0026mdash;will then set in.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd now the application comes directly home to you and me. Probably to\r\nalmost every one of us here the most adverse life would seem well worth\r\nliving, if we only could be \u003cI\u003ecertain\u003c/I\u003e that our bravery and patience\r\nwith it were terminating and eventuating and bearing fruit somewhere in\r\nan unseen spiritual world. But granting we are not certain, does it\r\nthen follow that a bare trust in such a world is a fool\u0027s paradise and\r\nlubberland, or rather that it is a living attitude in which we are free\r\nto indulge? Well, we are free to trust at our own risks anything that\r\nis not impossible, and that can bring analogies to bear in its behalf.\r\nThat the world of physics is probably not absolute, all the converging\r\nmultitude of arguments that make in favor of idealism tend to prove;\r\nand that our whole physical life may lie soaking in a spiritual\r\natmosphere, a dimension of being that we at present have no organ for\r\napprehending, is vividly suggested to us by the analogy of the life of\r\nour domestic animals. Our dogs, for example, are in our human life but\r\nnot of it. They witness hourly the outward body of events whose inner\r\nmeaning cannot, by any possible operation, be revealed to their\r\nintelligence,\u0026mdash;events in which they themselves often play the cardinal\r\npart. My terrier bites a teasing boy, for example, and the father\r\ndemands damages. The dog\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P58\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e58}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmay be present at every step of the\r\nnegotiations, and see the money paid, without an inkling of what it all\r\nmeans, without a suspicion that it has anything to do with \u003cI\u003ehim\u003c/I\u003e; and\r\nhe never \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e know in his natural dog\u0027s life. Or take another case\r\nwhich used greatly to impress me in my medical-student days. Consider\r\na poor dog whom they are vivisecting in a laboratory. He lies strapped\r\non a board and shrieking at his executioners, and to his own dark\r\nconsciousness is literally in a sort of hell. He cannot see a single\r\nredeeming ray in the whole business; and yet all these\r\ndiabolical-seeming events are often controlled by human intentions with\r\nwhich, if his poor benighted mind could only be made to catch a glimpse\r\nof them, all that is heroic in him would religiously acquiesce.\r\nHealing truth, relief to future sufferings of beast and man, are to be\r\nbought by them. It may be genuinely a process of redemption. Lying on\r\nhis back on the board there he may be performing a function\r\nincalculably higher than any that prosperous canine life admits of; and\r\nyet, of the whole performance, this function is the one portion that\r\nmust remain absolutely beyond his ken.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow turn from this to the life of man. In the dog\u0027s life we see the\r\nworld invisible to him because we live in both worlds. In human life,\r\nalthough we only see our world, and his within it, yet encompassing\r\nboth these worlds a still wider world may be there, as unseen by us as\r\nour world is by him; and to believe in that world \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e be the most\r\nessential function that our lives in this world have to perform. But\r\n\"\u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e be! \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e be!\" one now hears the positivist contemptuously\r\nexclaim; \"what use can a scientific life have for maybes?\" Well, I\r\nreply, the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P59\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e59}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u0027scientific\u0027 life itself has much to do with maybes,\r\nand human life at large has everything to do with them. So far as man\r\nstands for anything, and is productive or originative at all, his\r\nentire vital function may be said to have to deal with maybes. Not a\r\nvictory is gained, not a deed of faithfulness or courage is done,\r\nexcept upon a maybe; not a service, not a sally of generosity, not a\r\nscientific exploration or experiment or text-book, that may not be a\r\nmistake. It is only by risking our persons from one hour to another\r\nthat we live at all. And often enough our faith beforehand in an\r\nuncertified result \u003cI\u003eis the only thing that makes the result come true\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nSuppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain, and have\r\nworked yourself into a position from which the only escape is by a\r\nterrible leap. Have faith that you can successfully make it, and your\r\nfeet are nerved to its accomplishment. But mistrust yourself, and\r\nthink of all the sweet things you have heard the scientists say of\r\nmaybes, and you will hesitate so long that, at last, all unstrung and\r\ntrembling, and launching yourself in a moment of despair, you roll in\r\nthe abyss. In such a case (and it belongs to an enormous class), the\r\npart of wisdom as well as of courage is to \u003cI\u003ebelieve what is in the line\r\nof your needs\u003c/I\u003e, for only by such belief is the need fulfilled. Refuse\r\nto believe, and you shall indeed be right, for you shall irretrievably\r\nperish. But believe, and again you shall be right, for you shall save\r\nyourself. You make one or the other of two possible universes true by\r\nyour trust or mistrust,\u0026mdash;both universes having been only \u003cI\u003emaybes\u003c/I\u003e, in\r\nthis particular, before you contributed your act.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, it appears to me that the question whether life is worth living is\r\nsubject to conditions logically\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P60\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e60}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmuch like these. It does, indeed,\r\ndepend on you \u003cI\u003ethe liver\u003c/I\u003e. If you surrender to the nightmare view and\r\ncrown the evil edifice by your own suicide, you have indeed made a\r\npicture totally black. Pessimism, completed by your act, is true\r\nbeyond a doubt, so far as your world goes. Your mistrust of life has\r\nremoved whatever worth your own enduring existence might have given to\r\nit; and now, throughout the whole sphere of possible influence of that\r\nexistence, the mistrust has proved itself to have had divining power.\r\nBut suppose, on the other hand, that instead of giving way to the\r\nnightmare view you cling to it that this world is not the \u003cI\u003eultimatum\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nSuppose you find yourself a very well-spring, as Wordsworth says, of\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Zeal, and the virtue to exist by faith\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAs soldiers live by courage; as, by strength\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOf heart, the sailor fights with roaring seas.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nSuppose, however thickly evils crowd upon you, that your unconquerable\r\nsubjectivity proves to be their match, and that you find a more\r\nwonderful joy than any passive pleasure can bring in trusting ever in\r\nthe larger whole. Have you not now made life worth living on these\r\nterms? What sort of a thing would life really be, with your qualities\r\nready for a tussle with it, if it only brought fair weather and gave\r\nthese higher faculties of yours no scope? Please remember that\r\noptimism and pessimism are definitions of the world, and that our own\r\nreactions on the world, small as they are in bulk, are integral parts\r\nof the whole thing, and necessarily help to determine the definition.\r\nThey may even be the decisive elements in determining the definition.\r\nA large mass can have its unstable equilibrium overturned by the\r\naddition\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P61\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e61}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof a feather\u0027s weight; a long phrase may have its sense\r\nreversed by the addition of the three letters \u003cI\u003en-o-t\u003c/I\u003e. This life is\r\nworth living, we can say, \u003cI\u003esince it is what we make it, from the moral\r\npoint of view\u003c/I\u003e; and we are determined to make it from that point of\r\nview, so far as we have anything to do with it, a success.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, in this description of faiths that verify themselves I have\r\nassumed that our faith in an invisible order is what inspires those\r\nefforts and that patience which make this visible order good for moral\r\nmen. Our faith in the seen world\u0027s goodness (goodness now meaning\r\nfitness for successful moral and religious life) has verified itself by\r\nleaning on our faith in the unseen world. But will our faith in the\r\nunseen world similarly verify itself? Who knows?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOnce more it is a case of \u003cI\u003emaybe\u003c/I\u003e; and once more maybes are the essence\r\nof the situation. I confess that I do not see why the very existence\r\nof an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response\r\nwhich any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in\r\nshort, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our\r\nfidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and\r\ntragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If\r\nthis life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained\r\nfor the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private\r\ntheatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it \u003cI\u003efeels\u003c/I\u003e like a\r\nreal fight,\u0026mdash;as if there were something really wild in the universe\r\nwhich we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to\r\nredeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and\r\nfears. For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is\r\nadapted. The deepest thing in our\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P62\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e62}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnature is this \u003cI\u003eBinnenleben\u003c/I\u003e\r\n(as a German doctor lately has called it), this dumb region of the\r\nheart in which we dwell alone with our willingnesses and\r\nunwillingnesses, our faiths and fears. As through the cracks and\r\ncrannies of caverns those waters exude from the earth\u0027s bosom which\r\nthen form the fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths\r\nof personality the sources of all our outer deeds and decisions take\r\ntheir rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature\r\nof things; and compared with these concrete movements of our soul all\r\nabstract statements and scientific arguments\u0026mdash;the veto, for example,\r\nwhich the strict positivist pronounces upon our faith\u0026mdash;sound to us like\r\nmere chatterings of the teeth. For here possibilities, not finished\r\nfacts, are the realities with which we have actively to deal; and to\r\nquote my friend William Salter, of the Philadelphia Ethical Society,\r\n\"as the essence of courage is to stake one\u0027s life on a possibility, so\r\nthe essence of faith is to believe that the possibility exists.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThese, then, are my last words to you: Be not afraid of life. Believe\r\nthat life \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e worth living, and your belief will help create the fact.\r\nThe \u0027scientific proof\u0027 that you are right may not be clear before the\r\nday of judgment (or some stage of being which that expression may serve\r\nto symbolize) is reached. But the faithful fighters of this hour, or\r\nthe beings that then and there will represent them, may then turn to\r\nthe faint-hearted, who here decline to go on, with words like those\r\nwith which Henry IV. greeted the tardy Crillon after a great victory\r\nhad been gained: \"Hang yourself, brave Crillon! we fought at Arques,\r\nand you were not there.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch02fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch02fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch02fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] An Address to the Harvard Young Men\u0027s Christian Association.\r\nPublished in the International Journal of Ethics for October, 1895, and\r\nas a pocket volume by S. B. Weston, Philadelphia, 1896.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch02fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] Quoted by George E. Waring in his book on Tyrol. Compare A.\r\nBérard: Les Vaudois, Lyon, Storck, 1892.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap03\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P63\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e63}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTHE SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nI.\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat is the task which philosophers set themselves to perform; and why\r\ndo they philosophize at all? Almost every one will immediately reply:\r\nThey desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall\r\non the whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which\r\nevery one by nature carries about with him under his hat. But suppose\r\nthis rational conception attained, how is the philosopher to recognize\r\nit for what it is, and not let it slip through ignorance? The only\r\nanswer can be that he will recognize its rationality as he recognizes\r\neverything else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him.\r\nWhen he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the rationality.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat, then, are the marks? A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest, is\r\none of them. The transition from a state of puzzle and perplexity to\r\nrational comprehension is full of lively relief and pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut this relief seems to be a negative rather than a positive\r\ncharacter. Shall we then say that the feeling of rationality is\r\nconstituted merely by the absence\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P64\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e64}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof any feeling of irrationality?\r\nI think there are very good grounds for upholding such a view. All\r\nfeeling whatever, in the light of certain recent psychological\r\nspeculations, seems to depend for its physical condition not on simple\r\ndischarge of nerve-currents, but on their discharge under arrest,\r\nimpediment, or resistance. Just as we feel no particular pleasure when\r\nwe breathe freely, but a very intense feeling of distress when the\r\nrespiratory motions are prevented,\u0026mdash;so any unobstructed tendency to\r\naction discharges itself without the production of much cogitative\r\naccompaniment, and any perfectly fluent course of thought awakens but\r\nlittle feeling; but when the movement is inhibited, or when the thought\r\nmeets with difficulties, we experience distress. It is only when the\r\ndistress is upon us that we can be said to strive, to crave, or to\r\naspire. When enjoying plenary freedom either in the way of motion or\r\nof thought, we are in a sort of anaesthetic state in which we might say\r\nwith Walt Whitman, if we cared to say anything about ourselves at such\r\ntimes, \"I am sufficient as I am.\" This feeling of the sufficiency of\r\nthe present moment, of its absoluteness,\u0026mdash;this absence of all need to\r\nexplain it, account for it, or justify it,\u0026mdash;is what I call the\r\nSentiment of Rationality. As soon, in short, as we are enabled from\r\nany cause whatever to think with perfect fluency, the thing we think of\r\nseems to us \u003cI\u003epro tanto\u003c/I\u003e rational.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhatever modes of conceiving the cosmos facilitate this fluency,\r\nproduce the sentiment of rationality. Conceived in such modes, being\r\nvouches for itself and needs no further philosophic formulation. But\r\nthis fluency may be obtained in various ways; and first I will take up\r\nthe theoretic way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P65\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e65}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe facts of the world in their sensible diversity are always before\r\nus, but our theoretic need is that they should be conceived in a way\r\nthat reduces their manifoldness to simplicity. Our pleasure at finding\r\nthat a chaos of facts is the expression of a single underlying fact is\r\nlike the relief of the musician at resolving a confused mass of sound\r\ninto melodic or harmonic order. The simplified result is handled with\r\nfar less mental effort than the original data; and a philosophic\r\nconception of nature is thus in no metaphorical sense a labor-saving\r\ncontrivance. The passion for parsimony, for economy of means in\r\nthought, is the philosophic passion \u003cI\u003epar excellence\u003c/I\u003e; and any character\r\nor aspect of the world\u0027s phenomena which gathers up their diversity\r\ninto monotony will gratify that passion, and in the philosopher\u0027s mind\r\nstand for that essence of things compared with which all their other\r\ndeterminations may by him be overlooked.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMore universality or extensiveness is, then, one mark which the\r\nphilosopher\u0027s conceptions must possess. Unless they apply to an\r\nenormous number of cases they will not bring him relief. The knowledge\r\nof things by their causes, which is often given as a definition of\r\nrational knowledge, is useless to him unless the causes converge to a\r\nminimum number, while still producing the maximum number of effects.\r\nThe more multiple then are the instances, the more flowingly does his\r\nmind rove from fact to fact. The phenomenal transitions are no real\r\ntransitions; each item is the same old friend with a slightly altered\r\ndress.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWho does not feel the charm of thinking that the moon and the apple\r\nare, as far as their relation to the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P66\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e66}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nearth goes, identical; of\r\nknowing respiration and combustion to be one; of understanding that the\r\nballoon rises by the same law whereby the stone sinks; of feeling that\r\nthe warmth in one\u0027s palm when one rubs one\u0027s sleeve is identical with\r\nthe motion which the friction checks; of recognizing the difference\r\nbetween beast and fish to be only a higher degree of that between human\r\nfather and son; of believing our strength when we climb the mountain or\r\nfell the tree to be no other than the strength of the sun\u0027s rays which\r\nmade the corn grow out of which we got our morning meal?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut alongside of this passion for simplification there exists a sister\r\npassion, which in some minds\u0026mdash;though they perhaps form the minority\u0026mdash;is\r\nits rival. This is the passion for distinguishing; it is the impulse\r\nto be \u003cI\u003eacquainted\u003c/I\u003e with the parts rather than to comprehend the whole.\r\nLoyalty to clearness and integrity of perception, dislike of blurred\r\noutlines, of vague identifications, are its characteristics. It loves\r\nto recognize particulars in their full completeness, and the more of\r\nthese it can carry the happier it is. It prefers any amount of\r\nincoherence, abruptness, and fragmentariness (so long as the literal\r\ndetails of the separate facts are saved) to an abstract way of\r\nconceiving things that, while it simplifies them, dissolves away at the\r\nsame time their concrete fulness. Clearness and simplicity thus set up\r\nrival claims, and make a real dilemma for the thinker.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA man\u0027s philosophic attitude is determined by the balance in him of\r\nthese two cravings. No system of philosophy can hope to be universally\r\naccepted among men which grossly violates either need, or\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P67\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e67}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nentirely\r\nsubordinates the one to the other. The fate of Spinosa, with his\r\nbarren union of all things in one substance, on the one hand; that of\r\nHume, with his equally barren \u0027looseness and separateness\u0027 of\r\neverything, on the other,\u0026mdash;neither philosopher owning any strict and\r\nsystematic disciples to-day, each being to posterity a warning as well\r\nas a stimulus,\u0026mdash;show us that the only possible philosophy must be a\r\ncompromise between an abstract monotony and a concrete heterogeneity.\r\nBut the only way to mediate between diversity and unity is to class the\r\ndiverse items as cases of a common essence which you discover in them.\r\nClassification of things into extensive \u0027kinds\u0027 is thus the first step;\r\nand classification of their relations and conduct into extensive \u0027laws\u0027\r\nis the last step, in their philosophic unification. A completed\r\ntheoretic philosophy can thus never be anything more than a completed\r\nclassification of the world\u0027s ingredients; and its results must always\r\nbe abstract, since the basis of every classification is the abstract\r\nessence embedded in the living fact,\u0026mdash;the rest of the living fact being\r\nfor the time ignored by the classifier. This means that none of our\r\nexplanations are complete. They subsume things under heads wider or\r\nmore familiar; but the last heads, whether of things or of their\r\nconnections, are mere abstract genera, data which we just find in\r\nthings and write down.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen, for example, we think that we have rationally explained the\r\nconnection of the facts \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e by classing both under their common\r\nattribute \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e, it is obvious that we have really explained only so much\r\nof these items as \u003cI\u003eis x\u003c/I\u003e. To explain the connection of choke-damp and\r\nsuffocation by the lack of oxygen is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P68\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e68}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nto leave untouched all the\r\nother peculiarities both of choke-damp and of suffocation,\u0026mdash;such as\r\nconvulsions and agony on the one hand, density and explosibility on the\r\nother. In a word, so far as \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e contain \u003cI\u003el\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cI\u003em\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cI\u003en\u003c/I\u003e, and\r\n\u003cI\u003eo\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cI\u003ep\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cI\u003eq,\u003c/I\u003e respectively, in addition to \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e, they are not explained\r\nby \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e. Each additional particularity makes its distinct appeal. A\r\nsingle explanation of a fact only explains it from a single point of\r\nview. The entire fact is not accounted for until each and all of its\r\ncharacters have been classed with their likes elsewhere. To apply this\r\nnow to the case of the universe, we see that the explanation of the\r\nworld by molecular movements explains it only so far as it actually\r\n\u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e such movements. To invoke the \u0027Unknowable\u0027 explains only so much\r\nas is unknowable, \u0027Thought\u0027 only so much as is thought, \u0027God\u0027 only so\r\nmuch as is God. \u003cI\u003eWhich\u003c/I\u003e thought? \u003cI\u003eWhich\u003c/I\u003e God?\u0026mdash;are questions that\r\nhave to be answered by bringing in again the residual data from which\r\nthe general term was abstracted. All those data that cannot be\r\nanalytically identified with the attribute invoked as universal\r\nprinciple, remain as independent kinds or natures, associated\r\nempirically with the said attribute but devoid of rational kinship with\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHence the unsatisfactoriness of all our speculations. On the one hand,\r\nso far as they retain any multiplicity in their terms, they fail to get\r\nus out of the empirical sand-heap world; on the other, so far as they\r\neliminate multiplicity the practical man despises their empty\r\nbarrenness. The most they can say is that the elements of the world\r\nare such and such, and that each is identical with itself wherever\r\nfound; but the question Where is it found? the practical man is left to\r\nanswer by his own wit. Which, of all the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P69\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e69}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nessences, shall here and\r\nnow be held the essence of this concrete thing, the fundamental\r\nphilosophy never attempts to decide. We are thus led to the conclusion\r\nthat the simple classification of things is, on the one hand, the best\r\npossible theoretic philosophy, but is, on the other, a most miserable\r\nand inadequate substitute for the fulness of the truth. It is a\r\nmonstrous abridgment of life, which, like all abridgments is got by the\r\nabsolute loss and casting out of real matter. This is why so few human\r\nbeings truly care for philosophy. The particular determinations which\r\nshe ignores are the real matter exciting needs, quite as potent and\r\nauthoritative as hers. What does the moral enthusiast care for\r\nphilosophical ethics? Why does the \u003cI\u003eAEsthetik\u003c/I\u003e of every German\r\nphilosopher appear to the artist an abomination of desolation?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nGrau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie\u003cBR\u003e\r\nUnd grün des Lebens goldner Baum.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nThe entire man, who feels all needs by turns, will take nothing as an\r\nequivalent for life but the fulness of living itself. Since the\r\nessences of things are as a matter of fact disseminated through the\r\nwhole extent of time and space, it is in their spread-outness and\r\nalternation that he will enjoy them. When weary of the concrete clash\r\nand dust and pettiness, he will refresh himself by a bath in the\r\neternal springs, or fortify himself by a look at the immutable natures.\r\nBut he will only be a visitor, not a dweller in the region; he will\r\nnever carry the philosophic yoke upon his shoulders, and when tired of\r\nthe gray monotony of her problems and insipid spaciousness of her\r\nresults, will always escape gleefully into the teeming and dramatic\r\nrichness of the concrete world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P70\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e70}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo our study turns back here to its beginning. Every way of\r\nclassifying a thing is but a way of handling it for some particular\r\npurpose. Conceptions, \u0027kinds,\u0027 are teleological instruments. No\r\nabstract concept can be a valid substitute for a concrete reality\r\nexcept with reference to a particular interest in the conceiver. The\r\ninterest of theoretic rationality, the relief of identification, is but\r\none of a thousand human purposes. When others rear their heads, it\r\nmust pack up its little bundle and retire till its turn recurs. The\r\nexaggerated dignity and value that philosophers have claimed for their\r\nsolutions is thus greatly reduced. The only virtue their theoretic\r\nconception need have is simplicity, and a simple conception is an\r\nequivalent for the world only so far as the world is simple,\u0026mdash;the world\r\nmeanwhile, whatever simplicity it may harbor, being also a mightily\r\ncomplex affair. Enough simplicity remains, however, and enough urgency\r\nin our craving to reach it, to make the theoretic function one of the\r\nmost invincible of human impulses. The quest of the fewest elements of\r\nthings is an ideal that some will follow, as long as there are men to\r\nthink at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut suppose the goal attained. Suppose that at last we have a system\r\nunified in the sense that has been explained. Our world can now be\r\nconceived simply, and our mind enjoys the relief. Our universal\r\nconcept has made the concrete chaos rational. But now I ask, Can that\r\nwhich is the ground of rationality in all else be itself properly\r\ncalled rational? It would seem at first sight that it might. One is\r\ntempted at any rate to say that, since the craving for rationality is\r\nappeased by the identification of one\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P71\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e71}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthing with another, a datum\r\nwhich left nothing else outstanding might quench that craving\r\ndefinitively, or be rational \u003cI\u003ein se\u003c/I\u003e. No otherness being left to annoy\r\nus, we should sit down at peace. In other words, as the theoretic\r\ntranquillity of the boor results from his spinning no further\r\nconsiderations about his chaotic universe, so any datum whatever\r\n(provided it were simple, clear, and ultimate) ought to banish puzzle\r\nfrom the universe of the philosopher and confer peace, inasmuch as\r\nthere would then be for him absolutely no further considerations to\r\nspin.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis in fact is what some persons think. Professor Bain says,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"A difficulty is solved, a mystery unriddled, when it can be shown to\r\nresemble something else; to be an example of a fact already known.\r\nMystery is isolation, exception, or it may be apparent contradiction:\r\nthe resolution of the mystery is found in assimilation, identity,\r\nfraternity. When all things are assimilated, so far as assimilation\r\ncan go, so far as likeness holds, there is an end to explanation; there\r\nis an end to what the mind can do, or can intelligently desire…. The\r\npath of science as exhibited in modern ages is toward generality, wider\r\nand wider, until we reach the highest, the widest laws of every\r\ndepartment of things; there explanation is finished, mystery ends,\r\nperfect vision is gained.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, unfortunately, this first answer will not hold. Our mind is so\r\nwedded to the process of seeing an \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e beside every item of its\r\nexperience, that when the notion of an absolute datum is presented to\r\nit, it goes through its usual procedure and remains pointing at the\r\nvoid beyond, as if in that lay further matter for contemplation. In\r\nshort, it spins for itself the further positive consideration of a\r\nnonentity\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P72\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e72}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nenveloping the being of its datum; and as that leads\r\nnowhere, back recoils the thought toward its datum again. But there is\r\nno natural bridge between nonentity and this particular datum, and the\r\nthought stands oscillating to and fro, wondering \"Why was there\r\nanything but nonentity; why just this universal datum and not another?\"\r\nand finds no end, in wandering mazes lost. Indeed, Bain\u0027s words are so\r\nuntrue that in reflecting men it is just when the attempt to fuse the\r\nmanifold into a single totality has been most successful, when the\r\nconception of the universe as a unique fact is nearest its perfection,\r\nthat the craving for further explanation, the ontological\r\nwonder-sickness, arises in its extremest form. As Schopenhauer says,\r\n\"The uneasiness which keeps the never-resting clock of metaphysics in\r\nmotion, is the consciousness that the non-existence of this world is\r\njust as possible as its existence.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe notion of nonentity may thus be called the parent of the\r\nphilosophic craving in its subtilest and profoundest sense. Absolute\r\nexistence is absolute mystery, for its relations with the nothing\r\nremain unmediated to our understanding. One philosopher only has\r\npretended to throw a logical bridge over this chasm. Hegel, by trying\r\nto show that nonentity and concrete being are linked together by a\r\nseries of identities of a synthetic kind, binds everything conceivable\r\ninto a unity, with no outlying notion to disturb the free rotary\r\ncirculation of the mind within its bounds. Since such unchecked\r\nmovement gives the feeling of rationality, he must be held, if he has\r\nsucceeded, to have eternally and absolutely quenched all rational\r\ndemands.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut for those who deem Hegel\u0027s heroic effort to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P73\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e73}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhave failed,\r\nnought remains but to confess that when all things have been unified to\r\nthe supreme degree, the notion of a possible other than the actual may\r\nstill haunt our imagination and prey upon our system. The bottom of\r\nbeing is left logically opaque to us, as something which we simply come\r\nupon and find, and about which (if we wish to act) we should pause and\r\nwonder as little as possible. The philosopher\u0027s logical tranquillity\r\nis thus in essence no other than the boor\u0027s. They differ only as to\r\nthe point at which each refuses to let further considerations upset the\r\nabsoluteness of the data he assumes. The boor does so immediately, and\r\nis liable at any moment to the ravages of many kinds of doubt. The\r\nphilosopher does not do so till unity has been reached, and is\r\nwarranted against the inroads of those considerations, but only\r\npractically, not essentially, secure from the blighting breath of the\r\nultimate Why? If he cannot exorcise this question, he must ignore or\r\nblink it, and, assuming the data of his system as something given, and\r\nthe gift as ultimate, simply proceed to a life of contemplation or of\r\naction based on it. There is no doubt that this acting on an opaque\r\nnecessity is accompanied by a certain pleasure. See the reverence of\r\nCarlyle for brute fact: \"There is an infinite significance in fact.\"\r\n\"Necessity,\" says Dühring, and he means not rational but given\r\nnecessity, \"is the last and highest point that we can reach…. It is\r\nnot only the interest of ultimate and definitive knowledge, but also\r\nthat of the feelings, to find a last repose and an ideal equilibrium in\r\nan uttermost datum which can simply not be other than it is.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch is the attitude of ordinary men in their theism, God\u0027s fiat being\r\nin physics and morals such an\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P74\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e74}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nuttermost datum. Such also is the\r\nattitude of all hard-minded analysts and \u003cI\u003eVerstandesmenschen\u003c/I\u003e. Lotze,\r\nRenouvier, and Hodgson promptly say that of experience as a whole no\r\naccount can be given, but neither seek to soften the abruptness of the\r\nconfession nor to reconcile us with our impotence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut mediating attempts may be made by more mystical minds. The peace\r\nof rationality may be sought through ecstasy when logic fails. To\r\nreligious persons of every shade of doctrine moments come when the\r\nworld, as it is, seems so divinely orderly, and the acceptance of it by\r\nthe heart so rapturously complete, that intellectual questions vanish;\r\nnay, the intellect itself is hushed to sleep,\u0026mdash;as Wordsworth says,\r\n\"thought is not; in enjoyment it expires.\" Ontological emotion so\r\nfills the soul that ontological speculation can no longer overlap it\r\nand put her girdle of interrogation-marks round existence. Even the\r\nleast religious of men must have felt with Walt Whitman, when loafing\r\non the grass on some transparent summer morning, that \"swiftly arose\r\nand spread round him the peace and knowledge that pass all the argument\r\nof the earth.\" At such moments of energetic living we feel as if there\r\nwere something diseased and contemptible, yea vile, in theoretic\r\ngrubbing and brooding. In the eye of healthy sense the philosopher is\r\nat best a learned fool.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSince the heart can thus wall out the ultimate irrationality which the\r\nhead ascertains, the erection of its procedure into a systematized\r\nmethod would be a philosophic achievement of first-rate importance.\r\nBut as used by mystics hitherto it has lacked universality, being\r\navailable for few persons and at few times, and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P75\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e75}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\neven in these\r\nbeing apt to be followed by fits of reaction and dryness; and if men\r\nshould agree that the mystical method is a subterfuge without logical\r\npertinency, a plaster but no cure, and that the idea of non-entity can\r\nnever be exorcised, empiricism will be the ultimate philosophy.\r\nExistence then will be a brute fact to which as a whole the emotion of\r\nontologic wonder shall rightfully cleave, but remain eternally\r\nunsatisfied. Then wonderfulness or mysteriousness will be an essential\r\nattribute of the nature of things, and the exhibition and emphasizing\r\nof it will continue to be an ingredient in the philosophic industry of\r\nthe race. Every generation will produce its Job, its Hamlet, its\r\nFaust, or its Sartor Resartus.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWith this we seem to have considered the possibilities of purely\r\ntheoretic rationality. But we saw at the outset that rationality meant\r\nonly unimpeded mental function. Impediments that arise in the\r\ntheoretic sphere might perhaps be avoided if the stream of mental\r\naction should leave that sphere betimes and pass into the practical.\r\nLet us therefore inquire what constitutes the feeling of rationality in\r\nits \u003cI\u003epractical\u003c/I\u003e aspect. If thought is not to stand forever pointing at\r\nthe universe in wonder, if its movement is to be diverted from the\r\nissueless channel of purely theoretic contemplation, let us ask what\r\nconception of the universe will awaken active impulses capable of\r\neffecting this diversion. A definition of the world which will give\r\nback to the mind the free motion which has been blocked in the purely\r\ncontemplative path may so far make the world seem rational again.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWell, of two conceptions equally fit to satisfy the logical demand,\r\nthat one which awakens the active\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P76\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e76}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nimpulses, or satisfies other\r\naesthetic demands better than the other, will be accounted the more\r\nrational conception, and will deservedly prevail.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere is nothing improbable in the supposition that an analysis of the\r\nworld may yield a number of formulae, all consistent with the facts.\r\nIn physical science different formulae may explain the phenomena\r\nequally well,\u0026mdash;the one-fluid and the two-fluid theories of electricity,\r\nfor example. Why may it not be so with the world? Why may there not\r\nbe different points of view for surveying it, within each of which all\r\ndata harmonize, and which the observer may therefore either choose\r\nbetween, or simply cumulate one upon another? A Beethoven\r\nstring-quartet is truly, as some one has said, a scraping of horses\u0027\r\ntails on cats\u0027 bowels, and may be exhaustively described in such terms;\r\nbut the application of this description in no way precludes the\r\nsimultaneous applicability of an entirely different description. Just\r\nso a thorough-going interpretation of the world in terms of mechanical\r\nsequence is compatible with its being interpreted teleologically, for\r\nthe mechanism itself may be designed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf, then, there were several systems excogitated, equally satisfying to\r\nour purely logical needs, they would still have to be passed in review,\r\nand approved or rejected by our aesthetic and practical nature. Can we\r\ndefine the tests of rationality which these parts of our nature would\r\nuse?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPhilosophers long ago observed the remarkable fact that mere\r\nfamiliarity with things is able to produce a feeling of their\r\nrationality. The empiricist school has been so much struck by this\r\ncircumstance\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P77\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e77}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nas to have laid it down that the feeling of\r\nrationality and the feeling of familiarity are one and the same thing,\r\nand that no other kind of rationality than this exists. The daily\r\ncontemplation of phenomena juxtaposed in a certain order begets an\r\nacceptance of their connection, as absolute as the repose engendered by\r\ntheoretic insight into their coherence. To explain a thing is to pass\r\neasily back to its antecedents; to know it is easily to foresee its\r\nconsequents. Custom, which lets us do both, is thus the source of\r\nwhatever rationality the thing may gain in our thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the broad sense in which rationality was defined at the outset of\r\nthis essay, it is perfectly apparent that custom must be one of its\r\nfactors. We said that any perfectly fluent and easy thought was devoid\r\nof the sentiment of irrationality. Inasmuch then as custom acquaints\r\nus with all the relations of a thing, it teaches us to pass fluently\r\nfrom that thing to others, and \u003cI\u003epro tanto\u003c/I\u003e tinges it with the rational\r\ncharacter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, there is one particular relation of greater practical importance\r\nthan all the rest,\u0026mdash;I mean the relation of a thing to its future\r\nconsequences. So long as an object is unusual, our expectations are\r\nbaffled; they are fully determined as soon as it becomes familiar. I\r\ntherefore propose this as the first practical requisite which a\r\nphilosophic conception must satisfy: \u003cI\u003eIt must, in a general way at\r\nleast, banish uncertainty from the future\u003c/I\u003e. The permanent presence of\r\nthe sense of futurity in the mind has been strangely ignored by most\r\nwriters, but the fact is that our consciousness at a given moment is\r\nnever free from the ingredient of expectancy. Every one knows how when\r\na painful thing has to be undergone in the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P78\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e78}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnear future, the vague\r\nfeeling that it is impending penetrates all our thought with uneasiness\r\nand subtly vitiates our mood even when it does not control our\r\nattention; it keeps us from being at rest, at home in the given\r\npresent. The same is true when a great happiness awaits us. But when\r\nthe future is neutral and perfectly certain, \u0027we do not mind it,\u0027 as we\r\nsay, but give an undisturbed attention to the actual. Let now this\r\nhaunting sense of futurity be thrown off its bearings or left without\r\nan object, and immediately uneasiness takes possession of the mind.\r\nBut in every novel or unclassified experience this is just what occurs;\r\nwe do not know what will come next; and novelty \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e becomes a\r\nmental irritant, while custom \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e is a mental sedative, merely\r\nbecause the one baffles while the other settles our expectations.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEvery reader must feel the truth of this. What is meant by coming \u0027to\r\nfeel at home\u0027 in a new place, or with new people? It is simply that,\r\nat first, when we take up our quarters in a new room, we do not know\r\nwhat draughts may blow in upon our back, what doors may open, what\r\nforms may enter, what interesting objects may be found in cupboards and\r\ncorners. When after a few days we have learned the range of all these\r\npossibilities, the feeling of strangeness disappears. And so it does\r\nwith people, when we have got past the point of expecting any\r\nessentially new manifestations from their character.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe utility of this emotional effect of expectation is perfectly\r\nobvious; \u0027natural selection,\u0027 in fact, was bound to bring it about\r\nsooner or later. It is of the utmost practical importance to an animal\r\nthat he should have prevision of the qualities of the objects\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P79\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e79}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthat\r\nsurround him, and especially that he should not come to rest in\r\npresence of circumstances that might be fraught either with peril or\r\nadvantage,\u0026mdash;go to sleep, for example, on the brink of precipices, in\r\nthe dens of enemies, or view with indifference some new-appearing\r\nobject that might, if chased, prove an important addition to the\r\nlarder. Novelty \u003cI\u003eought\u003c/I\u003e to irritate him. All curiosity has thus a\r\npractical genesis. We need only look at the physiognomy of a dog or a\r\nhorse when a new object comes into his view, his mingled fascination\r\nand fear, to see that the element of conscious insecurity or perplexed\r\nexpectation lies at the root of his emotion. A dog\u0027s curiosity about\r\nthe movements of his master or a strange object only extends as far as\r\nthe point of deciding what is going to happen next. That settled,\r\ncuriosity is quenched. The dog quoted by Darwin, whose behavior in\r\npresence of a newspaper moved by the wind seemed to testify to a sense\r\n\u0027of the supernatural,\u0027 was merely exhibiting the irritation of an\r\nuncertain future. A newspaper which could move spontaneously was in\r\nitself so unexpected that the poor brute could not tell what new\r\nwonders the next moment might bring forth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo turn back now to philosophy. An ultimate datum, even though it be\r\nlogically unrationalized, will, if its quality is such as to define\r\nexpectancy, be peacefully accepted by the mind; while if it leave the\r\nleast opportunity for ambiguity in the future, it will to that extent\r\ncause mental uneasiness if not distress. Now, in the ultimate\r\nexplanations of the universe which the craving for rationality has\r\nelicited from the human mind, the demands of expectancy to be satisfied\r\nhave always played a fundamental part.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P80\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e80}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nThe term set up by\r\nphilosophers as primordial has been one which banishes the\r\nincalculable. \u0027Substance,\u0027 for example, means, as Kant says, \u003cI\u003edas\r\nBeharrliche\u003c/I\u003e, which will be as it has been, because its being is\r\nessential and eternal. And although we may not be able to prophesy in\r\ndetail the future phenomena to which the substance shall give rise, we\r\nmay set our minds at rest in a general way, when we have called the\r\nsubstance God, Perfection, Love, or Reason, by the reflection that\r\nwhatever is in store for us can never at bottom be inconsistent with\r\nthe character of this term; so that our attitude even toward the\r\nunexpected is in a general sense defined. Take again the notion of\r\nimmortality, which for common people seems to be the touchstone of\r\nevery philosophic or religious creed: what is this but a way of saying\r\nthat the determination of expectancy is the essential factor of\r\nrationality? The wrath of science against miracles, of certain\r\nphilosophers against the doctrine of free-will, has precisely the same\r\nroot,\u0026mdash;dislike to admit any ultimate factor in things which may rout\r\nour prevision or upset the stability of our outlook.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnti-substantialist writers strangely overlook this function in the\r\ndoctrine of substance; \"If there be such a \u003cI\u003esubstratum\u003c/I\u003e,\" says Mill,\r\n\"suppose it at this instant miraculously annihilated, and let the\r\nsensations continue to occur in the same order, and how would the\r\n\u003cI\u003esubstratum\u003c/I\u003e be missed? By what signs should we be able to discover\r\nthat its existence had terminated? Should we not have as much reason\r\nto believe that it still existed as we now have? And if we should not\r\nthen be warranted in believing it, how can we be so now?\" Truly\r\nenough, if we have\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P81\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e81}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nalready securely bagged our facts in a certain\r\norder, we can dispense with any further warrant for that order. But\r\nwith regard to the facts yet to come the case is far different. It\r\ndoes not follow that if substance may be dropped from our conception of\r\nthe irrecoverably past, it need be an equally empty complication to our\r\nnotions of the future. Even if it were true that, for aught we know to\r\nthe contrary, the substance might develop at any moment a wholly new\r\nset of attributes, the mere logical form of referring things to a\r\nsubstance would still (whether rightly or wrongly) remain accompanied\r\nby a feeling of rest and future confidence. In spite of the acutest\r\nnihilistic criticism, men will therefore always have a liking for any\r\nphilosophy which explains things \u003cI\u003eper substantiam\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA very natural reaction against the theosophizing conceit and\r\nhide-bound confidence in the upshot of things, which vulgarly\r\noptimistic minds display, has formed one factor of the scepticism of\r\nempiricists, who never cease to remind us of the reservoir of\r\npossibilities alien to our habitual experience which the cosmos may\r\ncontain, and which, for any warrant we have to the contrary, may turn\r\nit inside out to-morrow. Agnostic substantialism like that of Mr.\r\nSpencer, whose Unknowable is not merely the unfathomable but the\r\nabsolute-irrational, on which, if consistently represented in thought,\r\nit is of course impossible to count, performs the same function of\r\nrebuking a certain stagnancy and smugness in the manner in which the\r\nordinary philistine feels his security. But considered as anything\r\nelse than as reactions against an opposite excess, these philosophies\r\nof uncertainty cannot be acceptable; the general mind will fail to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P82\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e82}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncome to rest in their presence, and will seek for solutions of a more\r\nreassuring kind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe may then, I think, with perfect confidence lay down as a first point\r\ngained in our inquiry, that a prime factor in the philosophic craving\r\nis the desire to have expectancy defined; and that no philosophy will\r\ndefinitively triumph which in an emphatic manner denies the possibility\r\nof gratifying this need.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe pass with this to the next great division of our topic. It is not\r\nsufficient for our satisfaction merely to know the future as\r\ndetermined, for it may be determined in either of many ways, agreeable\r\nor disagreeable. For a philosophy to succeed on a universal scale it\r\nmust define the future \u003cI\u003econgruously with our spontaneous powers\u003c/I\u003e. A\r\nphilosophy may be unimpeachable in other respects, but either of two\r\ndefects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, its ultimate\r\nprinciple must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints our\r\ndearest desires and most cherished powers. A pessimistic principle\r\nlike Schopenhauer\u0027s incurably vicious Will-substance, or Hartmann\u0027s\r\nwicked jack-of-all-trades the Unconscious, will perpetually call forth\r\nessays at other philosophies. Incompatibility of the future with their\r\ndesires and active tendencies is, in fact, to most men a source of more\r\nfixed disquietude than uncertainty itself. Witness the attempts to\r\novercome the \u0027problem of evil,\u0027 the \u0027mystery of pain.\u0027 There is no\r\n\u0027problem of good.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut a second and worse defect in a philosophy than that of\r\ncontradicting our active propensities is to give them no object\r\nwhatever to press against. A philosophy whose principle is so\r\nincommensurate with our most intimate powers as to deny them all\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P83\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e83}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrelevancy in universal affairs, as to annihilate their motives at one\r\nblow, will be even more unpopular than pessimism. Better face the\r\nenemy than the eternal Void! This is why materialism will always fail\r\nof universal adoption, however well it may fuse things into an\r\natomistic unity, however clearly it may prophesy the future eternity.\r\nFor materialism denies reality to the objects of almost all the\r\nimpulses which we most cherish. The real \u003cI\u003emeaning\u003c/I\u003e of the impulses, it\r\nsays, is something which has no emotional interest for us whatever.\r\nNow, what is called \u0027extradition\u0027 is quite as characteristic of our\r\nemotions as of our senses: both point to an object as the cause of the\r\npresent feeling. What an intensely objective reference lies in fear!\r\nIn like manner an enraptured man and a dreary-feeling man are not\r\nsimply aware of their subjective states; if they were, the force of\r\ntheir feelings would all evaporate. Both believe there is outward\r\ncause why they should feel as they do: either, \"It is a glad world! how\r\ngood life is!\" or, \"What a loathsome tedium is existence!\" Any\r\nphilosophy which annihilates the validity of the reference by\r\nexplaining away its objects or translating them into terms of no\r\nemotional pertinency, leaves the mind with little to care or act for.\r\nThis is the opposite condition from that of nightmare, but when acutely\r\nbrought home to consciousness it produces a kindred horror. In\r\nnightmare we have motives to act, but no power; here we have powers,\r\nbut no motives. A nameless \u003cI\u003eunheimlichkeit\u003c/I\u003e comes over us at the\r\nthought of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in the\r\nobjects of those loves and aspirations which are our deepest energies.\r\nThe monstrously lopsided equation of the universe and its\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P84\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e84}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nknower,\r\nwhich we postulate as the ideal of cognition, is perfectly paralleled\r\nby the no less lopsided equation of the universe and the \u003cI\u003edoer\u003c/I\u003e. We\r\ndemand in it a character for which our emotions and active propensities\r\nshall be a match. Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the\r\ncosmos impinges upon each one of us, each one desires to feel that his\r\nreaction at that point is congruous with the demands of the vast\r\nwhole,\u0026mdash;that he balances the latter, so to speak, and is able to do\r\nwhat it expects of him. But as his abilities to do lie wholly in the\r\nline of his natural propensities; as he enjoys reacting with such\r\nemotions as fortitude, hope, rapture, admiration, earnestness, and the\r\nlike; and as he very unwillingly reacts with fear, disgust, despair, or\r\ndoubt,\u0026mdash;a philosophy which should only legitimate emotions of the\r\nlatter sort would be sure to leave the mind a prey to discontent and\r\ncraving.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is far too little recognized how entirely the intellect is built up\r\nof practical interests. The theory of evolution is beginning to do\r\nvery good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of\r\nreflex action. Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting moment, a\r\ncross-section at a certain point, of what in its totality is a motor\r\nphenomenon. In the lower forms of life no one will pretend that\r\ncognition is anything more than a guide to appropriate action. The\r\ngerminal question concerning things brought for the first time before\r\nconsciousness is not the theoretic \u0027What is that?\u0027 but the practical\r\n\u0027Who goes there?\u0027 or rather, as Horwicz has admirably put it, \u0027What is\r\nto be done?\u0027\u0026mdash;\u0027Was fang\u0027 ich an?\u0027 In all our discussions about the\r\nintelligence of lower animals, the only test we use is that of their\r\n\u003cI\u003eacting\u003c/I\u003e as if for a purpose.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P85\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e85}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nCognition, in short, is incomplete\r\nuntil discharged in act; and although it is true that the later mental\r\ndevelopment, which attains its maximum through the hypertrophied\r\ncerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast amount of theoretic activity\r\nover and above that which is immediately ministerial to practice, yet\r\nthe earlier claim is only postponed, not effaced, and the active nature\r\nasserts its rights to the end.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen the cosmos in its totality is the object offered to consciousness,\r\nthe relation is in no whit altered. React on it we must in some\r\ncongenial way. It was a deep instinct in Schopenhauer which led him to\r\nreinforce his pessimistic argumentation by a running volley of\r\ninvective against the practical man and his requirements. No hope for\r\npessimism unless he is slain!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHelmholtz\u0027s immortal works on the eye and ear are to a great extent\r\nlittle more than a commentary on the law that practical utility wholly\r\ndetermines which parts of our sensations we shall be aware of, and\r\nwhich parts we shall ignore. We notice or discriminate an ingredient\r\nof sense only so far as we depend upon it to modify our actions. We\r\n\u003cI\u003ecomprehend\u003c/I\u003e a thing when we synthetize it by identity with another\r\nthing. But the other great department of our understanding,\r\n\u003cI\u003eacquaintance\u003c/I\u003e (the two departments being recognized in all languages\r\nby the antithesis of such words as \u003cI\u003ewissen\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003ekennen\u003c/I\u003e; \u003cI\u003escire\u003c/I\u003e and\r\n\u003cI\u003enoscere\u003c/I\u003e, etc.), what is that also but a synthesis,\u0026mdash;a synthesis of a\r\npassive perception with a certain tendency to reaction? We are\r\nacquainted with a thing as soon as we have learned how to behave\r\ntowards it, or how to meet the behavior which we expect from it. Up to\r\nthat point it is still \u0027strange\u0027 to us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P86\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e86}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf there be anything at all in this view, it follows that however\r\nvaguely a philosopher may define the ultimate universal datum, he\r\ncannot be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest\r\ndegree pretends that our emotional or active attitude toward it should\r\nbe of one sort rather than another. He who says \"life is real, life is\r\nearnest,\" however much he may speak of the fundamental mysteriousness\r\nof things, gives a distinct definition to that mysteriousness by\r\nascribing to it the right to claim from us the particular mood called\r\nseriousness,\u0026mdash;which means the willingness to live with energy, though\r\nenergy bring pain. The same is true of him who says that all is\r\nvanity. For indefinable as the predicate \u0027vanity\u0027 may be \u003cI\u003ein se\u003c/I\u003e, it\r\nis clearly something that permits anaesthesia, mere escape from\r\nsuffering, to be our rule of life. There can be no greater incongruity\r\nthan for a disciple of Spencer to proclaim with one breath that the\r\nsubstance of things is unknowable, and with the next that the thought\r\nof it should inspire us with awe, reverence, and a willingness to add\r\nour co-operative push in the direction toward which its manifestations\r\nseem to be drifting. The unknowable may be unfathomed, but if it make\r\nsuch distinct demands upon our activity we surely are not ignorant of\r\nits essential quality.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf we survey the field of history and ask what feature all great\r\nperiods of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common,\r\nwe shall find, I think, simply this: that each and all of them have\r\nsaid to the human being, \"The inmost nature of the reality is congenial\r\nto \u003cI\u003epowers\u003c/I\u003e which you possess.\" In what did the emancipating message\r\nof primitive Christianity consist but in the announcement that\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P87\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e87}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nGod\r\nrecognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely\r\noverlooked? Take repentance: the man who can do nothing rightly can at\r\nleast repent of his failures. But for paganism this faculty of\r\nrepentance was a pure supernumerary, a straggler too late for the fair.\r\nChristianity took it, and made it the one power within us which\r\nappealed straight to the heart of God. And after the night of the\r\nmiddle ages had so long branded with obloquy even the generous impulses\r\nof the flesh, and defined the reality to be such that only slavish\r\nnatures could commune with it, in what did the \u003cI\u003esursum corda\u003c/I\u003e of the\r\nplatonizing renaissance lie but in the proclamation that the archetype\r\nof verity in things laid claim on the widest activity of our whole\r\naesthetic being? What were Luther\u0027s mission and Wesley\u0027s but appeals\r\nto powers which even the meanest of men might carry with them,\u0026mdash;faith\r\nand self-despair,\u0026mdash;but which were personal, requiring no priestly\r\nintermediation, and which brought their owner face to face with God?\r\nWhat caused the wildfire influence of Rousseau but the assurance he\r\ngave that man\u0027s nature was in harmony with the nature of things, if\r\nonly the paralyzing corruptions of custom would stand from between?\r\nHow did Kant and Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, inspire their time with\r\ncheer, except by saying, \"Use all your powers; that is the only\r\nobedience the universe exacts\"? And Carlyle with his gospel of work,\r\nof fact, of veracity, how does he move us except by saying that the\r\nuniverse imposes no tasks upon us but such as the most humble can\r\nperform? Emerson\u0027s creed that everything that ever was or will be is\r\nhere in the enveloping now; that man has but to obey himself,\u0026mdash;\"He who\r\nwill rest in what he \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P88\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e88}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nis a part of destiny,\"\u0026mdash;is in like\r\nmanner nothing but an exorcism of all scepticism as to the pertinency\r\nof one\u0027s natural faculties.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn a word, \"Son of Man, \u003cI\u003estand upon thy feet\u003c/I\u003e and I will speak unto\r\nthee!\" is the only revelation of truth to which the solving epochs have\r\nhelped the disciple. But that has been enough to satisfy the greater\r\npart of his rational need. \u003cI\u003eIn se\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e the universal essence\r\nhas hardly been more defined by any of these formulas than by the\r\nagnostic \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e; but the mere assurance that my powers, such as they are,\r\nare not irrelevant to it, but pertinent; that it speaks to them and\r\nwill in some way recognize their reply; that I can be a match for it if\r\nI will, and not a footless waif,\u0026mdash;suffices to make it rational to my\r\nfeeling in the sense given above. Nothing could be more absurd than to\r\nhope for the definitive triumph of any philosophy which should refuse\r\nto legitimate, and to legitimate in an emphatic manner, the more\r\npowerful of our emotional and practical tendencies. Fatalism, whose\r\nsolving word in all crises of behavior is \"all striving is vain,\" will\r\nnever reign supreme, for the impulse to take life strivingly is\r\nindestructible in the race. Moral creeds which speak to that impulse\r\nwill be widely successful in spite of inconsistency, vagueness, and\r\nshadowy determination of expectancy. Man needs a rule for his will,\r\nand will invent one if one be not given him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now observe a most important consequence. Men\u0027s active impulses\r\nare so differently mixed that a philosophy fit in this respect for\r\nBismarck will almost certainly be unfit for a valetudinarian poet. In\r\nother words, although one can lay down in advance the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P89\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e89}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrule that a\r\nphilosophy which utterly denies all fundamental ground for seriousness,\r\nfor effort, for hope, which says the nature of things is radically\r\nalien to human nature, can never succeed,\u0026mdash;one cannot in advance say\r\nwhat particular dose of hope, or of gnosticism of the nature of things,\r\nthe definitely successful philosophy shall contain. In short, it is\r\nalmost certain that personal temperament will here make itself felt,\r\nand that although all men will insist on being spoken to by the\r\nuniverse in some way, few will insist on being spoken to in just the\r\nsame way. We have here, in short, the sphere of what Matthew Arnold\r\nlikes to call \u003cI\u003eAberglaube\u003c/I\u003e, legitimate, inexpugnable, yet doomed to\r\neternal variations and disputes.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTake idealism and materialism as examples of what I mean, and suppose\r\nfor a moment that both give a conception of equal theoretic clearness\r\nand consistency, and that both determine our expectations equally well.\r\nIdealism will be chosen by a man of one emotional constitution,\r\nmaterialism by another. At this very day all sentimental natures, fond\r\nof conciliation and intimacy, tend to an idealistic faith. Why?\r\nBecause idealism gives to the nature of things such kinship with our\r\npersonal selves. Our own thoughts are what we are most at home with,\r\nwhat we are least afraid of. To say then that the universe essentially\r\nis thought, is to say that I myself, potentially at least, am all.\r\nThere is no radically alien corner, but an all-pervading \u003cI\u003eintimacy\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nNow, in certain sensitively egotistic minds this conception of reality\r\nis sure to put on a narrow, close, sick-room air. Everything\r\nsentimental and priggish will be consecrated by it. That element in\r\nreality which every strong man of common-sense willingly feels there\r\nbecause it calls forth\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P90\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e90}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npowers that he owns\u0026mdash;the rough, harsh,\r\nsea-wave, north-wind element, the denier of persons, the\r\ndemocratizer\u0026mdash;is banished because it jars too much on the desire for\r\ncommunion. Now, it is the very enjoyment of this element that throws\r\nmany men upon the materialistic or agnostic hypothesis, as a polemic\r\nreaction against the contrary extreme. They sicken at a life wholly\r\nconstituted of intimacy. There is an overpowering desire at moments to\r\nescape personality, to revel in the action of forces that have no\r\nrespect for our ego, to let the tides flow, even though they flow over\r\nus. The strife of these two kinds of mental temper will, I think,\r\nalways be seen in philosophy. Some men will keep insisting on the\r\nreason, the atonement, that lies in the heart of things, and that we\r\ncan act \u003cI\u003ewith\u003c/I\u003e; others, on the opacity of brute fact that we must react\r\n\u003cI\u003eagainst\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, there is one element of our active nature which the Christian\r\nreligion has emphatically recognized, but which philosophers as a rule\r\nhave with great insincerity tried to huddle out of sight in their\r\npretension to found systems of absolute certainty. I mean the element\r\nof faith. Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is\r\nstill theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness\r\nto act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the\r\nprosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance. It is in\r\nfact the same moral quality which we call courage in practical affairs;\r\nand there will be a very widespread tendency in men of vigorous nature\r\nto enjoy a certain amount of uncertainty in their philosophic creed,\r\njust as risk lends a zest to worldly activity. Absolutely certified\r\nphilosophies\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P91\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e91}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nseeking the \u003cI\u003einconcussum\u003c/I\u003e are fruits of mental\r\nnatures in which the passion for identity (which we saw to be but one\r\nfactor of the rational appetite) plays an abnormally exclusive part.\r\nIn the average man, on the contrary, the power to trust, to risk a\r\nlittle beyond the literal evidence, is an essential function. Any mode\r\nof conceiving the universe which makes an appeal to this generous\r\npower, and makes the man seem as if he were individually helping to\r\ncreate the actuality of the truth whose metaphysical reality he is\r\nwilling to assume, will be sure to be responded to by large numbers.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude is\r\nstrongly insisted on by the scientific philosophers of the present day;\r\nbut by a singularly arbitrary caprice they say that it is only\r\nlegitimate when used in the interests of one particular\r\nproposition,\u0026mdash;the proposition, namely, that the course of nature is\r\nuniform. That nature will follow to-morrow the same laws that she\r\nfollows to-day is, they all admit, a truth which no man can \u003cI\u003eknow\u003c/I\u003e; but\r\nin the interests of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or\r\nassume it. As Helmholtz says: \"Hier gilt nur der eine Rath: vertraue\r\nund handle!\" And Professor Bain urges: \"Our only error is in proposing\r\nto give any reason or justification of the postulate, or to treat it as\r\notherwise than begged at the very outset.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWith regard to all other possible truths, however, a number of our most\r\ninfluential contemporaries think that an attitude of faith is not only\r\nillogical but shameful. Faith in a religious dogma for which there is\r\nno outward proof, but which we are tempted to postulate for our\r\nemotional interests, just as we\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P92\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e92}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npostulate the uniformity of nature\r\nfor our intellectual interests, is branded by Professor Huxley as \"the\r\nlowest depth of immorality.\" Citations of this kind from leaders of\r\nthe modern \u003cI\u003eAufklärung\u003c/I\u003e might be multiplied almost indefinitely. Take\r\nProfessor Clifford\u0027s article on the \u0027Ethics of Belief.\u0027 He calls it\r\n\u0027guilt\u0027 and \u0027sin\u0027 to believe even the truth without \u0027scientific\r\nevidence.\u0027 But what is the use of being a genius, unless \u003cI\u003ewith the\r\nsame scientific evidence\u003c/I\u003e as other men, one can reach more truth than\r\nthey? Why does Clifford fearlessly proclaim his belief in the\r\nconscious-automaton theory, although the \u0027proofs\u0027 before him are the\r\nsame which make Mr. Lewes reject it? Why does he believe in primordial\r\nunits of \u0027mind-stuff\u0027 on evidence which would seem quite worthless to\r\nProfessor Bain? Simply because, like every human being of the\r\nslightest mental originality, he is peculiarly sensitive to evidence\r\nthat bears in some one direction. It is utterly hopeless to try to\r\nexorcise such sensitiveness by calling it the disturbing subjective\r\nfactor, and branding it as the root of all evil. \u0027Subjective\u0027 be it\r\ncalled! and \u0027disturbing\u0027 to those whom it foils! But if it helps those\r\nwho, as Cicero says, \"vim naturae magis sentiunt,\" it is good and not\r\nevil. Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we\r\nform our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion\r\nco-operate just as they do in practical affairs; and lucky it is if the\r\npassion be not something as petty as a love of personal conquest over\r\nthe philosopher across the way. The absurd abstraction of an intellect\r\nverbally formulating all its evidence and carefully estimating the\r\nprobability thereof by a vulgar fraction by the size of whose\r\ndenominator and numerator alone it is swayed, is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P93\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e93}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nideally as inept\r\nas it is actually impossible. It is almost incredible that men who are\r\nthemselves working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy can\r\nbe, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal\r\npreference, belief, or divination. How have they succeeded in so\r\nstultifying their sense for the living facts of human nature as not to\r\nperceive that every philosopher, or man of science either, whose\r\ninitiative counts for anything in the evolution of thought, has taken\r\nhis stand on a sort of dumb conviction that the truth must lie in one\r\ndirection rather than another, and a sort of preliminary assurance that\r\nhis notion can be made to work; and has borne his best fruit in trying\r\nto make it work? These mental instincts in different men are the\r\nspontaneous variations upon which the intellectual struggle for\r\nexistence is based. The fittest conceptions survive, and with them the\r\nnames of their champions shining to all futurity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe coil is about us, struggle as we may. The only escape from faith\r\nis mental nullity. What we enjoy most in a Huxley or a Clifford is not\r\nthe professor with his learning, but the human personality ready to go\r\nin for what it feels to be right, in spite of all appearances. The\r\nconcrete man has but one interest,\u0026mdash;to be right. That for him is the\r\nart of all arts, and all means are fair which help him to it. Naked he\r\nis flung into the world, and between him and nature there are no rules\r\nof civilized warfare. The rules of the scientific game, burdens of\r\nproof, presumptions, \u003cI\u003eexperimenta crucis\u003c/I\u003e, complete inductions, and the\r\nlike, are only binding on those who enter that game. As a matter of\r\nfact we all more or less do enter it, because it helps us to our end.\r\nBut if the means presume to frustrate the end and call us cheats for\r\nbeing right in\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P94\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e94}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nadvance of their slow aid, by guesswork or by hook\r\nor crook, what shall we say of them? Were all of Clifford\u0027s works,\r\nexcept the Ethics of Belief, forgotten, he might well figure in future\r\ntreatises on psychology in place of the somewhat threadbare instance of\r\nthe miser who has been led by the association of ideas to prefer his\r\ngold to all the goods he might buy therewith.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn short, if I am born with such a superior general reaction to\r\nevidence that I can guess right and act accordingly, and gain all that\r\ncomes of right action, while my less gifted neighbor (paralyzed by his\r\nscruples and waiting for more evidence which he dares not anticipate,\r\nmuch as he longs to) still stands shivering on the brink, by what law\r\nshall I be forbidden to reap the advantages of my superior native\r\nsensitiveness? Of course I yield to my belief in such a case as this\r\nor distrust it, alike at my peril, just as I do in any of the great\r\npractical decisions of life. If my inborn faculties are good, I am a\r\nprophet; if poor, I am a failure: nature spews me out of her mouth, and\r\nthere is an end of me. In the total game of life we stake our persons\r\nall the while; and if in its theoretic part our persons will help us to\r\na conclusion, surely we should also stake them there, however\r\ninarticulate they may be.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P95\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e95}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut in being myself so very articulate in proving what to all readers\r\nwith a sense for reality will seem a platitude, am I not wasting words?\r\nWe cannot live or think at all without some degree of faith. Faith is\r\nsynonymous with working hypothesis. The only difference is that while\r\nsome hypotheses can be refuted in five minutes, others may defy ages.\r\nA chemist who conjectures that a certain wall-paper contains arsenic,\r\nand has faith enough to lead him to take the trouble to put some of it\r\ninto a hydrogen bottle, finds out by the results of his action whether\r\nhe was right or wrong. But theories like that of Darwin, or that of\r\nthe kinetic constitution of matter, may exhaust the labors of\r\ngenerations in their corroboration, each tester of their truth\r\nproceeding in this simple way,\u0026mdash;that he acts as if it were true, and\r\nexpects the result to disappoint him if his assumption is false. The\r\nlonger disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith in his\r\ntheory.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, in such questions as God, immortality, absolute morality, and\r\nfree-will, no non-papal believer at the present day pretends his faith\r\nto be of an essentially different complexion; he can always doubt his\r\ncreed. But his intimate persuasion is that the odds in its favor are\r\nstrong enough to warrant him in acting all along on the assumption of\r\nits truth. His corroboration or repudiation by the nature of things\r\nmay be deferred until the day of judgment. The\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P96\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e96}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nuttermost he now\r\nmeans is something like this: \"I \u003cI\u003eexpect\u003c/I\u003e then to triumph with tenfold\r\nglory; but if it should turn out, as indeed it may, that I have spent\r\nmy days in a fool\u0027s paradise, why, better have been the dupe of \u003cI\u003esuch\u003c/I\u003e\r\na dreamland than the cunning reader of a world like that which then\r\nbeyond all doubt unmasks itself to view.\" In short, we \u003cI\u003ego in\u003c/I\u003e against\r\nmaterialism very much as we should \u003cI\u003ego in\u003c/I\u003e, had we a chance, against\r\nthe second French empire or the Church of Rome, or any other system of\r\nthings toward which our repugnance is vast enough to determine\r\nenergetic action, but too vague to issue in distinct argumentation.\r\nOur reasons are ludicrously incommensurate with the volume of our\r\nfeeling, yet on the latter we unhesitatingly act.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, I wish to show what to my knowledge has never been clearly pointed\r\nout, that belief (as measured by action) not only does and must\r\ncontinually outstrip scientific evidence, but that there is a certain\r\nclass of truths of whose reality belief is a factor as well as a\r\nconfessor; and that as regards this class of truths faith is not only\r\nlicit and pertinent, but essential and indispensable. The truths\r\ncannot become true till our faith has made them so.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuppose, for example, that I am climbing in the Alps, and have had the\r\nill-luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is\r\nby a terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no\r\nevidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope and\r\nconfidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, and nerve my\r\nfeet to execute what without those subjective emotions would perhaps\r\nhave been impossible. But suppose that, on the contrary,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P97\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e97}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe\r\nemotions of fear and mistrust preponderate; or suppose that, having\r\njust read the Ethics of Belief, I feel it would be sinful to act upon\r\nan assumption unverified by previous experience,\u0026mdash;why, then I shall\r\nhesitate so long that at last, exhausted and trembling, and launching\r\nmyself in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll into the\r\nabyss. In this case (and it is one of an immense class) the part of\r\nwisdom clearly is to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of\r\nthe indispensable preliminary conditions of the realization of its\r\nobject. \u003cI\u003eThere are then cases where faith creates its own\r\nverification\u003c/I\u003e. Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save\r\nyourself; doubt, and you shall again be right, for you shall perish.\r\nThe only difference is that to believe is greatly to your advantage.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe future movements of the stars or the facts of past history are\r\ndetermined now once for all, whether I like them or not. They are\r\ngiven irrespective of my wishes, and in all that concerns truths like\r\nthese subjective preference should have no part; it can only obscure\r\nthe judgment. But in every fact into which there enters an element of\r\npersonal contribution on my part, as soon as this personal contribution\r\ndemands a certain degree of subjective energy which, in its turn, calls\r\nfor a certain amount of faith in the result,\u0026mdash;so that, after all, the\r\nfuture fact is conditioned by my present faith in it,\u0026mdash;how trebly\r\nasinine would it be for me to deny myself the use of the subjective\r\nmethod, the method of belief based on desire!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn every proposition whose bearing is universal (and such are all the\r\npropositions of philosophy), the acts of the subject and their\r\nconsequences throughout eternity should be included in the formula. If\r\n\u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P98\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e98}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrepresent the entire world \u003cI\u003eminus\u003c/I\u003e the reaction of the thinker\r\nupon it, and if \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e + \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e represent the absolutely total matter of\r\nphilosophic propositions (\u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e standing for the thinker\u0027s reaction and\r\nits results),\u0026mdash;what would be a universal truth if the term x were of\r\none complexion, might become egregious error if \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e altered its\r\ncharacter. Let it not be said that \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e is too infinitesimal a\r\ncomponent to change the character of the immense whole in which it lies\r\nimbedded. Everything depends on the point of view of the philosophic\r\nproposition in question. If we have to define the universe from the\r\npoint of view of sensibility, the critical material for our judgment\r\nlies in the animal kingdom, insignificant as that is, quantitatively\r\nconsidered. The moral definition of the world may depend on phenomena\r\nmore restricted still in range. In short, many a long phrase may have\r\nits sense reversed by the addition of three letters, \u003cI\u003en-o-t\u003c/I\u003e; many a\r\nmonstrous mass have its unstable equilibrium discharged one way or the\r\nother by a feather weight that falls.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet us make this clear by a few examples. The philosophy of evolution\r\noffers us to-day a new criterion to serve as an ethical test between\r\nright and wrong. Previous criteria, it says, being subjective, have\r\nleft us still floundering in variations of opinion and the \u003cI\u003estatus\r\nbelli\u003c/I\u003e. Here is a criterion which is objective and fixed: \u003cI\u003eThat is to\r\nbe called good which is destined to prevail or survive\u003c/I\u003e. But we\r\nimmediately see that this standard can only remain objective by leaving\r\nmyself and my conduct out. If what prevails and survives does so by my\r\nhelp, and cannot do so without that help; if something else will\r\nprevail in case I alter my conduct,\u0026mdash;how can I possibly now, conscious\r\nof alternative courses of action open before me, either of which\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P99\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e99}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nI\r\nmay suppose capable of altering the path of events, decide which course\r\nto take by asking what path events will follow? If they follow my\r\ndirection, evidently my direction cannot wait on them. The only\r\npossible manner in which an evolutionist can use his standard is the\r\nobsequious method of forecasting the course society would take \u003cI\u003ebut for\r\nhim\u003c/I\u003e, and then putting an extinguisher on all personal idiosyncrasies\r\nof desire and interest, and with bated breath and tiptoe tread\r\nfollowing as straight as may be at the tail, and bringing up the rear\r\nof everything. Some pious creatures may find a pleasure in this; but\r\nnot only does it violate our general wish to lead and not to follow (a\r\nwish which is surely not immoral if we but lead aright), but if it be\r\ntreated as every ethical principle must be treated,\u0026mdash;namely, as a rule\r\ngood for all men alike,\u0026mdash;its general observance would lead to its\r\npractical refutation by bringing about a general deadlock. Each good\r\nman hanging back and waiting for orders from the rest, absolute\r\nstagnation would ensue. Happy, then, if a few unrighteous ones\r\ncontribute an initiative which sets things moving again!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll this is no caricature. That the course of destiny may be altered\r\nby individuals no wise evolutionist ought to doubt. Everything for him\r\nhas small beginnings, has a bud which may be \u0027nipped,\u0027 and nipped by a\r\nfeeble force. Human races and tendencies follow the law, and have also\r\nsmall beginnings. The best, according to evolution, is that which has\r\nthe biggest endings. Now, if a present race of men, enlightened in the\r\nevolutionary philosophy, and able to forecast the future, were able to\r\ndiscern in a tribe arising near them the potentiality of future\r\nsupremacy; were able to see that their own\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P100\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e100}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrace would eventually\r\nbe wiped out of existence by the new-comers if the expansion of these\r\nwere left unmolested,\u0026mdash;these present sages would have two courses open\r\nto them, either perfectly in harmony with the evolutionary test:\r\nStrangle the new race now, and ours survives; help the new race, and it\r\nsurvives. In both cases the action is right as measured by the\r\nevolutionary standard,\u0026mdash;it is action for the winning side.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus the evolutionist foundation of ethics is purely objective only to\r\nthe herd of nullities whose votes count for zero in the march of\r\nevents. But for others, leaders of opinion or potentates, and in\r\ngeneral those to whose actions position or genius gives a far-reaching\r\nimport, and to the rest of us, each in his measure,\u0026mdash;whenever we\r\nespouse a cause we contribute to the determination of the evolutionary\r\nstandard of right. The truly wise disciple of this school will then\r\nadmit faith as an ultimate ethical factor. Any philosophy which makes\r\nsuch questions as, What is the ideal type of humanity? What shall be\r\nreckoned virtues? What conduct is good? depend on the question, What\r\nis going to succeed?\u0026mdash;must needs fall back on personal belief as one of\r\nthe ultimate conditions of the truth. For again and again success\r\ndepends on energy of act; energy again depends on faith that we shall\r\nnot fail; and that faith in turn on the faith that we are right,\u0026mdash;which\r\nfaith thus verifies itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTake as an example the question of optimism or pessimism, which makes\r\nso much noise just now in Germany. Every human being must sometime\r\ndecide for himself whether life is worth living. Suppose that in\r\nlooking at the world and seeing how full it is of misery, of old age,\r\nof wickedness and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P101\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e101}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npain, and how unsafe is his own future, he\r\nyields to the pessimistic conclusion, cultivates disgust and dread,\r\nceases striving, and finally commits suicide. He thus adds to the mass\r\n\u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e of mundane phenomena, independent of his subjectivity, the\r\nsubjective complement \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e, which makes of the whole an utterly black\r\npicture illumined by no gleam of good. Pessimism completed, verified\r\nby his moral reaction and the deed in which this ends, is true beyond a\r\ndoubt. \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e + \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e expresses a state of things totally bad. The man\u0027s\r\nbelief supplied all that was lacking to make it so, and now that it is\r\nmade so the belief was right.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now suppose that with the same evil facts \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e, the man\u0027s reaction\r\n\u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e is exactly reversed; suppose that instead of giving way to the evil\r\nhe braves it, and finds a sterner, more wonderful joy than any passive\r\npleasure can yield in triumphing over pain and defying fear; suppose he\r\ndoes this successfully, and however thickly evils crowd upon him proves\r\nhis dauntless subjectivity to be more than their match,\u0026mdash;will not every\r\none confess that the bad character of the \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e is here the \u003cI\u003econditio\r\nsine qua non\u003c/I\u003e of the good character of the \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e? Will not every one\r\ninstantly declare a world fitted only for fair-weather human beings\r\nsusceptible of every passive enjoyment, but without independence,\r\ncourage, or fortitude, to be from a moral point of view incommensurably\r\ninferior to a world framed to elicit from the man every form of\r\ntriumphant endurance and conquering moral energy? As James Hinton\r\nsays,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"Little inconveniences, exertions, pains.\u0026mdash;these are the only things in\r\nwhich we rightly feel our life at all. If these be not there,\r\nexistence becomes worthless, or worse;\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P102\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e102}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsuccess in putting them\r\nall away is fatal. So it is men engage in athletic sports, spend their\r\nholidays in climbing up mountains, find nothing so enjoyable as that\r\nwhich taxes their endurance and their energy. This is the way we are\r\nmade, I say. It may or may not be a mystery or a paradox; it is a\r\nfact. Now, this enjoyment in endurance is just according to the\r\nintensity of life: the more physical vigor and balance, the more\r\nendurance can be made an element of satisfaction. A sick man cannot\r\nstand it. The line of enjoyable suffering is not a fixed one; it\r\nfluctuates with the perfectness of the life. That our pains are, as\r\nthey are, unendurable, awful, overwhelming, crushing, not to be borne\r\nsave in misery and dumb impatience, which utter exhaustion alone makes\r\npatient,\u0026mdash;that our pains are thus unendurable, means not that they are\r\ntoo great, but that \u003cI\u003ewe are sick\u003c/I\u003e. We have not got our proper life.\r\nSo you perceive pain is no more necessarily an evil, but an essential\r\nelement of the highest good.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut the highest good can be achieved only by our getting our proper\r\nlife; and that can come about only by help of a moral energy born of\r\nthe faith that in some way or other we shall succeed in getting it if\r\nwe try pertinaciously enough. This world \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e good, we must say, since\r\nit is what we make it,\u0026mdash;and we shall make it good. How can we exclude\r\nfrom the cognition of a truth a faith which is involved in the creation\r\nof the truth? \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e has its character indeterminate, susceptible of\r\nforming part of a thorough-going pessimism on the one hand, or of a\r\nmeliorism, a moral (as distinguished from a sensual) optimism on the\r\nother. All depends on the character of the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P103\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e103}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npersonal contribution\r\n\u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e. Wherever the facts to be formulated contain such a contribution,\r\nwe may logically, legitimately, and inexpugnably believe what we\r\ndesire. The belief creates its verification. The thought becomes\r\nliterally father to the fact, as the wish was father to the thought.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn4text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet us now turn to the radical question of life,\u0026mdash;the question whether\r\nthis be at bottom a moral or an unmoral universe,\u0026mdash;and see whether the\r\nmethod of faith may legitimately have a place there. It is really the\r\nquestion of materialism. Is the world a simple brute actuality, an\r\nexistence \u003cI\u003ede facto\u003c/I\u003e about which the deepest thing that can be said is\r\nthat it happens so to be; or is the judgment of \u003cI\u003ebetter\u003c/I\u003e or worse, of\r\n\u003cI\u003eought\u003c/I\u003e, as intimately pertinent to phenomena as the simple judgment\r\n\u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003eis not\u003c/I\u003e? The materialistic theorists say that judgments of\r\nworth are themselves mere matters of fact; that the words \u0027good\u0027 and\r\n\u0027bad\u0027 have no sense apart from subjective passions and interests which\r\nwe may, if we please, play fast and loose with at will, so far as any\r\nduty of ours to the non-human universe is concerned. Thus, when a\r\nmaterialist says it is better for him to suffer great inconvenience\r\nthan to break a promise, he only means that his social interests have\r\nbecome so knit up with\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P104\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e104}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nkeeping faith that, those interests once\r\nbeing granted, it is better for him to keep the promise in spite of\r\neverything. But the interests themselves are neither right nor wrong,\r\nexcept possibly with reference to some ulterior order of interests\r\nwhich themselves again are mere subjective data without character,\r\neither good or bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor the absolute moralists, on the contrary, the interests are not\r\nthere merely to be felt,\u0026mdash;they are to be believed in and obeyed. Not\r\nonly is it best for my social interests to keep my promise, but best\r\nfor me to have those interests, and best for the cosmos to have this\r\nme. Like the old woman in the story who described the world as resting\r\non a rock, and then explained that rock to be supported by another\r\nrock, and finally when pushed with questions said it was rocks all the\r\nway down,\u0026mdash;he who believes this to be a radically moral universe must\r\nhold the moral order to rest either on an absolute and ultimate\r\n\u003cI\u003eshould\u003c/I\u003e, or on a series of \u003cI\u003eshoulds\u003c/I\u003e all the way down.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn5text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe practical difference between this objective sort of moralist and\r\nthe other one is enormous. The subjectivist in morals, when his moral\r\nfeelings are at war with the facts about him, is always free to seek\r\nharmony by toning down the sensitiveness of the feelings. Being mere\r\ndata, neither good nor evil in themselves, he may pervert them or lull\r\nthem to sleep by any means at his command. Truckling, compromise,\r\ntime-serving, capitulations of conscience, are conventionally\r\nopprobrious names for what, if successfully carried out,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P105\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e105}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwould be\r\non his principles by far the easiest and most praiseworthy mode of\r\nbringing about that harmony between inner and outer relations which is\r\nall that he means by good. The absolute moralist, on the other hand,\r\nwhen his interests clash with the world, is not free to gain harmony by\r\nsacrificing the ideal interests. According to him, these latter should\r\nbe as they are and not otherwise. Resistance then, poverty, martyrdom\r\nif need be, tragedy in a word,\u0026mdash;such are the solemn feasts of his\r\ninward faith. Not that the contradiction between the two men occurs\r\nevery day; in commonplace matters all moral schools agree. It is only\r\nin the lonely emergencies of life that our creed is tested: then\r\nroutine maxims fail, and we fall back on our gods. It cannot then be\r\nsaid that the question, Is this a moral world? is a meaningless and\r\nunverifiable question because it deals with something non-phenomenal.\r\nAny question is full of meaning to which, as here, contrary answers\r\nlead to contrary behavior. And it seems as if in answering such a\r\nquestion as this we might proceed exactly as does the physical\r\nphilosopher in testing an hypothesis. He deduces from the hypothesis\r\nan experimental action, \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e; this he adds to the facts \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e already\r\nexisting. It fits them if the hypothesis be true; if not, there is\r\ndiscord. The results of the action corroborate or refute the idea from\r\nwhich it flowed. So here: the verification of the theory which you may\r\nhold as to the objectively moral character of the world can consist\r\nonly in this,\u0026mdash;that if you proceed to act upon your theory it will be\r\nreversed by nothing that later turns up as your action\u0027s fruit; it will\r\nharmonize so well with the entire drift of experience that the latter\r\nwill, as it were, adopt it, or at most give it an ampler\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P106\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e106}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ninterpretation, without obliging you in any way to change the essence\r\nof its formulation. If this be an objectively moral universe, all acts\r\nthat I make on that assumption, all expectations that I ground on it,\r\nwill tend more and more completely to interdigitate with the phenomena\r\nalready existing. \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e + \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e will be in accord; and the more I live,\r\nand the more the fruits of my activity come to light, the more\r\nsatisfactory the consensus will grow. While if it be not such a moral\r\nuniverse, and I mistakenly assume that it is, the course of experience\r\nwill throw ever new impediments in the way of my belief, and become\r\nmore and more difficult to express in its language. Epicycle upon\r\nepicycle of subsidiary hypothesis will have to be invoked to give to\r\nthe discrepant terms a temporary appearance of squaring with each\r\nother; but at last even this resource will fail.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf, on the other hand, I rightly assume the universe to be not moral,\r\nin what does my verification consist? It is that by letting moral\r\ninterests sit lightly, by disbelieving that there is any duty about\r\n\u003cI\u003ethem\u003c/I\u003e (since duty obtains only as \u003cI\u003ebetween\u003c/I\u003e them and other phenomena),\r\nand so throwing them over if I find it hard to get them satisfied,\u0026mdash;it\r\nis that by refusing to take up a tragic attitude, I deal in the\r\nlong-run most satisfactorily with the facts of life. \"All is vanity\"\r\nis here the last word of wisdom. Even though in certain limited series\r\nthere may be a great appearance of seriousness, he who in the main\r\ntreats things with a degree of good-natured scepticism and radical\r\nlevity will find that the practical fruits of his epicurean hypothesis\r\nverify it more and more, and not only save him from pain but do honor\r\nto his sagacity. While, on the other hand, he who contrary\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P107\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e107}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nto\r\nreality stiffens himself in the notion that certain things absolutely\r\nshould be, and rejects the truth that at bottom it makes no difference\r\nwhat is, will find himself evermore thwarted and perplexed and\r\nbemuddled by the facts of the world, and his tragic disappointment\r\nwill, as experience accumulates, seem to drift farther and farther away\r\nfrom that final atonement or reconciliation which certain partial\r\ntragedies often get.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eAnaesthesia\u003c/I\u003e is the watchword of the moral sceptic brought to bay and\r\nput to his trumps. \u003cI\u003eEnergy\u003c/I\u003e is that of the moralist. Act on my creed,\r\ncries the latter, and the results of your action will prove the creed\r\ntrue, and that the nature of things is earnest infinitely. Act on\r\nmine, says the epicurean, and the results will prove that seriousness\r\nis but a superficial glaze upon a world of fundamentally trivial\r\nimport. You and your acts and the nature of things will be alike\r\nenveloped in a single formula, a universal \u003cI\u003evanitas vanitatum\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor the sake of simplicity I have written as if the verification might\r\noccur in the life of a single philosopher,\u0026mdash;which is manifestly untrue,\r\nsince the theories still face each other, and the facts of the world\r\ngive countenance to both. Rather should we expect, that, in a question\r\nof this scope, the experience of the entire human race must make the\r\nverification, and that all the evidence will not be \u0027in\u0027 till the final\r\nintegration of things, when the last man has had his say and\r\ncontributed his share to the still unfinished \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e. Then the proof will\r\nbe complete; then it will appear without doubt whether the moralistic x\r\nhas filled up the gap which alone kept the \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e of the world from\r\nforming an even and harmonious unity, or whether the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P108\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e108}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnon-moralistic \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e has given the finishing touches which were alone\r\nneeded to make the \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e appear outwardly as vain as it inwardly was.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut if this be so, is it not clear that the facts \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e, taken \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nare inadequate to justify a conclusion either way in advance of my\r\naction? My action is the complement which, by proving congruous or\r\nnot, reveals the latent nature of the mass to which it is applied. The\r\nworld may in fact be likened unto a lock, whose inward nature, moral or\r\nunmoral, will never reveal itself to our simply expectant gaze. The\r\npositivists, forbidding us to make any assumptions regarding it,\r\ncondemn us to eternal ignorance, for the \u0027evidence\u0027 which they wait for\r\ncan never come so long as we are passive. But nature has put into our\r\nhands two keys, by which we may test the lock. If we try the moral key\r\n\u003cI\u003eand it fits\u003c/I\u003e, it is a moral lock. If we try the unmoral key and \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e\r\nfits, it is an unmoral lock. I cannot possibly conceive of any other\r\nsort of \u0027evidence\u0027 or \u0027proof\u0027 than this. It is quite true that the\r\nco-operation of generations is needed to educe it. But in these\r\nmatters the solidarity (so called) of the human race is a patent fact.\r\nThe essential thing to notice is that our active preference is a\r\nlegitimate part of the game,\u0026mdash;that it is our plain business as men to\r\ntry one of the keys, and the one in which we most confide. If then the\r\nproof exist not till I have acted, and I must needs in acting run the\r\nrisk of being wrong, how can the popular science professors be right in\r\nobjurgating in me as infamous a \u0027credulity\u0027 which the strict logic of\r\nthe situation requires? If this really be a moral universe; if by my\r\nacts I be a factor of its destinies; if to believe where I may doubt be\r\nitself a moral act\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P109\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e109}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nanalogous to voting for a side not yet sure to\r\nwin,\u0026mdash;by what right shall they close in upon me and steadily negate the\r\ndeepest conceivable function of my being by their preposterous command\r\nthat I shall stir neither hand nor foot, but remain balancing myself in\r\neternal and insoluble doubt? Why, doubt itself is a decision of the\r\nwidest practical reach, if only because we may miss by doubting what\r\ngoods we might be gaining by espousing the winning side. But more than\r\nthat! it is often practically impossible to distinguish doubt from\r\ndogmatic negation. If I refuse to stop a murder because I am in doubt\r\nwhether it be not justifiable homicide, I am virtually abetting the\r\ncrime. If I refuse to bale out a boat because I am in doubt whether my\r\nefforts will keep her afloat, I am really helping to sink her. If in\r\nthe mountain precipice I doubt my right to risk a leap, I actively\r\nconnive at my destruction. He who commands himself not to be credulous\r\nof God, of duty, of freedom, of immortality, may again and again be\r\nindistinguishable from him who dogmatically denies them. Scepticism in\r\nmoral matters is an active ally of immorality. Who is not for is\r\nagainst. The universe will have no neutrals in these questions. In\r\ntheory as in practice, dodge or hedge, or talk as we like about a wise\r\nscepticism, we are really doing volunteer military service for one side\r\nor the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYet obvious as this necessity practically is, thousands of innocent\r\nmagazine readers lie paralyzed and terrified in the network of shallow\r\nnegations which the leaders of opinion have thrown over their souls.\r\nAll they need to be free and hearty again in the exercise of their\r\nbirthright is that these fastidious vetoes should be swept away. All\r\nthat the human\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P110\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e110}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nheart wants is its chance. It will willingly\r\nforego certainty in universal matters if only it can be allowed to feel\r\nthat in them it has that same inalienable right to run risks, which no\r\none dreams of refusing to it in the pettiest practical affairs. And if\r\nI, in these last pages, like the mouse in the fable, have gnawed a few\r\nof the strings of the sophistical net that has been binding down its\r\nlion-strength, I shall be more than rewarded for my pains.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo sum up: No philosophy will permanently be deemed rational by all men\r\nwhich (in addition to meeting logical demands) does not to some degree\r\npretend to determine expectancy, and in a still greater degree make a\r\ndirect appeal to all those powers of our nature which we hold in\r\nhighest esteem. Faith, being one of these powers, will always remain a\r\nfactor not to be banished from philosophic constructions, the more so\r\nsince in many ways it brings forth its own verification. In these\r\npoints, then, it is hopeless to look for literal agreement among\r\nmankind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe ultimate philosophy, we may therefore conclude, must not be too\r\nstrait-laced in form, must not in all its parts divide heresy from\r\northodoxy by too sharp a line. There must be left over and above the\r\npropositions to be subscribed, \u003cI\u003eubique, semper, et ab omnibus\u003c/I\u003e, another\r\nrealm into which the stifled soul may escape from pedantic scruples and\r\nindulge its own faith at its own risks; and all that can here be done\r\nwill be to mark out distinctly the questions which fall within faith\u0027s\r\nsphere.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] This essay as far as page 75 consists of extracts from an article\r\nprinted in Mind for July, 1879. Thereafter it is a reprint of an\r\naddress to the Harvard Philosophical Club, delivered in 1880, and\r\npublished in the Princeton Review, July, 1882.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] At most, the command laid upon us by science to believe nothing not\r\nyet verified by the senses is a prudential rule intended to maximize\r\nour right thinking and minimize our errors \u003cI\u003ein the long run\u003c/I\u003e. In the\r\nparticular instance we must frequently lose truth by obeying it; but on\r\nthe whole we are safer if we follow it consistently, for we are sure to\r\ncover our losses with our gains. It is like those gambling and\r\ninsurance rules based on probability, in which we secure ourselves\r\nagainst losses in detail by hedging on the total run. But this hedging\r\nphilosophy requires that long run should be there; and this makes it\r\ninapplicable to the question of religious faith as the latter comes\r\nhome to the individual man. He plays the game of life not to escape\r\nlosses, for he brings nothing with him to lose; he plays it for gains;\r\nand it is now or never with him, for the long run which exists indeed\r\nfor humanity, is not there for him. Let him doubt, believe, or deny,\r\nhe runs his risk, and has the natural right to choose which one it\r\nshall be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] Life of James Hinton, pp. 172, 173. See also the excellent chapter\r\non Faith and Sight in the Mystery of Matter, by J. Allanson Picton.\r\nHinton\u0027s Mystery of Pain will undoubtedly always remain the classical\r\nutterance on this subject.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch03fn5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn4text\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] Observe that in all this not a word has been said of free-will. It\r\nall applies as well to a predetermined as to an indeterminate universe.\r\nIf \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e + \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e is fixed in advance, the belief which leads to \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e and the\r\ndesire which prompts the belief are also fixed. But fixed or not,\r\nthese subjective states form a phenomenal condition necessarily\r\npreceding the facts; necessarily constitutive, therefore, of the truth\r\n\u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e + \u003cI\u003ex\u003c/I\u003e which we seek. If, however, free acts be possible, a faith\r\nin their possibility, by augmenting the moral energy which gives them\r\nbirth, will increase their frequency in a given individual.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch03fn5text\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] In either case, as a later essay explains (see p. 193), the\r\n\u003cI\u003eshould\u003c/I\u003e which the moralist regards as binding upon him must be rooted\r\nin the feeling of some other thinker, or collection of thinkers, to\r\nwhose demands he individually bows.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap04\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P111\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e111}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nREFLEX ACTION AND THEISM.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nMEMBERS OF THE MINISTERS\u0027 INSTITUTE:\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet me confess to the diffidence with which I find myself standing here\r\nto-day. When the invitation of your committee reached me last fall,\r\nthe simple truth is that I accepted it as most men accept a\r\nchallenge,\u0026mdash;not because they wish to fight, but because they are\r\nashamed to say no. Pretending in my small sphere to be a teacher, I\r\nfelt it would be cowardly to shrink from the keenest ordeal to which a\r\nteacher can be exposed,\u0026mdash;the ordeal of teaching other teachers.\r\nFortunately, the trial will last but one short hour; and I have the\r\nconsolation of remembering Goethe\u0027s verses,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Vor den Wissenden sich stellen,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nSicher ist \u0027s in allen Fällen,\"\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nfor if experts are the hardest people to satisfy, they have at any rate\r\nthe liveliest sense of the difficulties of one\u0027s task, and they know\r\nquickest when one hits the mark.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSince it was as a teacher of physiology that I was most unworthily\r\nofficiating when your committee\u0027s\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P112\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e112}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ninvitation reached me, I must\r\nsuppose it to be for the sake of bringing a puff of the latest winds of\r\ndoctrine which blow over that somewhat restless sea that my presence is\r\ndesired. Among all the healthy symptoms that characterize this age, I\r\nknow no sounder one than the eagerness which theologians show to\r\nassimilate results of science, and to hearken to the conclusions of men\r\nof science about universal matters. One runs a better chance of being\r\nlistened to to-day if one can quote Darwin and Helmholtz than if one\r\ncan only quote Schleiermacher or Coleridge. I almost feel myself this\r\nmoment that were I to produce a frog and put him through his\r\nphysiological performances in a masterly manner before your eyes, I\r\nshould gain more reverential ears for what I have to say during the\r\nremainder of the hour. I will not ask whether there be not something\r\nof mere fashion in this prestige which the words of the physiologists\r\nenjoy just now. If it be a fashion, it is certainly a beneficial one\r\nupon the whole; and to challenge it would come with a poor grace from\r\none who at the moment he speaks is so conspicuously profiting by its\r\nfavors.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI will therefore only say this: that the latest breeze from the\r\nphysiological horizon need not necessarily be the most important one.\r\nOf the immense amount of work which the laboratories of Europe and\r\nAmerica, and one may add of Asia and Australia, are producing every\r\nyear, much is destined to speedy refutation; and of more it may be said\r\nthat its interest is purely technical, and not in any degree\r\nphilosophical or universal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis being the case, I know you will justify me if I fall back on a\r\ndoctrine which is fundamental and well established rather than novel,\r\nand ask you whether\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P113\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e113}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nby taking counsel together we may not trace\r\nsome new consequences from it which shall interest us all alike as men.\r\nI refer to the doctrine of reflex action, especially as extended to the\r\nbrain. This is, of course, so familiar to you that I hardly need\r\ndefine it. In a general way, all educated people know what reflex\r\naction means.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt means that the acts we perform are always the result of outward\r\ndischarges from the nervous centres, and that these outward discharges\r\nare themselves the result of impressions from the external world,\r\ncarried in along one or another of our sensory nerves. Applied at\r\nfirst to only a portion of our acts, this conception has ended by being\r\ngeneralized more and more, so that now most physiologists tell us that\r\nevery action whatever, even the most deliberately weighed and\r\ncalculated, does, so far as its organic conditions go, follow the\r\nreflex type. There is not one which cannot be remotely, if not\r\nimmediately, traced to an origin in some incoming impression of sense.\r\nThere is no impression of sense which, unless inhibited by some other\r\nstronger one, does not immediately or remotely express itself in action\r\nof some kind. There is no one of those complicated performances in the\r\nconvolutions of the brain to which our trains of thought correspond,\r\nwhich is not a mere middle term interposed between an incoming\r\nsensation that arouses it and an outgoing discharge of some sort,\r\ninhibitory if not exciting, to which itself gives rise. The structural\r\nunit of the nervous system is in fact a triad, neither of whose\r\nelements has any independent existence. The sensory impression exists\r\nonly for the sake of awaking the central process of reflection, and the\r\ncentral process of reflection exists\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P114\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e114}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nonly for the sake of calling\r\nforth the final act. All action is thus \u003cI\u003ere\u003c/I\u003e-action upon the outer\r\nworld; and the middle stage of consideration or contemplation or\r\nthinking is only a place of transit, the bottom of a loop, both whose\r\nends have their point of application in the outer world. If it should\r\never have no roots in the outer world, if it should ever happen that it\r\nled to no active measures, it would fail of its essential function, and\r\nwould have to be considered either pathological or abortive. The\r\ncurrent of life which runs in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out\r\nat our hands, feet, or lips. The only use of the thoughts it occasions\r\nwhile inside is to determine its direction to whichever of these organs\r\nshall, on the whole, under the circumstances actually present, act in\r\nthe way most propitious to our welfare.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe willing department of our nature, in short, dominates both the\r\nconceiving department and the feeling department; or, in plainer\r\nEnglish, perception and thinking are only there for behavior\u0027s sake.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI am sure I am not wrong in stating this result as one of the\r\nfundamental conclusions to which the entire drift of modern\r\nphysiological investigation sweeps us. If asked what great\r\ncontribution physiology has made to psychology of late years, I am sure\r\nevery competent authority will reply that her influence has in no way\r\nbeen so weighty as in the copious illustration, verification, and\r\nconsolidation of this broad, general point of view.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI invite you, then, to consider what may be the possible speculative\r\nconsequences involved in this great achievement of our generation.\r\nAlready, it dominates all the new work done in psychology; but\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P115\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e115}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\nwhat I wish to ask is whether its influence may not extend far beyond\r\nthe limits of psychology, even into those of theology herself. The\r\nrelations of the doctrine of reflex action with no less a matter than\r\nthe doctrine of theism is, in fact, the topic to which I now invite\r\nyour attention.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe are not the first in the field. There have not been wanting writers\r\nenough to say that reflex action and all that follows from it give the\r\n\u003cI\u003ecoup de grâce\u003c/I\u003e to the superstition of a God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf you open, for instance, such a book on comparative psychology, as\r\nder Thierische Wille of G. H. Schneider, you will find, sandwiched in\r\namong the admirable dealings of the author with his proper subject, and\r\npopping out upon us in unexpected places, the most delightfully \u003cI\u003enaïf\u003c/I\u003e\r\nGerman onslaughts on the degradation of theologians, and the utter\r\nincompatibility of so many reflex adaptations to the environment with\r\nthe existence of a creative intelligence. There was a time, remembered\r\nby many of us here, when the existence of reflex action and all the\r\nother harmonies between the organism and the world were held to prove a\r\nGod. Now, they are held to disprove him. The next turn of the\r\nwhirligig may bring back proof of him again.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nInto this debate about his existence, I will not pretend to enter. I\r\nmust take up humbler ground, and limit my ambition to showing that a\r\nGod, whether existent or not, is at all events the kind of being which,\r\nif he did exist, would form \u003cI\u003ethe most adequate possible object\u003c/I\u003e for\r\nminds framed like our own to conceive as lying at the root of the\r\nuniverse. My thesis, in other words, is this: that some outward\r\nreality of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P116\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e116}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\na nature defined as God\u0027s nature must be defined, is\r\nthe only ultimate object that is at the same time rational and possible\r\nfor the human mind\u0027s contemplation. \u003cI\u003eAnything short of God is not\r\nrational, anything more than God is not possible\u003c/I\u003e, if the human mind be\r\nin truth the triadic structure of impression, reflection, and reaction\r\nwhich we at the outset allowed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTheism, whatever its objective warrant, would thus be seen to have a\r\nsubjective anchorage in its congruity with our nature as thinkers; and,\r\nhowever it may fare with its truth, to derive from this subjective\r\nadequacy the strongest possible guaranty of its permanence. It is and\r\nwill be the classic mean of rational opinion, the centre of gravity of\r\nall attempts to solve the riddle of life,\u0026mdash;some falling below it by\r\ndefect, some flying above it by excess, itself alone satisfying every\r\nmental need in strictly normal measure. Our gain will thus in the\r\nfirst instance be psychological. We shall merely have investigated a\r\nchapter in the natural history of the mind, and found that, as a matter\r\nof such natural history, God may be called the normal object of the\r\nmind\u0027s belief. Whether over and above this he be really the living\r\ntruth is another question. If he is, it will show the structure of our\r\nmind to be in accordance with the nature of reality. Whether it be or\r\nnot in such accordance is, it seems to me, one of those questions that\r\nbelong to the province of personal faith to decide. I will not touch\r\nupon the question here, for I prefer to keep to the strictly\r\nnatural-history point of view. I will only remind you that each one of\r\nus is entitled either to doubt or to believe in the harmony between his\r\nfaculties and the truth; and that, whether he doubt or\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P117\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e117}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbelieve,\r\nhe does it alike on his personal responsibility and risk.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Du musst glauben, du musst wagen,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eDenn die Götter leihn kein Pfand,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNur ein Wunder kann dich tragen\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eIn das schöne Wunderland.\"\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI will presently define exactly what I mean by God and by Theism, and\r\nexplain what theories I referred to when I spoke just now of attempts\r\nto fly beyond the one and to outbid the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, first of all, let me ask you to linger a moment longer over what I\r\nhave called the reflex theory of mind, so as to be sure that we\r\nunderstand it absolutely before going on to consider those of its\r\nconsequences of which I am more particularly to speak. I am not quite\r\nsure that its full scope is grasped even by those who have most\r\nzealously promulgated it. I am not sure, for example, that all\r\nphysiologists see that it commits them to regarding the mind as an\r\nessentially teleological mechanism. I mean by this that the conceiving\r\nor theorizing faculty\u0026mdash;the mind\u0027s middle department\u0026mdash;functions\r\n\u003cI\u003eexclusively for the sake of ends\u003c/I\u003e that do not exist at all in the\r\nworld of impressions we receive by way of our senses, but are set by\r\nour emotional and practical subjectivity altogether.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] It is a\r\ntransformer of the world of our impressions into a totally different\r\nworld,\u0026mdash;the world of our conception; and the transformation is effected\r\nin the interests of our volitional nature, and for no other purpose\r\nwhatsoever. Destroy the volitional nature, the definite subjective\r\npurposes, preferences,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P118\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e118}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfondnesses for certain effects, forms,\r\norders, and not the slightest motive would remain for the brute order\r\nof our experience to be remodelled at all. But, as we have the\r\nelaborate volitional constitution we do have, the remodelling must be\r\neffected; there is no escape. The world\u0027s contents are \u003cI\u003egiven\u003c/I\u003e to each\r\nof us in an order so foreign to our subjective interests that we can\r\nhardly by an effort of the imagination picture to ourselves what it is\r\nlike. We have to break that order altogether,\u0026mdash;and by picking out from\r\nit the items which concern us, and connecting them with others far\r\naway, which we say \u0027belong\u0027 with them, we are able to make out definite\r\nthreads of sequence and tendency; to foresee particular liabilities and\r\nget ready for them; and to enjoy simplicity and harmony in place of\r\nwhat was chaos. Is not the sum of your actual experience taken at this\r\nmoment and impartially added together an utter chaos? The strains of\r\nmy voice, the lights and shades inside the room and out, the murmur of\r\nthe wind, the ticking of the clock, the various organic feelings you\r\nmay happen individually to possess, do these make a whole at all? Is\r\nit not the only condition of your mental sanity in the midst of them\r\nthat most of them should become non-existent for you, and that a few\r\nothers\u0026mdash;the sounds, I hope, which I am uttering\u0026mdash;should evoke from\r\nplaces in your memory that have nothing to do with this scene\r\nassociates fitted to combine with them in what we call a rational train\r\nof thought,\u0026mdash;rational, because it leads to a conclusion which we have\r\nsome organ to appreciate? We have no organ or faculty to appreciate\r\nthe simply given order. The real world as it is given objectively at\r\nthis moment is the sum total of all its beings and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P119\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e119}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nevents now.\r\nBut can we think of such a sum? Can we realize for an instant what a\r\ncross-section of all existence at a definite point of time would be?\r\nWhile I talk and the flies buzz, a sea-gull catches a fish at the mouth\r\nof the Amazon, a tree falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes\r\nin Germany, a horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in France.\r\nWhat does that mean? Does the contemporaneity of these events with one\r\nanother and with a million others as disjointed, form a rational bond\r\nbetween them, and unite them into anything that means for us a world?\r\nYet just such a collateral contemporaneity, and nothing else, is the\r\nreal order of the world. It is an order with which we have nothing to\r\ndo but to get away from it as fast as possible. As I said, we break\r\nit: we break it into histories, and we break it into arts, and we break\r\nit into sciences; and then we begin to feel at home. We make ten\r\nthousand separate serial orders of it, and on any one of these we react\r\nas though the others did not exist. We discover among its various\r\nparts relations that were never given to sense at all (mathematical\r\nrelations, tangents, squares, and roots and logarithmic functions), and\r\nout of an infinite number of these we call certain ones essential and\r\nlawgiving, and ignore the rest. Essential these relations are, but\r\nonly \u003cI\u003efor our purpose\u003c/I\u003e, the other relations being just as real and\r\npresent as they; and our purpose is to \u003cI\u003econceive simply\u003c/I\u003e and to\r\n\u003cI\u003eforesee\u003c/I\u003e. Are not simple conception and prevision subjective ends\r\npure and simple? They are the ends of what we call science; and the\r\nmiracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up by any\r\nphilosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the remodelling.\r\nIt shows itself plastic to many of our scientific, to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P120\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e120}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmany of our\r\naesthetic, to many of our practical purposes and ends.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen the man of affairs, the artist, or the man of science fails, he is\r\nnot rebutted. He tries again. He says the impressions of sense \u003cI\u003emust\u003c/I\u003e\r\ngive way, \u003cI\u003emust\u003c/I\u003e be reduced to the desiderated form.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] They all\r\npostulate in the interests of their volitional nature a harmony between\r\nthe latter and the nature of things. The theologian does no more. And\r\nthe reflex doctrine of the mind\u0027s structure, though all theology should\r\nas yet have failed of its endeavor, could but confess that the endeavor\r\nitself at least obeyed in form the mind\u0027s most necessary law.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn4text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow for the question I asked above: What kind of a being would God be\r\nif he did exist? The word \u0027God\u0027 has come to mean many things in the\r\nhistory\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P121\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e121}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof human thought, from Venus and Jupiter to the \u0027Idee\u0027\r\nwhich figures in the pages of Hegel. Even the laws of physical nature\r\nhave, in these positivistic times, been held worthy of divine honor and\r\npresented as the only fitting object of our reverence.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn5text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] Of course,\r\nif our discussion is to bear any fruit, we must mean something more\r\ndefinite than this. We must not call any object of our loyalty a \u0027God\u0027\r\nwithout more ado, simply because to awaken our loyalty happens to be\r\none of God\u0027s functions. He must have some intrinsic characteristics of\r\nhis own besides; and theism must mean the faith of that man who\r\nbelieves that the object of \u003cI\u003ehis\u003c/I\u003e loyalty has those other attributes,\r\nnegative or positive, as the case may be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, as regards a great many of the attributes of God, and their\r\namounts and mutual relations, the world has been delivered over to\r\ndisputes. All such may for our present purpose be considered as quite\r\ninessential. Not only such matters as his mode of revealing himself,\r\nthe precise extent of his providence and power and their connection\r\nwith our free-will, the proportion of his mercy to his justice, and the\r\namount of his responsibility for evil; but also his metaphysical\r\nrelation to the phenomenal world, whether causal, substantial, ideal,\r\nor what not,\u0026mdash;are affairs of purely sectarian opinion that need not\r\nconcern us at all. Whoso debates them presupposes the essential\r\nfeatures of theism to be granted already; and it is with these\r\nessential features, the bare poles of the subject, that our business\r\nexclusively lies.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P122\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e122}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, what are these essential features? First, it is essential that\r\nGod be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he\r\nmust be conceived under the form of a mental personality. The\r\npersonality need not be determined intrinsically any further than is\r\ninvolved in the holding of certain things dear, and in the recognition\r\nof our dispositions toward those things, the things themselves being\r\nall good and righteous things. But, extrinsically considered, so to\r\nspeak, God\u0027s personality is to be regarded, like any other personality,\r\nas something lying outside of my own and other than me, and whose\r\nexistence I simply come upon and find. A power not ourselves, then,\r\nwhich not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which\r\nrecognizes us,\u0026mdash;such is the definition which I think nobody will be\r\ninclined to dispute. Various are the attempts to shadow forth the\r\nother lineaments of so supreme a personality to our human imagination;\r\nvarious the ways of conceiving in what mode the recognition, the\r\nhearkening to our cry, can come. Some are gross and idolatrous; some\r\nare the most sustained efforts man\u0027s intellect has ever made to keep\r\nstill living on that subtile edge of things where speech and thought\r\nexpire. But, with all these differences, the essence remains\r\nunchanged. In whatever other respects the divine personality may\r\ndiffer from ours or may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at\r\nleast in this,\u0026mdash;that both have purposes for which they care, and each\r\ncan hear the other\u0027s call.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMeanwhile, we can already see one consequence and one point of\r\nconnection with the reflex-action theory of mind. Any mind,\r\nconstructed on the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P123\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e123}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ntriadic-reflex pattern, must first get its\r\nimpression from the object which it confronts; then define what that\r\nobject is, and decide what active measures its presence demands; and\r\nfinally react. The stage of reaction depends on the stage of\r\ndefinition, and these, of course, on the nature of the impressing\r\nobject. When the objects are concrete, particular, and familiar, our\r\nreactions are firm and certain enough,\u0026mdash;often instinctive. I see the\r\ndesk, and lean on it; I see your quiet faces, and I continue to talk.\r\nBut the objects will not stay concrete and particular: they fuse\r\nthemselves into general essences, and they sum themselves into a\r\nwhole,\u0026mdash;the universe. And then the object that confronts us, that\r\nknocks on our mental door and asks to be let in, and fixed and decided\r\nupon and actively met, is just this whole universe itself and its\r\nessence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat are \u003cI\u003ethey\u003c/I\u003e, and how shall I meet \u003cI\u003ethem\u003c/I\u003e?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe whole flood of faiths and systems here rush in. Philosophies and\r\ndenials of philosophy, religions and atheisms, scepticisms and\r\nmysticisms, confirmed emotional moods and habitual practical biases,\r\njostle one another; for all are alike trials, hasty, prolix, or of\r\nseemly length, to answer this momentous question. And the function of\r\nthem all, long or short, that which the moods and the systems alike\r\nsubserve and pass into, is the third stage,\u0026mdash;the stage of action. For\r\nno one of them itself is final. They form but the middle segment of\r\nthe mental curve, and not its termination. As the last theoretic pulse\r\ndies away, it does not leave the mental process complete: it is but the\r\nforerunner of the practical moment, in which alone the cycle of\r\nmentality finds its rhythmic pause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P124\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e124}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe easily delude ourselves about this middle stage. Sometimes we think\r\nit final, and sometimes we fail to see, amid the monstrous diversity in\r\nthe length and complication of the cogitations which may fill it, that\r\nit can have but one essential function, and that the one we have\r\npointed out,\u0026mdash;the function of defining the direction which our\r\nactivity, immediate or remote, shall take.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf I simply say, \"Vanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas!\" I am defining the\r\ntotal nature of things in a way that carries practical consequences\r\nwith it as decidedly as if I write a treatise De Natura Rerum in twenty\r\nvolumes. The treatise may trace its consequences more minutely than\r\nthe saying; but the only worth of either treatise or saying is that the\r\nconsequences are there. The long definition can do no more than draw\r\nthem; the short definition does no less. Indeed, it may be said that\r\nif two apparently different definitions of the reality before us should\r\nhave identical consequences, those two definitions would really be\r\nidentical definitions, made delusively to appear different merely by\r\nthe different verbiage in which they are expressed.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn6text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMy time is unfortunately too short to stay and give to this truth the\r\ndevelopment it deserves; but I will assume that you grant it without\r\nfurther parley, and pass to the next step in my argument. And here,\r\ntoo, I shall have to bespeak your close attention for a moment, while I\r\npass over the subject far more\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P125\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e125}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrapidly than it deserves. Whether\r\ntrue or false, any view of the universe which shall completely satisfy\r\nthe mind must obey conditions of the mind\u0027s own imposing, must at least\r\nlet the mind be the umpire to decide whether it be fit to be called a\r\nrational universe or not. Not any nature of things which may seem to\r\nbe will also seem to be \u003cI\u003eipso facto\u003c/I\u003e rational; and if it do not seem\r\nrational, it will afflict the mind with a ceaseless uneasiness, till it\r\nbe formulated or interpreted in some other and more congenial way. The\r\nstudy of what the mind\u0027s criteria of rationality are, the definition of\r\nits exactions in this respect, form an intensely interesting subject\r\ninto which I cannot enter now with any detail.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn7text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn7\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e] But so much I think\r\nyou will grant me without argument,\u0026mdash;that all three departments of the\r\nmind alike have a vote in the matter, and that no conception will pass\r\nmuster which violates any of their essential modes of activity, or\r\nwhich leaves them without a chance to work. By what title is it that\r\nevery would-be universal formula, every system of philosophy which\r\nrears its head, receives the inevitable critical volley from one half\r\nof mankind, and falls to the rear, to become at the very best the creed\r\nof some partial sect? Either it has dropped out of its net some of our\r\nimpressions of sense,\u0026mdash;what we call the facts of nature,\u0026mdash;or it has\r\nleft the theoretic and defining department with a lot of\r\ninconsistencies and unmediated transitions on its hands; or else,\r\nfinally, it has left some one or more of our fundamental active and\r\nemotional powers with no object outside of themselves to react-on or to\r\nlive for. Any one of these defects is fatal to its complete success.\r\nSome one\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P126\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e126}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwill be sure to discover the flaw, to scout the system,\r\nand to seek another in its stead.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI need not go far to collect examples to illustrate to an audience of\r\ntheologians what I mean. Nor will you in particular, as champions of\r\nthe Unitarianism of New England, be slow to furnish, from the motives\r\nwhich led to your departure from our orthodox ancestral Calvinism,\r\ninstances enough under the third or practical head. A God who gives so\r\nlittle scope to love, a predestination which takes from endeavor all\r\nits zest with all its fruit, are irrational conceptions, because they\r\nsay to our most cherished powers, There is no object for you.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWell, just as within the limits of theism some kinds are surviving\r\nothers by reason of their greater practical rationality, so theism\r\nitself, by reason of its practical rationality, is certain to survive\r\nall lower creeds. Materialism and agnosticism, even were they true,\r\ncould never gain universal and popular acceptance; for they both,\r\nalike, give a solution of things which is irrational to the practical\r\nthird of our nature, and in which we can never volitionally feel at\r\nhome. Each comes out of the second or theoretic stage of mental\r\nfunctioning, with its definition of the essential nature of things, its\r\nformula of formulas prepared. The whole array of active forces of our\r\nnature stands waiting, impatient for the word which shall tell them how\r\nto discharge themselves most deeply and worthily upon life. \"Well!\"\r\ncry they, \"what shall we do?\" \"Ignoramus, ignorabimus!\" says\r\nagnosticism. \"React upon atoms and their concussions!\" says\r\nmaterialism. What a collapse! The mental train misses fire, the\r\nmiddle fails to ignite the end, the cycle breaks down half-way to its\r\nconclusion; and the active\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P127\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e127}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npowers left alone, with no proper\r\nobject on which to vent their energy, must either atrophy, sicken, and\r\ndie, or else by their pent-up convulsions and excitement keep the whole\r\nmachinery in a fever until some less incommensurable solution, some\r\nmore practically rational formula, shall provide a normal issue for the\r\ncurrents of the soul.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, theism always stands ready with the most practically rational\r\nsolution it is possible to conceive. Not an energy of our active\r\nnature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of\r\nwhich it does not normally and naturally release the springs. At a\r\nsingle stroke, it changes the dead blank \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e of the world into a\r\nliving \u003cI\u003ethou\u003c/I\u003e, with whom the whole man may have dealings. To you, at\r\nany rate, I need waste no words in trying to prove its supreme\r\ncommensurateness with all the demands that department Number Three of\r\nthe mind has the power to impose on department Number Two.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOur volitional nature must then, until the end of time, exert a\r\nconstant pressure upon the other departments of the mind to induce them\r\nto function to theistic conclusions. No contrary formulas can be more\r\nthan provisionally held. Infra-theistic theories must be always in\r\nunstable equilibrium; for department Number Three ever lurks in ambush,\r\nready to assert its rights, and on the slightest show of justification\r\nit makes its fatal spring, and converts them into the other form in\r\nwhich alone mental peace and order can permanently reign.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe question is, then, \u003cI\u003eCan\u003c/I\u003e departments One and Two, \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e the facts\r\nof nature and the theoretic elaboration of them, always lead to\r\ntheistic conclusions?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe future history of philosophy is the only\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P128\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e128}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nauthority capable of\r\nanswering that question. I, at all events, must not enter into it\r\nto-day, as that would be to abandon the purely natural-history point of\r\nview I mean to keep.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis only is certain, that the theoretic faculty lives between two\r\nfires which never give her rest, and make her incessantly revise her\r\nformulations. If she sink into a premature, short-sighted, and\r\nidolatrous theism, in comes department Number One with its battery of\r\nfacts of sense, and dislodges her from her dogmatic repose. If she\r\nlazily subside into equilibrium with the same facts of sense viewed in\r\ntheir simple mechanical outwardness, up starts the practical reason\r\nwith its demands, and makes \u003cI\u003ethat\u003c/I\u003e couch a bed of thorns. From\r\ngeneration to generation thus it goes,\u0026mdash;now a movement of reception\r\nfrom without, now one of expansion from within; department Number Two\r\nalways worked to death, yet never excused from taking the most\r\nresponsible part in the arrangements. To-day, a crop of new facts;\r\nto-morrow, a flowering of new motives,\u0026mdash;the theoretic faculty always\r\nhaving to effect the transition, and life growing withal so complex and\r\nsubtle and immense that her powers of conceiving are almost ruptured\r\nwith the strain. See how, in France, the mummy-cloths of the academic\r\nand official theistic philosophy are rent by the facts of evolution,\r\nand how the young thinkers are at work! See, in Great Britain, how the\r\ndryness of the strict associationist school, which under the\r\nministration of Mill, Bain, and Spencer dominated us but yesterday,\r\ngives way to more generous idealisms, born of more urgent emotional\r\nneeds and wrapping the same facts in far more massive intellectual\r\nharmonies! These are but tackings to the common\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P129\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e129}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nport, to that\r\nultimate \u003cI\u003eWeltanschauung\u003c/I\u003e of maximum subjective as well as objective\r\nrichness, which, whatever its other properties may be, will at any rate\r\nwear the theistic form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere let me say one word about a remark we often hear coming from the\r\nanti-theistic wing: It is base, it is vile, it is the lowest depth of\r\nimmorality, to allow department Number Three to interpose its demands,\r\nand have any vote in the question of what is true and what is false;\r\nthe mind must be a passive, reactionless sheet of white paper, on which\r\nreality will simply come and register its own philosophic definition,\r\nas the pen registers the curve on the sheet of a chronograph. \"Of all\r\nthe cants that are canted in this canting age\" this has always seemed\r\nto me the most wretched, especially when it comes from professed\r\npsychologists. As if the mind could, consistently with its definition,\r\nbe a reactionless sheet at all! As if conception could possibly occur\r\nexcept for a teleological purpose, except to show us the way from a\r\nstate of things our senses cognize to another state of things our will\r\ndesires! As if \u0027science\u0027 itself were anything else than such an end of\r\ndesire, and a most peculiar one at that! And as if the \u0027truths\u0027 of\r\nbare physics in particular, which these sticklers for intellectual\r\npurity contend to be the only uncontaminated form, were not as great an\r\nalteration and falsification of the simply \u0027given\u0027 order of the world,\r\ninto an order conceived solely for the mind\u0027s convenience and delight,\r\nas any theistic doctrine possibly can be!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPhysics is but one chapter in the great jugglery which our conceiving\r\nfaculty is forever playing with\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P130\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e130}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe order of being as it presents\r\nitself to our reception. It transforms the unutterable dead level and\r\ncontinuum of the \u0027given\u0027 world into an utterly unlike world of sharp\r\ndifferences and hierarchic subordinations for no other reason than to\r\nsatisfy certain subjective passions we possess.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn8text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn8\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd, so far as we can see, the given world is there only for the sake\r\nof the operation. At any rate, to operate upon it is our only chance\r\nof approaching it; for never can we get a glimpse of it in the\r\nunimaginable insipidity of its virgin estate. To bid the man\u0027s\r\nsubjective interests be passive till truth express itself from out the\r\nenvironment, is to bid the sculptor\u0027s chisel be passive till the statue\r\nexpress itself from out the stone. Operate we must! and the only\r\nchoice left us is that between operating to poor or to rich results.\r\nThe only possible duty there can be in the matter is the duty of\r\ngetting the richest results that the material given will allow. The\r\nrichness lies, of course, in the energy of all three departments of the\r\nmental cycle. Not a sensible \u0027fact\u0027 of department One must be left in\r\nthe cold, not a faculty of department Three be paralyzed; and\r\ndepartment Two must form an indestructible bridge. It is natural that\r\nthe habitual neglect of department One by theologians should arouse\r\nindignation; but it is most \u003cI\u003eun\u003c/I\u003enatural that the indignation should\r\ntake the form of a wholesale denunciation of department Three. It is\r\nthe story of Kant\u0027s dove over again, denouncing the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P131\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e131}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npressure of\r\nthe air. Certain of our positivists keep chiming to us, that, amid the\r\nwreck of every other god and idol, one divinity still stands\r\nupright,\u0026mdash;that his name is Scientific Truth, and that he has but one\r\ncommandment, but that one supreme, saying, \u003cI\u003eThou shalt not be a\r\ntheist\u003c/I\u003e, for that would be to satisfy thy subjective propensities, and\r\nthe satisfaction of those is intellectual damnation. These most\r\nconscientious gentlemen think they have jumped off their own\r\nfeet,\u0026mdash;emancipated their mental operations from the control of their\r\nsubjective propensities at large and \u003cI\u003ein toto\u003c/I\u003e. But they are deluded.\r\nThey have simply chosen from among the entire set of propensities at\r\ntheir command those that were certain to construct, out of the\r\nmaterials given, the leanest, lowest, aridest result,\u0026mdash;namely, the bare\r\nmolecular world,\u0026mdash;and they have sacrificed all the rest.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn9text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn9\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMan\u0027s chief difference from the brutes lies in the exuberant excess of\r\nhis subjective propensities,\u0026mdash;his pre-eminence over them simply and\r\nsolely in the number and in the fantastic and unnecessary character of\r\nhis wants, physical, moral, aesthetic, and intellectual. Had his whole\r\nlife not been a quest for the superfluous, he would never have\r\nestablished himself as inexpugnably as he has done in the necessary.\r\nAnd from the consciousness of this he should draw the lesson that his\r\nwants are to be trusted; that even\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P132\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e132}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwhen their gratification seems\r\nfarthest off, the uneasiness they occasion is still the best guide of\r\nhis life, and will lead him to issues entirely beyond his present\r\npowers of reckoning. Prune down his extravagance, sober him, and you\r\nundo him. The appetite for immediate consistency at any cost, or what\r\nthe logicians call the \u0027law of parsimony,\u0027\u0026mdash;which is nothing but the\r\npassion for conceiving the universe in the most labor-saving\r\nway,\u0026mdash;will, if made the exclusive law of the mind, end by blighting the\r\ndevelopment of the intellect itself quite as much as that of the\r\nfeelings or the will. The scientific conception of the world as an\r\narmy of molecules gratifies this appetite after its fashion most\r\nexquisitely. But if the religion of exclusive scientificism should\r\never succeed in suffocating all other appetites out of a nation\u0027s mind,\r\nand imbuing a whole race with the persuasion that simplicity and\r\nconsistency demand a \u003cI\u003etabula rasa\u003c/I\u003e to be made of every notion that does\r\nnot form part of the \u003cI\u003esoi-disant\u003c/I\u003e scientific synthesis, that nation,\r\nthat race, will just as surely go to ruin, and fall a prey to their\r\nmore richly constituted neighbors, as the beasts of the field, as a\r\nwhole, have fallen a prey to man.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have myself little fear for our Anglo-Saxon race. Its moral,\r\naesthetic, and practical wants form too dense a stubble to be mown by\r\nany scientific Occam\u0027s razor that has yet been forged. The knights of\r\nthe razor will never form among us more than a sect; but when I see\r\ntheir fraternity increasing in numbers, and, what is worse, when I see\r\ntheir negations acquiring almost as much prestige and authority as\r\ntheir affirmations legitimately claim over the minds of the docile\r\npublic, I feel as if the influences working in the direction of our\r\nmental barbarization were\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P133\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e133}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbeginning to be rather strong, and\r\nneeded some positive counteraction. And when I ask myself from what\r\nquarter the invasion may best be checked, I can find no answer as good\r\nas the one suggested by casting my eyes around this room. For this\r\nneedful task, no fitter body of men than the Unitarian clergy exists.\r\nWho can uphold the rights of department Three of the mind with better\r\ngrace than those who long since showed how they could fight and suffer\r\nfor department One? As, then, you burst the bonds of a narrow\r\necclesiastical tradition, by insisting that no fact of sense or result\r\nof science must be left out of account in the religious synthesis, so\r\nmay you still be the champions of mental completeness and\r\nall-sidedness. May you, with equal success, avert the formation of a\r\nnarrow scientific tradition, and burst the bonds of any synthesis which\r\nwould pretend to leave out of account those forms of being, those\r\nrelations of reality, to which at present our active and emotional\r\ntendencies are our only avenues of approach. I hear it said that\r\nUnitarianism is not growing in these days. I know nothing of the truth\r\nof the statement; but if it be true, it is surely because the great\r\nship of Orthodoxy is nearing the port and the pilot is being taken on\r\nboard. If you will only lead in a theistic science, as successfully as\r\nyou have led in a scientific theology, your separate name as Unitarians\r\nmay perish from the mouths of men; for your task will have been done,\r\nand your function at an end. Until that distant day, you have work\r\nenough in both directions awaiting you.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMeanwhile, let me pass to the next division of our subject. I said\r\nthat we are forced to regard God as\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P134\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e134}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe normal object of the\r\nmind\u0027s belief, inasmuch as any conception that falls short of God is\r\nirrational, if the word \u0027rational\u0027 be taken in its fullest sense; while\r\nany conception that goes beyond God is impossible, if the human mind be\r\nconstructed after the triadic-reflex pattern we have discussed at such\r\nlength. The first half of the thesis has been disposed of.\r\nInfra-theistic conceptions, materialisms and agnosticisms, are\r\nirrational because they are inadequate stimuli to man\u0027s practical\r\nnature. I have now to justify the latter half of the thesis.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI dare say it may for an instant have perplexed some of you that I\r\nshould speak of conceptions that aimed at going beyond God, and of\r\nattempts to fly above him or outbid him; so I will now explain exactly\r\nwhat I mean. In defining the essential attributes of God, I said he\r\nwas a personality lying outside our own and other than us,\u0026mdash;a power not\r\nourselves. Now, the attempts to fly beyond theism, of which I speak,\r\nare attempts to get over this ultimate duality of God and his believer,\r\nand to transform it into some sort or other of identity. If\r\ninfratheistic ways of looking on the world leave it in the third\r\nperson, a mere \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e; and if theism turns the \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e into a \u003cI\u003ethou\u003c/I\u003e,\u0026mdash;so we\r\nmay say that these other theories try to cover it with the mantle of\r\nthe first person, and to make it a part of \u003cI\u003eme\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI am well aware that I begin here to tread on ground in which trenchant\r\ndistinctions may easily seem to mutilate the facts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThat sense of emotional reconciliation with God which characterizes the\r\nhighest moments of the theistic consciousness may be described as\r\n\u0027oneness\u0027 with him, and so from the very bosom of theism a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P135\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e135}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmonistic doctrine seem to arise. But this consciousness of\r\nself-surrender, of absolute practical union between one\u0027s self and the\r\ndivine object of one\u0027s contemplation, is a totally different thing from\r\nany sort of substantial identity. Still the object God and the subject\r\nI are two. Still I simply come upon him, and find his existence given\r\nto me; and the climax of my practical union with what is given, forms\r\nat the same time the climax of my perception that as a numerical fact\r\nof existence I am something radically other than the Divinity with\r\nwhose effulgence I am filled.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, it seems to me that the only sort of union of creature with\r\ncreator with which theism, properly so called, comports, is of this\r\nemotional and practical kind; and it is based unchangeably on the\r\nempirical fact that the thinking subject and the object thought are\r\nnumerically two. How my mind and will, which are not God, can yet\r\ncognize and leap to meet him, how I ever came to be so separate from\r\nhim, and how God himself came to be at all, are problems that for the\r\ntheist can remain unsolved and insoluble forever. It is sufficient for\r\nhim to know that he himself simply is, and needs God; and that behind\r\nthis universe God simply is and will be forever, and will in some way\r\nhear his call. In the practical assurance of these empirical facts,\r\nwithout \u0027Erkentnisstheorie\u0027 or philosophical ontology, without\r\nmetaphysics of emanation or creation to justify or make them more\r\nintelligible, in the blessedness of their mere acknowledgment as given,\r\nlie all the peace and power he craves. The floodgates of the religious\r\nlife are opened, and the full currents can pour through.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is this empirical and practical side of the theistic position, its\r\ntheoretic chastity and modesty, which I\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P136\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e136}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwish to accentuate here.\r\nThe highest flights of theistic mysticism, far from pretending to\r\npenetrate the secrets of the \u003cI\u003eme\u003c/I\u003e and the \u003cI\u003ethou\u003c/I\u003e in worship, and to\r\ntranscend the dualism by an act of intelligence, simply turn their\r\nbacks on such attempts. The problem for them has simply\r\nvanished,\u0026mdash;vanished from the sight of an attitude which refuses to\r\nnotice such futile theoretic difficulties. Get but that \"peace of God\r\nwhich passeth understanding,\" and the questions of the understanding\r\nwill cease from puzzling and pedantic scruples be at rest. In other\r\nwords, theistic mysticism, that form of theism which at first sight\r\nseems most to have transcended the fundamental otherness of God from\r\nman, has done it least of all in the theoretic way. The pattern of its\r\nprocedure is precisely that of the simplest man dealing with the\r\nsimplest fact of his environment. Both he and the theist tarry in\r\ndepartment Two of their minds only so long as is necessary to define\r\nwhat is the presence that confronts them. The theist decides that its\r\ncharacter is such as to be fitly responded to on his part by a\r\nreligious reaction; and into that reaction he forthwith pours his soul.\r\nHis insight into the \u003cI\u003ewhat\u003c/I\u003e of life leads to results so immediately and\r\nintimately rational that the \u003cI\u003ewhy\u003c/I\u003e, the \u003cI\u003ehow\u003c/I\u003e, and the \u003cI\u003ewhence\u003c/I\u003e of it\r\nare questions that lose all urgency. \u0027Gefühl ist Alles,\u0027 Faust says.\r\nThe channels of department Three have drained those of department Two\r\nof their contents; and happiness over the fact that being has made\r\nitself what it is, evacuates all speculation as to how it could make\r\nitself at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now, although to most human minds such a position as this will be\r\nthe position of rational equilibrium, it is not difficult to bring\r\nforward certain\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P137\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e137}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nconsiderations, in the light of which so simple\r\nand practical a mental movement begins to seem rather short-winded and\r\nsecond-rate and devoid of intellectual style. This easy acceptance of\r\nan opaque limit to our speculative insight; this satisfaction with a\r\nBeing whose character we simply apprehend without comprehending\r\nanything more about him, and with whom after a certain point our\r\ndealings can be only of a volitional and emotional sort; above all,\r\nthis sitting down contented with a blank unmediated dualism,\u0026mdash;are they\r\nnot the very picture of unfaithfulness to the rights and duties of our\r\ntheoretic reason?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSurely, if the universe is reasonable (and we must believe that it is\r\nso), it must be susceptible, potentially at least, of being reasoned\r\n\u003cI\u003eout\u003c/I\u003e to the last drop without residuum. Is it not rather an insult to\r\nthe very word \u0027rational\u0027 to say that the rational character of the\r\nuniverse and its creator means no more than that we practically feel at\r\nhome in their presence, and that our powers are a match for their\r\ndemands? Do they not in fact demand to be \u003cI\u003eunderstood\u003c/I\u003e by us still\r\nmore than to be reacted on? Is not the unparalleled development of\r\ndepartment Two of the mind in man his crowning glory and his very\r\nessence; and may not the \u003cI\u003eknowing of the truth\u003c/I\u003e be his absolute\r\nvocation? And if it is, ought he flatly to acquiesce in a spiritual\r\nlife of \u0027reflex type,\u0027 whose form is no higher than that of the life\r\nthat animates his spinal cord,\u0026mdash;nay, indeed, that animates the writhing\r\nsegments of any mutilated worm?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is easy to see how such arguments and queries may result in the\r\nerection of an ideal of our mental destiny, far different from the\r\nsimple and practical religious one we have described. We may well\r\nbegin\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P138\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e138}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nto ask whether such things as practical reactions can be\r\nthe final upshot and purpose of all our cognitive energy. Mere outward\r\nacts, changes in the position of parts of matter (for they are nothing\r\nelse), can they possibly be the culmination and consummation of our\r\nrelations with the nature of things? Can they possibly form a result\r\nto which our godlike powers of insight shall be judged merely\r\nsubservient? Such an idea, if we scan it closely, soon begins to seem\r\nrather absurd. Whence this piece of matter comes and whither that one\r\ngoes, what difference ought that to make to the nature of things,\r\nexcept so far as with the comings and the goings our wonderful inward\r\nconscious harvest may be reaped?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd so, very naturally and gradually, one may be led from the theistic\r\nand practical point of view to what I shall call the \u003cI\u003egnostical\u003c/I\u003e one.\r\nWe may think that department Three of the mind, with its doings of\r\nright and its doings of wrong, must be there only to serve department\r\nTwo; and we may suspect that the sphere of our activity exists for no\r\nother purpose than to illumine our cognitive consciousness by the\r\nexperience of its results. Are not all sense and all emotion at bottom\r\nbut turbid and perplexed modes of what in its clarified shape is\r\nintelligent cognition? Is not all experience just the eating of the\r\nfruit of the tree of \u003cI\u003eknowledge\u003c/I\u003e of good and evil, and nothing more?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThese questions fan the fire of an unassuageable gnostic thirst, which\r\nis as far removed from theism in one direction as agnosticism was\r\nremoved from it in the other; and which aspires to nothing less than an\r\nabsolute unity of knowledge with its object, and refuses to be\r\nsatisfied short of a fusion and solution and saturation of both\r\nimpression and action with reason, and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P139\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e139}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nan absorption of all three\r\ndepartments of the mind into one. Time would fail us to-day (even had\r\nI the learning, which I have not) to speak of gnostic systems in\r\ndetail. The aim of all of them is to shadow forth a sort of process by\r\nwhich spirit, emerging from its beginnings and exhausting the whole\r\ncircle of finite experience in its sweep, shall at last return and\r\npossess itself as its own object at the climax of its career. This\r\nclimax is the religious consciousness. At the giddy height of this\r\nconception, whose latest and best known form is the Hegelian\r\nphilosophy, definite words fail to serve their purpose; and the\r\nultimate goal,\u0026mdash;where object and subject, worshipped and worshipper,\r\nfacts and the knowledge of them, fall into one, and where no other is\r\nleft outstanding beyond this one that alone is, and that we may call\r\nindifferently act or fact, reality or idea, God or creation,\u0026mdash;this\r\ngoal, I say, has to be adumbrated to our halting and gasping\r\nintelligence by coarse physical metaphors, \u0027positings\u0027 and\r\n\u0027self-returnings\u0027 and \u0027removals\u0027 and \u0027settings free,\u0027 which hardly help\r\nto make the matter clear.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut from the midst of the curdling and the circling of it all we seem\r\ndimly to catch a glimpse of a state in which the reality to be known\r\nand the power of knowing shall have become so mutually adequate that\r\neach exhaustively is absorbed by the other and the twain become one\r\nflesh, and in which the light shall somehow have soaked up all the\r\nouter darkness into its own ubiquitous beams. Like all headlong\r\nideals, this apotheosis of the bare conceiving faculty has its depth\r\nand wildness, its pang and its charm. To many it sings a truly siren\r\nstrain; and so long as it is held only as a postulate, as a mere\r\nvanishing\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P140\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e140}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npoint to give perspective to our intellectual aim, it\r\nis hard to see any empirical title by which we may deny the legitimacy\r\nof gnosticism\u0027s claims. That we are not as yet near the goal it\r\nprefigures can never be a reason why we might not continue indefinitely\r\nto approach it; and to all sceptical arguments, drawn from our reason\u0027s\r\nactual finiteness, gnosticism can still oppose its indomitable faith in\r\nthe infinite character of its potential destiny.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, here it is that the physiologist\u0027s generalization, as it seems to\r\nme, may fairly come in, and by ruling any such extravagant faith out of\r\ncourt help to legitimate our personal mistrust of its pretensions. I\r\nconfess that I myself have always had a great mistrust of the\r\npretensions of the gnostic faith. Not only do I utterly fail to\r\nunderstand what a cognitive faculty erected into the absolute of being,\r\nwith itself as its object, can mean; but even if we grant it a being\r\nother than itself for object, I cannot reason myself out of the belief\r\nthat however familiar and at home we might become with the character of\r\nthat being, the bare being of it, the fact that it is there at all,\r\nmust always be something blankly given and presupposed in order that\r\nconception may begin its work; must in short lie beyond speculation,\r\nand not be enveloped in its sphere.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAccordingly, it is with no small pleasure that as a student of\r\nphysiology and psychology I find the only lesson I can learn from these\r\nsciences to be one that corroborates these convictions. From its first\r\ndawn to its highest actual attainment, we find that the cognitive\r\nfaculty, where it appears to exist at all, appears but as one element\r\nin an organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental\r\npowers,\u0026mdash;the powers\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P141\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e141}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof will. Such a thing as its emancipation\r\nand absolution from these organic relations receives no faintest color\r\nof plausibility from any fact we can discern. Arising as a part, in a\r\nmental and objective world which are both larger than itself, it must,\r\nwhatever its powers of growth may be (and I am far from wishing to\r\ndisparage them), remain a part to the end. This is the character of\r\nthe cognitive element in all the mental life we know, and we have no\r\nreason to suppose that that character will ever change. On the\r\ncontrary, it is more than probable that to the end of time our power of\r\nmoral and volitional response to the nature of things will be the\r\ndeepest organ of communication therewith we shall ever possess. In\r\nevery being that is real there is something external to, and sacred\r\nfrom, the grasp of every other. God\u0027s being is sacred from ours. To\r\nco-operate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems\r\nall he wants of us. In such co-operation with his purposes, not in any\r\nchimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretic drinking\r\nof him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis is nothing new. All men know it at those rare moments when the\r\nsoul sobers herself, and leaves off her chattering and protesting and\r\ninsisting about this formula or that. In the silence of our theories\r\nwe then seem to listen, and to hear something like the pulse of Being\r\nbeat; and it is borne in upon us that the mere turning of the\r\ncharacter, the dumb willingness to suffer and to serve this universe,\r\nis more than all theories about it put together. The most any theory\r\nabout it can do is to bring us to that. Certain it is that the acutest\r\ntheories, the greatest intellectual power, the most elaborate\r\neducation, are a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P142\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e142}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsheer mockery when, as too often happens, they\r\nfeed mean motives and a nerveless will. And it is equally certain that\r\na resolute moral energy, no matter how inarticulate or unequipped with\r\nlearning its owner may be, extorts from us a respect we should never\r\npay were we not satisfied that the essential root of human personality\r\nlay there.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have sketched my subject in the briefest outlines; but still I hope\r\nyou will agree that I have established my point, and that the\r\nphysiological view of mentality, so far from invalidating, can but give\r\naid and comfort to the theistic attitude of mind. Between agnosticism\r\nand gnosticism, theism stands midway, and holds to what is true in\r\neach. With agnosticism, it goes so far as to confess that we cannot\r\nknow how Being made itself or us. With gnosticism, it goes so far as\r\nto insist that we can know Being\u0027s character when made, and how it asks\r\nus to behave.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf any one fear that in insisting so strongly that behavior is the aim\r\nand end of every sound philosophy I have curtailed the dignity and\r\nscope of the speculative function in us, I can only reply that in this\r\nascertainment of the \u003cI\u003echaracter\u003c/I\u003e of Being lies an almost infinite\r\nspeculative task. Let the voluminous considerations by which all\r\nmodern thought converges toward idealistic or pan-psychic conclusions\r\nspeak for me. Let the pages of a Hodgson, of a Lotze, of a Renouvier,\r\nreply whether within the limits drawn by purely empirical theism the\r\nspeculative faculty finds not, and shall not always find, enough to do.\r\nBut do it little or much, its \u003cI\u003eplace\u003c/I\u003e in a philosophy is always the\r\nsame, and is set by the structural form of the mind. Philosophies,\r\nwhether expressed in sonnets or\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P143\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e143}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsystems, all must wear this form.\r\nThe thinker starts from some experience of the practical world, and\r\nasks its meaning. He launches himself upon the speculative sea, and\r\nmakes a voyage long or short. He ascends into the empyrean, and\r\ncommunes with the eternal essences. But whatever his achievements and\r\ndiscoveries be while gone, the utmost result they can issue in is some\r\nnew practical maxim or resolve, or the denial of some old one, with\r\nwhich inevitably he is sooner or later washed ashore on the \u003cI\u003eterra\r\nfirma\u003c/I\u003e of concrete life again.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhatever thought takes this voyage is a philosophy. We have seen how\r\ntheism takes it. And in the philosophy of a thinker who, though long\r\nneglected, is doing much to renovate the spiritual life of his native\r\nFrance to-day (I mean Charles Renouvier, whose writings ought to be\r\nbetter known among us than they are), we have an instructive example of\r\nthe way in which this very empirical element in theism, its confession\r\nof an ultimate opacity in things, of a dimension of being which escapes\r\nour theoretic control, may suggest a most definite practical\r\nconclusion,\u0026mdash;this one, namely, that \u0027our wills are free.\u0027 I will say\r\nnothing of Renouvier\u0027s line of reasoning; it is contained in many\r\nvolumes which I earnestly recommend to your attention.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn10text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e] But to\r\nenforce my doctrine that the number of volumes is not what makes the\r\nphilosophy, let me conclude by recalling to you the little poem of\r\nTennyson, published last year, in which the speculative voyage is made,\r\nand the same conclusion reached in a few lines:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P144\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e144}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Out of the deep, my child, out of the deep,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nFrom that great deep before our world begins,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhereon the Spirit of God moves as he will,\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOut of the deep, my child, out of the deep,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nFrom that true world within the world we see,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhereof our world is but the bounding shore,\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOut of the deep, Spirit, out of the deep,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWith this ninth moon that sends the hidden sun\u003cBR\u003e\r\nDown yon dark sea, thou comest, darling boy.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nFor in the world which is not ours, they said,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u0027Let us make man,\u0027 and that which should be man,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nFrom that one light no man can look upon,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nDrew to this shore lit by the suns and moons\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd all the shadows. O dear Spirit, half-lost\u003cBR\u003e\r\nIn thine own shadow and this fleshly sign\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThat thou art thou,\u0026mdash;who wailest being born\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd banish\u0027d into mystery,…\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 5em\"\u003e…our mortal veil\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd shattered phantom of that Infinite One,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWho made thee unconceivably thyself\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOut of his whole world-self and all in all,\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLive thou, and of the grain and husk, the grape\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd ivyberry, choose; and still depart\u003cBR\u003e\r\nFrom death to death through life and life, and find\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNearer and ever nearer Him who wrought\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNot matter, nor the finite-infinite,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eBut this main miracle, that thou art thou,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWith power on thine own act and on the world\u003c/I\u003e.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn7\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn8\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn9\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch04fn10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] Address delivered to the Unitarian Ministers\u0027 Institute at\r\nPrinceton, Mass., 1881, and printed in the Unitarian Review for October\r\nof that year.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] See some Remarks on Spencer\u0027s Definition of Mind, in the Journal of\r\nSpeculative Philosophy for January, 1878.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] \"No amount of failure in the attempt to subject the world of\r\nsensible experience to a thorough-going system of conceptions, and to\r\nbring all happenings back to cases of immutably valid law, is able to\r\nshake our faith in the rightness of our principles. We hold fast to\r\nour demand that even the greatest apparent confusion must sooner or\r\nlater solve itself in transparent formulas. We begin the work ever\r\nafresh; and, refusing to believe that nature will permanently withhold\r\nthe reward of our exertions, think rather that we have hitherto only\r\nfailed to push them in the right direction. And all this pertinacity\r\nflows from a conviction that we have no right to renounce the\r\nfulfilment of our task. What, in short sustains the courage of\r\ninvestigators is the force of obligation of an ethical idea.\"\r\n(Sigwart: Logik, bd. ii., p. 23.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\nThis is a true account of the spirit of science. Does it essentially\r\ndiffer from the spirit of religion? And is any one entitled to say in\r\nadvance, that, while the one form of faith shall be crowned with\r\nsuccess, the other is certainly doomed to fail?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn4text\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] Concerning the transformation of the given order into the order of\r\nconception, see S. H. Hodgson, The Philosophy of Reflection, chap. v.;\r\nH. Lotze, Logik, sects. 342-351; C. Sigwart, Logik, sects. 60-63, 105.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn5text\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] Haeckel has recently (Der Monismus, 1893, p. 37) proposed the\r\nCosmic Ether as a divinity fitted to reconcile science with theistic\r\nfaith.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn6text\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e] See the admirably original \"Illustrations of the Logic of Science,\"\r\nby C. S. Peirce, especially the second paper, \"How to make our Thoughts\r\nclear,\" in the Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn7text\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e] On this subject, see the preceding Essay.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn8text\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e] \"As soon as it is recognized that our thought, as logic deals with\r\nit, reposes on our \u003cI\u003ewill to think\u003c/I\u003e, the primacy of the will, even in\r\nthe theoretical sphere, must be conceded; and the last of\r\npresuppositions is not merely [Kant\u0027s] that \u0027I think\u0027 must accompany\r\nall my representations, but also that \u0027I will\u0027 must dominate all my\r\nthinking.\" (Sigwart; Logik, ll. 25.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn9text\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e] As our ancestors said, \u003cI\u003eFiat justitia, pereat mundus\u003c/I\u003e, so we, who\r\ndo not believe in justice or any absolute good, must, according to\r\nthese prophets, be willing to see the world perish, in order that\r\n\u003cI\u003escientia fiat\u003c/I\u003e. Was there ever a more exquisite idol of the den, or\r\nrather of the \u003cI\u003eshop\u003c/I\u003e? In the clean sweep to be made of superstitions,\r\nlet the idol of stern obligation to be scientific go with the rest, and\r\npeople will have a fair chance to understand one another. But this\r\nblowing of hot and of cold makes nothing but confusion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch04fn10text\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e] Especially the Essais de Critique Générale, 2me Edition, 6 vols.,\r\n12mo, Paris, 1875; and the Esquisse d\u0027une Classification Systématique\r\ndes Doctrines Philosophiques, 2 vols., 8vo, Paris, 1885.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap05\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P145\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e145}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTHE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA common opinion prevails that the juice has ages ago been pressed out\r\nof the free-will controversy, and that no new champion can do more than\r\nwarm up stale arguments which every one has heard. This is a radical\r\nmistake. I know of no subject less worn out, or in which inventive\r\ngenius has a better chance of breaking open new ground,\u0026mdash;not, perhaps,\r\nof forcing a conclusion or of coercing assent, but of deepening our\r\nsense of what the issue between the two parties really is, of what the\r\nideas of fate and of free-will imply. At our very side almost, in the\r\npast few years, we have seen falling in rapid succession from the press\r\nworks that present the alternative in entirely novel lights. Not to\r\nspeak of the English disciples of Hegel, such as Green and Bradley; not\r\nto speak of Hinton and Hodgson, nor of Hazard here,\u0026mdash;we see in the\r\nwritings of Renouvier, Fouillée, and Delboeuf[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] how completely changed\r\nand refreshed is the form of all the old disputes. I cannot pretend to\r\nvie in originality with any of the masters I have named, and my\r\nambition limits itself to just one little point. If I can make two of\r\nthe necessarily implied corollaries\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P146\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e146}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof determinism clearer to you\r\nthan they have been made before, I shall have made it possible for you\r\nto decide for or against that doctrine with a better understanding of\r\nwhat you are about. And if you prefer not to decide at all, but to\r\nremain doubters, you will at least see more plainly what the subject of\r\nyour hesitation is. I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all\r\npretension to prove to you that the freedom of the will is true. The\r\nmost I hope is to induce some of you to follow my own example in\r\nassuming it true, and acting as if it were true. If it be true, it\r\nseems to me that this is involved in the strict logic of the case. Its\r\ntruth ought not to be forced willy-nilly down our indifferent throats.\r\nIt ought to be freely espoused by men who can equally well turn their\r\nbacks upon it. In other words, our first act of freedom, if we are\r\nfree, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free.\r\nThis should exclude, it seems to me, from the free-will side of the\r\nquestion all hope of a coercive demonstration,\u0026mdash;a demonstration which\r\nI, for one, am perfectly contented to go without.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWith thus much understood at the outset, we can advance. But not\r\nwithout one more point understood as well. The arguments I am about to\r\nurge all proceed on two suppositions: first, when we make theories\r\nabout the world and discuss them with one another, we do so in order to\r\nattain a conception of things which shall give us subjective\r\nsatisfaction; and, second, if there be two conceptions, and the one\r\nseems to us, on the whole, more rational than the other, we are\r\nentitled to suppose that the more rational one is the truer of the two.\r\nI hope that you are all willing to make these suppositions with me;\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P147\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e147}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfor I am afraid that if there be any of you here who are not,\r\nthey will find little edification in the rest of what I have to say. I\r\ncannot stop to argue the point; but I myself believe that all the\r\nmagnificent achievements of mathematical and physical science\u0026mdash;our\r\ndoctrines of evolution, of uniformity of law, and the rest\u0026mdash;proceed\r\nfrom our indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational\r\nshape in our minds than the shape into which it is thrown there by the\r\ncrude order of our experience. The world has shown itself, to a great\r\nextent, plastic to this demand of ours for rationality. How much\r\nfarther it will show itself plastic no one can say. Our only means of\r\nfinding out is to try; and I, for one, feel as free to try conceptions\r\nof moral as of mechanical or of logical rationality. If a certain\r\nformula for expressing the nature of the world violates my moral\r\ndemand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at least to\r\ndoubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence,\r\nfor example; the one demand being, so far as I can see, quite as\r\nsubjective and emotional as the other is. The principle of causality,\r\nfor example,\u0026mdash;what is it but a postulate, an empty name covering simply\r\na demand that the sequence of events shall some day manifest a deeper\r\nkind of belonging of one thing with another than the mere arbitrary\r\njuxtaposition which now phenomenally appears? It is as much an altar\r\nto an unknown god as the one that Saint Paul found at Athens. All our\r\nscientific and philosophic ideals are altars to unknown gods.\r\nUniformity is as much so as is free-will. If this be admitted, we can\r\ndebate on even terms. But if any one pretends that while freedom and\r\nvariety are, in the first instance, subjective demands, necessity and\r\nuniformity are something\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P148\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e148}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\naltogether different, I do not see how\r\nwe can debate at all.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo begin, then, I must suppose you acquainted with all the usual\r\narguments on the subject. I cannot stop to take up the old proofs from\r\ncausation, from statistics, from the certainty with which we can\r\nforetell one another\u0027s conduct, from the fixity of character, and all\r\nthe rest. But there are two words which usually encumber these\r\nclassical arguments,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P149\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e149}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nand which we must immediately dispose of if\r\nwe are to make any progress. One is the eulogistic word \u003cI\u003efreedom\u003c/I\u003e, and\r\nthe other is the opprobrious word \u003cI\u003echance\u003c/I\u003e. The word \u0027chance\u0027 I wish\r\nto keep, but I wish to get rid of the word \u0027freedom.\u0027 Its eulogistic\r\nassociations have so far overshadowed all the rest of its meaning that\r\nboth parties claim the sole right to use it, and determinists to-day\r\ninsist that they alone are freedom\u0027s champions. Old-fashioned\r\ndeterminism was what we may call \u003cI\u003ehard\u003c/I\u003e determinism. It did not shrink\r\nfrom such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and\r\nthe like. Nowadays, we have a \u003cI\u003esoft\u003c/I\u003e determinism which abhors harsh\r\nwords, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination,\r\nsays that its real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity\r\nunderstood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom.\r\nEven a writer as little used to making capital out of soft words as Mr.\r\nHodgson hesitates not to call himself a \u0027free-will determinist.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, all this is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of\r\nfact has been entirely smothered. Freedom in all these senses presents\r\nsimply no problem at all. No matter what the soft determinist mean by\r\nit,\u0026mdash;whether he mean the acting without external constraint; whether he\r\nmean the acting rightly, or whether he mean the acquiescing in the law\r\nof the whole,\u0026mdash;who cannot answer him that sometimes we are free and\r\nsometimes we are not? But there \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e a problem, an issue of fact and\r\nnot of words, an issue of the most momentous importance, which is often\r\ndecided without discussion in one sentence,\u0026mdash;nay, in one clause of a\r\nsentence,\u0026mdash;by those very writers who spin out whole chapters in their\r\nefforts to show\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P150\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e150}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwhat \u0027true\u0027 freedom is; and that is the question\r\nof determinism, about which we are to talk to-night.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFortunately, no ambiguities hang about this word or about its opposite,\r\nindeterminism. Both designate an outward way in which things may\r\nhappen, and their cold and mathematical sound has no sentimental\r\nassociations that can bribe our partiality either way in advance. Now,\r\nevidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and\r\nindeterminism is, as I intimated a while back, strictly impossible to\r\nfind. Let us look at the difference between them and see for\r\nourselves. What does determinism profess?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt professes that those parts of the universe already laid down\r\nabsolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The\r\nfuture has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we\r\ncall the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other\r\nfuture complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The\r\nwhole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an\r\nabsolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or\r\nshadow of turning.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"With earth\u0027s first clay they did the last man knead,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd there of the last harvest sowed the seed.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd the first morning of creation wrote\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhat the last dawn of reckoning shall read.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIndeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain\r\namount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of\r\nthem does not necessarily determine what the others shall be. It\r\nadmits that possibilities may be in excess of actualities, and that\r\nthings not yet revealed to our knowledge may really in themselves be\r\nambiguous. Of two\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P151\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e151}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nalternative futures which we conceive, both\r\nmay now be really possible; and the one become impossible only at the\r\nvery moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself.\r\nIndeterminism thus denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact.\r\nIt says there is a certain ultimate pluralism in it; and, so saying, it\r\ncorroborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of things. To that\r\nview, actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from\r\nout of which they are chosen; and, \u003cI\u003esomewhere\u003c/I\u003e, indeterminism says,\r\nsuch possibilities exist, and form a part of truth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDeterminism, on the contrary, says they exist \u003cI\u003enowhere\u003c/I\u003e, and that\r\nnecessity on the one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole\r\ncategories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get realized are,\r\nfor determinism, pure illusions: they never were possibilities at all.\r\nThere is nothing inchoate, it says, about this universe of ours, all\r\nthat was or is or shall be actual in it having been from eternity\r\nvirtually there. The cloud of alternatives our minds escort this mass\r\nof actuality withal is a cloud of sheer deceptions, to which\r\n\u0027impossibilities\u0027 is the only name that rightfully belongs.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe issue, it will be seen, is a perfectly sharp one, which no\r\neulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth \u003cI\u003emust\u003c/I\u003e\r\nlie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the\r\nother false.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe question relates solely to the existence of possibilities, in the\r\nstrict sense of the term, as things that may, but need not, be. Both\r\nsides admit that a volition, for instance, has occurred. The\r\nindeterminists say another volition might have occurred in its place;\r\nthe determinists swear that nothing could possibly\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P152\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e152}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhave occurred\r\nin its place. Now, can science be called in to tell us which of these\r\ntwo point-blank contradicters of each other is right? Science\r\nprofesses to draw no conclusions but such as are based on matters of\r\nfact, things that have actually happened; but how can any amount of\r\nassurance that something actually happened give us the least grain of\r\ninformation as to whether another thing might or might not have\r\nhappened in its place? Only facts can be proved by other facts. With\r\nthings that are possibilities and not facts, facts have no concern. If\r\nwe have no other evidence than the evidence of existing facts, the\r\npossibility-question must remain a mystery never to be cleared up.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd the truth is that facts practically have hardly anything to do with\r\nmaking us either determinists or indeterminists. Sure enough, we make\r\na flourish of quoting facts this way or that; and if we are\r\ndeterminists, we talk about the infallibility with which we can predict\r\none another\u0027s conduct; while if we are indeterminists, we lay great\r\nstress on the fact that it is just because we cannot foretell one\r\nanother\u0027s conduct, either in war or statecraft or in any of the great\r\nand small intrigues and businesses of men, that life is so intensely\r\nanxious and hazardous a game. But who does not see the wretched\r\ninsufficiency of this so-called objective testimony on both sides?\r\nWhat fills up the gaps in our minds is something not objective, not\r\nexternal. What divides us into possibility men and anti-possibility\r\nmen is different faiths or postulates,\u0026mdash;postulates of rationality. To\r\nthis man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it,\u0026mdash;to\r\nthat man more rational with possibilities excluded; and talk as we will\r\nabout having to yield to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P153\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e153}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nevidence, what makes us monists or\r\npluralists, determinists or indeterminists, is at bottom always some\r\nsentiment like this.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe stronghold of the deterministic sentiment is the antipathy to the\r\nidea of chance. As soon as we begin to talk indeterminism to our\r\nfriends, we find a number of them shaking their heads. This notion of\r\nalternative possibility, they say, this admission that any one of\r\nseveral things may come to pass, is, after all, only a roundabout name\r\nfor chance; and chance is something the notion of which no sane mind\r\ncan for an instant tolerate in the world. What is it, they ask, but\r\nbarefaced crazy unreason, the negation of intelligibility and law? And\r\nif the slightest particle of it exist anywhere, what is to prevent the\r\nwhole fabric from falling together, the stars from going out, and chaos\r\nfrom recommencing her topsy-turvy reign?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nRemarks of this sort about chance will put an end to discussion as\r\nquickly as anything one can find. I have already told you that\r\n\u0027chance\u0027 was a word I wished to keep and use. Let us then examine\r\nexactly what it means, and see whether it ought to be such a terrible\r\nbugbear to us. I fancy that squeezing the thistle boldly will rob it\r\nof its sting.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe sting of the word \u0027chance\u0027 seems to lie in the assumption that it\r\nmeans something positive, and that if anything happens by chance, it\r\nmust needs be something of an intrinsically irrational and preposterous\r\nsort. Now, chance means nothing of the kind. It is a purely negative\r\nand relative term,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn4text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] giving us\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P154\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e154}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nno information about that of\r\nwhich it is predicated, except that it happens to be disconnected with\r\nsomething else,\u0026mdash;not controlled, secured, or necessitated by other\r\nthings in advance of its own actual presence. As this point is the\r\nmost subtile one of the whole lecture, and at the same time the point\r\non which all the rest hinges, I beg you to pay particular attention to\r\nit. What I say is that it tells us nothing about what a thing may be\r\nin itself to call it \u0027chance.\u0027 It may be a bad thing, it may be a good\r\nthing. It may be lucidity, transparency, fitness incarnate, matching\r\nthe whole system of other things, when it has once befallen, in an\r\nunimaginably perfect way. All you mean by calling it \u0027chance\u0027 is that\r\nthis is not guaranteed, that it may also fall out otherwise. For the\r\nsystem of other things has no positive hold on the chance-thing. Its\r\norigin is in a certain fashion negative: it escapes, and says, Hands\r\noff! coming, when it comes, as a free gift, or not at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis negativeness, however, and this opacity of the chance-thing when\r\nthus considered \u003cI\u003eab. extra\u003c/I\u003e, or from the point of view of previous\r\nthings or distant things, do not preclude its having any amount of\r\npositiveness and luminosity from within, and at its own place and\r\nmoment. All that its chance-character asserts about it is that there\r\nis something in it really of its own, something that is not the\r\nunconditional property of the whole. If the whole wants this property,\r\nthe whole must wait till it can get it, if it be a matter of chance.\r\nThat the universe may actually be a sort of joint-stock society of this\r\nsort, in which the sharers have both limited liabilities and limited\r\npowers, is of course a simple and conceivable notion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNevertheless, many persons talk as if the minutest\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P155\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e155}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndose of\r\ndisconnectedness of one part with another, the smallest modicum of\r\nindependence, the faintest tremor of ambiguity about the future, for\r\nexample, would ruin everything, and turn this goodly universe into a\r\nsort of insane sand-heap or nulliverse, no universe at all. Since\r\nfuture human volitions are as a matter of fact the only ambiguous\r\nthings we are tempted to believe in, let us stop for a moment to make\r\nourselves sure whether their independent and accidental character need\r\nbe fraught with such direful consequences to the universe as these.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after\r\nthe lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance as far as the present\r\nmoment is concerned? It means that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford\r\nStreet are called; but that only one, and that one \u003cI\u003eeither\u003c/I\u003e one, shall\r\nbe chosen. Now, I ask you seriously to suppose that this ambiguity of\r\nmy choice is real; and then to make the impossible hypothesis that the\r\nchoice is made twice over, and each time falls on a different street.\r\nIn other words, imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and\r\nthen imagine that the powers governing the universe annihilate ten\r\nminutes of time with all that it contained, and set me back at the door\r\nof this hall just as I was before the choice was made. Imagine then\r\nthat, everything else being the same, I now make a different choice and\r\ntraverse Oxford Street. You, as passive spectators, look on and see\r\nthe two alternative universes,\u0026mdash;one of them with me walking through\r\nDivinity Avenue in it, the other with the same me walking through\r\nOxford Street. Now, if you are determinists you believe one of these\r\nuniverses to have been from eternity impossible: you believe it to have\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P156\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e156}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbeen impossible because of the intrinsic irrationality or\r\naccidentality somewhere involved in it. But looking outwardly at these\r\nuniverses, can you say which is the impossible and accidental one, and\r\nwhich the rational and necessary one? I doubt if the most iron-clad\r\ndeterminist among you could have the slightest glimmer of light on this\r\npoint. In other words, either universe \u003cI\u003eafter the fact\u003c/I\u003e and once there\r\nwould, to our means of observation and understanding, appear just as\r\nrational as the other. There would be absolutely no criterion by which\r\nwe might judge one necessary and the other matter of chance. Suppose\r\nnow we relieve the gods of their hypothetical task and assume my\r\nchoice, once made, to be made forever. I go through Divinity Avenue\r\nfor good and all. If, as good determinists, you now begin to affirm,\r\nwhat all good determinists punctually do affirm, that in the nature of\r\nthings I \u003cI\u003ecouldn\u0027t\u003c/I\u003e have gone through Oxford Street,\u0026mdash;had I done so it\r\nwould have been chance, irrationality, insanity, a horrid gap in\r\nnature,\u0026mdash;I simply call your attention to this, that your affirmation is\r\nwhat the Germans call a \u003cI\u003eMachtspruch\u003c/I\u003e, a mere conception fulminated as\r\na dogma and based on no insight into details. Before my choice, either\r\nstreet seemed as natural to you as to me. Had I happened to take\r\nOxford Street, Divinity Avenue would have figured in your philosophy as\r\nthe gap in nature; and you would have so proclaimed it with the best\r\ndeterministic conscience in the world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut what a hollow outcry, then, is this against a chance which, if it\r\nwere present to us, we could by no character whatever distinguish from\r\na rational necessity! I have taken the most trivial of examples, but\r\nno possible example could lead to any different\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P157\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e157}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nresult. For what\r\nare the alternatives which, in point of fact, offer themselves to human\r\nvolition? What are those futures that now seem matters of chance? Are\r\nthey not one and all like the Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street of our\r\nexample? Are they not all of them \u003cI\u003ekinds\u003c/I\u003e of things already here and\r\nbased in the existing frame of nature? Is any one ever tempted to\r\nproduce an \u003cI\u003eabsolute\u003c/I\u003e accident, something utterly irrelevant to the\r\nrest of the world? Do not all the motives that assail us, all the\r\nfutures that offer themselves to our choice, spring equally from the\r\nsoil of the past; and would not either one of them, whether realized\r\nthrough chance or through necessity, the moment it was realized, seem\r\nto us to fit that past, and in the completest and most continuous\r\nmanner to interdigitate with the phenomena already there?[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn5text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe more one thinks of the matter, the more one wonders that so empty\r\nand gratuitous a hubbub as this outcry against chance should have found\r\nso great an echo in the hearts of men. It is a word which tells us\r\nabsolutely nothing about what chances, or about the \u003cI\u003emodus operandi\u003c/I\u003e of\r\nthe chancing; and the use of it as a war-cry shows only a temper of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P158\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e158}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nintellectual absolutism, a demand that the world shall be a solid\r\nblock, subject to one control,\u0026mdash;which temper, which demand, the world\r\nmay not be bound to gratify at all. In every outwardly verifiable and\r\npractical respect, a world in which the alternatives that now actually\r\ndistract \u003cI\u003eyour\u003c/I\u003e choice were decided by pure chance would be by \u003cI\u003eme\u003c/I\u003e\r\nabsolutely undistinguished from the world in which I now live. I am,\r\ntherefore, entirely willing to call it, so far as your choices go, a\r\nworld of chance for me. To \u003cI\u003eyourselves\u003c/I\u003e, it is true, those very acts\r\nof choice, which to me are so blind, opaque, and external, are the\r\nopposites of this, for you are within them and effect them. To you\r\nthey appear as decisions; and decisions, for him who makes them, are\r\naltogether peculiar psychic facts. Self-luminous and self-justifying\r\nat the living moment at which they occur, they appeal to no outside\r\nmoment to put its stamp upon them or make them continuous with the rest\r\nof nature. Themselves it is rather who seem to make nature continuous;\r\nand in their strange and intense function of granting consent to one\r\npossibility and withholding it from another, to transform an equivocal\r\nand double future into an inalterable and simple past.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut with the psychology of the matter we have no concern this evening.\r\nThe quarrel which determinism has with chance fortunately has nothing\r\nto do with this or that psychological detail. It is a quarrel\r\naltogether metaphysical. Determinism denies the ambiguity of future\r\nvolitions, because it affirms that nothing future can be ambiguous.\r\nBut we have said enough to meet the issue. Indeterminate future\r\nvolitions do mean chance. Let us not fear to shout it from the\r\nhouse-tops if need be; for we now know that\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P159\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e159}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe idea of chance\r\nis, at bottom, exactly the same thing as the idea of gift,\u0026mdash;the one\r\nsimply being a disparaging, and the other a eulogistic, name for\r\nanything on which we have no effective \u003cI\u003eclaim\u003c/I\u003e. And whether the world\r\nbe the better or the worse for having either chances or gifts in it\r\nwill depend altogether on \u003cI\u003ewhat\u003c/I\u003e these uncertain and unclaimable things\r\nturn out to be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd this at last brings us within sight of our subject. We have seen\r\nwhat determinism means: we have seen that indeterminism is rightly\r\ndescribed as meaning chance; and we have seen that chance, the very\r\nname of which we are urged to shrink from as from a metaphysical\r\npestilence, means only the negative fact that no part of the world,\r\nhowever big, can claim to control absolutely the destinies of the\r\nwhole. But although, in discussing the word \u0027chance,\u0027 I may at moments\r\nhave seemed to be arguing for its real existence, I have not meant to\r\ndo so yet. We have not yet ascertained whether this be a world of\r\nchance or no; at most, we have agreed that it seems so. And I now\r\nrepeat what I said at the outset, that, from any strict theoretical\r\npoint of view, the question is insoluble. To deepen our theoretic\r\nsense of the \u003cI\u003edifference\u003c/I\u003e between a world with chances in it and a\r\ndeterministic world is the most I can hope to do; and this I may now at\r\nlast begin upon, after all our tedious clearing of the way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI wish first of all to show you just what the notion that this is a\r\ndeterministic world implies. The implications I call your attention to\r\nare all bound up with the fact that it is a world in which we\r\nconstantly have to make what I shall, with your permission, call\r\njudgments of regret. Hardly an hour passes in\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P160\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e160}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwhich we do not\r\nwish that something might be otherwise; and happy indeed are those of\r\nus whose hearts have never echoed the wish of Omar Khayam\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"That we might clasp, ere closed, the book of fate,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eAnd make the writer on a fairer leaf\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nInscribe our names, or quite obliterate.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Ah! Love, could you and I with fate conspire\u003cBR\u003e\r\nTo mend this sorry scheme of things entire,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 1em\"\u003eWould we not shatter it to bits, and then\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nRemould it nearer to the heart\u0027s desire?\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, it is undeniable that most of these regrets are foolish, and quite\r\non a par in point of philosophic value with the criticisms on the\r\nuniverse of that friend of our infancy, the hero of the fable The\r\nAtheist and the Acorn,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Fool! had that bough a pumpkin bore,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThy whimsies would have worked no more,\" etc.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nEven from the point of view of our own ends, we should probably make a\r\nbotch of remodelling the universe. How much more then from the point\r\nof view of ends we cannot see! Wise men therefore regret as little as\r\nthey can. But still some regrets are pretty obstinate and hard to\r\nstifle,\u0026mdash;regrets for acts of wanton cruelty or treachery, for example,\r\nwhether performed by others or by ourselves. Hardly any one can remain\r\n\u003cI\u003eentirely\u003c/I\u003e optimistic after reading the confession of the murderer at\r\nBrockton the other day: how, to get rid of the wife whose continued\r\nexistence bored him, he inveigled her into a desert spot, shot her four\r\ntimes, and then, as she lay on the ground and said to him, \"You didn\u0027t\r\ndo it on purpose, did you, dear?\" replied, \"No, I\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P161\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e161}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndidn\u0027t do it on\r\npurpose,\" as he raised a rock and smashed her skull. Such an\r\noccurrence, with the mild sentence and self-satisfaction of the\r\nprisoner, is a field for a crop of regrets, which one need not take up\r\nin detail. We feel that, although a perfect mechanical fit to the rest\r\nof the universe, it is a bad moral fit, and that something else would\r\nreally have been better in its place.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut for the deterministic philosophy the murder, the sentence, and the\r\nprisoner\u0027s optimism were all necessary from eternity; and nothing else\r\nfor a moment had a ghost of a chance of being put into their place. To\r\nadmit such a chance, the determinists tell us, would be to make a\r\nsuicide of reason; so we must steel our hearts against the thought.\r\nAnd here our plot thickens, for we see the first of those difficult\r\nimplications of determinism and monism which it is my purpose to make\r\nyou feel. If this Brockton murder was called for by the rest of the\r\nuniverse, if it had to come at its preappointed hour, and if nothing\r\nelse would have been consistent with the sense of the whole, what are\r\nwe to think of the universe? Are we stubbornly to stick to our\r\njudgment of regret, and say, though it \u003cI\u003ecouldn\u0027t\u003c/I\u003e be, yet it \u003cI\u003ewould\u003c/I\u003e\r\nhave been a better universe with something different from this Brockton\r\nmurder in it? That, of course, seems the natural and spontaneous thing\r\nfor us to do; and yet it is nothing short of deliberately espousing a\r\nkind of pessimism. The judgment of regret calls the murder bad.\r\nCalling a thing bad means, if it mean anything at all, that the thing\r\nought not to be, that something else ought to be in its stead.\r\nDeterminism, in denying that anything else can be in its stead,\r\nvirtually defines the universe\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P162\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e162}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nas a place in which what ought to\r\nbe is impossible,\u0026mdash;in other words, as an organism whose constitution is\r\nafflicted with an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw. The pessimism\r\nof a Schopenhauer says no more than this,\u0026mdash;that the murder is a\r\nsymptom; and that it is a vicious symptom because it belongs to a\r\nvicious whole, which can express its nature no otherwise than by\r\nbringing forth just such a symptom as that at this particular spot.\r\nRegret for the murder must transform itself, if we are determinists and\r\nwise, into a larger regret. It is absurd to regret the murder alone.\r\nOther things being what they are, \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e could not be different. What we\r\nshould regret is that whole frame of things of which the murder is one\r\nmember. I see no escape whatever from this pessimistic conclusion, if,\r\nbeing determinists, our judgment of regret is to be allowed to stand at\r\nall.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe only deterministic escape from pessimism is everywhere to abandon\r\nthe judgment of regret. That this can be done, history shows to be not\r\nimpossible. The devil, \u003cI\u003equoad existentiam\u003c/I\u003e, may be good. That is,\r\nalthough he be a \u003cI\u003eprinciple\u003c/I\u003e of evil, yet the universe, with such a\r\nprinciple in it, may practically be a better universe than it could\r\nhave been without. On every hand, in a small way, we find that a\r\ncertain amount of evil is a condition by which a higher form of good is\r\nbought. There is nothing to prevent anybody from generalizing this\r\nview, and trusting that if we could but see things in the largest of\r\nall ways, even such matters as this Brockton murder would appear to be\r\npaid for by the uses that follow in their train. An optimism \u003cI\u003equand\r\nmême\u003c/I\u003e, a systematic and infatuated optimism like that ridiculed by\r\nVoltaire in his Candide, is one of the possible\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P163\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e163}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nideal ways in\r\nwhich a man may train himself to look on life. Bereft of dogmatic\r\nhardness and lit up with the expression of a tender and pathetic hope,\r\nsuch an optimism has been the grace of some of the most religious\r\ncharacters that ever lived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Throb thine with Nature\u0027s throbbing breast,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd all is clear from east to west.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEven cruelty and treachery may be among the absolutely blessed fruits\r\nof time, and to quarrel with any of their details may be blasphemy.\r\nThe only real blasphemy, in short, may be that pessimistic temper of\r\nthe soul which lets it give way to such things as regrets, remorse, and\r\ngrief.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus, our deterministic pessimism may become a deterministic optimism\r\nat the price of extinguishing our judgments of regret.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut does not this immediately bring us into a curious logical\r\npredicament? Our determinism leads us to call our judgments of regret\r\nwrong, because they are pessimistic in implying that what is impossible\r\nyet ought to be. But how then about the judgments of regret\r\nthemselves? If they are wrong, other judgments, judgments of approval\r\npresumably, ought to be in their place. But as they are necessitated,\r\nnothing else \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e be in their place; and the universe is just what it\r\nwas before,\u0026mdash;namely, a place in which what ought to be appears\r\nimpossible. We have got one foot out of the pessimistic bog, but the\r\nother one sinks all the deeper. We have rescued our actions from the\r\nbonds of evil, but our judgments are now held fast. When murders and\r\ntreacheries cease to be sins, regrets are theoretic absurdities and\r\nerrors. The theoretic and the active life thus play a kind of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P164\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e164}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\nsee-saw with each other on the ground of evil. The rise of either\r\nsends the other down. Murder and treachery cannot be good without\r\nregret being bad: regret cannot be good without treachery and murder\r\nbeing bad. Both, however, are supposed to have been foredoomed; so\r\nsomething must be fatally unreasonable, absurd, and wrong in the world.\r\nIt must be a place of which either sin or error forms a necessary part.\r\nFrom this dilemma there seems at first sight no escape. Are we then so\r\nsoon to fall back into the pessimism from which we thought we had\r\nemerged? And is there no possible way by which we may, with good\r\nintellectual consciences, call the cruelties and the treacheries, the\r\nreluctances and the regrets, \u003cI\u003eall\u003c/I\u003e good together?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCertainly there is such a way, and you are probably most of you ready\r\nto formulate it yourselves. But, before doing so, remark how\r\ninevitably the question of determinism and indeterminism slides us into\r\nthe question of optimism and pessimism, or, as our fathers called it,\r\n\u0027the question of evil.\u0027 The theological form of all these disputes is\r\nthe simplest and the deepest, the form from which there is the least\r\nescape,\u0026mdash;not because, as some have sarcastically said, remorse and\r\nregret are clung to with a morbid fondness by the theologians as\r\nspiritual luxuries, but because they are existing facts of the world,\r\nand as such must be taken into account in the deterministic\r\ninterpretation of all that is fated to be. If they are fated to be\r\nerror, does not the bat\u0027s wing of irrationality still cast its shadow\r\nover the world?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe refuge from the quandary lies, as I said, not far off. The\r\nnecessary acts we erroneously regret\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P165\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e165}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmay be good, and yet our\r\nerror in so regretting them may be also good, on one simple condition;\r\nand that condition is this: The world must not be regarded as a machine\r\nwhose final purpose is the making real of any outward good, but rather\r\nas a contrivance for deepening the theoretic consciousness of what\r\ngoodness and evil in their intrinsic natures are. Not the doing either\r\nof good or of evil is what nature cares for, but the knowing of them.\r\nLife is one long eating of the fruit of the tree of \u003cI\u003eknowledge\u003c/I\u003e. I am\r\nin the habit, in thinking to myself, of calling this point of view the\r\n\u003cI\u003egnostical\u003c/I\u003e point of view. According to it, the world is neither an\r\noptimism nor a pessimism, but a \u003cI\u003egnosticism\u003c/I\u003e. But as this term may\r\nperhaps lead to some misunderstandings, I will use it as little as\r\npossible here, and speak rather of \u003cI\u003esubjectivism\u003c/I\u003e, and the\r\n\u003cI\u003esubjectivistic\u003c/I\u003e point of view.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSubjectivism has three great branches,\u0026mdash;we may call them scientificism,\r\nsentimentalism, and sensualism, respectively. They all agree\r\nessentially about the universe, in deeming that what happens there is\r\nsubsidiary to what we think or feel about it. Crime justifies its\r\ncriminality by awakening our intelligence of that criminality, and\r\neventually our remorses and regrets; and the error included in remorses\r\nand regrets, the error of supposing that the past could have been\r\ndifferent, justifies itself by its use. Its use is to quicken our\r\nsense of \u003cI\u003ewhat\u003c/I\u003e the irretrievably lost is. When we think of it as that\r\nwhich might have been (\u0027the saddest words of tongue or pen\u0027), the\r\nquality of its worth speaks to us with a wilder sweetness; and,\r\nconversely, the dissatisfaction wherewith we think of what seems to\r\nhave driven it from its natural place gives us the severer pang.\r\nAdmirable artifice of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P166\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e166}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnature! we might be tempted to\r\nexclaim,\u0026mdash;deceiving us in order the better to enlighten us, and leaving\r\nnothing undone to accentuate to our consciousness the yawning distance\r\nof those opposite poles of good and evil between which creation swings.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe have thus clearly revealed to our view what may be called the\r\ndilemma of determinism, so far as determinism pretends to think things\r\nout at all. A merely mechanical determinism, it is true, rather\r\nrejoices in not thinking them out. It is very sure that the universe\r\nmust satisfy its postulate of a physical continuity and coherence, but\r\nit smiles at any one who comes forward with a postulate of moral\r\ncoherence as well. I may suppose, however, that the number of purely\r\nmechanical or hard determinists among you this evening is small. The\r\ndeterminism to whose seductions you are most exposed is what I have\r\ncalled soft determinism,\u0026mdash;the determinism which allows considerations\r\nof good and bad to mingle with those of cause and effect in deciding\r\nwhat sort of a universe this may rationally be held to be. The dilemma\r\nof this determinism is one whose left horn is pessimism and whose right\r\nhorn is subjectivism. In other words, if determinism is to escape\r\npessimism, it must leave off looking at the goods and ills of life in a\r\nsimple objective way, and regard them as materials, indifferent in\r\nthemselves, for the production of consciousness, scientific and\r\nethical, in us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo escape pessimism is, as we all know, no easy task. Your own studies\r\nhave sufficiently shown you the almost desperate difficulty of making\r\nthe notion that there is a single principle of things, and that\r\nprinciple absolute perfection, rhyme together with\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P167\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e167}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nour daily\r\nvision of the facts of life. If perfection be the principle, how comes\r\nthere any imperfection here? If God be good, how came he to\r\ncreate\u0026mdash;or, if he did not create, how comes he to permit\u0026mdash;the devil?\r\nThe evil facts must be explained as seeming: the devil must be\r\nwhitewashed, the universe must be disinfected, if neither God\u0027s\r\ngoodness nor his unity and power are to remain impugned. And of all\r\nthe various ways of operating the disinfection, and making bad seem\r\nless bad, the way of subjectivism appears by far the best.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn6text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor, after all, is there not something rather absurd in our ordinary\r\nnotion of external things being good or bad in themselves? Can murders\r\nand treacheries, considered as mere outward happenings, or motions of\r\nmatter, be bad without any one to feel their badness? And could\r\nparadise properly be good in the absence of a sentient principle by\r\nwhich the goodness was perceived? Outward goods and evils seem\r\npractically indistinguishable except in so far as they result in\r\ngetting moral judgments made about them. But then the moral judgments\r\nseem the main thing, and the outward facts mere perishing instruments\r\nfor their production. This is subjectivism. Every one must at some\r\ntime have wondered at that strange paradox of our moral nature, that,\r\nthough the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P168\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e168}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\npursuit of outward good is the breath of its nostrils,\r\nthe attainment of outward good would seem to be its suffocation and\r\ndeath. Why does the painting of any paradise or Utopia, in heaven or\r\non earth, awaken such yawnings for nirvana and escape? The white-robed\r\nharp-playing heaven of our sabbath-schools, and the ladylike tea-table\r\nelysium represented in Mr. Spencer\u0027s Data of Ethics, as the final\r\nconsummation of progress, are exactly on a par in this\r\nrespect,\u0026mdash;lubberlands, pure and simple, one and all.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn7text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn7\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e] We look upon\r\nthem from this delicious mess of insanities and realities, strivings\r\nand deadnesses, hopes and fears, agonies and exultations, which forms\r\nour present state, and \u003cI\u003etedium vitae\u003c/I\u003e is the only sentiment they awaken\r\nin our breasts. To our crepuscular natures, born for the conflict, the\r\nRembrandtesque moral chiaroscuro, the shifting struggle of the sunbeam\r\nin the gloom, such pictures of light upon light are vacuous and\r\nexpressionless, and neither to be enjoyed nor understood. If \u003cI\u003ethis\u003c/I\u003e be\r\nthe whole fruit of the victory, we say; if the generations of mankind\r\nsuffered and laid down their lives; if prophets confessed and martyrs\r\nsang in the fire, and all the sacred tears were shed for no other end\r\nthan that a race of creatures of such unexampled insipidity should\r\nsucceed, and protract \u003cI\u003ein saecula saeculorum\u003c/I\u003e their contented and\r\ninoffensive lives,\u0026mdash;why, at such a rate, better lose than win the\r\nbattle, or at all events better ring down the curtain before the last\r\nact of the play, so that a business that began so importantly may be\r\nsaved from so singularly flat a winding-up.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P169\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e169}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll this is what I should instantly say, were I called on to plead for\r\ngnosticism; and its real friends, of whom you will presently perceive I\r\nam not one, would say without difficulty a great deal more. Regarded\r\nas a stable finality, every outward good becomes a mere weariness to\r\nthe flesh. It must be menaced, be occasionally lost, for its goodness\r\nto be fully felt as such. Nay, more than occasionally lost. No one\r\nknows the worth of innocence till he knows it is gone forever, and that\r\nmoney cannot buy it back. Not the saint, but the sinner that\r\nrepenteth, is he to whom the full length and breadth, and height and\r\ndepth, of life\u0027s meaning is revealed. Not the absence of vice, but\r\nvice there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal human\r\nstate. And there seems no reason to suppose it not a permanent human\r\nstate. There is a deep truth in what the school of Schopenhauer\r\ninsists on,\u0026mdash;the illusoriness of the notion of moral progress. The\r\nmore brutal forms of evil that go are replaced by others more subtle\r\nand more poisonous. Our moral horizon moves with us as we move, and\r\nnever do we draw nearer to the far-off line where the black waves and\r\nthe azure meet. The final purpose of our creation seems most plausibly\r\nto be the greatest possible enrichment of our ethical consciousness,\r\nthrough the intensest play of contrasts and the widest diversity of\r\ncharacters. This of course obliges some of us to be vessels of wrath,\r\nwhile it calls others to be vessels of honor. But the subjectivist\r\npoint of view reduces all these outward distinctions to a common\r\ndenominator. The wretch languishing in the felon\u0027s cell may be\r\ndrinking draughts of the wine of truth that will never pass the lips of\r\nthe so-called favorite of fortune. And the peculiar consciousness of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P170\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e170}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\neach of them is an indispensable note in the great ethical\r\nconcert which the centuries as they roll are grinding out of the living\r\nheart of man.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo much for subjectivism! If the dilemma of determinism be to choose\r\nbetween it and pessimism, I see little room for hesitation from the\r\nstrictly theoretical point of view. Subjectivism seems the more\r\nrational scheme. And the world may, possibly, for aught I know, be\r\nnothing else. When the healthy love of life is on one, and all its\r\nforms and its appetites seem so unutterably real; when the most brutal\r\nand the most spiritual things are lit by the same sun, and each is an\r\nintegral part of the total richness,\u0026mdash;why, then it seems a grudging and\r\nsickly way of meeting so robust a universe to shrink from any of its\r\nfacts and wish them not to be. Rather take the strictly dramatic point\r\nof view, and treat the whole thing as a great unending romance which\r\nthe spirit of the universe, striving to realize its own content, is\r\neternally thinking out and representing to itself.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn8text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn8\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo one, I hope, will accuse me, after I have said all this, of\r\nunderrating the reasons in favor of subjectivism. And now that I\r\nproceed to say why those reasons, strong as they are, fail to convince\r\nmy own mind, I trust the presumption may be that my objections are\r\nstronger still.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI frankly confess that they are of a practical order. If we\r\npractically take up subjectivism in a sincere and radical manner and\r\nfollow its consequences, we meet with some that make us pause. Let a\r\nsubjectivism\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P171\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e171}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbegin in never so severe and intellectual a way, it\r\nis forced by the law of its nature to develop another side of itself\r\nand end with the corruptest curiosity. Once dismiss the notion that\r\ncertain duties are good in themselves, and that we are here to do them,\r\nno matter how we feel about them; once consecrate the opposite notion\r\nthat our performances and our violations of duty are for a common\r\npurpose, the attainment of subjective knowledge and feeling, and that\r\nthe deepening of these is the chief end of our lives,\u0026mdash;and at what\r\npoint on the downward slope are we to stop? In theology, subjectivism\r\ndevelops as its \u0027left wing\u0027 antinomianism. In literature, its left\r\nwing is romanticism. And in practical life it is either a nerveless\r\nsentimentality or a sensualism without bounds.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEverywhere it fosters the fatalistic mood of mind. It makes those who\r\nare already too inert more passive still; it renders wholly reckless\r\nthose whose energy is already in excess. All through history we find\r\nhow subjectivism, as soon as it has a free career, exhausts itself in\r\nevery sort of spiritual, moral, and practical license. Its optimism\r\nturns to an ethical indifference, which infallibly brings dissolution\r\nin its train. It is perfectly safe to say now that if the Hegelian\r\ngnosticism, which has begun to show itself here and in Great Britain,\r\nwere to become a popular philosophy, as it once was in Germany, it\r\nwould certainly develop its left wing here as there, and produce a\r\nreaction of disgust. Already I have heard a graduate of this very\r\nschool express in the pulpit his willingness to sin like David, if only\r\nhe might repent like David. You may tell me he was only sowing his\r\nwild, or rather his tame, oats; and perhaps he was. But the point is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P172\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e172}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthat in the subjectivistic or gnostical philosophy oat-sowing,\r\nwild or tame, becomes a systematic necessity and the chief function of\r\nlife. After the pure and classic truths, the exciting and rancid ones\r\nmust be experienced; and if the stupid virtues of the philistine herd\r\ndo not then come in and save society from the influence of the children\r\nof light, a sort of inward putrefaction becomes its inevitable doom.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLook at the last runnings of the romantic school, as we see them in\r\nthat strange contemporary Parisian literature, with which we of the\r\nless clever countries are so often driven to rinse out our minds after\r\nthey have become clogged with the dulness and heaviness of our native\r\npursuits. The romantic school began with the worship of subjective\r\nsensibility and the revolt against legality of which Rousseau was the\r\nfirst great prophet: and through various fluxes and refluxes, right\r\nwings and left wings, it stands to-day with two men of genius, M. Renan\r\nand M. Zola, as its principal exponents,\u0026mdash;one speaking with its\r\nmasculine, and the other with what might be called its feminine, voice.\r\nI prefer not to think now of less noble members of the school, and the\r\nRenan I have in mind is of course the Renan of latest dates. As I have\r\nused the term gnostic, both he and Zola are gnostics of the most\r\npronounced sort. Both are athirst for the facts of life, and both\r\nthink the facts of human sensibility to be of all facts the most worthy\r\nof attention. Both agree, moreover, that sensibility seems to be there\r\nfor no higher purpose,\u0026mdash;certainly not, as the Philistines say, for the\r\nsake of bringing mere outward rights to pass and frustrating outward\r\nwrongs. One dwells on the sensibilities for their energy, the other\r\nfor their sweetness; one speaks with a voice of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P173\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e173}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbronze, the other\r\nwith that of an Æolian harp; one ruggedly ignores the distinction of\r\ngood and evil, the other plays the coquette between the craven\r\nunmanliness of his Philosophic Dialogues and the butterfly optimism of\r\nhis Souvenirs de Jeunesse. But under the pages of both there sounds\r\nincessantly the hoarse bass of \u003cI\u003evanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nwhich the reader may hear, whenever he will, between the lines. No\r\nwriter of this French romantic school has a word of rescue from the\r\nhour of satiety with the things of life,\u0026mdash;the hour in which we say, \"I\r\ntake no pleasure in them,\"\u0026mdash;or from the hour of terror at the world\u0027s\r\nvast meaningless grinding, if perchance such hours should come. For\r\nterror and satiety are facts of sensibility like any others; and at\r\ntheir own hour they reign in their own right. The heart of the\r\nromantic utterances, whether poetical, critical, or historical, is this\r\ninward remedilessness, what Carlyle calls this far-off whimpering of\r\nwail and woe. And from this romantic state of mind there is absolutely\r\nno possible \u003cI\u003etheoretic\u003c/I\u003e escape. Whether, like Renan, we look upon life\r\nin a more refined way, as a romance of the spirit; or whether, like the\r\nfriends of M. Zola, we pique ourselves on our \u0027scientific\u0027 and\r\n\u0027analytic\u0027 character, and prefer to be cynical, and call the world a\r\n\u0027roman experimental\u0027 on an infinite scale,\u0026mdash;in either case the world\r\nappears to us potentially as what the same Carlyle once called it, a\r\nvast, gloomy, solitary Golgotha and mill of death.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe only escape is by the practical way. And since I have mentioned\r\nthe nowadays much-reviled name of Carlyle, let me mention it once more,\r\nand say it is the way of his teaching. No matter for Carlyle\u0027s life,\r\nno matter for a great deal of his\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P174\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e174}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwriting. What was the most\r\nimportant thing he said to us? He said: \"Hang your sensibilities!\r\nStop your snivelling complaints, and your equally snivelling raptures!\r\nLeave off your general emotional tomfoolery, and get to WORK like men!\"\r\nBut this means a complete rupture with the subjectivist philosophy of\r\nthings. It says conduct, and not sensibility, is the ultimate fact for\r\nour recognition. With the vision of certain works to be done, of\r\ncertain outward changes to be wrought or resisted, it says our\r\nintellectual horizon terminates. No matter how we succeed in doing\r\nthese outward duties, whether gladly and spontaneously, or heavily and\r\nunwillingly, do them we somehow must; for the leaving of them undone is\r\nperdition. No matter how we feel; if we are only faithful in the\r\noutward act and refuse to do wrong, the world will in so far be safe,\r\nand we quit of our debt toward it. Take, then, the yoke upon our\r\nshoulders; bend our neck beneath the heavy legality of its weight;\r\nregard something else than our feeling as our limit, our master, and\r\nour law; be willing to live and die in its service,\u0026mdash;and, at a stroke,\r\nwe have passed from the subjective into the objective philosophy of\r\nthings, much as one awakens from some feverish dream, full of bad\r\nlights and noises, to find one\u0027s self bathed in the sacred coolness and\r\nquiet of the air of the night.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut what is the essence of this philosophy of objective conduct, so\r\nold-fashioned and finite, but so chaste and sane and strong, when\r\ncompared with its romantic rival? It is the recognition of limits,\r\nforeign and opaque to our understanding. It is the willingness, after\r\nbringing about some external good, to feel at peace; for our\r\nresponsibility ends with the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P175\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e175}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nperformance of that duty, and the\r\nburden of the rest we may lay on higher powers.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn9text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn9\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Look to thyself, O Universe,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThou art better and not worse,\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nwe may say in that philosophy, the moment we have done our stroke of\r\nconduct, however small. For in the view of that philosophy the\r\nuniverse belongs to a plurality of semi-independent forces, each one of\r\nwhich may help or hinder, and be helped or hindered by, the operations\r\nof the rest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut this brings us right back, after such a long detour, to the\r\nquestion of indeterminism and to the conclusion of all I came here to\r\nsay to-night. For the only consistent way of representing a pluralism\r\nand a world whose parts may affect one another through their conduct\r\nbeing either good or bad is the indeterministic way. What interest,\r\nzest, or excitement can there be in achieving the right way, unless we\r\nare enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and a natural\r\nway,\u0026mdash;nay, more, a menacing and an imminent way? And what sense can\r\nthere be in condemning ourselves for taking the wrong way, unless we\r\nneed have done nothing of the sort, unless the right way was open to us\r\nas well? I cannot understand the willingness to act, no matter how we\r\nfeel, without the belief that acts are really good and bad. I cannot\r\nunderstand the belief that an act is bad, without regret at its\r\nhappening. I cannot understand regret without the admission of real,\r\ngenuine possibilities in the world. Only \u003cI\u003ethen\u003c/I\u003e is it\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P176\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e176}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nother than\r\na mockery to feel, after we have failed to do our best, that an\r\nirreparable opportunity is gone from the universe, the loss of which it\r\nmust forever after mourn.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf you insist that this is all superstition, that possibility is in the\r\neye of science and reason impossibility, and that if I act badly \u0027tis\r\nthat the universe was foredoomed to suffer this defect, you fall right\r\nback into the dilemma, the labyrinth, of pessimism and subjectivism,\r\nfrom out of whose toils we have just wound our way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, we are of course free to fall back, if we please. For my own\r\npart, though, whatever difficulties may beset the philosophy of\r\nobjective right and wrong, and the indeterminism it seems to imply,\r\ndeterminism, with its alternative of pessimism or romanticism, contains\r\ndifficulties that are greater still. But you will remember that I\r\nexpressly repudiated awhile ago the pretension to offer any arguments\r\nwhich could be coercive in a so-called scientific fashion in this\r\nmatter. And I consequently find myself, at the end of this long talk,\r\nobliged to state my conclusions in an altogether personal way. This\r\npersonal method of appeal seems to be among the very conditions of the\r\nproblem; and the most any one can do is to confess as candidly as he\r\ncan the grounds for the faith that is in him, and leave his example to\r\nwork on others as it may.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet me, then, without circumlocution say just this. The world is\r\nenigmatical enough in all conscience, whatever theory we may take up\r\ntoward it. The indeterminism I defend, the free-will theory of popular\r\nsense based on the judgment of regret, represents\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P177\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e177}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthat world as\r\nvulnerable, and liable to be injured by certain of its parts if they\r\nact wrong. And it represents their acting wrong as a matter of\r\npossibility or accident, neither inevitable nor yet to be infallibly\r\nwarded off. In all this, it is a theory devoid either of transparency\r\nor of stability. It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in\r\nwhich no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to\r\na mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt,\r\nremain forever inacceptable. A friend with such a mind once told me\r\nthat the thought of my universe made him sick, like the sight of the\r\nhorrible motion of a mass of maggots in their carrion bed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut while I freely admit that the pluralism and the restlessness are\r\nrepugnant and irrational in a certain way, I find that every\r\nalternative to them is irrational in a deeper way. The indeterminism\r\nwith its maggots, if you please to speak so about it, offends only the\r\nnative absolutism of my intellect,\u0026mdash;an absolutism which, after all,\r\nperhaps, deserves to be snubbed and kept in check. But the determinism\r\nwith its necessary carrion, to continue the figure of speech, and with\r\nno possible maggots to eat the latter up, violates my sense of moral\r\nreality through and through. When, for example, I imagine such carrion\r\nas the Brockton murder, I cannot conceive it as an act by which the\r\nuniverse, as a whole, logically and necessarily expresses its nature\r\nwithout shrinking from complicity with such a whole. And I\r\ndeliberately refuse to keep on terms of loyalty with the universe by\r\nsaying blankly that the murder, since it does flow from the nature of\r\nthe whole, is not carrion. There are some instinctive reactions which\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P178\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e178}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nI, for one, will not tamper with. The only remaining\r\nalternative, the attitude of gnostical romanticism, wrenches my\r\npersonal instincts in quite as violent a way. It falsifies the simple\r\nobjectivity of their deliverance. It makes the goose-flesh the murder\r\nexcites in me a sufficient reason for the perpetration of the crime.\r\nIt transforms life from a tragic reality into an insincere melodramatic\r\nexhibition, as foul or as tawdry as any one\u0027s diseased curiosity\r\npleases to carry it out. And with its consecration of the \u0027roman\r\nnaturaliste\u0027 state of mind, and its enthronement of the baser crew of\r\nParisian \u003cI\u003elittérateurs\u003c/I\u003e among the eternally indispensable organs by\r\nwhich the infinite spirit of things attains to that subjective\r\nillumination which is the task of its life, it leaves me in presence of\r\na sort of subjective carrion considerably more noisome than the\r\nobjective carrion I called it in to take away.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo! better a thousand times, than such systematic corruption of our\r\nmoral sanity, the plainest pessimism, so that it be straightforward;\r\nbut better far than that the world of chance. Make as great an uproar\r\nabout chance as you please, I know that chance means pluralism and\r\nnothing more. If some of the members of the pluralism are bad, the\r\nphilosophy of pluralism, whatever broad views it may deny me, permits\r\nme, at least, to turn to the other members with a clean breast of\r\naffection and an unsophisticated moral sense. And if I still wish to\r\nthink of the world as a totality, it lets me feel that a world with a\r\nchance in it of being altogether good, even if the chance never come to\r\npass, is better than a world with no such chance at all. That \u0027chance\u0027\r\nwhose very notion I am exhorted and conjured to banish\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P179\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e179}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfrom my\r\nview of the future as the suicide of reason concerning it, that\r\n\u0027chance\u0027 is\u0026mdash;what? Just this,\u0026mdash;the chance that in moral respects the\r\nfuture may be other and better than the past has been. This is the\r\nonly chance we have any motive for supposing to exist. Shame, rather,\r\non its repudiation and its denial! For its presence is the vital air\r\nwhich lets the world live, the salt which keeps it sweet.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd here I might legitimately stop, having expressed all I care to see\r\nadmitted by others to-night. But I know that if I do stop here,\r\nmisapprehensions will remain in the minds of some of you, and keep all\r\nI have said from having its effect; so I judge it best to add a few\r\nmore words.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the first place, in spite of all my explanations, the word \u0027chance\u0027\r\nwill still be giving trouble. Though you may yourselves be adverse to\r\nthe deterministic doctrine, you wish a pleasanter word than \u0027chance\u0027 to\r\nname the opposite doctrine by; and you very likely consider my\r\npreference for such a word a perverse sort of a partiality on my part.\r\nIt certainly \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e a bad word to make converts with; and you wish I had\r\nnot thrust it so butt-foremost at you,\u0026mdash;you wish to use a milder term.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWell, I admit there may be just a dash of perversity in its choice.\r\nThe spectacle of the mere word-grabbing game played by the soft\r\ndeterminists has perhaps driven me too violently the other way; and,\r\nrather than be found wrangling with them for the good words, I am\r\nwilling to take the first bad one which comes along, provided it be\r\nunequivocal. The question is of things, not of eulogistic names for\r\nthem; and the best word is the one that enables men to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P180\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e180}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nknow the\r\nquickest whether they disagree or not about the things. But the word\r\n\u0027chance,\u0027 with its singular negativity, is just the word for this\r\npurpose. Whoever uses it instead of \u0027freedom,\u0027 squarely and resolutely\r\ngives up all pretence to control the things he says are free. For\r\n\u003cI\u003ehim\u003c/I\u003e, he confesses that they are no better than mere chance would be.\r\nIt is a word of \u003cI\u003eimpotence\u003c/I\u003e, and is therefore the only sincere word we\r\ncan use, if, in granting freedom to certain things, we grant it\r\nhonestly, and really risk the game. \"Who chooses me must give and\r\nforfeit all he hath.\" Any other word permits of quibbling, and lets\r\nus, after the fashion of the soft determinists, make a pretence of\r\nrestoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, while with the other\r\nwe anxiously tie a string to its leg to make sure it does not get\r\nbeyond our sight.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now you will bring up your final doubt. Does not the admission of\r\nsuch an unguaranteed chance or freedom preclude utterly the notion of a\r\nProvidence governing the world? Does it not leave the fate of the\r\nuniverse at the mercy of the chance-possibilities, and so far insecure?\r\nDoes it not, in short, deny the craving of our nature for an ultimate\r\npeace behind all tempests, for a blue zenith above all clouds?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo this my answer must be very brief. The belief in free-will is not\r\nin the least incompatible with the belief in Providence, provided you\r\ndo not restrict the Providence to fulminating nothing but \u003cI\u003efatal\u003c/I\u003e\r\ndecrees. If you allow him to provide possibilities as well as\r\nactualities to the universe, and to carry on his own thinking in those\r\ntwo categories just as we do ours, chances may be there, uncontrolled\r\neven by him, and the course of the universe be really ambiguous;\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P181\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e181}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nand yet the end of all things may be just what he intended it to be\r\nfrom all eternity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAn analogy will make the meaning of this clear. Suppose two men before\r\na chessboard,\u0026mdash;the one a novice, the other an expert player of the\r\ngame. The expert intends to beat. But he cannot foresee exactly what\r\nany one actual move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all\r\nthe \u003cI\u003epossible\u003c/I\u003e moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to meet\r\neach of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of\r\nvictory. And the victory infallibly arrives, after no matter how\r\ndevious a course, in the one predestined form of check-mate to the\r\nnovice\u0027s king.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet now the novice stand for us finite free agents, and the expert for\r\nthe infinite mind in which the universe lies. Suppose the latter to be\r\nthinking out his universe before he actually creates it. Suppose him\r\nto say, I will lead things to a certain end, but I will not \u003cI\u003enow\u003c/I\u003e[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn10text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e]\r\ndecide on all the steps thereto. At various points, ambiguous\r\npossibilities shall be left\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P182\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e182}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nopen, \u003cI\u003eeither\u003c/I\u003e of which, at a given\r\ninstant, may become actual. But whichever branch of these bifurcations\r\nbecome real, I know what I shall do at the \u003cI\u003enext\u003c/I\u003e bifurcation to keep\r\nthings from drifting away from the final result I intend.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn11text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn11\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe creator\u0027s plan of the universe would thus be left blank as to many\r\nof its actual details, but all possibilities would be marked down. The\r\nrealization of some of these would be left absolutely to chance; that\r\nis, would only be determined when the moment of realization came.\r\nOther possibilities would be \u003cI\u003econtingently\u003c/I\u003e determined; that is, their\r\ndecision would have to wait till it was seen how the matters of\r\nabsolute chance fell out. But the rest of the plan, including its\r\nfinal upshot, would be rigorously determined once for all. So the\r\ncreator himself would not need to know \u003cI\u003eall\u003c/I\u003e the details of actuality\r\nuntil they came; and at any time his own view of the world would be a\r\nview partly of facts and partly of possibilities, exactly as ours is\r\nnow. Of one thing, however, he might be certain; and that is that his\r\nworld was safe, and that no matter how much it might zig-zag he could\r\nsurely bring it home at last.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P183\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e183}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, it is entirely immaterial, in this scheme, whether the creator\r\nleave the absolute chance-possibilities to be decided by himself, each\r\nwhen its proper moment arrives, or whether, on the contrary, he\r\nalienate this power from himself, and leave the decision out and out to\r\nfinite creatures such as we men are. The great point is that the\r\npossibilities are really \u003cI\u003ehere\u003c/I\u003e. Whether it be we who solve them, or\r\nhe working through us, at those soul-trying moments when fate\u0027s scales\r\nseem to quiver, and good snatches the victory from evil or shrinks\r\nnerveless from the fight, is of small account, so long as we admit that\r\nthe issue is decided nowhere else than here and now. \u003cI\u003eThat\u003c/I\u003e is what\r\ngives the palpitating reality to our moral life and makes it tingle, as\r\nMr. Mallock says, with so strange and elaborate an excitement. This\r\nreality, this excitement, are what the determinisms, hard and soft\r\nalike, suppress by their denial that \u003cI\u003eanything\u003c/I\u003e is decided here and\r\nnow, and their dogma that all things were foredoomed and settled long\r\nago. If it be so, may you and I then have been foredoomed to the error\r\nof continuing to believe in liberty.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn12text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e] It is fortunate for the\r\nwinding up of controversy that in every discussion with determinism\r\nthis \u003cI\u003eargumentum ad hominem\u003c/I\u003e can be its adversary\u0027s last word.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn7\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn8\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn9\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch05fn12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] An Address to the Harvard Divinity Students, published in the\r\nUnitarian Review for September, 1884.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] And I may now say Charles S. Peirce,\u0026mdash;see the Monist, for 1892-93.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] \"The whole history of popular beliefs about Nature refutes the\r\nnotion that the thought of a universal physical order can possibly have\r\narisen from the purely passive reception and association of particular\r\nperceptions. Indubitable as it is that men infer from known cases to\r\nunknown, it is equally certain that this procedure, if restricted to\r\nthe phenomenal materials that spontaneously offer themselves, would\r\nnever have led to the belief in a general uniformity, but only to the\r\nbelief that law and lawlessness rule the world in motley alternation.\r\nFrom the point of view of strict experience, nothing exists but the sum\r\nof particular perceptions, with their coincidences on the one hand,\r\ntheir contradictions on the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\"That there is more order in the world than appears at first sight is\r\nnot discovered; \u003cI\u003etill the order is looked for\u003c/I\u003e. The first impulse to\r\nlook for it proceeds from practical needs: where ends must be attained,\r\nor produce a result. But the practical need is only the first occasion\r\nfor our reflection on the conditions of true knowledge; and even were\r\nthere no such need, motives would still be present for carrying us\r\nbeyond the stage of mere association. For not with an equal interest,\r\nor rather with an equal lack of interest, does man contemplate those\r\nnatural processes in which a thing is linked with its former mate, and\r\nthose in which it is linked to something else. \u003cI\u003eThe former processes\r\nharmonize with the conditions of his own thinking\u003c/I\u003e: the latter do not.\r\nIn the former, his \u003cI\u003econcepts\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cI\u003egeneral judgments\u003c/I\u003e, and \u003cI\u003einferences\u003c/I\u003e\r\napply to reality: in the latter, they have no such application. And\r\nthus the intellectual satisfaction which at first comes to him without\r\nreflection, at last excites in him the conscious wish to find realized\r\nthroughout the entire phenomenal world those rational continuities,\r\nuniformities, and necessities which are the fundamental element and\r\nguiding principle of his own thought.\" (Sigwart, Logik, bd. 3, s. 382.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn4text\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] Speaking technically, it is a word with a positive denotation, but\r\na connotation that is negative. Other things must be silent about\r\n\u003cI\u003ewhat\u003c/I\u003e it is: it alone can decide that point at the moment in which it\r\nreveals itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn5text\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] A favorite argument against free-will is that if it be true, a\r\nman\u0027s murderer may as probably be his best friend as his worst enemy, a\r\nmother be as likely to strangle as to suckle her first-born, and all of\r\nus be as ready to jump from fourth-story windows as to go out of front\r\ndoors, etc. Users of this argument should properly be excluded from\r\ndebate till they learn what the real question is. \u0027Free-will\u0027 does not\r\nsay that everything that is physically conceivable is also morally\r\npossible. It merely says that of alternatives that really \u003cI\u003etempt\u003c/I\u003e our\r\nwill more than one is really possible. Of course, the alternatives\r\nthat do thus tempt our will are vastly fewer than the physical\r\npossibilities we can coldly fancy. Persons really tempted often do\r\nmurder their best friends, mothers do strangle their first-born, people\r\ndo jump out of fourth-story windows, etc.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn6text\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e] To a reader who says he is satisfied with a pessimism, and has no\r\nobjection to thinking the whole bad, I have no more to say: he makes\r\nfewer demands on the world than I, who, making them, wish to look a\r\nlittle further before I give up all hope of having them satisfied. If,\r\nhowever, all he means is that the badness of some parts does not\r\nprevent his acceptance of a universe whose \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e parts give him\r\nsatisfaction, I welcome him as an ally. He has abandoned the notion of\r\nthe \u003cI\u003eWhole\u003c/I\u003e, which is the essence of deterministic monism, and views\r\nthings as a pluralism, just as I do in this paper.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn7text\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e] Compare Sir James Stephen\u0027s Essays by a Barrister, London, 1862,\r\npp. 138, 318.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn8text\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e] Cet univers est un spectacle que Dieu se donne à lui-même. Servons\r\nles intentions du grand chorège en contribuant à rendre le spectacle\r\naussi brillant, aussi varié que possible.\u0026mdash;RENAN.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn9text\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e] The burden, for example, of seeing to it that the \u003cI\u003eend\u003c/I\u003e of all our\r\nrighteousness be some positive universal gain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn10text\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e] This of course leaves the creative mind subject to the law of\r\ntime. And to any one who insists on the timelessness of that mind I\r\nhave no reply to make. A mind to whom all time is simultaneously\r\npresent must see all things under the form of actuality, or under some\r\nform to us unknown. If he thinks certain moments as ambiguous in their\r\ncontent while future, he must simultaneously know how the ambiguity\r\nwill have been decided when they are past. So that none of his mental\r\njudgments can possibly be called hypothetical, and his world is one\r\nfrom which chance is excluded. Is not, however, the timeless mind\r\nrather a gratuitous fiction? And is not the notion of eternity being\r\ngiven at a stroke to omniscience only just another way of whacking upon\r\nus the block-universe, and of denying that possibilities exist?\u0026mdash;just\r\nthe point to be proved. To say that time is an illusory appearance is\r\nonly a roundabout manner of saying there is no real plurality, and that\r\nthe frame of things is an absolute unit. Admit plurality, and time may\r\nbe its form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn11text\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e] And this of course means \u0027miraculous\u0027 interposition, but not\r\nnecessarily of the gross sort our fathers took such delight in\r\nrepresenting, and which has so lost its magic for us. Emerson quotes\r\nsome Eastern sage as saying that if evil were really done under the\r\nsun, the sky would incontinently shrivel to a snakeskin and cast it out\r\nin spasms. But, says Emerson, the spasms of Nature are years and\r\ncenturies; and it will tax man\u0027s patience to wait so long. We may\r\nthink of the reserved possibilities God keeps in his own hand, under as\r\ninvisible and molecular and slowly self-summating a form as we please.\r\nWe may think of them as counteracting human agencies which he inspires\r\n\u003cI\u003ead hoc\u003c/I\u003e. In short, signs and wonders and convulsions of the earth and\r\nsky are not the only neutralizers of obstruction to a god\u0027s plans of\r\nwhich it is possible to think.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch05fn12text\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e] As long as languages contain a future perfect tense, determinists,\r\nfollowing the bent of laziness or passion, the lines of least\r\nresistance, can reply in that tense, saying, \"It will have been fated,\"\r\nto the still small voice which urges an opposite course; and thus\r\nexcuse themselves from effort in a quite unanswerable way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap06\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P184\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e184}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTHE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch06fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch06fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe main purpose of this paper is to show that there is no such thing\r\npossible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. We\r\nall help to determine the content of ethical philosophy so far as we\r\ncontribute to the race\u0027s moral life. In other words, there can be no\r\nfinal truth in ethics any more than in physics, until the last man has\r\nhad his experience and said his say. In the one case as in the other,\r\nhowever, the hypotheses which we now make while waiting, and the acts\r\nto which they prompt us, are among the indispensable conditions which\r\ndetermine what that \u0027say\u0027 shall be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFirst of all, what is the position of him who seeks an ethical\r\nphilosophy? To begin with, he must be distinguished from all those who\r\nare satisfied to be ethical sceptics. He \u003cI\u003ewill\u003c/I\u003e not be a sceptic;\r\ntherefore so far from ethical scepticism being one possible fruit of\r\nethical philosophizing, it can only be regarded as that residual\r\nalternative to all philosophy which from the outset menaces every\r\nwould-be philosopher who may give up the quest discouraged, and\r\nrenounce his original aim. That aim is to find an account of the moral\r\nrelations that obtain among things, which\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P185\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e185}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwill weave them into\r\nthe unity of a stable system, and make of the world what one may call a\r\ngenuine universe from the ethical point of view. So far as the world\r\nresists reduction to the form of unity, so far as ethical propositions\r\nseem unstable, so far does the philosopher fail of his ideal. The\r\nsubject-matter of his study is the ideals he finds existing in the\r\nworld; the purpose which guides him is this ideal of his own, of\r\ngetting them into a certain form. This ideal is thus a factor in\r\nethical philosophy whose legitimate presence must never be overlooked;\r\nit is a positive contribution which the philosopher himself necessarily\r\nmakes to the problem. But it is his only positive contribution. At\r\nthe outset of his inquiry he ought to have no other ideals. Were he\r\ninterested peculiarly in the triumph of any one kind of good, he would\r\n\u003cI\u003epro tanto\u003c/I\u003e cease to be a judicial investigator, and become an advocate\r\nfor some limited element of the case.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere are three questions in ethics which must be kept apart. Let them\r\nbe called respectively the \u003cI\u003epsychological\u003c/I\u003e question, the \u003cI\u003emetaphysical\u003c/I\u003e\r\nquestion, and the \u003cI\u003ecasuistic\u003c/I\u003e question. The psychological question\r\nasks after the historical \u003cI\u003eorigin\u003c/I\u003e of our moral ideas and judgments;\r\nthe metaphysical question asks what the very \u003cI\u003emeaning\u003c/I\u003e of the words\r\n\u0027good,\u0027 \u0027ill,\u0027 and \u0027obligation\u0027 are; the casuistic question asks what\r\nis the \u003cI\u003emeasure\u003c/I\u003e of the various goods and ills which men recognize, so\r\nthat the philosopher may settle the true order of human obligations.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nI.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe psychological question is for most disputants the only question.\r\nWhen your ordinary doctor of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P186\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e186}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndivinity has proved to his own\r\nsatisfaction that an altogether unique faculty called \u0027conscience\u0027 must\r\nbe postulated to tell us what is right and what is wrong; or when your\r\npopular-science enthusiast has proclaimed that \u0027apriorism\u0027 is an\r\nexploded superstition, and that our moral judgments have gradually\r\nresulted from the teaching of the environment, each of these persons\r\nthinks that ethics is settled and nothing more is to be said. The\r\nfamiliar pair of names, Intuitionist and Evolutionist, so commonly used\r\nnow to connote all possible differences in ethical opinion, really\r\nrefer to the psychological question alone. The discussion of this\r\nquestion hinges so much upon particular details that it is impossible\r\nto enter upon it at all within the limits of this paper. I will\r\ntherefore only express dogmatically my own belief, which is this,\u0026mdash;that\r\nthe Benthams, the Mills, and the Barns have done a lasting service in\r\ntaking so many of our human ideals and showing how they must have\r\narisen from the association with acts of simple bodily pleasures and\r\nreliefs from pain. Association with many remote pleasures will\r\nunquestionably make a thing significant of goodness in our minds; and\r\nthe more vaguely the goodness is conceived of, the more mysterious will\r\nits source appear to be. But it is surely impossible to explain all\r\nour sentiments and preferences in this simple way. The more minutely\r\npsychology studies human nature, the more clearly it finds there traces\r\nof secondary affections, relating the impressions of the environment\r\nwith one another and with our impulses in quite different ways from\r\nthose mere associations of coexistence and succession which are\r\npractically all that pure empiricism can admit. Take the love of\r\ndrunkenness; take bashfulness, the terror\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P187\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e187}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof high places, the\r\ntendency to sea-sickness, to faint at the sight of blood, the\r\nsusceptibility to musical sounds; take the emotion of the comical, the\r\npassion for poetry, for mathematics, or for metaphysics,\u0026mdash;no one of\r\nthese things can be wholly explained by either association or utility.\r\nThey \u003cI\u003ego with\u003c/I\u003e other things that can be so explained, no doubt; and\r\nsome of them are prophetic of future utilities, since there is nothing\r\nin us for which some use may not be found. But their origin is in\r\nincidental complications to our cerebral structure, a structure whose\r\noriginal features arose with no reference to the perception of such\r\ndiscords and harmonies as these.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWell, a vast number of our moral perceptions also are certainly of this\r\nsecondary and brain-born kind. They deal with directly felt fitnesses\r\nbetween things, and often fly in the teeth of all the prepossessions of\r\nhabit and presumptions of utility. The moment you get beyond the\r\ncoarser and more commonplace moral maxims, the Decalogues and Poor\r\nRichard\u0027s Almanacs, you fall into schemes and positions which to the\r\neye of common-sense are fantastic and overstrained. The sense for\r\nabstract justice which some persons have is as excentric a variation,\r\nfrom the natural-history point of view, as is the passion for music or\r\nfor the higher philosophical consistencies which consumes the soul of\r\nothers. The feeling of the inward dignity of certain spiritual\r\nattitudes, as peace, serenity, simplicity, veracity; and of the\r\nessential vulgarity of others, as querulousness, anxiety, egoistic\r\nfussiness, etc.,\u0026mdash;are quite inexplicable except by an innate preference\r\nof the more ideal attitude for its own pure sake. The nobler thing\r\n\u003cI\u003etastes\u003c/I\u003e better, and that is all that we can say.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P188\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e188}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u0027Experience\u0027\r\nof consequences may truly teach us what things are \u003cI\u003ewicked\u003c/I\u003e, but what\r\nhave consequences to do with what is \u003cI\u003emean\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003evulgar\u003c/I\u003e? If a man has\r\nshot his wife\u0027s paramour, by reason of what subtile repugnancy in\r\nthings is it that we are so disgusted when we hear that the wife and\r\nthe husband have made it up and are living comfortably together again?\r\nOr if the hypothesis were offered us of a world in which Messrs.\r\nFourier\u0027s and Bellamy\u0027s and Morris\u0027s Utopias should all be outdone, and\r\nmillions kept permanently happy on the one simple condition that a\r\ncertain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of\r\nlonely torture, what except a specifical and independent sort of\r\nemotion can it be which would make us immediately feel, even though an\r\nimpulse arose within us to clutch at the happiness so offered, how\r\nhideous a thing would be its enjoyment when deliberately accepted as\r\nthe fruit of such a bargain? To what, once more, but subtile\r\nbrain-born feelings of discord can be due all these recent protests\r\nagainst the entire race-tradition of retributive justice?\u0026mdash;I refer to\r\nTolstoi with his ideas of non-resistance, to Mr. Bellamy with his\r\nsubstitution of oblivion for repentance (in his novel of Dr.\r\nHeidenhain\u0027s Process), to M. Guyau with his radical condemnation of the\r\npunitive ideal. All these subtileties of the moral sensibility go as\r\nmuch beyond what can be ciphered out from the \u0027laws of association\u0027 as\r\nthe delicacies of sentiment possible between a pair of young lovers go\r\nbeyond such precepts of the \u0027etiquette to be observed during\r\nengagement\u0027 as are printed in manuals of social form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo! Purely inward forces are certainly at work here. All the higher,\r\nmore penetrating ideals are\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P189\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e189}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrevolutionary. They present\r\nthemselves far less in the guise of effects of past experience than in\r\nthat of probable causes of future experience, factors to which the\r\nenvironment and the lessons it has so far taught as must learn to bend.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis is all I can say of the psychological question now. In the last\r\nchapter of a recent work[\u003cA NAME=\"ch06fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch06fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] I have sought to prove in a general way the\r\nexistence, in our thought, of relations which do not merely repeat the\r\ncouplings of experience. Our ideals have certainly many sources. They\r\nare not all explicable as signifying corporeal pleasures to be gained,\r\nand pains to be escaped. And for having so constantly perceived this\r\npsychological fact, we must applaud the intuitionist school. Whether\r\nor not such applause must be extended to that school\u0027s other\r\ncharacteristics will appear as we take up the following questions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe next one in order is the metaphysical question, of what we mean by\r\nthe words \u0027obligation,\u0027 \u0027good,\u0027 and \u0027ill.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFirst of all, it appears that such words can have no application or\r\nrelevancy in a world in which no sentient life exists. Imagine an\r\nabsolutely material world, containing only physical and chemical facts,\r\nand existing from eternity without a God, without even an interested\r\nspectator: would there be any sense in saying of that world that one of\r\nits states is better than another? Or if there were two such worlds\r\npossible, would there be any rhyme or reason in calling one good and\r\nthe other bad,\u0026mdash;good or\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P190\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e190}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbad positively, I mean, and apart from\r\nthe fact that one might relate itself better than the other to the\r\nphilosopher\u0027s private interests? But we must leave these private\r\ninterests out of the account, for the philosopher is a mental fact, and\r\nwe are asking whether goods and evils and obligations exist in physical\r\nfacts \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e. Surely there is no \u003cI\u003estatus\u003c/I\u003e for good and evil to exist\r\nin, in a purely insentient world. How can one physical fact,\r\nconsidered simply as a physical fact, be \u0027better\u0027 than another?\r\nBetterness is not a physical relation. In its mere material capacity,\r\na thing can no more be good or bad than it can be pleasant or painful.\r\nGood for what? Good for the production of another physical fact, do\r\nyou say? But what in a purely physical universe demands the production\r\nof that other fact? Physical facts simply \u003cI\u003eare\u003c/I\u003e or are \u003cI\u003enot\u003c/I\u003e; and\r\nneither when present or absent, can they be supposed to make demands.\r\nIf they do, they can only do so by having desires; and then they have\r\nceased to be purely physical facts, and have become facts of conscious\r\nsensibility. Goodness, badness, and obligation must be \u003cI\u003erealised\u003c/I\u003e\r\nsomewhere in order really to exist; and the first step in ethical\r\nphilosophy is to see that no merely inorganic \u0027nature of things\u0027 can\r\nrealize them. Neither moral relations nor the moral law can swing \u003cI\u003ein\r\nvacuo\u003c/I\u003e. Their only habitat can be a mind which feels them; and no\r\nworld composed of merely physical facts can possibly be a world to\r\nwhich ethical propositions apply.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe moment one sentient being, however, is made a part of the universe,\r\nthere is a chance for goods and evils really to exist. Moral relations\r\nnow have their \u003cI\u003estatus\u003c/I\u003e, in that being\u0027s consciousness. So far as he\r\nfeels anything to be good, he \u003cI\u003emakes\u003c/I\u003e it good. It\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P191\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e191}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e good, for\r\nhim; and being good for him, is absolutely good, for he is the sole\r\ncreator of values in that universe, and outside of his opinion things\r\nhave no moral character at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn such a universe as that it would of course be absurd to raise the\r\nquestion of whether the solitary thinker\u0027s judgments of good and ill\r\nare true or not. Truth supposes a standard outside of the thinker to\r\nwhich he must conform; but here the thinker is a sort of divinity,\r\nsubject to no higher judge. Let us call the supposed universe which he\r\ninhabits a \u003cI\u003emoral solitude\u003c/I\u003e. In such a moral solitude it is clear that\r\nthere can be no outward obligation, and that the only trouble the\r\ngod-like thinker is liable to have will be over the consistency of his\r\nown several ideals with one another. Some of these will no doubt be\r\nmore pungent and appealing than the rest, their goodness will have a\r\nprofounder, more penetrating taste; they will return to haunt him with\r\nmore obstinate regrets if violated. So the thinker will have to order\r\nhis life with them as its chief determinants, or else remain inwardly\r\ndiscordant and unhappy. Into whatever equilibrium he may settle,\r\nthough, and however he may straighten out his system, it will be a\r\nright system; for beyond the facts of his own subjectivity there is\r\nnothing moral in the world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf now we introduce a second thinker with his likes and dislikes into\r\nthe universe, the ethical situation becomes much more complex, and\r\nseveral possibilities are immediately seen to obtain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOne of these is that the thinkers may ignore each other\u0027s attitude\r\nabout good and evil altogether, and each continue to indulge his own\r\npreferences, indifferent to what the other may feel or do. In such a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P192\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e192}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncase we have a world with twice as much of the ethical quality in\r\nit as our moral solitude, only it is without ethical unity. The same\r\nobject is good or bad there, according as you measure it by the view\r\nwhich this one or that one of the thinkers takes. Nor can you find any\r\npossible ground in such a world for saying that one thinker\u0027s opinion\r\nis more correct than the other\u0027s, or that either has the truer moral\r\nsense. Such a world, in short, is not a moral universe but a moral\r\ndualism. Not only is there no single point of view within it from\r\nwhich the values of things can be unequivocally judged, but there is\r\nnot even a demand for such a point of view, since the two thinkers are\r\nsupposed to be indifferent to each other\u0027s thoughts and acts. Multiply\r\nthe thinkers into a pluralism, and we find realized for us in the\r\nethical sphere something like that world which the antique sceptics\r\nconceived of,\u0026mdash;in which individual minds are the measures of all\r\nthings, and in which no one \u0027objective\u0027 truth, but only a multitude of\r\n\u0027subjective\u0027 opinions, can be found.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut this is the kind of world with which the philosopher, so long as he\r\nholds to the hope of a philosophy, will not put up. Among the various\r\nideals represented, there must be, he thinks, some which have the more\r\ntruth or authority; and to these the others \u003cI\u003eought\u003c/I\u003e to yield, so that\r\nsystem and subordination may reign. Here in the word \u0027ought\u0027 the\r\nnotion of \u003cI\u003eobligation\u003c/I\u003e comes emphatically into view, and the next thing\r\nin order must be to make its meaning clear.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSince the outcome of the discussion so far has been to show us that\r\nnothing can be good or right except\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P193\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e193}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nso far as some consciousness\r\nfeels it to be good or thinks it to be right, we perceive on the very\r\nthreshold that the real superiority and authority which are postulated\r\nby the philosopher to reside in some of the opinions, and the really\r\ninferior character which he supposes must belong to others, cannot be\r\nexplained by any abstract moral \u0027nature of things\u0027 existing\r\nantecedently to the concrete thinkers themselves with their ideals.\r\nLike the positive attributes good and bad, the comparative ones better\r\nand worse must be \u003cI\u003erealised\u003c/I\u003e in order to be real. If one ideal\r\njudgment be objectively better than another, that betterness must be\r\nmade flesh by being lodged concretely in some one\u0027s actual perception.\r\nIt cannot float in the atmosphere, for it is not a sort of\r\nmeteorological phenomenon, like the aurora borealis or the zodiacal\r\nlight. Its \u003cI\u003eesse\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003epercipi\u003c/I\u003e, like the \u003cI\u003eesse\u003c/I\u003e of the ideals\r\nthemselves between which it obtains. The philosopher, therefore, who\r\nseeks to know which ideal ought to have supreme weight and which one\r\nought to be subordinated, must trace the \u003cI\u003eought\u003c/I\u003e itself to the \u003cI\u003ede\r\nfacto\u003c/I\u003e constitution of some existing consciousness, behind which, as\r\none of the data of the universe, he as a purely ethical philosopher is\r\nunable to go. This consciousness must make the one ideal right by\r\nfeeling it to be right, the other wrong by feeling it to be wrong. But\r\nnow what particular consciousness in the universe \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e enjoy this\r\nprerogative of obliging others to conform to a rule which it lays down?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf one of the thinkers were obviously divine, while all the rest were\r\nhuman, there would probably be no practical dispute about the matter.\r\nThe divine thought would be the model, to which the others should\r\nconform. But still the theoretic question\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P194\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e194}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwould remain, What is\r\nthe ground of the obligation, even here?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn our first essays at answering this question, there is an inevitable\r\ntendency to slip into an assumption which ordinary men follow when they\r\nare disputing with one another about questions of good and bad. They\r\nimagine an abstract moral order in which the objective truth resides;\r\nand each tries to prove that this pre-existing order is more accurately\r\nreflected in his own ideas than in those of his adversary. It is\r\nbecause one disputant is backed by this overarching abstract order that\r\nwe think the other should submit. Even so, when it is a question no\r\nlonger of two finite thinkers, but of God and ourselves,\u0026mdash;we follow our\r\nusual habit, and imagine a sort of \u003cI\u003ede jure\u003c/I\u003e relation, which antedates\r\nand overarches the mere facts, and would make it right that we should\r\nconform our thoughts to God\u0027s thoughts, even though he made no claim to\r\nthat effect, and though we preferred \u003cI\u003ede facto\u003c/I\u003e to go on thinking for\r\nourselves.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut the moment we take a steady look at the question, \u003cI\u003ewe see not only\r\nthat without a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be\r\nno obligation, but that there is some obligation wherever there is a\r\nclaim\u003c/I\u003e. Claim and obligation are, in fact, coextensive terms; they\r\ncover each other exactly. Our ordinary attitude of regarding ourselves\r\nas subject to an overarching system of moral relations, true \u0027in\r\nthemselves,\u0027 is therefore either an out-and-out superstition, or else\r\nit must be treated as a merely provisional abstraction from that real\r\nThinker in whose actual demand upon us to think as he does our\r\nobligation must be ultimately based. In a theistic-ethical philosophy\r\nthat thinker in question is, of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P195\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e195}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncourse, the Deity to whom the\r\nexistence of the universe is due.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI know well how hard it is for those who are accustomed to what I have\r\ncalled the superstitious view, to realize that every \u003cI\u003ede facto\u003c/I\u003e claim\r\ncreates in so far forth an obligation. We inveterately think that\r\nsomething which we call the \u0027validity\u0027 of the claim is what gives to it\r\nits obligatory character, and that this validity is something outside\r\nof the claim\u0027s mere existence as a matter of fact. It rains down upon\r\nthe claim, we think, from some sublime dimension of being, which the\r\nmoral law inhabits, much as upon the steel of the compass-needle the\r\ninfluence of the Pole rains down from out of the starry heavens. But\r\nagain, how can such an inorganic abstract character of imperativeness,\r\nadditional to the imperativeness which is in the concrete claim itself,\r\n\u003cI\u003eexist\u003c/I\u003e? Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however\r\nweak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied?\r\nIf not, prove why not. The only possible kind of proof you could\r\nadduce would be the exhibition of another creature who should make a\r\ndemand that ran the other way. The only possible reason there can be\r\nwhy any phenomenon ought to exist is that such a phenomenon actually is\r\ndesired. Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it\r\n\u003cI\u003emakes\u003c/I\u003e itself valid by the fact that it exists at all. Some desires,\r\ntruly enough, are small desires; they are put forward by insignificant\r\npersons, and we customarily make light of the obligations which they\r\nbring. But the fact that such personal demands as these impose small\r\nobligations does not keep the largest obligations from being personal\r\ndemands.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf we must talk impersonally, to be sure we can say\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P196\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e196}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthat \u0027the\r\nuniverse\u0027 requires, exacts, or makes obligatory such or such an action,\r\nwhenever it expresses itself through the desires of such or such a\r\ncreature. But it is better not to talk about the universe in this\r\npersonified way, unless we believe in a universal or divine\r\nconsciousness which actually exists. If there be such a consciousness,\r\nthen its demands carry the most of obligation simply because they are\r\nthe greatest in amount. But it is even then not \u003cI\u003eabstractly right\u003c/I\u003e\r\nthat we should respect them. It is only concretely right,\u0026mdash;or right\r\nafter the fact, and by virtue of the fact, that they are actually made.\r\nSuppose we do not respect them, as seems largely to be the case in this\r\nqueer world. That ought not to be, we say; that is wrong. But in what\r\nway is this fact of wrongness made more acceptable or intelligible when\r\nwe imagine it to consist rather in the laceration of an \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e\r\nideal order than in the disappointment of a living personal God? Do\r\nwe, perhaps, think that we cover God and protect him and make his\r\nimpotence over us less ultimate, when we back him up with this \u003cI\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/I\u003e blanket from which he may draw some warmth of further appeal?\r\nBut the only force of appeal to \u003cI\u003eus\u003c/I\u003e, which either a living God or an\r\nabstract ideal order can wield, is found in the \u0027everlasting ruby\r\nvaults\u0027 of our own human hearts, as they happen to beat responsive and\r\nnot irresponsive to the claim. So far as they do feel it when made by\r\na living consciousness, it is life answering to life. A claim thus\r\nlivingly acknowledged is acknowledged with a solidity and fulness which\r\nno thought of an \u0027ideal\u0027 backing can render more complete; while if, on\r\nthe other hand, the heart\u0027s response is withheld, the stubborn\r\nphenomenon is there of an impotence in the claims\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P197\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e197}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwhich the\r\nuniverse embodies, which no talk about an eternal nature of things can\r\ngloze over or dispel. An ineffective \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e order is as impotent a\r\nthing as an ineffective God; and in the eye of philosophy, it is as\r\nhard a thing to explain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe may now consider that what we distinguished as the metaphysical\r\nquestion in ethical philosophy is sufficiently answered, and that we\r\nhave learned what the words \u0027good,\u0027 \u0027bad,\u0027 and \u0027obligation\u0027 severally\r\nmean. They mean no absolute natures, independent of personal support.\r\nThey are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or\r\nanchorage in Being, apart from the existence of actually living minds.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWherever such minds exist, with judgments of good and ill, and demands\r\nupon one another, there is an ethical world in its essential features.\r\nWere all other things, gods and men and starry heavens, blotted out\r\nfrom this universe, and were there left but one rock with two loving\r\nsouls upon it, that rock would have as thoroughly moral a constitution\r\nas any possible world which the eternities and immensities could\r\nharbor. It would be a tragic constitution, because the rock\u0027s\r\ninhabitants would die. But while they lived, there would be real good\r\nthings and real bad things in the universe; there would be obligations,\r\nclaims, and expectations; obediences, refusals, and disappointments;\r\ncompunctions and longings for harmony to come again, and inward peace\r\nof conscience when it was restored; there would, in short, be a moral\r\nlife, whose active energy would have no limit but the intensity of\r\ninterest in each other with which the hero and heroine might be endowed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P198\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e198}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe, on this terrestrial globe, so far as the visible facts go, are just\r\nlike the inhabitants of such a rock. Whether a God exist, or whether\r\nno God exist, in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an\r\nethical republic here below. And the first reflection which this leads\r\nto is that ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a universe\r\nwhere the highest consciousness is human, as in a universe where there\r\nis a God as well. \u0027The religion of humanity\u0027 affords a basis for\r\nethics as well as theism does. Whether the purely human system can\r\ngratify the philosopher\u0027s demand as well as the other is a different\r\nquestion, which we ourselves must answer ere we close.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIII.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe last fundamental question in Ethics was, it will be remembered, the\r\n\u003cI\u003ecasuistic\u003c/I\u003e question. Here we are, in a world where the existence of a\r\ndivine thinker has been and perhaps always will be doubted by some of\r\nthe lookers-on, and where, in spite of the presence of a large number\r\nof ideals in which human beings agree, there are a mass of others about\r\nwhich no general consensus obtains. It is hardly necessary to present\r\na literary picture of this, for the facts are too well known. The wars\r\nof the flesh and the spirit in each man, the concupiscences of\r\ndifferent individuals pursuing the same unshareable material or social\r\nprizes, the ideals which contrast so according to races, circumstances,\r\ntemperaments, philosophical beliefs, etc.,\u0026mdash;all form a maze of\r\napparently inextricable confusion with no obvious Ariadne\u0027s thread to\r\nlead one out. Yet the philosopher, just because he is a philosopher,\r\nadds his own peculiar ideal to the confusion\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P199\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e199}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n(with which if he\r\nwere willing to be a sceptic he would be passably content), and insists\r\nthat over all these individual opinions there is a \u003cI\u003esystem of truth\u003c/I\u003e\r\nwhich he can discover if he only takes sufficient pains.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe stand ourselves at present in the place of that philosopher, and\r\nmust not fail to realize all the features that the situation comports.\r\nIn the first place we will not be sceptics; we hold to it that there is\r\na truth to be ascertained. But in the second place we have just gained\r\nthe insight that that truth cannot be a self-proclaiming set of laws,\r\nor an abstract \u0027moral reason,\u0027 but can only exist in act, or in the\r\nshape of an opinion held by some thinker really to be found. There is,\r\nhowever, no visible thinker invested with authority. Shall we then\r\nsimply proclaim our own ideals as the lawgiving ones? No; for if we\r\nare true philosophers we must throw our own spontaneous ideals, even\r\nthe dearest, impartially in with that total mass of ideals which are\r\nfairly to be judged. But how then can we as philosophers ever find a\r\ntest; how avoid complete moral scepticism on the one hand, and on the\r\nother escape bringing a wayward personal standard of our own along with\r\nus, on which we simply pin our faith?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe dilemma is a hard one, nor does it grow a bit more easy as we\r\nrevolve it in our minds. The entire undertaking of the philosopher\r\nobliges him to seek an impartial test. That test, however, must be\r\nincarnated in the demand of some actually existent person; and how can\r\nhe pick out the person save by an act in which his own sympathies and\r\nprepossessions are implied?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOne method indeed presents itself, and has as a matter of history been\r\ntaken by the more serious\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P200\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e200}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nethical schools. If the heap of things\r\ndemanded proved on inspection less chaotic than at first they seemed,\r\nif they furnished their own relative test and measure, then the\r\ncasuistic problem would be solved. If it were found that all goods\r\n\u003cI\u003equâ\u003c/I\u003e goods contained a common essence, then the amount of this essence\r\ninvolved in any one good would show its rank in the scale of goodness,\r\nand order could be quickly made; for this essence would be \u003cI\u003ethe\u003c/I\u003e good\r\nupon which all thinkers were agreed, the relatively objective and\r\nuniversal good that the philosopher seeks. Even his own private ideals\r\nwould be measured by their share of it, and find their rightful place\r\namong the rest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVarious essences of good have thus been found and proposed as bases of\r\nthe ethical system. Thus, to be a mean between two extremes; to be\r\nrecognized by a special intuitive faculty; to make the agent happy for\r\nthe moment; to make others as well as him happy in the long run; to add\r\nto his perfection or dignity; to harm no one; to follow from reason or\r\nflow from universal law; to be in accordance with the will of God; to\r\npromote the survival of the human species on this planet,\u0026mdash;are so many\r\ntests, each of which has been maintained by somebody to constitute the\r\nessence of all good things or actions so far as they are good.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo one of the measures that have been actually proposed has, however,\r\ngiven general satisfaction. Some are obviously not universally present\r\nin all cases,\u0026mdash;\u003cI\u003ee. g.\u003c/I\u003e, the character of harming no one, or that of\r\nfollowing a universal law; for the best course is often cruel; and many\r\nacts are reckoned good on the sole condition that they be exceptions,\r\nand serve not as examples of a universal law. Other\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P201\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e201}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncharacters,\r\nsuch as following the will of God, are unascertainable and vague.\r\nOthers again, like survival, are quite indeterminate in their\r\nconsequences, and leave us in the lurch where we most need their help:\r\na philosopher of the Sioux Nation, for example, will be certain to use\r\nthe survival-criterion in a very different way from ourselves. The\r\nbest, on the whole, of these marks and measures of goodness seems to be\r\nthe capacity to bring happiness. But in order not to break down\r\nfatally, this test must be taken to cover innumerable acts and impulses\r\nthat never \u003cI\u003eaim\u003c/I\u003e at happiness; so that, after all, in seeking for a\r\nuniversal principle we inevitably are carried onward to the most\r\nuniversal principle,\u0026mdash;that \u003cI\u003ethe essence of good is simply to satisfy\r\ndemand\u003c/I\u003e. The demand may be for anything under the sun. There is\r\nreally no more ground for supposing that all our demands can be\r\naccounted for by one universal underlying kind of motive than there is\r\nground for supposing that all physical phenomena are cases of a single\r\nlaw. The elementary forces in ethics are probably as plural as those\r\nof physics are. The various ideals have no common character apart from\r\nthe fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can be so\r\nused as to yield to the philosopher anything like a scientifically\r\naccurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA look at another peculiarity of the ethical universe, as we find it,\r\nwill still further show us the philosopher\u0027s perplexities. As a purely\r\ntheoretic problem, namely, the casuistic question would hardly ever\r\ncome up at all. If the ethical philosopher were only asking after the\r\nbest \u003cI\u003eimaginable\u003c/I\u003e system of goods he would indeed have an easy task;\r\nfor all demands as\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P202\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e202}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsuch are \u003cI\u003eprimâ facie\u003c/I\u003e respectable, and the\r\nbest simply imaginary world would be one in which \u003cI\u003eevery\u003c/I\u003e demand was\r\ngratified as soon as made. Such a world would, however, have to have a\r\nphysical constitution entirely different from that of the one which we\r\ninhabit. It would need not only a space, but a time, \u0027of\r\n\u003cI\u003en\u003c/I\u003e-dimensions,\u0027 to include all the acts and experiences incompatible\r\nwith one another here below, which would then go on in\r\nconjunction,\u0026mdash;such as spending our money, yet growing rich; taking our\r\nholiday, yet getting ahead with our work; shooting and fishing, yet\r\ndoing no hurt to the beasts; gaining no end of experience, yet keeping\r\nour youthful freshness of heart; and the like. There can be no\r\nquestion that such a system of things, however brought about, would be\r\nthe absolutely ideal system; and that if a philosopher could create\r\nuniverses \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e, and provide all the mechanical conditions, that\r\nis the sort of universe which he should unhesitatingly create.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut this world of ours is made on an entirely different pattern, and\r\nthe casuistic question here is most tragically practical. The actually\r\npossible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded;\r\nand there is always a \u003cI\u003epinch\u003c/I\u003e between the ideal and the actual which\r\ncan only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind. There is\r\nhardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for the\r\npossession of the same bit of space and time with some other imagined\r\ngood. Every end of desire that presents itself appears exclusive of\r\nsome other end of desire. Shall a man drink and smoke, \u003cI\u003eor\u003c/I\u003e keep his\r\nnerves in condition?\u0026mdash;he cannot do both. Shall he follow his fancy for\r\nAmelia, \u003cI\u003eor\u003c/I\u003e for Henrietta?\u0026mdash;both cannot be the choice of his heart.\r\nShall he have the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P203\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e203}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndear old Republican party, \u003cI\u003eor\u003c/I\u003e a spirit of\r\nunsophistication in public affairs?\u0026mdash;he cannot have both, etc. So that\r\nthe ethical philosopher\u0027s demand for the right scale of subordination\r\nin ideals is the fruit of an altogether practical need. Some part of\r\nthe ideal must be butchered, and he needs to know which part. It is a\r\ntragic situation, and no mere speculative conundrum, with which he has\r\nto deal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow we are blinded to the real difficulty of the philosopher\u0027s task by\r\nthe fact that we are born into a society whose ideals are largely\r\nordered already. If we follow the ideal which is conventionally\r\nhighest, the others which we butcher either die and do not return to\r\nhaunt us; or if they come back and accuse us of murder, every one\r\napplauds us for turning to them a deaf ear. In other words, our\r\nenvironment encourages us not to be philosophers but partisans. The\r\nphilosopher, however, cannot, so long as he clings to his own ideal of\r\nobjectivity, rule out any ideal from being heard. He is confident, and\r\nrightly confident, that the simple taking counsel of his own intuitive\r\npreferences would be certain to end in a mutilation of the fulness of\r\nthe truth. The poet Heine is said to have written \u0027Bunsen\u0027 in the\r\nplace of \u0027Gott\u0027 in his copy of that author\u0027s work entitled \"God in\r\nHistory,\" so as to make it read \u0027Bunsen in der Geschichte.\u0027 Now, with\r\nno disrespect to the good and learned Baron, is it not safe to say that\r\nany single philosopher, however wide his sympathies, must be just such\r\na Bunsen in der Geschichte of the moral world, so soon as he attempts\r\nto put his own ideas of order into that howling mob of desires, each\r\nstruggling to get breathing-room for the ideal to which it clings? The\r\nvery best of men must not only be insensible, but\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P204\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e204}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbe ludicrously\r\nand peculiarly insensible, to many goods. As a militant, fighting\r\nfree-handed that the goods to which he is sensible may not be submerged\r\nand lost from out of life, the philosopher, like every other human\r\nbeing, is in a natural position. But think of Zeno and of Epicurus,\r\nthink of Calvin and of Paley, think of Kant and Schopenhauer, of\r\nHerbert Spencer and John Henry Newman, no longer as one-sided champions\r\nof special ideals, but as schoolmasters deciding what all must\r\nthink,\u0026mdash;and what more grotesque topic could a satirist wish for on\r\nwhich to exercise his pen? The fabled attempt of Mrs. Partington to\r\narrest the rising tide of the North Atlantic with her broom was a\r\nreasonable spectacle compared with their effort to substitute the\r\ncontent of their clean-shaven systems for that exuberant mass of goods\r\nwith which all human nature is in travail, and groaning to bring to the\r\nlight of day. Think, furthermore, of such individual moralists, no\r\nlonger as mere schoolmasters, but as pontiffs armed with the temporal\r\npower, and having authority in every concrete case of conflict to order\r\nwhich good shall be butchered and which shall be suffered to\r\nsurvive,\u0026mdash;and the notion really turns one pale. All one\u0027s slumbering\r\nrevolutionary instincts waken at the thought of any single moralist\r\nwielding such powers of life and death. Better chaos forever than an\r\norder based on any closet-philosopher\u0027s rule, even though he were the\r\nmost enlightened possible member of his tribe. No! if the philosopher\r\nis to keep his judicial position, he must never become one of the\r\nparties to the fray.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat can he do, then, it will now be asked, except to fall back on\r\nscepticism and give up the notion of being a philosopher at all?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P205\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e205}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut do we not already see a perfectly definite path of escape which is\r\nopen to him just because he is a philosopher, and not the champion of\r\none particular ideal? Since everything which is demanded is by that\r\nfact a good, must not the guiding principle for ethical philosophy\r\n(since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world)\r\nbe simply to satisfy at all times \u003cI\u003eas many demands as we can\u003c/I\u003e? That\r\nact must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best whole,\r\nin the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions. In the\r\ncasuistic scale, therefore, those ideals must be written highest which\r\n\u003cI\u003eprevail at the least cost\u003c/I\u003e, or by whose realization the least possible\r\nnumber of other ideals are destroyed. Since victory and defeat there\r\nmust be, the victory to be philosophically prayed for is that of the\r\nmore inclusive side,\u0026mdash;of the side which even in the hour of triumph\r\nwill to some degree do justice to the ideals in which the vanquished\r\nparty\u0027s interests lay. The course of history is nothing but the story\r\nof men\u0027s struggles from generation to generation to find the more and\r\nmore inclusive order. \u003cI\u003eInvent some manner\u003c/I\u003e of realizing your own\r\nideals which will also satisfy the alien demands,\u0026mdash;that and that only\r\nis the path of peace! Following this path, society has shaken itself\r\ninto one sort of relative equilibrium after another by a series of\r\nsocial discoveries quite analogous to those of science. Polyandry and\r\npolygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial\r\ntorture and arbitrary royal power have slowly succumbed to actually\r\naroused complaints; and though some one\u0027s ideals are unquestionably the\r\nworse off for each improvement, yet a vastly greater total number of\r\nthem find shelter in our civilized society than in the older\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P206\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e206}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsavage ways. So far then, and up to date, the casuistic scale is made\r\nfor the philosopher already far better than he can ever make it for\r\nhimself. An experiment of the most searching kind has proved that the\r\nlaws and usages of the land are what yield the maximum of satisfaction\r\nto the thinkers taken all together. The presumption in cases of\r\nconflict must always be in favor of the conventionally recognized good.\r\nThe philosopher must be a conservative, and in the construction of his\r\ncasuistic scale must put the things most in accordance with the customs\r\nof the community on top.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd yet if he be a true philosopher he must see that there is nothing\r\nfinal in any actually given equilibrium of human ideals, but that, as\r\nour present laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones,\r\nso they will in their turn be overthrown by any newly discovered order\r\nwhich will hush up the complaints that they still give rise to, without\r\nproducing others louder still. \"Rules are made for man, not man for\r\nrules,\"\u0026mdash;that one sentence is enough to immortalize Green\u0027s Prolegomena\r\nto Ethics. And although a man always risks much when he breaks away\r\nfrom established rules and strives to realize a larger ideal whole than\r\nthey permit, yet the philosopher must allow that it is at all times\r\nopen to any one to make the experiment, provided he fear not to stake\r\nhis life and character upon the throw. The pinch is always here. Pent\r\nin under every system of moral rules are innumerable persons whom it\r\nweighs upon, and goods which it represses; and these are always\r\nrumbling and grumbling in the background, and ready for any issue by\r\nwhich they may get free. See the abuses which the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P207\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e207}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ninstitution of\r\nprivate property covers, so that even to-day it is shamelessly asserted\r\namong us that one of the prime functions of the national government is\r\nto help the adroiter citizens to grow rich. See the unnamed and\r\nunnamable sorrows which the tyranny, on the whole so beneficent, of the\r\nmarriage-institution brings to so many, both of the married and the\r\nunwed. See the wholesale loss of opportunity under our \u003cI\u003erégime\u003c/I\u003e of\r\nso-called equality and industrialism, with the drummer and the\r\ncounter-jumper in the saddle, for so many faculties and graces which\r\ncould flourish in the feudal world. See our kindliness for the humble\r\nand the outcast, how it wars with that stern weeding-out which until\r\nnow has been the condition of every perfection in the breed. See\r\neverywhere the struggle and the squeeze; and ever-lastingly the problem\r\nhow to make them less. The anarchists, nihilists, and free-lovers; the\r\nfree-silverites, socialists, and single-tax men; the free-traders and\r\ncivil-service reformers; the prohibitionists and anti-vivisectionists;\r\nthe radical darwinians with their idea of the suppression of the\r\nweak,\u0026mdash;these and all the conservative sentiments of society arrayed\r\nagainst them, are simply deciding through actual experiment by what\r\nsort of conduct the maximum amount of good can be gained and kept in\r\nthis world. These experiments are to be judged, not \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e, but by\r\nactually finding, after the fact of their making, how much more outcry\r\nor how much appeasement comes about. What closet-solutions can\r\npossibly anticipate the result of trials made on such a scale? Or what\r\ncan any superficial theorist\u0027s judgment be worth, in a world where\r\nevery one of hundreds of ideals has its special champion already\r\nprovided\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P208\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e208}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin the shape of some genius expressly born to feel it,\r\nand to fight to death in its behalf? The pure philosopher can only\r\nfollow the windings of the spectacle, confident that the line of least\r\nresistance will always be towards the richer and the more inclusive\r\narrangement, and that by one tack after another some approach to the\r\nkingdom of heaven is incessantly made.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nIV.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll this amounts to saying that, so far as the casuistic question goes,\r\nethical science is just like physical science, and instead of being\r\ndeducible all at once from abstract principles, must simply bide its\r\ntime, and be ready to revise its conclusions from day to day. The\r\npresumption of course, in both sciences, always is that the vulgarly\r\naccepted opinions are true, and the right casuistic order that which\r\npublic opinion believes in; and surely it would be folly quite as\r\ngreat, in most of us, to strike out independently and to aim at\r\noriginality in ethics as in physics. Every now and then, however, some\r\none is born with the right to be original, and his revolutionary\r\nthought or action may bear prosperous fruit. He may replace old \u0027laws\r\nof nature\u0027 by better ones; he may, by breaking old moral rules in a\r\ncertain place, bring in a total condition of things more ideal than\r\nwould have followed had the rules been kept.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOn the whole, then, we must conclude that no philosophy of ethics is\r\npossible in the old-fashioned absolute sense of the term. Everywhere\r\nthe ethical philosopher must wait on facts. The thinkers who create\r\nthe ideals come he knows not whence, their sensibilities are evolved he\r\nknows not how; and the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P209\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e209}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nquestion as to which of two conflicting\r\nideals will give the best universe then and there, can be answered by\r\nhim only through the aid of the experience of other men. I said some\r\ntime ago, in treating of the \u0027first\u0027 question, that the intuitional\r\nmoralists deserve credit for keeping most clearly to the psychological\r\nfacts. They do much to spoil this merit on the whole, however, by\r\nmixing with it that dogmatic temper which, by absolute distinctions and\r\nunconditional \u0027thou shalt nots,\u0027 changes a growing, elastic, and\r\ncontinuous life into a superstitious system of relics and dead bones.\r\nIn point of fact, there are no absolute evils, and there are no\r\nnon-moral goods; and the \u003cI\u003ehighest\u003c/I\u003e ethical life\u0026mdash;however few may be\r\ncalled to bear its burdens\u0026mdash;consists at all times in the breaking of\r\nrules which have grown too narrow for the actual case. There is but\r\none unconditional commandment, which is that we should seek\r\nincessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring\r\nabout the very largest total universe of good which we can see.\r\nAbstract rules indeed can help; but they help the less in proportion as\r\nour intuitions are more piercing, and our vocation is the stronger for\r\nthe moral life. For every real dilemma is in literal strictness a\r\nunique situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized and\r\nideals disappointed which each decision creates is always a universe\r\nwithout a precedent, and for which no adequate previous rule exists.\r\nThe philosopher, then, \u003cI\u003equâ\u003c/I\u003e philosopher, is no better able to\r\ndetermine the best universe in the concrete emergency than other men.\r\nHe sees, indeed, somewhat better than most men, what the question\r\nalways is,\u0026mdash;not a question of this good or that good simply taken, but\r\nof the two total\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P210\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e210}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nuniverses with which these goods respectively\r\nbelong. He knows that he must vote always for the richer universe, for\r\nthe good which seems most organizable, most fit to enter into complex\r\ncombinations, most apt to be a member of a more inclusive whole. But\r\nwhich particular universe this is he cannot know for certain in\r\nadvance; he only knows that if he makes a bad mistake the cries of the\r\nwounded will soon inform him of the fact. In all this the philosopher\r\nis just like the rest of us non-philosophers, so far as we are just and\r\nsympathetic instinctively, and so far as we are open to the voice of\r\ncomplaint. His function is in fact indistinguishable from that of the\r\nbest kind of statesman at the present day. His books upon ethics,\r\ntherefore, so far as they truly touch the moral life, must more and\r\nmore ally themselves with a literature which is confessedly tentative\r\nand suggestive rather than dogmatic,\u0026mdash;I mean with novels and dramas of\r\nthe deeper sort, with sermons, with books on statecraft and\r\nphilanthropy and social and economical reform. Treated in this way\r\nethical treatises may be voluminous and luminous as well; but they\r\nnever can be \u003cI\u003efinal\u003c/I\u003e, except in their abstractest and vaguest features;\r\nand they must more and more abandon the old-fashioned, clear-cut, and\r\nwould-be \u0027scientific\u0027 form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nV.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe chief of all the reasons why concrete ethics cannot be final is\r\nthat they have to wait on metaphysical and theological beliefs. I said\r\nsome time back that real ethical relations existed in a purely human\r\nworld. They would exist even in what we called a moral solitude if the\r\nthinker had various\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P211\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e211}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nideals which took hold of him in turn. His\r\nself of one day would make demands on his self of another; and some of\r\nthe demands might be urgent and tyrannical, while others were gentle\r\nand easily put aside. We call the tyrannical demands \u003cI\u003eimperatives\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nIf we ignore these we do not hear the last of it. The good which we\r\nhave wounded returns to plague us with interminable crops of\r\nconsequential damages, compunctions, and regrets. Obligation can thus\r\nexist inside a single thinker\u0027s consciousness; and perfect peace can\r\nabide with him only so far as he lives according to some sort of a\r\ncasuistic scale which keeps his more imperative goods on top. It is\r\nthe nature of these goods to be cruel to their rivals. Nothing shall\r\navail when weighed in the balance against them. They call out all the\r\nmercilessness in our disposition, and do not easily forgive us if we\r\nare so soft-hearted as to shrink from sacrifice in their behalf.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe deepest difference, practically, in the moral life of man is the\r\ndifference between the easy-going and the strenuous mood. When in the\r\neasy-going mood the shrinking from present ill is our ruling\r\nconsideration. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite\r\nindifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained. The\r\ncapacity for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every man,\r\nbut it has more difficulty in some than in others in waking up. It\r\nneeds the wilder passions to arouse it, the big fears, loves, and\r\nindignations; or else the deeply penetrating appeal of some one of the\r\nhigher fidelities, like justice, truth, or freedom. Strong relief is a\r\nnecessity of its vision; and a world where all the mountains are\r\nbrought down and all the valleys are\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P212\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e212}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nexalted is no congenial\r\nplace for its habitation. This is why in a solitary thinker this mood\r\nmight slumber on forever without waking. His various ideals, known to\r\nhim to be mere preferences of his own, are too nearly of the same\r\ndenominational value: he can play fast or loose with them at will.\r\nThis too is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to\r\nour moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life,\r\nto be sure, is even in such a world a genuinely ethical symphony; but\r\nit is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the\r\ninfinite scale of values fails to open up. Many of us, indeed,\u0026mdash;like\r\nSir James Stephen in those eloquent \u0027Essays by a Barrister,\u0027\u0026mdash;would\r\nopenly laugh at the very idea of the strenuous mood being awakened in\r\nus by those claims of remote posterity which constitute the last appeal\r\nof the religion of humanity. We do not love these men of the future\r\nkeenly enough; and we love them perhaps the less the more we hear of\r\ntheir evolutionized perfection, their high average longevity and\r\neducation, their freedom from war and crime, their relative immunity\r\nfrom pain and zymotic disease, and all their other negative\r\nsuperiorities. This is all too finite, we say; we see too well the\r\nvacuum beyond. It lacks the note of infinitude and mystery, and may\r\nall be dealt with in the don\u0027t-care mood. No need of agonizing\r\nourselves or making others agonize for these good creatures just at\r\npresent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of\r\nthe claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the\r\nsymphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now\r\nbegin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance, and\r\nto utter the penetrating, shattering,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P213\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e213}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ntragically challenging note\r\nof appeal. They ring out like the call of Victor Hugo\u0027s alpine eagle,\r\n\"qui parle au précipice et que le gouffre entend,\" and the strenuous\r\nmood awakens at the sound. It saith among the trumpets, ha, ha! it\r\nsmelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains and the\r\nshouting. Its blood is up; and cruelty to the lesser claims, so far\r\nfrom being a deterrent element, does but add to the stern joy with\r\nwhich it leaps to answer to the greater. All through history, in the\r\nperiodical conflicts of puritanism with the don\u0027t-care temper, we see\r\nthe antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast\r\nbetween the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high,\r\nand those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite need.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural\r\nhuman possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or\r\ntraditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one\r\nsimply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of\r\nexistence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards\r\nconcrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there\r\nare none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously\r\nface tragedy for an infinite demander\u0027s sake. Every sort of energy and\r\nendurance, of courage and capacity for handling life\u0027s evils, is set\r\nfree in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous\r\ntype of character will on the battle-field of human history always\r\noutwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the\r\nwall.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt would seem, too,\u0026mdash;and this is my final conclusion,\u0026mdash;that the stable\r\nand systematic moral universe\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P214\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e214}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfor which the ethical philosopher\r\nasks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker\r\nwith all-enveloping demands. If such a thinker existed, his way of\r\nsubordinating the demands to one another would be the finally valid\r\ncasuistic scale; his claims would be the most appealing; his ideal\r\nuniverse would be the most inclusive realizable whole. If he now\r\nexist, then actualized in his thought already must be that ethical\r\nphilosophy which we seek as the pattern which our own must evermore\r\napproach.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch06fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch06fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] In the interests of our own ideal of systematically\r\nunified moral truth, therefore, we, as would-be philosophers, must\r\npostulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious\r\ncause. Meanwhile, exactly what the thought of the infinite thinker may\r\nbe is hidden from us even were we sure of his existence; so that our\r\npostulation of him after all serves only to let loose in us the\r\nstrenuous mood. But this is what it does in all men, even those who\r\nhave no interest in philosophy. The ethical philosopher, therefore,\r\nwhenever he ventures to say which course of action is the best, is on\r\nno essentially different level from the common man. \"See, I have set\r\nbefore thee this day life and good, and death and evil; therefore,\r\nchoose life that thou and thy seed may live,\"\u0026mdash;when this challenge\r\ncomes to us, it is simply our total character and personal genius that\r\nare on trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and\r\nuse of that also are but revelations of our personal aptitude or\r\nincapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no\r\nprofessor\u0027s lectures and no array of books\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P215\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e215}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncan save us. The\r\nsolving word, for the learned and the unlearned man alike, lies in the\r\nlast resort in the dumb willingnesses and unwillingnesses of their\r\ninterior characters, and nowhere else. It is not in heaven, neither is\r\nit beyond the sea; but the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth\r\nand in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch06fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch06fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch06fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch06fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] An Address to the Yale Philosophical Club, published in the\r\nInternational Journal of Ethics, April, 1891.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch06fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] The Principles of Psychology, New York, H. Holt \u0026amp; Co, 1890.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch06fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] All this is set forth with great freshness and force in the work of\r\nmy colleague, Professor Josiah Royce: \"The Religious Aspect of\r\nPhilosophy.\" Boston, 1885.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap07\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P216\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e216}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nGREAT MEN AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA remarkable parallel, which I think has never been noticed, obtains\r\nbetween the facts of social evolution on the one hand, and of\r\nzoölogical evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt will be best to prepare the ground for my thesis by a few very\r\ngeneral remarks on the method of getting at scientific truth. It is a\r\ncommon platitude that a complete acquaintance with any one thing,\r\nhowever small, would require a knowledge of the entire universe. Not a\r\nsparrow falls to the ground but some of the remote conditions of his\r\nfall are to be found in the milky way, in our federal constitution, or\r\nin the early history of Europe. That is to say, alter the milky way,\r\nalter the federal constitution, alter the facts of our barbarian\r\nancestry, and the universe would so far be a different universe from\r\nwhat it now is. One fact involved in the difference might be that the\r\nparticular little street-boy who threw the stone which brought down the\r\nsparrow might not find himself opposite the sparrow at that particular\r\nmoment; or, finding himself there, he might not be in that particular\r\nserene and disengaged mood of mind which expressed itself in throwing\r\nthe stone. But, true as all this is, it would be very foolish for any\r\none who\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P217\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e217}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwas inquiring the cause of the sparrow\u0027s fall to overlook\r\nthe boy as too personal, proximate, and so to speak anthropomorphic an\r\nagent, and to say that the true cause is the federal constitution, the\r\nwestward migration of the Celtic race, or the structure of the milky\r\nway. If we proceeded on that method, we might say with perfect\r\nlegitimacy that a friend of ours, who had slipped on the ice upon his\r\ndoor-step and cracked his skull, some months after dining with thirteen\r\nat the table, died because of that ominous feast. I know, in fact, one\r\nsuch instance; and I might, if I chose, contend with perfect logical\r\npropriety that the slip on the ice was no real accident. \"There are no\r\naccidents,\" I might say, \"for science. The whole history of the world\r\nconverged to produce that slip. If anything had been left out, the\r\nslip would not have occurred just there and then. To say it would is\r\nto deny the relations of cause and effect throughout the universe. The\r\nreal cause of the death was not the slip, \u003cI\u003ebut the conditions which\r\nengendered the slip\u003c/I\u003e,\u0026mdash;and among them his having sat at a table, six\r\nmonths previous, one among thirteen. \u003cI\u003eThat\u003c/I\u003e is truly the reason why he\r\ndied within the year.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt will soon be seen whose arguments I am, in form, reproducing here.\r\nI would fain lay down the truth without polemics or recrimination. But\r\nunfortunately we never fully grasp the import of any true statement\r\nuntil we have a clear notion of what the opposite untrue statement\r\nwould be. The error is needed to set off the truth, much as a dark\r\nbackground is required for exhibiting the brightness of a picture. And\r\nthe error which I am going to use as a foil to set off what seems to me\r\nthe truth of my own statements is contained in the philosophy of Mr.\r\nHerbert Spencer and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P218\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e218}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhis disciples. Our problem is, What are the\r\ncauses that make communities change from generation to\r\ngeneration,\u0026mdash;that make the England of Queen Anne so different from the\r\nEngland of Elizabeth, the Harvard College of to-day so different from\r\nthat of thirty years ago?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall reply to this problem, The difference is due to the accumulated\r\ninfluences of individuals, of their examples, their initiatives, and\r\ntheir decisions. The Spencerian school replies, The changes are\r\nirrespective of persons, and independent of individual control. They\r\nare due to the environment, to the circumstances, the physical\r\ngeography, the ancestral conditions, the increasing experience of outer\r\nrelations; to everything, in fact, except the Grants and the Bismarcks,\r\nthe Joneses and the Smiths.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, I say that these theorizers are guilty of precisely the same\r\nfallacy as he who should ascribe the death of his friend to the dinner\r\nwith thirteen, or the fall of the sparrow to the milky way. Like the\r\ndog in the fable, who drops his real bone to snatch at its image, they\r\ndrop the real causes to snatch at others, which from no possible human\r\npoint of view are available or attainable. Their fallacy is a\r\npractical one. Let us see where it lies. Although I believe in\r\nfree-will myself, I will waive that belief in this discussion, and\r\nassume with the Spencerians the predestination of all human actions.\r\nOn that assumption I gladly allow that were the intelligence\r\ninvestigating the man\u0027s or the sparrow\u0027s death omniscient and\r\nomnipresent, able to take in the whole of time and space at a single\r\nglance, there would not be the slightest objection to the milky way or\r\nthe fatal feast being\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P219\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e219}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ninvoked among the sought-for causes. Such\r\na divine intelligence would see instantaneously all the infinite lines\r\nof convergence towards a given result, and it would, moreover, see\r\nimpartially: it would see the fatal feast to be as much a condition of\r\nthe sparrow\u0027s death as of the man\u0027s; it would see the boy with the\r\nstone to be as much a condition of the man\u0027s fall as of the sparrow\u0027s.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe human mind, however, is constituted on an entirely different plan.\r\nIt has no such power of universal intuition. Its finiteness obliges it\r\nto see but two or three things at a time. If it wishes to take wider\r\nsweeps it has to use \u0027general ideas,\u0027 as they are called, and in so\r\ndoing to drop all concrete truths. Thus, in the present case, if we as\r\nmen wish to feel the connection between the milky way and the boy and\r\nthe dinner and the sparrow and the man\u0027s death, we can do so only by\r\nfalling back on the enormous emptiness of what is called an abstract\r\nproposition. We must say, All things in the world are fatally\r\npredetermined, and hang together in the adamantine fixity of a system\r\nof natural law. But in the vagueness of this vast proposition we have\r\nlost all the concrete facts and links; and in all practical matters the\r\nconcrete links are the only things of importance. The human mind is\r\nessentially partial. It can be efficient at all only by \u003cI\u003epicking out\u003c/I\u003e\r\nwhat to attend to, and ignoring everything else,\u0026mdash;by narrowing its\r\npoint of view. Otherwise, what little strength it has is dispersed,\r\nand it loses its way altogether. Man always wants his curiosity\r\ngratified for a particular purpose. If, in the case of the sparrow,\r\nthe purpose is punishment, it would be idiotic to wander off from the\r\ncats, boys, and other possible agencies close by in the street, to\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P220\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e220}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsurvey the early Celts and the milky way: the boy would meanwhile\r\nescape. And if, in the case of the unfortunate man, we lose ourselves\r\nin contemplation of the thirteen-at-table mystery, and fail to notice\r\nthe ice on the step and cover it with ashes, some other poor fellow,\r\nwho never dined out in his life, may slip on it in coming to the door,\r\nand fall and break his head too.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is, then, a necessity laid upon us as human beings to limit our\r\nview. In mathematics we know how this method of ignoring and\r\nneglecting quantities lying outside of a certain range has been adopted\r\nin the differential calculus. The calculator throws out all the\r\n\u0027infinitesimals\u0027 of the quantities he is considering. He treats them\r\n(under certain rules) as if they did not exist. In themselves they\r\nexist perfectly all the while; but they are as if they did not exist\r\nfor the purposes of his calculation. Just so an astronomer, in dealing\r\nwith the tidal movements of the ocean, takes no account of the waves\r\nmade by the wind, or by the pressure of all the steamers which day and\r\nnight are moving their thousands of tons upon its surface. Just so the\r\nmarksman, in sighting his rifle, allows for the motion of the wind, but\r\nnot for the equally real motion of the earth and solar system. Just so\r\na business man\u0027s punctuality may overlook an error of five minutes,\r\nwhile a physicist, measuring the velocity of light, must count each\r\nthousandth of a second.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere are, in short, \u003cI\u003edifferent cycles of operation\u003c/I\u003e in nature;\r\ndifferent departments, so to speak, relatively independent of one\r\nanother, so that what goes on at any moment in one may be compatible\r\nwith almost any condition of things at the same time in the next. The\r\nmould on the biscuit in the store-room of a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P221\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e221}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nman-of-war vegetates\r\nin absolute indifference to the nationality of the flag, the direction\r\nof the voyage, the weather, and the human dramas that may go on on\r\nboard; and a mycologist may study it in complete abstraction from all\r\nthese larger details. Only by so studying it, in fact, is there any\r\nchance of the mental concentration by which alone he may hope to learn\r\nsomething of its nature. On the other hand, the captain who in\r\nmanoeuvring the vessel through a naval fight should think it necessary\r\nto bring the mouldy biscuit into his calculations would very likely\r\nlose the battle by reason of the excessive \u0027thoroughness\u0027 of his mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe causes which operate in these incommensurable cycles are connected\r\nwith one another only \u003cI\u003eif we take the whole universe into account\u003c/I\u003e.\r\nFor all lesser points of view it is lawful\u0026mdash;nay, more, it is for human\r\nwisdom necessary\u0026mdash;to regard them as disconnected and irrelevant to one\r\nanother.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd this brings us nearer to our special topic. If we look at an\r\nanimal or a human being, distinguished from the rest of his kind by the\r\npossession of some extraordinary peculiarity, good or bad, we shall be\r\nable to discriminate between the causes which originally \u003cI\u003eproduced\u003c/I\u003e the\r\npeculiarity in him and the causes that \u003cI\u003emaintain\u003c/I\u003e it after it is\r\nproduced; and we shall see, if the peculiarity be one that he was born\r\nwith, that these two sets of causes belong to two such irrelevant\r\ncycles. It was the triumphant originality of Darwin to see this, and\r\nto act accordingly. Separating the causes of production under the\r\ntitle of \u0027tendencies to spontaneous variation,\u0027 and relegating them to\r\na physiological cycle which he forthwith\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P222\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e222}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nagreed to ignore\r\naltogether,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] he confined his attention to the causes of preservation,\r\nand under the names of natural selection and sexual selection studied\r\nthem exclusively as functions of the cycle of the environment.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPre-Darwinian philosophers had also tried to establish the doctrine of\r\ndescent with modification; but they all committed the blunder of\r\nclumping the two cycles of causation into one. What preserves an\r\nanimal with his peculiarity, if it be a useful one, they saw to be the\r\nnature of the environment to which the peculiarity was adjusted. The\r\ngiraffe with his peculiar neck is preserved by the fact that there are\r\nin his environment tall trees whose leaves he can digest. But these\r\nphilosophers went further, and said that the presence of the trees not\r\nonly maintained an animal with a long neck to browse upon their\r\nbranches, but also produced him. They \u003cI\u003emade\u003c/I\u003e his neck long by the\r\nconstant striving they aroused in him to reach up to them. The\r\nenvironment, in short, was supposed by these writers to mould the\r\nanimal by a kind of direct pressure, very much as a seal presses the\r\nwax into harmony with itself. Numerous instances were given of the way\r\nin which this goes on under our eyes. The exercise of the forge makes\r\nthe right arm strong, the palm grows callous to the oar, the mountain\r\nair distends the chest, the chased fox grows cunning and the chased\r\nbird shy, the arctic cold stimulates the animal combustion, and so\r\nforth. Now these changes, of which many more examples might be\r\nadduced, are\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P223\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e223}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nat present distinguished by the special name of\r\n\u003cI\u003eadaptive\u003c/I\u003e changes. Their peculiarity is that that very feature in the\r\nenvironment to which the animal\u0027s nature grows adjusted, itself\r\nproduces the adjustment. The \u0027inner relation,\u0027 to use Mr. Spencer\u0027s\r\nphrase, \u0027corresponds\u0027 with its own efficient cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDarwin\u0027s first achievement was to show the utter insignificance in\r\namount of these changes produced by direct adaptation, the immensely\r\ngreater mass of changes being produced by internal molecular accidents,\r\nof which we know nothing. His next achievement was to define the true\r\nproblem with which we have to deal when we study the effects of the\r\nvisible environment on the animal. That problem is simply this; Is the\r\nenvironment more likely to \u003cI\u003epreserve or to destroy him\u003c/I\u003e, on account of\r\nthis or that peculiarity with which he may be born? In giving the name\r\nof \u0027accidental variations\u0027 to those peculiarities with which an animal\r\nis born, Darwin does not for a moment mean to suggest that they are not\r\nthe fixed outcome of natural law. If the total system of the universe\r\nbe taken into account, the causes of these variations and the visible\r\nenvironment which preserves or destroys them, undoubtedly do, in some\r\nremote and roundabout way, hang together. What Darwin means is, that,\r\nsince that environment is a perfectly known thing, and its relations to\r\nthe organism in the way of destruction or preservation are tangible and\r\ndistinct, it would utterly confuse our finite understandings and\r\nfrustrate our hopes of science to mix in with it facts from such a\r\ndisparate and incommensurable cycle as that in which the variations are\r\nproduced. This last cycle is that of occurrences before the animal is\r\nborn. It is the cycle of influences upon ova and embryos;\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P224\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e224}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin\r\nwhich lie the causes that tip them and tilt them towards masculinity or\r\nfemininity, towards strength or weakness, towards health or disease,\r\nand towards divergence from the parent type. What are the causes there?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the first place, they are molecular and invisible,\u0026mdash;inaccessible,\r\ntherefore, to direct observation of any kind. Secondly, their\r\noperations are compatible with any social, political, and physical\r\nconditions of environment. The same parents, living in the same\r\nenvironing conditions, may at one birth produce a genius, at the next\r\nan idiot or a monster. The visible external conditions are therefore\r\nnot direct determinants of this cycle; and the more we consider the\r\nmatter, the more we are forced to believe that two children of the same\r\nparents are made to differ from each other by causes as\r\ndisproportionate to their ultimate effects as is the famous pebble on\r\nthe Rocky Mountain crest, which separates two rain-drops, to the Gulf\r\nof St. Lawrence and the Pacific Ocean toward which it makes them\r\nseverally flow.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe great mechanical distinction between transitive forces and\r\ndischarging forces is nowhere illustrated on such a scale as in\r\nphysiology. Almost all causes there are forces of \u003cI\u003edetent\u003c/I\u003e, which\r\noperate by simply unlocking energy already stored up. They are\r\nupsetters of unstable equilibria, and the resultant effect depends\r\ninfinitely more on the nature of the materials upset than on that of\r\nthe particular stimulus which joggles them down. Galvanic work, equal\r\nto unity, done on a frog\u0027s nerve will discharge from the muscle to\r\nwhich the nerve belongs mechanical work equal to seventy thousand; and\r\nexactly the same muscular\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P225\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e225}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\neffect will emerge if other irritants\r\nthan galvanism are employed. The irritant has merely started or\r\nprovoked something which then went on of itself,\u0026mdash;as a match may start\r\na fire which consumes a whole town. And qualitatively as well as\r\nquantitatively the effect may be absolutely incommensurable with the\r\ncause. We find this condition of things in ail organic matter.\r\nChemists are distracted by the difficulties which the instability of\r\nalbuminoid compounds opposes to their study. Two specimens, treated in\r\nwhat outwardly seem scrupulously identical conditions, behave in quite\r\ndifferent ways. You know about the invisible factors of fermentation,\r\nand how the fate of a jar of milk\u0026mdash;whether it turn into a sour clot or\r\na mass of koumiss\u0026mdash;depends on whether the lactic acid ferment or the\r\nalcoholic is introduced first, and gets ahead of the other in starting\r\nthe process. Now, when the result is the tendency of an ovum, itself\r\ninvisible to the naked eye, to tip towards this direction or that in\r\nits further evolution,\u0026mdash;to bring forth a genius or a dunce, even as the\r\nrain-drop passes east or west of the pebble,\u0026mdash;is it not obvious that\r\nthe deflecting cause must lie in a region so recondite and minute, must\r\nbe such a ferment of a ferment, an infinitesimal of so high an order,\r\nthat surmise itself may never succeed even in attempting to frame an\r\nimage of it?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch being the case, was not Darwin right to turn his back upon that\r\nregion altogether, and to keep his own problem carefully free from all\r\nentanglement with matters such as these? The success of his work is a\r\nsufficiently affirmative reply.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd this brings us at last to the heart of our subject. The causes of\r\nproduction of great men lie in a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P226\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e226}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nsphere wholly inaccessible to\r\nthe social philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses as data, just\r\nas Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations. For him, as for Darwin,\r\nthe only problem is, these data being given, How does the environment\r\naffect them, and how do they affect the environment? Now, I affirm\r\nthat the relation of the visible environment to the great man is in the\r\nmain exactly what it is to the \u0027variation\u0027 in the Darwinian philosophy.\r\nIt chiefly adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys, in short \u003cI\u003eselects\u003c/I\u003e\r\nhim.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] And whenever it adopts and preserves the great man, it becomes\r\nmodified by his influence in an entirely original and peculiar way. He\r\nacts as a ferment, and changes its constitution, just as the advent of\r\na new zoölogical species changes the faunal and floral equilibrium of\r\nthe region in which it appears. We all recollect Mr. Darwin\u0027s famous\r\nstatement of the influence of cats on the growth of clover in their\r\nneighborhood. We all have read of the effects of the European rabbit\r\nin New Zealand, and we have many of us taken part in the controversy\r\nabout the English sparrow here,\u0026mdash;whether he kills most canker-worms, or\r\ndrives away most native birds. Just so the great man, whether he be an\r\nimportation from without like Clive in India or Agassiz here, or\r\nwhether he spring from the soil like Mahomet or Franklin, brings about\r\na rearrangement, on a large or a small scale, of the pre-existing\r\nsocial relations.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P227\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e227}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe mutations of societies, then, from generation to generation, are in\r\nthe main due directly or indirectly to the acts or the example of\r\nindividuals whose genius was so adapted to the receptivities of the\r\nmoment, or whose accidental position of authority was so critical that\r\nthey became ferments, initiators of movement, setters of precedent or\r\nfashion, centres of corruption, or destroyers of other persons, whose\r\ngifts, had they had free play, would have led society in another\r\ndirection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe see this power of individual initiative exemplified on a small scale\r\nall about us, and on a large scale in the case of the leaders of\r\nhistory. It is only following the common-sense method of a Lyell, a\r\nDarwin, and a Whitney to interpret the unknown by the known, and reckon\r\nup cumulatively the only causes of social change we can directly\r\nobserve. Societies of men are just like individuals, in that both at\r\nany given moment offer ambiguous potentialities of development.\r\nWhether a young man enters business or the ministry may depend on a\r\ndecision which has to be made before a certain day. He takes the place\r\noffered in the counting-house, and is \u003cI\u003ecommitted\u003c/I\u003e. Little by little,\r\nthe habits, the knowledges, of the other career, which once lay so\r\nnear, cease to be reckoned even among his possibilities. At first, he\r\nmay sometimes doubt whether the self he murdered in that decisive hour\r\nmight not have been the better of the two; but with the years such\r\nquestions themselves expire, and the old alternative \u003cI\u003eego\u003c/I\u003e, once so\r\nvivid, fades into something less substantial than a dream. It is no\r\notherwise with nations. They may be committed by kings and ministers\r\nto peace or war, by generals to victory or defeat, by prophets to this\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P228\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e228}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nreligion or to that, by various geniuses to fame in art, science,\r\nor industry. A war is a true point of bifurcation of future\r\npossibilities. Whether it fail or succeed, its declaration must be the\r\nstarting-point of new policies. Just so does a revolution, or any\r\ngreat civic precedent, become a deflecting influence, whose operations\r\nwiden with the course of time. Communities obey their ideals; and an\r\naccidental success fixes an ideal, as an accidental failure blights it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWould England have to-day the \u0027imperial\u0027 ideal which she now has, if a\r\ncertain boy named Bob Clive had shot himself, as he tried to do, at\r\nMadras? Would she be the drifting raft she is now in European\r\naffairs[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn4text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] if a Frederic the Great had inherited her throne instead of\r\na Victoria, and if Messrs. Bentham, Mill, Cobden, and Bright had all\r\nbeen born in Prussia? England has, no doubt, to-day precisely the same\r\nintrinsic value relatively to the other nations that she ever had.\r\nThere is no such fine accumulation of human material upon the globe.\r\nBut in England the material has lost effective form, while in Germany\r\nit has found it. Leaders give the form. Would England be crying\r\nforward and backward at once, as she does now, \u0027letting I will not wait\r\nupon I would,\u0027 wishing to conquer but not to fight, if her ideal had in\r\nall these years been fixed by a succession of statesmen of supremely\r\ncommanding personality, working in one direction? Certainly not. She\r\nwould have espoused, for better or worse, either one course or another.\r\nHad Bismarck died in his cradle, the Germans would still be satisfied\r\nwith appearing to themselves as a race of spectacled \u003cI\u003eGelehrten\u003c/I\u003e and\r\npolitical herbivora, and to the French as \u003cI\u003eces bons\u003c/I\u003e, or \u003cI\u003eces naifs\u003c/I\u003e,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P229\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e229}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eAllemands\u003c/I\u003e. Bismarck\u0027s will showed them, to their own great\r\nastonishment, that they could play a far livelier game. The lesson\r\nwill not be forgotten. Germany may have many vicissitudes, but they\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 3em\"\u003e\"will never do away, I ween,\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe marks of that which once hath been\"\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nof Bismarck\u0027s initiative, namely, from 1860 to 1873.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe fermentative influence of geniuses must be admitted as, at any\r\nrate, one factor in the changes that constitute social evolution. The\r\ncommunity \u003cI\u003emay\u003c/I\u003e evolve in many ways. The accidental presence of this\r\nor that ferment decides in which way it \u003cI\u003eshall\u003c/I\u003e evolve. Why, the very\r\nbirds of the forest, the parrot, the mino, have the power of human\r\nspeech, but never develop it of themselves; some one must be there to\r\nteach them. So with us individuals. Rembrandt must teach us to enjoy\r\nthe struggle of light with darkness, Wagner to enjoy peculiar musical\r\neffects; Dickens gives a twist to our sentimentality, Artemus Ward to\r\nour humor; Emerson kindles a new moral light within us. But it is like\r\nColumbus\u0027s egg. \"All can raise the flowers now, for all have got the\r\nseed.\" But if this be true of the individuals in the community, how\r\ncan it be false of the community as a whole? If shown a certain way, a\r\ncommunity may take it; if not, it will never find it. And the ways are\r\nto a large extent indeterminate in advance. A nation may obey either\r\nof many alternative impulses given by different men of genius, and\r\nstill live and be prosperous, just as a man may enter either of many\r\nbusinesses. Only, the prosperities may differ in their type.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut the indeterminism is not absolute. Not every\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P230\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e230}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u0027man\u0027 fits\r\nevery \u0027hour.\u0027 Some incompatibilities there are. A given genius may\r\ncome either too early or too late. Peter the Hermit would now be sent\r\nto a lunatic asylum. John Mill in the tenth century would have lived\r\nand died unknown. Cromwell and Napoleon need their revolutions, Grant\r\nhis civil war. An Ajax gets no fame in the day of telescopic-sighted\r\nrifles; and, to express differently an instance which Spencer uses,\r\nwhat could a Watt have effected in a tribe which no precursive genius\r\nhad taught to smelt iron or to turn a lathe?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, the important thing to notice is that what makes a certain genius\r\nnow incompatible with his surroundings is usually the fact that some\r\nprevious genius of a different strain has warped the community away\r\nfrom the sphere of his possible effectiveness. After Voltaire, no\r\nPeter the Hermit; after Charles IX. and Louis XIV., no general\r\nprotestantization of France; after a Manchester school, a\r\nBeaconsfield\u0027s success is transient; after a Philip II., a Castelar\r\nmakes little headway; and so on. Each bifurcation cuts off certain\r\nsides of the field altogether, and limits the future possible angles of\r\ndeflection. A community is a living thing, and in words which I can do\r\nno better than quote from Professor Clifford,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn5text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] \"it is the peculiarity\r\nof living things not merely that they change under the influence of\r\nsurrounding circumstances, but that any change which takes place in\r\nthem is not lost but retained, and as it were built into the organism\r\nto serve as the foundation for future actions. If you cause any\r\ndistortion in the growth of a tree and make it crooked, whatever you\r\nmay do afterwards to make the tree straight the mark of your\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P231\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e231}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndistortion is there; it is absolutely indelible; it has become part of\r\nthe tree\u0027s nature…. Suppose, however, that you take a lump of gold,\r\nmelt it, and let it cool…. No one can tell by examining a piece of\r\ngold how often it has been melted and cooled in geologic ages, or even\r\nin the last year by the hand of man. Any one who cuts down an oak can\r\ntell by the rings in its trunk how many times winter has frozen it into\r\nwidowhood, and how many times summer has warmed it into life. A living\r\nbeing must always contain within itself the history, not merely of its\r\nown existence, but of all its ancestors.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEvery painter can tell us how each added line deflects his picture in a\r\ncertain sense. Whatever lines follow must be built on those first laid\r\ndown. Every author who starts to rewrite a piece of work knows how\r\nimpossible it becomes to use any of the first-written pages again. The\r\nnew beginning has already excluded the possibility of those earlier\r\nphrases and transitions, while it has at the same time created the\r\npossibility of an indefinite set of new ones, no one of which, however,\r\nis completely determined in advance. Just so the social surroundings\r\nof the past and present hour exclude the possibility of accepting\r\ncertain contributions from individuals; but they do not positively\r\ndefine what contributions shall be accepted, for in themselves they are\r\npowerless to fix what the nature of the individual offerings shall\r\nbe.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn6text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P232\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e232}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly\r\ndistinct factors,\u0026mdash;the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the\r\nplay of physiological and infra-social forces, but bearing all the\r\npower of initiative and origination in his hands; and, second, the\r\nsocial environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him\r\nand his gifts. Both factors are essential to change. The community\r\nstagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away\r\nwithout the sympathy of the community.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll this seems nothing more than common-sense. All who wish to see it\r\ndeveloped by a man of genius should read that golden little work,\r\nBagehot\u0027s Physics and Politics, in which (it seems to me) the complete\r\nsense of the way in which concrete things grow and change is as\r\nlivingly present as the straining after a pseudo-philosophy of\r\nevolution is livingly absent. But there are never wanting minds to\r\nwhom such views seem personal and contracted, and allied to an\r\nanthropomorphism long exploded in other fields of knowledge. \"The\r\nindividual withers, and the world is more and more,\" to these writers;\r\nand in a Buckle, a Draper, and a Taine we all know how much the \u0027world\u0027\r\nhas come to be almost synonymous with the \u003cI\u003eclimate\u003c/I\u003e. We all know, too,\r\nhow the controversy has been kept up between the partisans of a\r\n\u0027science of history\u0027 and those who deny the existence of anything like\r\nnecessary \u0027laws\u0027 where human societies are concerned. Mr. Spencer, at\r\nthe opening of his Study of Sociology, makes an onslaught on the\r\n\u0027great-man theory\u0027 of history, from which a few passages may be\r\nquoted:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"The genesis of societies by the action of great men may be comfortably\r\nbelieved so long as, resting in general\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P233\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e233}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnotions, you do not ask\r\nfor particulars. But now, if, dissatisfied with vagueness, we demand\r\nthat our ideas shall be brought into focus and exactly defined, we\r\ndiscover the hypothesis to be utterly incoherent. If, not stopping at\r\nthe explanation of social progress as due to the great man, we go back\r\na step, and ask, Whence comes the great man? we find that the theory\r\nbreaks down completely. The question has two conceivable answers: his\r\norigin is supernatural, or it is natural. Is his origin supernatural?\r\nThen he is a deputy god, and we have theocracy once removed,\u0026mdash;or,\r\nrather, not removed at all…. Is this an unacceptable solution? Then\r\nthe origin of the great man is natural; and immediately this is\r\nrecognized, he must be classed with all other phenomena in the society\r\nthat gave him birth as a product of its antecedents. Along with the\r\nwhole generation of which he forms a minute part, along with its\r\ninstitutions, language, knowledge, manners, and its multitudinous arts\r\nand appliances, he is a \u003cI\u003eresultant\u003c/I\u003e…. You must admit that the\r\ngenesis of the great man depends on the long series of complex\r\ninfluences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the\r\nsocial state into which that race has slowly grown…. Before he can\r\nremake his society, his society must make him. All those changes of\r\nwhich he is the proximate initiator have their chief causes in the\r\ngenerations he descended from. If there is to be anything like a real\r\nexplanation of those changes, it must be sought in that aggregate of\r\nconditions out of which both he and they have arisen.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn7text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn7\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, it seems to me that there is something which one might almost call\r\nimpudent in the attempt which Mr. Spencer makes, in the first sentence\r\nof this extract, to pin the reproach of vagueness upon those who\r\nbelieve in the power of initiative of the great man.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P234\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e234}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuppose I say that the singular moderation which now distinguishes\r\nsocial, political, and religious discussion in England, and contrasts\r\nso strongly with the bigotry and dogmatism of sixty years ago, is\r\nlargely due to J. S. Mill\u0027s example. I may possibly be wrong about the\r\nfacts; but I am, at any rate, \u0027asking for particulars,\u0027 and not\r\n\u0027resting in general notions.\u0027 And if Mr. Spencer should tell me it\r\nstarted from no personal influence whatever, but from the \u0027aggregate of\r\nconditions,\u0027 the \u0027generations,\u0027 Mill and all his contemporaries\r\n\u0027descended from,\u0027 the whole past order of nature in short, surely he,\r\nnot I, would be the person \u0027satisfied with vagueness.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe fact is that Mr. Spencer\u0027s sociological method is identical with\r\nthat of one who would invoke the zodiac to account for the fall of the\r\nsparrow, and the thirteen at table to explain the gentleman\u0027s death.\r\nIt is of little more scientific value than the Oriental method of\r\nreplying to whatever question arises by the unimpeachable truism, \"God\r\nis great.\" \u003cI\u003eNot\u003c/I\u003e to fall back on the gods, where a proximate principle\r\nmay be found, has with us Westerners long since become the sign of an\r\nefficient as distinguished from an inefficient intellect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo believe that the cause of everything is to be found in its\r\nantecedents is the starting-point, the initial postulate, not the goal\r\nand consummation, of science. If she is simply to lead us out of the\r\nlabyrinth by the same hole we went in by three or four thousand years\r\nago, it seems hardly worth while to have followed her through the\r\ndarkness at all. If anything is humanly certain it is that the great\r\nman\u0027s society, properly so called, does not make him before he can\r\nremake it. Physiological forces, with which\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P235\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e235}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe social,\r\npolitical, geographical, and to a great extent anthropological\r\nconditions have just as much and just as little to do as the condition\r\nof the crater of Vesuvius has to do with the flickering of this gas by\r\nwhich I write, are what make him. Can it be that Mr. Spencer holds the\r\nconvergence of sociological pressures to have so impinged on\r\nStratford-upon-Avon about the 26th of April, 1564, that a W.\r\nShakespeare, with all his mental peculiarities, had to be born\r\nthere,\u0026mdash;as the pressure of water outside a certain boat will cause a\r\nstream of a certain form to ooze into a particular leak? And does he\r\nmean to say that if the aforesaid W. Shakespeare had died of cholera\r\ninfantum, another mother at Stratford-upon-Avon would needs have\r\nengendered a duplicate copy of him, to restore the sociologic\r\nequilibrium,\u0026mdash;just as the same stream of water will reappear, no matter\r\nhow often you pass a sponge over the leak, so long as the outside level\r\nremains unchanged? Or might the substitute arise at\r\n\u0027Stratford-atte-Bowe\u0027? Here, as elsewhere, it is very hard, in the\r\nmidst of Mr. Spencer\u0027s vagueness, to tell what he does mean at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe have, however, in his disciple, Mr. Grant Allen, one who leaves us\r\nin no doubt whatever of his precise meaning. This widely informed,\r\nsuggestive, and brilliant writer published last year a couple of\r\narticles in the Gentleman\u0027s Magazine, in which he maintained that\r\nindividuals have no initiative in determining social change.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"The differences between one nation and another, whether in intellect,\r\ncommerce, art, morals, or general temperament, ultimately depend, not\r\nupon any mysterious properties of race, nationality, or any other\r\nunknown and unintelligible abstractions, but simply and solely upon the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P236\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e236}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nphysical circumstances to which they are exposed. If it be a\r\nfact, as we know it to be, that the French nation differs recognizably\r\nfrom the Chinese, and the people of Hamburg differ recognizably from\r\nthe people of Timbuctoo, then the notorious and conspicuous differences\r\nbetween them are wholly due to the geographical position of the various\r\nraces. If the people who went to Hamburg had gone to Timbuctoo, they\r\nwould now be indistinguishable from the semi-barbarian negroes who\r\ninhabit that central African metropolis;[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn8text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn8\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e] and if the people who went\r\nto Timbuctoo had gone to Hamburg, they would now have been\r\nwhite-skinned merchants driving a roaring trade in imitation sherry and\r\nindigestible port…. The differentiating agency must be sought in the\r\ngreat permanent geographical features of land and sea; … these have\r\nnecessarily and inevitably moulded the characters and histories of\r\nevery nation upon the earth…. We cannot regard any nation as an\r\nactive agent in differentiating itself. Only the surrounding\r\ncircumstances can have any effect in such a direction. [These two\r\nsentences dogmatically deny the existence of the relatively independent\r\nphysiological cycle of causation.] To suppose otherwise is to suppose\r\nthat the mind of man is exempt from the universal law of causation.\r\nThere is no caprice, no spontaneous impulse, in human endeavors. Even\r\ntastes and inclinations \u003cI\u003emust\u003c/I\u003e themselves be the result of surrounding\r\ncauses.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn9text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn9\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P237\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e237}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nElsewhere Mr. Allen, writing of the Greek culture, says:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"It was absolutely and unreservedly the product of the geographical\r\nHellas, acting upon the given factor of the undifferentiated Aryan\r\nbrain,… To me it seems a self-evident proposition that nothing\r\nwhatsoever can differentiate one body of men from another, except the\r\nphysical conditions in which they are set,\u0026mdash;including, of course, under\r\nthe term \u003cI\u003ephysical conditions\u003c/I\u003e the relations of place and time in which\r\nthey stand with regard to other bodies of men. To suppose otherwise is\r\nto deny the primordial law of causation. To imagine that the mind can\r\ndifferentiate itself is to imagine that it can be differentiated\r\nwithout a cause.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn10text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis outcry about the law of universal causation being undone, the\r\nmoment we refuse to invest in the kind of causation which is peddled\r\nround by a particular school, makes one impatient. These writers have\r\nno imagination of alternatives. With them there is no \u003cI\u003etertium quid\u003c/I\u003e\r\nbetween outward environment and miracle. \u003cI\u003eAut Caesar, aut nullus\u003c/I\u003e!\r\n\u003cI\u003eAut\u003c/I\u003e Spencerism, \u003cI\u003eaut\u003c/I\u003e catechism!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf by \u0027physical conditions\u0027 Mr. Allen means what he does mean, the\r\noutward cycle of visible nature and man, his assertion is simply\r\nphysiologically false. For a national mind differentiates \u0027itself\u0027\r\nwhenever a genius is born in its midst by causes acting in the\r\ninvisible and molecular cycle. But if Mr. Allen means by \u0027physical\r\nconditions\u0027 the whole of nature, his assertion, though true, forms but\r\nthe vague Asiatic\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P238\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e238}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nprofession of belief in an all-enveloping fate,\r\nwhich certainly need not plume itself on any specially advanced or\r\nscientific character.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd how can a thinker so clever as Mr. Allen fail to have distinguished\r\nin these matters between \u003cI\u003enecessary\u003c/I\u003e conditions and \u003cI\u003esufficient\u003c/I\u003e\r\nconditions of a given result? The French say that to have an omelet we\r\nmust break our eggs; that is, the breaking of eggs is a necessary\r\ncondition of the omelet. But is it a sufficient condition? Does an\r\nomelet appear whenever three eggs are broken? So of the Greek mind.\r\nTo get such versatile intelligence it may be that such commercial\r\ndealings with the world as the geographical Hellas afforded are a\r\nnecessary condition. But if they are a sufficient condition, why did\r\nnot the Phoenicians outstrip the Greeks in intelligence? No\r\ngeographical environment can produce a given type of mind. It can only\r\nfoster and further certain types fortuitously produced, and thwart and\r\nfrustrate others. Once again, its function is simply selective, and\r\ndetermines what shall actually be only by destroying what is positively\r\nincompatible. An Arctic environment is incompatible with improvident\r\nhabits in its denizens; but whether the inhabitants of such a region\r\nshall unite with their thrift the peacefulness of the Eskimo or the\r\npugnacity of the Norseman is, so far as the climate is concerned, an\r\naccident. Evolutionists should not forget that we all have five\r\nfingers not because four or six would not do just as well, but merely\r\nbecause the first vertebrate above the fishes \u003cI\u003ehappened\u003c/I\u003e to have that\r\nnumber. He owed his prodigious success in founding a line of descent\r\nto some entirely other quality,\u0026mdash;we know\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P239\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e239}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnot which,\u0026mdash;but the\r\ninessential five fingers were taken in tow and preserved to the present\r\nday. So of most social peculiarities. Which of them shall be taken in\r\ntow by the few qualities which the environment necessarily exacts is a\r\nmatter of what physiological accidents shall happen among individuals.\r\nMr. Allen promises to prove his thesis in detail by the examples of\r\nChina, India, England, Rome, etc. I have not the smallest hesitation\r\nin predicting that he will do no more with these examples than he has\r\ndone with Hellas. He will appear upon the scene after the fact, and\r\nshow that the quality developed by each race was, naturally enough, not\r\nincompatible with its habitat. But he will utterly fail to show that\r\nthe particular form of compatibility fallen into in each case was the\r\none necessary and only possible form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNaturalists know well enough how indeterminate the harmonies between a\r\nfauna and its environment are. An animal may better his chances of\r\nexistence in either of many ways,\u0026mdash;growing aquatic, arboreal, or\r\nsubterranean; small and swift, or massive and bulky; spiny, horny,\r\nslimy, or venomous; more timid or more pugnacious; more cunning or more\r\nfertile of offspring; more gregarious or more solitary; or in other\r\nways besides,\u0026mdash;and any one of these ways may suit him to many widely\r\ndifferent environments.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nReaders of Mr. A. R. Wallace will well remember the striking\r\nillustrations of this in his Malay Archipelago:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"Borneo closely resembles New Guinea not only in its vast size and its\r\nfreedom from volcanoes, but in its variety of geological structure, its\r\nuniformity of climate, and the general aspect of the forest vegetation\r\nthat clothes its surface; the Moluccas are the counterpart of the\r\nPhilippines\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P240\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e240}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin their volcanic structure, their extreme fertility,\r\ntheir luxuriant forests, and their frequent earthquakes; and Bali, with\r\nthe east end of Java, has a climate almost as dry and a soil almost as\r\narid as that of Timor. Yet between these corresponding groups of\r\nislands, constructed, as it were, after the same pattern, subjected to\r\nthe same climate, and bathed by the same oceans, there exists the\r\ngreatest possible contrast when we compare their animal productions.\r\nNowhere does the ancient doctrine that differences or similarities in\r\nthe various forms of life that inhabit different countries are due to\r\ncorresponding physical differences or similarities in the countries\r\nthemselves, meet with so direct and palpable a contradiction. Borneo\r\nand New Guinea, as alike physically as two distinct countries can be,\r\nare zoölogically wide as the poles asunder; while Australia, with its\r\ndry winds, its open plains, its stony deserts, and its temperate\r\nclimate, yet produces birds and quadrupeds which are closely related to\r\nthose inhabiting the hot, damp, luxuriant forests which everywhere\r\nclothe the plains and mountains of New Guinea.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere we have similar physical-geography environments harmonizing with\r\nwidely differing animal lives, and similar animal lives harmonizing\r\nwith widely differing geographical environments. A singularly\r\naccomplished writer, E. Gryzanowski, in the North American Review,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn11text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn11\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e]\r\nuses the instances of Sardinia and Corsica in support of this thesis\r\nwith great effect He says:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"These sister islands, lying in the very centre of the Mediterranean,\r\nat almost equal distances from the centres of Latin and Neo-Latin\r\ncivilization, within easy reach of the Phoenician, the Greek, and the\r\nSaracen, with a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P241\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e241}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncoast-line of more than a thousand miles, endowed\r\nwith obvious and tempting advantages, and hiding untold sources of\r\nagricultural and mineral wealth, have nevertheless remained unknown,\r\nunheeded, and certainly uncared for during the thirty centuries of\r\nEuropean history…. These islands have dialects, but no language;\r\nrecords of battles, but no history. They have customs, but no laws;\r\nthe \u003cI\u003evendetta\u003c/I\u003e, but no justice. They have wants and wealth, but no\r\ncommerce, timber and ports, but no shipping. They have legends, but no\r\npoetry, beauty, but no art; and twenty years ago it could still be said\r\nthat they had universities, but no students…. That Sardinia, with\r\nall her emotional and picturesque barbarism, has never produced a\r\nsingle artist is almost as strange as her barbarism itself…. Near\r\nthe focus of European civilization, in the very spot which an \u003cI\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/I\u003e geographer would point out as the most favorable place for\r\nmaterial and intellectual, commercial, and political development, these\r\nstrange sister islands have slept their secular sleep, like \u003cI\u003enodes\u003c/I\u003e on\r\nthe sounding-board of history.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis writer then goes on to compare Sardinia and Sicily with some\r\ndetail. All the material advantages are in favor of Sardinia, \"and the\r\nSardinian population, being of an ancestry more mixed than that of the\r\nEnglish race, would justify far higher expectations than that of\r\nSicily.\" Yet Sicily\u0027s past history has been brilliant in the extreme,\r\nand her commerce to-day is great. Dr. Gryzanowski has his own theory\r\nof the historic torpor of these favored isles. He thinks they\r\nstagnated because they never gained political autonomy, being always\r\nowned by some Continental power. I will not dispute the theory; but I\r\nwill ask, Why did they not gain it? and answer immediately: Simply\r\nbecause no individuals were\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P242\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e242}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nborn there with patriotism and\r\nability enough to inflame their countrymen with national pride,\r\nambition, and thirst for independent life. Corsicans and Sardinians\r\nare probably as good stuff as any of their neighbors. But the best\r\nwood-pile will not blaze till a torch is applied, and the appropriate\r\ntorches seem to have been wanting.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn12text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSporadic great men come everywhere. But for a community to get\r\nvibrating through and through\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P243\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e243}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwith intensely active life, many\r\ngeniuses coming together and in rapid succession are required. This is\r\nwhy great epochs are so rare,\u0026mdash;why the sudden bloom of a Greece, an\r\nearly Rome, a Renaissance, is such a mystery. Blow must follow blow so\r\nfast that no cooling can occur in the intervals. Then the mass of the\r\nnation grows incandescent, and may continue to glow by pure inertia\r\nlong after the originators of its internal movement have passed away.\r\nWe often hear surprise expressed that in these high tides of human\r\naffairs not only the people should be filled with stronger life, but\r\nthat individual geniuses should seem so exceptionally abundant. This\r\nmystery is just about as deep as the time-honored conundrum as to why\r\ngreat rivers flow by great towns. It is true that great public\r\nfermentations awaken and adopt many geniuses, who in more torpid times\r\nwould have had no chance to work. But over and above this there must\r\nbe an exceptional concourse of genius about a time, to make the\r\nfermentation begin at all. The unlikeliness of the concourse is far\r\ngreater than the unlikeliness of any particular genius; hence the\r\nrarity of these periods and the exceptional aspect which they always\r\nwear.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P244\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e244}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is folly, then, to speak of the \u0027laws of history\u0027 as of something\r\ninevitable, which science has only to discover, and whose consequences\r\nany one can then foretell but do nothing to alter or avert. Why, the\r\nvery laws of physics are conditional, and deal with \u003cI\u003eifs\u003c/I\u003e. The\r\nphysicist does not say, \"The water will boil anyhow;\" he only says it\r\nwill boil if a fire be kindled beneath it. And so the utmost the\r\nstudent of sociology can ever predict is that \u003cI\u003eif\u003c/I\u003e a genius of a\r\ncertain sort show the way, society will be sure to follow. It might\r\nlong ago have been predicted with great confidence that both Italy and\r\nGermany would reach a stable unity if some one could but succeed in\r\nstarting the process. It could not have been predicted, however, that\r\nthe \u003cI\u003emodus operandi\u003c/I\u003e in each case would be subordination to a paramount\r\nstate rather than federation, because no historian could have\r\ncalculated the freaks of birth and fortune which gave at the same\r\nmoment such positions of authority to three such peculiar individuals\r\nas Napoleon III., Bismarck, and Cavour. So of our own politics. It is\r\ncertain now that the movement of the independents, reformers, or\r\nwhatever one please to call them, will triumph. But whether it do so\r\nby converting the Republican party to its ends, or by rearing a new\r\nparty on the ruins of both our present factions, the historian cannot\r\nsay. There can be no doubt that the reform movement would make more\r\nprogress in one year with an adequate personal leader than as now in\r\nten without one. Were there a great citizen, splendid with every civic\r\ngift, to be its candidate, who can doubt that he would lead us to\r\nvictory? But, at present, we, his environment, who sigh for him and\r\nwould so gladly preserve and adopt him if he came, can neither\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P245\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e245}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmove without him, nor yet do anything to bring him forth.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn13text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo conclude: The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital\r\nimportance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and\r\nunscientific conception, a lapse from modern scientific determinism\r\ninto the most ancient oriental fatalism. The lesson of the analysis\r\nthat we have made (even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with\r\nwhich we started) forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the\r\nenergy of the individual. Even the dogged resistance of the\r\nreactionary conservative to changes which he cannot hope entirely to\r\ndefeat is justified and shown to be effective. He retards the\r\nmovement; deflects it a little by the concessions he extracts; gives it\r\na resultant momentum, compounded of his inertia and his adversaries\u0027\r\nspeed; and keeps up, in short, a constant lateral pressure, which, to\r\nbe sure, never heads it round about, but brings it up at last at a goal\r\nfar to the right or left of that to which it would have drifted had he\r\nallowed it to drift alone.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI now pass to the last division of my subject, the function of the\r\nenvironment in \u003cI\u003emental\u003c/I\u003e evolution. After what I have already said, I\r\nmay be quite concise. Here, if anywhere, it would seem at first sight\r\nas if that school must be right which makes the mind passively plastic,\r\nand the environment actively productive of the form and order of its\r\nconceptions; which, in a word, thinks that all mental progress must\r\nresult from\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P246\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e246}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\na series of adaptive changes, in the sense already\r\ndefined of that word. We know what a vast part of our mental furniture\r\nconsists of purely remembered, not reasoned, experience. The entire\r\nfield of our habits and associations by contiguity belongs here. The\r\nentire field of those abstract conceptions which were taught us with\r\nthe language into which we were born belongs here also. And, more than\r\nthis, there is reason to think that the order of \u0027outer relations\u0027\r\nexperienced by the individual may itself determine the order in which\r\nthe general characters imbedded therein shall be noticed and extracted\r\nby his mind.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn14text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn14\"\u003e14\u003c/A\u003e] The pleasures and benefits, moreover, which certain\r\nparts of the environment yield, and the pains and hurts which other\r\nparts inflict, determine the direction of our interest and our\r\nattention, and so decide at which points the accumulation of mental\r\nexperiences shall begin. It might, accordingly, seem as if there were\r\nno room for any other agency than this; as if the distinction we have\r\nfound so useful between \u0027spontaneous variation,\u0027 as the producer of\r\nchanged forms, and the environment, as their preserver and destroyer,\r\ndid not hold in the case of mental progress; as if, in a word, the\r\nparallel with darwinism might no longer obtain, and Spencer might be\r\nquite right with his fundamental law of intelligence, which says, \"The\r\ncohesion between psychical states is proportionate to the frequency\r\nwith which the relation between the answering external phenomena has\r\nbeen repeated in experience.\"[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn15text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P247\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e247}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, in spite of all these facts, I have no hesitation whatever in\r\nholding firm to the darwinian distinction even here. I maintain that\r\nthe facts in question are all drawn from the lower strata of the mind,\r\nso to speak,\u0026mdash;from the sphere of its least evolved functions, from the\r\nregion of intelligence which man possesses in common with the brutes.\r\nAnd I can easily show that throughout the whole extent of those mental\r\ndepartments which are highest, which are most characteristically human,\r\nSpencer\u0027s law is violated at every step; and that as a matter of fact\r\nthe new conceptions, emotions, and active tendencies which evolve are\r\noriginally produced in the shape of random images, fancies, accidental\r\nout-births of spontaneous variation in the functional activity of the\r\nexcessively instable human brain, which the outer environment simply\r\nconfirms or refutes, adopts or rejects, preserves or\r\ndestroys,\u0026mdash;selects, in short, just as it selects morphological and\r\nsocial variations due to molecular accidents of an analogous sort.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is one of the tritest of truisms that human intelligences of a\r\nsimple order are very literal. They are slaves of habit, doing what\r\nthey have been taught without variation; dry, prosaic, and\r\nmatter-of-fact in their remarks; devoid of humor, except of the coarse\r\nphysical kind which rejoices in a practical joke; taking the world for\r\ngranted; and possessing in their faithfulness and honesty the single\r\ngift by which they are sometimes able to warm us into admiration. But\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P248\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e248}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\neven this faithfulness seems to have a sort of inorganic ring,\r\nand to remind us more of the immutable properties of a piece of\r\ninanimate matter than of the steadfastness of a human will capable of\r\nalternative choice. When we descend to the brutes, all these\r\npeculiarities are intensified. No reader of Schopenhauer can forget\r\nhis frequent allusions to the \u003cI\u003etrockener ernst\u003c/I\u003e of dogs and horses, nor\r\nto their \u003cI\u003eehrlichkeit\u003c/I\u003e. And every noticer of their ways must receive a\r\ndeep impression of the fatally literal character of the few, simple,\r\nand treadmill-like operations of their minds.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut turn to the highest order of minds, and what a change! Instead of\r\nthoughts of concrete things patiently following one another in a beaten\r\ntrack of habitual suggestion, we have the most abrupt cross-cuts and\r\ntransitions from one idea to another, the most rarefied abstractions\r\nand discriminations, the most unheard-of combinations of elements, the\r\nsubtlest associations of analogy; in a word, we seem suddenly\r\nintroduced into a seething caldron of ideas, where everything is\r\nfizzling and bobbing about in a state of bewildering activity, where\r\npartnerships can be joined or loosened in an instant, treadmill routine\r\nis unknown, and the unexpected seems the only law. According to the\r\nidiosyncrasy of the individual, the scintillations will have one\r\ncharacter or another. They will be sallies of wit and humor; they will\r\nbe flashes of poetry and eloquence; they will be constructions of\r\ndramatic fiction or of mechanical device, logical or philosophic\r\nabstractions, business projects, or scientific hypotheses, with trains\r\nof experimental consequences based thereon; they will be musical\r\nsounds, or images of plastic beauty or picturesqueness, or visions of\r\nmoral harmony. But, whatever their\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P249\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e249}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndifferences may be, they will\r\nall agree in this,\u0026mdash;that their genesis is sudden and, as it were,\r\nspontaneous. That is to say, the same premises would not, in the mind\r\nof another individual, have engendered just that conclusion; although,\r\nwhen the conclusion is offered to the other individual, he may\r\nthoroughly accept and enjoy it, and envy the brilliancy of him to whom\r\nit first occurred.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo Professor Jevons is due the great credit of having emphatically\r\npointed out[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn16text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn16\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e] how the genius of discovery depends altogether on the\r\nnumber of these random notions and guesses which visit the\r\ninvestigator\u0027s mind. To be fertile in hypotheses is the first\r\nrequisite, and to be willing to throw them away the moment experience\r\ncontradicts them is the next. The Baconian method of collating tables\r\nof instances may be a useful aid at certain times. But one might as\r\nwell expect a chemist\u0027s note-book to write down the name of the body\r\nanalyzed, or a weather table to sum itself up into a prediction of\r\nprobabilities of its own accord, as to hope that the mere fact of\r\nmental confrontation with a certain series of facts will be sufficient\r\nto make \u003cI\u003eany\u003c/I\u003e brain conceive their law. The conceiving of the law is a\r\nspontaneous variation in the strictest sense of the term. It flashes\r\nout of one brain, and no other, because the instability of that brain\r\nis such as to tip and upset itself in just that particular direction.\r\nBut the important thing to notice is that the good flashes and the bad\r\nflashes, the triumphant hypotheses and the absurd conceits, are on an\r\nexact equality in respect of their origin. Aristotle\u0027s absurd Physics\r\nand his immortal Logic flow from one source: the forces that produce\r\nthe one produce the other.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P250\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e250}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nWhen walking along the street, thinking of the blue sky or the\r\nfine spring weather, I may either smile at some grotesque whim which\r\noccurs to me, or I may suddenly catch an intuition of the solution of a\r\nlong-unsolved problem, which at that moment was far from my thoughts.\r\nBoth notions are shaken out of the same reservoir,\u0026mdash;the reservoir of a\r\nbrain in which the reproduction of images in the relations of their\r\noutward persistence or frequency has long ceased to be the dominant\r\nlaw. But to the thought, when it is once engendered, the consecration\r\nof agreement with outward relations may come. The conceit perishes in\r\na moment, and is forgotten. The scientific hypothesis arouses in me a\r\nfever of desire for verification. I read, write, experiment, consult\r\nexperts. Everything corroborates my notion, which being then published\r\nin a book spreads from review to review and from mouth to mouth, till\r\nat last there is no doubt I am enshrined in the Pantheon of the great\r\ndiviners of nature\u0027s ways. The environment \u003cI\u003epreserves\u003c/I\u003e the conception\r\nwhich it was unable to \u003cI\u003eproduce\u003c/I\u003e in any brain less idiosyncratic than\r\nmy own.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, the spontaneous upsettings of brains this way and that at\r\nparticular moments into particular ideas and combinations are matched\r\nby their equally spontaneous permanent tiltings or saggings towards\r\ndeterminate directions. The humorous bent is quite characteristic; the\r\nsentimental one equally so. And the personal tone of each mind, which\r\nmakes it more alive to certain classes of experience than others, more\r\nattentive to certain impressions, more open to certain reasons, is\r\nequally the result of that invisible and unimaginable play of the\r\nforces of growth within the nervous system which, irresponsibly to the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P251\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e251}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nenvironment, makes the brain peculiarly apt to function in a\r\ncertain way. Here again the selection goes on. The products of the\r\nmind with the determined aesthetic bent please or displease the\r\ncommunity. We adopt Wordsworth, and grow unsentimental and serene. We\r\nare fascinated by Schopenhauer, and learn from him the true luxury of\r\nwoe. The adopted bent becomes a ferment in the community, and alters\r\nits tone. The alteration may be a benefit or a misfortune, for it is\r\n(\u003cI\u003epace\u003c/I\u003e Mr. Allen) a differentiation from within, which has to run the\r\ngauntlet of the larger environment\u0027s selective power. Civilized\r\nLanguedoc, taking the tone of its scholars, poets, princes, and\r\ntheologians, fell a prey to its rude Catholic environment in the\r\nAlbigensian crusade. France in 1792, taking the tone of its St. Justs\r\nand Marats, plunged into its long career of unstable outward relations.\r\nPrussia in 1806, taking the tone of its Humboldts and its Steins,\r\nproved itself in the most signal way \u0027adjusted\u0027 to its environment in\r\n1872.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMr. Spencer, in one of the strangest chapters of his Psychology,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn17text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn17\"\u003e17\u003c/A\u003e]\r\ntries to show the necessary order in which the development of\r\nconceptions in the human race occurs. No abstract conception can be\r\ndeveloped, according to him, until the outward experiences have reached\r\na certain degree of heterogeneity, definiteness, coherence, and so\r\nforth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"Thus the belief in an unchanging order, the belief in \u003cI\u003elaw\u003c/I\u003e, is a\r\nbelief of which the primitive man is absolutely incapable….\r\nExperiences such as he receives furnish but few data for the conception\r\nof uniformity, whether as displayed in things or in relations…. The\r\ndaily\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P252\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e252}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nimpressions which the savage gets yield the notion very\r\nimperfectly, and in but few cases. Of all the objects around,\u0026mdash;trees,\r\nstones, hills, pieces of water, clouds, and so forth,\u0026mdash;most differ\r\nwidely, … and few approach complete likeness so nearly as to make\r\ndiscrimination difficult. Even between animals of the same species it\r\nrarely happens that, whether alive or dead, they are presented in just\r\nthe same attitudes…. It is only along with a gradual development of\r\nthe arts … that there come frequent experiences of perfectly straight\r\nlines admitting of complete apposition, bringing the perceptions of\r\nequality and inequality. Still more devoid is savage life of the\r\nexperiences which generate the conception of the uniformity of\r\nsuccession. The sequences observed from hour to hour and day to day\r\nseem anything but uniform, difference is a far more conspicuous trait\r\namong them…. So that if we contemplate primitive human life as a\r\nwhole, we see that multiformity of sequence, rather than uniformity, is\r\nthe notion which it tends to generate…. Only as fast as the practice\r\nof the arts develops the idea of measure can the consciousness of\r\nuniformity become clear…. Those conditions furnished by advancing\r\ncivilization which make possible the notion of uniformity\r\nsimultaneously make possible the notion of \u003cI\u003eexactness\u003c/I\u003e…. Hence the\r\nprimitive man has little experience which cultivates the consciousness\r\nof what we call \u003cI\u003etruth\u003c/I\u003e. How closely allied this is to the\r\nconsciousness which the practice of the arts cultivates is implied even\r\nin language. We speak of a true surface as well as a true statement.\r\nExactness describes perfection in a mechanical fit, as well as perfect\r\nagreement between the results of calculations.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe whole burden of Mr. Spencer\u0027s book is to show the fatal way in\r\nwhich the mind, supposed passive, is moulded by its experiences of\r\n\u0027outer\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P253\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e253}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nrelations.\u0027 In this chapter the yard-stick, the balance,\r\nthe chronometer, and other machines and instruments come to figure\r\namong the \u0027relations\u0027 external to the mind. Surely they are so, after\r\nthey have been manufactured; but only because of the preservative power\r\nof the social environment. Originally all these things and all other\r\ninstitutions were flashes of genius in an individual head, of which the\r\nouter environment showed no sign. Adopted by the race and become its\r\nheritage, they then supply instigations to new geniuses whom they\r\nenviron to make new inventions and discoveries; and so the ball of\r\nprogress rolls. But take out the geniuses, or alter their\r\nidiosyncrasies, and what increasing uniformities will the environment\r\nshow? We defy Mr. Spencer or any one else to reply.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe plain truth is that the \u0027philosophy\u0027 of evolution (as distinguished\r\nfrom our special information about particular cases of change) is a\r\nmetaphysical creed, and nothing else. It is a mood of contemplation,\r\nan emotional attitude, rather than a system of thought,\u0026mdash;a mood which\r\nis old as the world, and which no refutation of any one incarnation of\r\nit (such as the spencerian philosophy) will dispel; the mood of\r\nfatalistic pantheism, with its intuition of the One and All, which was,\r\nand is, and ever shall be, and from whose womb each single thing\r\nproceeds. Far be it from us to speak slightingly here of so hoary and\r\nmighty a style of looking on the world as this. What we at present\r\ncall scientific discoveries had nothing to do with bringing it to\r\nbirth, nor can one easily conceive that they should ever give it its\r\n\u003cI\u003equietus\u003c/I\u003e, no matter how logically incompatible with its spirit the\r\nultimate phenomenal distinctions which\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P254\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e254}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nscience accumulates should\r\nturn out to be. It can laugh at the phenomenal distinctions on which\r\nscience is based, for it draws its vital breath from a region\r\nwhich\u0026mdash;whether above or below\u0026mdash;is at least altogether different from\r\nthat in which science dwells. A critic, however, who cannot disprove\r\nthe truth of the metaphysic creed, can at least raise his voice in\r\nprotest against its disguising itself in \u0027scientific\u0027 plumes. I think\r\nthat all who have had the patience to follow me thus far will agree\r\nthat the spencerian \u0027philosophy\u0027 of social and intellectual progress is\r\nan obsolete anachronism, reverting to a pre-darwinian type of thought,\r\njust as the spencerian philosophy of \u0027Force,\u0027 effacing all the previous\r\ndistinctions between actual and potential energy, momentum, work,\r\nforce, mass, etc., which physicists have with so much agony achieved,\r\ncarries us back to a pre-galilean age.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn7\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn8\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn9\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn13\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn14\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn15\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn16\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch07fn17\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] A lecture before the Harvard Natural History Society; published in\r\nthe Atlantic Monthly, October, 1880.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] Darwin\u0027s theory of pangenesis is, it is true, an attempt to account\r\n(among other things) for variation. But it occupies its own separate\r\nplace, and its author no more invokes the environment when he talks of\r\nthe adhesions of gemmules than he invokes these adhesions when he talks\r\nof the relations of the whole animal to the environment. \u003cI\u003eDivide et\r\nimpera!\u003c/I\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] It is true that it remodels him, also, to some degree, by its\r\neducative influence, and that this constitutes a considerable\r\ndifference between the social case and the zoölogical case, I neglect\r\nthis aspect of the relation here, for the other is the more important.\r\nAt the end of the article I will return to it incidentally.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn4text\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] The reader will remember when this was written.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn5text\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e] Lectures and Essays, i. 82.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn6text\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e] Mr. Grant Allen himself, in an article from which I shall presently\r\nquote, admits that a set of people who, if they had been exposed ages\r\nago to the geographical agencies of Timbuctoo, would have developed\r\ninto negroes might now, after a protracted exposure to the conditions\r\nof Hamburg, never become negroes if transplanted to Timbuctoo.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn7text\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e] Study of Sociology, pages 33-35.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn8text\"\u003e8\u003c/A\u003e] No! not even though they were bodily brothers! The geographical\r\nfactor utterly vanishes before the ancestral factor. The difference\r\nbetween Hamburg and Timbuctoo as a cause of ultimate divergence of two\r\nraces is as nothing to the difference of constitution of the ancestors\r\nof the two races, even though as in twin brothers, this difference\r\nmight be invisible to the naked eye. No two couples of the most\r\nhomogeneous race could possibly be found so identical as, if set in\r\nidentical environments, to give rise to two identical lineages. The\r\nminute divergence at the start grows broader with each generation, and\r\nends with entirely dissimilar breeds.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn9text\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e] Article \u0027Nation Making,\u0027 in Gentleman\u0027s Magazine, 1878. I quote\r\nfrom the reprint in the Popular Science Monthly Supplement December,\r\n1878, pages 121, 123, 126.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn10text\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e] Article \u0027Hellas,\u0027 in Gentleman\u0027s Magazine, 1878. Reprint in\r\nPopular Science Monthly Supplement, September, 1878.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn11text\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e] Vol. cxiii. p. 318 (October, 1871).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn12text\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e] I am well aware that in much that follows (though in nothing that\r\nprecedes) I seem to be crossing the heavily shotted bows of Mr. Galton,\r\nfor whose laborious investigations into the heredity of genius I have\r\nthe greatest respect. Mr. Galton inclines to think that genius of\r\nintellect and passion is bound to express itself, whatever the outward\r\nopportunity, and that within any given race an equal number of geniuses\r\nof each grade must needs be born in every equal period of time; a\r\nsubordinate race cannot possibly engender a large number of high-class\r\ngeniuses, etc. He would, I suspect, infer the suppositions I go on to\r\nmake\u0026mdash;of great men fortuitously assembling around a given epoch and\r\nmaking it great, and of their being fortuitously absent from certain\r\nplaces and times (from Sardinia, from Boston now, etc.)\u0026mdash;to be\r\nradically vicious. I hardly think, however, that he does justice to\r\nthe great complexity of the conditions of \u003cI\u003eeffective\u003c/I\u003e greatness, and to\r\nthe way in which the physiological averages of production may be masked\r\nentirely during long periods, either by the accidental mortality of\r\ngeniuses in infancy, or by the fact that the particular geniuses born\r\nhappened not to find tasks. I doubt the truth of his assertion that\r\n\u003cI\u003eintellectual\u003c/I\u003e genius, like murder, \u0027will out.\u0027 It is true that certain\r\ntypes are irrepressible. Voltaire, Shelley, Carlyle, can hardly be\r\nconceived leading a dumb and vegetative life in any epoch. But take\r\nMr. Galton himself, take his cousin Mr. Darwin, and take Mr. Spencer:\r\nnothing is to me more have died \u0027with all their music in them,\u0027 known\r\nonly to their friends as persons of strong and original character and\r\njudgment. What has started them on their career of effective greatness\r\nis simply the accident of each stumbling upon a task vast, brilliant,\r\nand congenial enough to call out the convergence of all his passions\r\nand powers. I see no more reason why, in case they had not fallen in\r\nwith their several hobbies at propitious periods in their life, they\r\nneed necessarily have hit upon other hobbies, and made themselves\r\nequally great. Their case seems similar to that of the Washingtons,\r\nCromwells, and Grants, who simply rose to their occasions. But apart\r\nfrom these causes of fallacy, I am strongly disposed to think that\r\nwhere transcendent geniuses are concerned the numbers anyhow are so\r\nsmall that their appearance will not fit into any scheme of averages.\r\nThat is, two or three might appear together, just as the two or three\r\nballs nearest the target centre might be fired consecutively. Take\r\nlonger epochs and more firing, and the great geniuses and near balls\r\nwould on the whole be more spread out.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn13text\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e] Since this paper was written, President Cleveland has to a certain\r\nextent met the need. But who can doubt that if he had certain other\r\nqualities which he has not yet shown, his influence would have been\r\nstill more decisive? (1896.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn14text\"\u003e14\u003c/A\u003e] That is, if a certain general character be rapidly repeated in our\r\nouter experience with a number of strongly contrasted concomitants, it\r\nwill be sooner abstracted than if its associates are invariable or\r\nmonotonous.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn15text\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e] Principles of Psychology, i. 460. See also pp. 463, 464, 500. On\r\npage 408 the law is formulated thus: The \u003cI\u003epersistence\u003c/I\u003e of the\r\nconnection in consciousness is proportionate to the \u003cI\u003epersistence\u003c/I\u003e of\r\nthe outer connection. Mr. Spencer works most with the law of\r\nfrequency. Either law, from my point of view, is false; but Mr.\r\nSpencer ought not to think them synonymous.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn16text\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e] In his Principles of Science, chapters xi., xii., xxvi.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch07fn17text\"\u003e17\u003c/A\u003e] Part viii. chap. iii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap08\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P255\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e255}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTHE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS.\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe previous Essay, on Great Men, etc., called forth two replies,\u0026mdash;one\r\nby Mr. Grant Allen, entitled the \u0027Genesis of Genius,\u0027 in the Atlantic\r\nMonthly, vol. xlvii. p. 351; the other entitled \u0027Sociology and Hero\r\nWorship,\u0027 by Mr. John Fiske, \u003cI\u003eibidem\u003c/I\u003e, p. 75. The article which\r\nfollows is a rejoinder to Mr. Allen\u0027s article. It was refused at the\r\ntime by the Atlantic, but saw the day later in the Open Court for\r\nAugust, 1890. It appears here as a natural supplement to the foregoing\r\narticle, on which it casts some explanatory light.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMr. Allen\u0027s contempt for hero-worship is based on very simple\r\nconsiderations. A nation\u0027s great men, he says, are but slight\r\ndeviations from the general level. The hero is merely a special\r\ncomplex of the ordinary qualities of his race. The petty differences\r\nimpressed upon ordinary Greek minds by Plato or Aristotle or Zeno, are\r\nnothing at all compared with the vast differences between every Greek\r\nmind and every Egyptian or Chinese mind. We may neglect them in a\r\nphilosophy of history, just as in calculating the impetus of a\r\nlocomotive we neglect the extra impetus given by a single piece of\r\nbetter coal. What each man adds is but an infinitesimal fraction\r\ncompared with what he derives from his parents, or\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P256\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e256}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nindirectly\r\nfrom his earlier ancestry. And if what the past gives to the hero is\r\nso much bulkier than what the future receives from him, it is what\r\nreally calls for philosophical treatment. The problem for the\r\nsociologist is as to what produces the average man; the extraordinary\r\nmen and what they produce may by the philosophers be taken for granted,\r\nas too trivial variations to merit deep inquiry.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, as I wish to vie with Mr. Allen\u0027s unrivalled polemic amiability\r\nand be as conciliatory as possible, I will not cavil at his facts or\r\ntry to magnify the chasm between an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Napoleon\r\nand the average level of their respective tribes. Let it be as small\r\nas Mr. Allen thinks. All that I object to is that he should think the\r\nmere \u003cI\u003esize\u003c/I\u003e of a difference is capable of deciding whether that\r\ndifference be or be not a fit subject for philosophic study. Truly\r\nenough, the details vanish in the bird\u0027s-eye view; but so does the\r\nbird\u0027s-eye view vanish in the details. Which is the right point of\r\nview for philosophic vision? Nature gives no reply, for both points of\r\nview, being equally real, are equally natural; and no one natural\r\nreality \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e is any more emphatic than any other. Accentuation,\r\nforeground, and background are created solely by the interested\r\nattention of the looker-on; and if the small difference between the\r\ngenius and his tribe interests me most, while the large one between\r\nthat tribe and another tribe interests Mr. Allen, our controversy\r\ncannot be ended until a complete philosophy, accounting for all\r\ndifferences impartially, shall justify us both.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAn unlearned carpenter of my acquaintance once said in my hearing:\r\n\"There is very little difference between one man and another; but what\r\nlittle there\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P257\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e257}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nis, \u003cI\u003eis very important\u003c/I\u003e.\" This distinction seems to\r\nme to go to the root of the matter. It is not only the size of the\r\ndifference which concerns the philosopher, but also its place and its\r\nkind. An inch is a small thing, but we know the proverb about an inch\r\non a man\u0027s nose. Messrs. Allen and Spencer, in inveighing against\r\nhero-worship, are thinking exclusively of the size of the inch; I, as a\r\nhero-worshipper, attend to its seat and function.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, there is a striking law over which few people seem to have\r\npondered. It is this: That among all the differences which exist, the\r\nonly ones that interest us strongly are those \u003cI\u003ewe do not take for\r\ngranted\u003c/I\u003e. We are not a bit elated that our friend should have two\r\nhands and the power of speech, and should practise the matter-of-course\r\nhuman virtues; and quite as little are we vexed that our dog goes on\r\nall fours and fails to understand our conversation. Expecting no more\r\nfrom the latter companion, and no less from the former, we get what we\r\nexpect and are satisfied. We never think of communing with the dog by\r\ndiscourse of philosophy, or with the friend by head-scratching or the\r\nthrowing of crusts to be snapped at. But if either dog or friend fall\r\nabove or below the expected standard, they arouse the most lively\r\nemotion. On our brother\u0027s vices or genius we never weary of\r\ndescanting; to his bipedism or his hairless skin we do not consecrate a\r\nthought. \u003cI\u003eWhat\u003c/I\u003e he says may transport us; that he is able to speak at\r\nall leaves us stone cold. The reason of all this is that his virtues\r\nand vices and utterances might, compatibly with the current range of\r\nvariation in our tribe, be just the opposites of what they are, while\r\nhis zoölogically human attributes cannot possibly go astray. There\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P258\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e258}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nis thus a zone of insecurity in human affairs in which all the\r\ndramatic interest lies; the rest belongs to the dead machinery of the\r\nstage. This is the formative zone, the part not yet ingrained into the\r\nrace\u0027s average, not yet a typical, hereditary, and constant factor of\r\nthe social community in which it occurs. It is like the soft layer\r\nbeneath the bark of the tree in which all the year\u0027s growth is going\r\non. Life has abandoned the mighty trunk inside, which stands inert and\r\nbelongs almost to the inorganic world. Layer after layer of human\r\nperfection separates me from the central Africans who pursued Stanley\r\nwith cries of \"meat, meat!\" This vast difference ought, on Mr. Allen\u0027s\r\nprinciples, to rivet my attention far more than the petty one which\r\nobtains between two such birds of a feather as Mr. Allen and myself.\r\nYet while I never feel proud that the sight of a passer-by awakens in\r\nme no cannibalistic waterings of the mouth, I am free to confess that I\r\nshall feel very proud if I do not publicly appear inferior to Mr. Allen\r\nin the conduct of this momentous debate. To me as a teacher the\r\nintellectual gap between my ablest and my dullest student counts for\r\ninfinitely more than that between the latter and the amphioxus: indeed,\r\nI never thought of the latter chasm till this moment. Will Mr. Allen\r\nseriously say that this is all human folly, and tweedledum and\r\ntweedledee?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo a Veddah\u0027s eyes the differences between two white literary men seem\r\nslight indeed,\u0026mdash;same clothes, same spectacles, same harmless\r\ndisposition, same habit of scribbling on paper and poring over books,\r\netc. \"Just two white fellows,\" the Veddah will say, \"with no\r\nperceptible difference.\" But what a difference to the literary men\r\nthemselves! Think, Mr. Allen, of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P259\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e259}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nconfounding our philosophies\r\ntogether merely because both are printed in the same magazines and are\r\nindistinguishable to the eye of a Veddah! Our flesh creeps at the\r\nthought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut in judging of history Mr. Allen deliberately prefers to place\r\nhimself at the Veddah\u0027s point of view, and to see things \u003cI\u003een gros\u003c/I\u003e and\r\nout of focus, rather than minutely. It is quite true that there are\r\nthings and differences enough to be seen either way. But which are the\r\nhumanly important ones, those most worthy to arouse our interest,\u0026mdash;the\r\nlarge distinctions or the small? In the answer to this question lies\r\nthe whole divergence of the hero-worshippers from the sociologists. As\r\nI said at the outset, it is merely a quarrel of emphasis; and the only\r\nthing I can do is to state my personal reasons for the emphasis I\r\nprefer.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe zone of the individual differences, and of the social \u0027twists\u0027\r\nwhich by common confession they initiate, is the zone of formative\r\nprocesses, the dynamic belt of quivering uncertainty, the line where\r\npast and future meet. It is the theatre of all we do not take for\r\ngranted, the stage of the living drama of life; and however narrow its\r\nscope, it is roomy enough to lodge the whole range of human passions.\r\nThe sphere of the race\u0027s average, on the contrary, no matter how large\r\nit may be, is a dead and stagnant thing, an achieved possession, from\r\nwhich all insecurity has vanished. Like the trunk of a tree, it has\r\nbeen built up by successive concretions of successive active zones.\r\nThe moving present in which we live with its problems and passions, its\r\nindividual rivalries, victories, and defeats, will soon pass over to\r\nthe majority and leave its small deposit on this static mass, to make\r\nroom for fresh actors and a newer play.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P260\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e260}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nAnd though it may be\r\ntrue, as Mr. Spencer predicts, that each later zone shall fatally be\r\nnarrower than its forerunners; and that when the ultimate lady-like\r\ntea-table elysium of the Data of Ethics shall prevail, such questions\r\nas the breaking of eggs at the large or the small end will span the\r\nwhole scope of possible human warfare,\u0026mdash;still even in this shrunken and\r\nenfeebled generation, \u003cI\u003espatio aetatis defessa vetusto\u003c/I\u003e, what eagerness\r\nthere will be! Battles and defeats will occur, the victors will be\r\nglorified and the vanquished dishonored just as in the brave days of\r\nyore, the human heart still withdrawing itself from the much it has in\r\nsafe possession, and concentrating all its passion upon those\r\nevanescent possibilities of fact which still quiver in fate\u0027s scale.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd is not its instinct right? Do not we here grasp the\r\nrace-differences \u003cI\u003ein the making\u003c/I\u003e, and catch the only glimpse it is\r\nallotted to us to attain of the working units themselves, of whose\r\ndifferentiating action the race-gaps form but the stagnant sum? What\r\nstrange inversion of scientific procedure does Mr. Allen practise when\r\nhe teaches us to neglect elements and attend only to aggregate\r\nresultants? On the contrary, simply because the active ring, whatever\r\nits bulk, \u003cI\u003eis elementary\u003c/I\u003e, I hold that the study of its conditions (be\r\nthese never so \u0027proximate\u0027) is the highest of topics for the social\r\nphilosopher. If individual variations determine its ups and downs and\r\nhair-breadth escapes and twists and turns, as Mr. Allen and Mr. Fiske\r\nboth admit, Heaven forbid us from tabooing the study of these in favor\r\nof the average! On the contrary, let us emphasize these, and the\r\nimportance of these; and in picking out from history our heroes, and\r\ncommuning with their\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P261\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e261}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nkindred spirits,\u0026mdash;in imagining as strongly\r\nas possible what differences their individualities brought about in\r\nthis world, while its surface was still plastic in their hands, and\r\nwhat whilom feasibilities they made impossible,\u0026mdash;each one of us may\r\nbest fortify and inspire what creative energy may lie in his own\r\nsoul.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch08fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch08fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis is the lasting justification of hero-worship, and the pooh-poohing\r\nof it by \u0027sociologists\u0027 is the ever-lasting excuse for popular\r\nindifference to their general laws and averages. The difference\r\nbetween an America rescued by a Washington or by a \u0027Jenkins\u0027 may, as\r\nMr. Allen says, be \u0027little,\u0027 but it is, in the words of my carpenter\r\nfriend, \u0027important.\u0027 Some organizing genius must in the nature of\r\nthings have emerged from the French Revolution; but what Frenchman will\r\naffirm it to have been an accident of no consequence that he should\r\nhave had the supernumerary idiosyncrasies of a Bonaparte? What animal,\r\ndomestic or wild, will call it a matter of no moment that scarce a word\r\nof sympathy with brutes should have survived from the teachings of\r\nJesus of Nazareth?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe preferences of sentient creatures are what \u003cI\u003ecreate\u003c/I\u003e the importance\r\nof topics. They are the absolute and ultimate law-giver here. And I\r\nfor my part cannot but consider the talk of the contemporary\r\nsociological school about averages and general laws and predetermined\r\ntendencies, with its obligatory undervaluing of the importance of\r\nindividual\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P262\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e262}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndifferences, as the most pernicious and immoral of\r\nfatalisms. Suppose there is a social equilibrium fated to be, whose is\r\nit to be,\u0026mdash;that of your preference, or mine? There lies the question\r\nof questions, and it is one which no study of averages can decide.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch08fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch08fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] M. G. Tarde\u0027s book (itself a work of genius), Les Lois de\r\nl\u0027Imitation, Étude Sociologique (2me Édition, Paris, Alcan, 1895), is\r\nthe best possible commentary on this text,\u0026mdash;\u0027invention\u0027 on the one\r\nhand, and \u0027imitation\u0027 on the other, being for this author the two sole\r\nfactors of social change.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap09\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P263\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e263}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nON SOME HEGELISMS.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe are just now witnessing a singular phenomenon in British and\r\nAmerican philosophy. Hegelism, so defunct on its native soil that I\r\nbelieve but a single youthful disciple of the school is to be counted\r\namong the privat-docenten and younger professors of Germany, and whose\r\nolder champions are all passing off the stage, has found among us so\r\nzealous and able a set of propagandists that to-day it may really be\r\nreckoned one of the most powerful influences of the time in the higher\r\nwalks of thought. And there is no doubt that, as a movement of\r\nreaction against the traditional British empiricism, the hegelian\r\ninfluence represents expansion and freedom, and is doing service of a\r\ncertain kind. Such service, however, ought not to make us blindly\r\nindulgent. Hegel\u0027s philosophy mingles mountain-loads of corruption\r\nwith its scanty merits, and must, now that it has become\r\nquasi-official, make ready to defend itself as well as to attack\r\nothers. It is with no hope of converting independent thinkers, but\r\nrather with the sole aspiration of showing some chance youthful\r\ndisciple that there \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e another point of view in philosophy that I\r\nfire this skirmisher\u0027s shot, which may, I hope, soon be followed by\r\nsomebody else\u0027s heavier musketry.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P264\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e264}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe point of view I have in mind will become clearer if I begin with a\r\nfew preparatory remarks on the motives and difficulties of\r\nphilosophizing in general.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo show that the real is identical with the ideal may roughly be set\r\ndown as the mainspring of philosophic activity. The atomic and\r\nmechanical conception of the world is as ideal from the point of view\r\nof some of our faculties as the teleological one is from the point of\r\nview of others. In the realm of every ideal we can begin anywhere and\r\nroam over the field, each term passing us to its neighbor, each member\r\ncalling for the next, and our reason rejoicing in its glad activity.\r\nWhere the parts of a conception seem thus to belong together by inward\r\nkinship, where the whole is defined in a way congruous with our powers\r\nof reaction, to see is to approve and to understand.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMuch of the real seems at the first blush to follow a different law.\r\nThe parts seem, as Hegel has said, to be shot out of a pistol at us.\r\nEach asserts itself as a simple brute fact, uncalled for by the rest,\r\nwhich, so far as we can see, might even make a better system without\r\nit. Arbitrary, foreign, jolting, discontinuous\u0026mdash;are the adjectives by\r\nwhich we are tempted to describe it. And yet from out the bosom of it\r\na partial ideality constantly arises which keeps alive our aspiration\r\nthat the whole may some day be construed in ideal form. Not only do\r\nthe materials lend themselves under certain circumstances to aesthetic\r\nmanipulation, but underlying their worst disjointedness are three great\r\ncontinua in which for each of us reason\u0027s ideal is actually reached. I\r\nmean the continua of memory or personal consciousness, of time and of\r\nspace. In\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P265\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e265}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthese great matrices of all we know, we are absolutely\r\nat home. The things we meet are many, and yet are one; each is itself,\r\nand yet all belong together; continuity reigns, yet individuality is\r\nnot lost.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nConsider, for example, space. It is a unit. No force can in any way\r\nbreak, wound, or tear it. It has no joints between which you can pass\r\nyour amputating knife, for it penetrates the knife and is not split,\r\nTry to make a hole in space by annihilating an inch of it. To make a\r\nhole you must drive something else through. But what can you drive\r\nthrough space except what is itself spatial?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut notwithstanding it is this very paragon of unity, space in its\r\nparts contains an infinite variety, and the unity and the variety do\r\nnot contradict each other, for they obtain in different respects. The\r\none is the whole, the many are the parts. Each part is one again, but\r\nonly one fraction; and part lies beside part in absolute nextness, the\r\nvery picture of peace and non-contradiction. It is true that the space\r\nbetween two points both unites and divides them, just as the bar of a\r\ndumb-bell both unites and divides the two balls. But the union and the\r\ndivision are not \u003cI\u003esecundum idem\u003c/I\u003e: it divides them by keeping them out\r\nof the space between, it unites them by keeping them out of the space\r\nbeyond; so the double function presents no inconsistency.\r\nSelf-contradiction in space could only ensue if one part tried to oust\r\nanother from its position; but the notion of such an absurdity vanishes\r\nin the framing, and cannot stay to vex the mind.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] Beyond the parts\r\nwe see or think at any\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P266\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e266}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ngiven time extend further parts; but the\r\nbeyond is homogeneous with what is embraced, and follows the same law;\r\nso that no surprises, no foreignness, can ever emerge from space\u0027s womb.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus with space our intelligence is absolutely intimate; it is\r\nrationality and transparency incarnate. The same may be said of the\r\nego and of time. But if for simplicity\u0027s sake we ignore them, we may\r\ntruly say that when we desiderate rational knowledge of the world the\r\nstandard set by our knowledge of space is what governs our desire.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn3text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e]\r\nCannot the breaks, the jolts, the margin of foreignness, be exorcised\r\nfrom other things and leave them unitary like the space they fill?\r\nCould this be done, the philosophic kingdom of heaven would be at hand.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut the moment we turn to the material qualities\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P267\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e267}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof being, we\r\nfind the continuity ruptured on every side. A fearful jolting begins.\r\nEven if we simplify the world by reducing it to its mechanical bare\r\npoles,\u0026mdash;atoms and their motions,\u0026mdash;the discontinuity is bad enough. The\r\nlaws of clash, the effects of distance upon attraction and repulsion,\r\nall seem arbitrary collocations of data. The atoms themselves are so\r\nmany independent facts, the existence of any one of which in no wise\r\nseems to involve the existence of the rest. We have not banished\r\ndiscontinuity, we have only made it finer-grained. And to get even\r\nthat degree of rationality into the universe we have had to butcher a\r\ngreat part of its contents. The secondary qualities we stripped off\r\nfrom the reality and swept into the dust-bin labelled \u0027subjective\r\nillusion,\u0027 still \u003cI\u003eas such\u003c/I\u003e are facts, and must themselves be\r\nrationalized in some way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut when we deal with facts believed to be purely subjective, we are\r\nfarther than ever from the goal. We have not now the refuge of\r\ndistinguishing between the \u0027reality\u0027 and its appearances. Facts of\r\nthought being the only facts, differences of thought become the only\r\ndifferences, and identities of thought the only identities there are.\r\nTwo thoughts that seem different are different to all eternity. We can\r\nno longer speak of heat and light being reconciled in any \u003cI\u003etertium\r\nquid\u003c/I\u003e like wave-motion. For motion is motion, and light is light, and\r\nheat heat forever, and their discontinuity is as absolute as their\r\nexistence. Together with the other attributes and things we conceive,\r\nthey make up Plato\u0027s realm of immutable ideas. Neither \u003cI\u003eper se\u003c/I\u003e calls\r\nfor the other, hatches it out, is its \u0027truth,\u0027 creates it, or has any\r\nsort of inward community with it except that of being comparable\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P268\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e268}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin an ego and found more or less differing, or more or less resembling,\r\nas the case may be. The world of qualities is a world of things almost\r\nwholly discontinuous \u003cI\u003einter se\u003c/I\u003e. Each only says, \"I am that I am,\" and\r\neach says it on its own account and with absolute monotony. The\r\ncontinuities of which they \u003cI\u003epartake\u003c/I\u003e, in Plato\u0027s phrase, the ego,\r\nspace, and time, are for most of them the only grounds of union they\r\npossess.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt might seem as if in the mere \u0027partaking\u0027 there lay a contradiction\r\nof the discontinuity. If the white must partake of space, the heat of\r\ntime, and so forth,\u0026mdash;do not whiteness and space, heat and time,\r\nmutually call for or help to create each other?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYes; a few such \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e couplings must be admitted. They are the\r\naxioms: no feeling except as occupying some space and time, or as a\r\nmoment in some ego; no motion but of something moved; no thought but of\r\nan object; no time without a previous time,\u0026mdash;and the like. But they\r\nare limited in number, and they obtain only between excessively broad\r\ngenera of concepts, and leave quite undetermined what the\r\nspecifications of those genera shall be. What feeling shall fill\r\n\u003cI\u003ethis\u003c/I\u003e time, what substance execute \u003cI\u003ethis\u003c/I\u003e motion, what qualities\r\ncombine in \u003cI\u003ethis\u003c/I\u003e being, are as much unanswered questions as if the\r\nmetaphysical axioms never existed at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe existence of such syntheses as they are does then but slightly\r\nmitigate the jolt, jolt, jolt we get when we pass over the facts of the\r\nworld. Everywhere indeterminate variables, subject only to these few\r\nvague enveloping laws, independent in all besides.\u0026mdash;such seems the\r\ntruth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn yet another way, too, ideal and real are so far\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P269\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e269}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\napart that\r\ntheir conjunction seems quite hopeless. To eat our cake and have it,\r\nto lose our soul and save it, to enjoy the physical privileges of\r\nselfishness and the moral luxury of altruism at the same time, would be\r\nthe ideal. But the real offers us these terms in the shape of mutually\r\nexclusive alternatives of which only one can be true at once; so that\r\nwe must choose, and in choosing murder one possibility. The wrench is\r\nabsolute: \"Either\u0026mdash;or!\" Just as whenever I bet a hundred dollars on an\r\nevent, there comes an instant when I am a hundred dollars richer or\r\npoorer without any intermediate degrees passed over; just as my\r\nwavering between a journey to Portland or to New York does not carry me\r\nfrom Cambridge in a resultant direction in which both motions are\r\ncompounded, say to Albany, but at a given moment results in the\r\nconjunction of reality in all its fulness for one alternative and\r\nimpossibility in all its fulness for the other,\u0026mdash;so the bachelor joys\r\nare utterly lost from the face of being for the married man, who must\r\nhenceforward find his account in something that is not them but is good\r\nenough to make him forget them; so the careless and irresponsible\r\nliving in the sunshine, the \u0027unbuttoning after supper and sleeping upon\r\nbenches in the afternoon,\u0027 are stars that have set upon the path of him\r\nwho in good earnest makes himself a moralist. The transitions are\r\nabrupt, absolute, truly shot out of a pistol; for while many\r\npossibilities are called, the few that are chosen are chosen in all\r\ntheir sudden completeness.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMust we then think that the world that fills space and time can yield\r\nus no acquaintance of that high and perfect type yielded by empty space\r\nand time themselves? Is what unity there is in the world\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P270\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e270}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmainly\r\nderived from the fact that the world is \u003cI\u003ein\u003c/I\u003e space and time and\r\n\u0027partakes\u0027 of them? Can no vision of it forestall the facts of it, or\r\nknow from some fractions the others before the others have arrived?\r\nAre there real logically indeterminate possibilities which forbid there\r\nbeing any equivalent for the happening of it all but the happening\r\nitself? Can we gain no anticipatory assurance that what is to come\r\nwill have no strangeness? Is there no substitute, in short, for life\r\nbut the living itself in all its long-drawn weary length and breadth\r\nand thickness?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the negative reply to all these questions, a modest common-sense\r\nfinds no difficulty in acquiescing. To such a way of thinking the\r\nnotion of \u0027partaking\u0027 has a deep and real significance. Whoso partakes\r\nof a thing enjoys his share, and comes into contact with the thing and\r\nits other partakers. But he claims no more. His share in no wise\r\nnegates the thing or their share; nor does it preclude his possession\r\nof reserved and private powers with which they have nothing to do, and\r\nwhich are not all absorbed in the mere function of sharing. Why may\r\nnot the world be a sort of republican banquet of this sort, where all\r\nthe qualities of being respect one another\u0027s personal sacredness, yet\r\nsit at the common table of space and time?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo me this view seems deeply probable. Things cohere, but the act of\r\ncohesion itself implies but few conditions, and leaves the rest of\r\ntheir qualifications indeterminate. As the first three notes of a tune\r\ncomport many endings, all melodious, but the tune is not named till a\r\nparticular ending has actually come,\u0026mdash;so the parts actually known of\r\nthe universe may comport many ideally possible complements. But as\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P271\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e271}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe facts are not the complements, so the knowledge of the one is\r\nnot the knowledge of the other in anything but the few necessary\r\nelements of which all must partake in order to be together at all.\r\nWhy, if one act of knowledge could from one point take in the total\r\nperspective, with all mere possibilities abolished, should there ever\r\nhave been anything more than that act? Why duplicate it by the tedious\r\nunrolling, inch by inch, of the foredone reality? No answer seems\r\npossible. On the other hand, if we stipulate only a partial community\r\nof partially independent powers, we see perfectly why no one part\r\ncontrols the whole view, but each detail must come and be actually\r\ngiven, before, in any special sense, it can be said to be determined at\r\nall. This is the moral view, the view that gives to other powers the\r\nsame freedom it would have itself,\u0026mdash;not the ridiculous \u0027freedom to do\r\nright,\u0027 which in my mouth can only mean the freedom to do as \u003cI\u003eI\u003c/I\u003e think\r\nright, but the freedom to do as \u003cI\u003ethey\u003c/I\u003e think right, or wrong either.\r\nAfter all, what accounts do the nether-most bounds of the universe owe\r\nto me? By what insatiate conceit and lust of intellectual despotism do\r\nI arrogate the right to know their secrets, and from my philosophic\r\nthrone to play the only airs they shall march to, as if I were the\r\nLord\u0027s anointed? Is not my knowing them at all a gift and not a right?\r\nAnd shall it be given before they are given? \u003cI\u003eData! gifts!\u003c/I\u003e something\r\nto be thankful for! It is a gift that we can approach things at all,\r\nand, by means of the time and space of which our minds and they\r\npartake, alter our actions so as to meet them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere are \u0027bounds of ord\u0027nance\u0027 set for all things, where they must\r\npause or rue it. \u0027Facts\u0027 are the bounds of human knowledge, set for\r\nit, not by it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P272\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e272}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, to a mind like Hegel\u0027s such pusillanimous twaddle sounds simply\r\nloathsome. Bounds that we can\u0027t overpass! Data! facts that say,\r\n\"Hands off, till we are given\"! possibilities we can\u0027t control! a\r\nbanquet of which we merely share! Heavens, this is intolerable; such a\r\nworld is no world for a philosopher to have to do with. He must have\r\nall or nothing. If the world cannot be rational in my sense, in the\r\nsense of unconditional surrender, I refuse to grant that it is rational\r\nat all. It is pure incoherence, a chaos, a nulliverse, to whose\r\nhaphazard sway I will not truckle. But, no! this is not the world.\r\nThe world is philosophy\u0027s own,\u0026mdash;a single block, of which, if she once\r\nget her teeth on any part, the whole shall inevitably become her prey\r\nand feed her all-devouring theoretic maw. Naught shall be but the\r\nnecessities she creates and impossibilities; freedom shall mean freedom\r\nto obey her will, ideal and actual shall be one: she, and I as her\r\nchampion, will be satisfied on no lower terms.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe insolence of sway, the \u003cI\u003ehubris\u003c/I\u003e on which gods take vengeance, is in\r\ntemporal and spiritual matters usually admitted to be a vice. A\r\nBonaparte and a Philip II. are called monsters. But when an\r\n\u003cI\u003eintellect\u003c/I\u003e is found insatiate enough to declare that all existence\r\nmust bend the knee to its requirements, we do not call its owner a\r\nmonster, but a philosophic prophet. May not this be all wrong? Is\r\nthere any one of our functions exempted from the common lot of\r\nliability to excess? And where everything else must be contented with\r\nits part in the universe, shall the theorizing faculty ride rough-shod\r\nover the whole?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI confess I can see no \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e reason for the exception. He who\r\nclaims it must be judged by the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P273\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e273}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nconsequences of his acts, and by\r\nthem alone. Let Hegel then confront the universe with his claim, and\r\nsee how he can make the two match.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe universe absolutely refuses to let him travel without jolt. Time,\r\nspace, and his ego are continuous; so are degrees of heat, shades of\r\nlight and color, and a few other serial things; so too do potatoes call\r\nfor salt, and cranberries for sugar, in the taste of one who knows what\r\nsalt and sugar are. But on the whole there is nought to soften the\r\nshock of surprise to his intelligence, as it passes from one quality of\r\nbeing to another. Light is not heat, heat is not light; and to him who\r\nholds the one the other is not given till it give itself. Real being\r\ncomes moreover and goes from any concept at its own sweet will, with no\r\npermission asked of the conceiver. In despair must Hegel lift vain\r\nhands of imprecation; and since he will take nothing but the whole, he\r\nmust throw away even the part he might retain, and call the nature of\r\nthings an \u003cI\u003eabsolute\u003c/I\u003e muddle and incoherence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, hark! What wondrous strain is this that steals upon his ear?\r\nIncoherence itself, may it not be the very sort of coherence I require?\r\nMuddle! is it anything but a peculiar sort of transparency? Is not\r\njolt passage? Is friction other than a kind of lubrication? Is not a\r\nchasm a filling?\u0026mdash;a queer kind of filling, but a filling still. Why\r\nseek for a glue to hold things together when their very falling apart\r\nis the only glue you need? Let all that negation which seemed to\r\ndisintegrate the universe be the mortar that combines it, and the\r\nproblem stands solved. The paradoxical character of the notion could\r\nnot fail to please a mind monstrous even in its native\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P274\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e274}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nGermany,\r\nwhere mental excess is endemic. Richard, for a moment brought to bay,\r\nis himself again. He vaults into the saddle, and from that time his\r\ncareer is that of a philosophic desperado,\u0026mdash;one series of outrages upon\r\nthe chastity of thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd can we not ourselves sympathize with his mood in some degree? The\r\nold receipts of squeezing the thistle and taking the bull by the horns\r\nhave many applications. An evil frankly accepted loses half its sting\r\nand all its terror. The Stoics had their cheap and easy way of dealing\r\nwith evil. \u003cI\u003eCall\u003c/I\u003e your woes goods, they said; refuse to \u003cI\u003ecall\u003c/I\u003e your\r\nlost blessings by that name,\u0026mdash;and you are happy. So of the\r\nunintelligibilities: call them means of intelligibility, and what\r\nfurther do you require? There is even a more legitimate excuse than\r\nthat. In the exceedingness of the facts of life over our formulas lies\r\na standing temptation at certain times to give up trying to say\r\nanything adequate about them, and to take refuge in wild and whirling\r\nwords which but confess our impotence before their ineffability. Thus\r\nBaron Bunsen writes to his wife: \"Nothing is near but the far; nothing\r\ntrue but the highest; nothing credible but the inconceivable; nothing\r\nso real as the impossible; nothing clear but the deepest; nothing so\r\nvisible as the invisible; and no life is there but through death.\" Of\r\nthese ecstatic moments the \u003cI\u003ecredo quia impossibile\u003c/I\u003e is the classical\r\nexpression. Hegel\u0027s originality lies in his making their mood\r\npermanent and sacramental, and authorized to supersede all others,\u0026mdash;not\r\nas a mystical bath and refuge for feeling when tired reason sickens of\r\nher intellectual responsibilities (thank Heaven! that bath is always\r\nready), but as the very form of intellectual responsibility itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P275\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e275}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd now after this long introduction, let me trace some of Hegel\u0027s ways\r\nof applying his discovery. His system resembles a mouse-trap, in which\r\nif you once pass the door you may be lost forever. Safety lies in not\r\nentering. Hegelians have anointed, so to speak, the entrance with\r\nvarious considerations which, stated in an abstract form, are so\r\nplausible as to slide us unresistingly and almost unwittingly through\r\nthe fatal arch. It is not necessary to drink the ocean to know that it\r\nis salt; nor need a critic dissect a whole system after proving that\r\nits premises are rotten. I shall accordingly confine myself to a few\r\nof the points that captivate beginners most; and assume that if they\r\nbreak down, so must the system which they prop.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFirst of all, Hegel has to do utterly away with the sharing and\r\npartaking business he so much loathes. He will not call contradiction\r\nthe glue in one place and identity in another; that is too\r\nhalf-hearted. Contradiction must be a glue universal, and must derive\r\nits credit from being shown to be latently involved in cases that we\r\nhitherto supposed to embody pure continuity. Thus, the relations of an\r\nego with its objects, of one time with another time, of one place with\r\nanother place, of a cause with its effect, of a thing with its\r\nproperties, and especially of parts with wholes, must be shown to\r\ninvolve contradiction. Contradiction, shown to lurk in the very heart\r\nof coherence and continuity, cannot after that be held to defeat them,\r\nand must be taken as the universal solvent,\u0026mdash;or, rather, there is no\r\nlonger any need of a solvent. To \u0027dissolve\u0027 things in identity was the\r\ndream of earlier cruder schools. Hegel will show that their very\r\ndifference is their identity, and that\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P276\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e276}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin the act of detachment\r\nthe detachment is undone, and they fall into each other\u0027s arms.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, at the very outset it seems rather odd that a philosopher who\r\npretends that the world is absolutely rational, or in other words that\r\nit can be completely understood, should fall back on a principle (the\r\nidentity of contradictories) which utterly defies understanding, and\r\nobliges him in fact to use the word \u0027understanding,\u0027 whenever it occurs\r\nin his pages, as a term of contempt. Take the case of space we used\r\nabove. The common man who looks at space believes there is nothing in\r\nit to be acquainted with beyond what he sees; no hidden machinery, no\r\nsecrets, nothing but the parts as they lie side by side and make the\r\nstatic whole. His intellect is satisfied with accepting space as an\r\nultimate genus of the given. But Hegel cries to him: \"Dupe! dost thou\r\nnot see it to be one nest of incompatibilities? Do not the unity of\r\nits wholeness and the diversity of its parts stand in patent\r\ncontradiction? Does it not both unite and divide things; and but for\r\nthis strange and irreconcilable activity, would it be at all? The\r\nhidden dynamism of self-contradiction is what incessantly produces the\r\nstatic appearance by which your sense is fooled.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut if the man ask how self-contradiction \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e do all this, and how\r\nits dynamism may be seen to work, Hegel can only reply by showing him\r\nthe space itself and saying: \"Lo, \u003cI\u003ethus\u003c/I\u003e.\" In other words, instead of\r\nthe principle of explanation being more intelligible than the thing to\r\nbe explained, it is absolutely unintelligible if taken by itself, and\r\nmust appeal to its pretended product to prove its existence. Surely,\r\nsuch a system of explaining \u003cI\u003enotum per ignotum\u003c/I\u003e, of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P277\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e277}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nmaking the\r\n\u003cI\u003eexplicans\u003c/I\u003e borrow credentials from the \u003cI\u003eexplicand\u003c/I\u003e, and of creating\r\nparadoxes and impossibilities where none were suspected, is a strange\r\ncandidate for the honor of being a complete rationalizer of the world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe principle of the contradictoriness of identity and the identity of\r\ncontradictories is the essence of the hegelian system. But what\r\nprobably washes this principle down most with beginners is the\r\ncombination in which its author works it with another principle which\r\nis by no means characteristic of his system, and which, for want of a\r\nbetter name, might be called the \u0027principle of totality.\u0027 This\r\nprinciple says that you cannot adequately know even a part until you\r\nknow of what whole it forms a part. As Aristotle writes and Hegel\r\nloves to quote, an amputated hand is not even a hand. And as Tennyson\r\nsays,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Little flower\u0026mdash;but if I could understand\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhat you are, root and all, and all in all,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nI should know what God and man is.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nObviously, until we have taken in all the relations, immediate or\r\nremote, into which the thing actually enters or potentially may enter,\r\nwe do not know all \u003cI\u003eabout\u003c/I\u003e the thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd obviously for such an exhaustive acquaintance with the thing, an\r\nacquaintance with every other thing, actual and potential, near and\r\nremote, is needed; so that it is quite fair to say that omniscience\r\nalone can completely know any one thing as it stands. Standing in a\r\nworld of relations, that world must be known before the thing is fully\r\nknown. This doctrine is of course an integral part of empiricism, an\r\nintegral part of common-sense. Since when could good men not apprehend\r\nthe passing hour\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P278\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e278}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin the light of life\u0027s larger sweep,\u0026mdash;not grow\r\ndispassionate the more they stretched their view? Did the \u0027law of\r\nsharing\u0027 so little legitimate their procedure that a law of identity of\r\ncontradictories, forsooth, must be trumped up to give it scope? Out\r\nupon the idea!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHume\u0027s account of causation is a good illustration of the way in which\r\nempiricism may use the principle of totality. We call something a\r\ncause; but we at the same time deny its effect to be in any latent way\r\ncontained in or substantially identical with it. We thus cannot tell\r\nwhat its causality amounts to until its effect has actually supervened.\r\nThe effect, then, or something beyond the thing is what makes the thing\r\nto be so far as it is a cause. Humism thus says that its causality is\r\nsomething adventitious and not necessarily given when its other\r\nattributes are there. Generalizing this, empiricism contends that we\r\nmust everywhere distinguish between the intrinsic being of a thing and\r\nits relations, and, among these, between those that are essential to\r\nour knowing it at all and those that may be called adventitious. The\r\nthing as actually present in a given world is there with \u003cI\u003eall\u003c/I\u003e its\r\nrelations; for it to be known as it \u003cI\u003ethere\u003c/I\u003e exists, they must be known\r\ntoo, and it and they form a single fact for any consciousness large\r\nenough to embrace that world as a unity. But what constitutes this\r\nsingleness of fact, this unity? Empiricism says, Nothing but the\r\nrelation-yielding matrix in which the several items of the world find\r\nthemselves embedded,\u0026mdash;time, namely, and space, and the mind of the\r\nknower. And it says that were some of the items quite different from\r\nwhat they are and others the same, still, for aught we can see, an\r\nequally unitary world might be, provided each\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P279\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e279}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nitem were an object\r\nfor consciousness and occupied a determinate point in space and time.\r\nAll the adventitious relations would in such a world be changed, along\r\nwith the intrinsic natures and places of the beings between which they\r\nobtained; but the \u0027principle of totality\u0027 in knowledge would in no wise\r\nbe affected.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut Hegelism dogmatically denies all this to be possible. In the first\r\nplace it says there are no intrinsic natures that may change; in the\r\nsecond it says there are no adventitious relations. When the relations\r\nof what we call a thing are told, no \u003cI\u003ecaput mortuum\u003c/I\u003e of intrinsicality,\r\nno \u0027nature,\u0027 is left. The relations soak up all there is of the thing;\r\nthe \u0027items\u0027 of the world are but \u003cI\u003efoci\u003c/I\u003e of relation with other \u003cI\u003efoci\u003c/I\u003e\r\nof relation; and all the relations are necessary. The unity of the\r\nworld has nothing to do with any \u0027matrix.\u0027 The matrix and the items,\r\neach with all, make a unity, simply because each in truth is all the\r\nrest. The proof lies in the \u003cI\u003ehegelian\u003c/I\u003e principle of totality, which\r\ndemands that if any one part be posited alone all the others shall\r\nforthwith \u003cI\u003eemanate\u003c/I\u003e from it and infallibly reproduce the whole. In the\r\n\u003cI\u003emodus operandi\u003c/I\u003e of the emanation comes in, as I said, that partnership\r\nof the principle of totality with that of the identity of\r\ncontradictories which so recommends the latter to beginners in Hegel\u0027s\r\nphilosophy. To posit one item alone is to deny the rest; to deny them\r\nis to refer to them; to refer to them is to begin, at least, to bring\r\nthem on the scene; and to begin is in the fulness of time to end.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf we call this a monism, Hegel is quick to cry, Not so! To say simply\r\nthat the one item is the rest\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P280\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e280}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nof the universe is as false and\r\none-sided as to say that it is simply itself. It is both and neither;\r\nand the only condition on which we gain the right to affirm that it is,\r\nis that we fail not to keep affirming all the while that it is not, as\r\nwell. Thus the truth refuses to be expressed in any single act of\r\njudgment or sentence. The world appears as a monism \u003cI\u003eand\u003c/I\u003e a pluralism,\r\njust as it appeared in our own introductory exposition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut the trouble that keeps us and Hegel from ever joining hands over\r\nthis apparent formula of brotherhood is that we distinguish, or try to\r\ndistinguish, the respects in which the world is one from those in which\r\nit is many, while all such stable distinctions are what he most\r\nabominates. The reader may decide which procedure helps his reason\r\nmost. For my own part, the time-honored formula of empiricist\r\npluralism, that the world cannot be set down in any single proposition,\r\ngrows less instead of more intelligible when I add, \"And yet the\r\ndifferent propositions that express it are one!\" The unity of the\r\npropositions is that of the mind that harbors them. Any one who\r\ninsists that their diversity is in any way itself their unity, can only\r\ndo so because he loves obscurity and mystification for their own pure\r\nsakes.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhere you meet with a contradiction among realities, Herbart used to\r\nsay, it shows you have failed to make a real distinction. Hegel\u0027s\r\nsovereign method of going to work and saving all possible\r\ncontradictions, lies in pertinaciously refusing to distinguish. He\r\ntakes what is true of a term \u003cI\u003esecundum quid\u003c/I\u003e, treats it as true of the\r\nsame term \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e, and then, of course, applies it to the term\r\n\u003cI\u003esecundum aliud\u003c/I\u003e. A\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P281\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e281}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ngood example of this is found in the first\r\ntriad. This triad shows that the mutability of the real world is due\r\nto the fact that being constantly negates itself; that whatever \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e by\r\nthe same act \u003cI\u003eis not\u003c/I\u003e, and gets undone and swept away; and that thus\r\nthe irremediable torrent of life about which so much rhetoric has been\r\nwritten has its roots in an ineluctable necessity which lies revealed\r\nto our logical reason. This notion of a being which forever stumbles\r\nover its own feet, and has to change in order to exist at all, is a\r\nvery picturesque symbol of the reality, and is probably one of the\r\npoints that make young readers feel as if a deep core of truth lay in\r\nthe system.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut how is the reasoning done? Pure being is assumed, without\r\ndeterminations, being \u003cI\u003esecundum quid\u003c/I\u003e. In this respect it agrees with\r\nnothing. Therefore \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e it is nothing; wherever we find it,\r\nit is nothing; crowned with complete determinations then, or \u003cI\u003esecundum\r\naliud\u003c/I\u003e, it is nothing still, and \u003cI\u003ehebt sich auf\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is as if we said, Man without his clothes may be named \u0027the naked.\u0027\r\nTherefore man \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e is the naked; and finally man with his hat,\r\nshoes, and overcoat on is the naked still.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOf course we may in this instance or any other repeat that the\r\nconclusion is strictly true, however comical it seems. Man within the\r\nclothes is naked, just as he is without them. Man would never have\r\ninvented the clothes had he not been naked. The fact of his being clad\r\nat all does prove his essential nudity. And so in general,\u0026mdash;the form\r\nof any judgment, being the addition of a predicate to a subject, shows\r\nthat the subject has been conceived without the predicate, and thus by\r\na strained metaphor may\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P282\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e282}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nbe called the predicate\u0027s negation. Well\r\nand good! let the expression pass. But we must notice this. The\r\njudgment has now created a new subject, the naked-clad, and all\r\npropositions regarding this must be judged on their own merits; for\r\nthose true of the old subject, \u0027the naked,\u0027 are no longer true of this\r\none. For instance, we cannot say because the naked pure and simple\r\nmust not enter the drawing-room or is in danger of taking cold, that\r\nthe naked with his clothes on will also take cold or must stay in his\r\nbedroom. Hold to it eternally that the clad man \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e still naked if it\r\namuse you,\u0026mdash;\u0027tis designated in the bond; but the so-called\r\ncontradiction is a sterile boon. Like Shylock\u0027s pound of flesh, it\r\nleads to no consequences. It does not entitle you to one drop of his\r\nChristian blood either in the way of catarrh, social exclusion, or what\r\nfurther results pure nakedness may involve.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn a version of the first step given by our foremost American\r\nHegelian,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn4text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] we find this playing with the necessary form of judgment.\r\nPure being, he says, has no determinations. But the having none is\r\nitself a determination. Wherefore pure being contradicts its own self,\r\nand so on. Why not take heed to the \u003cI\u003emeaning\u003c/I\u003e of what is said? When\r\nwe make the predication concerning pure being, our meaning is merely\r\nthe denial of all other determinations than the particular one we make.\r\nThe showman who advertised his elephant as \u0027larger than any elephant in\r\nthe world except himself\u0027 must have been in an hegelian country where\r\nhe was afraid that if he were less explicit the audience would\r\ndialectically proceed to say:\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P283\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e283}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\"This elephant, larger than any in\r\nthe world, involves a contradiction; for he himself is in the world,\r\nand so stands endowed with the virtue of being both larger and smaller\r\nthan himself,\u0026mdash;a perfect hegelian elephant, whose immanent\r\nself-contradictoriness can only be removed in a higher synthesis. Show\r\nus the higher synthesis! We don\u0027t care to see such a mere abstract\r\ncreature as your elephant.\" It may be (and it was indeed suggested in\r\nantiquity) that all things are of their own size by being both larger\r\nand smaller than themselves. But in the case of this elephant the\r\nscrupulous showman nipped such philosophizing and all its inconvenient\r\nconsequences in the bud, by explicitly intimating that larger than any\r\n\u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e elephant was all he meant.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHegel\u0027s quibble with this word \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e exemplifies the same fallacy.\r\nAll \u0027others,\u0027 as such, are according to him identical. That is,\r\n\u0027otherness,\u0027 which can only be predicated of a given thing \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e,\r\n\u003cI\u003esecundum quid\u003c/I\u003e (as other than \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e, etc.), is predicated \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nand made to identify the \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e in question with \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e, which is other only\r\n\u003cI\u003esecundum aliud\u003c/I\u003e,\u0026mdash;namely other than \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother maxim that Hegelism is never tired of repeating is that \"to\r\nknow a limit is already to be beyond it.\" \"Stone walls do not a prison\r\nmake, nor iron bars a cage.\" The inmate of the penitentiary shows by\r\nhis grumbling that he is still in the stage of abstraction and of\r\nseparative thought. The more keenly he thinks of the fun he might be\r\nhaving outside, the more deeply he ought to feel that the walls\r\nidentify him with it. They set him beyond them \u003cI\u003esecundum quid\u003c/I\u003e, in\r\nimagination, in longing, in despair; \u003cI\u003eargal\u003c/I\u003e they take him there\r\n\u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e and\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P284\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e284}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin every way,\u0026mdash;in flesh, in power, in deed.\r\nFoolish convict, to ignore his blessings!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother mode of stating his principle is this: \"To know the finite as\r\nsuch, is also to know the infinite.\" Expressed in this abstract shape,\r\nthe formula is as insignificant as it is unobjectionable. We can cap\r\nevery word with a negative particle, and the word \u003cI\u003efinished\u003c/I\u003e\r\nimmediately suggests the word \u003cI\u003eunfinished\u003c/I\u003e, and we know the two words\r\ntogether.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut it is an entirely different thing to take the knowledge of a\r\nconcrete case of ending, and to say that it virtually makes us\r\nacquainted with other concrete facts \u003cI\u003ein infinitum\u003c/I\u003e. For, in the first\r\nplace, the end may be an absolute one. The \u003cI\u003ematter\u003c/I\u003e of the universe,\r\nfor instance, is according to all appearances in finite amount; and if\r\nwe knew that we had counted the last bit of it, infinite knowledge in\r\nthat respect, so far from being given, would be impossible. With\r\nregard to \u003cI\u003espace\u003c/I\u003e, it is true that in drawing a bound we are aware of\r\nmore. But to treat this little fringe as the equal of infinite space\r\nis ridiculous. It resembles infinite space \u003cI\u003esecundum quid\u003c/I\u003e, or in but\r\none respect,\u0026mdash;its spatial quality. We believe it homogeneous with\r\nwhatever spaces may remain; but it would be fatuous to say, because one\r\ndollar in my pocket is homogeneous with all the dollars in the country,\r\nthat to have it is to have them. The further points of space are as\r\nnumerically distinct from the fringe as the dollars from the dollar,\r\nand not until we have actually intuited them can we be said to \u0027know\u0027\r\nthem \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e. The hegelian reply is that the \u003cI\u003equality\u003c/I\u003e of space\r\nconstitutes its only \u003cI\u003eworth\u003c/I\u003e; and that there is nothing true, good, or\r\nbeautiful to be known\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P285\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e285}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nin the spaces beyond which is not already\r\nknown in the fringe. This introduction of a eulogistic term into a\r\nmathematical question is original. The \u0027true\u0027 and the \u0027false\u0027 infinite\r\nare about as appropriate distinctions in a discussion of cognition as\r\nthe good and the naughty rain would be in a treatise on meteorology.\r\nBut when we grant that all the worth of the knowledge of distant spaces\r\nis due to the knowledge of what they may carry in them, it then appears\r\nmore than ever absurd to say that the knowledge of the fringe is an\r\nequivalent for the infinitude of the distant knowledge. The distant\r\nspaces even \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e are not yet yielded to our thinking; and if\r\nthey were yielded \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e, would not be yielded \u003cI\u003esecundum aliud\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nor in respect to their material filling out.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nShylock\u0027s bond was an omnipotent instrument compared with this\r\nknowledge of the finite, which remains the ignorance it always was,\r\ntill the infinite by its own act has piece by piece placed itself in\r\nour hands.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere Hegelism cries out: \"By the identity of the knowledges of infinite\r\nand finite I never meant that one could be a \u003cI\u003esubstitute\u003c/I\u003e for the\r\nother; nor does true philosophy ever mean by identity capacity for\r\nsubstitution.\" This sounds suspiciously like the good and the naughty\r\ninfinite, or rather like the mysteries of the Trinity and the\r\nEucharist. To the unsentimental mind there are but two sorts of\r\nidentity,\u0026mdash;total identity and partial identity. Where the identity is\r\ntotal, the things can be substituted wholly for one another. Where\r\nsubstitution is impossible, it must be that the identity is incomplete.\r\nIt is the duty of the student then to ascertain the exact \u003cI\u003equid,\r\nsecundum\u003c/I\u003e which it obtains, as we have tried to do above. Even the\r\nCatholic will tell you that when he believes in the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P286\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e286}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nidentity of\r\nthe wafer with Christ\u0027s body, he does not mean in all respects,\u0026mdash;so\r\nthat he might use it to exhibit muscular fibre, or a cook make it smell\r\nlike baked meat in the oven. He means that in the one sole respect of\r\nnourishing his being in a certain way, it is identical with and can be\r\nsubstituted for the very body of his Redeemer.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\u0027The knowledge of opposites is one,\u0027 is one of the hegelian first\r\nprinciples, of which the preceding are perhaps only derivatives. Here\r\nagain Hegelism takes \u0027knowledge\u0027 \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e, and substituting it for\r\nknowledge in a particular respect, avails itself of the confusion to\r\ncover other respects never originally implied. When the knowledge of a\r\nthing is given us, we no doubt think that the thing may or must have an\r\nopposite. This postulate of something opposite we may call a\r\n\u0027knowledge of the opposite\u0027 if we like; but it is a knowledge of it in\r\nonly that one single respect, that it is something opposite. No number\r\nof opposites to a quality we have never directly experienced could ever\r\nlead us positively to infer what that quality is. There is a jolt\r\nbetween the negation of them and the actual positing of it in its\r\nproper shape, that twenty logics of Hegel harnessed abreast cannot\r\ndrive us smoothly over.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe use of the maxim \u0027All determination is negation\u0027 is the fattest and\r\nmost full-blown application of the method of refusing to distinguish.\r\nTaken in its vague confusion, it probably does more than anything else\r\nto produce the sort of flicker and dazzle which are the first mental\r\nconditions for the reception of Hegel\u0027s system. The word \u0027negation\u0027\r\ntaken \u003cI\u003esimpliciter\u003c/I\u003e is treated as if it covered an indefinite number of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P287\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e287}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003esecundums\u003c/I\u003e, culminating in the very peculiar one of\r\nself-negation. Whence finally the conclusion is drawn that assertions\r\nare universally self-contradictory. As this is an important matter, it\r\nseems worth while to treat it a little minutely.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen I measure out a pint, say of milk, and so determine it, what do I\r\ndo? I virtually make two assertions regarding it,\u0026mdash;it is this pint; it\r\nis not those other gallons. One of these is an affirmation, the other\r\na negation. Both have a common subject; but the predicates being\r\nmutually exclusive, the two assertions lie beside each other in endless\r\npeace.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI may with propriety be said to make assertions more remote\r\nstill,\u0026mdash;assertions of which those other gallons are the subject. As it\r\nis not they, so are they not the pint which it is. The determination\r\n\"this is the pint\" carries with it the negation,\u0026mdash;\"those are not the\r\npints.\" Here we have the same predicate; but the subjects are\r\nexclusive of each other, so there is again endless peace. In both\r\ncouples of propositions negation and affirmation are \u003cI\u003esecundum aliud\u003c/I\u003e:\r\nthis is \u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e; this is n\u0027t not-\u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e. This kind of negation involved in\r\ndetermination cannot possibly be what Hegel wants for his purposes.\r\nThe table is not the chair, the fireplace is not the cupboard,\u0026mdash;these\r\nare literal expressions of the law of identity and contradiction, those\r\nprinciples of the abstracting and separating understanding for which\r\nHegel has so sovereign a contempt, and which his logic is meant to\r\nsupersede.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd accordingly Hegelians pursue the subject further, saying there is\r\nin every determination an element of real conflict. Do you not in\r\ndetermining the milk to be this pint exclude it forever from the chance\r\nof being those gallons, frustrate it from\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P288\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e288}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nexpansion? And so do\r\nyou not equally exclude them from the being which it now maintains as\r\nits own?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAssuredly if you had been hearing of a land flowing with milk and\r\nhoney, and had gone there with unlimited expectations of the rivers the\r\nmilk would fill; and if you found there was but this single pint in the\r\nwhole country,\u0026mdash;the determination of the pint would exclude another\r\ndetermination which your mind had previously made of the milk. There\r\nwould be a real conflict resulting in the victory of one side. The\r\nrivers would be negated by the single pint being affirmed; and as\r\nrivers and pint are affirmed of the same milk (first as supposed and\r\nthen as found), the contradiction would be complete.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut it is a contradiction that can never by any chance occur in real\r\nnature or being. It can only occur between a false representation of a\r\nbeing and the true idea of the being when actually cognized. The first\r\ngot into a place where it had no rights and had to be ousted. But in\r\n\u003cI\u003ererum naturâ\u003c/I\u003e things do not get into one another\u0027s logical places.\r\nThe gallons first spoken of never say, \"We are the pint;\" the pint\r\nnever says, \"I am the gallons.\" It never tries to expand; and so there\r\nis no chance for anything to exclude or negate it. It thus remains\r\naffirmed absolutely.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCan it be believed in the teeth of these elementary truths that the\r\nprinciple \u003cI\u003edeterminatio negatio\u003c/I\u003e is held throughout Hegel to imply an\r\nactive contradiction, conflict, and exclusion? Do the horse-cars\r\njingling outside negate me writing in this room? Do I, reader, negate\r\nyou? Of course, if I say, \"Reader, we are two, and therefore I am\r\ntwo,\" I negate you, for I am actually thrusting a part into the seat of\r\nthe whole.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P289\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e289}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nThe orthodox logic expresses the fallacy by saying\r\nthe we is taken by me distributively instead of collectively; but as\r\nlong as I do not make this blunder, and am content with my part, we all\r\nare safe. In \u003cI\u003ererum naturâ\u003c/I\u003e, parts remain parts. Can you imagine one\r\nposition in space trying to get into the place of another position and\r\nhaving to be \u0027contradicted\u0027 by that other? Can you imagine your\r\nthought of an object trying to dispossess the real object from its\r\nbeing, and so being negated by it? The great, the sacred law of\r\npartaking, the noiseless step of continuity, seems something that Hegel\r\ncannot possibly understand. All or nothing is his one idea. For him\r\neach point of space, of time, each feeling in the ego, each quality of\r\nbeing, is clamoring, \"I am the all,\u0026mdash;there is nought else but me.\"\r\nThis clamor is its essence, which has to be negated in another act\r\nwhich gives it its true determination. What there is of affirmative in\r\nthis determination is thus the mere residuum left from the negation by\r\nothers of the negation it originally applied to them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut why talk of residuum? The Kilkenny cats of fable could leave a\r\nresiduum in the shape of their undevoured tails. But the Kilkenny cats\r\nof existence as it appears in the pages of Hegel are all-devouring, and\r\nleave no residuum. Such is the unexampled fury of their onslaught that\r\nthey get clean out of themselves and into each other, nay more, pass\r\nright through each other, and then \"return into themselves\" ready for\r\nanother round, as insatiate, but as inconclusive, as the one that went\r\nbefore.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf I characterized Hegel\u0027s own mood as \u003cI\u003ehubris\u003c/I\u003e, the insolence of\r\nexcess, what shall I say of the mood he ascribes to being? Man makes\r\nthe gods in his\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P290\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e290}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nimage; and Hegel, in daring to insult the\r\nspotless \u003cI\u003esôphrosune\u003c/I\u003e of space and time, the bound-respecters, in\r\nbranding as strife that law of sharing under whose sacred keeping, like\r\na strain of music, like an odor of incense (as Emerson says), the dance\r\nof the atoms goes forward still, seems to me but to manifest his own\r\ndeformity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis leads me to animadvert on an erroneous inference which hegelian\r\nidealism makes from the form of the negative judgment. Every negation,\r\nit says, must be an intellectual act. Even the most \u003cI\u003enaïf\u003c/I\u003e realism\r\nwill hardly pretend that the non-table as such exists \u003cI\u003ein se\u003c/I\u003e after the\r\nsame fashion as the table does. But table and non-table, since they\r\nare given to our thought together, must be consubstantial. Try to make\r\nthe position or affirmation of the table as simple as you can, it is\r\nalso the negation of the non-table; and thus positive being itself\r\nseems after all but a function of intelligence, like negation.\r\nIdealism is proved, realism is unthinkable. Now I have not myself the\r\nleast objection to idealism,\u0026mdash;an hypothesis which voluminous\r\nconsiderations make plausible, and whose difficulties may be cleared\r\naway any day by new discriminations or discoveries. But I object to\r\nproving by these patent ready-made \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e methods that which can\r\nonly be the fruit of a wide and patient induction. For the truth is\r\nthat our affirmations and negations do not stand on the same footing at\r\nall, and are anything but consubstantial. An affirmation says\r\nsomething about an objective existence. A negation says something\r\n\u003cI\u003eabout an affirmation\u003c/I\u003e,\u0026mdash;namely, that it is false. There are no\r\nnegative predicates or falsities in nature. Being makes no false\r\nhypotheses that have\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P291\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e291}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nto be contradicted. The only denials she\r\ncan be in any way construed to perform are denials of our errors. This\r\nshows plainly enough that denial must be of something mental, since the\r\nthing denied is always a fiction. \"The table is not the chair\"\r\nsupposes the speaker to have been playing with the false notion that it\r\nmay have been the chair. But affirmation may perfectly well be of\r\nsomething having no such necessary and constitutive relation to\r\nthought. Whether it really is of such a thing is for harder\r\nconsiderations to decide.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf idealism be true, the great question that presents itself is whether\r\nits truth involve the necessity of an infinite, unitary, and omniscient\r\nconsciousness, or whether a republic of semi-detached consciousnesses\r\nwill do,\u0026mdash;consciousnesses united by a certain common fund of\r\nrepresentations, but each possessing a private store which the others\r\ndo not share. Either hypothesis is to me conceivable. But whether the\r\negos be one or many, the \u003cI\u003enextness\u003c/I\u003e of representations to one another\r\nwithin them is the principle of unification of the universe. To be\r\nthus consciously next to some other representation is the condition to\r\nwhich each representation must submit, under penalty of being excluded\r\nfrom this universe, and like Lord Dundreary\u0027s bird \u0027flocking all\r\nalone,\u0027 and forming a separate universe by itself. But this is only a\r\ncondition of which the representations \u003cI\u003epartake\u003c/I\u003e; it leaves all their\r\nother determinations undecided. To say, because representation \u003cI\u003eb\u003c/I\u003e\r\ncannot be in the same universe with \u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e without being \u003cI\u003ea\u0027s neighbor\u003c/I\u003e;\r\nthat therefore \u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e possesses, involves, or necessitates \u003cI\u003eb\u003c/I\u003e, hide and\r\nhair, flesh and fell, all appurtenances and belongings,\u0026mdash;is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P292\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e292}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nonly\r\nthe silly hegelian all-or-nothing insatiateness once more.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHegel\u0027s own logic, with all the senseless hocus-pocus of its triads,\r\nutterly fails to prove his position. The only evident compulsion which\r\nrepresentations exert upon one another is compulsion to submit to the\r\nconditions of entrance into the same universe with them\u0026mdash;the conditions\r\nof continuity, of selfhood, space, and time\u0026mdash;under penalty of being\r\nexcluded. But what this universe shall be is a matter of fact which we\r\ncannot decide till we know what representations \u003cI\u003ehave\u003c/I\u003e submitted to\r\nthese its sole conditions. The conditions themselves impose no further\r\nrequirements. In short, the notion that real contingency and ambiguity\r\nmay be features of the real world is a perfectly unimpeachable\r\nhypothesis. Only in such a world can moral judgments have a claim to\r\nbe. For the bad is that which takes the place of something else which\r\npossibly might have been where it now is, and the better is that which\r\nabsolutely might be where it absolutely is not. In the universe of\r\nHegel\u0026mdash;the absolute block whose parts have no loose play, the pure\r\nplethora of necessary being with the oxygen of possibility all\r\nsuffocated out of its lungs\u0026mdash;there can be neither good nor bad, but one\r\ndead level of mere fate.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut I have tired the reader out. The worst of criticising Hegel is\r\nthat the very arguments we use against him give forth strange and\r\nhollow sounds that make them seem almost as fantastic as the errors to\r\nwhich they are addressed. The sense of a universal mirage, of a\r\nghostly unreality, steals over us, which is the very moonlit atmosphere\r\nof Hegelism itself. What wonder then if, instead of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P293\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e293}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nconverting,\r\nour words do but rejoice and delight, those already baptized in the\r\nfaith of confusion? To their charmed senses we all seem children of\r\nHegel together, only some of us have not the wit to know our own\r\nfather. Just as Romanists are sure to inform us that our reasons\r\nagainst Papal Christianity unconsciously breathe the purest spirit of\r\nCatholicism, so Hegelism benignantly smiles at our exertions, and\r\nmurmurs, \"If the red slayer think he slays;\" \"When me they fly, I am\r\nthe wings,\" etc.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo forefend this unwelcome adoption, let me recapitulate in a few\r\npropositions the reasons why I am not an hegelian.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n1. We cannot eat our cake and have it; that is, the only real\r\ncontradiction there can be between thoughts is where one is true, the\r\nother false. When this happens, one must go forever; nor is there any\r\n\u0027higher synthesis\u0027 in which both can wholly revive.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n2. A chasm is not a bridge in any utilizable sense; that is, no mere\r\nnegation can be the instrument of a positive advance in thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n3. The continua, time, space, and the ego, are bridges, because they\r\nare without chasm.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n4. But they bridge over the chasms between represented qualities only\r\npartially.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n5. This partial bridging, however, makes the qualities share in a\r\ncommon world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n6. The other characteristics of the qualities are separate facts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n7. But the same quality appears in many times and spaces. Generic\r\nsameness of the quality wherever found becomes thus a further means by\r\nwhich the jolts are reduced.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n8. What between different qualities jolts remain.\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P294\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e294}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nEach, as far\r\nas the other is concerned, is an absolutely separate and contingent\r\nbeing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n9. The moral judgment may lead us to postulate as irreducible the\r\ncontingencies of the world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n10. Elements mutually contingent are not in conflict so long as they\r\npartake of the continua of time, space, etc.,\u0026mdash;partaking being the\r\nexact opposite of strife. They conflict only when, as mutually\r\nexclusive possibilities, they strive to possess themselves of the same\r\nparts of time, space, and ego.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n11. That there are such real conflicts, irreducible to any\r\nintelligence, and giving rise to an excess of possibility over\r\nactuality, is an hypothesis, but a credible one. No philosophy should\r\npretend to be anything more.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNOTE.\u0026mdash;Since the preceding article was written, some observations on\r\nthe effects of nitrous-oxide-gas-intoxication which I was prompted to\r\nmake by reading the pamphlet called The Anaesthetic Revelation and the\r\nGist of Philosophy, by Benjamin Paul Blood, Amsterdam, N. Y., 1874,\r\nhave made me understand better than ever before both the strength and\r\nthe weakness of Hegel\u0027s philosophy. I strongly urge others to repeat\r\nthe experiment, which with pure gas is short and harmless enough. The\r\neffects will of course vary with the individual. Just as they vary in\r\nthe same individual from time to time; but it is probable that in the\r\nformer case, as in the latter, a generic resemblance will obtain. With\r\nme, as with every other person of whom I have heard, the keynote of the\r\nexperience is the tremendously exciting sense of an intense\r\nmetaphysical illumination. Truth lies open to the view in depth\r\nbeneath depth of almost blinding evidence. The mind sees all the\r\nlogical relations of being with an apparent subtlety and instantaneity\r\nto which its normal consciousness offers no parallel; only as sobriety\r\nreturns, the feeling of insight fades, and one is left staring vacantly\r\nat a few disjointed words and phrases, as one stares at a\r\ncadaverous-looking snow-peak from which the sunset glow has just fled,\r\nor at the black cinder left by an extinguished brand.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P295\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e295}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe immense emotional sense of \u003cI\u003ereconciliation\u003c/I\u003e which characterizes the\r\n\u0027maudlin\u0027 stage of alcoholic drunkenness,\u0026mdash;a stage which seems silly to\r\nlookers-on, but the subjective rapture of which probably constitutes a\r\nchief part of the temptation to the vice,\u0026mdash;is well known. The centre\r\nand periphery of things seem to come together. The ego and its\r\nobjects, the \u003cI\u003emeum\u003c/I\u003e and the \u003cI\u003etuum\u003c/I\u003e, are one. Now this, only a\r\nthousandfold enhanced, was the effect upon me of the gas: and its first\r\nresult was to make peal through me with unutterable power the\r\nconviction that Hegelism was true after all, and that the deepest\r\nconvictions of my intellect hitherto were wrong. Whatever idea or\r\nrepresentation occurred to the mind was seized by the same logical\r\nforceps, and served to illustrate the same truth; and that truth was\r\nthat every opposition, among whatsoever things, vanishes in a higher\r\nunity in which it is based; that all contradictions, so-called, are but\r\ndifferences; that all differences are of degree; that all degrees are\r\nof a common kind; that unbroken continuity is of the essence of being;\r\nand that we are literally in the midst of \u003cI\u003ean infinite\u003c/I\u003e, to perceive\r\nthe existence of which is the utmost we can attain. Without the \u003cI\u003esame\u003c/I\u003e\r\nas a basis, how could strife occur? Strife presupposes something to be\r\nstriven about; and in this common topic, the same for both parties, the\r\ndifferences merge. From the hardest contradiction to the tenderest\r\ndiversity of verbiage differences evaporate; \u003cI\u003eyes\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eno\u003c/I\u003e agree at\r\nleast in being assertions; a denial of a statement is but another mode\r\nof stating the same, contradiction can only occur of the same\r\nthing,\u0026mdash;all opinions are thus synonyms, are synonymous, are the same.\r\nBut the same phrase by difference of emphasis is two; and here again\r\ndifference and no-difference merge in one.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is impossible to convey an idea of the torrential character of the\r\nidentification of opposites as it streams through the mind in this\r\nexperience. I have sheet after sheet of phrases dictated or written\r\nduring the intoxication, which to the sober reader seem meaningless\r\ndrivel, but which at the moment of transcribing were fused in the fire\r\nof infinite rationality. God and devil, good and evil, life and death,\r\nI and thou, sober and drunk, matter and form, black and white, quantity\r\nand quality, shiver of ecstasy and shudder of horror, vomiting and\r\nswallowing, inspiration and expiration, fate and reason, great and\r\nsmall, extent and intent, joke and earnest, tragic and comic, and fifty\r\nother\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P296\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e296}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncontrasts figure in these pages in the same monotonous way.\r\nThe mind saw how each term \u003cI\u003ebelonged\u003c/I\u003e to its contrast through a\r\nknife-edge moment of transition which \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e effected, and which,\r\nperennial and eternal, was the \u003cI\u003enunc stans\u003c/I\u003e of life. The thought of\r\nmutual implication of the parts in the bare form of a judgment of\r\nopposition, as \u0027nothing\u0026mdash;but,\u0027 \u0027no more\u0026mdash;than,\u0027 \u0027only\u0026mdash;if,\u0027 etc.,\r\nproduced a perfect delirium of theoretic rapture. And at last, when\r\ndefinite ideas to work on came slowly, the mind went through the mere\r\n\u003cI\u003eform\u003c/I\u003e of recognizing sameness in identity by contrasting the same word\r\nwith itself, differently emphasized, or shorn of its initial letter.\r\nLet me transcribe a few sentences:\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nWhat\u0027s mistake but a kind of take?\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhat\u0027s nausea but a kind of -ausea?\u003cBR\u003e\r\nSober, drunk, -\u003cI\u003eunk\u003c/I\u003e, astonishment.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nEverything can become the subject of criticism\u0026mdash;how\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003ecriticise without something \u003cI\u003eto\u003c/I\u003e criticise?\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAgreement\u0026mdash;disagreement!!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nEmotion\u0026mdash;motion!!!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nDie away from, \u003cI\u003efrom\u003c/I\u003e, die away (without the \u003cI\u003efrom\u003c/I\u003e).\u003cBR\u003e\r\nReconciliation of opposites; sober, drunk, all the same!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nGood and evil reconciled in a laugh!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nIt escapes, it escapes!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nBut\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWhat escapes, WHAT escapes?\u003cBR\u003e\r\nEmphasis, EMphasis; there must be some emphasis in order\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003efor there to be a phasis.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNo verbiage can give it, because the verbiage is \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cI\u003eIn\u003c/I\u003ecoherent, coherent\u0026mdash;same.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nAnd it fades! And it\u0027s infinite! AND it\u0027s infinite!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nIf it was n\u0027t \u003cI\u003egoing\u003c/I\u003e, why should you hold on to it?\u003cBR\u003e\r\nDon\u0027t you see the difference, don\u0027t you see the identity?\u003cBR\u003e\r\nConstantly opposites united!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThe same me telling you to write and not to write!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nExtreme\u0026mdash;extreme, extreme! Within the \u003cI\u003eex\u003c/I\u003etensity that\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u0027extreme\u0027 contains is contained the \u0027\u003cI\u003eextreme\u003c/I\u003e\u0027 of intensity.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nSomething, and \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e than that thing!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nIntoxication, and \u003cI\u003eotherness\u003c/I\u003e than intoxication.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nEvery attempt at betterment,\u0026mdash;every attempt at otherment,\u0026mdash;is a\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nIt fades forever and forever as we move.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P297\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e297}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nThere \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e a reconciliation!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nReconciliation\u0026mdash;\u003cI\u003ee\u003c/I\u003econciliation!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nBy God, how that hurts! By God, how it \u003cI\u003edoes n\u0027t\u003c/I\u003e hurt!\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003eReconciliation of two extremes.\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\nBy George, nothing but \u003cI\u003eo\u003c/I\u003ething!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThat sounds like nonsense, but it is pure \u003cI\u003eon\u003c/I\u003esense!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nThought deeper than speech\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;!\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMedical school; divinity school, \u003cI\u003eschool\u003c/I\u003e! SCHOOL! Oh my\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cSPAN STYLE=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003eGod, oh God, oh God!\u003c/SPAN\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe most coherent and articulate sentence which came was this:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere are no differences but differences of degree between different\r\ndegrees of difference and no difference.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis phrase has the true Hegelian ring, being in fact a regular \u003cI\u003esich\r\nals sich auf sich selbst beziehende Negativität\u003c/I\u003e. And true Hegelians\r\nwill \u003cI\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/I\u003e be able to read between the lines and feel, at any\r\nrate, what \u003cI\u003epossible\u003c/I\u003e ecstasies of cognitive emotion might have bathed\r\nthese tattered fragments of thought when they were alive. But for the\r\nassurance of a certain amount of respect from them, I should hardly\r\nhave ventured to print what must be such caviare to the general.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut now comes the reverse of the medal. What is the principle of unity\r\nin all this monotonous rain of instances? Although I did not see it at\r\nfirst, I soon found that it was in each case nothing but the abstract\r\n\u003cI\u003egenus\u003c/I\u003e of which the conflicting terms were opposite species. In other\r\nwords, although the flood of ontologic \u003cI\u003eemotion\u003c/I\u003e was Hegelian through\r\nand through, the \u003cI\u003eground\u003c/I\u003e for it was nothing but the world-old\r\nprinciple that things are the same only so far and no farther than they\r\n\u003cI\u003eare\u003c/I\u003e the same, or partake of a common nature,\u0026mdash;the principle that\r\nHegel most tramples under foot. At the same time the rapture of\r\nbeholding a process that was infinite, changed (as the nature of the\r\ninfinitude was realized by the mind) into the sense of a dreadful and\r\nineluctable fate, with whose magnitude every finite effort is\r\nincommensurable and in the light of which whatever happens is\r\nindifferent. This instantaneous revulsion of mood from rapture to\r\nhorror is, perhaps, the strongest emotion I have ever experienced. I\r\ngot it repeatedly when the inhalation was continued long enough to\r\nproduce incipient nausea; and I cannot but regard it as the normal and\r\ninevitable outcome of the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P298\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e298}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nintoxication, if sufficiently\r\nprolonged. A pessimistic fatalism, depth within depth of impotence and\r\nindifference, reason and silliness united, not in a higher synthesis,\r\nbut in the fact that whichever you choose it is all one,\u0026mdash;this is the\r\nupshot of a revelation that began so rosy bright.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEven when the process stops short of this ultimatum, the reader will\r\nhave noticed from the phrases quoted how often it ends by losing the\r\nclue. Something \u0027fades,\u0027 \u0027escapes;\u0027 and the feeling of insight is\r\nchanged into an intense one of bewilderment, puzzle, confusion,\r\nastonishment. I know no more singular sensation than this intense\r\nbewilderment, with nothing particular left to be bewildered at save the\r\nbewilderment itself. It seems, indeed, \u003cI\u003ea causa sui\u003c/I\u003e, or \u0027spirit\r\nbecome its own object.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMy conclusion is that the togetherness of things in a common world, the\r\nlaw of sharing, of which I have said so much, may, when perceived,\r\nengender a very powerful emotion, that Hegel was so unusually\r\nsusceptible to this emotion throughout his life that its gratification\r\nbecame his supreme end, and made him tolerably unscrupulous as to the\r\nmeans he employed; that \u003cI\u003eindifferentism\u003c/I\u003e is the true outcome of every\r\nview of the world which makes infinity and continuity to be its\r\nessence, and that pessimistic or optimistic attitudes pertain to the\r\nmere accidental subjectivity of the moment; finally, that the\r\nidentification of contradictories, so far from being the\r\nself-developing process which Hegel supposes, is really a\r\nself-consuming process, passing from the less to the more abstract, and\r\nterminating either in a laugh at the ultimate nothingness, or in a mood\r\nof vertiginous amazement at a meaningless infinity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch09fn4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] Reprinted from Mind, April, 1882.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] The seeming contradiction between the infinitude of space and the\r\nfact that it is all finished and given and there, can be got over in\r\nmore than one way. The simplest way is by idealism, which\r\ndistinguishes between space as actual and space as potential. For\r\nidealism, space only exists so far as it is represented; but all\r\nactually represented spaces are finite; it is only possibly\r\nrepresentable spaces that are infinite.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn3text\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e] Not only for simplicity\u0027s sake do we select space as the paragon of\r\na rationalizing continuum. Space determines the relations of the items\r\nthat enter it in a far more intricate way than does time; in a far more\r\nfixed way than does the ego. By this last clause I mean that if things\r\nare in space at all, they must conform to geometry; while the being in\r\nan ego at all need not make them conform to logic or any other manner\r\nof rationality. Under the sheltering wings of a self the matter of\r\nunreason can lodge itself as safely as any other kind of content. One\r\ncannot but respect the devoutness of the ego-worship of some of our\r\nEnglish-writing Hegelians. But at the same time one cannot help\r\nfearing lest the monotonous contemplation of so barren a principle as\r\nthat of the pure formal self (which, be it never so essential a\r\ncondition of the existence of a world of organized experience at all,\r\nmust notwithstanding take its own \u003cI\u003echaracter\u003c/I\u003e from, not give the\r\ncharacter to, the separate empirical data over which its mantle is\r\ncast), one cannot but fear, I say, lest the religion of the\r\ntranscendental ego should, like all religions of the \u0027one thing\r\nneedful,\u0027 end by sterilizing and occluding the minds of its believers.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch09fn4text\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e] Journal of Speculative Philosophy, viii. 37.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P299\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e299}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nWHAT PSYCHICAL RESEARCH HAS ACCOMPLISHED.[\u003cA NAME=\"ch10fn1text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch10fn1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e]\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"The great field for new discoveries,\" said a scientific friend to me\r\nthe other day, \"is always the unclassified residuum.\" Round about the\r\naccredited and orderly facts of every science there ever floats a sort\r\nof dust-cloud of exceptional observations, of occurrences minute and\r\nirregular and seldom met with, which it always proves more easy to\r\nignore than to attend to. The ideal of every science is that of a\r\nclosed and completed system of truth. The charm of most sciences to\r\ntheir more passive disciples consists in their appearing, in fact, to\r\nwear just this ideal form. Each one of our various \u003cI\u003eologies\u003c/I\u003e seems to\r\noffer a definite head of classification for every possible phenomenon\r\nof the sort which it professes to cover; and so far from free is most\r\nmen\u0027s fancy, that, when a consistent and organized scheme of this sort\r\nhas once been comprehended and assimilated, a different scheme is\r\nunimaginable. No alternative, whether to whole or parts, can any\r\nlonger be conceived as possible. Phenomena unclassifiable within the\r\nsystem are therefore paradoxical\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P300\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e300}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nabsurdities, and must be held\r\nuntrue. When, moreover, as so often happens, the reports of them are\r\nvague and indirect; when they come as mere marvels and oddities rather\r\nthan as things of serious moment,\u0026mdash;one neglects or denies them with the\r\nbest of scientific consciences. Only the born geniuses let themselves\r\nbe worried and fascinated by these outstanding exceptions, and get no\r\npeace till they are brought within the fold. Your Galileos, Galvanis,\r\nFresnels, Purkinjes, and Darwins are always getting confounded and\r\ntroubled by insignificant things. Any one will renovate his science\r\nwho will steadily look after the irregular phenomena. And when the\r\nscience is renewed, its new formulas often have more of the voice of\r\nthe exceptions in them than of what were supposed to be the rules.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo part of the unclassified residuum has usually been treated with a\r\nmore contemptuous scientific disregard than the mass of phenomena\r\ngenerally called \u003cI\u003emystical\u003c/I\u003e. Physiology will have nothing to do with\r\nthem. Orthodox psychology turns its back upon them. Medicine sweeps\r\nthem out; or, at most, when in an anecdotal vein, records a few of them\r\nas \u0027effects of the imagination,\u0027\u0026mdash;a phrase of mere dismissal, whose\r\nmeaning, in this connection, it is impossible to make precise. All the\r\nwhile, however, the phenomena are there, lying broadcast over the\r\nsurface of history. No matter where you open its pages, you find\r\nthings recorded under the name of divinations, inspirations, demoniacal\r\npossessions, apparitions, trances, ecstasies, miraculous healings and\r\nproductions of disease, and occult powers possessed by peculiar\r\nindividuals over persons and things in their neighborhood. We suppose\r\nthat \u0027mediumship\u0027\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P301\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e301}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\noriginated in Rochester, N. Y., and animal\r\nmagnetism with Mesmer; but once look behind the pages of official\r\nhistory, in personal memoirs, legal documents, and popular narratives\r\nand books of anecdote, and you will find that there never was a time\r\nwhen these things were not reported just as abundantly as now. We\r\ncollege-bred gentry, who follow the stream of cosmopolitan culture\r\nexclusively, not infrequently stumble upon some old-established\r\njournal, or some voluminous native author, whose names are never heard\r\nof in \u003cI\u003eour\u003c/I\u003e circle, but who number their readers by the\r\nquarter-million. It always gives us a little shock to find this mass\r\nof human beings not only living and ignoring us and all our gods, but\r\nactually reading and writing and cogitating without ever a thought of\r\nour canons and authorities. Well, a public no less large keeps and\r\ntransmits from generation to generation the traditions and practices of\r\nthe occult; but academic science cares as little for its beliefs and\r\nopinions as you, gentle reader, care for those of the readers of the\r\nWaverley and the Fireside Companion. To no one type of mind is it\r\ngiven to discern the totality of truth. Something escapes the best of\r\nus,\u0026mdash;not accidentally, but systematically, and because we have a twist.\r\nThe scientific-academic mind and the feminine-mystical mind shy from\r\neach other\u0027s facts, just as they fly from each other\u0027s temper and\r\nspirit. Facts are there only for those who have a mental affinity with\r\nthem. When once they are indisputably ascertained and admitted, the\r\nacademic and critical minds are by far the best fitted ones to\r\ninterpret and discuss them,\u0026mdash;for surely to pass from mystical to\r\nscientific speculations is like passing from lunacy to sanity; but on\r\nthe other hand if there is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P302\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e302}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nanything which human history\r\ndemonstrates, it is the extreme slowness with which the ordinary\r\nacademic and critical mind acknowledges facts to exist which present\r\nthemselves as wild facts, with no stall or pigeon-hole, or as facts\r\nwhich threaten to break up the accepted system. In psychology,\r\nphysiology, and medicine, wherever a debate between the mystics and the\r\nscientifics has been once for all decided, it is the mystics who have\r\nusually proved to be right about the \u003cI\u003efacts\u003c/I\u003e, while the scientifics had\r\nthe better of it in respect to the theories. The most recent and\r\nflagrant example of this is \u0027animal magnetism,\u0027 whose facts were\r\nstoutly dismissed as a pack of lies by academic medical science the\r\nworld over, until the non-mystical theory of \u0027hypnotic suggestion\u0027 was\r\nfound for them,\u0026mdash;when they were admitted to be so excessively and\r\ndangerously common that special penal laws, forsooth, must be passed to\r\nkeep all persons unequipped with medical diplomas from taking part in\r\ntheir production. Just so stigmatizations, invulnerabilities,\r\ninstantaneous cures, inspired discourses, and demoniacal possessions,\r\nthe records of which were shelved in our libraries but yesterday in the\r\nalcove headed \u0027superstitions,\u0027 now, under the brand-new title of \u0027cases\r\nof hystero-epilepsy,\u0027 are republished, reobserved, and reported with an\r\neven too credulous avidity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nRepugnant as the mystical style of philosophizing maybe (especially\r\nwhen self-complacent), there is no sort of doubt that it goes with a\r\ngift for meeting with certain kinds of phenomenal experience. The\r\nwriter of these pages has been forced in the past few years to this\r\nadmission; and he now believes that he who will pay attention to facts\r\nof the sort dear to mystics,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P303\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e303}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwhile reflecting upon them in\r\nacademic-scientific ways, will be in the best possible position to help\r\nphilosophy. It is a circumstance of good augury that certain\r\nscientifically trained minds in all countries seem drifting to the same\r\nconclusion. The Society for Psychical Research has been one means of\r\nbringing science and the occult together in England and America; and\r\nbelieving that this Society fulfils a function which, though limited,\r\nis destined to be not unimportant in the organization of human\r\nknowledge, I am glad to give a brief account of it to the uninstructed\r\nreader.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAccording to the newspaper and drawing-room myth, soft-headedness and\r\nidiotic credulity are the bond of sympathy in this Society, and general\r\nwonder-sickness its dynamic principle. A glance at the membership\r\nfails, however, to corroborate this view. The president is Prof. Henry\r\nSidgwick,[\u003cA NAME=\"ch10fn2text\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#ch10fn2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] known by his other deeds as the most incorrigibly and\r\nexasperatingly critical and sceptical mind in England. The hard-headed\r\nArthur Balfour is one vice-president, and the hard-headed Prof. J. P.\r\nLangley, secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, is another. Such\r\nmen as Professor Lodge, the eminent English physicist, and Professor\r\nRichet, the eminent French physiologist, are among the most active\r\ncontributors to the Society\u0027s Proceedings; and through the catalogue of\r\nmembership are sprinkled names honored throughout the world for their\r\nscientific capacity. In fact, were I asked to point to a scientific\r\njournal where hard-headedness and never-sleeping suspicion of sources\r\nof error might be seen in their full bloom,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P304\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e304}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nI think I should have\r\nto fall back on the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.\r\nThe common run of papers, say on physiological subjects, which one\r\nfinds in other professional organs, are apt to show a far lower level\r\nof critical consciousness. Indeed, the rigorous canons of evidence\r\napplied a few years ago to testimony in the case of certain \u0027mediums\u0027\r\nled to the secession from the Society of a number of spiritualists.\r\nMessrs. Stainton Moses and A. R. Wallace, among others, thought that no\r\nexperiences based on mere eyesight could ever have a chance to be\r\nadmitted as true, if such an impossibly exacting standard of proof were\r\ninsisted on in every case.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe S. P. R., as I shall call it for convenience, was founded in 1882\r\nby a number of gentlemen, foremost among whom seem to have been\r\nProfessors Sidgwick, W. F. Barrett, and Balfour Stewart, and Messrs. R.\r\nH. Hutton, Hensleigh Wedgwood, Edmund Gurney, and F. W. H. Myers.\r\nTheir purpose was twofold,\u0026mdash;first, to carry on systematic\r\nexperimentation with hypnotic subjects, mediums, clairvoyants, and\r\nothers; and, secondly, to collect evidence concerning apparitions,\r\nhaunted houses, and similar phenomena which are incidentally reported,\r\nbut which, from their fugitive character, admit of no deliberate\r\ncontrol. Professor Sidgwick, in his introductory address, insisted\r\nthat the divided state of public opinion on all these matters was a\r\nscandal to science,\u0026mdash;absolute disdain on \u003cI\u003eà priori\u003c/I\u003e grounds\r\ncharacterizing what may be called professional opinion, while\r\nindiscriminate credulity was too often found among those who pretended\r\nto have a first-hand acquaintance with the facts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs a sort of weather bureau for accumulating\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P305\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e305}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nreports of such\r\nmeteoric phenomena as apparitions, the S. P. R. has done an immense\r\namount of work. As an experimenting body, it cannot be said to have\r\ncompletely fulfilled the hopes of its founders. The reasons for this\r\nlie in two circumstances: first, the clairvoyant and other subjects who\r\nwill allow themselves to be experimented upon are few and far between;\r\nand, secondly, work with them takes an immense amount of time, and has\r\nhad to be carried on at odd intervals by members engaged in other\r\npursuits. The Society has not yet been rich enough to control the\r\nundivided services of skilled experimenters in this difficult field.\r\nThe loss of the lamented Edmund Gurney, who more than any one else had\r\nleisure to devote, has been so far irreparable. But were there no\r\nexperimental work at all, and were the S. P. R. nothing but a\r\nweather-bureau for catching sporadic apparitions, etc., in their\r\nfreshness, I am disposed to think its function indispensable in the\r\nscientific organism. If any one of my readers, spurred by the thought\r\nthat so much smoke must needs betoken fire, has ever looked into the\r\nexisting literature of the supernatural for proof, he will know what I\r\nmean. This literature is enormous, but it is practically worthless for\r\nevidential purposes. Facts enough are cited, indeed; but the records\r\nof them are so fallible and imperfect that at most they lead to the\r\nopinion that it may be well to keep a window open upon that quarter in\r\none\u0027s mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the S. P. R.\u0027s Proceedings, on the contrary, a different law\r\nprevails. Quality, and not mere quantity, is what has been mainly kept\r\nin mind. The witnesses, where possible, have in every reported case\r\nbeen cross-examined personally, the collateral facts\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P306\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e306}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhave been\r\nlooked up, and the story appears with its precise coefficient of\r\nevidential worth stamped on it, so that all may know just what its\r\nweight as proof may be. Outside of these Proceedings, I know of no\r\nsystematic attempt to \u003cI\u003eweigh\u003c/I\u003e the evidence for the supernatural. This\r\nmakes the value of the volumes already published unique; and I firmly\r\nbelieve that as the years go on and the ground covered grows still\r\nwider, the Proceedings will more and more tend to supersede all other\r\nsources of information concerning phenomena traditionally deemed\r\noccult. Collections of this sort are usually best appreciated by the\r\nrising generation. The young anthropologists and psychologists who\r\nwill soon have full occupancy of the stage will feel how great a\r\nscientific scandal it has been to leave a great mass of human\r\nexperience to take its chances between vague tradition and credulity on\r\nthe one hand and dogmatic denial at long range on the other, with no\r\nbody of persons extant who are willing and competent to study the\r\nmatter with both patience and rigor. If the Society lives long enough\r\nfor the public to become familiar with its presence, so that any\r\napparition, or house or person infested with unaccountable noises or\r\ndisturbances of material objects, will as a matter of course be\r\nreported to its officers, we shall doubtless end by having a mass of\r\nfacts concrete enough to theorize upon. Its sustainers, therefore,\r\nshould accustom themselves to the idea that its first duty is simply to\r\nexist from year to year and perform this recording function well,\r\nthough no conclusive results of any sort emerge at first. All our\r\nlearned societies have begun in some such modest way.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut one cannot by mere outward organization make much progress in\r\nmatters scientific. Societies can\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P307\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e307}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nback men of genius, but can\r\nnever take their place. The contrast between the parent Society and\r\nthe American Branch illustrates this. In England, a little group of\r\nmen with enthusiasm and genius for the work supplied the nucleus; in\r\nthis country, Mr. Hodgson had to be imported from Europe before any\r\ntangible progress was made. What perhaps more than anything else has\r\nheld the Society together in England is Professor Sidgwick\u0027s\r\nextraordinary gift of inspiring confidence in diverse sorts of people.\r\nSuch tenacity of interest in the result and such absolute impartiality\r\nin discussing the evidence are not once in a century found in an\r\nindividual. His obstinate belief that there is something yet to be\r\nbrought to light communicates patience to the discouraged; his\r\nconstitutional inability to draw any precipitate conclusion reassures\r\nthose who are afraid of being dupes. Mrs. Sidgwick\u0026mdash;a sister, by the\r\nway, of the great Arthur Balfour\u0026mdash;is a worthy ally of her husband in\r\nthis matter, showing a similarly rare power of holding her judgment in\r\nsuspense, and a keenness of observation and capacity for experimenting\r\nwith human subjects which are rare in either sex.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe \u003cI\u003eworker\u003c/I\u003e of the Society, as originally constituted, was Edmund\r\nGurney. Gurney was a man of the rarest sympathies and gifts.\r\nAlthough, like Carlyle, he used to groan under the burden of his\r\nlabors, he yet exhibited a colossal power of dispatching business and\r\ngetting through drudgery of the most repulsive kind. His two thick\r\nvolumes on \u0027Phantasms of the Living,\u0027 collected and published in three\r\nyears, are a proof of this. Besides this, he had exquisite artistic\r\ninstincts, and his massive volume on \u0027The Power of Sound\u0027 was, when it\r\nappeared, the most important\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P308\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e308}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nwork on aesthetics in the English\r\nlanguage. He had also the tenderest heart and a mind of rare\r\nmetaphysical power, as his volumes of essays, \u0027Tertium Quid,\u0027 will\r\nprove to any reader. Mr. Frederic Myers, already well known as one of\r\nthe most brilliant of English essayists, is the \u003cI\u003eingenium praefervidum\u003c/I\u003e\r\nof the S. P. R. Of the value of Mr. Myers\u0027s theoretic writings I will\r\nsay a word later. Dr. Hodgson, the American secretary, is\r\ndistinguished by a balance of mind almost as rare in its way as\r\nSidgwick\u0027s. He is persuaded of the reality of many of the phenomena\r\ncalled spiritualistic, but he also has uncommon keenness in detecting\r\nerror; and it is impossible to say in advance whether it will give him\r\nmore satisfaction to confirm or to smash a given case offered to his\r\nexamination.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is now time to cast a brief look upon the actual contents of these\r\nProceedings. The first two years were largely taken up with\r\nexperiments in thought-transference. The earliest lot of these were\r\nmade with the daughters of a clergyman named Creery, and convinced\r\nMessrs. Balfour Stewart, Barrett, Myers, and Gurney that the girls had\r\nan inexplicable power of guessing names and objects thought of by other\r\npersons. Two years later, Mrs. Sidgwick and Mr. Gurney, recommencing\r\nexperiments with the same girls, detected them signalling to each\r\nother. It is true that for the most part the conditions of the earlier\r\nseries had excluded signalling, and it is also possible that the\r\ncheating may have grafted itself on what was originally a genuine\r\nphenomenon. Yet Gurney was wise in abandoning the entire series to the\r\nscepticism of the reader. Many critics of the S. P. R. seem out of all\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P309\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e309}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nits labors to have heard only of this case. But there are\r\nexperiments recorded with upwards of thirty other subjects. Three were\r\nexperimented upon at great length during the first two years: one was\r\nMr. G. A. Smith; the other two were young ladies in Liverpool in the\r\nemployment of Mr. Malcolm Guthrie.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is the opinion of all who took part in these latter experiments that\r\nsources of conscious and unconscious deception were sufficiently\r\nexcluded, and that the large percentage of correct reproductions by the\r\nsubjects of words, diagrams, and sensations occupying other persons\u0027\r\nconsciousness were entirely inexplicable as results of chance. The\r\nwitnesses of these performances were in fact all so satisfied of the\r\ngenuineness of the phenomena, that \u0027telepathy\u0027 has figured freely in\r\nthe papers of the Proceedings and in Gurney\u0027s book on Phantasms as a\r\n\u003cI\u003evera causa\u003c/I\u003e on which additional hypotheses might be built. No mere\r\nreader can be blamed, however, if he demand, for so revolutionary a\r\nbelief, a more overwhelming bulk of testimony than has yet been\r\nsupplied. Any day, of course, may bring in fresh experiments in\r\nsuccessful picture-guessing. But meanwhile, and lacking that, we can\r\nonly point out that the present data are strengthened in the flank, so\r\nto speak, by all observations that tend to corroborate the possibility\r\nof other kindred phenomena, such as telepathic impression,\r\nclairvoyance, or what is called \u0027test-mediumship.\u0027 The wider genus\r\nwill naturally cover the narrower species with its credit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nGurney\u0027s papers on hypnotism must be mentioned next. Some of them are\r\nless concerned with establishing new facts than with analyzing old\r\nones. But omitting these, we find that in the line of pure\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P310\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e310}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nobservation Gurney claims to have ascertained in more than one subject\r\nthe following phenomenon: The subject\u0027s hands are thrust through a\r\nblanket, which screens the operator from his eyes, and his mind is\r\nabsorbed in conversation with a third person. The operator meanwhile\r\npoints with his finger to one of the fingers of the subject, which\r\nfinger alone responds to this silent selection by becoming stiff or\r\nanaesthetic, as the case may be. The interpretation is difficult, but\r\nthe phenomenon, which I have myself witnessed, seems authentic.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother observation made by Gurney seems to prove the possibility of\r\nthe subject\u0027s mind being directly influenced by the operator\u0027s. The\r\nhypnotized subject responds, or fails to respond, to questions asked by\r\na third party according to the operator\u0027s silent permission or refusal.\r\nOf course, in these experiments all obvious sources of deception were\r\nexcluded. But Gurney\u0027s most important contribution to our knowledge of\r\nhypnotism was his series of experiments on the automatic writing of\r\nsubjects who had received post-hypnotic suggestions. For example, a\r\nsubject during trance is told that he will poke the fire in six minutes\r\nafter waking. On being waked he has no memory of the order, but while\r\nhe is engaged in conversation his hand is placed on a \u003cI\u003eplanchette\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nwhich immediately writes the sentence, \"P., you will poke the fire in\r\nsix minutes.\" Experiments like this, which were repeated in great\r\nvariety, seem to prove that below the upper consciousness the hypnotic\r\nconsciousness persists, engrossed with the suggestion and able to\r\nexpress itself through the involuntarily moving hand.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nGurney shares, therefore, with Janet and Binet, the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P311\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e311}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncredit of\r\ndemonstrating the simultaneous existence of two different strata of\r\nconsciousness, ignorant of each other, in the same person. The\r\n\u0027extra-consciousness,\u0027 as one may call it, can be kept on tap, as it\r\nwere, by the method of automatic writing. This discovery marks a new\r\nera in experimental psychology, and it is impossible to overrate its\r\nimportance. But Gurney\u0027s greatest piece of work is his laborious\r\n\u0027Phantasms of the Living.\u0027 As an example of the drudgery stowed away\r\nin the volumes, it may suffice to say that in looking up the proofs for\r\nthe alleged physical phenomena of witchcraft, Gurney reports a careful\r\nsearch through two hundred and sixty books on the subject, with the\r\nresult of finding no first-hand evidence recorded in the trials except\r\nthe confessions of the victims themselves; and these, of course, are\r\npresumptively due to either torture or hallucination. This statement,\r\nmade in an unobtrusive note, is only one instance of the care displayed\r\nthroughout the volumes. In the course of these, Gurney discusses about\r\nseven hundred cases of apparitions which he collected. A large number\r\nof these were \u0027veridical,\u0027 in the sense of coinciding with some\r\ncalamity happening to the person who appeared. Gurney\u0027s explanation is\r\nthat the mind of the person undergoing the calamity was at that moment\r\nable to impress the mind of the percipient with an hallucination.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nApparitions, on this \u0027telepathic\u0027 theory, may be called \u0027objective\u0027\r\nfacts, although they are not \u0027material\u0027 facts. In order to test the\r\nlikelihood of such veridical hallucinations being due to mere chance,\r\nGurney instituted the \u0027census of hallucinations,\u0027 which has been\r\ncontinued with the result of obtaining answers from over twenty-five\r\nthousand persons, asked\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P312\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e312}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nat random in different countries whether,\r\nwhen in good health and awake, they had ever heard a voice, seen a\r\nform, or felt a touch which no material presence could account for.\r\nThe result seems to be, roughly speaking, that in England about one\r\nadult in ten has had such an experience at least once in his life, and\r\nthat of the experiences themselves a large number coincide with some\r\ndistant event. The question is, Is the frequency of these latter cases\r\ntoo great to be deemed fortuitous, and must we suppose an occult\r\nconnection between the two events? Mr. and Mrs. Sidgwick have worked\r\nout this problem on the basis of the English returns, seventeen\r\nthousand in number, with a care and thoroughness that leave nothing to\r\nbe desired. Their conclusion is that the cases where the apparition of\r\na person is seen on the day of his death are four hundred and forty\r\ntimes too numerous to be ascribed to chance. The reasoning employed to\r\ncalculate this number is simple enough. If there be only a fortuitous\r\nconnection between the death of an individual and the occurrence of his\r\napparition to some one at a distance, the death is no more likely to\r\nfall on the same day as the apparition than it is to occur on the same\r\nday with any other event in nature. But the chance-probability that\r\nany individual\u0027s death will fall on any given day marked in advance by\r\nsome other event is just equal to the chance-probability that the\r\nindividual will die at all on any specified day; and the national\r\ndeath-rate gives that probability as one in nineteen thousand. If,\r\nthen, when the death of a person coincides with an apparition of the\r\nsame person, the coincidence be merely fortuitous, it ought not to\r\noccur oftener than once in nineteen thousand cases. As a matter of\r\nfact,\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P313\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e313}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nhowever, it does occur (according to the census) once in\r\nforty-three cases, a number (as aforesaid) four hundred and forty times\r\ntoo great. The American census, of some seven thousand answers, gives\r\na remarkably similar result. Against this conclusion the only rational\r\nanswer that I can see is that the data are still too few; that the net\r\nwas not cast wide enough; and that we need, to get fair averages, far\r\nmore than twenty-four thousand answers to the census question. This\r\nmay, of course, be true, though it seems exceedingly unlikely; and in\r\nour own twenty-four thousand answers veridical cases may possibly have\r\nheaped themselves unduly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe next topic worth mentioning in the Proceedings is the discussion of\r\nthe physical phenomena of mediumship (slate-writing, furniture-moving,\r\nand so forth) by Mrs. Sidgwick, Mr. Hodgson, and \u0027Mr. Davey.\u0027 This, so\r\nfar as it goes, is destructive of the claims of all the mediums\r\nexamined. \u0027Mr. Davey\u0027 himself produced fraudulent slate-writing of the\r\nhighest order, while Mr. Hodgson, a \u0027sitter\u0027 in his confidence,\r\nreviewed the written reports of the series of his other sitters,\u0026mdash;all\r\nof them intelligent persons,\u0026mdash;and showed that in every case they failed\r\nto see the essential features of what was done before their eyes. This\r\nDavey-Hodgson contribution is probably the most damaging document\r\nconcerning eye-witnesses\u0027 evidence that has ever been produced.\r\nAnother substantial bit of work based on personal observation is Mr.\r\nHodgson\u0027s report on Madame Blavatsky\u0027s claims to physical mediumship.\r\nThis is adverse to the lady\u0027s pretensions; and although some of Madame\r\nBlavatsky\u0027s friends make light of it, it is a stroke from which her\r\nreputation will not recover.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P314\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e314}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPhysical mediumship in all its phases has fared hard in the\r\nProceedings. The latest case reported on is that of the famous Eusapia\r\nPaladino, who being detected in fraud at Cambridge, after a brilliant\r\ncareer of success on the continent, has, according to the draconian\r\nrules of method which govern the Society, been ruled out from a further\r\nhearing. The case of Stainton Moses, on the other hand, concerning\r\nwhich Mr. Myers has brought out a mass of unpublished testimony, seems\r\nto escape from the universal condemnation, and appears to force upon us\r\nwhat Mr. Andrew Lang calls the choice between a moral and a physical\r\nmiracle.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the case of Mrs. Piper, not a physical but a trance medium, we seem\r\nto have no choice offered at all. Mr. Hodgson and others have made\r\nprolonged study of this lady\u0027s trances, and are all convinced that\r\nsuper-normal powers of cognition are displayed therein. These are\r\n\u003cI\u003eprimâ facie\u003c/I\u003e due to \u0027spirit-control.\u0027 But the conditions are so\r\ncomplex that a dogmatic decision either for or against the\r\nspirit-hypothesis must as yet be postponed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOne of the most important experimental contributions to the Proceedings\r\nis the article of Miss X. on \u0027Crystal Vision.\u0027 Many persons who look\r\nfixedly into a crystal or other vaguely luminous surface fall into a\r\nkind of daze, and see visions. Miss X. has this susceptibility in a\r\nremarkable degree, and is, moreover, an unusually intelligent critic.\r\nShe reports many visions which can only be described as apparently\r\nclairvoyant, and others which beautifully fill a vacant niche incur\r\nknowledge of subconscious mental operations. For example, looking into\r\nthe crystal before breakfast one morning she reads in printed\r\ncharacters of the\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P315\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e315}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ndeath of a lady of her acquaintance, the date\r\nand other circumstances all duly appearing in type. Startled by this,\r\nshe looks at the \u0027Times\u0027 of the previous day for verification, and\r\nthere among the deaths are the identical words which she has seen. On\r\nthe same page of the Times are other items which she remembers reading\r\nthe day before; and the only explanation seems to be that her eyes then\r\ninattentively observed, so to speak, the death-item, which forthwith\r\nfell into a special corner of her memory, and came out as a visual\r\nhallucination when the peculiar modification of consciousness induced\r\nby the crystal-gazing set in.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPassing from papers based on observation to papers based on narrative,\r\nwe have a number of ghost stories, etc., sifted by Mrs. Sidgwick and\r\ndiscussed by Messrs. Myers and Podmore. They form the best ghost\r\nliterature I know of from the point of view of emotional interest. As\r\nto the conclusions drawn, Mrs. Sidgwick is rigorously non-committal,\r\nwhile Mr. Myers and Mr. Podmore show themselves respectively hospitable\r\nand inhospitable to the notion that such stories have a basis of\r\nobjectivity dependent on the continued existence of the dead.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI must close my gossip about the Proceedings by naming what, after all,\r\nseems to me the most important part of its contents. This is the long\r\nseries of articles by Mr. Myers on what he now calls the \u0027subliminal\r\nself,\u0027 or what one might designate as ultra-marginal consciousness.\r\nThe result of Myers\u0027s learned and ingenious studies in hypnotism,\r\nhallucinations, automatic writing, mediumship, and the whole series of\r\nallied phenomena is a conviction which he expresses in the following\r\nterms:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P316\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e316}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"Each of us is in reality an abiding psychical entity far more\r\nextensive than he knows,\u0026mdash;an individuality which can never express\r\nitself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The self\r\nmanifests itself through the organism; but there is always some part of\r\nthe self unmanifested, and always, as it seems, some power of organic\r\nexpression in abeyance or reserve.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe ordinary consciousness Mr. Myers likens to the visible part of the\r\nsolar spectrum; the total consciousness is like that spectrum prolonged\r\nby the inclusion of the ultra-red and ultra-violet rays. In the\r\npsychic spectrum the \u0027ultra\u0027 parts may embrace a far wider range, both\r\nof physiological and of psychical activity, than is open to our\r\nordinary consciousness and memory. At the lower end we have the\r\n\u003cI\u003ephysiological\u003c/I\u003e extension, mind-cures, \u0027stigmatization\u0027 of ecstatics,\r\netc.; in the upper, the hyper-normal cognitions of the medium-trance.\r\nWhatever the judgment of the future may be on Mr. Myers\u0027s speculations,\r\nthe credit will always remain to them of being the first attempt in any\r\nlanguage to consider the phenomena of hallucination, hypnotism,\r\nautomatism, double personality, and mediumship as connected parts of\r\none whole subject. All constructions in this field must be\r\nprovisional, and it is as something provisional that Mr. Myers offers\r\nus his formulations. But, thanks to him, we begin to see for the first\r\ntime what a vast interlocked and graded system these phenomena, from\r\nthe rudest motor-automatisms to the most startling sensory-apparition,\r\nform. Quite apart from Mr. Myers\u0027s conclusions, his methodical\r\ntreatment of them by classes and series is the first great step toward\r\novercoming the distaste of orthodox science to look at them at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P317\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e317}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOne\u0027s reaction on hearsay testimony is always determined by one\u0027s own\r\nexperience. Most men who have once convinced themselves, by what seems\r\nto them a careful examination, that any one species of the supernatural\r\nexists, begin to relax their vigilance as to evidence, and throw the\r\ndoors of their minds more or less wide open to the supernatural along\r\nits whole extent. To a mind that has thus made its \u003cI\u003esalto mortale\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nthe minute work over insignificant cases and quiddling discussion of\r\n\u0027evidential values,\u0027 of which the Society\u0027s reports are full, seems\r\ninsufferably tedious. And it is so; few species of literature are more\r\ntruly dull than reports of phantasms. Taken simply by themselves, as\r\nseparate facts to stare at, they appear so devoid of meaning and sweep,\r\nthat, even were they certainly true, one would be tempted to leave them\r\nout of one\u0027s universe for being so idiotic. Every other sort of fact\r\nhas some context and continuity with the rest of nature. These alone\r\nare contextless and discontinuous.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHence I think that the sort of loathing\u0026mdash;no milder word will do\u0026mdash;which\r\nthe very words \u0027psychical research\u0027 and \u0027psychical researcher\u0027 awaken\r\nin so many honest scientific breasts is not only natural, but in a\r\nsense praiseworthy. A man who is unable himself to conceive of any\r\n\u003cI\u003eorbit\u003c/I\u003e for these mental meteors can only suppose that Messrs. Gurney,\r\nMyers, \u0026amp; Co.\u0027s mood in dealing with them must be that of silly\r\nmarvelling at so many detached prodigies. And such prodigies! So\r\nscience simply falls back on her general \u003cI\u003enon-possumus\u003c/I\u003e; and most of\r\nthe would-be critics of the Proceedings have been contented to oppose\r\nto the phenomena recorded the simple presumption that in some way or\r\nother the reports \u003cI\u003emust\u003c/I\u003e be\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P318\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e318}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfallacious,\u0026mdash;for so far as the order\r\nof nature has been subjected to really scientific scrutiny, it always\r\nhas been proved to run the other way. But the oftener one is forced to\r\nreject an alleged sort of fact by the use of this mere presumption, the\r\nweaker does the presumption itself get to be; and one might in course\r\nof time use up one\u0027s presumptive privileges in this way, even though\r\none started (as our anti-telepathists do) with as good a case as the\r\ngreat induction of psychology that all our knowledge comes by the use\r\nof our eyes and ears and other senses. And we must remember also that\r\nthis undermining of the strength of a presumption by reiterated report\r\nof facts to the contrary does not logically require that the facts in\r\nquestion should all be well proved. A lot of rumors in the air against\r\na business man\u0027s credit, though they might all be vague, and no one of\r\nthem amount to proof that he is unsound, would certainly weaken the\r\n\u003cI\u003epresumption\u003c/I\u003e of his soundness. And all the more would they have this\r\neffect if they formed what Gurney called a fagot and not a chain,\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, if they were independent of one another, and came from different\r\nquarters. Now, the evidence for telepathy, weak and strong, taken just\r\nas it comes, forms a fagot and not a chain. No one item cites the\r\ncontent of another item as part of its own proof. But taken together\r\nthe items have a certain general consistency; there is a method in\r\ntheir madness, so to speak. So each of them adds presumptive value to\r\nthe lot; and cumulatively, as no candid mind can fail to see, they\r\nsubtract presumptive force from the orthodox belief that there can be\r\nnothing in any one\u0027s intellect that has not come in through ordinary\r\nexperiences of sense.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut it is a miserable thing for a question of truth\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P319\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e319}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nto be\r\nconfined to mere presumption and counter-presumption, with no decisive\r\nthunderbolt of fact to clear the baffling darkness. And, sooth to say,\r\nin talking so much of the merely presumption-weakening value of our\r\nrecords, I have myself been wilfully taking the point of view of the\r\nso-called \u0027rigorously scientific\u0027 disbeliever, and making an \u003cI\u003ead\r\nhominem\u003c/I\u003e plea. My own point of view is different. For me the\r\nthunderbolt \u003cI\u003ehas\u003c/I\u003e fallen, and the orthodox belief has not merely had\r\nits presumption weakened, but the truth itself of the belief is\r\ndecisively overthrown. If I may employ the language of the\r\nprofessional logic-shop, a universal proposition can be made untrue by\r\na particular instance. If you wish to upset the law that all crows are\r\nblack, you must not seek to show that no crows are; it is enough if you\r\nprove one single crow to be white. My own white crow is Mrs. Piper.\r\nIn the trances of this medium, I cannot resist the conviction that\r\nknowledge appears which she has never gained by the ordinary waking use\r\nof her eyes and ears and wits. What the source of this knowledge may\r\nbe I know not, and have not the glimmer of an explanatory suggestion to\r\nmake; but from admitting the fact of such knowledge I can see no\r\nescape. So when I turn to the rest of the evidence, ghosts and all, I\r\ncannot carry with me the irreversibly negative bias of the \u0027rigorously\r\nscientific\u0027 mind, with its presumption as to what the true order of\r\nnature ought to be. I feel as if, though the evidence be flimsy in\r\nspots, it may nevertheless collectively carry heavy weight. The\r\nrigorously scientific mind may, in truth, easily overshoot the mark.\r\nScience means, first of all, a certain dispassionate method. To\r\nsuppose that it means a certain set of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P320\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e320}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nresults that one should\r\npin one\u0027s faith upon and hug forever is sadly to mistake its genius,\r\nand degrades the scientific body to the status of a sect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe all, scientists and non-scientists, live on some inclined plane of\r\ncredulity. The plane tips one way in one man, another way in another;\r\nand may he whose plane tips in no way be the first to cast a stone! As\r\na matter of fact, the trances I speak of have broken down for my own\r\nmind the limits of the admitted order of nature. Science, so far as\r\nscience denies such exceptional occurrences, lies prostrate in the dust\r\nfor me; and the most urgent intellectual need which I feel at present\r\nis that science be built up again in a form in which such things may\r\nhave a positive place. Science, like life, feeds on its own decay.\r\nNew facts burst old rules; then newly divined conceptions bind old and\r\nnew together into a reconciling law.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd here is the real instructiveness of Messrs. Myers and Gurney\u0027s\r\nwork. They are trying with the utmost conscientiousness to find a\r\nreconciling conception which shall subject the old laws of nature to\r\nthe smallest possible strain. Mr. Myers uses that method of gradual\r\napproach which has performed such wonders in Darwin\u0027s hands. When\r\nDarwin met a fact which seemed a poser to his theory, his regular\r\ncustom, as I have heard an able colleague say, was to fill in all round\r\nit with smaller facts, as a wagoner might heap dirt round a big rock in\r\nthe road, and thus get his team over without upsetting. So Mr. Myers,\r\nstarting from the most ordinary facts of inattentive consciousness,\r\nfollows this clue through a long series which terminates in ghosts, and\r\nseeks to show that these are but extreme manifestations of a\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P321\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e321}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\ncommon truth,\u0026mdash;the truth that the invisible segments of our minds are\r\nsusceptible, under rarely realized conditions, of acting and being\r\nacted upon by the invisible segments of other conscious lives. This\r\nmay not be ultimately true (for the theosophists, with their astral\r\nbodies and the like, may, for aught I now know, prove to be on the\r\ncorrecter trail), but no one can deny that it is in good scientific\r\nform,\u0026mdash;for science always takes a known kind of phenomenon, and tries\r\nto extend its range.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have myself, as American agent for the census, collected hundreds of\r\ncases of hallucination in healthy persons. The result is to make me\r\nfeel that we all have potentially a \u0027subliminal\u0027 self, which may make\r\nat any time irruption into our ordinary lives. At its lowest, it is\r\nonly the depository of our forgotten memories; at its highest, we do\r\nnot know what it is at all. Take, for instance, a series of cases.\r\nDuring sleep, many persons have something in them which measures the\r\nflight of time better than the waking self does. It wakes them at a\r\npreappointed hour; it acquaints them with the moment when they first\r\nawake. It may produce an hallucination,\u0026mdash;as in a lady who informs me\r\nthat at the instant of waking she has a vision of her watch-face with\r\nthe hands pointing (as she has often verified) to the exact time. It\r\nmay be the feeling that some physiological period has elapsed; but,\r\nwhatever it is, it is subconscious.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA subconscious something may also preserve experiences to which we do\r\nnot openly attend. A lady taking her lunch in town finds herself\r\nwithout her purse. Instantly a sense comes over her of rising from the\r\nbreakfast-table and hearing her purse drop upon the floor. On reaching\r\nhome she finds\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P322\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e322}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nnothing under the table, but summons the servant\r\nto say where she has put the purse. The servant produces it, saying;\r\n\"How did you know where it was? You rose and left the room as if you\r\ndid n\u0027t know you \u0027d dropped it.\" The same subconscious something may\r\nrecollect what we have forgotten. A lady accustomed to taking\r\nsalicylate of soda for muscular rheumatism wakes one early winter\r\nmorning with an aching neck. In the twilight she takes what she\r\nsupposes to be her customary powder from a drawer, dissolves it in a\r\nglass of water, and is about to drink it down, when she feels a sharp\r\nslap on her shoulder and hears a voice in her ear saying, \"Taste it!\"\r\nOn examination, she finds she has got a morphine powder by mistake.\r\nThe natural interpretation is that a sleeping memory of the morphine\r\npowders awoke in this quasi-explosive way. A like explanation offers\r\nitself as most plausible for the following case: A lady, with little\r\ntime to catch the train, and the expressman about to call, is excitedly\r\nlooking for the lost key of a packed trunk. Hurrying upstairs with a\r\nbunch of keys, proved useless, in her hand, she hears an \u0027objective\u0027\r\nvoice distinctly say, \"Try the key of the cake-box.\" Being tried, it\r\nfits. This also may well have been the effect of forgotten experience.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, the effect is doubtless due to the same hallucinatory mechanism;\r\nbut the source is less easily assigned as we ascend the scale of cases.\r\nA lady, for instance, goes after breakfast to see about one of her\r\nservants who has become ill over night. She is startled at distinctly\r\nreading over the bedroom door in gilt letters the word \u0027small-pox.\u0027\r\nThe doctor is sent for, and ere long pronounces small-pox to be the\r\ndisease, although the lady says, \"The thought of\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P323\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e323}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nthe girl\u0027s\r\nhaving small-pox never entered my mind till I saw the apparent\r\ninscription.\" Then come other cases of warning; for example, that of a\r\nyouth sitting in a wagon under a shed, who suddenly hears his dead\r\nmother\u0027s voice say, \"Stephen, get away from here quick!\" and jumps out\r\njust in time to see the shed-roof fall.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAfter this come the experiences of persons appearing to distant friends\r\nat or near the hour of death. Then, too, we have the trance-visions\r\nand utterances, which may appear astonishingly profuse and continuous,\r\nand maintain a fairly high intellectual level. For all these higher\r\nphenomena, it seems to me that while the proximate mechanism is that of\r\n\u0027hallucination,\u0027 it is straining an hypothesis unduly to name any\r\nordinary subconscious mental operation\u0026mdash;such as expectation,\r\nrecollection, or inference from inattentive perception\u0026mdash;as the ultimate\r\ncause that starts it up. It is far better tactics, if you wish to get\r\nrid of mystery, to brand the narratives themselves as unworthy of\r\ntrust. The trustworthiness of most of them is to my own mind far from\r\nproved. And yet in the light of the medium-trance, which is proved, it\r\nseems as if they might well all be members of a natural kind of fact of\r\nwhich we do not yet know the full extent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThousands of sensitive organizations in the United States to-day live\r\nas steadily in the light of these experiences, and are as indifferent\r\nto modern science, as if they lived in Bohemia in the twelfth century.\r\nThey are indifferent to science, because science is so callously\r\nindifferent to their experiences. Although in its essence science only\r\nstands for a method and for no fixed belief, yet as habitually taken,\r\nboth by its votaries and outsiders, it is\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P324\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e324}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nidentified with a\r\ncertain fixed belief,\u0026mdash;the belief that the hidden order of nature is\r\nmechanical exclusively, and that non-mechanical categories are\r\nirrational ways of conceiving and explaining even such things as human\r\nlife. Now, this mechanical rationalism, as one may call it, makes, if\r\nit becomes one\u0027s only way of thinking, a violent breach with the ways\r\nof thinking that have played the greatest part in human history.\r\nReligious thinking, ethical thinking, poetical thinking, teleological,\r\nemotional, sentimental thinking, what one might call the personal view\r\nof life to distinguish it from the impersonal and mechanical, and the\r\nromantic view of life to distinguish it from the rationalistic view,\r\nhave been, and even still are, outside of well-drilled scientific\r\ncircles, the dominant forms of thought. But for mechanical\r\nrationalism, personality is an insubstantial illusion. The chronic\r\nbelief of mankind, that events may happen for the sake of their\r\npersonal significance, is an abomination; and the notions of our\r\ngrandfathers about oracles and omens, divinations and apparitions,\r\nmiraculous changes of heart and wonders worked by inspired persons,\r\nanswers to prayer and providential leadings, are a fabric absolutely\r\nbaseless, a mass of sheer \u003cI\u003eun\u003c/I\u003etruth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, of course, we must all admit that the excesses to which the\r\nromantic and personal view of nature may lead, if wholly unchecked by\r\nimpersonal rationalism, are direful. Central African Mumbo-jumboism is\r\none of unchecked romanticism\u0027s fruits. One ought accordingly to\r\nsympathize with that abhorrence of romanticism as a sufficient\r\nworld-theory; one ought to understand that lively intolerance of the\r\nleast grain of romanticism in the views of life of other people, which\r\nare such characteristic marks of those who\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P325\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e325}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nfollow the scientific\r\nprofessions to-day. Our debt to science is literally boundless, and\r\nour gratitude for what is positive in her teachings must be\r\ncorrespondingly immense. But the S. P. R.\u0027s Proceedings have, it seems\r\nto me, conclusively proved one thing to the candid reader; and that is\r\nthat the verdict of pure insanity, of gratuitous preference for error,\r\nof superstition without an excuse, which the scientists of our day are\r\nled by their intellectual training to pronounce upon the entire thought\r\nof the past, is a most shallow verdict. The personal and romantic view\r\nof life has other roots besides wanton exuberance of imagination and\r\nperversity of heart. It is perennially fed by \u003cI\u003efacts of experience\u003c/I\u003e,\r\nwhatever the ulterior interpretation of those facts may prove to be;\r\nand at no time in human history would it have been less easy than\r\nnow\u0026mdash;at most times it would have been much more easy\u0026mdash;for advocates\r\nwith a little industry to collect in its favor an array of contemporary\r\ndocuments as good as those which our publications present. These\r\ndocuments all relate to real experiences of persons. These experiences\r\nhave three characters in common: They are capricious, discontinuous,\r\nand not easily controlled; they require peculiar persons for their\r\nproduction; their significance seems to be wholly for personal life.\r\nThose who preferentially attend to them, and still more those who are\r\nindividually subject to them, not only easily may find, but are\r\nlogically bound to find, in them valid arguments for their romantic and\r\npersonal conception of the world\u0027s course. Through my slight\r\nparticipation in the investigations of the S. P. R. I have become\r\nacquainted with numbers of persons of this sort, for whom the very word\r\n\u0027science\u0027 has become a name of reproach, for reasons that I now both\r\nunderstand\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P326\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e326}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nand respect. It is the intolerance of science for\r\nsuch phenomena as we are studying, her peremptory denial either of\r\ntheir existence or of their significance (except as proofs of man\u0027s\r\nabsolute innate folly), that has set science so apart from the common\r\nsympathies of the race. I confess that it is on this, its humanizing\r\nmission, that the Society\u0027s best claim to the gratitude of our\r\ngeneration seems to me to depend. It has restored continuity to\r\nhistory. It has shown some reasonable basis for the most superstitious\r\naberrations of the foretime. It has bridged the chasm, healed the\r\nhideous rift that science, taken in a certain narrow way, has shot into\r\nthe human world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI will even go one step farther. When from our present advanced\r\nstandpoint we look back upon the past stages of human thought, whether\r\nit be scientific thought or theological thought, we are amazed that a\r\nuniverse which appears to us of so vast and mysterious a complication\r\nshould ever have seemed to any one so little and plain a thing.\r\nWhether it be Descartes\u0027s world or Newton\u0027s, whether it be that of the\r\nmaterialists of the last century or that of the Bridgewater treatises\r\nof our own, it always looks the same to us,\u0026mdash;incredibly perspectiveless\r\nand short. Even Lyell\u0027s, Faraday\u0027s, Mill\u0027s, and Darwin\u0027s consciousness\r\nof their respective subjects are already beginning to put on an\r\ninfantile and innocent look. Is it then likely that the science of our\r\nown day will escape the common doom; that the minds of its votaries\r\nwill never look old-fashioned to the grandchildren of the latter? It\r\nwould be folly to suppose so. Yet if we are to judge by the analogy of\r\nthe past, when our science once becomes old-fashioned, it will be more\r\nfor its omissions of fact, for its\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P327\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e327}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\nignorance of whole ranges and\r\norders of complexity in the phenomena to be explained, than for any\r\nfatal lack in its spirit and principles. The spirit and principles of\r\nscience are mere affairs of method; there is nothing in them that need\r\nhinder science from dealing successfully with a world in which personal\r\nforces are the starting-point of new effects. The only form of thing\r\nthat we directly encounter, the only experience that we concretely\r\nhave, is our own personal life. The only complete category of our\r\nthinking, our professors of philosophy tell us, is the category of\r\npersonality, every other category being one of the abstract elements of\r\nthat. And this systematic denial on science\u0027s part of personality as a\r\ncondition of events, this rigorous belief that in its own essential and\r\ninnermost nature our world is a strictly impersonal world, may,\r\nconceivably, as the whirligig of time goes round, prove to be the very\r\ndefect that our descendants will be most surprised at in our own\r\nboasted science, the omission that to their eyes will most tend to make\r\nit look perspectiveless and short.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch10fn1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"ch10fn2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch10fn1text\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e] This Essay is formed of portions of an article in Scribner\u0027s\r\nMagazine for March, 1890, of an article in the Forum for July, 1892,\r\nand of the President\u0027s Address before the Society for Psychical\r\nResearch, published in the Proceedings for June, 1896, and in Science.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[\u003cA HREF=\"#ch10fn2text\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e] Written in 1891. Since then, Mr. Balfour, the present writer, and\r\nProfessor William Crookes have held the presidential office.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cSPAN CLASS=\"pagenum\"\u003e{\u003cA NAME=\"P329\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e329}\u003c/SPAN\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nINDEX.\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nABSOLUTISM, \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P30\"\u003e30\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAbstract conceptions, \u003cA HREF=\"#P219\"\u003e219\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAction, as a measure of belief, \u003cA HREF=\"#P3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P29\"\u003e29-30\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nActual world narrower than ideal, \u003cA HREF=\"#P202\"\u003e202\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAgnosticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P54\"\u003e54\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P81\"\u003e81\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P126\"\u003e126\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAllen, G., \u003cA HREF=\"#P231\"\u003e231\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P235\"\u003e235\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P256\"\u003e256\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAlps, leap in the, \u003cA HREF=\"#P59\"\u003e59\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P96\"\u003e96\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAlternatives, \u003cA HREF=\"#P156\"\u003e156\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P161\"\u003e161\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P202\"\u003e202\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P269\"\u003e269\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAmbiguity of choice, \u003cA HREF=\"#P156\"\u003e156\u003c/A\u003e; of being, \u003cA HREF=\"#P292\"\u003e292\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAnaesthetic revelation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P294\"\u003e294\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nA priori truths, \u003cA HREF=\"#P268\"\u003e268\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nApparitions, \u003cA HREF=\"#P311\"\u003e311\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAristotle, \u003cA HREF=\"#P249\"\u003e249\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAssociationism, in Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P186\"\u003e186\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAtheist and acorn, \u003cA HREF=\"#P160\"\u003e160\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAuthorities in Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P204\"\u003e204\u003c/A\u003e; \u003cI\u003eversus\u003c/I\u003e champions, \u003cA HREF=\"#P207\"\u003e207\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nAxioms, \u003cA HREF=\"#P268\"\u003e268\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBAGEHOT, \u003cA HREF=\"#P232\"\u003e232\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBain, \u003cA HREF=\"#P71\"\u003e71\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P91\"\u003e91\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBalfour, \u003cA HREF=\"#P9\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBeing, its character, \u003cA HREF=\"#P142\"\u003e142\u003c/A\u003e; in Hegel, \u003cA HREF=\"#P281\"\u003e281\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBelief, \u003cA HREF=\"#P59\"\u003e59\u003c/A\u003e. See \u0027Faith.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBellamy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P188\"\u003e188\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBismarck, \u003cA HREF=\"#P228\"\u003e228\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBlock-universe, \u003cA HREF=\"#P292\"\u003e292\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBlood, B. P., vi, \u003cA HREF=\"#P294\"\u003e294\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBrockton murderer, \u003cA HREF=\"#P160\"\u003e160\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P177\"\u003e177\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nBunsen, \u003cA HREF=\"#P203\"\u003e203\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P274\"\u003e274\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCALVINISM, \u003cA HREF=\"#P45\"\u003e45\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCarlyle, \u003cA HREF=\"#P42\"\u003e42\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P44\"\u003e44\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P45\"\u003e45\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P73\"\u003e73\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P87\"\u003e87\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P173\"\u003e173\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u0027Casuistic question\u0027 in Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P198\"\u003e198\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCausality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P147\"\u003e147\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCausation, Hume\u0027s doctrine of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P278\"\u003e278\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCensus of hallucinations, \u003cA HREF=\"#P312\"\u003e312\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCertitude, \u003cA HREF=\"#P13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P30\"\u003e30\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nChance, \u003cA HREF=\"#P149\"\u003e149\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P153\"\u003e153-9\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P178\"\u003e178-180\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nChoice, \u003cA HREF=\"#P156\"\u003e156\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nChristianity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P14\"\u003e14\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCicero, \u003cA HREF=\"#P92\"\u003e92\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCity of dreadful night, \u003cA HREF=\"#P35\"\u003e35\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nClark, X., \u003cA HREF=\"#P50\"\u003e50\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nClassifications, \u003cA HREF=\"#P67\"\u003e67\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nClifford, \u003cA HREF=\"#P6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P7\"\u003e7\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P14\"\u003e14\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P19\"\u003e19\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P21\"\u003e21\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P92\"\u003e92\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P230\"\u003e230\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nClive, \u003cA HREF=\"#P228\"\u003e228\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nClough, \u003cA HREF=\"#P6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCommon-sense, \u003cA HREF=\"#P270\"\u003e270\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nConceptual order of world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P118\"\u003e118\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nConscience, \u003cA HREF=\"#P186\"\u003e186-8\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nContradiction, as used by Hegel, \u003cA HREF=\"#P275\"\u003e275-277\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nContradictions of philosophers, \u003cA HREF=\"#P16\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCrillon, \u003cA HREF=\"#P62\"\u003e62\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCriterion of truth, \u003cA HREF=\"#P15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P16\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e; in Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P205\"\u003e205\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCrude order of experience, \u003cA HREF=\"#P118\"\u003e118\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCrystal vision, \u003cA HREF=\"#P314\"\u003e314\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nCycles in Nature, \u003cA HREF=\"#P220\"\u003e220\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P223\"\u003e223-4\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDARWIN, \u003cA HREF=\"#P221\"\u003e221\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P223\"\u003e223\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P226\"\u003e226\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P320\"\u003e320\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nData, \u003cA HREF=\"#P271\"\u003e271\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDavey, \u003cA HREF=\"#P313\"\u003e313\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDemands, as creators of value, \u003cA HREF=\"#P201\"\u003e201\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u0027Determination is negation,\u0027 \u003cA HREF=\"#P286\"\u003e286-290\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDeterminism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P150\"\u003e150\u003c/A\u003e; the Dilemma of;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P145\"\u003e145-183\u003c/A\u003e; \u003cA HREF=\"#P163\"\u003e163\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P166\"\u003e166\u003c/A\u003e; hard and soft, \u003cA HREF=\"#P149\"\u003e149\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDogs, \u003cA HREF=\"#P57\"\u003e57\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDogmatism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDoubt, \u003cA HREF=\"#P54\"\u003e54\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P109\"\u003e109\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nDupery, \u003cA HREF=\"#P27\"\u003e27\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEASY-GOING mood, \u003cA HREF=\"#P211\"\u003e211\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P213\"\u003e213\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nElephant, \u003cA HREF=\"#P282\"\u003e282\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEmerson, \u003cA HREF=\"#P23\"\u003e23\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P175\"\u003e175\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEmpiricism, i., \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P14\"\u003e14\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P17\"\u003e17\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P278\"\u003e278\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEngland, \u003cA HREF=\"#P228\"\u003e228\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEnvironment, its relation to great men,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P223\"\u003e223\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P226\"\u003e226\u003c/A\u003e; to great thoughts, \u003cA HREF=\"#P250\"\u003e250\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nError, \u003cA HREF=\"#P163\"\u003e163\u003c/A\u003e; duty of avoiding, \u003cA HREF=\"#P18\"\u003e18\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEssence of good and bad, \u003cA HREF=\"#P200\"\u003e200-1\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEthical ideals, \u003cA HREF=\"#P200\"\u003e200\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEthical philosophy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P208\"\u003e208\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P210\"\u003e210\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P216\"\u003e216\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEthical standards, \u003cA HREF=\"#P205\"\u003e205\u003c/A\u003e; diversity of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P200\"\u003e200\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEthics, its three questions, \u003cA HREF=\"#P185\"\u003e185\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEvidence, objective, \u003cA HREF=\"#P13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P16\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEvil, \u003cA HREF=\"#P46\"\u003e46\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P49\"\u003e49\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P161\"\u003e161\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P190\"\u003e190\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEvolution, social, \u003cA HREF=\"#P232\"\u003e232\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P237\"\u003e237\u003c/A\u003e; mental, \u003cA HREF=\"#P245\"\u003e245\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nEvolutionism, its test of right, \u003cA HREF=\"#P98\"\u003e98-100\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nExpectancy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P77\"\u003e77-80\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nExperience, crude, \u003cI\u003eversus\u003c/I\u003e rationalized,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P118\"\u003e118\u003c/A\u003e; tests our faiths, \u003cA HREF=\"#P105\"\u003e105\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFACTS, \u003cA HREF=\"#P271\"\u003e271\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFaith, that truth exists, \u003cA HREF=\"#P9\"\u003e9\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P23\"\u003e23\u003c/A\u003e; in our\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nfellows, \u003cA HREF=\"#P24\"\u003e24-5\u003c/A\u003e; school boys\u0027 definition of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P29\"\u003e29\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\na remedy for pessimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P60\"\u003e60\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P101\"\u003e101\u003c/A\u003e; religious, \u003cA HREF=\"#P56\"\u003e56\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\ndefined, \u003cA HREF=\"#P90\"\u003e90\u003c/A\u003e; defended against \u0027scientific\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nobjections, viii-xi, \u003cA HREF=\"#P91\"\u003e91-4\u003c/A\u003e; may\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\ncreate its own verification, \u003cA HREF=\"#P59\"\u003e59\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P96\"\u003e96-103\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFamiliarity confers rationality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P76\"\u003e76\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFatalism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P88\"\u003e88\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFiske, \u003cA HREF=\"#P255\"\u003e255\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P260\"\u003e260\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFitzgerald, \u003cA HREF=\"#P160\"\u003e160\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFreedom, \u003cA HREF=\"#P103\"\u003e103\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P271\"\u003e271\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nFree-will, \u003cA HREF=\"#P103\"\u003e103\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P145\"\u003e145\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P157\"\u003e157\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGALTON, \u003cA HREF=\"#P242\"\u003e242\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGeniuses, \u003cA HREF=\"#P226\"\u003e226\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P229\"\u003e229\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGhosts, \u003cA HREF=\"#P315\"\u003e315\u003c/A\u003e,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGnosticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P138\"\u003e138-140\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P165\"\u003e165\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P169\"\u003e169\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGod, \u003cA HREF=\"#P61\"\u003e61\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P68\"\u003e68\u003c/A\u003e; of Nature, \u003cA HREF=\"#P43\"\u003e43\u003c/A\u003e; the most\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nadequate object for our mind, \u003cA HREF=\"#P116\"\u003e116\u003c/A\u003e,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P122\"\u003e122\u003c/A\u003e; our relations to him, \u003cA HREF=\"#P134\"\u003e134-6\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nhis providence, \u003cA HREF=\"#P182\"\u003e182\u003c/A\u003e; his demands\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\ncreate obligation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P193\"\u003e193\u003c/A\u003e; his function\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nin Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P212\"\u003e212-215\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGoethe, \u003cA HREF=\"#P111\"\u003e111\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGood, \u003cA HREF=\"#P168\"\u003e168\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P200\"\u003e200\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P201\"\u003e201\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGoodness, \u003cA HREF=\"#P190\"\u003e190\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGreat-man theory of history, \u003cA HREF=\"#P232\"\u003e232\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGreat men and their environment, \u003cA HREF=\"#P216\"\u003e216-254\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGreen, \u003cA HREF=\"#P206\"\u003e206\u003c/A\u003e,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGryzanowski, \u003cA HREF=\"#P240\"\u003e240\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGurney, \u003cA HREF=\"#P306\"\u003e306\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P307\"\u003e307\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P311\"\u003e311\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGuthrie, \u003cA HREF=\"#P309\"\u003e309\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nGuyau, \u003cA HREF=\"#P188\"\u003e188\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHALLUCINATIONS, Census of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P312\"\u003e312\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHappiness, \u003cA HREF=\"#P33\"\u003e33\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHarris, \u003cA HREF=\"#P282\"\u003e282\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHegel, \u003cA HREF=\"#P72\"\u003e72\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P263\"\u003e263\u003c/A\u003e; his excessive claims,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P272\"\u003e272\u003c/A\u003e; his use of negation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P273\"\u003e273\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P290\"\u003e290\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nof contradiction, \u003cA HREF=\"#P274\"\u003e274\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P276\"\u003e276\u003c/A\u003e; on being,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P281\"\u003e281\u003c/A\u003e; on otherness, \u003cA HREF=\"#P283\"\u003e283\u003c/A\u003e; on infinity,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P284\"\u003e284\u003c/A\u003e; on identity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P285\"\u003e285\u003c/A\u003e; on determination,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P289\"\u003e289\u003c/A\u003e; his ontological emotion, \u003cA HREF=\"#P297\"\u003e297\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHegelisms, on some, \u003cA HREF=\"#P263\"\u003e263-298\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHeine, \u003cA HREF=\"#P203\"\u003e203\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHelmholtz, \u003cA HREF=\"#P85\"\u003e85\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P91\"\u003e91\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHenry IV., \u003cA HREF=\"#P62\"\u003e62\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHerbart, \u003cA HREF=\"#P280\"\u003e280\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHero-worship, \u003cA HREF=\"#P261\"\u003e261\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHinton, C. H., \u003cA HREF=\"#P15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHinton, J., \u003cA HREF=\"#P101\"\u003e101\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHodgson, R., \u003cA HREF=\"#P308\"\u003e308\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHodgson, S, H., \u003cA HREF=\"#P10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHonor, \u003cA HREF=\"#P50\"\u003e50\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHugo, \u003cA HREF=\"#P213\"\u003e213\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHuman mind, its habit of abstracting, \u003cA HREF=\"#P219\"\u003e219\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHume on causation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P278\"\u003e278\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHuxley, \u003cA HREF=\"#P6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P92\"\u003e92\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHypnotism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P302\"\u003e302\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P309\"\u003e309\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nHypotheses, live or dead, \u003cA HREF=\"#P2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e; their\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nverification, \u003cA HREF=\"#P105\"\u003e105\u003c/A\u003e; of genius, \u003cA HREF=\"#P249\"\u003e249\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIDEALS, \u003cA HREF=\"#P200\"\u003e200\u003c/A\u003e; their conflict, \u003cA HREF=\"#P202\"\u003e202\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIdealism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P89\"\u003e89\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P291\"\u003e291\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIdentity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P285\"\u003e285\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nImperatives, \u003cA HREF=\"#P211\"\u003e211\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nImportance of individuals, the, \u003cA HREF=\"#P255\"\u003e255-262\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nof things, its ground, \u003cA HREF=\"#P257\"\u003e257\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIndeterminism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P150\"\u003e150\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIndividual differences, \u003cA HREF=\"#P259\"\u003e259\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIndividuals, the importance of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P255\"\u003e255-262\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nInfinite, \u003cA HREF=\"#P284\"\u003e284\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nIntuitionism, in Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P186\"\u003e186\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P189\"\u003e189\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nJEVONS, \u003cA HREF=\"#P249\"\u003e249\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nJudgments of regret, \u003cA HREF=\"#P159\"\u003e159\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nKNOWING, \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nKnowledge, \u003cA HREF=\"#P85\"\u003e85\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nLEAP on precipice, \u003cA HREF=\"#P59\"\u003e59\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P96\"\u003e96\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nLeibnitz, \u003cA HREF=\"#P43\"\u003e43\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nLife, is it worth living, \u003cA HREF=\"#P32\"\u003e32-62\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMAGGOTS, \u003cA HREF=\"#P176\"\u003e176-7\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMahdi, the, \u003cA HREF=\"#P2\"\u003e2\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P6\"\u003e6\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMallock, \u003cA HREF=\"#P32\"\u003e32\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P183\"\u003e183\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMarcus Aurelius, \u003cA HREF=\"#P41\"\u003e41\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMaterialism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P126\"\u003e126\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u0027Maybes,\u0027 \u003cA HREF=\"#P59\"\u003e59\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMeasure of good, \u003cA HREF=\"#P205\"\u003e205\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMediumship, physical, \u003cA HREF=\"#P313\"\u003e313\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P314\"\u003e314\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMelancholy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P34\"\u003e34\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P39\"\u003e39\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P42\"\u003e42\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMental evolution, \u003cA HREF=\"#P246\"\u003e246\u003c/A\u003e; structure, \u003cA HREF=\"#P114\"\u003e114\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P117\"\u003e117\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMill, \u003cA HREF=\"#P234\"\u003e234\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMind, its triadic structure, \u003cA HREF=\"#P114\"\u003e114\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P117\"\u003e117\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nits evolution, \u003cA HREF=\"#P246\"\u003e246\u003c/A\u003e; its three departments,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P114\"\u003e114\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P122\"\u003e122\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P127\"\u003e127-8\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMonism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P279\"\u003e279\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMoods, the strenuous and the easy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P211\"\u003e211\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P213\"\u003e213\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMoralists, objective and subjective, \u003cA HREF=\"#P103\"\u003e103-108\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMoral judgments, their origin, \u003cA HREF=\"#P186\"\u003e186-8\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nobligation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P192\"\u003e192-7\u003c/A\u003e; order, \u003cA HREF=\"#P193\"\u003e193\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nphilosophy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P184\"\u003e184-5\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMoral philosopher and the moral life, the, \u003cA HREF=\"#P184\"\u003e184-215\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMurder, \u003cA HREF=\"#P178\"\u003e178\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMurderer, \u003cA HREF=\"#P160\"\u003e160\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P177\"\u003e177\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMyers, \u003cA HREF=\"#P308\"\u003e308\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P315\"\u003e315\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P320\"\u003e320\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMystical phenomena, \u003cA HREF=\"#P300\"\u003e300\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nMysticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P74\"\u003e74\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNAKED, the, \u003cA HREF=\"#P281\"\u003e281\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNatural theology, \u003cA HREF=\"#P40\"\u003e40-4\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNature, \u003cA HREF=\"#P20\"\u003e20\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P41\"\u003e41-4\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P56\"\u003e56\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNegation, as used by Hegel, \u003cA HREF=\"#P273\"\u003e273\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNewman, \u003cA HREF=\"#P10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNitrous oxide, \u003cA HREF=\"#P294\"\u003e294\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nNonentity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P72\"\u003e72\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nOBJECTIVE evidence, \u003cA HREF=\"#P13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P16\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nObligation, \u003cA HREF=\"#P192\"\u003e192-7\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nOccult phenomena, \u003cA HREF=\"#P300\"\u003e300\u003c/A\u003e; examples of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P323\"\u003e323\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nOmar Khayam, \u003cA HREF=\"#P160\"\u003e160\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nOptimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P60\"\u003e60\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P102\"\u003e102\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P163\"\u003e163\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nOptions offered to belief, \u003cA HREF=\"#P3\"\u003e3\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P11\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P27\"\u003e27\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nOrigin of moral judgments, \u003cA HREF=\"#P186\"\u003e186-8\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u0027Other,\u0027 in Hegel, \u003cA HREF=\"#P283\"\u003e283\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPARSIMONY, law of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P132\"\u003e132\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPartaking, \u003cA HREF=\"#P268\"\u003e268\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P270\"\u003e270\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P275\"\u003e275\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P291\"\u003e291\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPascal\u0027s wager, \u003cA HREF=\"#P5\"\u003e5\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P11\"\u003e11\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPersonality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P324\"\u003e324\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P327\"\u003e327\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPessimism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P39\"\u003e39\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P40\"\u003e40\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P47\"\u003e47\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P60\"\u003e60\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P100\"\u003e100\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P101\"\u003e101\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P161\"\u003e161\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P167\"\u003e167\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPhilosophy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P65\"\u003e65\u003c/A\u003e; depends on personal\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\ndemands, \u003cA HREF=\"#P93\"\u003e93\u003c/A\u003e; makes world unreal,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P39\"\u003e39\u003c/A\u003e; seeks unification, \u003cA HREF=\"#P67\"\u003e67-70\u003c/A\u003e; the\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nultimate, \u003cA HREF=\"#P110\"\u003e110\u003c/A\u003e; its contradictions, \u003cA HREF=\"#P16\"\u003e16\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPhysiology, its \u003cI\u003eprestige\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P112\"\u003e112\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPiper, Mrs., \u003cA HREF=\"#P314\"\u003e314\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P319\"\u003e319\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPlato, \u003cA HREF=\"#P268\"\u003e268\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPluralism, vi, \u003cA HREF=\"#P151\"\u003e151\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P178\"\u003e178\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P192\"\u003e192\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P264\"\u003e264\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P267\"\u003e267\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPositivism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P54\"\u003e54\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P108\"\u003e108\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPossibilities, \u003cA HREF=\"#P151\"\u003e151\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P181\"\u003e181-2\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P292\"\u003e292\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P294\"\u003e294\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPostulates, \u003cA HREF=\"#P91\"\u003e91-2\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPowers, our powers as congruous with the world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P86\"\u003e86\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nProvidence, \u003cA HREF=\"#P180\"\u003e180\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPsychical research, what it has accomplished, \u003cA HREF=\"#P299\"\u003e299-327\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSociety for, \u003cA HREF=\"#P303\"\u003e303\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P305\"\u003e305\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P325\"\u003e325\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nPugnacity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P49\"\u003e49\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P51\"\u003e51\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nQUESTIONS, three, in Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P185\"\u003e185\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRATIONALISM, \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P30\"\u003e30\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRationality, the sentiment of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P63\"\u003e63-110\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nlimits of theoretic, \u003cA HREF=\"#P65\"\u003e65-74\u003c/A\u003e; mystical,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P74\"\u003e74\u003c/A\u003e; practical, \u003cA HREF=\"#P82\"\u003e82-4\u003c/A\u003e; postulates of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P152\"\u003e152\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRational order of world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P118\"\u003e118\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P125\"\u003e125\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P147\"\u003e147\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nReflex action and theism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P111\"\u003e111-144\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nReflex action defined, \u003cA HREF=\"#P113\"\u003e113\u003c/A\u003e; it refutes gnosticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P140\"\u003e140-1\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRegret, judgments of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P159\"\u003e159\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nReligion, natural, \u003cA HREF=\"#P52\"\u003e52\u003c/A\u003e; of humanity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P198\"\u003e198\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nReligious hypothesis, \u003cA HREF=\"#P25\"\u003e25\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P28\"\u003e28\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P51\"\u003e51\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nReligious minds, \u003cA HREF=\"#P40\"\u003e40\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRenan, \u003cA HREF=\"#P170\"\u003e170\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P172\"\u003e172\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRenouvier, \u003cA HREF=\"#P143\"\u003e143\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRisks of belief or disbelief, ix, \u003cA HREF=\"#P26\"\u003e26\u003c/A\u003e; rules for minimizing, \u003cA HREF=\"#P94\"\u003e94\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRomantic view of world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P324\"\u003e324\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRomanticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P172\"\u003e172-3\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRousseau, \u003cA HREF=\"#P4\"\u003e4\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P33\"\u003e33\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P87\"\u003e87\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nRuskin, \u003cA HREF=\"#P37\"\u003e37\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSALTER, \u003cA HREF=\"#P62\"\u003e62\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nScepticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P12\"\u003e12\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P23\"\u003e23\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P109\"\u003e109\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nScholasticism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSchopenhauer, \u003cA HREF=\"#P72\"\u003e72\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P169\"\u003e169\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nScience, \u003cA HREF=\"#P10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P21\"\u003e21\u003c/A\u003e; its recency, \u003cA HREF=\"#P52\"\u003e52-4\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\ndue to peculiar desire, \u003cA HREF=\"#P129\"\u003e129-132\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P147\"\u003e147\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nits disbelief of the occult, \u003cA HREF=\"#P317\"\u003e317-320\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nits negation of personality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P324\"\u003e324-6\u003c/A\u003e;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\ncannot decide question of determinism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P152\"\u003e152\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nScience of Ethics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P208\"\u003e208-210\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSelection of great men, \u003cA HREF=\"#P226\"\u003e226\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSentiment of rationality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P63\"\u003e63\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSeriousness, \u003cA HREF=\"#P86\"\u003e86\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nShakespeare, \u003cA HREF=\"#P32\"\u003e32\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P235\"\u003e235\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSidgwick, \u003cA HREF=\"#P303\"\u003e303\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P307\"\u003e307\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSigwart, \u003cA HREF=\"#P120\"\u003e120\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P148\"\u003e148\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSociety for psychical research, \u003cA HREF=\"#P303\"\u003e303\u003c/A\u003e; its \u0027Proceedings,\u0027 \u003cA HREF=\"#P305\"\u003e305\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P325\"\u003e325\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSociology, \u003cA HREF=\"#P259\"\u003e259\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSolitude, moral, \u003cA HREF=\"#P191\"\u003e191\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSpace, \u003cA HREF=\"#P265\"\u003e265\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSpencer, \u003cA HREF=\"#P168\"\u003e168\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P218\"\u003e218\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P232\"\u003e232-235\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P246\"\u003e246\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P251\"\u003e251\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P260\"\u003e260\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nStephen, L., \u003cA HREF=\"#P1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nStephen, Sir J., \u003cA HREF=\"#P1\"\u003e1\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P30\"\u003e30\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P212\"\u003e212\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nStoics, \u003cA HREF=\"#P274\"\u003e274\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nStrenuous mood, \u003cA HREF=\"#P211\"\u003e211\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P213\"\u003e213\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSubjectivism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P165\"\u003e165\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P170\"\u003e170\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u0027Subliminal self,\u0027 \u003cA HREF=\"#P315\"\u003e315\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P321\"\u003e321\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSubstance, \u003cA HREF=\"#P80\"\u003e80\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSuicide, \u003cA HREF=\"#P38\"\u003e38\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P50\"\u003e50\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P60\"\u003e60\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nSystem in philosophy, \u003cA HREF=\"#P13\"\u003e13\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P185\"\u003e185\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P199\"\u003e199\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTELEPATHY, \u003cA HREF=\"#P10\"\u003e10\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P309\"\u003e309\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTheism, and reflex action, \u003cA HREF=\"#P111\"\u003e111-144\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTheism, \u003cA HREF=\"#P127\"\u003e127\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P134\"\u003e134-6\u003c/A\u003e; see \u0027God.\u0027\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTheology, natural, \u003cA HREF=\"#P41\"\u003e41\u003c/A\u003e; Calvinistic, \u003cA HREF=\"#P45\"\u003e45\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTheoretic faculty, \u003cA HREF=\"#P128\"\u003e128\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nThought-transference, \u003cA HREF=\"#P309\"\u003e309\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nThomson, \u003cA HREF=\"#P35\"\u003e35-7\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P45\"\u003e45\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P46\"\u003e46\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nToleration, \u003cA HREF=\"#P30\"\u003e30\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTolstoi, \u003cA HREF=\"#P188\"\u003e188\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u0027Totality,\u0027 the principle of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P277\"\u003e277\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTriadic structure of mind, \u003cA HREF=\"#P123\"\u003e123\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nTruth, criteria of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e; and error, \u003cA HREF=\"#P18\"\u003e18\u003c/A\u003e; moral, \u003cA HREF=\"#P190\"\u003e190-1\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nUNITARIANS, \u003cA HREF=\"#P126\"\u003e126\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P133\"\u003e133\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nUnknowable, the, \u003cA HREF=\"#P68\"\u003e68\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P81\"\u003e81\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nUniverse = M + x, \u003cA HREF=\"#P101\"\u003e101\u003c/A\u003e; its rationality, \u003cA HREF=\"#P125\"\u003e125\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P137\"\u003e137\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nUnseen world, \u003cA HREF=\"#P51\"\u003e51\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P54\"\u003e54\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P56\"\u003e56\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P61\"\u003e61\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nUtopias, \u003cA HREF=\"#P168\"\u003e168\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nVALUE, judgments of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P103\"\u003e103\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nVariations, in heredity, etc., \u003cA HREF=\"#P225\"\u003e225\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P249\"\u003e249\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nVaudois, \u003cA HREF=\"#P48\"\u003e48\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nVeddah, \u003cA HREF=\"#P258\"\u003e258\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nVerification of theories, \u003cA HREF=\"#P95\"\u003e95\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P105\"\u003e105-8\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nVivisection, \u003cA HREF=\"#P58\"\u003e58\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWALDENSES, \u003cA HREF=\"#P47\"\u003e47-9\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWallace, \u003cA HREF=\"#P239\"\u003e239\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P304\"\u003e304\u003c/A\u003e,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWhitman, \u003cA HREF=\"#P33\"\u003e33\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P64\"\u003e64\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P74\"\u003e74\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWordsworth, \u003cA HREF=\"#P60\"\u003e60\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWorld, its ambiguity, \u003cA HREF=\"#P76\"\u003e76\u003c/A\u003e; the invisible,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#P51\"\u003e51\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P54\"\u003e54\u003c/A\u003e, \u003cA HREF=\"#P56\"\u003e56\u003c/A\u003e; two orders of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P118\"\u003e118\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWorth, judgments of, \u003cA HREF=\"#P103\"\u003e103\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nWright, \u003cA HREF=\"#P52\"\u003e52\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nX., Miss, \u003cA HREF=\"#P314\"\u003e314\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nZOLA, \u003cA HREF=\"#P172\"\u003e172\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"index\"\u003e\r\nZöllner, \u003cA HREF=\"#P15\"\u003e15\u003c/A\u003e.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nBy the Same Author\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nTHE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n2 vols. 8vo. New York: Henry Holt \u0026 Co. London;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMacmillan \u0026 Co. 1890\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nPSYCHOLOGY: BRIEFER COURSE (TEXT BOOK).\u003cBR\u003e\r\n12mo. New York: Henry Holt \u0026 Co. London:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMacmillan \u0026 Co. 1892.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nTHE WILL TO BELIEVE, AND OTHER ESSAYS\u003cBR\u003e\r\nIN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n12mo. New York, London. Bombay and Calcutta:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLongmans, Green \u0026 Co. 1897.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nHUMAN IMMORTALITY: TWO SUPPOSED\u003cBR\u003e\r\nOBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n16mo. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1898.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nTALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY: AND\u003cBR\u003e\r\nTO STUDENTS ON SOME OF LIFE\u0027S IDEALS.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n12mo. New York: Henry Holt \u0026 Co. London,\u003cBR\u003e\r\nBombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green \u0026 Co. 1899.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nTHE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nA STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nGifford Lectures delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n8vo. New York, London, Bombay and Calcutta:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLongmans, Green \u0026 Co. 1902.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nPRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWAYS OF THINKING: POPULAR LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNew York, London, Bombay and Calcutta:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLongmans, Green \u0026 Co. 1907.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nA PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE: HIBBERT\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLECTURES AT MANCHESTER COLLEGE ON THE\u003cBR\u003e\r\nPRESENT SITUATION IN PHILOSOPHY.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNew York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta:\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLongmans, Green \u0026 Co. 1909.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nTHE MEANING OF TRUTH; A SEQUEL TO \"PRAGMATISM.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\nNew York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta;\u003cBR\u003e\r\nLongmans, Green \u0026 Co. 1909.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nTHE LITERARY REMAINS OF HENRY JAMES\u003cBR\u003e\r\nEdited, with an Introduction, by WILLIAM JAMES.\u003cBR\u003e\r\nWith Portrait. Crown 8vo. Boston: Houghton\u003cBR\u003e\r\nMifflin Co. 1885.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cHR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3\u003e\r\nTranscriber\u0027s notes:\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPage numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly\r\nbraces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page breaks occurred\r\nin the original book, in accordance with Project Gutenberg\u0027s FAQ-V-99.\r\nFor its Index, a page number has been placed only at the start of that\r\nsection. In the HTML version of this book, page numbers are placed in\r\nthe left margin.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFootnotes are indicated by numbers enclosed in square brackets, e.g.\r\n[2]. They have been renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of\r\ntheir respective chapters.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}